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Lawyer’s Oath
I_______, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school may be admitted to the Philippine Bar Examination.
Section 5 of B.M. 1153 provides that a Filipino citizen “who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted
to the bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses
leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the
proper authority; and (c) completion of all fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school
duly recognized by the Philippine Government” (Bar Matter No. 1153, Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing
Reforms in the Bar Examinations through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, March 9, 2010).
A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her degree in Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent in a foreign
law school must also present proof of completion of a separate bachelor’s degree.
Can Filipino lawyers practice law under the name of a foreign law firm?
No, the latter not being authorized to practice law in the Philippines. The use of the foreign law firm’s name is
unethical (Dacanay v. Baker & McKenzie, A.M. No. 2131, May 10, 1985).
General Rule: The appointment or election of an attorney to a government office DISQUALIFIES him from engaging
in the private practice of law.
Public Officials Prohibited to Practice Law in the Public Officials with Restrictions to Practice Law in
Philippines (JOP-GOCC-PS) the Philippines (SSRCF)
1. Judges and other officials or employees of the superior 1. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
court (RRC, Rule 138, Sec. 35); (CONSTI, Art. VI, Sec. 14);
2. Officials and employees of the Office of the Solicitor 2. Members of the Sanggunian;
General (RRC, Rule 138, Sec. 35); 3. Retired Justice or Judge receiving pension from the
3. Government Prosecutors; government (R.A. 910, Sec. 1); and
4. Governors, city and municipal mayors; 4. Civil Service officers or employees (whose duty does
5. Ombudsman and his deputies; not require his entire time to be at the disposal of the
6. Chairmen and members of the Constitutional government), provided he can secure a written permit
Commissions (CONSTI, Art. IX, Sec. 2); from the head of the department concerned (Revised
7. Civil service officers or employees whose duties Civil Service Rules, Rule XVIII, Sec. 12); and
require them to devote their entire time at the disposal 5. Former government attorney cannot, after leaving
of the government; government service, accept engagement or
8. President, Vice-President, members of the employment in connection with any matter in which he
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants had intervened while in the said service (CPR, Rule
(CONSTI, Art. VII, Sec. 13); 6.03).
9. Those who, by Special law, are prohibited from
engaging in the practice of their legal profession, but if
1 | ABRC2016.Pointers in Legal and Judicial Ethics (combined)/EVSA/crys
so authorized by the department head, he may, in an
isolated case, act as counsel for a relative or close
family friend (AGPALO, Legal and Judicial Ethics (2009),
pp. 47-54).
Prohibition against Members of Prohibition against Members of Restrictions in the Practice of Law
Legislature the Sanggunian of Retired Judges
a. Appearing as counsel before a. Appear as counsel before any a. Any civil case wherein the
any court of justice, electoral court in any civil case wherein a government or any subdivision
tribunals or quasi-judicial and local government unit or any office, or instrumentality thereof is the
administrative bodies. The agency or instrumentality of the adverse party
word “appearance” includes government is the adverse party; b. Any criminal case wherein an
not only arguing a case before b. Appear as counsel in any officer or an employee of the
any such body but also filing a criminal case wherein an officer or government is accused of an
pleading on behalf of a client employee of the national or local offense committed in
as “by simply filing a formal government is accused of an offense relation to his office
motion, plea or answer” committed in relation to his office; c. Collect any fees for his
(Ramos vs. Manalac, 89 Phil 27). c. Collect any fee for their appearance in any
b. Allowing his name to appear in appearance in administrative administrative proceedings to
such pleading by itself or as proceedings involving the local maintain an interest adverse to
part of a firm name under the government unit of which he is an the government, provincial or
signature of another qualified official; municipal, or to any of its legally
lawyer. “He cannot do d. Use property and personnel of constituted officers
indirectly what the the government except when the
Constitution prohibits directly” Sanggunian member concerned is
(In re: David 93 Phil 46, 1954). defending the interest of the
government.
Officials who, by express mandate of the law, are prohibited from practicing law, may not, even with the consent
of the department head, engage in the practice of law (Zeta v. Malinao, A.M. No. P-220, December 20, 1978).
BUT if such official is authorized by the department head, he may, in an isolated case, represent a relative or a
close family friend (Noriega v. Sison, A.M. No. 2266, October 27, 1983).
Appearance of the Solicitor General for one government agency if in so doing his representation run against the
interest of another government agency.
The Solicitor General is the lawyer of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or
agents. When confronted with a situation where one government office takes an adverse position against another
government agency, the Solicitor General should not refrain from performing his duty as the lawyer of the government. It is
incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government
although it may run counter to a client’s position. In such instance, the government office adversely affected by the position
taken by the Solicitor General, if it still believes in the merit of its case, may appear in its own behalf through its legal
personnel or representative (Orbos v. CSC, 189 SCRA 458, September 12, 1990).
What are the proceedings in which lawyers are prohibited from appearing?
Practice of Law by Public Officials
General Rule: Only those who are licensed to practice law can appear and handle cases in court
Exceptions:
A party may conduct his case or litigation in person with
Before the MTC the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him (Rule 138,
Sec. 34).
A party may conduct his litigation personally. But if he
Before any other court gets someone to aid him, that someone must be an
authorized member of the Bar(Rule 138, Sec. 34).
In a locality where a duly licensed member of the Bar is
NOT available, the judge may appoint a non-lawyer
In a criminal case before the MTC who is:
a. A resident of that province;
b. Of good repute for probity and ability to defend the
LEGAL ETHICS
Lawyer-client relationship.
Q – The lawyer and client signed a retainership agreement and he received an acceptance fee. He was the one who
prepared the complaint which was filed and he was the one who prepared the motion to serve summons through
publication. Is there a lawyer-client relationship? Explain.
Answer: Yes, because such acts or circumstances clearly establish lawyer-client relationship. It is sufficient that the advice
and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. (Toledo v. Kallos, A.M. No.
RTJ-05-1900, January 28, 2005, 449 SCRA 446, 457). Further, acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-
client relationship. (Amaya v. Atty. Tecson, 491 Phil. 111, 117 [2005]; Michael Ruby v. Atty. Espejo, et al., A.C. No. 10558,
February 23, 2015, Reyes, J, citing Canons 16 & 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility).
Q – State the duties of lawyer the moment there is a lawyer-client relationship. Explain.
Answer: The lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of the complainant and is obliged to keep the latter informed of the status of
his case. He is likewise bound to account for all money or property collected or received from the complainant. He may be
held administratively liable for any inaptitude or negligence he may have had committed in his dealing with the
complainant.
In Del Mundo v. Capistrano, A.C. No. 6903, 669 SCRA 462, it was emphasized that indeed, when a lawyer takes a
client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that
degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on
him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.
His workload does not justify neglect in handling one’s case because it is settled that a lawyer must only accept cases as
much as he can efficiently handle.
Moreover, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession. As trustee of
such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose
such as for the filing and processing of a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return
gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the conversion of
funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. (Michael Ruby v. Atty. Espejo, et al., A.C. No. 10558, February 23, 2015, Reyes, J).
Q – Respondent claimed or made to appear that STEELCORP was the licensee of the technical information and the
patent on Hot Dip Coating of Ferrous Strands or Philippine Patent No. 16269. However, an extensive investigation
made by the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline showed that STEELCORP only has rights as a licensee of the
technical information and not the right as a licensee of the patent. Can he be suspended? Explain.
Answer: Yes. Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards
of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law. They are expected to act with honesty in all their
dealings, especially with the court. Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or
consenting to any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice. Moreover, they are obliged to
observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. (Plus Builders, Inc. v. Revilla, Jr., 533
Phil. 250 (2006)).
Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed upon by the State upon those who show
that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of
those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a
practitioner’s honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties,
the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to
the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients.
