Int J Psychoanal (2015) doi: 10.1111/1745-8315.

12432

Education Section

Intersubjectivity, otherness, and thirdness:

A necessary relationship1

Leticia Glocer Fiorini

Argentine Psychoanalytic Association (APA), Buenos Aires, Argentina
– lglocerf@intramed.net.ar

(Accepted for publication 26 August 2015)

The author proposes an interplay among the notions of otherness, intersubjec-

tivity and thirdness with its coincidences and oppositions. Its polysemic nature
is analyzed in this paper. The relation internal world–external world is at
stake and concerns both the construction of subjectivity as well as the way
the analytic relation is deemed to assume. This review focuses on the psycho-
analytic developments from Freud to posfreudian and contemporary authors
plus, at the same time, interdisciplinary proposals are also included. It is also
revisited the notion of “analytic field”, proposed by Willy and Madeleine Bar-
anger who, early as 1961-62, underlined the transition from “the unipersonal
to the intersubjective”, emphasizing that this was an expression of a change
in the understanding of the analytic treatment. In this paper, the author
argues that the concept of otherness introduces a symbolic aspect of decen-
tring into the seeming interactive symmetry of intersubjectivity. At the same
time, it is stressed that thirdness places a wedge into the between-subjects,
which opens the way from and to recognition of the other and others.

Keywords: intersubjectivity, otherness, thirdness, object relation.

This paper was written because of the need to distinguish between the
notions of otherness, intersubjectivity, and thirdness, while at the same time
establishing links between them. The interplay of these polysemic concepts
is indicative of the complexity of the relationship between them.
A number of issues have given rise to polemics in the field of psychoanal-
ysis, some of them occasioned by the following questions: Is the nature of
human beings ultimately determined by drives, so that the institution of cul-
ture sets a limit to and demands the renunciation of the limitlessness of this
instinctual world? Or do the origins of psychic life lie in a synchronic rela-
tionship with others, with the consequence that there is no such thing as a
human being prior to culture and subsequently limited by it?
Although experience suggests that the symbolic production of subjectiv-
ity, in the sense of psychic movement and work, is impossible without
immersion in a field of otherness, the various theories are found to stress
one or other of the above options. Different versions of the construction of
the psyche and of the production of subjectivity are found to exist.
1
Translated by Philip Slotkin MA Cantab. MITI.

Copyright © 2015 Institute of Psychoanalysis

2 L. Glocer Fiorini

These problems are shared by the disciplines of philosophy and anthro-

pology. For example, Todorov writes:

What does the generally accepted idea that we are social beings mean? What are
the consequences of this statement that I does not exist without you? What does it
mean to the individual to be limited to a life in common?

(1995, p. x)

From a different perspective, in developing the concept of dialogics and

polyphony in the novel the literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin (1963) points out
that words are dialogic by definition, since they include in themselves those
of the other.
The same issues are debated in the field of psychoanalysis, although the
answers might appear obvious. While some emphasize the function of the
drives and of intrapsychic factors as the engine of construction of the psy-
che, others insist on the role of society and culture, while downplaying the
element of the drives.
Must we choose? The logic of dichotomous thought, focusing as it does
on one of two terms to the exclusion of the other, makes it all but impossi-
ble to settle the argument. In my opinion, this binary logic must be tran-
scended (Glocer Fiorini, 2004). It is essential to find an epistemological
framework that can accommodate both factors without giving rise to an
indiscriminate coexistence of concepts. In this sense, consideration of inter-
subjectivity calls for an interdisciplinary approach capable of broadening
their range of meanings in a psychoanalytic context. The paradigm of com-
plexity offers some fundamental epistemological tools for this purpose
(Morin, 1986, 1990). It represents a model of thought that can sustain para-
doxes and contradictions between heterogeneous terms while also linking
them together where possible.
The ideas of Guillaumin (2004; see also Guillaumin, 1997) afford an epis-
temology of this kind. In his 2004 contribution, whose title translates as
“The external world and the birth of the subject”, this author reviews the
paradoxes in the construction of the subject and concludes that an inquiry,
which in his view will be interminable, into the relations between inside and
outside is indispensable. These relations correspond, he writes, to “realities
that are both absolutely opposed to each other and structurally indissocia-
ble, between which psychic reality will have to develop” (ibid., translated,
28). Guillaumin draws attention to the following paradox: on the one hand,
it is impossible to become a subject without alienation from and dependence
on the other; while, on the other, in order to become a subject it is essential
to oppose and escape from these determinations. A distinction must be
made between the asymmetrical relationship with the other in the origins of
the individual – in which a subject cathects an object – and the relationship
of subject to subject. The latter relationship also involves asymmetries,
which, however, are not fixed but mobile.
For Green (2000), a new paradigm should take account of an essential
relationship – namely, that between drive and object. He postulates that the

