END OF TERM of any of said appointive officers dependent upon the pleasure of the President.
of any of said appointive officers dependent upon the pleasure of the President. If such were not the
FERNANDEZ V. LEDESMA
Facts:
Celso A. Fernandez was appointed ad interim chief of police of Basilan City. In an administrative
order, suspended Fernandez for one month for having been found guilty of gross negligence, violation of
law, and dereliction of duty.
Fernandez was later charged before the CFI of Basilan City, for disobedience of an order of his
superior officer and for oral defamation, for which he was suspended from office by the then Executive
Secretary Fortunato de Leon. After the prosecution had rested its cases, the latter was acquitted in the
two criminal cases abovementioned. Nevertheless, Fernandez continued suspended even if no formal
administrative charge were instituted against him, or any administrative investigation conducted of said
charges. On April 28, 1959, the then Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo wrote Fernandez informing him that
the President has terminated his services as chief of police of Basilan City and has designated Cecilio
Ledesma in his. The nomination of Ledesma having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, he took his oath of office as new chief of police of Basilan City on May 26, 1959.
Fernandez instituted an action for quo warranto with mandamus against Ledesma before the CFI of
Basilan City seeking his reinstatement on the ground that his removal from office without cause as
provided by law was in violation of our Constitution.
The court dismissed the complaint holding that the removal of petitioner from office by the
President was made in accordance with Section 17 of Republic Act 288 known as the Charter of the City
of Basilan. Fernandez appealed to SC on pure questions of law.
Issue:
WON Fernandez was validly removed from office by the act of the President.
Ruling:
It is clear that the President in the exercise of his discretion has put an end to the services of appellant,
and this he did pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by Section 17 of Republic Act 288, known
as the Charter of the City of Basilan, which reads as follows:
SEC. 17. Appointment and removal of officers and employees — Compensation.— The
President shall appoint with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the municipal
judge and auxiliary municipal judge, the city engineer, the city treasurer-assessor, the city
attorney, the chief of police and the other chiefs of departments of the city which may be
created from time to time, and the President may remove at his discretion any of said
appointive officers with the exception of the municipal judge, who may be removed only
according to law. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the aforesaid section, the President is vested with the authority to appoint, with the consent of
the Commission of Appointments, and in connection with such power the same section says "the
President may remove at his discretion any of said appointive officers with the exception of the municipal
judge, who may be removed only according to law." Verily, the President interpreted said removal clause
as meaning that he may terminate the services of any officer he may appoint under the charter at his
discretion or pleasure with the exception of the municipal judge who may be removed only according to
law, and in the exercise of such power he terminated the services of appellant as chief of police. This is
now assigned by appellant as error.
We agree with the foregoing interpretation. When the law says that the President may remove at his
discretion any of the appointive officers of the city with the exception of the municipal judge who may be
removed only according to law, it is evident that the legislative intent is to make the continuance in office
case, it would not have made a distinction in point of removal between appointive officers in general and
the municipal judge. This distinction verily is predicated upon the fact that nowhere in Republic Act No.
288 is there any mention that the term of office of the chief of police, with the exception of the municipal
judge, should be for a fixed period. The fact no term of office is fixed for that position is indicative of an
intention to make it dependent upon the discretion or pleasure of the appointing power. And Congress is
not wanting in power to do so for, as it was aptly said: "A public office is the right, authority and duty,
created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure
of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign function of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public" And in Alba v. Alajar, 53 O.G. No. 5, p.
1452, this Court also said: "Congress can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials
dependent upon the pleasure of the President."
Appellant, however, does not agree with the foregoing view for he contends that the act of the President
in appointing Cecilio Ledesma to the position of chief of police of Basilan City in his place is tantamount
to his removal without cause from office in violation of Section 4, Article XII, of our Constitution. But this
contention cannot be sustained considering that the position of the chief of police does not have a fixed
term. What is in point here is the case of Alba v. Alajar,supra, wherein this Court made the following
pronouncement:
The pervading error of the respondents lies in the fact that they insist on the act of the President in
designating petitioner Alba in the place of respondent Alajar as one of removal. The replacement of
respondent Alajar is not removal, but an expiration of his tenure, which is one the ordinary modes of
terminating official relations. Section 2546 refers to removal at pleasure while section 8 of Republic Act
No. 603 refers to holding office at the pleasure of the President.
What is involved here is the creation of an office and the tenure of such office, which has been made
expressly dependent upon the pleasure of the President. "'Even assuming for the moment that the act of
replacing Alajar constitutes removal, the act itself is valid and lawful, for no fixity of tenure has been
provided for, and the pleasure of the President has been exercised in accordance with the policy laid
down by Congress therein.
HERNANDEZ v. VILLEGAS
Facts:
Villegas, a lawyer and a civil service eligible, was appointed Director for Security of the Bureau of
Customs.