From the foregoing, it is clear that he violated his duties as a lawyer to avoid dishonest and deceitful conduct,
(Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and to act with candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01, Canon 10). Also, he desecrated the solemn
oath he took before this Court when he sought admission to the bar, i.e., not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court. Thus, even at the risk of jeopardizing the probability of prevailing on STEELCORP’s application for a search
warrant, respondent should have informed the court of the patent’s expiration so as to allow the latter to make an
informed decision given all available and pertinent facts. (Sonic Steel Industries, Inc. v. Atty. Chua, A.C. No. 6942, July 17,
2013).
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 529 Phil. 876 (2006), it was held that the preparation and signing
of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal
profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing
of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s
signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief
there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a pleading, it is
counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document. (Tapay, et al. v.
Atty. Bancolo, et al., A.C. No. 9604, March 20, 2013).
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Ambulance Chasing
A solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by laymen employed by an attorney for the purpose or by an
attorney himself.
Barratry
A lawyer’s act of fomenting suits among individuals and offering his legal services to one of them for monetary
motives or purposes.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Conflict of interest.
Q – In a complaint against a lawyer for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility Bernardino alleged that
the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty. Santos. Atty. Santos used the falsified
death certificate to support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication prepared by Atty. Santos states that he was the sole
heir of the wife.
Years later, Atty. Santos on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano Tulra, filed a
Complaint for sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and temporary restraining order
against Bernardino. The Complaint alleged that Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla, which allegedly
contradicted the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted. Hence, Atty. Santos represented client
with conflicting interests thus, the complaint.
As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty. Santos argued that he did not represent and was not
representing conflicting interests since Mariano Turla was already dead. Further, “he was representing Marilu
Turla against those who has an interest in her father’s estate.” Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication never
stated that there was no other legal heirs but only “that Mariano Turla was the sole heir of Rufino Turla.” Is the
lawyer administratively liable? Explain.
Answer: Yes. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall observed candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client. Furthermore, a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers must
treat all information received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in order to encourage client to fully inform
their counsels of the facts of their case. (Samson v. Atty. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013, 701 SCRA 241, 252 [Per J.
Bensamin, En Banc]). In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, 453 Phil. 108 [2003] [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division], the court
explained what conflict of interest means:
“There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would necessarily refute Mariano
Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to represent Marilu Turla. Worse, he knew that Mariano
Turla was not the only heir. (Bernardino v. Atty. Victor Rey Santos, A.C. No. 10583; Atty. Jose Caringal v. Atty. Santos, A.C.
No. 10583 & 10584, February 18, 2015).
ATTORNEY’S FEES
24. The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya entered into a compromise agreement concerning the division of the
subject lot where Atty. Lacaya ultimately agreed to acquire one half of the subject property of Cadavedos.
Atty. Lacaya defrayed all of the litigation expenses without providing for reimbursement, in exchange for a
contingency fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot. Is the contingency of his fees justified the compromise
agreement and rendered the agreed fee under the compromise agreement reasonable?
No. First, this agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy. Second, the contingent fee arrangement in
this case expressly transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer may not properly agree with a client that
the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense of litigation. Lastly, the questioned attorney’s fee should be declared void for
being excessive and unconscionable. The contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was allegedly agreed to secure
the services of Atty. Lacaya. A large fee is only allowed in the showing that special skills and additional work had been
involved. The issue involved in that case was simple and did not require of Atty. Lacaya extensive skill, effort and
research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition against the sale of a homestead lot within five years from its
acquisition(Cadavedo v. Lacaya, G.R. No. 173188, January 15, 2014).
DISBARMENT
Q – Is the Constitution the only basis of the power to discipline members of the Bar? Explain.
Answer: No. The Court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides that a member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Sec. 27).
Q – State the role of the Integrated Bar of the Phils. in the SC’s power to discipline lawyers. Explain.
Answer: In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo, A.C. No. 10537 p. 8 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc], the Court emphasized the authority
of the court to impose disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice of law, where it ruled that parenthetically, it is
the SC that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers. (Constitution [1987], Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]). Under
the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of
the Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional power of the SC. Its
recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory. (A.C. No. 10537, p. 8 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]).
The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court, which provides that “proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines … upon the verified complaint of any person.”
However, this authority is only to assist the Court with the investigation of the case, to determine factual findings, and to
recommend, at best, the penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer. (Bernardino v. Atty. Victor Rey Santos, A.C. No.
10583; Atty. Jose Caringal v. Atty. Santos, A.C. No. 10583 & 10584, February 18, 2015).
30. The Rules of Court enumerate the grounds or causes for which an attorney may be disbarred or suspended.
May he be disciplined on other grounds in disregard of the principle of “inclusion unius est exclusion
alterius”?
Yes. The statutory grounds for disbarment or suspension are not to be taken as a limitation on the general powers of
the courts in this respect. The inherent powers of the court over its officers cannot be restricted (Haliliv. Court of
Industrial Relations, 130 SCRA 138).
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended
from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.” (Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Sr., 468 Phil. 329, 335 [2004]). Immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opin ion of the
upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct. (See Garrido v. Attys.
Garrido and Valencia, 625 Phil. 347, 358 [2010]).
From his own admission, he knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic
was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and his wife were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still
validly married to his first wife; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity.
Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married his best friend. The foregoing
circumstances seriously tainted his sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of
our laws on marriage.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Dev’t. Co., 510 Phil. 839 [2005], the Court said that while a lawyer is
not required to present proof of his representation, when a court requires that he show such authorization, it is imperative
that he show his authority to act. Thus:
A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the
absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in
his client’s name. However, [a] court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party may require a
lawyer to adduce authorization from the client.
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without being retained nor
may he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of court. If an attorney appears on a client’s behalf without
a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party may be
bound or affected by his appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority. If a
lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction.
Q – A lawyer was serving suspension when she represented her husband in a pending case. May she be suspended?
Explain.
Answer: Yes, because of willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney of a party without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
She would have deserved a harsher penalty, but the Court recognized the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture
that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to
a spouse. Thus, considering that her actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she was
not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty. (Feliciano v.
Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada, A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015).
Effect if the complainant in a disbarment case executes an affidavit of withdrawal of the case.
A case of disbarment or suspension may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has
been duly proven (Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos,285 SCRA 93). Commented [S1]: Same Topic
Q – A lawyer consented to the submission of a falsified affidavit in order to beat the deadline in an electoral
protest. A complaint against him was filed, but he contended that he has been discharged from all causes of action
when the complainant filed a Release Waiver and Discharge. Is his contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant.
What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted
solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
administration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an
officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice.
The lawyer was found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court. (Atty. Umaguing v. Atty. Wallen R. De Vera, A.C. No.
10451, February 4, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Q – A lawyer defrauded a client by executing and notarizing a Deed of Sale so she could apply for a loan in
client’s/complainant’s behalf. The document cannot be located especially so that she did not submit her notarial
register to the Clerk of Court. Hence, complainant could not prove her claim that her signature was forged. She
facilitated the sale in favor of a third person without complainant’s approval. She was charged criminally, but the
case was dismissed as her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. State the effect of her acquittal on the
disbarment case against her. Explain.
Answer: Her acquittal has no effect on the disbarment case.
The criminal case of estafa from which she was acquitted, as her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, is
different from the administrative case, and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each
case. Section 5, in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only substantial
evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil
cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. (Freeman v. Reyes, A.C. No. 6246, November 15, 2011).
Freeman v. Reyes, A.C. No. 6246, November 15, 2011, held that the dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude
the continuance of a separate and independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to
establish the culpability is merely substantial evidence. An administrative case can proceed independently, even if there
was a full-blown trial wherein, based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a
judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution failed to prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, or that no crime was committed.
The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court
and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. The burden of proof rests
upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence. (Pena v. Atty. Paterno, A.C. No. 4191, June 10, 2013).
