Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Castoriadis, Foucault,
and Autonomy
New Approaches to Subjectivity,
Society, and Social Change
Marcela Tovar-Restrepo
B L O O M S B U R Y
C astoriadis, Foucault, a n d A utonom y
“In a d isc u ssio n o f th e h ig h est in te lle ctu a l quality, T ovar-R estrepo e x p lic a tes
Castoriadis* p rin cip a l ideas, p la c in g the d e v e lo p m e n t o f h is th o u g h t in its
historical a n d p o litica l c o n te x t, a n d e n g a g in g critically with the o n g o in g
d e b a te s su r r o u n d in g his work. In c o m p a r in g C astoriad is’ th o u g h t w ith that
o f th e m o r e w idely-know n F o u ca u lt, s h e u n c o v e r s th e str en g th s a n d w eak
n e sse s o f e a c h , an d p resen ts a p ersu asive ca se f o r the u n d er-recogn ized
valu e o f C astoriad is1 th o u g h t for u n d e rsta n d in g th e h u m an su b ject and
society, a n d as an in te lle ctu a l fo u n d a tio n for th e p o litic a l p r o je ct o f a u to n
om y. T h is b o o k is a n im p o r ta n t a d d itio n to th e g r o w in g b o d y o f sch olarsh ip
o n C astoriadis' th o u g h t a n d a valu a b le c o n tr ib u tio n to th e critical appraisal
o f F o u c a u lt ”
J e f f K looger, S w in b u rn e U n iversity o f T e ch n o lo g y , A ustralia, auth or o f
C astoriadis: Psyche, Society, A utonom y
M arcela Tovar-Restrepo
λ \
cc m lim ju n *
C ontinuum International Publishing G roup
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11 York Road Suite 704
London SEI "NX N ew York NY 10038
www.continuumbooks.com
The author has asserted h is/h er right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act, 1988, to be identified as Author o f this work.
In tr o d u c tio n 1
Notes 141
Bibliography 151
In d e x 161
Acknowledgments
Ici encore K a n t a v a it v u la chose, bien q u ’il l'a il travestie, lorsqu'il disait que
l'œ uvre d 'a rt est - présentation d a n s l'in tu itio n des Idées de la R aison ». Car ce
que l'a rt présente, ce n e sont p a s les Idées de la R aison, m ais le Chaos, l'Abîme,
le S a n s Fond, à quoi il donne forme. E t p a r cette présentation, il est fenêtre s u r le
Chaos, il abolit l'assurance tranquillem ent stupide de notre vie quotidienne, il
nous rappelle que nous v ivons toujours a u bord de l 'Abîme - ce q u i est le principal
savoir d 'u n être autonome.
H o b b es w as r ig h t th o u g h for th e w ro n g r ea so n . F ear o f d e a th is in d e e d
th e m a in state o f in stitu tio n . N o t fe a r o f b e in g k ille d by th e n e x t m a n but
th e ju s tifie d fear that ev ery th in g , e v en m e a n in g w ill dissolve.
g r o u p d iv id e d in to tw o at th e e n d o f 1 9 5 9 a n d th e b e g in n in g o f 1960.
S o m e m e m b er s, in c lu d in g C astoriadis, w ere in favor o f a m o r e radical
reje c tio n o f M arx’s e c o n o m ic theory' a n d cla ssica l p o sitio n s tow ards
p a u p e riz a tio n , e c o n o m ic crisis, th e grow th o f th e reserve industrial
arm y a n d th e role o f theory, w h ile th e rest w e r e in favor o f k e e p in g
M arxist p r in c ip le s. T h is d iscu ssio n lasted fo r th r e e years as b o th sid es
kept d isa g r e e in g u n til th e ir sp lit o c cu rred in 1963. T h e first g ro u p
kept S B a n d th e rest k ep t PO . A fter th e split th e g r o u p p u b lish e d six
issu es o f the review , th e last o n e o n Jun e 196 5 . SB c o n tin u e d fu n c
t io n in g un til 1966 w ith a c o n sid e r a b le read ersh ip : arou n d 1000 c o p
ie s s o ld p e r issu e a n d m e e tin g s w e n t u p to 2 0 0 p e o p le , N ev erth eless,
th e r e w a s a lm o st n o feed b a ck from th e m e m b e r s o f the g r o u p . T h e
w ork, in C astoriadis’ju d g m e n t, h ad b e c o m e solitary, acq u irin g a m ore
p h ilo so p h ic a l ch a r a cte r in an a ttem p t to retu rn to th e fo u n d a tio n s o f
th e c o n c e p tio n s o f so c ie ty a n d history. C astoriad is p r o p o se d th e n the
su sp e n sio n o f th e p u b lication .
L e T a m b o u r C a fé (1 9 4 9 -5 3 )
T h e d isc u ssio n raised b y S ou B in their first p u b lic a tio n fin d s its r o o ts in the
political e x p e r ie n c e C astoriadis h ad w ith th e G r e e k C o m m u n ist P a m
d u r in g 1 9 4 4 /1 9 4 5 ." T h is e x p e r ie n c e le d h im to sy m p a th ize with Trotskyism
a n d h e lp e d to d e v e lo p h is early p o s itio n tow ard bureaucracy. U sin g
Trotskyists' last w ritin gs as a p o in t o f d e p a r tu r e , C astoriad is a r g u e d that a
critical e x a m in a tio n o f th e U SSR was essen tia l if M arxist revolu tion ary
th eo ry w as to p rovid e a c o h e r e n t p o litic a l o r ie n ta tio n fo r m ilitan ts. A lth o u g h
S o u B d e fe n d e d th e Trotskyist view in w h ich p olitical org a n iza tio n and
id e o lo g ic a l “corr ec tn e ss” w e re fu n d a m en ta l e le m e n ts o f revolutionary
p o litics, th e y also d isa g r e ed w ith his g e n e r a l c o n c e p tio n o f Stalinism .
C on trary to Trotskyist p rin cip les, th e g r o u p u n d e r sto o d b u reaucracy n o t as
a d ir ec t r esu lt o f Stalin b e in g in pow er, b u t as a p h e n o m e n o n lin k e d with
th e L e n in ist V an guard Party a n d its d ivision o f in te lle ctu a l a n d m anu al
w ork in revolu tion ary activities w h er e w ork ers c o u ld n e v e r tran scen d m e re
p r o leta r ia n co n scio u sn ess.
F or Trotskyists, th e Stalinists h ad lin e d u p o n th e sid e o f b o u r g e o is o r d e r
a n d r e p r e se n te d reform ism . Trotskyism e n v isa g e d a se c o n d rev o lu tio n as
th e w o r k in g class r e je cte d S talin ism an d r e-ap p rop riated th e revolutionary
c o r e o f M arxism . T h e ir tactic c o n siste d in su p p o r tin g th e CP to lake pow er
w ith th e h o p e that it w o u ld b e c o m e fra g ile a n d t h e c o n tr a d ictio n betw een
16 Castoriadis, Foucault, a n d A utonomy
“A u to g estio n ” : T h e germ o f a u to n o m y (1 9 5 8 -6 9 )
T h e Radical Im aginary
T h e Existing-Being
(a) T h e livin g-b ein g. Every livin g b e in g , from th e sin g le cellu lar level o n
to th e m o st c o m p le x o rgan ism , can b e c o n sid e r e d as a “fo r-itself’. T h e
liv in g -b ein g involves th e r efo r e a natural a n d b iological d im e n sio n .
As a “fo r-itself’, d ie livin g b e in g c a n n o t r e p r e se n t its e lf o u t o f its
ow n interior. A “fo r-itself’ c a n n o t b e c o n c e iv e d e x c e p t from w ithin. It
exists in a n d th ro u g h a p e r m a n e n t clo su re. H ow ever, its c lo su r e d o es
n o t m e a n th at th e r e is n o th in g “o u ts id e ”; c erta in ly th e r e is. T h e “for-
itse lf' e n c o u n te r s th e e x ter n a l th r o u g h w h a t C astoriadis calls a sh ock .
In C astoriad is’ view, n atu re d o e s n o t c o n ta in in form ation w aitin g to
b e g a th e r e d , it on ly a n n o u n c e s its p r e se n c e th r o u g h a s h o c k that d o e s
n o t m e a n in fo rm a tio n in th e strict se n se . T h e “for-itself* e n c o u n te r s
th e e x te r n a l, w h ich b e c o m e s so m e th in g o n ly a s th e for-itself fo rm s it.
T h is c a n b e c a lle d th e c o g n itiv e fu n c tio n o f th e livin g b e in g .
(b) T h e h u m a n p sy ch e. T h e h u m an p sych e is n o t d e fin e d by Castoriadis
as a h o m o g e n o u s w h o le , b u t as a plu rality th a t c o n ta in s variou s intra-
p sych ical “in sta n ce s” o r “p sych ical p e r so n s.” It refers in psych oan a
lytical term s to t h e e g o , id, a n d th e su p er-ego.
