G.R. No.

100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO

OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN
DOES, respondents.

The City Attorney for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

VITUG, J.:

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again
placed into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and
preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further
hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos
Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City
Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to,
and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North
EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a
grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned
premises of North EDSA.1Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private
respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give
way to the "People's Park".2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque
Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against
the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be
addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the
private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint
was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order,
directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA
pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering
said petitioners to appear before the CHR.4

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990,
as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners
carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the
CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of
not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing
materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to
"desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a
citation for contempt and arrest."6

A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion
also averred, among other things, that:

1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the
Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors
agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in
Metro-Manila;

xxx xxx xxx

3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium

referred to therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of the structures of
poor dwellers;
 4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but
independent business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in
its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;

5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the

sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and

6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion
and authority whether or not a certain business establishment (should) be
allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel
a permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and
ordinance.8

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing
that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners
likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.

On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating
that the Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the
investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in
this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business."9

On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along
with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit
vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then
unresolved).10

In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for
carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to
desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.

On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and
supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:

Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate

had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who
complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights.
The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.13

The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create
only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be
(considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for
the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:

The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to

life and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon
by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of
women and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have
psychologically scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and
exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.

In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this recourse.

The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently
reinstated, however, in our resolution16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary
restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No.
90-1580."17

The petitioners pose the following:

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:

a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents
whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the
Mayor of Quezon City;

b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the
demolition.

In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing
his comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment,18 through
Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with
the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the
resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.

The petition has merit.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive
Order No. 163,20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It
succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights.21

The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to
—

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of
all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and
provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to

enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human

rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human
rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty

obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or

whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in

the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that
the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-
judicial body.23 This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v.
Commission on Human Rights,24 the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance
can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:

. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the

fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country,
or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of

adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy
may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject
to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of
this controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt
to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us
observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of
the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you
understand by "human rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of the society,
have given the following varied answers:

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his
humanity. They are the same in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines
or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or
Indonesia . . . .

Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and
property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom, and
the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the
right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political
associations and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an
education, employment, and social services.25

Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the
sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are
not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it.26

(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human.
They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.28

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those
that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus
seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an
individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights,
encompassing almost all aspects of life.

Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986
Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in
creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back
at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled
the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard.
Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others,
comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties,
who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the Philippines,"29 observes:

But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of
Rights most of the human rights expressed in the International Covenant,
these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21
September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the
thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and
held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until
ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right
to petition for the redress of grievances became useless, since group actions
were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were
subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence
and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were
required to submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the
acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared
by international bodies like Amnesty International and the International
Commission of Jurists.

Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the
following discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:

MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view
of the importance of human rights and also because civil and political rights
have been determined by many international covenants and human rights
legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill
of Rights and subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide
territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task,
hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.

So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the

commission can be most effective.

MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political

rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political
rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his political
right. So, where do we draw the line?

MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear
in the language of human rights advocates, as well as in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the
right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and
so on. These are very specific rights that are considered enshrined in many
international documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and
political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.

MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as
defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of

Civil and Political Rights distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and
economic rights, and there are other violations of rights of citizens which can
be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions,
and, therefore, in doing that the commission will be authorized to take under
its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the
jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the
government. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to
define the specific parameters which cover civil and political rights as
covered by the international standards governing the behavior of
governments regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens,
especially of political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect we have
experienced during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.

MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what
we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all
those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined
as human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?

MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution. They are integral parts of that.

MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under
the Bill of Rights covered by human rights?

MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I
would like to state that in the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation
of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a
matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food,
decent housing and a life consistent with human dignity.

So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political
rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.

MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points
raised by the previous speaker.

There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could
act effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of
prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of
disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes
committed against the religious.

xxx xxx xxx

The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.

I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we
should, in order to make the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as
much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the
concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was actually
disturbed this morning when the reference was made without qualification to
the rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although
later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained
therein.

If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after

mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or
linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other
convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of

Torture of 1985?

MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International

Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory.

MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the
other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified
in that other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering
whether it would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms
like "convention," rather than specify the rights contained in the convention.

As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the

Committee, before the period of amendments, could specify to us which of
these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political
rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional
article, but to give the sense of the Commission as to what human rights
would be included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises.
For example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner
Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or a
social right. It is not a civil right?

