Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-40411 August 7, 1935
DAVAO SAW MILL CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
APRONIANO G. CASTILLO and DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC.,
defendants-appellees.
Arsenio Suazo and Jose L. Palma Gil and Pablo Lorenzo and Delfin Joven for
appellant.
J.W. Ferrier for appellees.
MALCOLM, J.:
The issue in this case, as announced in the opening sentence of the decision in
the trial court and as set
forth by counsel for the parties on appeal, involves the determination of the
nature of the properties
described in the complaint. The trial judge found that those properties were
personal in nature, and as a
consequence absolved the defendants from the complaint, with costs against the
plaintiff.
The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the
Government of the
Philippine Islands. It has operated a sawmill in the sitio of Maa, barrio of Tigatu,
municipality of
Davao, Province of Davao. However, the land upon which the business was
conducted belonged to
another person. On the land the sawmill company erected a building which
housed the machinery used
by it. Some of the implements thus used were clearly personal property, the
conflict concerning
machines which were placed and mounted on foundations of cement. In the
contract of lease between
the sawmill company and the owner of the land there appeared the following
provision:
That on the expiration of the period agreed upon, all the improvements and
buildings introduced
and erected by the party of the second part shall pass to the exclusive ownership
of the party of
the first part without any obligation on its part to pay any amount for said
improvements and
buildings; also, in the event the party of the second part should leave or abandon
the land leased
before the time herein stipulated, the improvements and buildings shall likewise
pass to the
ownership of the party of the first part as though the time agreed upon had
expired: Provided,
however, That the machineries and accessories are not included in the
improvements which will
pass to the party of the first part on the expiration or abandonment of the land
leased.
In another action, wherein the Davao Light & Power Co., Inc., was the plaintiff
and the Davao, Saw,
Mill Co., Inc., was the defendant, a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff
in that action
against the defendant in that action; a writ of execution issued thereon, and the
properties now in
question were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. No third party claim was
filed for such
properties at the time of the sales thereof as is borne out by the record made by
the plaintiff herein.
Indeed the bidder, which was the plaintiff in that action, and the defendant herein
having consummated
the sale, proceeded to take possession of the machinery and other properties
described in the
corresponding certificates of sale executed in its favor by the sheriff of Davao.
As connecting up with the facts, it should further be explained that the Davao
Saw Mill Co., Inc., has
on a number of occasions treated the machinery as personal property by
executing chattel mortgages in
favor of third persons. One of such persons is the appellee by assignment from
the original mortgages.
Article 334, paragraphs 1 and 5, of the Civil Code, is in point. According to the
Code, real property
consists of —
1. Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil;
xxxxxxxxx
5. Machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner
of any
building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on
therein and
which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade of industry.
Appellant emphasizes the first paragraph, and appellees the last mentioned
paragraph. We entertain no
doubt that the trial judge and appellees are right in their appreciation of the legal
doctrines flowing
from the facts.
In the first place, it must again be pointed out that the appellant should have
registered its protest before
or at the time of the sale of this property. It must further be pointed out that while
not conclusive, the
characterization of the property as chattels by the appellant is indicative of
intention and impresses
upon the property the character determined by the parties. In this connection the
decision of this court
in the case of Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo ( [1923], 44 Phil., 630),
whether obiter dicta
or not, furnishes the key to such a situation.
It is, however not necessary to spend overly must time in the resolution of this
appeal on side issues. It
is machinery which is involved; moreover, machinery not intended by the owner
of any building or
land for use in connection therewith, but intended by a lessee for use in a
building erected on the land
by the latter to be returned to the lessee on the expiration or abandonment of the
lease.
A similar question arose in Puerto Rico, and on appeal being taken to the United
States Supreme Court,
it was held that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes
immobilized when placed in a
plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a
usufructuary, or any
person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of
the owner. In the
opinion written by Chief Justice White, whose knowledge of the Civil Law is well
known, it was in
part said:
To determine this question involves fixing the nature and character of the
property from the
point of view of the rights of Valdes and its nature and character from the point of
view of
Nevers & Callaghan as a judgment creditor of the Altagracia Company and the
rights derived by
them from the execution levied on the machinery placed by the corporation in the
plant.
Following the Code Napoleon, the Porto Rican Code treats as immovable (real)
property, not
only land and buildings, but also attributes immovability in some cases to
property of a movable
nature, that is, personal property, because of the destination to which it is
applied. "Things," says
section 334 of the Porto Rican Code, "may be immovable either by their own
nature or by their
destination or the object to which they are applicable." Numerous illustrations are
given in the
fifth subdivision of section 335, which is as follows: "Machinery, vessels,
instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenements for the industrial or works
that they may
carry on in any building or upon any land and which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said
industry or works." (See also Code Nap., articles 516, 518 et seq. to and
inclusive of article 534,
recapitulating the things which, though in themselves movable, may be
immobilized.) So far as
the subject-matter with which we are dealing — machinery placed in the plant —
it is plain,
both under the provisions of the Porto Rican Law and of the Code Napoleon, that
machinery
which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant
by the owner
of the property or plant. Such result would not be accomplished, therefore, by the
placing of
machinery in a plant by a tenant or a usufructuary or any person having only a
temporary right.
(Demolombe, Tit. 9, No. 203; Aubry et Rau, Tit. 2, p. 12, Section 164; Laurent,
Tit. 5, No. 447;
and decisions quoted in Fuzier-Herman ed. Code Napoleon under articles 522 et
seq.) The
distinction rests, as pointed out by Demolombe, upon the fact that one only
having a temporary
right to the possession or enjoyment of property is not presumed by the law to
have applied
movable property belonging to him so as to deprive him of it by causing it by an
act of
immobilization to become the property of another. It follows that abstractly
speaking the
machinery put by the Altagracia Company in the plant belonging to Sanchez did
not lose its
character of movable property and become immovable by destination. But in the
concrete
immobilization took place because of the express provisions of the lease under
which the
Altagracia held, since the lease in substance required the putting in of improved
machinery,
deprived the tenant of any right to charge against the lessor the cost such
machinery, and it was
expressly stipulated that the machinery so put in should become a part of the
plant belonging to
the owner without compensation to the lessee. Under such conditions the tenant
in putting in the
machinery was acting but as the agent of the owner in compliance with the
obligations resting
upon him, and the immobilization of the machinery which resulted arose in legal
effect from the
act of the owner in giving by contract a permanent destination to the machinery.
xxxxxxxxx
The machinery levied upon by Nevers & Callaghan, that is, that which was
placed in the plant
by the Altagracia Company, being, as regards Nevers & Callaghan, movable
property, it follows
that they had the right to levy on it under the execution upon the judgment in their
favor, and the
exercise of that right did not in a legal sense conflict with the claim of Valdes,
since as to him
the property was a part of the realty which, as the result of his obligations under
the lease, he
could not, for the purpose of collecting his debt, proceed separately against.
(Valdes vs. Central
Altagracia [192], 225 U.S., 58.)
Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment appealed from will be
affirmed, the costs of this
instance to be paid by the appellant.
Villa-Real, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.
[1982V226] MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. CENTRAL BOARD OF

ASSESSMENT APPEALS, BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF BATANGAS and

PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF BATANGAS, respondents.1982 May 31 2nd Division G.R. No. L-

47943

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the imposition of the realty tax on two oil storage tanks installed in 1969 by Manila

Electric Company on a lot in San Pascual, Batangas which it leased in 1968 from Caltex (Phil.), Inc.