Int J Psychoanal (2015) Copyright © 2015 Institute of Psychoanalysis

 Intersubjectivity, otherness and thirdness 9

Intersubjectivity can therefore be regarded as having both an imaginary

and a symbolic sense, the latter being applicable when the concepts of third-
ness and otherness are included in its symbolic value. A number of links are
thus seen to exist between these concepts, although each retains its own
order of meanings.
Hence the category of otherness remains an essential condition for the
processes of production of subjectivity, conferring a symbolic dimension on
the concept of intersubjectivity, even if the relations of inclusion and exclu-
sion between these categories are rendered increasingly complex.
The relevance of the subject matter of this contribution lies in the exis-
tence of an enigmatic and mysterious quality in the other, an opacity that
calls one’s own self into question, basically because this mystery is inescapably
bound up with that of death as absolute otherness.
This negotiation of problematic issues and debates that are unfinished
and by definition open and impossible to bring to a conclusion reveals the
existence of a heterogeneous route. If this heterogeneity of ideas enables us
to revisit questions and to outline points of agreement and disagreement,
we shall have overcome an indiscriminate coexistence of concepts and
entered into a theoretico-clinical order characterized by hypercomplexity, in
which critical pluralism can cease to be eclecticism.
This review stresses the polysemic nature of the terms here discussed,
namely intersubjectivity, otherness, and thirdness. This polysemy is tenable
only if the other is listened to in a way that allows the blind spots in one’s
own theoretical framework to be delimited. Pluralism makes sense only if it
takes the form of a challenge that impels every theoretical development to
question its own premises and conclusions; otherwise it will have forfeited
its potential for calling other ideas into question. Rather than presenting an
equivalent discourse, the need is to take issue with theories, to subject
answers to critical examination, and to formulate new questions about what
is deemed to be already established.

References
Abraham K (1924). A short study of the development of the libido. In: Selected Papers, 418–501.
London: Hogarth, 1942.
Badiou A (1988). L’e^ tre et l’e
 ve
 nement [Being and the event]. Paris: Seuil. [El ser y el acontecimiento.
Buenos Aires: Manantial]
Bakhtin M (1963). Problems of Dostoevsky’s poetics. Emerson C, translator. Minneapolis MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
Balint M (1969). Trauma and object relationship. Int J Psychoanal 50:429–35.
Baranger M, Baranger W (1961–62). La situacio  n analıtica como campo dina  mico [The analytic
situation as a dynamic field]. Revista Uruguaya de Psicoana  lisis 4:3–54.
Baranger M, Baranger W (2004). La teorıa del campo [Field theory]. In: Glocer Fiorini L, editor. El otro
en la trama intersubjetiva, 145–69. Buenos Aires: Lugar Editorial.
Baranger M, Baranger W (2008). The analytic situation as a dynamic field. Int J Psychoanal 89:795–
826 [translation of Baranger M, Baranger W (1961–62)].
Baranger M, Baranger W (2009). The work of confluence: Listening and interpreting in the
psychoanalytic field. Glocer Fiorini L, editor. London: Karnac.
Berenstein I (2001). The link and the other. Int J Psychoanal 82:141–9.
Bollas C (1979). The transformational object. Int J Psychoanal 60:97–107.
Bowlby J (1969). Attachment and loss. London: Hogarth.
Castoriadis C (1978). Psychoanalysis: Project and elucidation. In: Soper K and Ryle MH, translators.
Crossroads in the labyrinth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984. [La psychanalyse, projet et