T h e sp ec ific ity o f th e h u m a n p sych e c o n sists in its d efu n ctio n a l-
iz a tio n in r ela tio n to iLs b io lo g ic a l c o m p o n e n t. In o th e r w ords, the
h u m a n p sy ch e d o c s n o t fo llo w fu n c tio n a l c a n o n ic p a ttern s that
r e s p o n d to b io lo g ic a l fu n ctio n s. It is in th e h u m a n p sych e w h ere the
rad ical im a g in a tio n a n d its q u id p ro q u o facu lty o p e r a te , e n a b lin g
u n fix e d r ep re se n ta tio n s a n d n o n c a n o n ic a l r esp o n ses, e n ta ilin g the
p r e d o m in a n c e o f rep resen ta tio n a l p lea su re o v er organ p leasu re.8
T h e h u m a n p sy ch e e x p e r ie n c e s a stratification p ro cess, fr o m a clo sed
m o n a d to a social ind ivid u al, as b riefly e x p la in e d later.
(c ) T h e s o c ia l ind ivid u al. T h is is th e in d ivid u al u n d e r sto o d as a social
p r o d u c t. It is th e tran sform ation o f th e h u m a n p sy ch e by society.
Society p ro d u ces social su bjects by p r o v id in g se n se , m e a n in g , o r
Cornelius Castoriadis ' Ontology o f Creation 47
C astoriadis writes:
u n d e r c e r ta in c o n d itio n s th e “in o r g a n ic ” c a n p r o d u c e th e “o r g a n ic ”: the
living b e in g b rings a b o u t th e a p p ea r a n c e o f laws a n d q u a lities that, as
su c h , h a v e n o m e a n in g in th e physical realm . It is im m ed ia te ly e v id e n t that
th e e m e r g e n c e o f the b e in g -fo r-itself (th e livin g b e in g , p sy ch e, th e social-
h istorical) e n ta ils a n essen tia l fr a g m e n ta tio n o f (otal B e in g /b e in g . . .T h e
fact o f c r e a tio n also h as w eighty o n to lo g ic a l im p lic a tio n . . . it en ta ils the
a b a n d o n m e n t o f the h yp er c a teg o r y o f d e te r m in a c y as a b so lu te . . . b u t it
is a lo g ica l error to th in k . . . that d u e to th is fact o n e m ust rep lace this
h y p er c a te g o iy by th e id ea o f a b so lu te a n d c o m p le te in d ete rm in a tio n .
My p h ilo so p h y is n o t a “p h ilo so p h y o f in d é te r m in a tio n .” C rea tio n m ean s,
precisely, th e p o s itin g o f n ew d e te r m in a tio n s— th e e m e r g e n c e o f new
form s, e id e , th e r e fo r e ip so fa c to th e e m e r g e n c e o f n ew laws— th e laws
a p p e r ta in in g to th e se m o d e s o f b e in g . A t the m o s t g e n e ra l level, th e id ea
o f c r e a tio n im p lie s in d éte rm in a tio n u n iq u ely o n ly in th e fo llo w in g sense:
th e totality o f w hat is n e v e r s o totally a n d ex h a u stiv e ly “d e te r m in e d ” that
m ig h t e x c lu d e (r e n d e r im p o ssib le) th e su r g in g fo r th o f n e w d e te rm in a
tio n s (1 9 9 7 c , pp. 3 6 8 -9 ).
C astoriadis adds:
T h e p sy ch e is a fo r m in s o far as it is f o r m in g ,. . . th e “e n te le c h y ” in q u es
tion h e r e is s o m e th in g en tirely d iffe re n t from th e p r e d e te r m in e d pred es
tin ation i n view o f an e n d , a d e fin ite telos. . . th is “e n te le c h y ” is th e radical
im a g in a tio n , p h a n ta sia su b jected to n o given e n d b u t the c r e a tio n o f its
e n d s , . . . th e living b o d y is th e h u m a n livin g b o d y in s o far as it rep resen ts
a n d r ep re se n ts itself, . . . it puts th in g s an d itse lf in to “im a g es” far b eyon d
w h at w o u ld b e r e q u ire d o r im p lie d by its “n a tu r e ” a s livin g b e in g . For the
living h u m a n bod y, that is to say, originally, for th e psych ical m o n a d , all
e x ter n a l calls, all e x ter n a l o r in tern al “sen sorial stim u la tio n s,” all “im p res
s io n s” b e c o m e representations (1 9 8 7 , p p . 3 0 0 - 1 ) .
P sy ch e an d so c iety
S u m m in g u p a n im p o r ta n t c o n c lu s io n o f th e p r e v io u s s e c tio n , it is cle a r
th at C a sto rid ia n th e o r y d o c s n o t take t h e su b je c t sim p ly as a “real” en tity
o r a s a n a b s o lu te g iv e n . T h e su b ject h as to b e “m a d e," it is a so c ia l a n d
h isto r ic a l c r e a tio n that b e c o m e s p o s sib le th a n k s to th e so c ia liz a tio n a n d
su b lim a tio n p r o c e sse s that th e n e o n a te h as to c o n fr o n t. S ociety, in the
le a n in g -o n th eory, is a n e c e ssa r y stra tu m for t h e su b je ct to su rvive, an d for
th e p sy c h e to fin d th e r e q u ir e d s e n s e fo r its fu n c tio n in g . C astoriad is
w rites:
. . . th e r e m u s t b e a so c ie ty in e x iste n c e , s o th a t th e se in e p t a n d in sa n e
b e in g s [n e o n a te h u m a n s] can survive a n d b e c o m e h u m a n , an d th e r e is
n o th in g in th e h u m a n u n c o n sc io u s cap ab le o f p r o d u c in g th e basic char
acteristics o f e v e iy society, that is, in stitu tio n s a n d im agin ary sig n ifica
tio n s. T h e psych e c a n n o t b e r ed u c ed to so ciety , e v en if th e socialized
su b ject is a lm o st n o th in g b u t su ccessive layers o f so c ia liz a tio n , b u t the
psych e a s su ch , in its d e p th , c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d o r c o n fin e d to so ciety
an d so c ie ty c a n n o t b e c o n fin e d to th e p sych e b e c a u se , y e t again , th e r e is
n o th in g w ith in th e h u m a n u n c o n sc io u s that can p r o d u ce in stitu tio n s-----
T h e o n ly th in g o n e can say is that th e r e m u st b e so m e so r t o f co rr esp o n
d e n c e b e tw e en th e d e m a n d s o f th e p sych e an d th e d e m a n d s o f society.
T h is c o r r e s p o n d e n c e is r e d u c e d to th e fact th a t in stitu tio n s a n d social
im a g in a ry sig n ifica tio n s m u st o ffe r m e a n in g to the so cializab le psyche;
th a t is, th ey m u st create for th e p sy ch e a daily w orld w h er e . . . distin ctive
h u m a n b e in g s e xist, w h ere all th e se are c o m b in e d an d in tertw in ed , a n d
w h ere, f o r th e socializable su b ject itself , life a n d e v e n d eath have a m e a n in g
(20 1 0 a , p . 156).
T h e p sy ch e d o c s n o t c o n ta in an a b so lu te m e a n in g th at is gradually ex ter
n alized a n d rea lized in th e form o f th e subject; it d o e s n o t co n sist o f an a
p r io ri ilia I is b o th lo g ica l a n d o n to lo g ic a l, a te m p o ra l a n d universal, always
th e sa m e , p e n e tr a tin g every h u m a n cre a tio n . T h e radical im a gin ation is
n ot so m e th in g lo c a te d b e n e a th o r b e h in d t h e su b ject as a sep arate and
in d e p e n d e n t entity. . . . [C astoriadis d o e s n o t] a r g u e that b e n e a th the
variou s sta g e s o f socia liza tio n th e r e is so m e th in g a u th e n tic w'hosc sca led
m o u th n e e d s o n ly to b e o p e n e d . . . . T h e p sy ch e is a psych oanalytical cat
e g o ry w ith o n to lo g ic a l im p lic a tio n s, n o t a m etap h ysical-tran scen d en tal
o n e (1 9 9 8 a , p. 181).
A u to n o m y
C astoriad is p u ts it th is way:
A u to n o m y a s d em ocracy
A n a tten tiv e rea d in g o f C astoriad is’ w ork rev eals a n e w d e fin itio n o f
d em o cra cy as t h e self-in stitu tion o f so c ie ty in g r a in e d in his c o n c e p ts o f
cre a tio n , a u to n o m y , an d in stitu tin g a n d in stitu te d pow ers. T h e c o llectiv e
d im e n sio n o f a u to n o m y was lin k e d by C astoriadis to a n id ea o f p o litic s and
d em o cra cy w h er e so ciety is n o t fro zen in a c o n c e p tio n o f w hat is ju s t, eq u al,
o r fr ee , b u t rather in stitu tes itse lf in su c h a w ay th at th e q u e stio n s o f
fr e e d o m , o f ju s tic e , a n d o f eq u ity an d eq u a lity m igh t b e co n tin u a lly
r e c o n s id e r e d as part o f th e “n o r m a l” fu n c tio n in g o f so c iety (C astoriadis,
1 98 7 , p. 8 7 ).
