FREEDOM OF RELIGION

NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010, Del Castillo, J.

What our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.

Facts:

AngLadlad is an organization composed of persons who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or
trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). AngLadlad applied for registration with the COMELEC. The application
for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership. AngLadlad
again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC. Petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that
because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that
AngLadlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated in jurisprudence. AngLadlad laid out its national
membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform
of governance. After admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition
on moral grounds.

Issue:

Whether COMELEC violated the non-establishment clause of the Constitution in dismissing the petition.

Ruling:

YES. COMELEC mistakenly opines that the Court’s ruling in AngBagongBayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections (412 Phil. 308, 2001) stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically
enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. AngLadlad has sufficiently
demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs
moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever
found that AngLadlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under
RA 7941 or the guidelines in AngBagongBayani.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. The Court found that it was a grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of AngLadlad.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on
whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to
religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have
primarily secular effects.

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FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

GERONA V. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

106 PHIL 2 (1959)

FACTS:
Petitioners' children, Jehovah’s Witneses, refused to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge contrary to the requirement of Department Order No. which establishes the rules in the
conduct during a flag ceremony.
As a result they were expelled from school.

HELD: DO 8 is VALID
DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious
group, whether or not a certain practice is one.

1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of
national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution
guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of government,
the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any
religious ceremony.

After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the
courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise,
there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to
be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers.

2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form
or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by
competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion
involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being
persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to
obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the
expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave
it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend
public schools.

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the
Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a
religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland
which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized
to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag
ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision
about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and
reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a
prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag
ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending.

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EBRALINAG V. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU (1993)

FACTS:
This is a consolidated special civil action for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the petitioners
composed of 43 high school and elementary school students in the towns of DaanBantayan, Pinamungajan,
Carcar, and Taburan Cebu province and 25 high school and grade school students enrolled in public schools
in Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses.

All the petitioners in this case were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for
refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act
No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.

The reason given by the petitioners for refusing salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge is that under the teachings of the Jehovah’s Witnesses the aforementioned acts are “acts of
worship” or “religious devotion” which they cannot give but to God alone since doing the contrary will
amount to idolatry.

The petitioner, therefore, alleges that the actions of the local authorities of compelling the flag salute and
pledge violate their right to freedom of religion duly guaranteed by the Constitution.

The respondents argued that in the case of Gerona, the Supreme Court already settled that under a system of
complete separation of church and state in the government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious
significance. Saluting the flag does not involve any religious ceremony and that the n requiring school pupils
to participate in the flag salute; the State thru the Secretary of Education is not imposing a religion or
religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school
regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant or Jehovah's Witness.

ISSUE:
WON compelling the students who are members of the Jehovah’s Witness to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite patriotic pledge violates their religious freedom?

HELD:
The Supreme Court reversed the 30-year old ruling the case of Gerona, and ruled that in expelling the
student-petitioners for their refusal to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge,
the respondents infringed on their freedom of religion.

As long held by the Supreme Court, religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest
priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator
and that the sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty)
to prevent. In this case, the petitioner merely refuses to take part in the compulsory flag ceremony and offers
no disturbance to those who participate, therefore the character of “grave and present danger” is not present
therefore the court find it proper to exempt the students who are Jehovah’s Witnesses from the compulsory
flag ceremony.

EBRALINAG V. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU (RESOLUTION, 1995)

FACTS:
Same as the facts in Ebralinag V. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU (1993)

ISSUES:
Same as the issue in Ebralinag V. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU (1993)

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HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld their previous ruling in the case of Ebralinag V. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT
OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU (1993).

Additionally, the court stated that while it is both the duty and right of the State to inculcate patriotism in the
minds of the youth, this right must still be balanced with the fundamental right embodied in the Free Exercise
Clause, the constitutional right to education and the unassailable interest of parents to guide the religious
upbringing of their children in accordance with the dictates of their conscience and their sincere religious
beliefs. Since the freedom of religion enshrined in the Constitution should be seen as the rule, not the
exception, it is the duty of the respondent to prove that there is a substantial evil that is both grave and
imminent that will justify the regulation of the petitioner’s exercise of religious freedom. However, the
respondent failed to prove the same; therefore the court sustains its ruling that student-petitioners should be
exempt from the compulsory flag ceremony.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC.) v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION
PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S. MENDEZ
G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, Puno, J.

The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect: freedom to believe and freedom to act on
one’s beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.

FACTS:
Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc. (INC), has a television program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” aired every Sunday. The
program presents INC’s religious beliefs, often in comparative studies with other religions. INC submitted to
the respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program. The
Board classified the series as X or not for public viewing on the ground that they offend other religions. INC
pursued two courses of action against the Board. It appealed to the Office of the President the classification of
its TV Series. The Office of the President reversed the decision of the Board. Forthwith, the Board allowed the
series to be publicly telecast. INC also filed against the Board a civil case with the RTC. INC alleged that the
Board acted with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program
and in x-rating them. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court and held that the Board did not abuse
its discretion when it denied the permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on
the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. It also found the series indecent,
contrary to law and contrary to good customs.

ISSUE:
Whether the Board gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of INC’s religious program.

RULING:
YES. Any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the Board to
overthrow this presumption. It failed to do this in the case at bar. An examination of the evidence show that
the “attacks” are mere criticisms of the tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the CA
yet they were considered as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public
viewing. This clearly suppresses petitioner’s freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion.

The Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to
interdict such criticisms however unclean they may be. Under our Constitutional scheme, it is not the task of
the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious beliefs are often
at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of
freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Neutrality alone is its fixed and
immovable stance. In fine, the board cannot squelch the speech of INC simply because it attacks other
religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where there

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ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against
bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served
by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas
demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding
ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger
rule. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground
that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. It is
only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare
of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent
necessary to avoid the danger.