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil
and political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this provision —
freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair
and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings,
hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is limited to politically related
crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a specific group of
individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.

MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no
longer linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights
with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.

MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, I was referring to an international instrument.

MR. GUINGONA. I know.

MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every
specific article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and politically
related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
 MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction
between civil and social rights.

MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International

Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the
different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing,
shelter, et cetera.

MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the
committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified.

MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

xxx xxx xxx

SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human
rights, I cannot stress more on how much we need a Commission on Human
Rights. . . .

. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very
few lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones
more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very
delicate — torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest,
massacre — and the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power
like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human
Rights Commission must be independent.

I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission,
especially for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of help
and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political
violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we will have
no place to go again and we will not receive any response. . . .30 (emphasis
supplied)

The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a
provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on
complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights"
(Sec. 1).

The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —

(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in
wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the
organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of
property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or,
as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue
of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its
general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil
action.

Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious
persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.32

Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right
to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to
citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily
apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its
attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance,
mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of
prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of
disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the
religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect,
more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it
has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen
it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human
rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation."35

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private
respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than
that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial
notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to
be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been
violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that
as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances
obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of
the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the
Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational
guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance
with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its
revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to
impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided
for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to
apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential
to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be
exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly
withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the
instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an
adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority
vs. Commission on Human Rights,36 the Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina
Griño-Aquino, explained:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive

measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly
said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is
never derived by implication.

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the
Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of
preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf
of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR
itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction
may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending
[within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme
Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available
only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the
rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes
omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and
recommendations to any appropriate agency of government.37

The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial
aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant
petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to question the
disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative
agencies concerned to initially consider.

The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has
become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already
been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not
intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said
Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The
instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely
doing that.39

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human
Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from
implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore
issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

_________

G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education,

Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City
Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN,
ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA
REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the
Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the
Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or
modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or
official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case
and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law
within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial
and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same
subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?

The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as
substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action.
These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this
Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.

1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers,
among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and
Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted
actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's
attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions"
after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without
disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had
elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in
staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in
peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the
mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24
hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to
initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week,
with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands
of the MPSTA. 4

2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were
also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to
hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5

3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named

the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for
respondents, 6

suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court

of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when
their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the
Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made
at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout
signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a
Decision of Secretary Cariño dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the
evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents,
decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9)
months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cariño), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the
Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The

Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of

ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9

the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so

numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous
to be impleaded."

5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated
September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were
participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as
teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to
them. 10
6. Their complaints — and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) — were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the
Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance therein. 11

On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cariño) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and
Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal
notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants)

The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13reciting these facts and making the
sympathize." 12

following disposition:

To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its
investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers
are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly,
Secretary Isidro Cariño, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr.
Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon
Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the
Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any
and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the
Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on
the basis of complainants' evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariño sought and was granted
leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November
14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that
the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14

8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two
(2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:

a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cariño in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months
of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and

b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may
take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cariño to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges
against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17

9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cariño's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after

It held that the "striking teachers"

which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18

"were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance
to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political
rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its
"utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in
the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's
joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).

It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in
behalf of petitioner Cariño, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.

The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by
this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its
intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the
merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise
jurisdiction over the following general issues:

1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for
the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and

2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA
teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass
action or strike.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with
character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and
decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil
Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers
affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power
under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-
judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and
decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights
violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it
was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied
by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to
such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have. 22

The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.

Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the

The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23

Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the
Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the
Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as
Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of
violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the
power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules
of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant
immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is
not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to

The purpose of investigation, of course, is to

search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27

discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion
of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by
application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into
with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence;
a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe
as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2
Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection
of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to

And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon

a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30

as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of

controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle
or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the
merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do
so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by
the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve
on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or
otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to
discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of
relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them;
and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or
omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the
disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

and it appears that appeals have been

Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33

seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this
Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are
adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the
respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and
political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary
Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme
Court.

The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and
functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the
latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining
teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they
anticipated would be adverse to them.

This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cariño, it would have no
power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary

Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35
It cannot arrogate unto
itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and
Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC
Case No. 90-775) on the merits."

SO ORDERED.