Copyright © 2015 Institute of Psychoanalysis Int J Psychoanal (2015)

4 L. Glocer Fiorini

nuclear family, which is no longer universal and tends to be called into

question today, it nevertheless throws light on the processes of construction
of the psyche in an intersubjective context. The formation of the superego
as an expression of the voices of parents, educators, and culture draws
attention, in Freud, to certain theoretical aspects that inevitably include
other persons. Similarly, both Group psychology and the analysis of the ego
(1921) and Civilization and its discontents (1930) bear witness to a concern
that extends beyond the element of the drives alone while also transcending
the bounds of family structuring considered in isolation.
It is clear from the combination of Freud’s constant stressing of the role
of the drives and sexuality with his consideration also of the relationship
with others, that subjectivity is marked and delimited by a field of otherness
in an interaction in which both categories are included while at the same
time transcending each other.
The relations between sexuality and otherness in the course of Freud’s
oeuvre are thus seen to be complex in nature. The vicissitudes of the drives
and of psychosexuality can therefore be thought of as taking place at the
intersection between inside and outside. The concept of the fold introduced
by Deleuze (1988), following Leibniz, may throw light on these ideas and
facilitate the achievement of a complex conceptualization of the relations
between inside and outside.
Yet the authors who came after Freud are found to favour either one the-
oretical approach or the other. Abraham (1924) stresses stages in the devel-
opment of the libido that centre on sexuality. In Ferenczi (1920), Klein
(1952), Fairbairn (1946), and Balint (1969), the emphasis is instead on the
importance of the object relationship. The work of Ferenczi, the ideas of
Sullivan (1953) on interaction, as well as the social criticism of Fromm
(1941) and Horney (1924), in some respects anticipate today’s intersubjec-
tive trends as observed mainly in the United States and featuring in the
work of Ogden (1994), Renik (1996), Mitchell (1988), Levine and Friedman
(2000), and many others. From a different perspective, Bowlby (1969)
emphasized the role of others on a level other than that of sexuality: in this
author’s attachment theory, not everything is attributed to the drives.
From yet another point of view, Lacan (1953, 1973) adopts a new
approach to the theme of otherness, which he distinguishes from intersub-
jectivity. He makes a distinction between the imaginary, mirror-other and
the symbolic Other that is the Other of language and of culture. To these
he adds a third register – one that alludes more than those mentioned previ-
ously to the real, which for him is the non-symbolizable.2
Here a range of divergent issues and meanings are encountered and must
be unravelled.
First, it should be noted that the intersubjectivist trends of the last few
decades have become extremely popular in the United States. In other
countries with a significant psychoanalytic presence, such as France and

2
Note that the non-symbolizable is not the same as difficulties experienced in acceding to symbolization.
In our view there are shifting and porous boundaries between the symbolizable and the non-symboliz-
able, and these defy any attempt at reification of the non-symbolizable.