D e m o cr a c y e n d o w s an exp an sive co llectiv ity w ith in c r e a sin g creative
p o w er w h er e in d ivid u als sh o u ld p articip ate w ith real c o n d itio n s— n o t on ly
form al c o n d itio n s— to m o d ify th e laws a n d d e c is io n s that c o n c e r n th e m as
social m e m b e r s o f a society'. D e m o cr a tic r e g im e s d o n o t p r e su p p o se a
natu rally g iv en c o lle ctiv e su b je ct o r th e id ea o f p o p u la r sovereign ty with
r ep re se n ta tiv e pow ers. It m e a n s th e c r e a tio n o f n ew social form s and
in stitu tio n s th ro u g h a p u b lic sp h e r e w h er e c o m m o n e n d s can b e articulated
d e sp ite th e m u ltip licity o f su b je ct’s p o sitio n s. F u r th e rm o r e, it p r e su p p o ses
the c o n stitu tio n o f a c o llectiv e subjectivity c a p a b le o f b r id g in g d ifferen t
social im a g in a ry sig n ifica tio n s a n d d ifferen t p o litic a l agen d as.
A d e m o c r a tic so c ie ty s h o u ld sim u lta n e o u s ly se p a r a te a n d a r tic u la te
th e th r e e s p h e r e s th a t C a sto ria d is d e s c r ib e d as th e so c ia l s p a c e s w'here
th e r e la t io n s h ip o f in d iv id u a ls a n d so c ie ty are p la y ed o u t: th e private
sp h e r e ( o i k o s ) , t h e p u b lic /p r iv a te s p h e r e ( a g o r a ), a n d th e p u b l i c /
p u b lic s p h e r e ( e c c le s ia ) . 18 A n e c e ssa r y c o n d it io n fo r a n a u to n o m o u s
so c ie ty is th a t th e e c c le sia truly b e a p u b lic s p a c e a n d n o t m e r e ly an
o b je c t o f p r iv a te a p p r o p r ia tio n by p a r ticu la r g r o u p s . T h e im p lic a tio n s o f
th is c o n d it io n a ffe c t th e o r g a n iz a tio n o f a ll p o w e r e x is t in g in so c iety . Ii
m e a n s th a t “c o n s titu tio n a lly ” sp e a k in g , th e le g isla tiv e , j u d ic ia l, a n d
g o v e r n m e n ta l p o w er s b e lo n g to th e p e o p le a n d are e x e r c is e d by the
p e o p le (C a sto r ia d is, 1 9 9 7 c , p p . 4 0 5 - 7 ) .
It is w ith th e a d v e n t o f dem ocracy, as e m b o d y in g th e g e rm o f a u to n o m y
in th e a n c ie n t G reek p o lis, that th e d istin ctio n betw 'een p o litic s a n d the
p o litic a l wra s sa n c tio n e d . C astoriadis u n d e rsta n d s th e m e a n in g o f p o litic s
{le politique) as th e e x p lic it c o lle ctiv e activity th a t aim s at b e in g lu cid
(reflective a n d d elib era tiv e) a n d w h o se o b je c t is th e in stitu tio n o f so c iety as
su ch . P o litic s p erta in s to ev ery th in g in so c iety th at p erm its p articip ation
a n d that c a n b e sh a red (C astoriadis, 1991c, pp. 1 6 0 , 1 6 9 ). Its o b je c t is to
create th e in stitu tio n s that ind ividu als in te rn a liz e in o r d e r to facilitate th e ir
Agency a n d A utonomy in Castoriadis 87
su c h la b e lin g a n d v a lu e c h a r g in g . M a d n e ss w as an e x a m p le o f a m o d e
o f o b je c tifica tio n th at tran sform ed h u m a n b e in g s in to su bjects, and
sim u lta n e o u sly c re a ted in stitu tio n s th a t e n c o m p a ss e d , su sta in ed , a n d
r e p r o d u c e d th e m as su b jects (F ou cau lt, 1983b . p. 2 0 8 ).
Likew ise, F o u ca u lt stressed th e in stitu tion al a n d p olitical p r e co n d itio n s
f o r the e la b o r a tio n o f a fo r m o f k n o w le d g e in T h e B irth o f the C linic (1 9 6 3 ).
In th is c a se , th e s c ie n c e in q u estio n w as o n e o f th e bod y rather than o f th e
m in d . F o u c a u lt an alyzed th e sh ift from a p r e m o d e r n m e d ic in e to m o d e r n ,
r a tio n a liz ed , em p irically b ased m e d ic in e . H e a r g u e d that m o d e r n m ed ical
e x p e r ie n c e su ffered a refo rm u la tio n w h er e d ise a se s w e re c o n n o te d and
m e d ica lly cla ssified u sin g m e c h a n ism s that m a r k e d th e c o n c r e te sp a ce o f
d ie b o d y (1 9 7 3 b , p . 16).
I n th e se tw o first b ook s, F ou cau lt se t u p th e b ases o f his w ork o n k n o w led g e,
social p r a c tic es, an d pow er. D e e p e n in g his in te r e st, in 1966 h e p u b lish ed
T h e Order o j Things. T h e r e h e fo c u s e d o n th e p la n e o f r ep re se n ta tio n ,
revealin g th e m o d e o f c o n str u c tin g a n d n a m in g th e o b je c ts o f k n o w led g e
that p r o d u c e d m e a n in g , subjectivity, a n d sig n ifica tio n . H is aim was to show-
k ey e le m e n ts in p o w e r rela tio n s a n d th e ir d o m in a tio n effects, a n d illustrate
th e c o n flic t w ithin w h ich d isc o u r se s e m e r g e d a n d fu n ctio n e d .
K n o w led g e in flic te d d isc ip lin e, su rv eilla n ce, a n d r e g u la tio n . T h is c o u ld
b e s e e n in. certain e m p irical fo rm s o f k n o w le d g e su c h as psychiatry.
K n o w led g e d isc ip lin e s c o n str u c ted d iffe re n t w ays o f se e in g o r sp ea k in g
ab ou t th e ir o b je c t, d e lim itin g its b o u n d a rie s to d e fin e w h at w as tru e o r
false. F o u c a u lt saw this sa m e p r in c ip le w o rk in g in a ll social rep resen tation s.
1 1 c sh o w e d h o w th e m o d e o f rep resen ta tio n th at e x iste d in th e m edieval
a n d classical a g e s co n tra sted with th e m o d e r n a g e , w h ere d isc o u r se and
la n g u a g e g a v e birth to th e su b je ct as a n e p iste m o lo g ic a l category. A s is
w idely k n o w n , F o u c a u lt stated that b e fo r e t h e e ig h te e n th cen tury, m an d id
not ex ist as an y m o r e than th e p o te n c y o f life an d th e produ ctivity o f labor.
H e w rote th at m a n was q u ite a r ec e n t crea tu re (1 9 7 0 , p. 3 0 8 ). H e stated:
Last w o rk s o f F oucault
T e c h n o lo g ie s o f th e s e lf b e c a m e th e m o st im p o r ta n t fo c u s o f his work. I Ic
d e fin e d th e se as p r a c tic es that p e r m itte d in d iv id u a ls to effe c t, by th e ir own
m e a n s o r w ith the h e lp o f o th e r s, a cer ta in n u m b e r o f o p e r a tio n s o n their
o w n b o d ie s a n d so u ls, th o u g h ts, c o n d u c t, a n d ways o f b e in g , so as to
tran sform th e m se lv es in o r d e r to attain a certain sta te o f h a p p in ess, purity,
w isd o m , p e r fe c tio n , o r im m ortality (ibid., p. 1 8 ). U s in g th is c o n c e p t,
F o u ca u lt a d d r e sse d G reek , R om an , a n d C h ristian c u ltu r es o f an tiq u ity in
th e last tw o v o lu m e s o f T he History o f Sexuality (1 9 8 4 ). B e g in n in g w ith early
C h ristian c u ltu r es, h e d e m o n stra te d h o w th e s e lf was a c o n stitu te d su bject
o f d e sir e. F ollow in g this p rocess, h e tra ced t h e m oral d im e n sio n s o f
C hristian, G re ek , a n d R om an c u ltu res a n d th e d iffe r e n c e s a m o n g th e m . He
was in te r e ste d in sh o w in g h o w (»reeks an d R o m a n s c o n c e iv e d a n d regu lated
p leasu re a n d d e sir e th ro u g h in stitu tion s su ch as m arriage, h etero-an d
h o m o sex u a lity , a n d form s o f th e ca re o f th e self. F o u ca u lt saw C hristianity
as c lo ser t o m o d e r n cu ltu r e than to th at o f th e G reek s o r R om an s, w h ich
sh a re d th e ir ways o f e x p e r ie n c in g th e b od y an d its p o ten tia l e x p r essio n s o f
b e a u ty w ith o u t a p p e a lin g to eth ica l in te rd ic tio n s. H e id e n tifie d in
C h ristian ity th e a b a n d o n m e n t o f a m o r e e th ic a l a n d a e sth e tic p ersp ective
tow ard sex u a lity in favor o f a h e r m e n e u tic s o f d e sir e, w h er e individuals
so u g h t in sex u a lity th e tru th o f th e ir b e in g . H e b e lie v e d that G reeks and
R om an s fo llo w e d a fr e e r p attern than C h ristians d id in term s o f th e ir form s
o f eth ics. In his view, th e way G reek s rela ted to t h e s e lf was m o r e reflexive,
a n d so ciety p la c e d a great e m p h a sis o n th e r esp on sib ility o f au to-regu lation
a n d th e e x p e c ta tio n th at o n e is th e m aster o f o n e ’s o w n desires. In o th e r
w ords, co n tra ry to th e C hristian trad ition , G re ek s an d R om an s (e x c e p tin g
slaves a n d w o m e n ) fo llo w ed a n auto-d elib erative sc h e m a (F ou cau lt, 1985,
pp. 7 8 -9 3 ) .
