ARTICLE IN PRESS

Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 63 (2005) 370–382

www.elsevier.com/locate/ijhcs

Creativity or creativities?
Robert J. Sternberga,b,
a
Department of Psychology, Center for the Psychology of Abilities, Competencies, and Expertise
(PACE Center), Yale University, P.O. Box 208358, New Haven, CT 06520-8358, USA
b
American Psychological Association, USA
Available online 1 July 2005

Abstract

Creativity is typically thought of in the singular—as an attribute. But it may instead be

multiple. This article investigates three respects in which there might be multiple creativities—
processes, domains, and styles. It considers different potential models for multiple creativities.
It concludes by suggesting that the different respects in which creativity might be multiple are
complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Creativity; Confluence; Investment theory; Creative thinking

1. Introduction

The field of creativity was practically somnolent when Guilford (1950) woke it up
more than half-a-century ago with a presidential address to the American Psychological
Association. He pointed out, correctly, that there was pitifully little research on
creativity relative to the importance of such research to the field of psychology.
Although his address instigated fresh research, Sternberg and Lubart (1996) argued
many years later that the field was still under-researched relative to its importance.

Corresponding author. Department of Psychology, Center for the Psychology of Abilities,

Competencies, and Expertise (PACE Center), Yale University, P.O. Box 208358, New Haven,
CT 06520-8358, USA. Tel.: +1 203 432 4633; fax: +1 203 432 8317.
E-mail address: robert.sternberg@yale.edu.
URL: http://www.yale.edu/pace, http://www.yale.edu/rjsternberg.

1071-5819/$ - see front matter r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2005.04.003
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R.J. Sternberg / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 63 (2005) 370–382 371

Today the field has seen an explosion of interest. Indeed, there is even an
Encyclopedia of Creativity (Runco and Pritzker, 1999) and a Handbook of Creativity
(Sternberg, 1999a). Moreover, current work addresses creativity—creatively—a
condition that has not always been reached.
Some of the questions currently being addressed are illustrated in this special issue.
Here is a sampling of the diversity of questions being addressed:

1. What is creativity? (Burleson, 2005; Edmonds et al., 2005).

2. How can creativity be enhanced? (Edmonds et al., 2005; Oppenheim, 2005; Fischer
et al., 2005).
3. How do previous sources of information contribute to present creativity? (Bonnardel
and Marmeche, 2005).
4. How can the environment be designed to support creativity? (Hewett, 2005;
Oppenheim, 2005; Yamamoto and Nakakoji, 2005).
5. What are the cognitive, personality, and motivational constituents of creativity?
(Burleson, 2005; Selker, 2005).
6. What is the relation of creativity to knowledge and expertise? (Burleson, 2005).
7. What role can technology play in understanding and enhancing creativity?
(Bonnardel and Marmeche, 2005; Edmonds et al., 2005; Hewett, 2005; Selker,
2005).
8. What is the role of social context in creativity? (Fischer et al., 2005).

These questions, as well as many other similar questions, are often interpreted so as
to assume that there is a single entity of creativity, typically defined along the lines of
the ability to produce ideas and/or products that are novel and useful (see essays in
Sternberg, 1999a; Sternberg et al., 2004). But perhaps there is more than one kind of
creativity. This issue of the Journal implies as much in several places and in this
paper the question is addressed explicitly by posing some specific questions.
Is there reason to believe that there are multiple creativities? If there are, then what
forms might they take? In this article, I propose that there are at least three different
forms multiple creativities might take: creativities with respect to processes, domains,
and styles. Multiple creativities would exist if creativity was not only multi-
dimensional, but multiple in nature. That is, it would exist if there is no one thing
that is truly creativity, but rather, multiple things that are.

2. Multiple creativities: processes

Several models of multiple processes of creativity have been proposed.

2.1. Geneplore

One model of multiple processes is Geneplore (Finke et al., 1992; see also Smith et
al., 1995; Ward et al., 1999). According to this model, there are two main processing
phases in creative thought: a generative phase and an exploratory phase. In the
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372 R.J. Sternberg / Int. J. Human-Computer Studies 63 (2005) 370–382

generative phase, an individual constructs mental representations referred to as

preinventive structures, which have properties promoting creative discoveries. In the
exploratory phase, these properties are used by creative thinkers to come up with
creative ideas. A number of mental processes may enter into these phases of creative
invention, such as retrieval, association, synthesis, transformation, analogical
transfer, and categorical reduction (i.e., mentally reducing objects or elements to
more primitive categorical descriptions). In a typical experimental test based on the
model (see, e.g., Finke, 1990), participants will be shown parts of objects, such as a
circle, a cube, a parallelogram, and a cylinder. On a given trial, three parts will be
named, and participants will be asked to imagine combining the parts to produce a
practical object or device. For example, participants might imagine a tool, a weapon,
or a piece of furniture. The objects thus produced are then rated by judges for their
practicality and originality.

