GENELLE MAE A.

MADRIGAL
LLB III – Conflict of Laws
BC School of Law
1st Sem AY 2018-2019

Chapter VIII - Cases in Marriage and Divorce

US vs. Jarvison

Citation: 409 F. 3d 1221

2005

Facts:
The wife of the respondent invoked spousal testimonial privilege when petitioner-government
compelled her to testify against his husband for sexual molestation of their granddaughter,
leading to a contesting of the validity of their marriage as members of the Navajo tribe.

Issue:
Whether the marriage in a traditional Navajo ceremony was valid and that full faith and credit
should be accorded to it.

Held:

Yes. The petitioner’s contention that the marriage was invalid because they did not have their
marriage validated or licensed fails under Navajo law, which does not require such a license.
Thus, the Jarvisons’ failure to license or validate their traditional marriage did not result in
their marriage being invalid under such law, hence, valid.

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 Cook vs. Cook

Citation: 104 P.3d 857

2005

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were first cousins which were married in Virginia (which was valid in
this state) and then moved to Arizona (which was void in this state, except those marriages
held valid by the laws where they are contracted). Subsequently, an amendment to Arizona
marriage laws made those previously held valid marriages as now void and prohibited.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is valid under Arizona law.

Held:
Yes. According to Arizona law, no statute is retroactive unless expressly declared therein, and
there was no express declaration as such. Also, since appellee has a vested right in the validity
of her marriage that includes a “vested property interest”, such is harmonized to the already
prospective construction of such amendatory statute.

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 Obergefell vs. Hodges

Citation: 135 S. Ct. 2584

2015

Facts:
Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky,
and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage
or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for
such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal
Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of
plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in
favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the
states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other
states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due
process.

Issue:
Whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two
people of the same sex.

Held:
Yes. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to
same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent
has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of
individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between two people, it
safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising
children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order.

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 Langan v. St. Vincent's Hospital of NY

Citation: 802 N.Y.S.2d 476

2005

Facts:
John Langan and his same-sex partner formally entered into a Vermont civil union. Langan's
partner subsequently died after being struck by a car while in New York. Langan then sued St.
Vincent's Hospital seeking damages for the wrongful death of his partner. The hospital moved
to dismiss the case, claiming that Langan had no standing to bring the suit. The hospital
appealed the trial court's ruling in favor of Langan to New York's intermediate appellate court.

Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff had standing as a surviving spouse to sue the defendant hospital
for wrongful death.

Held:
Supreme Court denied the motion and the appeal ensued.

“Unlike the court, which can only rule on the issues before it, the legislature is empowered to
act on all facts of the issues of the solemnization and creation of such relationships, the
dissolution of such relationship and the consequences attendant thereto, and all other rights
and liabilities that flow from such a relationship. Any contrary decision, no matter how
circumscribed, will be taken as judicial imprimatur of same-sex marriages and would
constitute a usurpation of powers expressly reserved by our Constitution to the legislature.
Accordingly, the order must be reversed insofar as appealed from…”

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 Tenchavez vs. Escano

Citation: G.R. No. L-19671

November 29, 1965

Facts:
Vicenta Escaño, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, on February 24, 1948,
before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar.
However, the two were unable to live together after the marriage and as of June 1948, they
were already estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed
a verified complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of
“Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was
issued in open court by the said tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California,
had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship.

Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May
1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged
with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos
in damages. Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts,
and counterclaimed for moral damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.

Held:

No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and undissolved under
the Philippine Law.

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Pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code, laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.

Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine Law to
which Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued, Escaño, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties,
deserting her husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to
secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which constitute
a willful infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our
law on the basis of adultery.

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 Van Dorn vs. Romillo

Citation: G.R. No. L-68470

October 8, 1985

Facts:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen,
was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and
had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time
with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that
petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and
prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be
declared as the administrator of the said property.

Issue:

Whether the divorce decree should be recognized in our jurisdiction.

Held:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own
representation before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital
obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated
against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

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 San Luis vs. San Luis

Citation: G.R. No. 134029

February 06, 2007 c

Facts:

During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia
Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint
for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of
America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad
San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his
death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because
she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee.