WISCONSIN VS YODER

FACTS:

Respondents, members of the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were
convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law (which requires a child's school
attendance until age 16) by declining to send their children to public or private school after they had
graduated from the eighth grade. The evidence showed that the Amish provide continuing informal
vocational education to their children designed to prepare them for life in the rural Amish community.

The evidence also showed that respondents sincerely believed that high school attendance was contrary to
the Amish religion and way of life and that they would endanger their own salvation and that of their children
by complying with the law.

Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary to Amish beliefs, not only because it places
Amish children in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs with increasing emphasis on competition in class
work and sports and with pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and ways of the peer group, but also
because it takes them away from their community, physically and emotionally, during the crucial and
formative adolescent period of life.

ISSUE: WON such law infringes upon Right to Religion/ Free Exercise Clause

HELD: YES

Compelling attendance in a public school from age eight to age 16 unreasonably interfered with the interest
of parents in directing the rearing of their offspring, including their education in church-operated schools.
The values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and
formative years have a high place in our society.

In order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth grade against a claim that such
attendance interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the State
does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest of
sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.

State's claim that it is empowered, as parenspatriae, to extend the benefit of secondary education to children
regardless of the wishes of their parents cannot be sustained against a free exercise claim of the nature
revealed by this record, for the Amish have introduced convincing evidence that accommodating their
religious objections by forgoing one or two additional years of compulsory education will not impair the
physical or mental health of the child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to discharge the duties
and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract from the welfare of society

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Thus, a State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing
process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious
upbringing of their children so long as they prepare them for additional obligations.

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR

A.M. No.P-02-1651 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P), June 22, 2006, Puno, J.

To validly override a free exercise of religion claim, the compelling state interest test must be satisfied. The
State must articulate in specific terms the state interest, which must be compelling, involved in preventing the
free exercise of religion. It has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary. Otherwise, the exercise of the
freedom of religion must be respected.

Facts:

Soledad Escritor was charged with immoral conduct for living with a man not her husband, and having borne
a child within this live-in arrangement. She admitted living with another man without the benefit of marriage
more than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. However, as a
member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses, she asserted that their conjugal arrangement
is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. In fact, she was able to
secure a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," which allows members of the congregation who have been
abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations, and thus makes the resulting union moral and
binding within the congregation all over the world. In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is
concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and her common-law-
husband.

Issue:

Whether Escritor’s conjugal arrangement is not immoral in light of the freedom of religion.

Ruling:

YES. In this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor's conjugal arrangement cannot be
penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom
of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including
religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man
stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be
so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In
addition, it must also be shown that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary. Accordingly, in the absence of a showing that a compelling
state interest exists and the least intrusive means is employed, man must be allowed to subscribe to the
Infinite.

In this case, the state has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges
against Escritor or her partner as it has never sought to prosecute Escritor nor her partner. It cannot
therefore assert that unbending application of a criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling
interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce that prohibition. Thus, the State's asserted interest, in this
case, is only abstract. Nonetheless, even assuming that there is a compelling state interest, the state failed to
show that it used the least intrusive means possible. The records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to
procure any such evidence to show that the means the state adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is
the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom.

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RE: REQUEST OF MUSLIM A.M. No. 02-2-10-SC EMPLOYEES IN THE DIFFERENT COURTS IN Present:
ILIGAN CITY (RE: OFFICE
Facts:
In their Letter dated November 19, 2001 addressed to Executive Judge Valerio M. Salazar, Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, several Muslim employees in the different courts in the said city request that they be
allowed to enjoy the following privileges:

1. to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or coffee breaks during the month of
Ramadan;

2. to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire
calendar year.

Judge Salazar forwarded the said letter-request to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Judge Salazar
expressed his conformity with the first request, However, he expressed some misgivings about the second
request.
In support of their requests, the Muslim employees invoke Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 291 as amended by
P.D. No. 322 .The avowed purpose of P.D. No. 291 was to reinforce national unity by recognizing Muslim
holidays and making them part of our national holidays.

Muslims employees in the government are excused from reporting to office during these holidays in order
that they may be able to properly observe them.

Section 3 of the same law, further provides that:

Sec. 3. (a) During the fasting season on the month of Ramadan, all Muslim employees in the national
government, government-owned or controlled corporations, provinces, cities, municipalities and
other instrumentalities shall observe office hours from seven-thirty in the morning (7:30 a.m.) to
three-thirty in the afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without lunch break or coffee breaks, and that there shall be
no diminution of salary or wages, provided, that the employee who is not fasting is not entitled to the
benefit of this provision.

Pursuant thereto, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) promulgated a resolution granting such request.

Issue: WON requests should be allowed

Ruling: Only Request 1

The Court is constrained to deny for lack of statutory basis the request of the Muslim employees to be
excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday to allow them to attend the Muslim Prayer Day.
As correctly observed by Atty. Edna Dio, Chief, Office of the Court Attorney, in her Report dated May 13, 2005,
the CSC exceeded its authority insofar as it declared that Muslim employees are excused from work from
10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. 
 every Friday subject to certain conditions. CSC Resolution No. 81-1277 was
purportedly issued pursuant to Sections 2 and 5 of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No 322, but neither of the
two decrees mention 'Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day as one of the recognized holidays.

The Court is not unmindful that the subject requests are grounded on Section 5, Article III of the Constitution:

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil and political rights.

This provision contains two aspects: (1) the non-establishment clause; and (2) the free exercise clause. The
subject requests are based on the latter and in interpreting this clause (the free exercise clause) embodied in
the Constitution, the Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine that:

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The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to
act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
[6]

Justice Isagani A. Cruz explained these two concepts in this wise:

(1) Freedom to Believe

The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his
own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion;
acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the
immortality of his soul ' in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd
his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe
as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so.
Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. 'Men may believe what they cannot prove. Every one has a right to his
beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes.

(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs

But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do
so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all
other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others.
It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it
impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious
practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious
conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.