Int J Psychoanal (2015) Copyright © 2015 Institute of Psychoanalysis

 Intersubjectivity, otherness and thirdness 5

Argentina, important ideas that depart in other ways from a solipsistic con-
ception of the subject have arisen, the concept of otherness being introduced
as a key category in the production of subjectivity. These differ from certain
of today’s intersubjectivist schools.
The concept of intersubjectivity admittedly predates the psychoanalytic
debates and stems from other disciplines (Todorov, 1995). The concept did
not originate with Freud, although it can be inferred from his work. The con-
sensus on intersubjectivity is that subjectivity can only be attained by way of
an intersubjective framework (a space between subjects). It is an essential idea
for understanding the construction of the psyche. However, intersubjectivity
is categorized in different ways by the various theoretical schools. Some see it
as a harmonious and complementary relationship between subjects; others as
a mirror-type relationship with a fellow human being; while still others inter-
pret it as an incorporation and assimilation of the other into the self. Now the
concept of otherness introduces a further option, which is the possibility of
considering the category of intersubjectivity with its irreducibilities and decen-
tring aspects. That is to say, the notion of intersubjectivity must be seen in
more complex terms in the psychoanalytic field.
In order to make progress here, it must be borne in mind that, as stated
earlier, the concepts of intersubjectivity and otherness do not completely
coincide. In view of the polysemy of these terms, no simplification of these
issues is possible.
An element of heterogeneity is inherent in the concept of otherness, on which
light is cast, from the discipline of philosophy, by the work of Levinas (1947).
This author points out that the notion of otherness is directed towards the
absolutely and radically other, which, in its extreme decentredness, attacks
the certainties of the ego. Hence it is not exclusively a matter of an imaginary
other or, indeed, only of a symbolic Other in a Lacanian sense. According to
Levinas, the other as other is not merely an alter ego; it is that which I am
not. He adds that the absence of the other is precisely its presence as an other.
For Levinas, opening up to the Other takes place by way of opposition to the
reduction of the other to one’s self that is customary in Western tradition.
A further question is whether the notion of the object relationship extends to
and includes the concept of otherness (Berenstein, 2001). It should be borne in
mind that the ego–object relationship is situated on a different level from the
subject–object relationship, since the ego must be distinguished from the sub-
ject. However, even then, do these distinctions cover every aspect of the con-
cept of otherness? As its name suggests, the notion of the object relationship
implies a mutual link between the ego and/or subject, on the one hand, and
the object, on the other. Whether it is a love object, the object of a drive or
wish, or of anxiety, the object inevitably forms part of a group in which the
ego and the subject are involved (even including their mutual contradictions).
From a radical point of view, the concept of otherness, for its part, points
to the absolutely eccentric other, radically separated from a relationship
with a group – in other words, to the alien or foreign, something which lies
beyond the complex of the similar, and which might well take on ominous
characteristics. Anxiety is involved. From this perspective, the other

Copyright © 2015 Institute of Psychoanalysis Int J Psychoanal (2015)

6 L. Glocer Fiorini

assumes the form of a wedge that shatters the comfort of an imaginary

unity in the intersubjective relationship.
Note, however, that the subject–object relationship must not be reified.
That is to say, otherness does not entail a fixed and immanent place, but is
a condition that, while inescapable, is fluid and in motion: the other in our-
selves and ourselves in the other (Castoriadis, 1978, 1999). This results in a
non-solipsistic conception of the subject. The relationship between subjects
thus takes on ever more complexity.

Clinical practice
The analytic field: Willy and Madeleine Baranger
In the last few decades the intersubjective approach and its variant forms
have increasingly taken the stage to explain phenomena that could not be
accounted for exclusively by intrapsychic determinations. At the same time,
issues concerning the analytic process have been reviewed and the notions
of transference and countertransference revisited in the context of the ana-
lytic relationship. The analytic couple includes two participants: is their
interaction symmetrical? What form, it was asked, should be assumed by a
theory of something more than a simple exchange or dialogue between two
persons? These considerations gave rise to additional ramifications.
Dunn (1995) has exhaustively reviewed a controversy that has come to
the fore in recent years, chiefly in American psychoanalysis, between the
intersubjectivist school and the ‘classical’ model. He outlines some of the
aspects of the debate. First, he describes what each school takes as the basis
of its theory of human nature: the drives and biological urges for classical
analysts, and interpersonal models or object relations for the intersubjec-
tivists. Second, he presents each model’s conceptualization of the direction
of the analytic process: for the protagonists of the classical approach, the
patient’s psyche impels the analyst in one direction or another, while for the
intersubjectivists the analyst is an active constructor of the psychic data and
of the treatment process – indeed, some authors even recommend active
expression of the analyst’s subjectivity.
Today’s intersubjectivist schools find themselves at the focus of various
polemics. One of these is whether recognition of the analyst’s subjectivity
excludes certain possibilities of objectivization. Another question is whether,
as some of these schools contend, a symmetry exists in the analyst–analy-
sand relationship and is enacted in the session, thus leading to specific
reformulations of technique. A further issue is whether anonymity and neu-
trality are impossible, and even, in addition, whether a ‘posture of self-reve-
lation’ should be adopted, in order to share with the patient the dilemmas
and problems of the analytic process.
All this was predated by Willy and Madeleine Baranger’s publication of
‘La situaci on analıtica como campo dinamico’ (Baranger and Baranger,
1961–62) (recently translated into English as ‘The analytic situation as a
dynamic field’ [2008]). These authors point out, too, that the concept of the
analytic field arises in the transition from “the unipersonal to the intersub-