2.2. Kinds of insights

Another model of multiple processes of creativity is that of Robert Sternberg and

Janet Davidson (Sternberg and Davidson, 1982; Davidson and Sternberg, 1984;
Sternberg, 1985; Davidson, 1995). According to this model, creative insights are of
three kinds: selective encoding, selective combination, and selective comparison.
Selective encoding involves distinguishing irrelevant from relevant information in
one’s field of experience. We are all barraged with much more information than we
can possibly handle. An important task confronting each of us is to select the
information that is important for our purposes, and to filter out the information that
is not important. Selective encoding is the process by which this filtering is done.
Consider, e.g., a particularly significant example of selective encoding in science, the
unusual means by which Sir Alexander Fleming discovered penicillin. Fleming ‘‘was
performing an experiment that involved growing bacteria in a petri dish, which is a
little glass or plastic dish that contains a gelatin in which bacteria grow easily.
Unfortunately, from some points of view, the culture was spoiled: A mold grew
within the culture and killed the bacteria. A lesser scientist would have bemoaned the
failure of the experiment and promised to do a better job next time. Fleming,
however, noticed that the mold had killed the bacteria, and thereby provided the
basis for his discovery of the important antibiotic, penicillin.
Insights of selective combination involve taking selectively encoded information
and combining it in a novel but productive way. Often, it is not enough just to
identify the important information for solving a problem. One must also figure out
how to put it together. Consider a famous example of what might be called a
selective-combination insight, the formulation of the theory of evolution. The
information upon which Darwin drew to formulate this theory had been available to
him and others for a long time. What had eluded Darwin and his contemporaries
was how this information could he combined so as to account for observed changes
in species. Darwin finally saw how to combine the available information, and thus
was born his theory of natural selection.
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Insights of selective comparison involve novel relating of new information to old

information. Creative analogies fall into the domain of selective comparison. In
important problems, we almost always need to bring old knowledge to bear upon the
solution of new problems, and to relate new knowledge to old knowledge. Insights of
selective comparison are the basis for this relating. A famous example of an insight
of selective comparison is Kekulé’s discovery of the structure of the benzene ring.
Kekulé had been seeking this structure for some time, but without success. One
night, he dreamt that he was watching a snake dancing around and around. Finally,
the snake bit its tail. When Kekulé arose, he realized that the image of the snake
biting its tail formed the geometric shape for the structure of the benzene ring.

2.3. Are there any creative processes?

Not everyone agrees that there are multiple kinds of creative processes, or even
that there are any creative processes. Weisberg (1986, 1988, 1993, 1999) has proposed
that creativity involves essentially ordinary cognitive processes yielding extraordin-
ary products. Weisberg attempted to show that the insights depend on subjects using
conventional cognitive processes (such as analogical transfer) applied to knowledge
already stored in memory. He did so through the use of case studies of eminent
creators and laboratory research, such as studies with Duncker’s (1945) candle
problem. This problem requires participants to attach a candle to a wall using only
certain available objects (candle, box of tacks, and book of matches). Langley et al.
(1987) made a similar claim about the ordinary nature of creative thinking.
As a concrete example of this approach, Weisberg and Alba (1981) had people
solve the notorious nine-dot problem. In this problem, people are asked to connect
all of the dots, which are arranged in the shape of a square with three rows of three
dots each, using no more than four straight lines, never arriving at a given dot twice,
and never lifting their pencil from the page. The problem can be solved only if people
allow their line segments to go outside the periphery of the dots. Typically, solution
of this task had been viewed as hinging upon the insight that one had to go ‘‘outside
the box.’’ Weisberg and Alba showed that even when people were given the insight,
they still had difficulty in solving the problem. In other words, whatever is required
to solve the nine-dot problem, it is not just some kind of extraordinary insight.

3. Multiple domains

Different creativities might reflect multiple content or symbolic domains as well as

or instead of multiple processes.