Shortly thereafter, he was temporarily detailed to the Arrastre Service vice Eleazer Manikan and, in his his
stead, James Keefe was designated Acting Director for Security.
Meanwhile, Hernandez proposed to the Office of the President the permanent appointment of Villegas
as Arrastre Superintendent. A few days later, the appointment of James Keefe to the position of Director
for Security was likewise proposed.
Executive Secretary Pao advised Secretary Hernandez that the President had approved the proposed
appointments of Villegas and Keefe. Accordingly, Villegas and Keefe’s appointments were prepared and
later signed by Hernandez. As the CA observed in its decision, “In one of the appointments, Keefe was
promoted to the position of Director for Security and in the other plaintiff was demoted to the rank of
arrastre superintendent.
It appears that Villegas did not know of his appointment and that of Keefe. On this day, he learned that
Keefe was being paid the salary for Director for Security and, on further inquiry, found that he had been
appointed Arrastre Superintendent. Therefore, he served notice on Customs Commissioner Capapas that
he was resuming the duties and functions of his office as Director for Security. He also wrote the Auditor
General, Secretary Hernandez and Commissioner Capapas, the Budget Commissioner and the Civil
Service Commissioner, asking them to disapprove the promotional appointment of Keefe to the post of
Director for Security.
When all else failed, Villegas filed this action for quo warranto in the CFI.
Issue: WON Villegas removal is with cause
Ruling. No.
-Even officers and employees of the civil service occupying primarily confidential positions are subject to
the constitutional safeguard against removal or suspension except for cause.
-Officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue only for so long as confidence
in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of
confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration
of the term of office.
RETIREMENT
Beronilla v GSIS, G.R. No. L-21723, Nov. 26, 1970
Facts:
Beronilla changed his year of birth from 1898 to 1900 and it was approved by the GSIS general manager.
Thus the proceeds of his insurance policy were re-computed, maturity date and value were adjusted and
he also paid additional premium payments. But later on, it was found out that he had been paid salaries
and fringe benefits despite lapse of his compulsory retirement age. Thus, the GSISBOTs resolved to
supersede the decision of the general manager that allowed the change of year of birth. He argued it
impaired the obligations of contract between him and GSIS regarding his retirement.
Held: The constitutional injunction against impairment of obligations of insurance contracts can only be
directed against legislation and not resolutions of the government agencies. Retirement of government
employees is imposed by law and is not a result of any contractual stipulation.
ABOLITION OF OFFICE- MANALANG V. QUITORIANO
94 Phil 903 – Law on Public Officers – Abolition of a Public Office – Appointing Power Vested in the
Executive
Luis Manalang was the Director of the Placement Bureau. However in 1952, a law was passed by
Congress abolishing the Placement Bureau (PB). The said bureau was replaced by the National
Employment Service (NES). Aurelio Quitoriano, then acting Secretary of Labor, recommended Manalang
to be the Commissioner of NES. But then it was Quitoriano who was appointed by the President as the
Commissioner of NES. Manalang then filed a quo warranto case against Quitoriano and the two others
who succeeded Quitoriano in the said post.
Manalang contended that the law creating the NES provided for the automatic absorption of qualified
personnel from the PB to the NES; that as Director of PB, he should automatically be the Commissioner
of NES; that he if he won’t be appointed as such, he is in effect being ousted from his position and such
violates his security of tenure.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manalang is correct.
HELD: No. The Placement Bureau was duly abolished by a valid law. Consequently, Manalang’s former
office as Director of PB is likewise abolished. There I no termination to speak of and his right to security
of tenure is not violated. He was not removed from office. His office simply ceased to exist.
Even though it appears that the NES and the PB has similar functions, Manalang’s argument that based
on the law creating NES, he should be automatically absorbed as Commissioner therein is not tenable.
The absorption of qualified personnel provided for in the law (RA 761: An Act to Provide for the
Organization of a National Employment Service) does not include the Director of PB because if that it
does the intention of Congress, then Congress is usurping the power of the president to appoint.
Congress cannot appoint a specific person into a public office. The appointing power is the exclusive
prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be imposed by Congress, except those
resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and from the
exercise of the limited legislative power to prescribe the qualifications to a given appointive office
FACUNDO V. PABLAN
Facts:
 Valeriano Ulep and Alejandro Facundo jointly filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a
petition for mandamus against respondents Leonardo Carbonell (municipal mayor of Asingan,
Pangasinan), Tiburcio Layos, Federico Domingo, Roberto Lopez, Mariano de los Trinos, Bartolome
Cruz (municipal councilors of Asingan), and Vicente Perez (municipal treasurer)
 as first cause of action, that on February 11, 1948, petitioner Ulep was appointed Local Civil
Registry Clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer of Asingan, and has held said position and
received salary therefor, continuously since his appointment; that because he is a non-civil service
eligible, he (Ulep) took the general clerical (qualifying) civil service examination on February 27,
1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2260, known as the Civil Service Act of 1959;
that on June 24, 1960, respondents municipal councilors passed Resolution No. 67, abolishing his
position and, on the same day, approved Resolution No. 70, creating 4 positions of policemen; and
that four days later, respondent Mayor Carbonell wrote a letter to him (Ulep) terminating his
services as Local Civil Registry clerk.