W ithin th is analysis F ou cau lt a ttem p ted to p r o d u c e a g e n e a lo g y o f
subjectivity. H e b e c a m e in creasin gly in te r e ste d in th e in d ivid u al’s capacity
fo r se lf-re fle ctin g a n d articu latin g his e x p e r ie n c e . F o u ca u lt u sed n o tio n s
su ch as t h e aesth etic th a t o p e n e d u p th e c h o ic e o f th e ind ivid u al. T h e
a e sth e tics o f e x is te n c e rela ted to a way o f life w h o se m oral valu e d id not
d e p e n d o n a c o d e o f b eh avior, b u t o n cer ta in p r in c ip le s in th e use o f
p lea su re (ibid., pp. 8 9 - 9 3 ) . In this way, F ou cau lt sh o w e d h o w G reeks and
R om an s e m p h a s iz e d th e ir o w n self-d irectio n , fo llo w in g o r m o d ify in g w hat
was given a s a ru le o r im p o sitio n . T h is o b ser v a tio n m arked fo r F o u ca u lt a
su bstantial c h a n g e w ith resp e ct to his p e r c e p tio n o f th e au to-d elib erative
a n d se lf-g o v er n in g su bject.
In his la te r w orks, F o u ca u lt e v o k e d a privatistic realm th at a llo w ed die
individual to se lf-r e fle c ta n d m ake p o litica l d e c isio n s. T h is w as also illustrated
10(3 Castoriadis, Foucault, a n d A utonomy
H e a d d e d : “n o w I am in te r e ste d , in fa c t, in th e w ay in w h ic h t h e su b je c t
c o n s titu te s h im s e lf in a n a c tiv e fa s h io n , b y th e p r a c tic e s o f s e l f ’ (1 9 9 4 ,
p. 1 1 ).
F o u c a u lt o n t h e S u b je c t
R e p r e s e n t a t io n a n d S o c ia l M e a n in g in F o u c a u lt
an d in g e n e r a l tow ard d iffe re n t social ord ers. For F ou cau lt, that th e r e was
n o su ch th in g as a reality that was n o t c o n stitu te d b y e p iste in ic o r discursive
fo r m a tio n im p lie d th e relativistic n a tu r e o f m e a n in g a n d the possible
realities th a t c o u ld o r ig in a te from it. T h e d iv erse an d h e te r o g e n e o u s
sc e n a r io s w ith in w h ic h reality c o u ld b e played o u t h a d in e sse n c e th e sam e
n a tu re a n d valu e. T h e ir e m e r g e n c e a n d c o n fig u r a tio n c a m e fr o m d ie sam e
so u r c e a n d w o r k e d w ithin th e sa m e dyn am ic. In th is se n se , F ou cau lt d id n ot
w orry a b o u t th e m oral ran k in g o f social o r d e r s o r t h e a d eq u a te o r d istorted
ch aracter o f cu ltu ral r ep re se n ta tio n . H is in te r e st w as fo c u s e d o n p ractices
a n d d isc o u r se c rea tio n s w h er e th e e p iste m o lo g ic a l d im e n s io n w as su b su m ed
in relativism w h en it c a m e to ju d g in g righ t o r w rong.
T h is v ie w p o in t was c o h e r e n t w ith his p o litic a l p o sitio n tow ard any
n orm ative c riterio n as a le n s for o b serv in g , e v alu atin g, o r c o n te stin g any
social ord er. S in ce an y tran sform ation o r m o d ific a tio n to a certain pow er
r e g im e m e a n t th e rise o f a n ew p o w er structure fu ll o f m argin alizin g social
r ela tio n sh ip s a n d d ifferen t fo rm s o f su b je ctio n , an y p o litica l co m p r o m ise
w ith sp e c ific p o litic a l goals o r m oral m axim s m e a n t th e d iscrim in ation
again st s o c ia l sectors a n d in d ivid u als a n d r eq u ire d th e n orm a liza tio n o f
individuals. In th is se n se , F ou cau lt d id n o t give a n y c o n sid e r a tio n to the
ju d g m e n t o f p ractices su p p o rte d by c o m p le x e s o f social sig n ifica tio n s. As a
social-h istorical p r o d u ct r ep r e se n tin g cer ta in in terests, social m e a n in g
sh o u ld b e v ie w e d an d e x a m in e d — in F o u ca u lt’s o p in io n — w ith ou t having
any m oral ju d g m e n t o v er th em .
F u r th e rm o r e, sp e c ific asp ects o f th e c o lle ctiv e a n d in d ivid u al d im e n sio n s
o f se lf-a g en cy in m e a n in g g e n e ra tio n also r e m a in e d in su fficien tly th eo rized .
T h e social-h istorical field for F o u ca u lt was d e fin e d as s o m e th in g im p o sed
ra th er th a n a freely c r e a te d realm fo r se lf-co n stitu tio n . T h e so u r c e o f
d isco u rses w as d ilu te d th r o u g h th e w h o le society, a n d th e particu lar m eans
o f th e ir c r e a tio n n e v e r c o n stitu te d a m ajor c o n c e r n fo r F oucault. T h e
q u estion s: “W h a t e n a b le d h u m a n s to c re a te m e a n in g ? ” “W h at d iffe re n tia ted
h u m a n s as so c ia l beings?” a n d ,“h o w w e re h u m a n s a b le to p r o d u c e m e a n in g
a n d r ep r e se n t th e ir reality?” w e re n e v e r e x p lic itly p o s e d o r an sw ered by
F ou cau lt, d e sp ite the fact that a ll th e se q u e stio n s w ere at the h e a r t o f his
w ork an d co n tr ib u tio n s.
F o u ca u lt’s c o n c e p ts o f d isco u rse, e p iste m e , so c ia l practices, a n d s o forth,
im p lie d th at the m e a n in g a n d sig n ifica tio n th a t gave th e m life and
e n c o m p a ss e d th e m w ere already p r e se n t in society. T h e so u r c e o f m e a n in g
was taken a s a g iv en . W ithin h is fram ew ork, r e p r e se n tin g an d a ssig n in g
m e a n in g to reality w as n e v e r an alyzed d e e p ly e n o u g h by F ou cau lt.
T h e a ssertio n m a d e by D reyfus a n d R ab in ow (1 9 8 3 , p. x ix ) in th is resp ect
d id n o t s h e d lig h t o n t o th is q u estio n . Stating— as th e y did — that F o u c a u lt’s
Society O ver the Subject 125
g o a l w a s t o r e n o u n c e to a n y a tte m p t to u n d e r s ta n d a m e a n in g -g iv in g
su b je c t in a p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l s e n s e still p r e s u p p o s e d a n e x p la n a tio n o f
r e p r e s e n ta tio n in F o u c a u lt th a t in m y view was n o t r e fin e d o r satisfactory.
A s m e a n in g is in tr in sic to r e p r e se n ta tio n , it b e c a m e e v id e n t th a t F o u c a u lt
a lso le ft a v o id h e r e . H e d id n o t d isc u ss e x te n siv e ly e n o u g h h o w in d iv id u a ls
a lo n e , a n d in so ciety , g e n e r a te d a n d e x p e r ie n c e d th e ir o w n su b jective
reality. T h e p r in c ip le by w h ic h h e d e fe n d e d th e p o s sib le e x is te n c e o f the
m u ltip lic ity o f r e a litie s (d isc o u r se s, k n o w le d g e , a n d p o w e r r eg im es)
t h r o u g h o u t h isto r y p r e s u p p o s e d a ca p a city in h u m a n s to r e p r e s e n t o r
im a g in e th e ir ow n w orld-view s. In th is s e n s e , p sy ch ic a l r e p r e se n ta tio n
w as at th e h e a r t o f h is th eory, b u t F o u c a u lt n e v e r th e o r iz e d it in an
e x h a u s tiv e way.