The Court recognizes that the observance of Ramadan and the Friday Muslim Prayer Day is integral to the
Islamic faith. However, while the observance of Ramadan and allowing the Muslim employees in the Judiciary
to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of Ramadan finds
support in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322, there is no such basis to excuse them
from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day, during the entire
calendar year.

On the other hand, the need of the State to prescribe government office hours as well as to enforce them
uniformly to all civil servants, Christians and Muslims alike, cannot be disregarded. Underlying Section 5, [8]
Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 is the interest of the general public to be
assured of continuous government service during office hours every Monday through Friday
To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every
Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year would mean a diminution of the prescribed
government working hours.
The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those belonging to other
religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the public. Indeed, the exercise of religious
freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with reasonable requirements of the law, including civil
service laws.

Austria v NLRC
Facts:

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Private respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a
religious corporation under Philippine law and is represented by the other private respondents. Petitioner
was a pastor of SDA until 1991, when his services were terminated.
Austria worked with SDA for 28 years. He started as a literature evangelist in 1963 then got promoted several
times. He became the Assistant Publishing Director in the West Visayan Mission of the SDA in 1968 and
Pastor in the West Visayan Mission in 1972. Finally in 1989, he was promoted as District Pastor of the Negros
Mission of the SDA.
On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications from Mr.
Ibesate, treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking the former to admit accountability and responsibility for the
church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the
Negros Mission.
In his answer, petitioner said that he should not be made accountable since it was private respondent Pastor
Buhat and Mr. Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very sick to do
the collecting at that time.
Thereafter, petitioner went to the office of Pastor Buhat, president of the Negros Mission, and asked for a
convention to settle the dispute between petitioner and Pastor Rodrigo. Pastor Buhat denied the request of
petitioner because there was no quorum. The two exchanged heated arguments until petitioner left the office.
However, while on his way out, he heard Pastor Buhat saying, "Pastor dawinisognainaiya (Pador you are
talking tough)” which prompted him to go back and overturn Pastor Buhat’s table, scatter books in the office,
bang Buhat’s attaché case and throw the phone.
Petitioner received a letter inviting him and his wife to attend the meeting to discuss the non-remittance of
church collection and the events that transpired between him and Pastor Buhat. A fact-finding committee was
created to investigate petitioner. Subsequently, petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing
misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual
neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized
representative, as grounds for the termination of his services.
(Nakakainis ‘tong part na ‘to dahil appeal nang appeal! Hahaha)
1) Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. = decision rendered in favor of
petitioner
2) SDA appealed to NLRC = decision rendered in favor of respondent
3) Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration = reinstated decision of Labor Arbiter
4) SDA filed motion for reconsideration = decision rendered in favor of respondent (grabeangkulit!)
Hence, this recourse to the court by the petitioner.

Issues:
1) WON the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by petitioner against
the SDA;
2) WON the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the
separation of church and state;

Held:
1) YES.
2) NO.
Ratio Decidendi:
The principle of separation of church and state finds no application in this case. The rationale of the principle
of the separation of church and state is summed up in the familiar saying, "Strong fences make good-
neighbors." The idea advocated by this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions
and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their
respective exclusive jurisdictions.
The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking
cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the
church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the
government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy
of membership. Examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affaits are proceedings for excommunication,
ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious

9
significance. The case at bar does not even remotely concern any of the given examples. What is involved here
is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has
no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. The matter of
terminating an employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling
a member from the religious congregation.
ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. NO. 153888. JULY 9, 2003.

Facts:
Petitioner is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people,
especially to Muslim Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a fee, halal certifications to qualified
products and food manufacturers on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due
to halal food producers' request. Subsequently, Executive Order (EO) 46 was issued creating the Philippine
Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its
implementation. In this petition for prohibition, petitioner alleged, among others, that the subject EO violates
the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by
the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt,
classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the
Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46
encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino
Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing
halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and
Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court found
no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of
their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can
be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.

Issue:
WON Executive Order 46 violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.

Held:
NO. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded preferred status
by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt,
classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the
Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, Executive
Order 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for
Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of
issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the
Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court found
no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of
their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can
be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.

Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can
justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy
of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like
ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to

10
exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. In the case at bar, we find no compelling
justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious
right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively
protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion
of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by
government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human
consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of
Muslims.

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, Cortes, J.

The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the
light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel. It must be
treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which
are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare.

Facts:

President Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution
and forced into exile in Hawaii. Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines
to die but Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the
stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and
move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines
is guaranteed under the Bill of Rights. The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair
the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law.”
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights.

Issue:

Whether former President Aquino acted whimsically in denying the Marcos’s return in the country.

Ruling:

NO. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the
exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the
general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of
abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request
or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied.

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within

11
by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab
power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to
mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize
the country, as earlier narrated in the ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this
time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.

As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military establishment
has given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of
the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back.
With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically
in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and
in prohibiting their return.

GUDANI V. SENGA
 G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, Tinga, J.

Mobility of travel is another necessary restriction on members of the military. A soldier cannot leave his/her
post without the consent of the commanding officer.

Facts:

The petitioners are high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines tasked with the maintenance
of peace and order during the 2004 elections. Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited them to appear at a public
hearing before the Senate. The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004
elections emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating.

However, an instruction from the President barred them from attending the hearing. Nonetheless, both Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both testified as to the conduct of the
2004 elections. They were then charged with a violation of Article of War on wilfully disobeying a superior
officer.

Issue:

Whether petitioners’ right to travel may be impaired.

Ruling:

YES. The principle that mobility of travel is another necessary restriction on members of the military. A
soldier cannot leave his/her post without the consent of the commanding officer. The reasons are self-
evident. The commanding officer has to be aware at all times of the location of the troops under command, so
as to be able to appropriately respond to any exigencies. For the same reason, commanding officers have to
be able to restrict the movement or travel of their soldiers, if in their judgment, their presence at place of call
of duty is necessary. At times, this may lead to unsentimental, painful consequences, such as a soldier being
denied permission to witness the birth of his first-born, or to attend the funeral of a parent. Yet again, military
life calls for considerable personal sacrifices during the period of conscription, wherein the higher duty is not
to self but to country.