 As second cause of action, that petitioner Facundo, a third grade civil service eligible, was
appointed as Market Collector in the office of the municipal treasurer of Asingan, on October 15,
1958, and has continuously held and performed the duties of said position; that in sad Resolution
No. 67, his position was abolished; and that on June 28, 1960, respondent Mayor Carbonell wrote
him a letter terminating his services as Market Collector.
 The petition further alleged that by the approval and adoption of said resolution and termination
of their services, petitioners have been unlawfully excluded from their positions; and that
respondents were impelled by revenge and ulterior motives and that their acts are oppressive,
persecutory, and violative of the specific provisions of RA 2260.
 The respondents contended that the positions abolished under the resolution in question”were
unnecessary and useless and carrying duties which could be efficiently performed by other
employees in the office of the Municipal Treasurer”; that the appropriation for said positions could
be applied for more important and useful undertakings of the municipality particularly in
maintaining peace and order which have been unduly neglected in the past; and that the
resolution is valid and lawful,enacted and resolved in order to bring about a better and more
efficient administration.
 Qualifications and nature of appointment of petitioners:
 Facundo is a third grade civil service eligible. While it is true that the appointment of
Alejandro A. Facundo is ` probational', yet it appears authorized and approved by the
Provincial Treasurer, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Civil Service.
Petitioner Facundo is entitled to permanency in his tenure as market collector; he cannot be
removed except for cause as provided by law; and his summary dismissal — by indirect
abolition of his position — not being approved nor sanctioned by the Commissioner of Civil
Service or the Secretary of Finance has no validity in law.
 Ulep is not a civil service eligible; his different appointments had always been
subject to Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code, and this was known to petitioner
himself.. Ulep said that he took the civil service examination in 1960, but the results were
not announced, even when this case was heard (August 31, 1960). Ulep, therefore, cannot
claim the permanency and protection of civil service law and rules. Valeriano Ulep,
therefore, cannot in this case claim any right to reinstatement.
 Lower court held that the abolishmet of Ulep’s position is valid while Facundo’s is invalid.
Furthermore, Facundo was entitled for reinstatement and back salaries.
Issues:
 With regards to Facundo’s petition, whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when it denied the motion for immediate partial execution of the judgment in favor of
Facundo.
 With regards to Ulep’s appeal, 1. Whether the council validly abolished his position; 2. If in the
affirmative, whether the abolition thereof resulted in the lawful separation of said appellant.
Ruling:
 (FACUNDO) the reinstatement issue is deemed moot since petitioner was reinstated pending
present petition. But with regards to his back salaries, the judge was ordered to issue a writ of
execution.
 (ULEP) 1. there is no law which expressly authorizes a municipal council to abolish the positions it
has created, but the rule is well-settled that the power to create an office includes the power to
abolish it, unless there are constitutional or statutory rules expressly or impliedly providing
otherwise. However, the office must be abolished in good faith; and if immediately after the office
is abolished, another office is created with substantially the same duties, and a different individual
is appointed, or if it otherwise appears that the office was abolished for personal or political
reasons, the courts will intervene.
 In the instant case, the reasons which impelled the municipal council of Asingan in
adopting Resolution No. 67, dated June 24, 1960, abolishing the position of
appellant are stated therein, to wit: there is "an excess of personnel" in the office of
the municipal treasurer of Asingan; the position of appellant "could be undertaken
by the internal revenue clerk" in said office. Observe too, that the new positions created (in
Resolution No. 70 of the same date as No. 67), are those of policemen, the duties of which, are
entirely different from those of appellant. In the circumstances, we are not prepared to declare
that the action of the municipal council of Asingan was an abuse of the power and discretion
lodged in it by existing law.
 2. appellant contends that his removal from his position was
illegal because having taken the civil service examination required under Section 232 of Republic
Act No. 2260, known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, he could not be replaced or removed from
office, unless the results of said examination shows he failed therein. He also argues that his
removal was illegal, as it was not for cause as provided by Section 4, Article XI of the Constitution.
But, appellant can not successfully invoke said provisions in his favor, because there has been no
removal of petitioner, but an abolition of his position, which was within the power of the municipal
council of Asingan to do.