The tanks are within the Caltex refinery compound. They have a total capacity of 566,000 barrels. They

are used for storing fuel oil for Meralco's power plants.

According to Meralco, the storage tanks are made of steel plates welded and assembled on the spot.

Their bottoms rest on a foundation consisting of compacted earth as the outermost layer, a sand pad as

the intermediate layer and a two-inch thick bituminous asphalt stratum as the top layer. The bottom of

each tank is in contact with the asphalt layer.

The steel sides of the tank are directly supported underneath by a circular wall made of concrete,

eighteen inches thick, to prevent the tank from sliding. Hence, according to Meralco, the tank is not

attached to its foundation. It is not anchored or welded to the concrete circular wall. Its bottom plate is

not attached to any part of the foundation by bolts, screws or similar devices. The tank merely sits on

its foundation. Each empty tank can be floated by flooding its dike-inclosed location with water four

feet deep. (pp. 29-30, Rollo.)

On the other hand, according to the hearing commissioners of the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, the area where the two tanks are located is enclosed with earthen dikes with electric steel

poles on top thereof and is divided into two parts as the site of each tank. The foundation of the tanks is

elevated from the remaining area. On both sides of the earthen dikes are two separate concrete steps

leading to the foundation of each tank.

Tank No. 2 is supported by a concrete foundation with an asphalt lining about an inch thick. Pipelines

were installed on the sides of each tank and are connected to the pipelines of the Manila Enterprises

Industrial Corporation whose buildings and pumping station are near Tank No. 2.

The Board concludes that while the tanks rest or sit on their foundation, the foundation itself and the

walls, dikes and steps, which are integral parts of the tanks, are affixed to the land while the pipelines

are attached to the tanks. (pp. 60-61, Rollo.)

In 1970, the municipal treasurer of Bauan, Batangas, on the basis of an assessment made by the

provincial assessor, required Meralco to pay realty taxes on the two tanks. For the five-year period

from 1970 to 1974, the tax and penalties amounted to P431,703.96 (p. 27, Rollo). The Board required

Meralco to pay the tax and penalties as a condition for entertaining its appeal from the adverse decision

of the Batangas board of assessment appeals.

The Central Board of Assessment Appeals (composed of Acting Secretary of Finance Pedro M.

Almanzor as chairman and Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos and Secretary of Local

Government and Community Development Jose Roño as members) in its decision dated November 5,

1976 ruled that the tanks together with the foundation, walls, dikes, steps, pipelines and other

appurtenances constitute taxable improvements. Meralco received a copy of that decision on February
28, 1977. On the fifteenth day, it filed a motion

for reconsideration which the Board denied in its resolution of November 25, 1977, a copy of which

was received by Meralco on February 28, 1978.

On March 15, 1978, Meralco filed this special civil action of certiorari to annul the Board's decision

and resolution. It contends that the Board acted without jurisdiction and committed a grave error of law

in holding that its storage tanks are taxable real property.

Meralco contends that the said oil storage tanks do not fall within any of the kinds of real property

enumerated in article 415 of the Civil Code and, therefore, they cannot be categorized as realty by

nature, by incorporation, by destination nor by analogy. Stress is laid on the fact that the tanks are not

attached to the land and that they were placed on leased land, not on the land owned by Meralco.

This is one of those highly controversial, borderline or penumbral cases on the classification of

property where strong divergent opinions are inevitable. The issue raised by Meralco has to be resolved

in the light of the provisions of the Assessment Law, Commonwealth Act No. 470, and the Real

Property Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 464 which took effect on June 1, 1974.

Section 2 of the Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is due "on real property, including land,

buildings, machinery, and other improvements" not specifically exempted in section 3 thereof. This

provision is reproduced with some modification in the Real Property Tax Code which provides:

"Sec. 38. Incidence of Real Property Tax. - They shall be levied, assessed and collected in all

provinces, cities and municipalities an annual ad valorem tax on real property, such as land, buildings,

machinery and other improvements affixed or attached to real property not hereinafter specifically

exempted."

The Code contains the following definition in its section 3:

"k) Improvements - is a valuable addition made to property or an amelioration in its condition,

amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement of waste, costing labor or capital and intended to

enhance its value, beauty or utility or to adapt it for new or further purposes."

We hold that while the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be

considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry.

It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles

for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its operations.

Oil storage tanks were held to be taxable realty in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey vs. Atlantic City, 15

Atl. 2nd 271.

For purposes of taxation, the term "real property" may include things which should generally be

regarded as personal property (84 C.J.S. 171, Note 8). It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed

as real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal

property (Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, 633). The case of Board of Assessment
Appeals vs. Manila Electric Company, 119 Phil. 328, wherein

Meralco's steel towers were held not to be subject to realty tax, is not in point because in that case the

steel towers were regarded as poles and under its franchise Meralco's poles are exempt from taxation.

Moreover, the steel towers were not attached to any land or building. They were removable from their

metal frames.

Nor is there any parallelism between this case and Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor, 116 Phil. 501,

where the tools and equipment in the repair, carpentry and blacksmith shops of a transportation

company were held not subject to realty tax because they were personal property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The Board's questioned decision and resolution are affirmed.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Chairman), Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Abad Santos, J., took no part.

\---!e-library! 6.0 Philippines Copyright © 2000 by Sony Valdez---/

([1982V226] MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. CENTRAL BOARD OF

ASSESSMENT APPEALS, BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF BATANGAS and

PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF BATANGAS, respondents., G.R. No. L-47943, 1982 May 31, 2nd

Division)
[1972V239] RAFAEL S. SALAS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; CONRADO F. ESTRELLA,

in his capacity as Governor of the Land Authority; and LORENZO GELLA, in his capacity as Register

of Deeds of Manila, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as P1972 Aug 30 1st

Division G.R. No. L-29788

DECISION

ESGUERRA, J:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, in

Civil Case No. 67946, dated September 23, 1968, the dispositive portion of which is as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment declaring Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional and

invalid in that it deprived the City of Manila of its property without due process and payment of just

compensation. Respondent Executive Secretary and Governor of the Land Authority are hereby

restrained and enjoined from implementing the provisions of said law. Respondent Register of Deeds

of the City of Manila is ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80876 which he had issued

in the name of the Land Tenure Administration and reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22547 in

the name of the City of Manila which he cancelled, if that is feasible, or issue a new certificate of title

for the same parcel of land in the name of the City of Manila." 1

The facts necessary for a clear understanding of this case are as follows:

On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a land

registration court, rendered judgment in Case No. 18, G.L.R.O. Record No. 111, declaring the City of

Manila the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1, Block 557 of the Cadastral
Survey of the City of Manila, containing an area of 9,689.8 square meters, more or less. Pursuant to

said judgment the Register of Deeds of Manila on August 21, 1920, issued in favor of the City of

Manila, Original Certificate of Title No. 4329 covering the aforementioned parcel of land. On various

dates in 1924, the City of Manila sold portions of the aforementioned parcel of land in favor of Pura

Villanueva. As a consequence of the transactions Original Certificate of Title No. 4329 was cancelled

and transfer certificates of title were issued in favor of Pura Villanueva for the portions purchased by

her. When the last sale to Pura Villanueva was effected on August 22, 1924, Transfer Certificate of

Title No. 21974 in the name of the City of Manila was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate

of Title (T.C.T.) No. 22547 covering the residue thereof known as Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557, with an

area of 7,490.10 square meters, was issued in the name of the City of Manila.