Petitioners seek to be exempted from military justice for having traveled to the Senate to testify before the
Senate Committee against the express orders of Gen. Senga, the AFP Chief of Staff. If petitioners position is
affirmed, a considerable exception would be carved from the unimpeachable right of military officers to
restrict the speech and movement of their juniors. The ruinous consequences to the chain of command and
military discipline simply cannot warrant the Courts imprimatur on petitioner’s position.

12
LEAVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR
(OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR) v. HEUSDENS
 A.M. No. P-11-2927, December 13, 2011,
Mendoza, J.

Regulation is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. If judges and court personnel can go on leave
and travel abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations, there could be a disruption in the
administration of justice.

Facts:

Heusdens, a staff clerk of MTC Tagum, left abroad without waiting for the results of her leave application. It
turned out that no travel authority was issued in her favor. Heusdens explained that it was not her intention
to violate the rules (OCA Circular) as her leave was approved by her superior judge.

Issue:

Whether the circular issued by the OCA can restrict a citizen’s right to travel as guaranteed by the
Constitution.

Ruling:

YES. The exercise of ones right to travel or the freedom to move from one place to another, as assured by the
Constitution, is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right
to travel. Section 6 itself provides that neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.

With respect to the power of the Court, Section 5 (6), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

As earlier stated, with respect to members and employees of the Judiciary, the Court issued OCA Circular No.
49-2003 to regulate their foreign travel in an unofficial capacity. Such regulation is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice. If judges and court personnel can go on leave and travel abroad at will and without
restrictions or regulations, there could be a disruption in the administration of justice. A situation where the
employees go on mass leave and travel together, despite the fact that their invaluable services are urgently
needed, could possibly arise. For said reason, members and employees of the Judiciary cannot just invoke and
demand their right to travel.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio:

OCA Circular No. 49-2003 provides that complete requirements should be submitted to the OCA at
least two weeks before the intended period of travel.

Respondents leave application for travel abroad was received by the OCA on 10 July 2009, or two
months before her intended leave from 11 September 2009 to 11 October 2009. However, it was only
on 26 November 2009, or after respondents intended leave, that the OCA issued a memorandum
recommending disapproval of her leave application. Furthermore, it was only in a letter dated 6 January 2010
that the OCA informed respondent of the disapproval of her leave application. Clearly, the OCAs letter dated 6
January 2010 disapproving the leave application came too late. Although OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not
provide for the time frame within which to act on the leave application, it is understood that it should be prior
to the applicants intended leave. The requirement that the leave application be submitted to the OCA at least
two weeks before the intended leave for travel is to give sufficient time for its approval or disapproval before
the intended leave.

13
Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292, a leave application should be acted upon
within five (5) working days after its receipt, otherwise the leave application is deemed approved.

I disagree with the majoritys view that clearance from the SCSLA is required before a court employee can
exercise his or her constitutional right to travel abroad. The SCSLA is a private association with private
funds, even if some of its investors are Supreme Court officials. The OCA has no power to enforce the
collection of loans extended by a private lender, under pain of denying a constitutional right of a citizen if he
does not secure clearance from the private lender. Although OCA Circular No. 49-2003 provides that
clearance as to money and property accountability is one of the requirements to be submitted, this refers to
accountability to the government, not to a private company like the SCSLA. Even if the OCAs Certificate of
Clearance Form requires the SCSLAs conformity, such requirement has no legal basis. The OCA does not have
jurisdiction to require such clearance because that would be tantamount to making the Court a collecting
agent of the SCSLA which is a private association.

Indeed, the OCA has no right to deny a court employees constitutional right to travel just to enforce collection
of the SCSLAs loans to its members. There is no law prohibiting a person from traveling abroad just because
he has an existing debt or financial obligation. Requiring the court employee clearance from the SCSLA is no
different from requiring the court employee to secure a clearance from his or her creditor banks before he or
she can travel abroad. That would unduly restrict a citizens right to travel which is guaranteed by Section 6,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution:

SEC. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied)

Although the constitutional right to travel is not absolute, it can only be restricted in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law

The constitutional right to travel cannot be impaired without due process of law. Here, due process of law
requires the existence of a law regulating travel abroad, in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health. There is no such law applicable to the travel abroad of respondent. Neither the OCA nor the
majority can point to the existence of such a law. In the absence of such a law, the denial of respondents right
to travel abroad is a gross violation of a fundamental constitutional right

During her approved leave of absence, respondents time was her own personal time and she could be
wherever she wanted to be. The Court cannot inquire what respondent does during her leave of absence since
that would constitute unwarranted interference into her private affairs and would encroach on her right to
privacy

The requirement of securing approval for any leave of absence is a reasonable and valid regulation to insure
continuity of service in the government. However, once a leave of absence is approved, any restriction during
the approved leave on the right to travel of the government employee violates his or her constitutional right
to travel.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

TANADA VS TUVERA
G.R. No.L-63915, April 24, 1985, Escolin, J.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by
law.

Facts:

14
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus
to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.

The respondents argued that petitioners have no legal standing to bring the petition in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances. Upon the
other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is
to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be
given due course.
Issue:

Whether the petitioner may file a petition for mandamus as against the the respondents to compel them to
publish the unpublished laws on the basis of their right to be informed on matters of public concern.

Ruling:

YES. The clear object of Article 2 of the Civil Code is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Without publication, the people have no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by
law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.

Bengzon V. Drilon

Facts:

1. The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently
receiving monthly pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 1797.

2. Under RA No. 910, justices of the SC and the CA shall receive a retirement pension equivalent to the
salary they were receiving prior to their retirement for the rest of their natural life if they rendered at least 20
years of service either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both, having attained
the age of seventy (70) years or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office.

3. RA No. 910 was amended by 1797 which provided for the automatic adjustment of the pension being
received by the retired justices. (the pension their receiving will be automatically adjusted to prevailing
salary being received by justices)

4. However, the then President Marcos signed into law Presidential Decree 644 which removed the
automatic adjustment feature of the retirement pension of the retired justices of the SC and CA. The said law
also removed the said feature from the pension of the retired members of Constitutional Commissions and
Officers of the Armed Forces.