Issue:

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Whether the divorce obtained by Merry Lee in Hawaii could be recognized in our jurisdiction.

Held:

Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through
judicial precedent.

The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A.,

she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law
Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the
said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as
they must be alleged and proved.
 Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.

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 Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera

Citation: G.R. No. 80116 c

June 30, 1989

Facts:
Imelda Pilapil was married to Erich Geiling in Germany and their marriage bore one child.
Geiling eventually filed for divorce in Germany stating the causes of failure of the marriage.
Petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before
the RTC Manila. After the promulgation of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two consecutive
complaints of adultery against Pilapil for having elationships with Chia and Chua. She asked
the court to have her arraignment deferred but to no avail, as well as the motion to quash due
to lack of jurisdiction. A temporary restraining order was eventually issued to him from
implementing said order.

Issue:
Whether or not a criminal case for adultery which took place after a divorce is barred by the
previously acquired decree of divorce.

Held:

The Court ruled on the affirmative side. This was based on two concepts. First, that the Civil
Code of the Philippines recognized a divorce acquired by an alien spouse in another country
provided that it is valid based on his national law. The second concept is that adultery requires
an offended spouse, which means tgat marital status is relevant. In the case at bar, Geiling’s
divorce decree acquired in Germany is recognized in the Philippines freeing him and Pilapil
from their marital bond and responsibility. Since they are validly divorced, Geiling cannot be
considered an offended spouse to file an adultery case against Pilapil who had then the right
and freedom to enter into another relationships.

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 Roehr v. Rodriguez

Citation: G.R. No. 142820

June 20, 2003

Facts:

Wife Rodriguez filed for declaration of nullity of marriage, which was subsequently moved for
dismissal by husband Roehr, a German national. Pending decision, the husband obtained a
decree of divorce from a German Court, providing for (1) the dissolution of their marriage and
(2) the grant of parental custody of the children to Roehr.

Thereafter, wife moved for partial reconsideration with a prayer that the case proceed for the
purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties
between the Roehr and Rodriguez. Motion was granted and thus challenged by Roehr.

Issue:

Whether or not there is nothing left to be tackled by the Court since there are no conjugal
properties alleged in the annulment and the divorce decree provides for the finality of the
custody of children.

Held:

No. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support
of the children, must be determined by our courts. The Court held that before our courts can
give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner
by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules
of Court.

Pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien

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spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Moreover, Section 50 of the Rules of Court states that the effect of a judgment of a tribunal of
a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment
may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Since the proceedings in the German court were summary, the wife was not given opportunity
to challenge said judgment. Therefore, the divorce decree did not provide for the finality of the
custody of children.

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 Republic vs. Orbecido

Citation: G.R. No. 154380

October 5, 2005

Facts:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named
Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. Five years later, the wife left for US bringing along their
son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a
divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition
for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Held:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par
2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

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 Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

Citation: G.R. No. 186571

August 11, 2010

Facts:

Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian, married Daisylyn
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. He soon left to Canada after their wedding due to work
commitments. Then he returned to Philippines on April 2005, only to find out Daisylyn has an
affair with another man. He returned to Canada to file a divorce that took effect on January
2006.

Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the Philippines. He went
to Pasig City Registrar's Office to register his Canadian divorce decree but was denied
considering that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law, that the foreign
divorce must be recognized judicially by the Philippine court.

Subsequently he filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of foreign divorce but
was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according to Article 26 of the
Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.

Issue:

Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of recognition of the foreign
divorce decree

Held:

General Rule: The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. In other
words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction. The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted
out of line when it registered the foreign divorce decree without judicial order recognition.
Therefore, the registration is still deemed to be void.

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 Fujiki vs. Marinay

Citation: G.R. No. 196049

June 26, 2013

Facts:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese,
Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara
were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to re-establish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”

RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment based on improper
venue and the lack of personality of Fujiki to file the petition. He filed a motion for
reconsideration which the RTC denied upon consideration that Fujiki as a "third person” in the
proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized.

Issues:

1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy.

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3. Whether the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Held:

1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.

2. YES. The prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of
the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. Fujiki has the personality
to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his
civil status as married to Marinay.

3. YES. The Philippine court can recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. Philippine courts
already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the
extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. However, the
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a
party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.

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