CRUZ V. PRIMICIAS , 23 SCRA 998
Facts:
 Cruz along with the others, are civil service eligible provincial clerks. The governor was authorized
by the provincial board to issue an Executive Order reorganizing his office and the provincial board
to promote economy, efficiency and simplicity. The positions of clerks were abolished but positions
for the governor’s confidential staff were created.
Issue:
 Whether or not the abolition of their offices was valid, not removal.
 Held:
 It is null because it clearly serves personal or political ends and circumvents security of tenure.
There is no promotion of economy because of the 72 positions abolished, only 22 were occupied
and paid P25,000/sem. Whereas 28 positions were created with salaries amounting to
P43,000/sem. Also, there is no need for efficiency since there is no showing that the said clerks
were inefficient because no complaint for inefficiency was filed against any of them. Such was even
contradicted by the prior promotional appointments of the said clerks whichclearly evidenced
their efficiency.
MARCELINO A. BUSACAY vs. ANTONIO F. BUENAVENTURA
One-liner: Abolition of the office presupposes clear intention to do away with it wholly and
permanently.
Facts:
The plaintiff was a duly appointed and qualified pre-war toll collector in the office of the provincial
treasurer of Pangasinan with station at the Bued toll bridge in Sison, Pangasinan. His appointment was
classified by the Commissioner of Civil Service as permanent. After liberation in 1945, he was
reappointed to that position with compensation at the rate of P720 per annum. On March 21, 1946, he
resigned but on April 16 he was reappointed, and had continuously served up to November of 1947,
when the bridge was destroyed by flood, by reason of which, he and two other toll collectors were laid
off.
Upon the reopening of the bridge to traffic after the repairs, he and his companions resumed work
without new appointments and continued working until the bridge was washed away by flood in 1947.
When the bridge was reconstructed and reopened to traffic about the end of November, 1950, the
plaintiff notified the respondent Provincial Treasurer of his intention and readiness to resume his duties
as toll collector but said respondent refused to reinstate or reappoint him.
Respondent Alfredo Murao, also a civil service eligible, was appointed instead of him in February, 1951,
and has been discharging the duties of the position ever since which carries a salary of P1,440 a year. The
Bued toll bridge is a portion of a national road and is a national toll bridge under Act No. 3932. The
salaries of toll collectors thereon are paid from toll collections. In 1948, 1949 and 1950, no appropriation
was set aside for these salaries, when the bridge was being rehabilitated. On September 1950, the board
on toll bridges approved the Bued river bridge as a toll bridge, authorized the collection of fees thereon,
and prescribed corresponding rules and regulations.
Issue: Whether or not by the total destruction of the bridge in 1947 the positions of toll collectors
provided therefor were abolished.
Held:
SG opined that they were. But the court disagreed.
To consider an office abolished there must have been an intention to do away with it wholly and
permanently, as the word "abolish" denotes. The collapse of said bridge did not work to destroy but
only to suspend the plaintiff's position, and that upon the bridge's rehabilitation and its reoperation as a
toll bridge, his right to the position was similarly and automatically restored.
This position is temporary, transitory or precarious only in the sense that its life is co-extensive with that
of the bridge as a toll bridge. For that matter, all offices created by statute are more or less temporary,
transitory or precarious in that they are subject to the power of the legislature to abolish them. But this
is not saying that the rights of the incumbents of such positions may be impaired while the offices
exist, except for cause.
We believe that the cases of pre-war officers and employees whose employments were not considered
forfeited notwithstanding the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines and who were allowed
to reoccupy them after liberation without the formality of new appointments are pertinent authority for
the views here expressed. Our judgment then is that the appellant should be reinstated to the position
he held before the destruction of the Bued river bridge.
REORGANIZATION
DARIO V. MISON
FACTS:In 1986, Cory Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO
IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE...”, the mandate of the people to Completely
reorganize the government.
In January 1987, she promulgated EO 127, "REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE". Among other
offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed
a new staffing pattern therefor.
In February 1987, a brand new constitution was adopted. On January 1988, incumbent Commissioner of
Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of
Reorganization Executive Orders," prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. It also provided
that by February 1988, all employees covered by EO 127 and the grace period extended to the Bureau of
Customs by the President on reorganization shall be: a) informed of their re-appointment, or b) offered
another position in the same department or agency, or c) informed of their termination.
Mison addressed several notices to various Customs officials stating that they shall continue to perform
their respective duties and responsibilities in a hold-over capacity, and that those incumbents whose
positions are not carried in the new reorganization pattern, or who are not re-appointed, shall be
deemed separated from the service. A total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs
were given individual notices of separation. They filed appeals with the CSC.
On June 1988, the CSC promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement of the 279 employees, the 279
private respondents in G.R. No. 85310. Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari proceedings.