15
5. The President, however, enacted PD No. 1638 which brought back the automatic adjustment feature of
the pension of the retired officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces.

6. Due to resulting unfairness, the Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed
provisions of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595 but it was vetoed by the then President
Corazon Aquino.

7. Prior to the instant petition, however, Retired Court of Appeals Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P.
Enriquez, Juan O. Reyes, Jr. and Guardson R. Lood filed a letter/petition dated April 22, 1991 which we
treated as Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA. The petitioners asked this Court far a readjustment of
their monthly pensions in accordance with Republic Act No. 1797. They reasoned out that Presidential Decree
644 repealing Republic Act No. 1797 did not become law as there was no valid publication pursuant to
Tañada v. Tuvera. The court granted such request.

8. Pursuant to the above resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year
1992 certain appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates due the
retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.

9. The President, however, vetoed the said appropriation made by Congress.

Issue:

1. WON PD No. 644 became a law which repealed the automatic adjustment feature in RA No. 1797?

Held:

The act of the President of vetoing the provision in the Appropriation Bill which set aside certain sum of
money for the payment of the adjusted retirement pension of retired justices of the SC and CA was invalid
because in reality, the President was vetoing RA No. 1797 and the ruling of the Supreme Court in the
Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA. The President has no power to veto an existing law and to set aside a
ruling promulgated by the SC because it violated the Separation of Powers principle.
PD No. 644, as already ruled by the SC in the pertinent Administrative Case, did not become a valid law
because it was not duly published. As held in the case of Tanada V. Tuvera, all laws must be published in the
Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect. Absence such publication, the
law shall be invalid. Since PD No. 644 never became a law, RA No. 1797 remains in force and so does the
automatic readjustment feature of the pension of the retired SC and CAS justices. Therefore the President
cannot veto the appropriation made by Congress.

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG VS MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES

FACTS:
Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig,
Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The military reservation, then
known as Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed (Fort Bonifacio).
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded
a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for
a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mgaBayani, which is under the
administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services

Again, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which
excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No.
423 and declared it open for disposition.At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a
handwritten addendum, which
reads:

16
"P.S.
–
This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos

The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official
Gazette in 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.

Years later, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated
Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from
the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition under the
provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including
portions of the Libingan ng mgaBayani. Thus, Brigadier General Bautista issued General Order creating Task
Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of
illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio. Members of petitioner NagkakaisangMaralita ng SitioMasigasig, Inc.
(NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP). COSLAP issued a
Resolution granting the Petition and declaring the portions of
land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General
dissenting. The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part
ofProclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be
defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the
COSLAP.
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions.
The Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-
PVAO’s Petition,

ISSUE: WON the handwritten addendum was considered published also at the time the Proclamation
was published.

HELD:NO, Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of penal regulations to make it
binding on the persons affected.
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their
claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476.
They allege that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the reclassification
of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation just below the
printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not
included when Proclamation No.2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the
determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of
law. ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.

Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law,
unless the law itself has otherwise provided. Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of
Proclamation No. 2476 as published.Withoutpublication, the note never had any legal force and effect.
Furthermore, Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the
Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos
intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.

Senate vs. Ermita

FACTS:

17
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for
them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to
Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said
officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better
enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that
“all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita
communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting
since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen.
Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such
attendance.

ISSUE: WON EO 464 violate people’s right to information on matters of public concern?

Ruling:
NO, it does not violate the right to information
E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in
the hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their right to
information on matters of public concern.
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For
one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not
have the same obligatory force as a subpoena ducestecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to
information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong
only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any
executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily
deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a
matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in
formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they can then communicate to
their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their
freedom of expression.

akbayan citizens action party vs. aquino

Facts:
The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the Asia-
Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a “milestone in the continuing cooperation and
collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both
countries).”
JPEPA which has been referred to as a ‘mega treaty’ is a comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in
goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a deal that encompasses
even our commitments to the WTO.
The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on
Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing
views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Government’s rosy projections on the
economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised
there very serious concerns about the country being turned into Japan’s toxic waste basket. The discussion in

18
the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one
that touches on broader national development concerns.

Issues:
1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of
the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress
2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the instant
petition.
3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general
rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying
access thereto.

Held:
The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of “Akbayan Citizens Action
Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al” (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal dismissed the Petition for
mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI)
Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since 11
September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said document has become moot and
academic. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court lengthily discussed the substatives issues, insofar as they
impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the
negotiations.

The Court held: “Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of
the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion
before [a treaty] is approved' – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be
privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives
submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same.
Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other
foreign governments in future negotiations.”
It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would
discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The
Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where
negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more
favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.
In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It said: “We
are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people's right to
information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its
endeavour to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the
opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.”

SERENO V. CTRM OF NEDA

782 SCRA 486 (2016)

FACTS:
On May 23, 2005, the CTRM, an office under the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), held
a meeting in which it resolved to recommend to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo the lifting of the
suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals and certain plastic products, thereby reducing
the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) rates on products covered by Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 161 from 7% or 10% to 5% starting July 2005.

Wilfredo A. Paras (Paras), Chairman of the Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines

19
(APMP), the main industry association in the petrochemical sector, wrote to the CTRM Secretariat, through its
Director Brenda Mendoza (Director Mendoza), to request a copy of the minutes of the meeting held on May
23, 2005. Director Mendoza denied the request through her letter.

The CTRM during its meeting on 14 July 2005 noted that Section 3, Rule IV of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees provides that every department, office or agency shall provide official information, records or
documents to any requesting public.