If criminal and not purely Proof Beyond Reasonable Members of the Judiciary,
administrative Doubt; The general rules If the ground is/are
in regard to admissibility misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption and/or incompetence
of evidence in criminal
trials apply.
If for an impeachable It must be coursed Proof Beyond Reasonable Only Supreme Court
offense through the House of Doubt; Penal in nature Justices are subject to
Representatives or the and governed by the rules impeachment
Senate in accordance on criminal case.
with the Rules on
Impeachment.
If the misconduct of a It must be filed with the Clear and Convincing Lawyers holding
government official is of Office of the Court evidence; the erring government offices
such a character as to Administrator of the government official may
affect his qualification as Supreme Court be disciplined as a
a lawyer or to show member of the Bar for
moral delinquency misconduct in the
discharge of his duties
as such. The lawyer’s
oath is a source of his
obligation and its
violation is a ground for
a disciplinary action.
A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official.
However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the CPR or the lawyer’s oath or is of such character as to
affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a
member of the bar for such misconduct (Pimentel, Jr. v. Llorente, A.C. No. 4680, August 29, 2000).
READMISSION
36. Nenita is the sole and exclusive legal heir of Pacita by virtue of a court order. Atty. Madamot is the illegitimate
half-cousin of Nenita administering the properties. Despite the order of the court declaring Nenita as the
successor-in-interest to all of Pacita’s properties, as well as her requests for the accounting and delivery of the
dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming from Pacita’s stockholdings in various corporations Atty.
Madamot acting as the administrator, still mortgaged a commercial property in favor of Philippine Savings
Bank although there is already an existing Trust Agreement wherein Atty. Madamot, in his capacity as
President of URCI, recognized Nenita to be the true and beneficial owner of the same. Is Atty. Madamot
administratively liable for serious misconduct?
Yes. Atty. Madamot is GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by mortgaging
the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits of his own claim as
president, Atty. Madamot should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have
exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property violation nor any action which would endanger the
Bar’s reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only
his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the
exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice (Yupangco-Nakpil v. Atty. Uy, A.C. No. 9115,
September 17, 2014).
A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross
misconduct outside of his professional capacity.
Lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients.
The fact that a lawyer obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of a
person is of no moment. A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for
gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for
misconduct committed in his non-professional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing
him as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyer’s professional dealings is so gross in character as to show
him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer.
Further, the misconduct of the lawyer is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the IBP
directing her to file an answer to the complaint and to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes
blatant disrespect for the IBP which amounts to conduct unbecoming a lawyer.
Undoubtedly, a lawyer’s issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed the directives of the Quezon
City Prosecutor’s Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. (Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlina Espejo, A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J)
The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that s/he shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not
only a condition precedent to the admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to
maintain ones good standing in the profession.
The Court found that the complainants could not have been defrauded without the representations of respondent.
He knew that his representations were false since the filing fee for a petition for reconstitution in 2001 was only P3,145,
and other expenses including the publication of the filing of the petition could not have cost more than P20,000. It is clear
that he employed deceit in convincing complainants to part with their hard earned money and the latter could not have
been easily swayed to lend the money were it not for his misrepresentations and failed promises as a member of the bar.
He also failed to pay his just and legal obligation.
His disobedience to the directives of the IBP in failing to participate in the proceedings before it is in reality a
gross and blatant disrespect to the Court. Failing in this duty as a member of the bar which is being supervised by the
Court under the Constitution, the SC found that a heavier sanction should fall on respondent. Thus, penalty is increased to
6 months suspension from the practice of law. (Sps. Amador, et al. v. Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa, A.C. No. 7434, August 23,
2007, Velasco, Jr., J)
Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members.
Senator Santiago’s privilege speech attacking the Chief Justice and other members of the Supreme Court was not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. However, the lady senator clearly violated
Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a
member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the Court
and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with
the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice. Senator Santiago should
13 |ABRC2016.Pointers in Legal and Judicial Ethics (combined)/EVSA/crys
have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the people’s faith in the integrity of
the courts. (Antero J. Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J)
The lawyer should not be sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a state of uncertainty. The failure to
file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence.
A retained counsel is expected to serve the client with competence and diligence. This duty includes not merely
reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care and giving the client sound legal advice, but also properly representing
the client in court, attending scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases
with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do
so. The lawyer should not be sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a state of uncertainty. The failure to file a
brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence. This default translates to a violation of the
injunction of Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Antonio Conlu v. Atty. Ireneo
Aredonio, Jr., A.C. No. 4955, September 12, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J)
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to respect the courts order and
processes.
A lawyer is guilty of grave misconduct arising from his violation of Canon 16 of the CPR which provides that
“money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the profession of the lawyer should be
reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by
him.”
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to respect the courts order and
processes. A lawyer miserably fell short of his duties as such officer. He trifled with the writ of attachment the court issued.
He was remiss in his obligation of taking good care of the attached cars. He also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by
persons who had no business using it. He did not inform the court or at least the sheriff of the destruction of the Volvo car.
What is worse is that he took custody of them without so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its authority.
For his negligence and unauthorized possession of the cars, the Court found him guilty of infidelity in the custody
of the attached cars and grave misconduct. We must mention, at this juncture, that the victorious parties in the case are not
without legal recourse in recovering the Volvo's value from him should they desire to do so. (Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon, Jr.
v. Atty. Joselito Frial, A.C. No. 7820, September 12, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J)
Notaries public should refrain from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document unless the persons
who signed it are the same individuals who executed and personally appeared before the notaries public to attest
to the truth of what are stated therein.
Notaries public should refrain from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document unless the persons
who signed it are the same individuals who executed and personally appeared before the notaries public to attest to the
truth of what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question,
notaries public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain
that the document is the party’s free act or deed. Furthermore, notaries public are required by the Notarial Law to certify
that the party to the instrument has acknowledged and presented before the notaries public the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its number, place, and date of issue as part of
certification.
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice now requires a party to the instrument to present competent evidence of
identity: (a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature
of the individual; (b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction
who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses
neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows
to the notary public documentary identification. For failing to meet such requirements, Atty. Dimaano’s notarial
commission was revoked. He was disqualified from being commission for 2 years and was suspended from the practice of
law for 1 year. (Dolores I. Dela Cruz, et al. v. Atty. Jose R. Dimaano, Jr., A.C. No. 7781, September 12, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J)
37. Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua claimed that ALUMCORP, a company where he was the Vice-President and the corporate
legal counsel, was the licensee of the technical information and the patent on Cold Dip Covering of Sulfurous
Strands or Philippine Patent No. 14344. However, an investigation on the matter showed that ALUMCORP only
has rights as a licensee of the technical information and not the rights as a licensee of the patent. Did Atty.
Mendoza violate the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Yes. Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he
mislead or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice. In the case bar, by making it appear that ALUMCORP has the
rights as a licensee of the patent, when it fact it has no such rights, Atty. Mendoza violated the mandate of the
abovementioned Rule. As such, Atty. Mendoza is guilty of deliberately misleading and intentionally deceiving the court,
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (Sonic Steel Industries, Inc. vs Chua, A.C. No. 6942 July 17, 2013).
38. A lawyer consented to the submission of a falsified affidavit in order to beat the deadline in an electoral
protest. A complaint against him was filed, but he contended that he has been discharged from all causes of
action when the complainant filed a Release Waiver and Discharge. Is his contention correct? Why?
No. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken
and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official administration of
persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense
14 |ABRC2016.Pointers in Legal and Judicial Ethics (combined)/EVSA/crys
a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration
of justice.
The lawyer was found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court (Atty. Umaguing v. Atty. Wallen R. De Vera, A.C. No.