On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila, presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio J.

Villegas, adopted a resolution requesting His Excellency, the President of the Philippines to consider

the feasibility of declaring the City property bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska Streets,

under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and 22547, containing a total area of 7,450 square

meters as a patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the

actual occupants thereof. 2

The said resolution of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila was officially transmitted to the

President of the Philippines by then Vice-Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on September 21, 1960, with the

information that the same resolution was, on the same date, transmitted to the Senate and House of

Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines. 3

During the First Session of the Fifth Congress of the Philippines, House Bill No. 191 was filed in the

House of Representatives by then Congressman Bartolome Cabangbang seeking to declare the property
in question as patrimonial property of the City of Manila, and for other purposes. The explanatory note

of the Bill gave the grounds for its enactment, to wit:

"In the particular case of the property subject of this bill, the City of Manila does not seem to have use

thereof as a public communal property. As a matter of fact, a resolution was adopted by the Municipal
Board of Manila at its regular session held on September 21, 1960, to request the feasibility of

declaring the city property bounded by Florida, San Andres and Nebraska Streets as a patrimonial

property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof.

Therefore, it will be to the best interest of society that the said property be used in one way or another.

Since this property has been occupied for a long time by the present occupants thereof and since said

occupants have expressed their willingness to buy the said property, it is but proper that the same be

sold to them." 4

Subsequently, a revised version of the Bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by

Congressmen Manuel Cases, Antonio Raquiza and Nicanor Yñiguez as House Bill No. 1453, with the

following explanatory note:

"The accompanying bill seeks to convert one (1) parcel of land in the district of Malate, which is

reserved as communal property into a disposable or alienable property of the State and to provide its

subdivision and sale to bona fide occupants or tenants.

"This parcel of land in question was originally an aggregate part of a piece of land with an area of

9,689.8 square meters, more or less. . . . On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila in its

regular session unanimously adopted a resolution requesting the President of the Philippines and

Congress of the Philippines the feasibility of declaring this property into disposable or alienable

property of the State. There is therefore a precedent that this parcel of land could be subdivided and

sold to bona fide occupants. This parcel of land will not serve any useful public project because it is

bounded on all sides by private properties which were formerly parts of this lot in question.

"Approval of this bill will implement the policy of the Administration of land for the landless and the

Fifth Declaration of Principles of the Constitution, which states that the promotion of Social Justice to

insure the well-being and economic security of all people should be the concern of the State. We are

ready and willing to enact legislation promoting the social and economic well-being of the people

whenever an opportunity for enacting such kind of legislation arises.

In view of the foregoing consideration and to insure fairness and justice to the present bona fide

occupants thereof, approval of this Bill is strongly urged." 5

The Bill having been passed by the House of Representatives, the same was thereafter sent to the

Senate where it was thoroughly discussed, as evidenced by the Congressional Records for May 20,

1964, pertinent portion of which is as follows:

"SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr. President, it will be recalled that when the late Mayor Lacson was

still alive, we approved a similar bill. But afterwards, the late Mayor Lacson came here and protested

against the approval, and the approval was reconsidered. May I know whether the defect in the bill

which we approved, has already been eliminated in this present bill?

"SENATOR TOLENTINO: I understand Mr. President, that has already been eliminated, and that is

why the City of Manila has no mole objection to this bill. "SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr. President, in view
of that manifestation and considering that Mayor

Villegas and Congressman Albert of the Fourth District of Manila are in favor of the bill. I would not

want to pretend to know more what is good for the City of Manila.

"SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there being no objection, I move that we approve this bill

on second reading.

"PRESIDENT PRO-TEMPORE: The bill is approved on second reading after several Senators said aye

and nobody said nay."

The bill was passed by the Senate, approved by the President on June 20, 1964, and became Republic

Act No. 4118. It reads as follows:

Lot 1-B-2-B op Block 557 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila, situated in the District of

Malate. City of Manila, which is reserved as communal property, is hereby converted into disposal or

alienable land of the State, to be placed under the disposal of the Land Tenure Administration. The

Land Tenure Administration shall subdivide the property into small lots, none of which shall exceed

one hundred and twenty square meters in area and sell the same on installment basis to the tenants or

bona fide occupants thereof and to individuals, in the order mentioned: Provided, That no down
payment shall be required of tenants or bona fide occupants who cannot afford to pay such down

payment: Provided, further, That no person can purchase more than one lot: Provided, furthermore,

That if the tenant or bona fide occupant of any given lot is not able to purchase the same, he shall be

given a lease from month to month until such time that he is able to purchase the lot: Provided, still

further, That in the event of lease the rentals which may be charged shall not exceed eight per cent per

annum of the assessed value of the property leased: And provided, finally, That in fixing the price of

each lot, which shall not exceed twenty pesos per square meter, the cost of subdivision and survey shall

not be included.

"Sec. 2. Upon approval of this Act no ejectment proceedings against any tenant or bona fide occupant

of the above lots shall be instituted and any ejectment proceedings pending in court against any such

tenant or bona fide occupant shall be dismissed upon motion of the defendant: Provided, That any

demolition order directed against any tenant or bona fide occupant shall be lifted.

"Sec. 3. Upon approval of this Act, if the tenant or bona fide occupant is in arrears in the payment of

any rentals, the amount legally due shall be liquidated and shall be payable in twenty-four equal

monthly installments from the date of liquidation.

"Sec. 4. No property acquired by virtue of this Act shall be transferred, sold, mortgaged, or otherwise

disposed of within a period of five years from the date full ownership thereof has been vested in the

purchaser without the consent of the Land Tenure Administration.

"Sec. 5. In the event of the death of the purchaser prior to the complete payment of the price of the lot

purchased by him, his widow and children shall succeed in all his rights and obligations with respect to

his lot.

"Sec. 6. The Chairman of the Land Tenure Administration shall implement and issue such rules and

regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. "Sec. 7. The sum of one hundred
fifty thousand pesos is appropriated out of any funds in the National

Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act.