By con trast, C astoriadis ela b o ra tes a th e o r y o f rep resen ta tio n th rou gh
w h ich h e d e fin e s t h e m ain d iffe r e n c e b etw een h u m a n s an d th e rest o f livin g
b e in g s. It is th r o u g h th e a fu n ctio n a l r ep re se n ta tio n o f th e h u m a n psyche
that h u m a n b e in g s g e n e r a te a ru p tu re w ith fix e d in stin ctu al regu lation s.
T h is is t h e ca p a city o f th e p sy ch e to create an im a g e o u t o f e x ter n a l stim uli
o n th e b o d y fr e e o f restrictio n by c a n o n ic p a tte rn s th a t o n ly o b e y b io lo g ic a l
n e e d s an d se e k th e ir satisfaction . A d irect c o n s é q u e n c e o f this singu lar
capacity— u n iq u e to h u m an s— is th e p r e d o m in a n c e o f rep resen ta tio n a l
p le a su r e o v e r o r g a n p leasu re, e v id e n c e d in th e se p a r a tio n o f sexu ality and
r ep ro d u c tio n . T h is e x p la in s w hy it is on ly h u m a n s w h o obtain p lea su re o u t
o f sex u a l fe tish ism , fo r ex a m p le.
C astoriad is’ e x p la n a tio n o f p sych ical r ep re se n ta tio n allow s h im to exp lain
th e e x is tin g rela tio n sh ip b e tw e en th e b io lo g ic a l a n d th e psych ical d o m a in s
o f h u m a n b e in g s w ith o u t fa llin g in to a d u alism o f so m a a n d p sych e.
C astoriadis r elies o n F reu d ian drive theory, in w h ic h b io lo g ic a l instin ctual
drives can on ly b e m a n ife sted in th e p sych e by m e a n s o f rep resen ta tio n .
Q u o tin g F reu d , C astoriadis affirm s th a t th e p sy c h e “su b m its th e drives to
th e o b lig a tio n o f a d e le g a tio n th r o u g h r e p r e se n ta tio n ” (1 9 8 7 , p . 2 8 2 ). T o
C astoriadis th is m e a n s th at in stin ctu al drives a n d th e afu n ctio n a lized
im a g in a tio n c a n n o t b e th o u g h t separately. T h e lea n in g -o n , o r anaclisis,
e x p la n a tio n allow s h im to estab lish a r ela tio n sh ip b e tw e en the b iological
a n d t h e so c ia l that c a n n o t b e c o n c e iv e d as an e v o lu tio n a r y c o n se q u e n c e .
B od y a n d m in d are n ot a n tin o m ie s b u t are c o n n e c te d th r o u g h d ifferen t
strata o r r e g io n s o f b e in g .
I d isa g r e e w ith K lo o g e r (2 0 0 9 , p. 8 5 ) w h en h e stated that by ta k in g u p th e
F reu d ian le a n in g -o n e x p la n a tio n o r anaclisis, parts o f C astoriad is’ ow n
w ritings b etra y th e n e e d to r efo r m u la te th e W estern p h ilo so p h ic a l d ic h o to m y
b e tw e en p sy ch e an d bod y.’’ O n th e contrary, I fin d a great p o ten tia l in
C astoriad is’ a r g u m e n ta tio n to q u estio n W estern p h ilo so p h ic a l dualistic
126 Castoriadis, Foucault, a n d A utonomy
w ith in a so c ia l c o n te x t an d a historical m o m e n t w h er e th is go a l h as b e e n
su n k in d isillu sio n m e n t, n aïve relativism , c o n fo r m ism , a n d in sign ifican cy,
as C astoriad is p u ts it.
T h e o n to lo g y o f cre a tio n , w h ich in C astoriad is’ view m ig h t b r in g new
p olitical p e r sp e c tiv e s a n d m o r e d e m o c ra tic and a u to n o m o u s social
in stitu tio n s, p o s e s n o m in o r c h a lle n g e to th e w ay w e u n d e rsta n d society
a n d t h e B e in g . A s fo r A ristotle, for C astoriadis “B e in g ” is C h aos, Abyss, a n d
G ro u n d le ssn e ss. It en ta ils th e c o n tin u o u sly su s p e n d e d fragility and
p r e ca r io u sn ess o f m e a n in g an d o f o u r c a th e c te d o b jects, w orks, affects,
a n d d esires: th e m ortality o f th e S e lf (C astoriadis, 1 9 9 7 q , 136). N o n eth ele ss,
“Being" is a lso c r e a tio n a n d u n d e te r m in e d im a g in a tio n , w h ich fin d their
b e st e x p r e s sio n in A rt a n d P o litics, as C astoriadis k n ew it.
Notes
Introduction
1Aglietta (1987) and Lipietz (1996) analyze die impact o f Fordism and its
conséquences in terms o f consum ption patterns and production, as well as
on labor relations through managerial schem es and wage regulations. From a
distinct point o f view, Ross (1999) makes an interesting examination o f crucial
cultural transformations that took place in France from the mid-1950s to the mid-
1960s. showing how those were key elem ents in shaping the French intellectual
and artistic productions in the following decades.
- Taylor (1979) discusses in depth Hegelian issues that influenced French debates
during this period.
5 Bourdieu (1993) showed how bodies o f knowledge understood as historical
and cultural productions are shaped and structured by political affairs, social
conjunctures, and networks o f legitimized agents in public and academic spheres.
Boschctti (1988) followed these prem ises and illustrated Sartre’s case in France.
1Macey (1995) and Eribon (1991) agree on this historical account.
Chapter 1
1Lefort was a French sociologist and philosopher who worked widi Merleau-Ponty
and who co-founded SB.
2 At this tim e the Communist Party (CP) had some 700 militants in France.
1Yugoslavia, as well as Russia’s other satellite countries, was considered as a country
where the revolution had not b een totally successful because the CP had not
nationalized everything in the very beginning and because it had kept in place a
few ministers who did not formally belong to the CP (Castoriadis, 1997m, p. 4).
'All these intellectuals were influenced by different theoretical trends being
discussed in France at that m om ent. In the case o f Castoriadis* early writings,
besides Marx it is possible to say that Max Weber an d Merleau-Ponty had som e
influence. Adam s (2007, pp. 4 6 -7 ) alludes further to the influence Castoriadis
received from Schelling, Fichte and Heidegger, primarily during his Soldi
period. I am not especially interested in tracking the effects o f these thinkers in
this chapter. It is m ore pertinent for my argum ent to exam ine how Castoriadis’
militancy and his analysis about the socio-political context, led him to reinterpret
revolutionary actions and socialism, openin g up a new theoretical path that
would distance him from Marx and other inherited philosophical traditions.
As H on n eth (1986. pp. 62 -7 8 ) argues, it is especially interesting how, at this
142 Notes
C h a p te r 2
1W hitebook ( 1998, p. 143) notes that on e of the major symptoms o f our times is the
abstract negation o f Cartesianism with the rush into intersubjectivity.. . . Whether
it em anates from Lévi-Strauss and structuralism, o r from Wittgenstein and
Habermas, the attempt has been to absorb the individual into the transindividual—
the subjective into the intersubjective—so thoroughly that the m om ent of
privatistic individuality drops out almost completely I resulting] in a superficial
view o f human creativity.
2 It is important to note that Castoriadis does not equate radical imagination to the
unconscious.
1For exam ple, when Freud explained the Oedipal C om plex h e traced it back to
the murder o f the primal father. All his developm ents on the original phantasies
followed this sort o f theoretical path, induced by his positivislic intention of
making psychoanalysis a formal science.
Notes 145
1Freud makes this observation in his letters to Fliess dated on May 2,1897 and May
25, 1897 (Masson, 1985).
5 Although later in his theory about sexual developm ent Freud called hetero
sexuality the “normal” state o f human sexuality, there is no doubt that h e intended
to change the conventional moral perception o f homosexuality.
' Dreams are characterized by overdetermination (m eaning that a signifier always
points to several signifieds), as well as by underdetermination (a signifier is not
the only o n e possible for any signified) and oversymbolization (a signified can be
indicated by several signifiers) (Castoriadis, 1992, p. 9).
7 For exam ple, Freud's initial belief in the positive reality of the event that
corresponds to the traumatic memory o f neurotics, o r his initial treatment o f the
topic o f seduction scenes o f a child by an adult, or the search for the primal scene
as a real event (Castoriadis, 1987, p. 281).
* This predom inance is connected to what Freud calls the magical om nipotence
o f thought within the unconscious where if a desire arises the representation
that fulfills it also appears. This is not to say that the organ pleasure dimension
disappears.
9 See for exam ple Castoriadis’ discussions with Francisco Varela on the living-
being and biolog}· in "Life and Creation: Cornelius Castoriadis in Dialogue with
Francisco Varela” (Castoriadis, 2011).
10 Castoriadis proposes an original process to explain the stratification o f the
human psyche, explained in more detail in Chapter 6 o f The Imaginary Institutions
o f Society. W ithout doing justice to its complexity, I will only make brief reference
to the different stages involved in such process centering on its most original and
controversial aspects.