On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, "AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL
SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION," was
signed into law containing the provision:
“Sec. 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission
to have been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered
reinstated or reappointed as the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be
entitled to full pay for the period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all
officers and employees, including casuals and temporary employees, who have
been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the
appropriate separation pay and retirement and other benefitsxxx”
On June 23, 1988, BenedictoAmasa and William Dionisio, customs examiners appointed by Commissioner
Mison pursuant to the ostensible reorganization subject of this controversy, petitioned the Court to
contest the validity of the statute.On October 21, 1988, thirty-five more Customs officials whom the Civil
Service Commission had ordered reinstated by its June 30, 1988 Resolution filed their own petition to
compel the Commissioner of Customs to comply with the said Resolution.
Cesar Dario was one of the Deputy Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs until his relief on orders of
Commissioner Mison on January 26, 1988. In essence, he questions the legality of his dismissal, which he
alleges was upon the authority of Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 (SEC. 59. New Structure and
Pattern. Upon approval of this Executive Order, the officers and employees of the Ministry shall, in a
holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties and responsibilities and receive the
corresponding salaries and benefits unless in the meantime they are separated from government service
pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or Article III of the Freedom Constitution. Incumbents whose
positions are not included therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the
service. Those separated from the service shall receive the retirement benefits to which they may be
entitled.

A provision he claims the Commissioner could not have legally invoked. He avers that he could not have
been legally deemed to be an "incumbent whose position is not included therein or who is not
reappointed” to justify his separation from the service. He contends that neither the Executive Order
(under the second paragraph of the section) nor the staffing pattern proposed by the Secretary of
Finance abolished the office of Deputy Commissioner of Customs, but, rather, increased it to three. Nor
can it be said, so he further maintains, that he had not been "reappointed" (under the second paragraph
of the section) because "reappointment therein presupposes that the position to which it refers is a new
one in lieu of that which has been abolished or although an existing one, has absorbed that which has
been abolished." He claims, finally, that under the Provisional Constitution, the power to dismiss public
officials without cause ended on February 25, 1987, and that thereafter, public officials enjoyed security
of tenure under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
Vicente Feria asserts his security of tenure and that he cannot be said to be covered by Section 59 of
Executive Order No. 127, having been appointed on April 22, 1986 - during the effectivity of the
Provisional Constitution. He adds that under Executive Order No. 39, "ENLARGING THE POWERS AND
FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS," the Commissioner of Customs has the power "to
appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President," and that his position, which is
that of a Presidential appointee, is beyond the control of Commissioner Mison for purposes of
reorganization.
Provisions of Section 16, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) explicitly authorize the removal of career civil
service employees "not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3
dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution. For this
reason, Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are allegedly no defense. That contrary to
the employees' argument, Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 is applicable (in particular, to Dario and
Feria), in the sense that retention in the Bureau, under the Executive Order, depends on either retention
of the position in the new staffing pattern or reappointment of the incumbent, and since the dismissed
employees had not been reappointed, they had been considered legally separated. Moreover, Mison
proffers that under Section 59 incumbents are considered on holdover status, "which means that all
those positions were considered vacant."
The Commissioner's two petitions are direct challenges to three rulings of the Civil Service Commission:
(1) the Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, reinstating the 265 customs employees above-stated; (2) the
Resolution, dated September 20, 1988, denying reconsideration; and (3) the Resolution, dated November
16, 1988, reinstating five employees.
ISSUE:WON Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a license upon the
Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done under an "automatic"-vacancy-
authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason. (NO)
RULING:The State can still carry out reorganizations provided that it is done in good faith. Removal of
career officials without cause cannot be done after the passing of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution:
“Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause
but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March
25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall
be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits
accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their
separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered
for employment in the Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities,
or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation,
tendered in line with the existing policy.”
The above is a mere recognition of the right of the Government to reorganize its offices, bureaus, and
instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article XVI, of the 1935 Constitution. Transition periods are
characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They are dictated by the need to hasten the
passage from the old to the new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process and security of
tenure.
Since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. We take
the silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a restraint upon the Government to dismiss public
servants at a moment's notice. If the present Charter envisioned an "automatic" vacancy, it should have
said so in clearer terms. Plainly the concern of Section 16 is to ensure compensation for "victims" of
constitutional revamps - whether under the Freedom or existing Constitution - and only secondarily and
impliedly, to allow reorganization.
In order to be entitled to the benefits granted under Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of
1987, two requisites, one negative and the other positive, must concur, to wit: 1. The separation must
not be for cause, and 2. The separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution ended on
February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. It can only mean, then, that whatever
reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter, and necessarily, upon the
mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it cannot be legitimately stated that we are merely
continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary Government had started. We are
through with reorganization under the Freedom Constitution - the first stage. We are on the second stage
- that inferred from the provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic document.
After February 2, 1987, incumbent officials and employees have acquired security of tenure.