However, the section also provides exceptions to the rules, such as if ‘...(c) such information, record or
document south falls within the concepts of established privileged or recognized exceptions as may be
provided by law or settled policy or jurisprudence...’ The acknowledged limitations to information access
under Section 3(c) include diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions
of either House of Congress, as well as internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. (Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, 299 SCRA 744)

The CTRM is of the view that the limitation pertaining to closed-door cabinet meetings under Section 3(c) of
the IRR applies to the minutes of the meeting requested by APMP. In view thereof, the CTRM is constrained
[not] to provide the said minutes to the APMP.

The APMP sent another letter-request to the CTRM reminding about the legal implications of the refusal to
furnish copies of the minutes as in violation of the petitioner’s Constitutional right of access to information on
matters of public concern. However, the CTRM continued to refuse access to the documents sought by the
APMP.

APMP filed the petition for mandamus in the RTC to compel the CTRM to provide the copy of the minutes and
to grant access to the minutes.

President Arroyo signed Executive Order No. 486, dated January 12, 2006, to lift the suspension of the
tariff reduction on petrochemical resins and other plastic products under the ASEAN Free Trade Area-
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (AFTA-CEPT) Scheme.
 “WHEREAS, Executive Order 161 issued on 9 January 2003 provides for the suspension of the
application of the tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals and certain products in 2003 and 2004
only;”
 “WHEREAS, the NEDA Board approved the lifting of the suspension of the aforesaid tariff reduction
schedule on petrochemicals and certain plastic products and the reversion of the CEPT rates on these
products to EO 161 (S. 2003) levels once the naphtha cracker plant is in commercial operation;”

RTC: denied mandamus; lack of merit;

“CTRM is an advisory body composed of various department heads or secretaries and is classified as cabinet
meetings and inter­agency communications”; and that the record of the communications of such body “falls
under the category of privileged information because of the sensitive subject matter which could seriously
affect public interest.” [Section 3 of Rule IV of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713 (Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)]”

In seeking the nullification of the assailed decision of the RTC, and the consequent release of the minutes and
the disclosure of all official records, documents, papers and government research data used as the basis for
the issuance of E.O. No. 486, petitioners invoked Sec. 7, Art. III in relation tos Sec. 28, Art. II of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
WON the CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the minutes of the
May 23, 2005 meeting based on the constitutional right to information on matters of public concern and the
State’s policy of full public disclosure.

20
HELD:
NO. Decision of RTC is affirmed.

The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of public concern enunciated in Section 7
of Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State’s policy of full public disclosure in all
transactions involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution. These
provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency in policy-making as well as in the operations of the
Government, and at safeguarding the exercise by the people of the freedom of expression. In a democratic
society like ours, the free exchange of information is necessary, and can be possible only if the people are
provided the proper information on matters that affect them. But the people’s right to information is not
absolute.

According to Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987), the constitutional guarantee to
information “does not open every door to any and all information.” It is limited to matters of public concern,
and is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Likewise, the State’s policy of full public
disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest, and is further subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law.

Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ of mandamus. Firstly,
the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or public interest. And secondly, it
must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

The second requisite, the Court has already declared that the constitutional guarantee of the people’s right to
information does not cover national security matters and intelligence information, trade secrets and banking
transactions and criminal matters the Court has ruled that the right to information does not extend to matters
acknowledged as “privileged information under the separation of powers,” which include “Presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed­door Cabinet meetings.”

The respondents claim of exemption is correct on the ground that the May 23, 2005 meeting was classified as
a closed­door Cabinet meeting by virtue of the committee’s composition and the nature of its mandate dealing
with matters of foreign affairs, trade and policy-making. They assert that the information withheld was within
the scope of the exemption from disclosure because the CTRM meetings were directly related to the exercise
of the sovereign prerogative of the President as the Head of State in the conduct of foreign affairs and the
regulation of trade, as provided in Section 3(a) of Rule IV of the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713.

IN RE: PRODUCTION OF COURT RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS AND THE ATTENDANCE OF COURT
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AS WITNESSES UNDER THE SUBPOENAS OF FEBRUARY 10, 2012 AND THE
VARIOUS LETTERS FOR THE IMPEACHMENT PROSECUTION PANEL DATED JANUARY 19 AND 25,
2012
 February 14, 2012, Per Curiam


As far as the Court is concerned, its Members and officials involved in all proceedings are duty-bound to
observe the privileged communication and confidentiality rules if the integrity of the administration of justice
were to be preserved.

Facts:

During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the Prosecution Panel manifested in a
COMPLIANCE that it would present about 100 witnesses and almost a thousand documents, to be secured
from both private and public offices. The list of proposed witnesses included Justices of the Supreme Court,
and Court officials and employees who will testify on matters, many of which are, internal to the Court.

Atty. Vidal, Clerk of the Supreme Court, brought to SC’s attention the Subpoena Ad Testificandum et
DucesTecum and Subpoena Ad Testificandum she received, commanding her to appear at 10:00 in the

21
morning of the 13th of February 2012 with the original and certified true copies of the documents listed
above, and to likewise appear in the afternoon at 2:00 of the same day and everyday thereafter, to produce
the listed documents and to testify. In light of the subpoenas served, the urgent need for a court ruling and
based on the Constitution, the pertinent laws and of the Court's rules and policies, there should be a
determination of how the Court will comply with the subpoenas and the letters of the Prosecution
Impeachment Panel.

Issue:

What is the policy of the Court with regard to the access to its records?

Ruling:

In line with the public's constitutional right to information, the Court has adopted a policy of transparency
with respect to documents in its possession or custody, necessary to maintain the integrity of its sworn duty
to adjudicate justiciable disputes.

The Members of the Court may not be compelled to testify in the impeachment proceedings against the Chief
Justice or other Members of the Court about information they acquired in the performance of their official
function of adjudication, such as information on how deliberations were conducted or the material inputs
that the justices used in decision-making, because the end-result would be the disclosure of confidential
information that could subject them to criminal prosecution. Such act violates judicial privilege (or the
equivalent of executive privilege) as it pertains to the exercise of the constitutional mandate of adjudication.

Jurisprudence implies that justices and judges may not be subject to any compulsory process in relation to
the performance of their adjudicatory functions.