"Sec. 8. All laws or parts of laws inconsistent with this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
"Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved, June 20, 1964."

To implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118, and pursuant to the request of the occupants of

the property involved, then Deputy Governor Jose V. Yap of the Land Authority (which succeeded the

Land Tenure Administration) addressed a letter, dated February 18, 1965, to Mayor Antonio Villegas,

furnishing him with a copy of the proposed subdivision plan of said lot as prepared for the Republic of

the Philippines for resale of the subdivision lots by the Land Authority to bona fide applicants. 6

On March 2, 1965, the City Mayor of Manila, through his Executive and Technical Adviser,

acknowledged receipt of the proposed subdivision plan of the property in question and informed the

Land Authority that his office would interpose no objection to the implementation of said law,

provided that its provisions be strictly complied with. 7

With the above-mentioned written conformity of the City of Manila for the implementation of Republic

Act No. 4118, the Laud Authority, thru then Deputy Governor Jose V. Yap, requested the City

Treasurer of Manila, thru the City Mayor, for the surrender and delivery to the former of the owner's

duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22547 in order to obtain title thereto in the name of the

Land Authority. The request was duly granted with the knowledge and consent of the Office of the City

Mayor. 8

With the presentation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22547, which had been yielded as above

stated by the City authorities to the Land Authority, Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T. No. 22547)

was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Manila and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No.

80876 was issued in the name of the Land Tenure Administration (now Land Authority) pursuant to the

provisions of Republic Act No. 4118. 9

But due to reasons which do not appear in the record, the City of Manila made a complete turn-about,

for on December 20, 1966, Antonio J. Villegas, in his capacity as the City Mayor of Manila and the

City of Manila as a duly organized public corporation, brought an action for injunction and/or
prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the herein appellants,

particularly the Governor of the Land Authority and the Register of Deeds of Manila, from further

implementing Republic Act No. 4118, and praying for the declaration of Republic Act No. 4118 as

unconstitutional.

With the foregoing antecedent facts, which are all contained in the partial stipulation of facts submitted

to the trial court and approved by respondent Judge, the parties waived the presentation of further

evidence and submitted the case for decision. On September 23, 1968, judgment was rendered by the

trial court declaring Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that it deprived

the City of Manila of its property without due process of law and payment of just compensation. The

respondents were ordered to undo all that had been done to carry out the provisions of said Act and

were restrained from further implementing the same.Two issues are presented for determination, on
the resolution of which the decision in this case hinges,

to wit:

I. Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila?

II. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the Constitution?

As regards the first issue, appellants maintain that the land involved is a communal land or "legua

comunal" which is a portion of the public domain owned by the State; that it came into existence as

such when the City of Manila, or any pueblo or town in the Philippines for that matter, was founded

under the laws of Spain, the former sovereign; that upon the establishment of a pueblo, the

administrative authority was required to allot and set aside portions of the public domain for a public

plaza, a church site, a site for public buildings, lands to serve as common pastures and for streets and

roads; that in assigning these lands some lots were earmarked for strictly public purposes, and

ownership of these lots (for public purposes) immediately passed to the new municipality; that in the

case of common lands or "legua comunal", there was no such immediate acquisition of ownership by

the pueblo, and the land though administered thereby, did not automatically become its property in the
absence of an express grant from the Central Government, and that the reason for this arrangement is

that this class of land was not absolutely needed for the discharge of the municipality's governmental

functions.

It is argued that the parcel of land involved herein has not been used by the City of Manila for any

public purpose and had not been officially earmarked as a site for the erection of some public

buildings; that this circumstance confirms the fact that it was originally "communal" land alloted to the

City of Manila by the Central Government not because it was needed in connection with its

organization as a municipality but simply for the common use of its inhabitants; that the present City of

Manila as successor of the Ayuntamiento de Manila under the former Spanish sovereign merely enjoys

the usufruct over said land, and its exercise of acts of ownership by selling parts thereof did not

necessarily convert the land into a patrimonial property of the City of Manila nor divest the State of its

paramount title.

Appellants further argue that a municipal corporation, like a city is a governmental agent of the State

with authority to govern a limited portion of its territory or to administer purely local affairs in a given

political subdivision, and the extent of its authority is strictly delimited by the grant of power conferred

by the State; that Congress has the exclusive power to create, change or destroy municipal

corporations; that even if We admit that legislative control over municipal corporations is not absolute

and even if it is true that the City of Manila has a registered title over the property in question, the mere

transfer of such land by an act of the legislature from one class of public land to another, without

compensation, does not invade the vested rights of the City.

Appellants finally argue that Republic Act No. 4118 has treated the land involved as one reserved for

communal use, and this classification is conclusive upon the courts; that if the City of Manila feels that

this is wrong and its interests have been thereby prejudiced, the matter should be brought to the

attention of Congress for correction; and that since Congress, in the exercise of its wide discretionary

powers has seen fit to classify the land in question as communal, the Courts certainly owe it to
coordinate branch of the Government to respect such determination and should not interfere with the

enforcement of the law. Upon the other hand, appellees argue by simply quoting portions of the
appealed decision of the trial

court, which read thus:

"The respondents (petitioners-appellants herein) contend, among other defenses, that the property in

question is communal property. This contention is, however, disproved by Original Certificate of Title

No. 4329 issued on August 21, 1920 in favor of the City of Manila after the land in question was

registered in the City's favor. The Torrens Title expressly states that the City of Manila was the owner

in 'fee simple' of the said land. Under Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act, as amended, the decree of

confirmation and registration in favor of the City of Manila . . . shall be conclusive upon and against all

persons including the Insular Government and all the branches there . . . is nothing in the said

certificate of title indicating that the land was 'communal' land as contended by the respondents. The

erroneous assumption by the Municipal Board of Manila that the land in question was communal land

did not make it so. The Municipal Board had no authority to do that.

"The respondents, however, contend that Congress had the power and authority to declare that the
land

in question was 'communal' land and the courts have no power or authority to make a contrary finding.

This contention is not entirely correct or accurate. Congress has the power to classify 'land of the public

domain', transfer them from one classification to another and declare them disposable or not. Such

power does not, however, extend to properties which are owned by cities, provinces and municipalities

in their 'patrimonial' capacity.

"Art. 324 of the Civil Code provides that properties of provinces, cities and municipalities are divided

into properties for public use and patrimonial property Art. 424 of the same code provides that

properties for public use consist of provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,

fountains, public waters, promenades and public works for public service paid for by said province,

cities or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial. Tested by this
criterion the Court finds and holds that the land in question is patrimonial property of the City of

Manila.

"Respondents contend that Congress has declared the land in question to be 'communal' and, therefore,

such designation is conclusive upon the courts. The Courts holds otherwise. When a statute is assailed

as unconstitutional the Courts have the power and authority to inquire into the question and pass upon

it. This has long ago been settled in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60, when the United States Supreme

Court speaking thru Chief Justice Marshall held:

'. . . If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its

validity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give effect? It is emphatically the province and duty of the

judicial department to say what the law is . . . So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the

law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case

conformable to the constitution, disregarding the law, the court must determine which of these

conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of unconstitutional judicial duty.'"