Int J Psychoanal (2015) Copyright © 2015 Institute of Psychoanalysis

 Intersubjectivity, otherness and thirdness 7

jective” and that this is the expression of a change in the conception of the
treatment (Baranger and Baranger, 2004). The context, in their view, was
the attempt to identify a factor that distinguishes the functioning of the
analytic situation from a simple exchange between two persons (ibid., trans-
lated). They postulate that this relationship structure gives rise to a sym-
bolic effect that finds expression in the “basic unconscious phantasy” (ibid.)
and involves the analytic object as a third entity. Madeleine Baranger
regards the concept of otherness in the analytic relationship as an essential
factor in the treatment and emphasizes that its basis is the transference.
The concept of the analytic field arose out of the convergence of various
sources and disciplines – namely, philosophy, with Merleau-Ponty’s concept
of the field in the sphere of phenomenology; Gestalt theory (K. Lewin); and
the work of Bion and Pichon Riviere with groups (Baranger and Baranger,
1961–62).
From this perspective, the Barangers’ introduction of the concept of the
dynamic field squarely addresses the question of intersubjectivity in the ana-
lytic situation. The analyst interpreting his object of study (the patient) has
given way to the formation of a bipersonal field in which the analyst is a
participant and not a neutral, dispassionate observer.
Psychic reality becomes more complex: an ‘other reality’ – the basic
unconscious phantasy – is structured, and is not static but shaped session
by session and moment by moment. This reality is inseparable from the
intersubjective field. The field thus possesses a spatial and temporal struc-
ture of its own, with its own laws that can give rise to the possibility of an
event. By this I mean the concept (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980; Badiou,
1988) of an event as the onset of something new, different from what pre-
cedes and determines it and not contained in the patient’s history. It must
also be stressed that a structural dimension and a temporal dimension come
together and coexist in the concept of the field (Glocer Fiorini, 2009).
Epistemological analysis of these ideas demonstrates the existence of cate-
gories that permit a conception of the analytic field in terms of its epistemo-
logical foundations. As Green (2003) has pointed out, hypercomplex
epistemologies are part of the future of psychoanalysis. The Barangers’
hypothesis can also be analysed in terms of these epistemologies because, as
stated earlier, they were ahead of their time and are absolutely relevant
today (Glocer Fiorini, 2009). It is particularly interesting to put these
notions together with the theories of the philosopher Trıas (1991) on the
“logic of the limit”, according to which the limit is a third space that gener-
ates laws of its own between two categories or groups that come into con-
tact with each other. This lends epistemological support to the view that the
Barangers’ thesis is not limited to the logic of a simple dualism between
patient and analyst. Nor is this the case with the interactional, symmetrical
version of intersubjectivity. The concept of the analytic field entails the
assumption of a logic different from that of subject-and-object in immov-
able positions, and from that of two subjects acting symmetrically, since it
is neither unipersonal nor bipersonal, but instead a creation that emerges
from the participants and in effect transcends them.