The present organic act requires that removals "not for cause" must be as a result of reorganization. As
we observed, the Constitution does not provide for "automatic" vacancies. It must also pass the test of
good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or
separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure
would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or
removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good
faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an
invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of
economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.

The Court finds that Commissioner Mison did not act in good faith since after February 2, 1987 no
perceptible restructuring of the Customs hierarchy - except for the change of personnel - has occurred,
which would have justified (all things being equal) the contested dismissals. There is also no showing that
legitimate structural changes have been made - or a reorganization actually undertaken, for that matter -
at the Bureau since Commissioner Mison assumed office, which would have validly prompted him to hire
and fire employees.
With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits that under Section 59 thereof,
"Those incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not reappointed shall be
deemed separated from the service." He submits that because the 394 removed personnel have not
been "reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin with, the Commissioner's appointing
power is subject to the provisions of Executive Order No. 39. Under Executive Order No. 39, the
Commissioner of Customs may "appoint all Bureau personnels except those appointed by the President."
Thus, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr., Commissioner Mison
could not have validly terminated them, they being Presidential appointees.
That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 had been on a mere holdover
status cannot mean that the positions held by them had become vacant. The occupancy of a position in a
holdover capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February 1987
(under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution
became effective. After the said date the provisions of the latter on security of tenure govern.
DELA LLANA V. ALBA
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of BP. 129 entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefore and for other Purposes,” the same being contrary to the security of
tenure provision of the Constitution as it separates from the judiciary Justices and judges of inferior
courts from the CA to municipal circuit courts except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court
of Tax appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act. They likewise impute lack
of good faith in its enactment and characterize as undue delegation of legislative power to the President
his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and Judges thereafter appointed and
the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. The SolGen
maintains that there is no valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of the statute, it being
a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the
allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the independence of the judiciary being
unwarranted and devoid of support in law.
After an intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case, the Supreme Court dismissed the
petition, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown. It held that the
enactment thereof was in answer to a pressing and urgent need for a major reorganization of the
judiciary; that the attendant abolition of the inferior courts which shall cause their incumbents to cease
from holding office does not impair the independence of the judiciary and the security of tenure
guarantee as incumbent justices and judges with good performance and clean records can be named
anew in legal contemplation without interruption in the continuity of their service; that the provision
granting the President authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges
survives the test of undue delegation of legislative power, a standard having been clearly adopted
therefor; that the reorganization provided by the challenged Act will be carried out in accordance with
the President's constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and the judiciary's
commitment to guard constitutional rights.
COTIANGCO V. PROVINCE OF BILIRAN
FACTS:
Petitioners held permanent appointments as public health workers in the Province of Biliran.
On 23 October 1998, the SangguniangPanlalawigan (SP) of Biliran passed SP Resolution No.
102, Series of 1998, approving the revised structure and staffing pattern of the provincial government
submitted by its then incumbent governor, DaniloParilla.
Pursuant to said Resolution, Governor Parilla issued Executive Order (EO) No. 98-07, Series of
1998, dated 4 November 1998, declaring all positions in the provincial government of Biliran as abolished
except those of the Provincial Treasurer and all elective positions.
EO No. 98-07 was revoked by EO No. 98-08, Series of 1998, which in turn declared all
positions under the new staffing pattern vacant and directed all permanent employees to submit their
application within fifteen (15) days from the date of posting of the approved new staffing pattern on
November 4, 1998.
Petitioners filed a suit for Prohibition1[2] to question the validity of EO No. 98-08, Series of
1998.
Pursuant to said EO, a Personnel Placement Committee (Committee) was created to screen
and evaluate all applicants for the vacant positions.
Petitioners failed/refused to apply for any position under the new staffing pattern, claiming
that to do so would be inconsistent with their pending suit for prohibition.
They argued that under Rule 6, Section 9 of CSC Resolution 91-1631,3 as well as Sections 5
and 6 of the Rules on Government Reorganization, there should be a screening of the qualifications of all
existing employees and not merely of those who filed their respective applications under the new staffing
pattern.
As a result of the reorganization, the positions occupied by petitioners in the Biliran Provincial
Health Service were excluded or abolished.
Petitioners received their notices of termination/non-reappointment and they appealed to
the governor but were denied thereof.
Petitioners thereafter filed an appeal to the CSC, which was likewise dismissed. CSC held that
petitioners failed to show that the reorganization resulted in a significant decrease in the number of
positions in the staffing pattern of the Biliran Provincial Hospital and further held that the reorganization
1
did not violate the Magna Carta of Public Health Workers, because the governor implemented a
procedure as follows:
1. Information dissemination regarding the reorganization to be
effected;
2. The Committee was established to screen and evaluate the
qualifications of existing employees;
3. Publication and dissemination of the new staffing pattern;
4. Invitation of employees to apply for the new positions; and
5. Notices to appellants that they were not reappointed in the
revised organization structure and staffing pattern.