10451, February 4, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
39. Baldado ran and won in the 2004 National and Local Elections. Nival, a losing candidate, filed a Petition for
Quo Warranto with the RTC against Baldado, questioning his qualifications as a candidate. Baldado hired the
legal services of Atty. Mejica for the said case. The RTC rendered a Decision, directing the issuance of a Writ of
Quo Warranto ousting Baldado from the Office of the Sangguniang Bayan. On May 19, 2005, Atty. Mejica
received a copy of the Decision of the trial court, and he had a period of five days to appeal the Decision to the
COMELEC. Atty. Mejica did not file an appeal within the said period because according to him, the notice of the
decision could not be deemed officially received by him, as the decision had not yet been promulgated in open
court. Is Atty. Mejica in any way liable for his failure to appeal?
Yes. Atty. Mejica is liable of gross negligence, gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law for failing to appeal
the Decision of the trial court. Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides, “A lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence.” Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Atty. Mejica should have kept
himself abreast of Lindo v. COMELEC which states that notice in advance of promulgation is not part of the process of
promulgation. Thus, respondent is guilty of gross negligence, gross incompetence, and gross ignorance of the law for
failing to appeal the trial court's decision in the quo warranto case before the COMELEC within 5 days (Augusto P.
Baldado v. Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica A.C. No. 9120, March 11, 2013).
Lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed in his professional or private affairs.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either
in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the
Court(Tan, Jr. v. Gumba, A.C. No. 9000, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 527, 532; Roa v. Moreno, A.C. No. 8382, April 21, 2010, 618
SCRA 693, 699). Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the
dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code not
to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of
Professional Responsibility exposes the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, viz.:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice(Campuganv. Atty. Tolentino, Jr., A.C. No. 8261; Campugan v.
Atty. Caluya, A.C. No. 8725, March 11, 2015, Bersamin).
40. Atty. Mendoza, in her capacity as the Solicitor General, advised the Central Bank on the procedure to liquidate
GenBank and she filed a Petition for liquidation of Genbank, which later on became Allied bank controlled by
Lucio Tan. The PCGG in cases for ill-gotten wealth against Lucio Tan and Allied Bank moved to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza for having been the counsel for Central bank before and for actively intervening in the liquidation of
GenBank. Is Atty. Mendoza disqualified from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which
she had intervened while in Government office under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
No. Giving advice on the procedure for liquidation does not come under the term “matter” and cannot disqualify Atty.
Mendoza. The subject matter of the case for liquidation is different from the sequestration of stocks involved in the
PCGG cases. Intervention under Rule 6.03 means the act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings or in which had participated personally and substantially as a public officer, Also, ruling otherw ise will
deprive the former government lawyer the freedom to exercise his profession (Domondon, Legal and Judicial Ethics
with Bar Questions 1920-1998 and Supreme Court Decisions up to December, 1998, 1999).
41. Dario leased from Ben a building space where she operated a bar. Meanwhile, Dario entered a Retainer
Agreement with RazSally Law Office where Atty. Raz and Atty. Sally are partners. Ben terminated the lease for
non-payment of rentals. Thereafter, one Nora took over the operation of the bar under the latter’s business
name. Dario filed an ejectment case against Nora. Atty. Raz however, appeared as counsel for Nora despite the
subsistence of the Retainer Agreement with RazSally Law Office. Thus, a disbarment case was filed against
Atty. Raz. Atty. Raz argues that while Dario is a client of RazSally Law Office, his case is actually handled only by
his partner Atty. Sally and that he has no knowledge of any information entrusted to his partner. Decide the
case.
Atty. Raz is incorrect. A lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the party who has engaged the services of
his law firm brings the law profession into public disrepute and suspicion and undermines the integrity of justice.
15 |ABRC2016.Pointers in Legal and Judicial Ethics (combined)/EVSA/crys
Thus, Atty. Raz's argument that he never took advantage of any information acquired by his law firm in the course of
its professional dealings with the complainant, even assuming it to be true, is of no moment. A lawyer’s act of
representing and defending the other party of the case who was impleaded as one of the defendants in a case filed by
his client during the subsistence of the Retainer Agreement is a clear violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Indeed, Atty. Raz could have simply advised both
Dario and Nora to instead engage the services of another lawyer (Daging v. Atty. Davis, A.C. no. 9395, November 12,
2014).
Q – Is it not that practice of law is not a business, hence, the services of a lawyer should for free? Explain.
Answer: No. It is beyond question that considerable amount of time was exerted by the lawyer in ensuring the successful
defense of the client’s cause. He deserves to be awarded attorney’s fees.
The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of justice
underscores the need to secure him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and
respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition or
fraud on the part of his client as the client against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to see
that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is also its duty to see to it that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his
capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time
and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape
payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client he
himself would not get his due. (Rosario, Jr. v. de Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 191247, July 10, 2013).
MCLE
16 |ABRC2016.Pointers in Legal and Judicial Ethics (combined)/EVSA/crys
42. Who are exempted from MCLE?
The Executive
a. The President, Vice-President, and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of executive departments;
b. The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Justice;
c. The Solicitor-General and the Assistant Solicitor-General;
d. The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;
e. Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions; and
f. Governors and Mayors.
The Legislative
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
The Judiciary
The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the SC, incumbent and retired justices of the judiciary, incumbent members
of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy Program of
Continuing Legal Education;
The Academe
a. Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least
10 years in accredited law schools;
b. The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professional Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial
Academy; and
Non-practicing lawyers
a. Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
b. Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors.
Other exemptions
A member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post
graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of the
requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to be established by the
MCLE Committee.
Effect of failure to indicate in all pleadings filed the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of
Compliance or Certificate of Exemption.
The Court En Banc issued a Resolution dated January 14, 2014, which reads as follows: B.M. No. 1922 (Re:
Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education [MCLE] Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the
Courts the Counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption). - The Court Resolved, upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board, to: (a) AMEND the June 3, 2008 resolution by repealing the phrase
"Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings
from the records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required information would subject the counsel to
appropriate penalty and disciplinary action"
Notary public who notarizes a document even without the presence of the party, may he be suspended.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated
therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what are stated therein are facts they have personal
knowledge of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their representative’s names should appear in the said documents
as the ones who executed the same.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. By affixing
his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public
document. In doing so, he effectively proclaimed to the world that: (a) all the parties therein personally appeared before
him; (b) they are all personally known to him; (c) they were the same persons who executed the instruments; (d) he
inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (e) they acknowledged personally before him that they
voluntarily and freely executed the same. A notary public is mandated to discharge his sacred duties with faithful
observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat. The act of certifying
under oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without requiring the personal appearance of the persons executing the
JUDICIAL ETHICS
44. Judge L is assigned in Turtle Province. His brother ran for Governor in Rabbit Province. During the election
period, Judge L took a leave of absence to help his brother conceptualize the campaign strategy. He even
contributed a modest amount to the campaign kitty and hosted lunches and dinners. Did Judge L incur
administrative and/or criminal liability? (Bar, 2010)
Yes. Judge L incurred administrative liability. Rule 5.18 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which applies suppletorily to
the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, provides that “[A] Judge is entitled to entertain personal views
on political questions, but to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches,
contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political
activities.”
He may also be held criminally liable for violation of Sec. 26 (I) of the Omnibus Elect ion Code, which penalizes any
officer or employee in the civil service who, directly or indirectly, intervenes, in any election campaign or engages in
any partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order.
Judges of the first and second level courts are allowed to receive assistance from the local government units
where they are stationed.
Exceptions to the rule that judges and members of their families cannot accept gifts, award or benefit.
A judge may not stay at his house to make some research, resolve motions and make decisions during days when
he does not have scheduled hearings.
A judge must report to his office even if he has no hearing on regular days. Pursuant to Circular No. 13, dated July
1, 1987, the Supreme Court emphasized the need for punctuality and the faithful observance of office hours with Judges
being enjoined to strictly observe the requirement of eight (8) hours of service a day. This was reiterated in Administrative
Circular No. 1 of January 28, 1988. In a decided case, it was said that the law regulating court sessions does not permit any
“day off” from regular office hours to enable a judge to engage exclusively in research or decision-writing, no matter how
important (Lacuron v.Atienza, A.M. No. RTJ-90-456, January 14, 1992).