Appellees finally concluded that when the courts declare a law unconstitutional it does not mean that

the judicial power is superior to the legislative power. It simply means that the power of the people is

superior to both and that when the will of the legislature, declared in statutes, stands in opposition to

that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the Constitution

rather than by the statutes. There is one outstanding factor that should be borne in mind in resolving
the character of the land

involved, and it is that the City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee

simple, has not shown by any shred of evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its private or

patrimonial property. It is true that the City of Manila as well as its predecessor, the Ayuntamiento de

Manila, could validly acquire property in its corporate or private capacity, following the accepted

doctrine on the dual character public and private of a municipal corporation. And when it acquires

property in its private capacity, it acts like an ordinary person capable of entering into contracts or

making transactions for the transmission of title or other real rights. When it comes to acquisition of
land, it must have done so under any of the modes established by law for the acquisition of ownership

and other real rights. In the absence of a title deed to any land claimed by the City of Manila as its own,

showing that it was acquired with its private or corporate funds, the presumption is that such land came

from the State upon the creation of the municipality (Unson vs. Lacson, et al., 100 Phil. 695).

Originally the municipality owned no patrimonial property except those that were granted by the State

not for its public but for private use. Other properties it owns are acquired in the course of the exercise

of its corporate powers as a juridical entity to which category a municipal corporation pertains.

Communal lands or "legua comunal" came into existence when a town or pueblo was established in

this country under the laws of Spain (Law VII, Title III, Book VI, Recopilacion de las Leyes de

Indios). The municipalities of the Philippines were not entitled, as a matter of right, to any part of the

public domain for use as communal lands. The Spanish law provided that the usufruct of a portion of

the public domain adjoining municipal territory might be granted by the Government for communal

purposes, upon proper petition, but, until granted, no rights therein passed to the municipalities, and, in

any event, the ultimate title remained in the sovereign (City of Manila vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil.

327).

"For the establishment, then, of new pueblos the administrative authority of the province, in

representation of the Governor General, designated the territory for their location and extension and
the

metes and bounds of the same; and before alloting the lands among the new settlers, a special

demarcation was made of the places which were to serve as the public square of the pueblo, for the

erection of the church, and as cites for the public buildings, among others, the municipal building or the

case real, as well as of the lands which were to constitute the common pastures, and propios of the

municipality and the streets and roads which were to intersect the new town were laid out, . . ."

(Municipality of Catbalogan vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 216, 220)

It may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule that regardless of the source or classification of land in

the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate
capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for

governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to the paramount power of the

legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance

of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for

purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds

the property and puts it to a different use (2 Mc Quilin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., p. 197, citing

Monagham vs. Armatage, 218 Minn. 27, 15 N.W. 2nd 241).

True it is that the legislative control over a municipal corporation is not absolute even when it comes to

its property devoted to public use, for such control must not be exercised to the extent of depriving

persons of their property or lights without due process of law, or in a manner impairing the obligations

of contracts. Nevertheless, when it comes to property of the municipality which it did not acquire in its

private or corporate capacity with its own funds, the legislature can transfer its administration and

disposition to an agency of the National Government to be disposed of according to its discretion. Here

it did so in obedience to the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice to insure the well-being

and economic security of the people. It has been held that a statute authorizing the transfer of a
Municipal airport to an Airport Commission

created by the legislature, even without compensation to the city, was not violative of the due process

clause of the American Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court of Minnessota in Monagham vs.

Armatage, supra, said:

". . . The case is controlled by the further rule that the legislature, having plenary control of the local

municipality, of its creation and of all its affairs, has the right to authorize or direct the expenditures of

money in its treasury, though raised, for a particular purpose, for any legitimate municipal purpose, or

to order and direct a distribution thereof upon a division of the territory into separate municipalities . . .

The local municipality has no such vested right in or to its public funds, like that which the

Constitution protects in the individual as precludes legislative interferences. People vs. Power, 25 Ill.

187; State Board (of Education) vs. City, 56 Miss. 518. As remarked by the supreme court of Maryland
in Mayor vs. Sehner, 37 Md. 180: 'It is of the essence of such a corporation, that the government has

the sole right as trustee of the public interest, at its own good will and pleasure, to inspect, regulate,

control, and direct the corporation, its funds, and franchises.'

"We therefore hold that c.500, in authorizing the transfer of the use and possession of the municipal

airport to the commission without compensation to the city or to the park board, does not violate the

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."

The Congress has dealt with the land involved as one reserved for communal use (terreno comunal).

The act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power and it

should not be interfered with by the courts.

This brings Us to the second question as regards the validity of Republic Act No. 4118, viewed in the

light of Article III, Sections 1, subsection (1) and (2) of the Constitution which ordain that no person

shall be deprived of his property without due process of law and that no private property shall be taken

for public use without just compensation.

II

The trial court declared Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional for allegedly depriving the City of

Manila of its property without due process of law and without payment of just compensation. It is now

well established that the presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of a law (U. S. vs. Ten

Yu, 24 Phil, 1; Go Ching, et al. vs. Dinglasan, et al., 45 O.G. No. 2, pp. 703, 705). To declare a law

unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, for even

if a law is aimed at the attainment of some public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is

allowed. To strike down a law there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns

or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done (Morfe vs. Mutuc, et al., G.R. No. L-20387, Jan. 31, 1968;

22 SCRA 424). That situation does not obtain in this case as the law assailed does not in any manner

trench upon the constitution as will hereafter be shown.

Republic Act No. 4118 was intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the
Government program of "Land for the Landless". The explanatory note of House Bill No. 1453 which

became Republic Act No. 4118, reads in part as follows:

"Approval of this bill will implement the policy of the administration of 'land for the landless' and the

Fifth Declaration of Principles of the Constitution which states that 'the promotion of social justice to

insure the well-being and economic security of all people should be the concern of the State.' We are

ready and willing to enact legislation promoting the social and economic well-being of the people

whenever an opportunity for enacting such kind of legislation arises.'" The respondent Court held that
Republic Act No. 4118, "by converting the land in question which is

the patrimonial property of the City of Manila into disposable alienable land of the State and placing it

under the disposal of the Land Tenure Administration violates the provisions of Article III (Secs. 1 and

2) of the Constitution which ordain that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just

compensation, and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of

law". In support thereof reliance is placed on the ruling in Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of

Zamboanga, G.R. No. 2440, March 28, 1968; 22 SCRA 1334, which holds that Congress cannot

deprive a municipality of its private or patrimonial property without due process of law and without

payment of just compensation since it has no absolute control thereof. There is no quarrel over this rule

if it is undisputed that the property sought to be taken is in reality a private or patrimonial property of

the municipality or city. But it would be simply begging the question to classify the land in question as

such. The property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own

funds in its private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its name a registered time is not questioned,

but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of

the territory of the City of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation. That the National