11 As discussed in the following chapter the m onad concept can be highly
controversial. For example, I-aplanche (1980) observes that it is not possible to
think about a primary unrepressed unconscious in psychoanalytical theory. In
his eyes this would be equivalent to posing a false statem ent about the place of
the biological dim ension. For him it is through the original repression that the
unconscious is constituted.
'2 It is important to remember that the psyche will never lose the tendency to lock
everything up in order to return to an impossible m onadic state—and when it fails
to do so, will appeal to its substitutes: hallucinatory satisfaction and phantasy.
,3 Castoriadis also used the term libido formandi as specific to the human domain
(1997b, p. 342).
11 As said, Castoriadis docs not establish an absolute polarity be tvve en the individual
and society. T h e individual or subject, as well as any f orm o f intersubjectivity, are
already social.
'’’This is what Castoriadis calls closure. T he term closure here is given the very
precise m eaning it enjoys in algebra. An algebraic field is said to be closed when
every algebraic equation that can be written in this field, with the elem ents o f this
field, can be solved with elem ents from the sam e field (1997d, p. 87).
16Castoriadis also considers ruptures to closure in Western Europe in the eleventh
century, with the creation o f com munes that vindicated forms o f auto-government,
the renaissance, the workers’ movements, and other movements, such as those of
feminists and ecologists (Castoriadis, 1997a, pp. 103—27).
14(5 Notes
C h a p te r 3
1 See J. Bernstein’s analysis of Habennas' critiques o f Castoriadis (Bernstein, 1989).
2 1will return to this discussion and its relationship to democracy later o n addressing
the notion o f popular sovereignty and its relationship to autonomy.
5 It would n ot be exactly correct to define radical im agination as the point o f origin
o f cultural representation, since for Castoriadis understanding the emergence
o f a creation or a new stratum in the totality o f the existing-being is not about
establishing “origins” or exact inaugural moments. It is about understanding
the advent o f som ething com pletely new; in this sense, the creation o f meaning
entails an essential fragmentation o f total B e in g /b ein g given in a magmatic order
as explained in Chapter 2.
* Noesis is the particular intentional act itself; a norm a ( plural, noemata) comprises
all that which makes the act to be as if it were o f an object experienced in a
certain wray (Mautner, 1998).
' There has always b een and always will be a dim ension o f the social institution
in charge o f this essential function: to reestablish order, to ensure the life and
operation o f society against whatever, actually or potentially, endangers them.
This fact is o n e o f the roots o f explicit power (Castoriadis, 1991c, p. 154).
'' Castoriadis presented and responded to the observations o f these authors in an
interesting discussion in "Done and to be D one” (1997c, pp. 385-98).
7 Kalyvas (li)98a. p. 162) is right when he notes that Castoriadis only provides good
reasons to prefer the value o f autonomy as a normative standard.
n A more extended discussion about m eaning and validity can be found in ‘‘Done
and to be D one” (Castoriadis, 1997c, pp. 385-98).
9 Kalyvas (1998a, p. 168) has called attention to this issue, suggesting that the
redefinition o f the encounter between norm and fact enables us to understand
the tensions present in Castoriadis between facticity and validity.
10 I will discuss here only the m ain theoretical intention of Arnason’s project. His
analyses are m uch comprehensive than the ones explored here, however, my
interest lies in showing what I see as the principal theoretical difference from
Castoriadis that reflects in their understandings o f creation and history.
Notes 147
11 This framework studies the civilizations associated with the major world religions
that provided the basis for divergent historical paths. Civilizations refer to the
cultural m o d es o f interpretation that first arrived with the onset o f writing
and which interacted with particular processes o f state formation to produce
distinct cultural com plexes. Civilizations are perpetually self-transforming and
develop n ot in isolation hut through interaction with others. This civilizational
analysis aim s to identify com m on trends while avoiding, 1) the discredited
evolutionary theory o f western civilization as a universal normative standard,
2) the idea o f distinct civilizations that develop in isolation from each other,
and 3) n otion s o f civilizations as engaged in a perpetual clash (Dclanty, 2010,
pp. 4 6 -7 ).
12 For Adams (2005) a m ore moderate idea o f creation is desirable. She states that
the n otion o f contextual creation docs not preclude the idea o f creation sui generis
and does not compromise the recognition o f ontological novelty (p. 26).
15 Adams (2005. p. 35) states that Castoriadis does not acknowledge hermeneutical
con tribu dons because he associates this tradition with Gadamerand H eidegger and
the with philosophical task o f discerning an ultimate truth through interpretation,
som ething that is at odds with his ideas o f creation and autonomy.
" Adams states that an aspect o f Arnason’s articulation o f the world is the idea—
drawing on Habermas—o f mutual understanding. Where Habermas poses
hom ogeneity to mutual understanding, Arnason is more interested in paying
due respect to its heterogeneous m odalities and intercultural aspects . . . the
challenge is to rethink the idea o f the “other"—and m utual understanding—such
that there is neither the unbridgeable chasm o f radical alterity nor the quashing
of différence by the assimilation o f the same (2007, p . 58).
15 Smith (2010) makes a parallel between Cornelius Castoriadis’ and Charles Taylor's
inquires in to the philosophical questions: W ho am I? W ho are we? And how are we
to live? By identifying their commonalities and differences. Smith moves beyond
these authors to build his own arguments about these perennial questions.
“ This will b e discussed later when the questions o f representation, meaning, and
the body are approached.
17 Smith (2010) refers to the term “oblique autonom y” discussed by Adams in a
2006 conference paper.
"'Castoriadis notes that this distinction makes sense, abstractly speaking, for all
societies. It permits the interpretation o f societies according to the distinction or
articulation they institute am ong these three.
19 Castoriadis acknowledges here the obvious difference in scale between the
Athenian democracy and contemporary democracies. He dismisses its “sophisms"
all argum ents against direct democracies based on issues o f numbers or
dim ension, arguing that it could be possible to instauratc direct regimes in cities
o f 40,000—50,000 inhabitants, as Athenians did during the classical period.
20 Castoriadis accepts the Greek notion o f “magistrates" that, as delegates, would
be taking care o f the division o f political tasks— n ot the division o f political
labor in direct regimes, however, he does n ot elaborate on this issue to dem on
strate how and why these cannot be assumed as a form o f representation (1997c,
pp. 407).
148 Notes
C h a p te r 4
1W hitebook. J. (unpublished manuscript) states that there are two possible ways
to look at Foucault’s developm ents over lime. T he first on e claims that Foucault’s
career consisted in a series o f radical breaks that tend to be seen as a product
o f his intellectual flexibility, open-mindedness, self-critical honest)·, or in a few
cases, as attem pts to resolve theoretical problems h e confronted. T he second
on e— the on e W hitebook subscribes to— argues that the series of radical breaks
in the developm ent o f Foucault’s career are more apparent than real, and that
they are in fact generated by the foundational position he defended in "Madness
and Civilization " that overvalued a romantic-transgressive thesis that he never
gave up completely. In this sense, Foucault's radical breaks are only apparent.
and they really represent an attempt to escape the inconsistencies generated by
his continuing adherence to a transgressive approach reflected in his view on
power, normality, and pathology.
2 In relation to the idea o f historical discontinuity, Foucault was influenced early
on by G eorges Canguilhem, who developed a new structural history' o f science
that stated that science did n ot progress by gradual evolution, but involved a
series o f discontinuities.
1An interesting article by B objessop (2006) argued that despite Foucault's explicit
rejection o f Marxism, papers such as “Society Must Be Defended," “Securité,
Territoire, Population” (1977), and “Naissance d e la Biopolitique’’ (1978)
marked a turn on issues o f governmentality where this position is attenuated and
it is possible to identify resonances between him and Marx.
* According to an unpublished interview with the author by Enrique Escobar
(Paris, 2003), Castoriadis never denied the role o f power in society nor sought
to theorize a powerless social formation. He declared him self surprised at being
attentively read by som e anarchists since, as he said, he never agreed with their
position regarding power (Escobar, 2003).
r‘ See the following articles by Castoriadis: “T he Crisis o f Culture and the State"
(1991a), “Reflections on ‘Rationality’ and ‘D evelopm ent’” (1991e), “The
Institution o f Society and Religion" (1997h), and “Reflections on Racism"
(1997s).
C h a p te r 5
1 Unpublished manuscript byJoel Whitebook.
- W hitebook (n.d.) saw' Foucault’s position toward Freud as an ambivalent, never
entirely resolved tension. According to him , Foucault initially praised the founder
o f psychoanalysis for haring been the first to re-establish the dialogue with unreason
after the Great Confinement. However, Foucault could not develop a systematic
relationship with psychoanalysis because it conflicted with his temptation to
valorize transgression. Despite Foucault’s intellectual sophistication and early
insights into the need to theoretically articulate an extra-discursive dimension,
h e never addressed this question, which generated inconsistencies in his work.
' Ibid., pp. 37-40.
Notes 149
Foucault R cfercnccs
Foucault, M. (1970). The Order of Things: A n Archaeology o f the Hum an Sciences. New
York: Pantheon Books.