45. When can judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts perform the function of
notaries public ex officio, even if the notarization of the documents is not in connection with the exercise of
their official functions and duties?
MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities of circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in their capacity
as notary public ex officio perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public, provide that (1) all
notarial fees charged be for the account of the government and turned over to the municipal treasurer (Lapena vs
Marcos, A.M. No. 1969-MJ), and (2) certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer
or notary public in such municipality or circuit (Abadilla vs Tabiliran, A.M. MTC-92-716).
46. A judge is prohibited to serve as an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian and a fiduciary. Is this rule
absolute?
No. When the estate, trust, ward or person for whom he will act is a member of the immediate family – which is
limited to the spouse and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity – provided that the judge’s services as
fiduciary shall not interfere with the performance of his judicial functions.
Judge may not be subjected to disciplinary action for mere errors of judgment.
For the liability to attach for gross negligence of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of a judge must
not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established that the judge was moved by bad faith,
dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive (Dela Cruz v. Concepcion, 235 SCRA 597). Commented [Fitz2]: rephrase na lang itong 69 and 70
When a judge is liable for rendering an unjust judgment. May a judge be administratively liable for mere error of judgment
A judge may be held liable for rendering an unjust judgment when he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some
answer bad faith
other like motive (Heirs of the late Nassir Yasin v. Felix, 250 SCRA 545).
48. A complaint was filed 24 years after the alleged offending act was committed, when the judge was still a
practicing lawyer prior to his appointment as judge. Will the complaint be barred by prescription?
No. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of
the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court
(Heck v. Santos, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, February 23, 2004, cited in AGUIRRE, 2014).
If a judge has already retired when an administrative case was filed against him, he is no longer within the court’s
jurisdiction.
In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be filed during the
incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of respondent’s cessation from office.
49. State, with a brief explanation, whether the judge concerned may be sanctioned for the conduct stated below.
a) Refusing to inhibit himself although one of the lawyers in the case is his second cousin.
b) Deciding a case in accordance with a Supreme Court ruling but adding that he does not agree with the
ruling.
c) Dictating his decision in open court immediately after trial.
a) One of the mandatory grounds for inhibition of a judge is when he is related to any of the lawyers handling a case
before him within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity (Sec. 5 [f], New Code of Judicial Conduct,
Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court). A second cousin of a judge is his relative within the sixth degree. Hence, he
may not be sanctioned for not inhibiting on such ground.
b) There is nothing wrong with such action. In fact, if a judge of a lower court feels that a decision of the Supreme
Court is against his way of reasoning or against his conscience, he may state his opinion, but apply the law in
accordance with the interpretation of the Supreme Court (Alberto v. CFI of Manila, G.R. No. L-26364, May 29,
1968).
c) There is no rule prohibiting such conduct, especially in simple cases such as when an accused pleads guilty to an
Information for a minor offense. But in complex and serious cases, such conduct may be considered inappropriate
and the judge accused of arriving at hasty decisions. In the case of Young v. De Guzman, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1365,
February 18, 1999, the Supreme Court gave this advice:
“x x x (T)he judge must not sacrifice for expediency’s sake the fundamental requirements of due process nor to
forget that he must conscientiously endeavor each time to seek the truth, to know and aptly apply the law, and to
dispose of the controversy objectively and impartially, all to the end that justice is done to every party” (U.P. LAW
COMPLEX, Answer to the Bar Examination Questions in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises).
In ejectment cases, the first duty of a judge is to examine the allegations in the complaint and the evidence
appended to it, and to dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds apparent for the dismissal of a civil action.
If there is a ground for dismissal existing and apparent upon the filing of the complaint, and yet the judge allowed
the case to unnecessarily drag on, the judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.
Under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the first duty of the respondent upon the filing of the case for ejectment
was to examine the allegations in the complaint and the evidence appended to it, and to dismiss the case outright on any of
the grounds apparent for the dismissal of a civil action. In this case, the ground for dismissing the Civil Case existed and
was apparent upon the filing of the basic complaint. The representative’s lack of personality was reflected in the corporate
secretary's certificate appended to the complaint. Yet, respondent judge allowed the case to unnecessarily drag on for
more than five years. Further, respondent having allowed several and doubtless unnecessary postponements which
contributed to the delay in the resolution of what was otherwise a simple case. Undue delay in rendering a decision or
order constitutes a less serious offense for which respondent is subjected to a fine. (Josefina Naguiat v. Judge Mario B.
Capellan, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1782 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-1807-MTJ], March 23, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J)
Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling lack of familiarity with simple rules of
law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence which tends to erode the public trust in the competence
and fairness of the court which he personifies.
Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling lack of familiarity with simple rules of
law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence which tends to erode the public trust in the competence and
fairness of the court which he personifies. Not to know the law as basic, almost elementary, as the Rules of Court, or acting
in disregard of established rule of law as if he were not aware of the same constitutes gross ignorance whence no one is
excused, especially an RTC judge.
Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in favor of his mother, Eltesa, did not
disregard the res judicata rule. The more appropriate description of the legal situation engendered by the March 15, 2011
Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the child not to be returned to his father, is that respondent judge exhibited
fidelity to jurisprudential command to accord primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child. As it were, the matter of
custody, to borrow from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals," is not permanent and unalterable and can always be re-examined
and adjusted." And as aptly observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custody agreement can never be
regarded as "permanent and unbending," the simple reason being that the situation of the parents and even of the child
can change, such that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no longer be to the latter’s best interest. In a very real
sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of a minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata.
(Geoffrey Beckett v. Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, A.M. RTJ-12-2326, January 30, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J)
No less than the 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 15(1), Article VIII, mandates lower courts to decide or
resolve all cases or matters within three (3) months from their date of submission. In relation to this mandate, the Code of
Judicial Conduct directs judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the required period. The
Court, in Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, likewise requires judges to scrupulously observe the
periods provided in the Constitution. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable
reason, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of an administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.
(Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Leodegario C. Quilatan, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1745, September 27, 2010, Velasco, Jr.,
J)
Effect if a judge failed to decide 23 cases already submitted for decision within the reglementary period.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that lower courts have three months within which to
decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. Moreover, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the required period. In addition,
under SC Administrative Circular No. 13 “judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section
15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases
or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while
all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so.” The Court has reiterated this admonition in SC
Administrative Circular No. 3-99 which requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the
Constitution for deciding cases and the failure to comply therewith is considered a serious violation of the constitutional
right of the parties to speedy disposition of their cases. (Re: Submitted for Decision Before Judge Baluma, A.M. No. RTJ-13-
2355, September 2, 2013, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Q – A judge was charged administratively for having delayed the rendition of judgment in several cases submitted
before him. May he be held liable? Explain.
Answer: Yes. Decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a member of the bench.
The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of the judiciary so the ends of justice may not be
compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to provide litigants their constitutional right to a speedy
trial and a speedy disposition of their cases.
A judge is mandated to render a decision not more than 90 days from the time a case is submitted for decision.
Judges are to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the period specified in the Constitution, that
is, 3 months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum. Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for
administrative sanction against the defaulting judge, absent sufficient justification for his non-compliance therewith.
Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should administer justice without delay. Rule
3.05 of Canon 3 states that judges shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, the Court held that:
A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension
granted by this Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross
inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.
The Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon3, Rule 3.05 mandates judges to attend promptly
to the business of the court and decide cases within the periods prescribed by law and the Rules. Under
the 1987 Constitution, lower court judges are also mandated to decide cases within 90 days from
submission. (OCA v. Judge Bustamante, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1806, April 7, 2014, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the integrity,
competence and independence of the judiciary and make the administration of justice more efficient. Time
and again, we have stressed the need to strictly observe this duty so as not to negate our efforts to
minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our
courts.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Garcia-Blanco, the Court held that the 90-day reglementary
period is mandatory. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period constitutes a ground for
administrative liability except when there are valid reasons for the delay.