3.1. The theory of multiple intelligences

A number of investigators have explored the notion that creativity is at least

partially domain specific. Howard Gardner (1983, 1999) has proposed a theory of
multiple intelligences, which he has applied to creativity (Gardner, 1993). Instead of
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speaking of multiple abilities that together constitute intelligence, like some other
theorists, Gardner proposed a theory of multiple intelligences, in which eight distinct
intelligences function somewhat independently but may interact to produce
intelligent behavior. The types of intelligence are linguistic, logical–mathematical,
spatial, musical, bodily-kinesthetic, interpersonal, intrapersonal, and naturalist.
Gardner (1999) also speculated on the possible existence of existential and spiritual
intelligences. Each intelligence is a separate system of functioning. Nevertheless,
these systems can interact to produce intelligent performance. For example, novelists
rely heavily on linguistic intelligence but might use logical–mathematical intelligence
in plotting story lines or checking for logical inconsistencies. Measuring intelligences
separately may produce a profile of skills that is broader than would be obtained
from, say, measuring verbal and mathematical abilities alone. This profile could then
be used to facilitate educational and career decisions.
To identify particular intelligences, Gardner used converging operations,
gathering evidence from multiple sources and types of data. The evidence includes
(but is not limited to) the distinctive effects of localized brain damage on specific
kinds of intelligences, distinctive patterns of development in each kind of intelligence
across the life span, exceptional individuals (from both ends of the spectrum), and
evolutionary history.
Gardner’s view of the mind is modular. Modularity theorists believe that different
abilities can be isolated as they emanate from distinct portions or modules of the
brain. Thus, a major task of existing and future research on intelligence is to isolate
the portions of the brain responsible for each of the intelligences. Gardner has
speculated about some of these relevant portions, but hard evidence for the existence
of separate intelligences has yet to be produced.
Gardner (1993) applied the theory of multiple intelligences to understand
creativity. He suggested that great creative minds often have relied on different
intelligences to manifest their creativity. For example, T.S. Eliot made his reputation
through linguistic intelligence, Einstein through logical–mathematical intelligence,
Martha Graham through bodily-kinesthetic intelligence, Igor Stravinsky through
musical intelligence, and so forth. Thus, this theory views creativities as emanating,
in part, through intelligences.

3.2. Creativity as domain general

As was the case for multiple-process theories, some theorists reject the idea of
multiples-domain creativities. For example, Root-Bernstein and Root-Bernstein
(2004) have argued that many scientists are artistic and that many artists are
scientific—that the distinction between scientific and artistic creativity, first
suggested by Snow (1964), is artificial. They have analysed the background of
extremely creative scientists and writers, and found them to be very broadly creative,
contrary to the thesis of two cultures of creativity proposed by Snow.
Similarly, Plucker and Beghetto (2004) have suggested that although creativity
may ‘‘look’’ domain specific, it is actually domain general. They have argued that
each of the components of their definition of creativity—interplay between abilities
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and mental processes, observable outcomes or products of creative thinking, novelty

and usefulness, and social context, has both domain-general and domain-specific
aspects. But they also have argued that the major source of domain specificity is not
in creative ability, per se, but rather in interest and commitment. Creative individuals
commit themselves to certain domains of work. It requires a great deal of experience
to generate creative works in these domains. Creativity appears to be domain specific
because of the time and effort needed to invest even in a single domain.

3.3. Intermediate positions—creativity as both domain-specific and domain-general

Perhaps the most popular position today is that creativity has both domain-
specific and domain-general aspects. For example, Amabile (1996) and Sternberg
and Lubart (1995, 1996; see also Sternberg, 2003; Lubart and Guignard, 2004) have
suggested multi-component models of creativity. In Sternberg and Lubart’s
confluence model, the multiple components are abilities, knowledge, thinking styles,
personality, motivation, and environment. Abilities range from more domain general
to more domain specific (see also Carroll, 1993). Our data, e.g., suggest that
analytical abilities are quite domain-general (Sternberg and Gardner, 1982), practical
abilities are relatively domain-general (Sternberg et al., 2000), and creative abilities
are somewhat domain specific (Lubart and Sternberg, 1995). Knowledge is quite
domain specific; thinking styles are somewhat less so (Sternberg, 1997). Personality
traits vary in domain specificity. And environment cross-cuts content domains.
Rearing environment is especially important: Children from authoritative families
are more creative than children from authoritarian ones with rigid rules for behavior
(Lubart and Lautrey, 1998; Lubart et al., 2003). In this view, there is no simple
accounting of whether creativity is domain specific or domain general. Rather, the
question must be answered complexly.
In the Sternberg–Lubart model, certain creative attitudes are associated with
creativity. These creative attitudes are essentially those that have emerged from years
of research on personality aspects of creativity (some of which are summarized in
Feist, 1999). They include attitudes such as willingness to (a) redefine difficult
problems, (b) analyse solutions to problems, (c) sell one’s ideas, (d) surmount
obstacles, (e) work hard in finding something one loves to do, (f) tolerate ambiguity,
(g) take sensible risks, (h) believe in one’s ability to be creative, (i) keep a perspective
on oneself, and (j) see things from multiple points of view. These attitudes can be
either domain specific or domain general, depending on how strongly they influence
an individual.