— . (1972), The Archaeology of Knowledge. A. Sheridan (Irans). New York: Pantheon
Books.
— . <1973a), Madness and Civilization: A History o f Insanity in the Age o f Reason. R. I loward
(trans). N ew York: Vintage Books.
— . (1973b), The Birth of Clinic. A. Sheridan (trans). N ew York: Pantheon Books.
— . (1977), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. D. Bouchard (ed.), D. Bouchard and
S. Simon (Irans). Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press.
— . (1978), The History o f Sexuality, Vol. I: An Introduction. R. Hurley (trans). New
York: Pantheon Books.
— . (1979), Discipline and Punish. A. Sheridan (trans). N ew York: Vintage Books.
— . (1980), Power/Know/edge: Selected Intenneios and Other Writings. C. Gordon,
L. Marshall. J. Mepham and K. Spoer (eds), C. Gordon (trans). New York:
Pantheon Books.
— . (1983a), 'Structuralism and post-structuralism: an interview with Michel
Foucault', Telos, 55,195-211.
— . (1983b). ‘T he subject and power’, in H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow (eds), Michel
Foucault: lieyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago: University o f Chicago
Press, pp. 208-26.
— . (1984), ‘What is enlightenm ent?’, in P. Rabinow (ed .), The Foucault Reader.
C. Porter (trans). New York: Pantheon.
— . (1985), The Use of Pleasure, Volume 2 o f History o f Sexuality. R. Hurley (trans). New'
York: Pantheon Books.
— . [1966J (1988a), Las Palabras y las Cosas. M exico City: Siglo XXI.
— . (1988b), ‘Power and Sex’, in L. D. Kritzman (e d .), Michel Foucault: Politics,
Philosophy, Culture: Inten'iews and Other Writings. A. Sheridan (trans). New York:
Routledge.
— . (1988c), ‘Technologies o f the s e lf’ in L. H. Martin. H . Gutman and P. H. Hutton
(ed s), Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault. Amherst: University o f
Massachusetts Press.
156 Bibliography
Castoriadis References
Castoriadis, C. [1953] (1976a). ‘Burocracia después de la m uerte d e Stalin’, in I m
Sociedad Burocrâltca (Vol. 2). E. Escobar (trans). Barcelona: Tusquets Editores,
pp. 127—53.
— . [1957] (1976b), ‘La via polaca hacia la burocracia’, in La Sociedad Burocratica
(Vol. 2). E. Escobar (trans). Barcelona: Tusquets Editores, pp. 273-301.
— . 11957) (1979a), 'Balance, perspectives, tareas'. in E. Escobar (trans). LaExperien-
cia delMovimienlo Obrero (Vol. 1). Barcelona: Tusquets Editores. pp. 287-305.
—. [19731 (1979b), 'Introducciôn. I.a cuestiôn de la historia del movimienlo
obrero’, in LaExperiencia del Movimiento Obrero (Vol. 1 ). E. Escobar (trans). Barce
lona: Tusquets Editores. pp. 9-89.
—. [1974] (1979c), Im Experiencia del Movimiento Obrero (Vol. 1). Como Luchar. Bar
celona: Tusquets Editores.
— . [1949-1952] (1979d), ‘Nota final a “el partido revolucionario” y a la “direccion
proletaria’” , in E. Escobar (Irans), La Experiencia del Movimiento Obreio (Vol. 1).
Barcelona: Tusquets Editores, pp. 131-45.
— . [1949] (1979e), ‘El partido revolucionario’, in E. Escobar (trans), La Experiencia
del Movimiento Obrero (Vol. 1). Barcelona: Tusquets Editores, pp. 119-31.
—. [1967] (1979Γ), ‘Suspension de la publication d e Socialisme o u Barbarie', in
E. Escobar (trans), La Experiencia del Movimiento Obrero (Vol. 2). Barcelona:
Tusquets Editores. pp. 311-17.
— . [1975] (1983), I m /nstitucion Imaginaria de la Sociedad. M. A. Galmarini (trans).
Madrid: Tusquets Editores.
— . 11972] (1984a), ‘Modern science and philosophical interrogation’, in Cmssroads
in the Labyrinth. Cambridge: MIT Press.
— . [1971] (1984b), ‘T he sayable and the unsayable: hom age to Merleau-Ponty’,
in K. Sop er and M. II. Ryle (trans, ed s), Crossroads in the Labyrinth. Brighton:
Harvester Press, pp. 119-44.
— . 119751 (1987). The Imaginary Institution of Society. K. Blarney (trans). Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
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Bibliography 157
ag e n cy , c o lle c tiv e a u to n o m y ,
d e m o c ra c y 90 p o litic s a n d d e m o c r a c y 62
F o u c a u lt's n o t i o n o f 134 s o c ie ty a n d h is to r y 6 1 -2
o n to lo g y o f c r e a tio n 33, 63 c o u n te r- d is c o u r s e s 128
s elf-ag e n cy 1 1 9 ,1 2 1 ,1 2 4
SouB 32 d e m o c ra c y ,
s u b je c t, a n c ie n t G r e e k c r e a tio n o f 87
C a s to r ia d is f o r m u la tio n 66 c o n te m p o ra ry 90
c re a tiv e p s y c h ic a l c a p a c ity a n d d ir e c t 8 7 -8
s o c ie ty 70 i n s ti tu te d /in s ti tu ti n g p o w e r 7 8 - 9 , 88
h is to ric a l d im e n s io n 6 5 -6 P a ris C o m m u n e 89
ra d ic a l im a g in a tio n 6 6 -7 p o litic s a n d p o litic a l, d is tin c tio n o f 8 6 -7
se lf-re fle c tiv e c a p a c ity 7 0 -1 r e p r e s e n ta tiv e 87
so c ia l-h is to ric a l c r e a tio n 67 d ir e c t d e m o c r a c y 8 7 -8
a n a c lis is see le a n in g -o n e x p la n a tio n th e o r y D iscipline a n d P u n ish 1 01-2
T he Archaeology o f Knowledge 9 8 - 1 0 0 , 123 d re a m s 3 9 - 4 1 , 1 1 7 -1 8 , I 4 5 n . 6
a u to g e s tio n p h a s e . S o u B 13
A lg e ria n W a r 30
F o u c a u lt’s w o rk ,
C a s to ria d is th e o r e tic a l a n a ly sis 3 1 -2
T he Λ n h a M logy o f Knowledge 9 8 -1 0 0
G a u llis m 31
T he B irth o f the Clinic 98
M a rx ist th e o ry , re v isio n s o f 31
D iscipline a n d P un ish 1 0 1 -2
g e n e a lo g ic a l a p p r o a c h , p o w e r 1 01-4
T h e B irth o f th e C linic 98
T he H istory o f Sexucdily,
b u r e a u c r a tic c a p ita lis m 12, 1 7 -1 8 , 21,
b io -p o w e r 103
I 4 3 n . 14
d is c o u r s e p r o d u c t io n 1 0 3 -4
su b jec tiv ity , s h ifts in 104
C a s to ria d is vs. F o u c a u lt, M adness a n d C ivilization 9 7 -8
c p is tc m o lo g ic a l a n d p o litic al T h e O tder o f T hings 9 8 -9
re la tiv is m 134 e p is te m e a n d d is c o u r s e 95
F r e u d 's w o r k 135 p o s ts tr u c tu r a lis m ,
in te rs u b jc c tiv ity 134 a e s d ie tic s o f e x is te n c e 95
m a in c o n t r ib u ti o n 133 e n l i g h t e n m e n t p r o p o s itio n s 94
m e a n in g a n d r e p r e s e n t a ti o n 136 e p is te m e a n d d is c o u r s e 95
p o litic a l p o s itio n s 137 h u m a n is m 9 6 -7
p sy c h o a n a ly sis 1 3 5 -6 la n g u a g e 92
r o le o f th e o r y 138 re a lity 9 2 -3
162 Index
I la b e rm a s ia n f ra m e w o rk , d e m o c ra c y 87
C a s to ria d is c o n c e p tio n 6 9 -7 1 E go a n d Id 59
p ro c e s s o f s o c ia liz a tio n , in tc rs u b jc c tiv ity 61
L e T a m b o u r C a fé p h a s e , S ouB , tria d ic p h a s e 49
b u r e a u c r a ti e c a p ita lis m 1 7 -1 8 W h i te b o o k 's c ritic is m 50
K o rean W a r 22 T he O rder o f T h in g s 9 8 -9
M a rx ism 16 e p is te m e a n d d is c o u rs e 95
re v o lu tio n a ry p o litic s, p r o le ta r ia n s 19
T ro tsk y ism 15 p h a n ta s y 3 7 - 8 see also ra d ic a l
im a g in a tio n
M adness a n d C ivilization 9 7 -8 p o s ts tru c tu ra lis m ,
m agm a 4-! a e s th e tic s o f e x is te n c e 95
M a rx ist th e o ry , re v isio n s o f 31 e n l i g h t e n m e n t p r o p o s itio n s 94
e p is te m e a n d d is c o u rs e 95
o n to lo g y o f c r e a tio n see also so cia l c h a n g e h u m a n is m 9 6 -7
c lo s e d so cie ty . la n g u a g e 92
c o lle c tiv e a u to n o m y 61—2 re a lity 9 2 -3
h e te ro n o m o u s 58 s u b je c t 9 4 -5
in d iv id u a l a u to n o m y 5 9 -6 1 theory· o f d is c o u r s e 93
c o n t e m p o r a r y th e o ry , e x tr e m e s o f 33 tru th 9 2 .9 5 - 6
F r e u d ’s p s y c h o a n a ly tic a l fin d in g s 3 4 -5 P ouvoi r O uvrier ( P O ) 11
ra d ic a l im a g in a tio n , p o w e r a n d d o m i n a ti o n .