Q – A judge cited a person in contempt and ordered his detention for an inadvertent usurpation of his parking lot
on the theory that there was improper conduct on his part in doing so. May the judge be penalized? Explain.
Answer: Yes. Under the Rules, after a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
x x x.
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice.
The phrase “improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice” is so broad and general that it encompasses wide spectrum of acts that could constitute indirect contempt.
However, the act of complainant in parking his car in a slot allegedly reserved for respondent judge does not fall under this
category. There was no showing that he acted with malice and/or bad faith or that he was improperly motivated to delay
the proceedings of the court by making use of the parking slot supposedly reserved for respondent judge. It cannot also be
said that act of complainant constitutes disrespect to the dignity of the court. In sum, the incident is too flimsy and
inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect contempt proceeding. (Inonong v. Judge Francisco Ibay, A.M. No. RTC-09-
2175, July 28, 2009, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Effect if a municipal court judge prepared and notarized an “Extrajudicial Partition with Sale.”
SC Circular No. 1-90 prohibits judges from undertaking the preparation and acknowledgment of private
documents, contracts and other deeds of conveyance which have no direct relation to the discharge of their official
functions. In this case, respondent judge admitted that he prepared both the document itself, entitled “Extra-Judicial
Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale” and the acknowledgment of the said document, which had no relation
at all to the performance of his function as a judge. These acts of respondent judge are clearly proscribed by the aforesaid
Circular.
While it may be true that no notary public was available or residing within respondent judge’s territorial
jurisdiction, as shown by the certifications issued by the RTC Clerk of Court and the Municipal Mayor of Talibon, Bohol, SC
Circular No. 1-90 specifically requires that a certification attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in the said
municipality or circuit be made in the notarized document. Here, no such certification was made in the Extra-Judicial
Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale. Respondent judge also failed to indicate in his answer as to whether or
not any notarial fee was charged for that transaction, and if so, whether the same was turned over to the Municipal
Treasurer of Talibon, Bohol. Clearly, then, respondent judge, who was the sitting judge of the MCTC, Talibon-Getafe, Bohol,
failed to comply with the aforesaid conditions prescribed by SC Circular No. 1-90, even if he could have acted as notary
public ex-officio in the absence of any lawyer or notary public in the municipality or circuit to which he was assigned.
(Fuentes v. Judge Buno, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1204, July 28, 2008, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Effect if judge did not set the preliminary conference of an ejectment suit within 30 days after the answer was
filed.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods. In general, courts are required to decide cases submitted for
decision within three months from the date of such submission. With respect to cases falling under the Rule on Summary
Procedure, first level court are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or the
expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to render judgment.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes
the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and
basic legal principles. Basic legal procedures must be at the palm of a judge’s hands. (Hipe v. Judge Literato, A.M. No. MTJ-
11-1781, April 25, 2012, Leoanrdo-de Castro, J).
The Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, for it
cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people’s faith and
23 |ABRC2016.Pointers in Legal and Judicial Ethics (combined)/EVSA/crys
confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross
inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction on them.
Q – A judge was charged with sexual harassment by one of the employees of the court, Allegedly, he kissed the
lady-employee, rubbed his body against her’s. when she pushed him, he knelt down with one hand clasping her
waist while the other was on her breast. There was however no substantial evidence to prove the allegations. Can
the judge be penalized? Explain.
Answer: No, considering that there was no sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that the judge committed the act,
he should be exonerated. Administrative complaints against members of the judiciary are viewed by the Court with utmost
care, for proceedings of this nature affect not only the reputation of the respondents concerned, but the integrity of the
entire judiciary as well. (Aquino v. Acosta, 429 Phil. 498 [2002]). Considering that the complainants failed to present
substantial evidence to prove the alleged sexual advances committed against them by respondent, elementary justice
dictates that he be exonerated from the said charge. (Samahan ng mga Babae sa Hudikatura (Samabahu) v. Judge Cesar O.
Untalan, A.M. No. RTC-13-2363, February 25, 2015, Villarama, J).
Q – In administrative complaints against judges who has the burden of proof? Explain.
Answer: In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his complaint with
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. Further, it is settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function primarily lodged in the
Investigating Justice. The finding of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of
the unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. The rule which concedes due respect,
and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to
administrative cases. However, there are some exceptions to the rule according finality to the trial judge’s assessment of a
witness’ testimony, such as when his evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would affect the result of the
case. (Samahan ng mga Babae sa Hudikatura (Samabahu) v. Judge Cesar O. Untalan, A.M. No. RTC-13-2363, February 25,
2015, Villarama, J).
Q – A complaint was filed against a judge alleging gross-ignorance of the law and gross inefficiency. It appears that
there were complaints for slight physical injuries before the MTC. The accused filed a MTD on the ground that
there was no prior referral to the Lupon for conciliation which is prohibited under Sec. 412 of the Local
Government Code. The motion was denied, hence, the complaint. In his answer, the judge admitted and
apologized for his mistake, “attributing it to pure oversight and inadvertence.” He said that “he had no intention
to disregard the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure or apply his own interpretation of the rule.” He explained
that the inadvertence “was mainly because of the bulk of work that he had to attend to, as the case was brought to
him barely a year since he was appointed as a judge. He admitted that “he erroneously thought that the
certification to file action was for Criminal Case No. 10-13570 and not Criminal Case 10-13569.” Can the judge be
penalized? Explain.
Answer: Yes, because of his carelessness in disposing of the motion. His experience as a public attorney and prosecutor
should have ingrained in him well-settled doctrines and basic tenets of law. He cannot be relieved from the consequences
of his actions simply because he was newly appointed and his case load was heavy. These circumstances are not unique to
him. His carelessness disposition of the motions is a reflection of his competency as a judge in discharging his official
duties.
Judges are to be reminded that it is the height of incompetence to dispense cases callously and in utter disregard
of procedural rules. Whether the resort to the shortcuts is borne out of ignorance or convenience is immaterial. Judges
took an oath to dispense their duties with competence and integrity; to fall short would be a disservice not only to the
entire judicial system, but more importantly to the public. Respondent’s failure must not be brushed aside. (Chua Keng Sin
v. Judge Mangente, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1851, February 11, 2015, Leonen, J).
Q – Explain the relationship between the judge on the one hand and media and public opinion on the other.
Answer: Media, as an institution, is undisputedly a pillar of a democratic polity. It is the main engine in the formulation of
public opinion. It can indeed influence in large measure all instrumentalities of government — sometimes, even the
judiciary. This reality sometimes clashes with the doctrine of judicial independence — and this happens when media
intrudes into the domain of judicial adjudication. In such a case, judges are advised that, in furtherance of the canon of
judicial independence, they should ignore public opinion, disregard intrusive editorials and columns and brush aside the
horn in arguments and opinions of TV and radio commentators.
In Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, the SC said:
It appears that the trial court has been moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the
detriment of the impartial administration of justice. The petitioner as portrayed by media is not exactly
a popular person. Nevertheless, the trial court should not have been influenced by this irrelevant
consideration, remembering instead that its only guide was the mandate of the law.
Corollary, a judge should not be afraid to render unpopular decisions. He is not supposed to
seek popularity but to render justice. If a judge believes that his decision is supported by the evidence
and the applicable law, he should render it even if he has a reasonable apprehension that he would be
pillored by media or the public for his judgment. Justice commands that in such a situation, the judge
should be willing to bite the bullet — that is what moral courage is all about! (Libarios v. Dabalos, A.M.
RTJ-89-1286, July 11, 1991, 199 SCRA 48).
Canon 3: Impartiality
Q – A judge ordered the presentation of specific documentary evidence without a corresponding motion from any
party or without the participation of the parties. Is the act of the judge proper? Why?
Answer: No. The act of the judge constituted undue interference in the conduct of the trial which tended to build or bolster
the case of one of the parties. The judge’s act violates the canon of impartiality. (Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank, G.R. Nos. 149797-98, February 13, 2004, 422 SCRA 649).