4. Multiple creative styles

Theorists of creativity and related topics have recognized that there are different
styles of creative contributions (see reviews in Sternberg, 1988; Ochse, 1990;
Weisberg, 1993). Consider some different approaches to styles.
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4.1. Psychometric views

People may express different styles of creativity. Tests of creativity (e.g., Torrance,
1974) typically provide scores that assess both quantitative and qualitative aspects of
performance (Plucker and Renzulli, 1999). For example, the Torrance tests can be
scored for originality of responses (how unusual each response is), flexibility (how
varied the responses are), and fluency of responses (how many unusual responses
there are). One person might stylistically be more fluent but make less novel
responses; another person might produce more novel responses, but fewer of them.
These types of scores also serve as a basis for a taxonomy of aspects of creativity
(Guilford, 1975; Michael and Wright, 1989). But the test scores are largely
atheoretical.

4.2. Normal and revolutionary styles

Kuhn (1970) distinguished between normal and revolutionary scientists. Normal

scientists expand upon or otherwise elaborate upon an already existing paradigm of
scientific research, whereas revolutionary scientists propose a new paradigm.
Revolutionary thinkers have included Newton and Einstein in the field of physics,
Darwin and Wallace in the field of biology, Braque and Picasso in the field of art,
and Freud and Wundt in the field of psychology. Darwin’s contribution is
particularly well analysed by Gruber (1981).

4.3. Kinds of creative contributions as reflective of styles

Gardner (1993, 1994) also described different types of creative contributions

individuals can make, which may reflect different styles for expressing one’s
creativity. They include (a) the solution of a well-defined problem, (b) the devising
of an encompassing theory, (c) the creation of a ‘‘frozen work,’’ (d) the perfor-
mance of a ritualized work, and (e) a ‘‘high-stakes’’ performance. Other bases -
for distinguishing among creative styles also exist. For example, psycho-
economic models such as those of Rubenson and Runco (1992) and Sternberg and
Lubart (1991a,b, 1995, 1996) can distinguish different types of contributions in
terms of the parameters of the models. Simonton’s (1998) model of creativity also
proposes parameters of creativity, and styles might be seen as differing in terms of
the extent to which people prefer to vary from in their contributions from other
contributions and in the extent to which they are selected for recognition by a field of
endeavor (see also Campbell, 1960; Perkins, 1995a,b; Simonton, 1998). But in no
case were these models intended explicitly to distinguish among specific styles of
creativity.

4.4. Scientific styles

Gough and Woodworth (1960) specifically discussed stylistic variations among

professional research scientists. The styles include zealots, initiators, diagnosticians,
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scholars, artificers, estheticians, and methodologists. For example, a zealot pro-

poses a cause and then becomes extremely strongly identified with that cause,
sometimes with only minimal empirical support for the arguments behind the
cause. A methodologist concentrates on and takes great care with the methodology
of his or her contributions and perhaps with the innovation inhering in the
methodology, possibly at the expense of paying attention to the substantive
contribution.

4.5. Primary and secondary creativity

Maslow (1967) distinguished more generally between two styles of creativity,

which he referred to as primary and secondary. Primary creativity is the kind of
creativity a person uses to become self-actualized—to find fulfillment in him or
herself and his or her life. Secondary creativity is the kind of creativity with which
scholars in the field are more familiar—the kind that leads to creative achievements
of the kind typically recognized by a field.