Government, through the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, in the cadastral

proceedings did not contest the claim of the City of Manila that the land is its property does not detract

from its character as State property and in no way divests the legislature of its power to deal with it as

such, the state not being bound by the mistakes and/or negligence of its officers.
One decisive fact that should be noted is that the City of Manila expressly recognized the paramount

title of the State over said land when by its resolution of September 20, 1960, the Municipal Board,

presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio Villegas, requested "His Excellency the President of the

Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the city property bounded by Florida, San Andres

and Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and 25547, containing an area of

7,450 square meters, as patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these

lots to the actual occupants thereof ." (See Annex E, Partial Stipulation of Facts, Civil Case No. 67945,

CFI, Manila, p. 121, Record of the Case)

The alleged patrimonial character of the land under the ownership of the City of Manila is totally belied

by the City's own official act, which is fatal to its claim since the Congress did not do as bidden. If it

were its patrimonial property why should the City of Manila be requesting the President to make

representation to the legislature to declare it as such so it can be disposed of in favor of the actual

occupants? There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land belongs to the State

and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes. But since the City did

not actually use said land for any recognized public purpose and allowed it to remain idle and

unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by squatters, no presumption of State grant of

ownership in favor of the City of Manila may be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own

private or patrimonial property (Municipality of Tigbauan vs. Director of Lands, 35 Phil. 798; City of

Manila vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 327; Municipality of Luzuriaga vs. Director of Lands, 24 Phil.

193). The conclusion of the respondent court that Republic Act No. 4118 converted a patrimonial

property of the City of Manila into a parcel of disposable land of the State and took it away from the

City without compensation is, therefore, unfounded. In the last analysis the land in question pertains to

the State and the City of Manila merely acted as trustee for the benefit of the people therein for whom

the State can legislate in the exercise of its legitimate powers.

Republic Act No. 4118 was never intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm
its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National

Government: And this was done at the instance or upon the request of the City of Manila itself. The

subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by

Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain without

just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution, but simply as

a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property. It should be emphasized that the law
assailed was enacted upon formal written petition of the

Municipal Board of Manila in the form of a legally approved resolution. The certificate of title over the

property in the name of the City of Manila was accordingly cancelled and another issued to the Land

Tenure Administration after the voluntary surrender of the City's duplicate certificate of title by the

City Treasurer with the knowledge and consent of the City Mayor. To implement the provisions of

Republic Act No. 4118, the then Deputy Governor of the Land Authority sent a letter, dated February

18, 1965, to the City Mayor furnishing him with a copy of the "proposed subdivision plan of the said

lot as prepared for the Republic of the Philippines for subdivision and resale by the Land Authority to

bona fide applicants." On March 2, 1965, the Mayor of Manila, through his Executive and Technical

Adviser, acknowledged receipt of the subdivision plan and informed the Land Authority that his Office

"will interpose no objection to the implementation of said law provided that its provisions are strictly

complied with." The foregoing sequence of events, clearly indicate a pattern of regularity and

observance of due process in the reversion of the property to the National Government. All such acts

were done in recognition by the City of Manila of the right and power of the Congress to dispose of the

land involved.

Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it owns, either under the due process

clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. If it failed to get from the Congress

the concession it sought of having the land involved given to it as its patrimonial property, the Courts

possess no power to grant that relief. Republic Act No. 4118 does not, therefore, suffer from any

constitutional infirmity.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and petitioners shall proceed with the free and

untrammeled implementation of Republic Act No. 4118 without any obstacle from the respondents.

Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Antonio, JJ., concur.

Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., did not take part.

[1926V63E] VIUDA DE TAN TOCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE MUNICIPAL