With respect to Court officials and employees, the same rules on confidentiality that apply to justices and
judges apply to them. They are barred from disclosing (1) the result of the raffle of cases, (2) the actions taken
by the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court's session, and (3) the deliberations of the
Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before it. They are subject as well to the
disqualification by reason of privileged communication and the sub judice rule. As stated above, these rules
extend to documents and other communications which cannot be disclosed.

These privileges, incidentally, belong to the Judiciary and are for the Supreme Court (as the representative
and entity speaking for the Judiciary), and not for the individual justice, judge, or court official or employees
to waive. Thus, every proposed waiver must be referred to the Supreme Court for its consideration and
approval.

To state the rule differently, Justices of the Court cannot be compelled to testify on matters relating to
the internal deliberations and actions of the Court, in the exercise of their adjudicatory functions and duties.
This is to be differentiated from a situation where the testimony is on a matter which is external to their
adjudicatory functions and duties.

RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH [SALN] AND
PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY
A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012, Mendoza, J.

The information disclosed in the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) is a matter of public
concern and interest. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure and honesty in the public service.

Facts:

22
The Research Director and researcher-writer of Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) sought
copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) of the SC Justices for the year 2008 for the
purpose of updating their database of information on government officials. Meanwhile, several requests for
copies of SALN and other personal documents of SC, CA and Sandiganbayan Justices were also filed. The
requests were made for different purposes. Although no direct opposition to the disclosure of SALN and other
personal documents is being expressed, it is the uniform position of the said magistrates and the various
judges’ associations that the disclosure must be made in accord with the guidelines set by the Court and
under such circumstances that would not undermine the independence of the Judiciary.

Issue:

Whether the SALNs of the Justices have to be disclosed for being matters of public concern and interest.

Ruling:

YES. Section 17, Article XI, has classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern
and interest. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure and honesty in the public service. The public has the right to know the assets, liabilities, net worth
and financial and business interests of public officials and employees including those of their spouses and of
unmarried children 18 years of age living in their households.

Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information, with its companion right of access to
official records, is not absolute. While providing guaranty for that right, the Constitution also provides that
the people’s right. Jurisprudence has provided the following limitations to that right: (1) national security
matters and intelligence information; (2) trade secrets and banking transactions; (3) criminal matters; and
(4) other confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially known to public
officers and employees by reason of their office and not made available to the public as well as diplomatic
correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.

This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access to official records, such as the
SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation.

People v Cabalquinto
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
National Press Club (NPC), Philippine Press Institute (PPI), Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP)
and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to comment on whether or not it is proper to
post the full text of decisions of similar cases on the Supreme Court Web Page.
The position of the OSG in its Comment3 is noteworthy. The OSG submits that the posting of the full text of
decisions in cases involving child abuse on the Supreme Court Web Page violates the right to privacy of the
aggrieved parties. In order to determine whether the subject matter upon which the right to privacy being
invoked falls within the constitutionally-protected zone of privacy, it must be shown that the person's
expectation of privacy is reasonable. The reasonableness of such expectancy depends on a two–part test: (1)
whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.

According to the OSG, the fact that the aggrieved child may have consented, through a parent or guardian, to a
public hearing of the case does not negate the expectation of privacy which the child may later invoke
because child victims cannot be presumed to have intended their initial agreement to extend beyond the
termination of their case to the posting of the decision reached by the Court on the Web Page. Moreover, such
an expectation of privacy is reasonable considering the various statutes and rules which reveal the intention
of the State to maintain the confidentiality of information pertaining to child abuse cases.

23
The OSG invites the Court's attention to a New Jersey statute which provides that all court documents which
state the name, address and identity of a child victim in certain sexual assault, endangering the welfare and
abuse and neglect cases should remain confidential. The name of the victim shall not appear in any public
record; rather, initials or a fictitious name shall appear. The offenses covered by the law include aggravated
sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, criminal sexual contact, endangering the
welfare of children, and any action alleging an abused or neglected child. Thus, in Application of V Pub. Corp.,
120 N.J. 508 (1990), and Div. of Youth & Fam. Serv. V. J.B., 120 N.J. 112 (1990), the New Jersey Supreme Court
provided guidelines in the implementation of this statute.

In conclusion, the OSG suggests the adoption of a system of coding which could include the use of
pseudonyms in cases of a similar nature. Short of withdrawing the full text of decisions in such cases from the
Web Page, the OSG proposes that the Court instead replace the material information, such as the name of the
child-victim, in its decisions.

The DSWD imparted the same sentiment. It submits that the court records of child abuse cases should be
treated with strict confidentiality not only throughout the court proceedings, but even after the promulgation
of the decision in order to protect the right to privacy of the child and her family and to preclude instances
where undue disclosure of information may impair the treatment and rehabilitation of the child-victim

The Court likewise appreciates the separate comments of the KBP and NPC. The KBP informs the Court that
its members have agreed not to identify in their broadcasts the names of children who are victims of abuse or
are in conflict with the law. The NPC, on the other hand, tells us that the prevailing media practice is to
inquire whether these individuals wish to have their names appear in the report. If they do not, media would
normally take off the names and merely provide a very general description of the individual in recognition of
the need to carefully balance the right to information with the welfare of the parties involved.

Taking all these opinions into account and in view of recent enactments which unequivocally express the
intention to maintain the confidentiality of information in cases involving violence against women and their
children, in this case and henceforth, the Court shall withhold the real name of the victim-survivor7 and shall
use fictitious initials instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors
or any other information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well those of their immediate
family or household members, shall not be disclosed.

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, MCTC, Compostela-New Bataan, Compostela Valley

Province v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015, Reyes, J.

The qualification standard by which the JBC shall
 determine proven competence of an applicant is not an
internal regulation; hence, its publication is indispensable. It is but a
 natural consequence thereof that
potential applicants be informed of the
 requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to
prepare
 for and comply with them.