Copyright © 2015 Institute of Psychoanalysis Int J Psychoanal (2015)

8 L. Glocer Fiorini

Opinions may admittedly differ on whether the Barangers’ concept of the

dynamic field and basic unconscious phantasy correspond to a dialectical
synthesis generated in the bipersonal field or whether heterogeneous aspects
that belong to the psyche of each member of the couple coexist in it. The
basic unconscious phantasy can in my view be regarded partly as a dialecti-
cal synthesis. At the same time, however, the analytic field also includes
aspects that belong to the analyst and others that belong to the patient, and
these constitute heterogeneous elements that may not be amenable to a final
synthesis. This situation could be thought of in terms of disjunctive con-
junctions that construct provisional syntheses (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980).
Negotiating the concepts of the dynamic field and the spiral process in
the work of the Barangers involves emphasis on the following points: (a)
that the analytic process is not a ‘natural’ process with a sequence of prede-
termined stages; (b) that an intrinsic degree of connection exists between
relationships of time and space, along the lines of Bakhtin’s ‘chronotopo’
(1963); (c) that each process is unique and in that sense atypical: it is pecu-
liar to the individual patient and that patient’s history and life. For this rea-
son, Willy Baranger saw the analytic process as a matter of craftsmanship.
To sum up, the Barangers’ concepts of the analytic field and of process
have to do with the capacity to generate differences – that is, not only to
encounter repetitions but also to create and invent. From this point of view,
the situation can be seen as a productive field having its roots in different tem-
poralities and always including the potential for expansion of psychic spaces.
In this sense, it is analogous to the transitional space between mother and
child described by Winnicott (1959), taking the form of an ‘other’ space, a
third space of play and of possible creativity. Later authors have presented
similar ideas, albeit each with their own specificities and differences. These
include Green (2004) on the analytic object as a third entity; Ogden (1994)
on the analytical third in intersubjectivity; and Bollas (1979) on the interme-
diate zone generated between the subjectivities of patient and analyst.3

Conclusions
It is here argued that the concept of otherness symbolically introduces an
aspect of decentring into the seeming interactive symmetry of intersubjectiv-
ity. For this reason, if the notion of intersubjectivity includes the concept of
otherness as the element that introduces the radically different and alien
into a comfortable unity of the self, it will then acquire another dimension.
Furthermore, the notion of otherness does not fully coincide with that of
thirdness although the two overlap to some extent. That is to say, the third
entity introduces a wedge into the between-subjects, which opens the way
from and to recognition of the other and others, thus implying the possibil-
ity of confrontation with limits and with finitude. The inclusion of the sub-
ject in a symbolic universe thus entails the acceptance of otherness in both
others and oneself. This also presupposes that the other can establish itself
as a subject in its own right.

3
Cf. Kancyper (1999) on the influence of the Barangers’ ideas in Latin American psychoanalysis.

Int J Psychoanal (2015) Copyright © 2015 Institute of Psychoanalysis

 Intersubjectivity, otherness and thirdness 9

Intersubjectivity can therefore be regarded as having both an imaginary

and a symbolic sense, the latter being applicable when the concepts of third-
ness and otherness are included in its symbolic value. A number of links are
thus seen to exist between these concepts, although each retains its own
order of meanings.
Hence the category of otherness remains an essential condition for the
processes of production of subjectivity, conferring a symbolic dimension on
the concept of intersubjectivity, even if the relations of inclusion and exclu-
sion between these categories are rendered increasingly complex.
The relevance of the subject matter of this contribution lies in the exis-
tence of an enigmatic and mysterious quality in the other, an opacity that
calls one’s own self into question, basically because this mystery is inescapably
bound up with that of death as absolute otherness.
This negotiation of problematic issues and debates that are unfinished
and by definition open and impossible to bring to a conclusion reveals the
existence of a heterogeneous route. If this heterogeneity of ideas enables us
to revisit questions and to outline points of agreement and disagreement,
we shall have overcome an indiscriminate coexistence of concepts and
entered into a theoretico-clinical order characterized by hypercomplexity, in
which critical pluralism can cease to be eclecticism.
This review stresses the polysemic nature of the terms here discussed,
namely intersubjectivity, otherness, and thirdness. This polysemy is tenable
only if the other is listened to in a way that allows the blind spots in one’s
own theoretical framework to be delimited. Pluralism makes sense only if it
takes the form of a challenge that impels every theoretical development to
question its own premises and conclusions; otherwise it will have forfeited
its potential for calling other ideas into question. Rather than presenting an
equivalent discourse, the need is to take issue with theories, to subject
answers to critical examination, and to formulate new questions about what
is deemed to be already established.