COUNCIL OF
ILOILO, defendant-appellee.1926 Mar 25 En Banc1.R. No. 24950
DECISION
VILLAMOR, J.:
It appears from the record that the widow of Tan Toco had sued the municipal
council of Iloilo for the
amount of P42,966.40, being the purchase price of two strips of land, one on
Calle J. M. Basa
consisting of 592 square meters, and the other on Calle Aldiguer consisting of 59
square meters, which
the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening said street. The Court of
First Instance of Iloilo
sentenced the said municipality to pay the plaintiff the amount so claimed, plus
the interest, and the
said judgment was on appeal affirmed by this court.
On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable to pay the said
judgment, wherefore
plaintiff had a writ of execution issue against the property of the said municipality,
by virtue of which
the sheriff attached two auto trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol
automobile, the police
stations on Mabini street, and in Molo and Mandurriao and the concrete
structures, with the
corresponding lots, used as markets by Iloilo, Molo, and Mandurriao.
After notice of the sale of said property had been made, and a few days before
the sale, the provincial
fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion with the Court of First Instance praying that the
attachment on the said
property be dissolved, that the said attachment be declared null and void as
being illegal and violative
of the rights of the defendant municipality.
Plaintiff's counsel objected to the fiscal's motion but the court, by order of August
12, 1925, declared
the attachment levied upon the aforementioned property of the defendant
municipality null and void,
thereby dissolving the said attachment.
From this order the plaintiff has appealed by bill of exceptions. The fundamental
question raised by
appellant in her four assignments of error is whether or not the property levied
upon is exempt from
execution.
The municipal law, section 2165 of the Administrative Code, provides that:
"Municipalities are political bodies corporate, and as such are endowed with the
faculties of municipal
corporations, to be exercised by and through their respective municipal
government in conformity with
law.
"It shall be competent for them, in their proper corporate name, to sue and be
sued, to contract and be
contracted with, to acquire and hold real and personal property for municipal
purposes, and generally to
exercise the powers hereinafter specified or otherwise conferred upon them by
law."
For the purposes of the matter here in question, the Administrative Code does
not specify the kind of
property that a municipality may acquire. However, article 343 of the Civil Code
divides the property
of provinces and (municipalities) into property for public use and patrimonial
property. According to
article 344 of the Code, provincial roads and foot-path, squares, streets,
fountains, and public waters,
drives and public improvements of general benefit built at the expense of the said
towns or provinces,
are property for public use.
All other property possessed by the said towns and provinces is patrimonial and
shall be subject to the
provision of the Civil Code except as provided by special laws.
Commenting upon article 344, Mr. Manresa says that "In accordance with
administrative legislation"
(Spanish) we must distinguish, as to the patrimonial property of the towns,
"between that of common
benefit and that which is private property of the town. The first differs from
property for public use in
that generally its enjoyment is less, as it is limited to neighbors or to a group or
class thereof; and
furthermore, such use, more or less general, is not intrinsic with this kind of
property, for by its very
nature it may be enjoyed as though it were private property. The third group, that
is, private property, is
used in the name of the town or province by the entities representing it and, like
any private property,
giving a source of revenue."
Such distinction, however, is of little practical importance in this jurisdiction in
view of the different
principles underlying the functions of a municipality under the American rule.
Notwithstanding this,
we believe that the principle governing property of the public domain of the State
is applicable to
property for public use of the municipalities as said municipal property is similar
in character. The
principle is that the property for public use of the State is not within the
commerce of man and,
consequently, is unalienable and not subject to prescription. Likewise, property
for public use of the
municipality is not within the commerce of man so long as it is used by the public
and, consequently,
said property is also inalienable.
The American Law is more explicit about this matter as expounded by McQuillin
in Municipal
Corporations, volume 3, paragraph 1160, where he says that:
"State statutes often provide that court houses, jails other buildings owned by
municipalities and the
lots on which they stand shall be exempt from attachment and execution. But
independent of express
statutory exemption, as a general proposition, property, real and personal, held
by municipal
corporations, in trust for the benefit of their inhabitants, and used for public
purposes, is exempt.
"For example, public buildings, school houses, streets, squares, parks, wharves,
engines and engine
houses, and the like, are not subject to execution. So city waterworks, and a
stock of liquors carried in a
town dispensary, are exempt. The reason for the exemption is obvious. Municipal
corporations are
created for public purposes and for the good of the citizens in their aggregate or
public capacity. That
they may properly discharge such public functions corporate property and
revenues are essential, and to
deny them these means the very purpose of their creation would be materially
impeded, and in some
instances practically destroy it. Respecting this subject the Supreme Court of
Louisiana remarked: 'On
the first view of this question there is something very repugnant to the moral
sense in the idea that a
municipal corporation should contract debts, and that having no resources but
the taxes which are due
to it these should not be subjected by legal process to the satisfaction of its
creditors. This
consideration, deduced from the principles of moral equity has only given way to
the more enlarged
contemplation of the great and paramount interests of public order and the
principles of government.'
"It is generally held that property owned by a municipality, where not used for a
public purpose but for
quasi private purposes, is subject to execution on a judgment against the
municipality, and may be sold.
This rule applies to shares of stock owned by a municipal corporation and the
like. But the mere fact
that corporate property held for public uses is being temporarily used for private
purposes does not
make it subject to execution.
"If municipal property exempt from execution is destroyed, the insurance money
stands in lieu thereof
and is also exempt.
"The members or inhabitants of a municipal corporation proper are not personally
liable for the debts
of the municipality, except that in the New England States the individual liability
of the inhabitant is
generally maintained."
In Corpus Juris, vol. 23, page 355, the following is found:
"Where property of a municipal or other public corporation is sought to be
subjected to execution to
satisfy judgments recovered against such corporation, the question as to whether
such property is
leviable or not is to be determined by the usage and purposes for which it is held.
The rule is that
property held for public uses, such as public buildings, streets, squares, parks,
promenades, wharves
landing places, fire engines, hose and hose carriages. engine houses, public
markets, hospitals,
cemeteries, and generally everything held for governmental purposes, is not
subject to levy and sale
under execution against such corporation. The rule also applies to funds in the
hands of a public officer.
Likewise it has been held that taxes due to a municipal corporation or county
cannot be seized under
execution by a creditor of such corporation. But where a municipal corporation or
county owns in its
proprietary, as distinguished from its public or governmental capacity, property
not useful or used for a
public purpose but for quasi private purposes, the general rule is that such
property may be seized and
sold under execution against the corporation, precisely as similar property of
individuals is seized and
sold. But property held for public purposes is not subject to execution merely
because it is temporarily
used for private purposes, although if the public use is wholly abandoned it
becomes subject to
execution. Whether or not property held as public property is necessary for the
public use is a political,
rather than a judicial question."
In the case of City of New Orleans vs. Louisiana Construction Co., Ltd. (140 U.
S., 654; 35 Law. ed.,
556), it was held that a wharf for unloading sugar and molasses, open to the
public, was property for
the public use of the City of New Orleans and was not subject to attachment for
the payment of the
debts of the said city.
In that case it was proven that the said wharf was a parcel of land adjacent to the
Mississippi River
where all shipments of sugar and molasses taken to New Orleans were
unloaded.
That city leased the said wharf to the Louisiana Construction Company, Ltd., in
order that it might
erect warehouses so that the merchandise upon discharge might not be spoiled
by the elements. The
said company was given the privilege of charging certain fees for storing
merchandise in the said
warehouses and the public in general had the right to unload sugar and
molasses there by paying the
required fees, 10 per cent of which was turned over to the city treasury.
The United States Supreme Court on an appeal held that the wharf was public
property, that it never
ceased to be such in order to become private property of the City; wherefore the
company could not
levy execution upon the wharf in order to collect the amount of the judgment
rendered in favor thereof.
In the case of Klein vs. City of New Orleans (98 U S., 149; 25 Law. ed., 430), the
Supreme Court of
the United States held that a public wharf on the banks of the Mississippi River
was public property
and not subject to execution for the payment of a debt of the City of New Orleans
where said wharf
was located.
In this case a parcel of land adjacent to the Mississippi River, which formerly was
the shore of the river
and which later enlarged itself by accession, was converted into wharf by the city
for public use, who
charged a certain fee for its use.
It was held that land was public property as necessary as a public street and was
not subject to
execution on account of the debts of the city. It was further held that the fees
collected were also
exempt from execution because they were a part of the income of the city.
In the case of Tufexis vs. Olaguera and Municipal Council of Guinobatan (32
Phil., 654), the question
raised was whether for the payment of a debt to a third person by the
concessionaire of a public market,
the said public market could be attached and sold at public auction. The
Supreme Court held that:
"Even though a creditor is unquestionably entitled to recover out of his debtor's
property, yet when
among such property there is included the special right granted by the
Government of usufruct in a
building intended for a public service, and when this privilege is closely related to
a service of a public
character, such right of the creditor to the collection of a debt owed him by the
debtor who enjoys the
said special privilege of usufruct in a public market is not absolute and may be
exercised only through
the action of a court of justice with respect to the profits or revenue obtained
under the special right of
usufruct enjoyed by debtor.
"The special concession of the right to usufruct in a public market cannot be
attached like any ordinary
right, because that would be to permit a person who has contracted with the state
or with the
administrative officials thereof to conduct and manage a service of a public
character, to be substituted,
without the knowledge and consent of the administrative authorities, by one who
took no part in the
contract, thus giving rise to the possibility of the regular course of a public service
being disturbed by
the more or less legal action of a grantee, to the prejudice of the state and the
public interests.
"The privilege or franchise granted to a private person to enjoy the usufruct of a
public market cannot
lawfully be attached and sold, and a creditor of such person can recover his debt
only out of the income
or revenue obtained by the debtor from the enjoyment or usufruct of the said
privilege, in the same
manner that the rights of the creditors of a railroad company can be exercised
and their creditors
collected only out of the gross receipts remaining after deduction has been made
therefrom of the
operating expenses of the road. (Law of November 12, 1869, extended to the
overseas provinces by the
royal order of August 3, 1886.)"
For the reasons contained in the authorities above quoted we believe that this
court would have reached
the same conclusion if the debtor had been the municipality of Guinobatan and
the public market had
been levied upon by virtue of the execution.
It is evident that the movable and immovable property of a municipality,
necessary for governmental
purposes, may not be attached and sold for the payment of a judgment against
the municipality. The
supreme reason for this rule is the character of the public use to which such kind
of property is devoted.