It was also pointed out that petitioner’s positions were duplications of other positions.
Petitioners elevated the case to the CA, wherein the CSC found that the Province of Biliran failed to
comply with the required procedure with respect to the other employees who were also not
reappointed. the CA affirmed the CSC resolution with modification. CA held that what petitioners
referred to as companion cases involve circumstances different from the case at bench where petitioners
had not presented any concrete evidence to prove their claim.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the reorganization was done in bad faith
2. Whether or not petitioners were denied due process when they were not screened and
evaluated for possible appointment to new positions
RULING:
1. Petitioners failed to show that the reorganization was done in bad faith. They have not adduced
sufficient evidence to establish the existence of bad faith.
Petitioners were all appointees of former Governor Wayne Jaro, who is the political enemy of Governor
Parilla but Reorganization was therefore called for to lessen the budget allocation for personnel services
It is a basic principle that good faith is presumed and that the party who alleges bad faith has the burden
of proving the allegation.
Petitioners failed to adduce evidence to show bad faith on the part of the Province in effecting the
reorganization. It is undisputed that from a high of 120 positions in 1998, the number of those at the
Biliran Provincial Health Office was reduced to only 98 after the reorganization.
Petitioners have failed to present evidence that an office performing substantially the same functions as
an abolished office was created as a result of the reorganization.
Petitioners have not shown that there was a reclassification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same function as the original offices.
Petitioners have not adduced evidence that they were replaced by those less qualified in terms of status
of appointment, performance and merit. Alternatively, petitioners have not adduced any evidence to
show that their qualifications in terms of performance and merit are any better than those possessed by
the persons who were eventually appointed to the reorganized positions.
Petitioners also erroneously insist on the application of the next in rank rule in claiming that they should
have been appointed to the available positions after the reorganization. However, the next in rank rule
specifically applies only to promotions and not to positions created in the course of a valid
reorganization.
2. Petitioners were not deprived of due process when they were not screened and evaluated for possible
appointment to new positions, as they had not filed their
Clearly, the law mandates that only those who have filed the requisite applications for the subject
position may be considered by the placement committee for possible appointment. The intent of this law
is clear enough. After all, it is the submission of the application form that signals an employees interest in
a position.
Without the filing of the requisite application form, there would hardly be a basis for
evaluating the qualifications of the candidates for employment. Petition denied for lack of merit.
CSC Resolution held that petitioners removal from their respective positions in the Biliran
Provincial Health Office as a result of the reorganization of the provincial government was lawful.
ABANDONMENT
Summers vs Ozaeta
Facts:
 Prior to February 16, 1946, the petitioner was a cadastral judge. On said date he qualified for and
assumed the position of judge-at-large of first instance by taking the corresponding oath of office
before the Secretary of Justice, the petitioner having received an ad interim appointment on
February 11, 1946.
 On July 9, 1946, petitioner's ad interim appointment was disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments, as a result of which the respondent Secretary of Justice duly informed the
petitioner that the latter was thereupon separated from the service.
 The petitioner seemed to have acquiesced in such separation, at least in so far as the same may be
inferred from the fact that, thereafter and until the present action was instituted on July 11, 1947,
his efforts were limited to the task of being reappointed, although in the letter dated November
22, 1946, written by Senator Vicente Sotto to the Secretary of Justice, and requesting the
reappointment of the petitioner to one of the vacancies in the Courts of First Instance, it was
argued that the petitioner did not cease to be a cadastral judge.
 At any rate, the petitioner does not pretend that he has ever rendered service as cadastral judge or
received any of its emoluments subsequent to the rejection of his ad interim appointment by the
Commission on Appointments.
Issue:
 It is now argued by the petitioner that, under section 9, Article VIII, of the Constitution, he is
entitled to continue as cadastral judge during good behavior until he reaches the age of seventy
years or becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of said office; that the positions of
cadastral judge and judge-at-large are not incompatible and that, therefore, by the acceptance of
the latter office he did not cease to be a cadastral judge, especially where his ad interim
appointment was disapproved by the Commission on Appointments.

Ruling:
 There can be no doubt about the constitutional right of members of the Supreme Court and judges
of inferior courts to hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. We believe, however, as already
pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justices Pablo, Perfecto and Hilado that said right is
waivable and should be construed without prejudice to the legal effects of
abandonment in proper cases.
 We do not hesitate to rule that petitioner's voluntary acceptance of the position of judge-at-large
consequent upon his taking of the oath of office on February 16, 1946, amounted to a waiver of his
right to hold the position of cadastral judge during the term fixed and guaranteed by the
Constitution.
 an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10, Article VII, of
the Constitution, which provides that "the President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress." It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad
interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its provisional period has
expired. Said appointment is of course distinguishable from an "acting" appointment which is
merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is issued.