Certainly, a judge can ask questions from witnesses but this should be limited to clarifying vague points in the
narration of witnesses. Questions designed to disentangle obscurity in the testimony and to elicit additional relevant
evidence to fill in the gaps in a testimony are not improper. (Paco v. Quilala, et. al., A.M. No. RTJ-02-1699, October 15, 2003,
413 SCRA 364). In other words, what is prohibited is the asking of adversarial or impeaching questions.
In disposing of a criminal case, a judge should avoid appearing like an advocate for either party. It is also
improper for a judge to push actively for amicable settlement against the wishes of a party. A judge’s unwelcome
persistence makes the judge vulnerable to suspicions of favoritism. (Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-04-1535,
March 12, 2004, 425 SCRA 40).
Q – A party litigant moved for the inhibition of a judge but did not present evidence of partiality. Should the judge
inhibit himself? Explain.
Answer: No. Bare allegations of partially and prejudgment will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence
to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his role to dispense justice according to law and evidence
without fear or favor. (Heirs of Juaban v. Boncale, et. al., G.R. No. 156011, July 6, 2008, 557 SCRA 1; Law Firm of Tungcol &
Tibayan v. CA, G.R. No. 169298, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 451).
Inhibition must be for just and valid causes: mere impression of bias and partiality is not ground for a judge to
inhibit, especially when the charge is without sufficient basis. (City of Naga v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 174042, July 9, 2008, 528
SCRA 528).
Q – A judge inhibited himself on the ground that he had personal knowledge of the disputed evidentiary facts. Is
the act proper? Why?
Answer: In Umale v. Villaluz, G.R. No. 33508, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 84, the Supreme Court commended a judge who
voluntarily inhibited himself on the ground that he had personal knowledge of the case.
When a judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings, he should recuse
from the case.
The purpose of this ground for disqualification is to avoid a situation where a judge may factor into the decisional
process facts which are not borne out by evidence duly presented in and admitted by the court in the course of trial. Thus,
any kind of knowledge of a judge which he obtains extrajudicially about a case before him should be sufficient reason for
him to recuse from the case. For example, if a judge witnessed the killing of a person, he should disqualify himself from
trying a criminal case involving such incident which is filed and raffled to his court.
Q – A Municipal Trial Court judge took cognizance of a criminal complaint lodged by his brother, and issued a
warrant of arrest. May the judge be disciplined for his act? Explain.
Answer: Yes, in fact such judge was dismissed from service. The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a
case where, as in the instant case, the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in
a manner completely free from suspicion as to his fairness and integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge
cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear
Voluntary inhibition
A judge is allowed under the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, to voluntary inhibit
from a case for just or valid reasons other than those grounds of disqualification. The judge should always remind himself
to hear or decide cases filed or raffled to his court. In inhibition of judges, a judge may motu proprio or on motion of a
party voluntarily recuse from a case if he has good or valid reasons which render him incapable of acting objectively on the
case.
Absent any ground for disqualification, a judge should not inhibit and if a motion to that effect is filed, he should
deny it if, despite the circumstances cited by the movant, he honestly believes that he can act on the case objectively. That
notwithstanding, it may be helpful for a judge, faced with a motion to inhibit, to consider the counsel of the Supreme Court:
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made
of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant
arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts
of justice is not impaired.
One factor that a judge should consider in resolving a motion for voluntary inhibition is the availability of a judge
to take over the case should he decide to recuse from it. Parayno v. Meneses, G.R. No. 112684, April 26, 1994, 231 SCRA
807, suggests that under the circumstances, the judge should not inhibit in order that justice may not be delayed.
Competence
The Constitution prescribes that a judge, among others, must be a person of proven competence. Antithetical to
competence is gross ignorance of the law. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, an error or irregularity on the part of a
judge on the application and interpretation of the law must not only be contrary to law and jurisprudence but should be
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.
Administrative complaint against justices pending petition with SC is not proper; judicial remedies should be
availed.
The acts complained of in an administrative case against justices of the CA relate to the validity of the proceedings
before the CA which were done in the exercise of their judicial functions. Resort to administrative charges against them is
not proper.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through
available judicial remedies. (Maylas, Jr. v. Sese, 529 Phil. 594, 597 (2006); Bautista v. Abdulwahid, A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-
CA-J, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 428, 434). Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement or
substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties
aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments. (Monticalbo v. Maraya, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197, April 13, 2011, 648
SCRA 573, 583, citing Flores v. Abesamis, 341 Phil. 299, 313 (1997)).
In Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. Laviña, 530 Phil. 441 (2006), it was ruled that resort to and exhaustion of judicial
remedies and a final ruling on the matter, are prerequisites for the taking of appropriate measures against the judges
concerned, whether of criminal, civil or administrative nature. If the assailed act is subsequently found and declared to be
correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all.
Resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final resolution of the judicial issues involved constitutes
an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice and further
clog the courts’ dockets. Those who seek relief from the courts must not be allowed to ignore basic legal rules and abuse
court processes in their efforts to vindicate their rights. (Re: Verified Complaint of AMA Land Inc. against Hon. Bueser, et
al., A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-202-CA-J, January 5, 2013; See also: Fernandez, et al. v. CA Associate Justice Bato, et al., A.M. OCA
IPI No. 12-201-CA-J, February 19, 2013).
Q – During the hearing a case, where Mayor Villarosa was a party, stepped out of the courtroom to take a call. He
exited through the door used by the judge and the employees of the court. According to complainants, the Mayor
did not speak to anyone, not even his lawyer, before leaving the courtroom. Thus, it came as a surprise to
everyone when respondent suddenly explained that the Mayor had to excuse himself for an important
appointment. May the judge be penalized for such action? Explain.
Answer: Yes, because of acts of impropriety. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities. (Canon 4).
The above provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of impropriety, but even acts that have
the appearance of impropriety. This is because appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial
functions. A judge — like Ceasar's wife — must not only be pure and faithful, but must also be above suspicion. (Dionisio v.
Escaño, 362 Phil. 46 [1999]).
In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the court’s permission to leave while the
trial was ongoing, respondent appeared to serve as the former’s advocate. He did so by declaring in open court that the
abrupt exit of the Mayor should be excused, as the latter had an important appointment to attend. Respondent does not
deny this in his Comment. It was the Mayor’s lawyer, and not respondent judge, who had the duty of explaining why the
mayor left the courtroom without asking for the court’s permission.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may
erode the people's faith in the Judiciary. (Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692
[Antonio Rosete v. Securities and Exchange Commission], 586 Phil. 321 [2008]). Members of the Judiciary should be
beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge
of their official duties, as well as in their personal behavior and everyday life. (Ladignon v. Garong, 584 Phil. 352 [2008]).
The actions of respondent no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust in him as a judge. He gave
petitioners reason to doubt his integrity and impartiality. Petitioners cannot be blamed for thinking that respondent must
have directly communicated with Mayor Villarosa. Otherwise, he would not have been able to explain that the Mayor could
no longer return to attend the hearing after leaving, when not even the latter’s own lawyers knew that. (Ascano, Jr., et al. v.
Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, January 12, 2015).
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
It is clear from all the foregoing that respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge.
Q – Petitioners claimed that during the hearings of a case that the judge “argued, berated, accused, scolded,
confused and admonished petitioners without basis or justification.” They further claimed that respondent judge
asked complainants “confusing and misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit answers damaging to
the cause of petitioners and favorable to the cause of their adversary.” May the judge be penalized for his actions?
Explain.
Answer: Yes. The judge raised his voice and uttered abrasive and unnecessary remarks to petitioners’
witness.31 Respondent failed to conduct himself in accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, (A.M. NO. 03-05-01-SC [2004]) which reads:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge
deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and
others subject to their influence, direction or control.