References
Abraham K (1924). A short study of the development of the libido. In: Selected Papers, 418–501.
London: Hogarth, 1942.
Badiou A (1988). L’e^ tre et l’e
 ve
 nement [Being and the event]. Paris: Seuil. [El ser y el acontecimiento.
Buenos Aires: Manantial]
Bakhtin M (1963). Problems of Dostoevsky’s poetics. Emerson C, translator. Minneapolis MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
Balint M (1969). Trauma and object relationship. Int J Psychoanal 50:429–35.
Baranger M, Baranger W (1961–62). La situacio  n analıtica como campo dina  mico [The analytic
situation as a dynamic field]. Revista Uruguaya de Psicoana  lisis 4:3–54.
Baranger M, Baranger W (2004). La teorıa del campo [Field theory]. In: Glocer Fiorini L, editor. El otro
en la trama intersubjetiva, 145–69. Buenos Aires: Lugar Editorial.
Baranger M, Baranger W (2008). The analytic situation as a dynamic field. Int J Psychoanal 89:795–
826 [translation of Baranger M, Baranger W (1961–62)].
Baranger M, Baranger W (2009). The work of confluence: Listening and interpreting in the
psychoanalytic field. Glocer Fiorini L, editor. London: Karnac.
Berenstein I (2001). The link and the other. Int J Psychoanal 82:141–9.
Bollas C (1979). The transformational object. Int J Psychoanal 60:97–107.
Bowlby J (1969). Attachment and loss. London: Hogarth.
Castoriadis C (1978). Psychoanalysis: Project and elucidation. In: Soper K and Ryle MH, translators.
Crossroads in the labyrinth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984. [La psychanalyse, projet et

Copyright © 2015 Institute of Psychoanalysis Int J Psychoanal (2015)

10 L. Glocer Fiorini
lucidation. In: Les carrefours du labyrinthe. Paris: Seuil.] [El psicoana
e  lisis, proyecto y elucidacio
 n.
Buenos Aires: Nueva Visio n, 1992.]
Castoriadis C (1999). Figures of the thinkable. Arnold H, translator. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2007.
[Figures du pensable. Paris: Seuil.] [Figuras de lo pensable. Madrid: Ca tedra, 1999.]
Deleuze G (1988). The fold: Leibniz and the baroque. Conley T, translator. London: Athlone, 1993. [Le
pli. Paris: Minuit.] [El pliegue. Barcelona: Paido  s, 1989.]
Deleuze G, Guattari F (1980). A thousand plateaus. Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press,
1987. [Mille plateaux. Paris: Minuit.]
Dunn J (1995). Intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis: A critical review. Int J Psychoanal 76:723–38.
Fairbairn RD (1946). Object-relationships and dynamic structure. Int J Psychoanal 27:30–7.
Ferenczi S (1920). The further development of an active therapy in psycho-analysis. In: Further
contributions to the theory and technique of psycho-analysis, 198–217. London: Hogarth, 1926.
Freud S (1921). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE 18:65–144.
Freud S (1923). The ego and the id. SE 19:1–66.
Freud S (1924). The dissolution of the Oedipus complex. SE 19:171–80.
Freud S (1925). Some psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes. SE
19:241–58.
Freud S (1930 [1929]). Civilization and its discontents. SE 21:57–146.
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