Private companies engage in Russia’s non-

linear warfare
[Content preview – Subscribe to Jane’s Intelligence Review for full article]

Moscow has deployed private military contractors to support its military operations in
Crimea, eastern Ukraine, and Syria. James Bingham and Konrad Muzyka examine the
rationale behind the use of these non-state and often deniable forces

Key Points
• As part of its non-linear approach to modern warfare, Russia has integrated private military
companies (PMCs) into its warfighting strategy in largely conventional and support roles.
• Russian PMCs have a close operational relationship with Russian special forces and
intelligence structures, but do not appear to be directly tasked with the collection of technical
intelligence.
• The use of private forces is likely to remain a feature of Russian non-linear warfare in the
future, as Moscow can claim that such fighters have a financial or individual ideological
motivation for fighting.

On 17 January 2018, RT’s Russian-language website reported that the Russian First Deputy
Chairman of the State Construction and Legislation Committee, Mikhail Yemelyanov, was planning
to introduce a draft bill into the State Duma legalising private military companies (PMCs). With the
Syrian conflict having shown the “relevance” of PMCs, according to Yemelyanov, the law would
enable such companies to engage in “counter-terrorism operations abroad” as well as to “protect
the sovereignty of allied states from external aggression”, in addition to providing protective security.

The concept of such a bill had first emerged in 2011, when Russian President Vladimir Putin (then
prime minister) gave support to the idea of legalising PMCs when delivering a report to the State
Duma. The draft bill, scheduled to enter the Duma in February 2018, will cover Russian citizens in
Russian and foreign PMCs, according to RT.

With Russia’s experience of using private contractors in Syria and Ukraine seemingly to be written
into statute, the use of PMCs as a Kremlin asset is almost certain to become more entrenched in
coming years. PMCs are part of an evolving conception of Russian military and intelligence
operations, and Jane’s has charted their evolution in support of the Kremlin’s foreign policy
objectives.

© 2018 IHS. No portion of this report may be reproduced, reused, or otherwise distributed in any form without prior written Page 1 of 3
consent, with the exception of any internal client distribution as may be permitted in the license agreement between client and
IHS. Content reproduced or redistributed with IHS permission must display IHS legal notices and attributions of authorship. The
information contained herein is from sources considered reliable but its accuracy and completeness are not warranted, nor are
the opinions and analyses which are based upon it, and to the extent permitted by law, IHS shall not be liable for any errors or
omissions or any loss, damage or expense incurred by reliance on information or any statement contained herein.
 Russian Navy Project 1124M frigates Suzdalets and Povorino fire RGB-60 anti-submarine
rockets during Russia’s Navy Day celebration in Sevastopol in Crimea on 30 July 2017.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was achieved not through displays of overwhelming
military force but instead through the effective use of irregular forces, a shift that suggests an
evolution in the Kremlin’s thinking about the best way to achieve its politico-military goals.
(AFP/Getty Images)
1707806

Russian force deployments into Crimea and subsequent involvement in military operations in
eastern Ukraine from 2014 onwards have showed how Moscow’s military thinking about warfare has
changed since operations in Chechnya in the 1990s. Previous military campaigns primarily sought
to annihilate any forms of resistance, be it civilian, guerrilla, or military, by using a preponderance of
power. This may still be an objective, but the increased resort to ‘hybrid’, ‘non-linear’, or ‘irregular’
warfare – concepts whose problematic definition prompts ongoing debate – suggests some
reorientation in the Kremlin’s thinking about politico-military goals and the means to achieve them.

On the web
Zapad exercises underline Russia’s domestic security concerns
The rising influence of Russian special forces

Author
James Bingham is a Senior Research Analyst for Jane’s Land Forces. Additional research by
Konrad Muzyka, a Jane’s Armed Forces Research Analyst.

© 2018 IHS. No portion of this report may be reproduced, reused, or otherwise distributed in any form without prior written Page 2 of 3
consent, with the exception of any internal client distribution as may be permitted in the license agreement between client and
IHS. Content reproduced or redistributed with IHS permission must display IHS legal notices and attributions of authorship. The
information contained herein is from sources considered reliable but its accuracy and completeness are not warranted, nor are
the opinions and analyses which are based upon it, and to the extent permitted by law, IHS shall not be liable for any errors or
omissions or any loss, damage or expense incurred by reliance on information or any statement contained herein.
For the full version and more content:

Jane's Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre

This analysis is taken from Jane’s Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre, which
delivers comprehensive and reliable country risk and military capabilities information, analysis and
daily insight.
IHS country risk and military capabilities news and analysis is also available within Jane’s
Intelligence Review. To learn more and to subscribe to Jane’s Intelligence Review online, offline
or print visit: http://magazines.ihs.com/

For advertising solutions visit Jane’s Advertising

© 2018 IHS. No portion of this report may be reproduced, reused, or otherwise distributed in any form without prior written Page 3 of 3
consent, with the exception of any internal client distribution as may be permitted in the license agreement between client and
IHS. Content reproduced or redistributed with IHS permission must display IHS legal notices and attributions of authorship. The
information contained herein is from sources considered reliable but its accuracy and completeness are not warranted, nor are
the opinions and analyses which are based upon it, and to the extent permitted by law, IHS shall not be liable for any errors or
omissions or any loss, damage or expense incurred by reliance on information or any statement contained herein.