The necessity for government service justifies that the property of public use of
the municipality be
exempt from execution just as it is necessary to exempt certain property of
private individuals in
accordance with section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Even the municipal income, according to the above quoted authorities, is exempt
from levy and
execution. In volume 1, page 467, Municipal Corporations by Dillon we find that:
"Municipal corporations are instituted by the supreme authority of a state for the
public good. They
exercise, by delegation from the legislature, a portion of the sovereign power.
The main object of their
creation is to act as administrative agencies for the state, and to provide for the
police and local
government of certain designated civil divisions of its territory. To this end they
are invested with
certain governmental powers and charged with civil, political, and municipal
duties. To enable them
beneficially to exercise these powers and discharge these duties, they are
clothed with the authority to
raise revenues, chiefly by taxation, and subordinately by other modes, as by
licenses, fines, and
penalties. The revenue of the public corporation is the essential means by which
it is enabled to
perform its appointed work. Deprived of its regular and adequated supply of
revenue, such a
corporation is practically destroyed, and the ends of its erection thwarted. Based
upon considerations of
this character, it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the public-property
but also the taxes
and public revenues of such corporations cannot be seized under execution
against them, either in the
treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds
of such judgments in
the hands of officers of the law, are not subject to execution unless so declared
by statute. The doctrine
of the inviolability of the public revenues by the creditor is maintained, although
the corporation is in
debt, and has no means of payment but the taxes which it is authorized to
collect."
Another error assigned by counsel for appellant is the holding of the court a quo
that the proper remedy
for collecting the judgment in favor of the plaintiff was by way of mandamus.
While this question is not necessarily included in the one which is the subject of
this appeal, yet we
believe that the holding of the trial court, assigned as error by appellant's
counsel, is true when, after a
judgment is rendered against a municipality, it has no property subject to
execution. This doctrine is
maintained by Dillon (Municipal Corporations vol. 4, par. 1507, 5th ed.) based
upon the decisions of
several States of the Union upholding the same principle and which are cited on
page 2679 of the
aforesaid work. In this sense this assignment of error, we believe, is groundless.
By virtue of all the foregoing, the judgment appealed from should be and is
hereby affirmed with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real,
JJ., concur.
-----------------
Footnotes
1. R.G. No. 22617, promulgated November 28, 1924, not reported.
\---!e-library! 6.0 Philippines Copyright © 2000 by Sony Valdez---/
([1926V63E] VIUDA DE TAN TOCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL OF
ILOILO, defendant-appellee., 1.R. No. 24950, 1926 Mar 25, En Banc)
[2000R1496ES] ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs.
SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION
ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS,
ALFREMO
CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M.
DALUPINES,
BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU
BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW
TEOFISTO
SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON
BAYAAN,
TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B.
ENDING,
DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI
NANAPNAYLIZA
SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA
HELINITA
T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-
CRISPEN
SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG,
TERESA GASPAR,
MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO
CARINO,
JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY
SEGUNDO, SATUR S.
BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO
ABUGAN, VIRGILIO
CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G.
ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO
C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI,
PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY,
RICO O.
SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB,
MIRLANDO H.
MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S.
MANSANG-CAGAN,
PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S.
SAWAY,
LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO
APANG,
MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG
AUGUSTO DIANO,
JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY
DIAMILING,
SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D.
EMBA,
NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA,
RENATO T.
BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L.
MENDI,
MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID,
represented by her
father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father
MONICO D.
LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M.
EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M.
EMUY, SR.,
SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTERPEOPLE'S
EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor. / IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS
PEOPLE and
HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, INC.,
intervenor.2000 Dec 6En BancG.R. No. 135385 R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371 (R.A.
8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA),
and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to
comment.[1] In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its
provisions, filed on October
13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality
of the IPRA and
pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources
(DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
filed through the
Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view
that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous peoples
and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier,
one of the authors of
the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, and the leaders
and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their
Motion for Leave to
Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and
praying for the dismissal
of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a
Motion to Intervene
and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression
of the principle of
parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee
the rights of those who
are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays
that the petition be
dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People
and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed
a motion to
Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and
Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition
and mandamus be
dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their
earlier pleadings and
during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and
its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's
ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains,
and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable
public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private
but community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains
and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the
ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral
lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources
within the areas claimed
to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable
for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect
and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest
cover or
reforestation."[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
"ancestral domains"
and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and
3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.[3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers
and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes
involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process
clause of the
Constitution.[4]
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and
recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral
lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an
ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the
Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary
of Justice and
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said
area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall
be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and
settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation
thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to
resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights
of the indigenous peoples."[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the
NCIP to the Office of
the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for
purposes of policy and
program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
President's power of control
over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.[6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and
other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and
Commissioners of the NCIP to
cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural
Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and
Management to cease
and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371;
and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of
Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine
natural
resources."[7]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which
the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions
of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions of the law
with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No.
1, series of 1998,
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA
which he contends
should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural
resources and should be
read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the
other hand, Justice
Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise
a justiciable
controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality
of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections
58, 59, 65, and 66 of
the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose
rights may have been
violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the
view that Sections
3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and
De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago, and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion
[1] Rollo, p. 114.
[2] Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.
[3] Id. at 23-25.
[4] Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws."
[5] Rollo, pp. 25-27.
[6] Id. at 27-28.
[7] Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13, 1999, pp. 5-
6.
\---!e-library! 6.0 Philippines Copyright © 2000 by Sony Valdez---/
([2000R1496ES] ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs.
SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION
ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS,
ALFREMO
CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M.
DALUPINES,
BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU
BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW
TEOFISTO
SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON
BAYAAN,
TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B.
ENDING,
DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI
NANAPNAYLIZA
SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA
HELINITA
T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-
CRISPEN
SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG,
TERESA GASPAR,
MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO
CARINO,
JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY
SEGUNDO, SATUR S.
BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO
ABUGAN, VIRGILIO
CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G.
ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO
C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI,
PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY,
RICO O.
SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB,
MIRLANDO H.
MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S.
MANSANG-CAGAN,
PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S.
SAWAY,
LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO
APANG,
MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG
AUGUSTO DIANO,
JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY
DIAMILING,
SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D.
EMBA,
NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA,
RENATO T.
BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L.
MENDI,
MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID,
represented by her
father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father
MONICO D.
LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M.
EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M.
EMUY, SR.,
SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTERPEOPLE'S
EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor. / IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS
PEOPLE and
HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, INC.,
intervenor., G.R. No. 135385, 2000 Dec 6, En Banc)