A ris to tle v ie w 3 5 -6 C a s to ria d is w o rk ,
d e f in itio n 35 h e te ro n o m y 1 1 0 -1 1
f o u n d a t io n s o f 3 7 -8 in s titu tio n s 1 1 0 -1 2
h is to ric a l o m iss io n o f 3 6 -7 F o u c a u lt's th e o ry ,
K a n t’s i n t u iti o n 36 h is to r ic a l d isc o n tin u ity ' 109
o n to lo g ic a l a s s u m p tio n s 37 H o n n e th v iew 108
p h a n ta s y 4 1 -5 in s titu tio n s 112
p sy ch ic al r e p r e s e n t a ti o n 3 8 -4 1 r u p tu r e s o f e p is te m e s 109
s o c ia l-h is to ric a l d im e n s io n o f so c ie ty 34 th e o r iz i n g p o w e r 109
IS S 5 5 -7
so cia l in s titu tio n s (S I) 55 ra d ic a l im a g in a tio n ,
s tr a ta , e x istin g -b e in g , A ris to tle v ie w 3 5 -6
fo r-itsc lf 4 5 -6 d e f in itio n 35
h e te ro g e n e o u s 45 f o u n d a t io n s o f 3 7 -8
h u m a n psyche 46 h is to ric a l o m is s io n o f 3 6 -7
in d iv id u a l a n d c o llectiv e K a n t’s i n t u iti o n 36
a u to n o m y 47 o n to lo g ic a l a s s u m p tio n s 37
ir r e d u c ib le 45 p h an tasy ,
liv in g -b e in g 46 C a s to ria d is vs. F r e u d c o n c e p ts 4 2 -4
so cia l in d iv id u a l 4 6 -7 m agm a 44
so cie ty a n d s o c ia l-h is to ric a l 47 u n c o n s c io u s lo g ic 4 1 -2
s tr a tif ic a tio n , h u m a n p sy c h e , p sy ch ic al r e p r e s e n t a ti o n ,
fo r c e o f f o r m a tio n 5 0 -1 a f u n c tio n a lity 3 8 -9
le a n in g - o n e x p la n a tio n , c r e a tio n 5 0 -2 C a s to ria d is vs. F r e u d
m o n a d ic s u ig c 4 8 -9 c o n c e p ts 4 2 -4
O e d ip a l p h a s e 4 9 -5 0 i n d é te r m in a ti o n 3 9 -4 1
p s y c h e t o s o c ie ty re la tio n 52—4 r e p r e s e n ta tiv e d e m o c r a c y 87
s u b lim a tio n p ro c e s s 48 R u ssian b u r e a u c r a c y 1 7 -1 8
164 Index
so cia l c h a n g e , d ir e c t d e m o c r a c y , w o r k e r c o u n c ils 24
C a s to ria d is ’ a u to n o m y , I iu n g a r ia n C o u n c ils 2 6 -8
A d a m s view 8 0 -3 P o lish crisis 25
A rn a s o n v ie w 7 9 -8 3 p r o le ta r ia n m a n a g e m e n t 19
a u to - r e f le c tio n 78 s e lf - m a n a g e m e n t 18
C ia r a m e lli’s view 81 u n to u c h a b le tr u th s 14
c iv iliz a tio n a l a x ia l a g e a p p r o a c h 80 U SS R 1 1 - 1 2 ,1 7
d e ju r e v a lid ity 78 S o c ia lis m e o u B a r b a r ie (S o u B )
d em o cracy 7 8 - 9 .8 6 - 9 0 a u to g e s tio n ,
h e r m e n e u ti c a l tr a n s f o r m a tio n 80 A lg e ria n W a r 30
h e t e r o n o m o u s s o c ie ty 75 C a s to ria d is t h e o r e tic a l a n a ly sis 3 1 -2
h e te ro n o m y 84—5 G a u llis m 31
K lo o g c r view 7 9 ,8 4 M a rx is t th e o r y , rev isio n s o f 31
le g itim a tio n 7 7 ,7 9 c a p ita lis t o r g a n iz a tio n 2 8 -9
n o rm a tiv e d im e n s io n 7 6 - 7 ,1 3 0 c o n t e n t o f s o c ia lis m 29
p s y c h o a n a ly tic th e o r y 75 O n th e C o n te n t o f S o cia lism (I, II, III) 28
relativ ism 77 d e a th o f S ta lin 2 3 -4
S m ith v ie w 82 d e c e n tr a l iz e d d e m o c r a c y 30
C a s to ria d is vs. F o u c a u lt 134, 137, 139 E a s t B e rlin e v e n ts 2 3 -4
d e fe n s e s 74 F o rd is m , i n F r a n c e 12
F o u c a u lt's w o rk , F r e n c h s tr ik e 24
n o r m a tiv e c r ite r ia 1 2 9 -3 0 in itia l w o rk a n d issu es 10-11
p o litic s 1 2 7 -8 L c T a m b o u r C afé,
pow er 1 2 8 -9 b u r e a u c r a ti c c a p ita lis m 1 7 -1 8
re s is ta n c e a n d c o u n te r -d is c o u r s e s 128 K o re a n W a r 22
subject 322 M a rx ism 16
W a lz e r v ie w 131 r e v o lu tio n ä r) 1 p o litic s, p r o le ta r ia n s 19
so c ia l-h is to ric a l 7 4 -5 T ro tsk y ism 15
s o c ia l m e a n in g . m ista k e a c k n o w le d g m e n t, K o re a n
C a s to ria d is v s. F o u c a u lt 136 W ar 23
C a s to ria d is ' w ork, phases 1 3 -1 4
le g e in a n d te u k h e in , o p e r a tio n s o f 73 P o lis h crisis 25
m a g m a tic o rg a n iz a tio n 73 Pouvoir O uvrier ( P O ) 11
p sy ch ic al r e p r e s e n t a ti o n 1 2 5 -6 s e lf-o rg a n iz a tio n , w o rk in g c la ss 27
a n d r e p r e s e n t a ti o n 74 S o c ia lis m R e a ffirm e d 1 4 2 n . 12
s o c ia l in s titu tio n s 72 in U SS R 1 1 -1 2
sta b ility 7 3 -4 w o rk e rs ’ c o u n c ils , tr a d itio n o f 1 2 -1 3 , 2 6
F o u c a u lt's w o rk , s o c ia liz a tio n , p r o c e s s of,
body a n d psyche 126 in d iv id u a l- s o c ie ty m e d ia t io n 68
d is c o u rs e a n d p o w e r 123 s o c ia l in d iv id u a l, lin g u is tic
e p is te m ic r u p tu r e s 123 c a p a c ity 6 7 -8
p sy ch ic al r e p r e s e n t a ti o n 125 society,
p s y c h o a n a ly s is 127 B e in g 140
se lf-a g e n c y 124 d e m o c ra c y 7 8 .8 6
s o c ia l p r a c tic c s 1 2 3 -4 h is to r y 8 2 -3
so cia lism , h o m o g e n e ity 58
C a s to ria d is d e f i n iti o n 12 T h e 1 I u n g a r i a n R e v o lu tio n 27
Index
in d iv id u a l a n d 6 8 , 70 p a n o p tic p o w e r 120
in s titu te d s o c ic ty w e in s ti tu te d society p o w e r, e f f e c ts o f 119
in s titu tin g s o c ic tv see in s titu tin g so cic ty p sy c h o a n a ly sis a n d e th n o lo g y 1
K o rean W a r 22 p s y c h o lo g ic a l irr e g u la r itie s 120
p o litic s 86 r e c ip r o c ity 122
p o w e r a n d d is c o u r s e 123 s o c ie ty a n d so cia l c h a n g e 122
psych e a n d 5 2 -7 , 6 9 -7 0 W illiam s view 121
ra d ic a l im a g in a tio n 67 s u b je c tific a tio n ,
R u s sia n so c ic ty 1 7 -1 8 F o u c a u lt's v ie w 10 7 , 11 5 , 117
s o c ia l c h a n g e 74 g e n e a lo g y 102
s o c ia l-h is to ric a l d im e n s io n 3 2 , 47 in t e r p r e ta tio n s 122
s o c ia lis m 30 p a n o p tic p o w e r 12 0