4.6. Styles as a basis for creative disagreements

Disagreements among scholars in the field of creativity also may reflect different
kinds of creative styles. Ward et al. (1999) noted three such apparent disagree-
ments and how the disagreements may reflect differences in kinds of creativity rather
than in what ‘‘truly’’ underlies creativity. One apparent disagreement is regarding
goal-oriented versus exploratory creativity. Ward and his colleagues noted that
there is evidence to favor the roles of both focusing (Bowers et al., 1990; Kaplan
and Simon, 1990) and of exploratory thinking (Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi,
1976; Bransford and Stein, 1984) on creative thinking. It may be, however, that
both kinds of thinking can lead to creative work of different kinds. A second
distinction made by Ward and his colleagues is between domain-specific (Perkins,
1981; Weisberg, 1986; Langley et al., 1987; Clement, 1989) and universal (Koestler,
1964; Guilford, 1968; Finke, 1990, 1995) creativity skills. Yet both kinds of skills
may be relevant to creativity. They suggested, e.g., that efficient exploration of a
preinventive structure depends on knowledge and experience, but that general
methods may be relevant in designing a new form of transportation. Finally, Ward
and his colleagues distinguished between unstructured (Bateson, 1979; Findlay and
Lumsden, 1988; Johnson-Laird, 1988) and structured or systematic (Perkins, 1981;
Weisberg, 1986; Ward, 1994) creativity. Unstructured creativity suggests that
randomness, or perhaps blind variation in the generation of ideas, plays a major role
in creativity (see, e.g., Cziko, 1998; Simonton, 1998) whereas structured creativity
suggests that some kind of system is highly involved in the generation of ideas.
Again, Ward and his colleagues saw structure and lack of structure as
complementary rather than contradictory. Indeed, different biological mechan-
isms—such as in levels or types of cortical activation—may underlie different types
of creativity (Martindale, 1999).
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4.7. The propulsion theory

Sternberg and his colleagues (Sternberg, 1999b, 2003; Sternberg et al., 2002) have
proposed a propulsion theory that suggests multiple styles of creative thinking.

4.7.1. Styles of creativity that accept current paradigms and attempt to extend them
1. Replication: The style expresses itself in an attempt to show that the field is in
the right place. The propulsion keeps the field where it is rather than moving it. This
type of creativity is represented by stationary motion, as of a wheel that is moving
but staying in place.
2. Redefinition: The style expresses itself in an attempt to redefine where the field is.
The current status of the field thus is seen from different points of view. The
propulsion leads to circular motion, such that the creative work leads back to where
the field is, but as viewed in a different way.
3. Forward incrementation: The style expresses itself in an attempt to move the field
forward in the direction it already is going. The propulsion leads to forward motion.
4. Advance forward incrementation: The style expresses itself in an attempt to move
the field forward in the direction it is already going, but by moving beyond where
others are ready for it to go. The propulsion leads to forward motion that is
accelerated beyond the expected rate of forward progression.

4.7.2. Styles of creativity that reject current paradigms and attempt to replace them
5. Redirection: The style expresses itself in an attempt to redirect the field from
where it is toward a different direction. The propulsion thus leads to motion in a
direction that diverges from the way the field is currently moving.
6. Reconstruction/redirection: The style expresses itself in an attempt to move the
field back to where it once was (a reconstruction of the past) so that it may move
onward from that point, but in a direction different from the one it took from that
point onward. The propulsion thus leads to motion that is backward and then
redirective.
7. Reinitiation: The style expresses itself in an attempt to move the field to a
different as yet unreached starting point and then to move from that point. The
propulsion is thus from a new starting point in a direction that is different from that
the field previously has pursued.

4.7.3. A style of creativity that puts together existing paradigms into a new one
8. Synthesis: The style expresses itself in an attempt to put together different kinds
of creative contributions from the past into a single kind of creative contribution in
the present.
The eight styles of creativity described above are viewed as qualitatively distinct.
However, within each type, there can be quantitative differences. For example, a
forward incrementation can represent a fairly small step forward, or a substantial
leap. A reinitiation can restart a subfield (e.g., the work of Leon Festinger on
cognitive dissonance) or an entire field (e.g., the work of Einstein on relativity theory).
Thus, the theory distinguishes contributions both qualitatively and quantitatively.
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5. Conclusion

Creativity researchers tend to refer to creativity as an attribute of a person. But it

may be a set of multiple attributes. How those multiple attributes might be arrayed
is, as yet, an open question. This article has proposed some different ways in which
creativity might be multiple. They are not mutually exclusive. People might show
consistent individual differences in processes, domains, and styles of creative
thinking. Future models might integrate these diverse sources of individual
differences.

Acknowledgements

Preparation of this article was supported by Grant REC-9979843 from the

National Science Foundation, by a government grant under the Javits Act Program
(Grant No. R206R000001) as administered by the Institute of Educational Sciences,
(formerly the Office of Educational Research and Improvement), and by the Temple
University Laboratory for Student Success (LSS) as part of a grant from the United
States Department of Education (Award # 31-1992-701), Institute for Educational
Sciences. Grantees undertaking such projects are encouraged to express freely their
professional judgment. This article, therefore, does not necessarily represent the
positions or the policies of the US government, and no official endorsement should
be inferred. Correspondence regarding this article should be addressed to Robert J.
Sternberg, PACE Center, Yale University, Box 208358, New Haven, CT 06520-8358.
E-mail: Robert.Sternberg@yale.edu

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