A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court, (De la Cruz v. Carretas,
559 Phil. 5 (2007) citing Retuya v. Equipilag, 180 Phil. 335 [1979]), viz:
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of
patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must
choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is
esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness. (Ascano, Jr., et al. v. Judge
Jose Jacinto, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, January 12, 2015).
IMPEACHMENT
50. What are the grounds that may warrant the impeachment of a member of the Supreme Court?
Section 2, Art. XI of the Constitution provides that: “The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of:
28 |ABRC2016.Pointers in Legal and Judicial Ethics (combined)/EVSA/crys
a. culpable violation of the Constitution;
b. treason;
c. bribery;
d. graft and corruption;
e. other high crimes or
f. betrayal of public trust.
All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.”
51. Atty. Cuenco filed a complaint for the disbarment alleging that Justice Fernan appeared as counsel for the
instituted heirs in the Vito Borromeo intestate estate proceedings, and despite having already accepted his
appointment as an Associate Justice of the Court, continues to be counsel for the instituted heirs. He also
alleged that Justice Fernan exerted personal efforts to take away the Vito Borromeo proceedings from the
Supreme Court en banc, the First and Second Divisions, to his Office to enable him to influence the decision or
the outcome. The records, however, reveal that Justice Fernan withdrew as counsel as early as February 19,
1968, long before his appointment to the Court in April 1986. An annotation appears beside his signature,
which states: “No part – I appeared as counsel for one of the parties.” Will the complaint for disbarment
prosper?
No. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine
Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for
disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to
ran afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment
for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution (Cuenco v.Fernan, A.M. No. 3135,
February 17, 1988).
52. In the case for X’s impeachment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, X admitted that he has P80 Million in 3
Peso accounts and US$2.4 Million in 4 US Dollar accounts, but that he had purposely not declared these assets
for 2 reasons: (1) That his Peso accounts represented "co-mingled funds" with the funds belonging to other
parties such as the Basa Guidote Enterprises, Inc. (BGEI) or his children, and (2) That he was not required to
report or declare his foreign currency deposits in his SALN because they were absolutely confidential under
R.A. 6426. Is he correct?
No. If, indeed, any of the Respondent’s cash deposits were co-mingled with the funds belonging to other parties, the
Respondent was still duty-bound to declare these deposits in his SALN, they being admittedly under his name.
Assuming that any part of such deposits in truth belonged to third parties, the Respondent could have indicated such
third-party funds as corresponding liabilities in his SALN. That would have reflected his real net worth.
As regards the second contention, the Respondent Chief Justice's reliance on the absolute confidentiality accorded to
foreign currency deposits under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426 is grossly misplaced. The Constitution, in Article
XI, Sec. 17, provides that "A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often as may be
required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth. x x x "
The provisions of R.A. 6426 cannot be interpreted as an exception to the unequivocal command and tenor of Article
XI, Sec. 17, of the 1987 Constitution. x x x The so-called conflict of laws between R.A. Nos. 6713 and 6426 is more
illusory than real. Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 merely prohibits the examination, inquiry or looking into a foreign
currency deposit account by an entity or person other than the depositor himself. But there is nothing in R.A. No. 6426
which prohibits the depositor from making a declaration on his own of such foreign currency funds, especially in this
case where the Constitution mandates the depositor who is a public officer to declare all assets under oath ( The vote
of the Senate President HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, On Article II of the Articles of Impeachment against Hon. Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona).
Sec. 1. Courts always open; justice to be promptly and impartially administered, for the following:
1. Filing of any pleading, motion or other papers;
2. The trial of cases;
3. Hearing of motions; and
4. Issuance of orders or rendition of judgments.
Exception: Legal holidays
As to publicity of records
General Rule: The records of every court of justice shall be public records, available for the inspection of any
interested person, at all proper business hours, under the supervision of the clerk having custody of such records,
Exception: Any special case, have forbidden their publicity, in the interest of morality or decency.
Writs of execution issued by inferior courts may be enforced in any part of the part of the Philippines without any
previous approval of the judge of first instance.
Criminal process may be issued by a justice of the peace or other inferior court, to be served outside his province,
when the district judge, or in his absence the provincial fiscal, shall certify that in his opinion the interest of justice
require such service.
Grounds for Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges under the Rules of Court:
1. Mandatory or Compulsory Disqualification (RULES OF COURT, Rule 137)(PREP)
a. When he, or his wife, or child is Pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise;
b. When he is Related to either party within the sixth (6th) degree of consanguinity or affinity or to counsel
within the fourth (4th) civil degree;
c. When he has been an Executor, guardian, administrator, trustee or counsel; or
30 |ABRC2016.Pointers in Legal and Judicial Ethics (combined)/EVSA/crys
d. When he has Presided in an inferior court where his ruling or decision is subject to review.
2. Voluntary Inhibition: A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself, for just and valid
reasons other than those mentioned above (Rule 137, Sec. 1).
Rationale: No judge should handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to
bias and partiality (Ubanes v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 72, 1994).
53. Rebecca’s complaint was raffled to the sala of Judge A. Rebecca is a daughter of Judge A’s wife by a previous
marriage. This is known to the defendant who does not, however, file a motion to inhibit the Judge. Is the
Judge justified in not inhibiting himself from the case?
No. The judge is not justified in not inhibiting himself. It is mandatory for him to inhibit if he is related to any of the
parties bv consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil. Judge A, being the stepfather of Rebecca, is related to her by
affinity by just one degree. “Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceeding in which they are
unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to
decide the matter impartially”. The fact that Rebecca is a daughter of Judge A’s wife is enough to make a reasonable
observer doubt him impartiality (U.P. LAW COMPLEX, Answer to the Bar Examination Questions in Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises)
54. In a criminal case for falsification and use of falsified document, the judge was charged with impartiality for
having failed to inhibit himself despite the fact that he was related to the accused within the fourth degree of
affinity, the wife of the accused being the first cousin of the judge. Was the act of the judge proper? Explain.
No. Under Rule 137, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, a judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the case without the consent of all parties, expressed in
writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record. This prohibition is not limited to cases in which he acts by
resolving motions and issuing orders as respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case. The purpose of the
prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge.
A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned (Canon 3, Rule
3.12) and he should administer justice impartially and without delay (Canon 1, Rule 1.02; Lazo v. Judge Antonio Tiong,
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173, December 15, 1998, 101 SCAD 692).
55. RTC Judge Q is a deacon in the Iglesia ni Kristo church in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. R, a member of
the same religious sect belonging to the same INK community in San Francisco del Monte, filed a case against S
who belongs to the El Shaddai charismatic group. The case was raffled to Judge Q’s sala. The lawyer of S filed a
motion to disqualify Judge Q on the ground that since he and the plaintiff belonged to the same religious sect
and community in San Francisco del Monte, Judge Q would not possess the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge. Judge Q denied the motion on the ground that the reason invoked for his disqualification was not
among the grounds for disqualification under the Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct. Was Judge
Q’s denial of the motion for inhibition well-founded?
Yes. The fact that Judge Q and Litigant R both belong to the INK while Litigant S belongs to the El Shaddai group, is not
a mandatory ground for disqualifying Judge Q from presiding over the case. The motion for his inhibition is addressed
to his sound discretion and he should exercise the same in a way the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not
impaired. He should reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought
that the Judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him (Dimacuha v. Concepcion, 117 SCRA 630).
56. A judge, in order to ease his clogged docket, would exert efforts to compel the accused in criminal cases to
plead guilty to a lesser offense and advise party litigants in civil cases, whose petitions appear weak, to accept
the compromise offered by the opposing party. Is the practice legally acceptable?
Yes. The practice is legally acceptable as long as the judge does not exert pressure on the parties and takes care that
he does not appear to have prejudged the case. Where a judge has told a party that his case is weak before the latter
was fully heard, such was considered as a ground for his disqualification (Castillo v. Juan, 62 SCRA 124).