 In the case at bar, the petitioner accepted and qualified for the position of judge-at-large by taking
the oath of office of judge-at- large, and not merely of an "acting" judge-at-large. He cannot argue
that said acceptance was conditioned upon the approval of the appointment by the Commission
on Appointments
 In a situation faced by the petitioner, the safer course to follow would have been for him to await
the confirmation of the ad interim appointment before qualifying for and assuming the position of
judge-at-large. A hasty acceptance on the part of an ad interim appointee, in the anxiety to enjoy
either the higher honor or better material advantages of a second offi ce, may lead to seemingly
unfair consequences for which the appointing power should not be blamed. While
in the ordinary course of things, an appointee certainly has the right to rely on his record and
expect the approval of his appointment, it is nevertheless the better part of wisdom for one always
to adopt the surer method which will, furthermore, protect him against any design, intentional or
otherwise, to oust him from an office the tenure of which is fixed by the Constitution.
RESIGNATION
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR.
G.R. No. 164679. July 27, 2011.
One-liner: The Ombudsman may still investigate an administrative offense after a year it was
committed except if the public officer resigned before it is filed.
FACTS:
Andutanwas formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of
the Department of Finance (DOF).Pursuant to the Memorandum issued by Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, directing all non-career officials or those occupying political positions to vacate their positions,
Andutan resigned from the DOF.
Subsequently, Andutan, et al. was criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of
the Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e)
and (j) ofRA 3019. As government employees, Andutan et al. were likewise administratively charged of
Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service. The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal
transfer of Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others.
The Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. Having been separated from the
service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other benefits and
privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government owned and controlled agencies or
corporations.
The CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that the latter “should not have
considered the administrative complaints” because: first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 provides that the
Ombudsman “may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission
complained of if it believes that x xx [t]he complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the
act or omission complained of”; and second, the administrative case was filed after Andutan’s forced
resignation.
Petitioner’s contention:
1. That contrary to the CA’s findings, administrative offenses do not prescribe after one year
from their commission. Consistent with existing jurisprudence, the use of the word "may"
indicates that Section 20 is merely directory or permissive. It is not ministerial upon it to
dismiss the administrative complaint, as long as any of the circumstances under Section 20 of
RA 6770 is present.
2. That in cases of "capital" administrative offenses, resignation or optional retirement cannot
render administrative proceedings moot and academic, since accessory penalties such as
perpetual disqualification and the forfeiture of retirement benefits may still be imposed.
Relying on Section VI(1) of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 38, 22 the
Ombudsman argues that "[a]s long as the breach of conduct was committed while the public
official or employee was still in the service x xx a public servant’s resignation is not a bar to his
administrative investigation, prosecution and adjudication."
Respondents Arguments:
1. According to Andutan, Section 20(5) "does not purport to impose a prescriptive period x xx
but simply prohibits the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting an investigation where
the complaint [was] filed more than one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or omission
 complained of." Ombudsman should have referred the complaint to another government
agency.
2. Administrative case against him was moot because he was no longer in the public service at
the time the case was commenced. He had already resigned before the administrative case
was initiated. . He further notes that his resignation from office cannot be characterized as
"preemptive, it was done pursuant to the Memorandum issued by then Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora.
3. The Ombudsman’s findings were void because procedural and substantive due process were
not observed as it lacked legal and factual bases.
separated from the service for a long time – may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his
superiors, ad infinitum. Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the
interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same. Under the "threefold
liability rule," the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and
administrative liability.Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an administrative case against a public
official who has already resigned or retired, the Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil cases to
vindicate Andutan’s alleged transgressions.
Thus, the court denied the Ombudsman’s petition and affirmed CA’s decision.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative
investigation a year after the act was committed.

2. Whether the Ombudsman has authority to institute an administrative complaint against a government
employee who had already resigned.

HELD:
1. No. The provisions of Section 20(5) are merely directory; the Ombudsman is not prohibited from
conducting an investigation a year after the supposed act was committed.
Well-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe. Administrative
offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees. In disciplining
public officers and employees, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but
the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in our
government. And it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation
on a complaint even if it was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission
complained of. In fine, the complaint is not barred by prescription. Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does
not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation after the lapse of one year,
reckoned from the time the alleged act was committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative case
was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its
discretion to conduct the administrative investigation

2. No. The Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the latter
was not a public servant at the time the case was filed. The SC observed that indeed it has held in the
past that a public official’s resignation does not render moot an administrative case that was filed prior to
the official’s resignation. In the past cases, the Court found that the public officials – subject of the
administrative cases – resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or to pre-empt
the imminent filing of one. Here, neither situation obtains. Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1,
1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one year and two months
after his resignation.

What is clear from the records that Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the
administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one year and two months after his
resignation, If the SC agreed with the interpretation of the Ombudsman, any official – even if he has been