Facts:

Petitioner Ferdinand Villanueva was appointed as the Judge of Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Compostela –
New Bataan. After more than one year of service, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in
three branches of RTC (in Tagum City, Davao City, and Agusan Del Sur). Consequently he was not included by
the JBC in the list of considered applicants since he failed to meet the 5-year service requirement, as he has
been a judge only for more than a year. The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates procedural
due
 process for lack of publication and non-submission to the University of the
 Philippines Law Center

24
Office of the National Administrative Register
 (ONAR). The petitioner said that the assailed policy will affect
all applying
 judges, thus, the said policy should have been published.

Issue:

Whether the 5-year service qualification should have been published.

Ruling:

YES. The assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can
qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been published. As a general rule, publication is
indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or
implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect. However, this publication requirement admits of
some exceptions. Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative
 rules and
regulations exempted from the publication requirement. The
 assailed policy involves a qualification
standard by which the JBC shall
 determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal
regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the members
 of the JBC and their staff.
Notably, the selection process involves a call to
 lawyers who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and
are willing to
 serve in the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a
 natural consequence
thereof that potential applicants be informed of the
 requirements to the judicial positions, so that they
would be able to prepare
 for and comply with them.

Nonetheless, the JBC’s failure to publish the assailed policy has not
 prejudiced the petitioner’s private
interest. The petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list of nominees for
 judicial vacancies since
the possession of the constitutional and statutory
 qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be
used to legally
 demand that one’s name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial
 vacancy. One’s
inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC.

HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN v. ABELARDO T. DOMONDON, JOSE A. GANGAN, and VIOLETA J. JOSEF
G.R. Nos. 165036 and 175705, July 5, 2010, Del Castillo, J.

Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people’s right to
information is limited to matters of public concern, and is further subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

Facts:

Petitioner Hazel Ma. C. Antolin took the 1997 CPA Board Examinations but did not make it. Convinced that
she deserved to pass the examinations, she wrote to respondent Domondon Acting Chairman of the Board of
Accountancy for her to be furnished a copy of her answer sheets and the questionnaires of the seven subjects
she took together with their answer keys. She was given only the copy of her answer sheet and nothing else.
The respondent contended that Section 36 of Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332
and Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338 preclude the Board from releasing the Examination
Papers (other than the answer sheet) and that the same constituted a valid limitation on petitioner’s right to
information and access to government documents.

Issue:

25
Whether petitioner Antolin has the right to demand access to the Examination Papers in view of her right to
information as enshrined in the Constitution.

Ruling:

YES. Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people’s right to
information is limited to matters of public concern, and is further subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. Similarly, the State’s policy of full disclosure is limited to transactions involving public
interest, and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. The Court has always grappled with the
meanings of the terms public interest and public concern. The SC has also recognized the need to preserve a
measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as national security, trade secrets and banking transactions,
criminal matters, and other confidential matters.

SC conceded that national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern.
The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and
competent administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the
accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely
quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning of the art and
science of accounting. On the other hand, there may be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination
Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it may
well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and
checking of these multiple choice exams that require that the questions and answers remain confidential for a
limited duration. However, the PRC is not a party to these proceedings. They have not been given an
opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the
Examination Documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of this case, which may impact
on every board examination administered by the PRC, and in order that all relevant issues may be ventilated,
the SC deemed it best to remand the cases to the RTC for further proceedings.

RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

Griswold V. Connecticut

Facts:

Appellants, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and its medical director,
a licensed physician, were convicted as accessories for giving married persons information and medical
advice on how to prevent conception and, following examination, prescribing a contraceptive device or
material for the wife's use. A Connecticut statute makes it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to
prevent conception. Appellants claimed that the accessory statute, as applied, violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Issue: WON the aforementioned law violates right to association and privacy?

Held:

26
The Supreme Court ruled that the right to association is one of the fundamental rights protected in the first
amendment. First amendment protects "association" that are not political in the customary sense, but pertain
to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the members from government intrusion.
The protection of the right to association creates “zones of privacy” which are protected from government
intrusion. Marriage, being a form of association, enjoys the right to privacy. The present case, then, concerns a
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it
concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives, rather than regulating their manufacture or
sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. Such a
law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so often applied by this Court, that a:
"Governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISIO T. BAYLON, RAMON

MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO
AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON.
CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY
G.R. Nos. 85279, July 28, 1989, Cortes, J.

In recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right
to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.

Facts:

The Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the
union’s demands. The strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council, which ordered the
strikers to return to work. However, the strikers refused to return to work prompting the SSS to file before
RTC a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners. SSS
contended that its employees are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code,
therefore they do not have the right to strike.

Issue:

Whether SSS employees have the right to strike.

Ruling:

NO. The Bill of Rights provides that the right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged (Art. III,
Sec. 8). While there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to
organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.

A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would
show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit
the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. At present, in
the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or
regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum
Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. Employees of the SSS are part of the civil service and are covered
by the Civil Service Commission’s Memorandum prohibiting strikes.

IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELINQUENCY OF ATTY. MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. MDD-1)
AC-1928, August 3, 1978, Castro, C.J.

27
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate.

Facts:

Respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. A resolution was
adopted by Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues to the IBP since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding due notice. Respondent contended that the
Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
alleged that Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of
freedom to associate.

Issue:

Whether Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for violating one’s freedom to associate.

Ruling:

NO. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is already a member. He became
a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every
lawyer is already a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further
the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost
of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program – the lawyers. Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER-FEDERATION OF

UNIONS IN BPI UNIBANK
G.R. No. 164301, August 10, 2010, Leonardo-De Castro, J.

When certain employees are obliged to join a particular union as a requisite for continued employment, as in
the case of Union Security Clauses, this condition is a valid restriction of the freedom or right not to join any
labor organization because it is in favor of unionism.

Facts:

Pursuant to the Article and Plan of Merger between BPI and FEBTC, all the assets and liabilities of FEBTC
were transferred to and absorbed by BPI as the surviving corporation. FEBTC employees, including those in
its different branches across the country, were hired by petitioner as its own employees, with their status and
tenure recognized and salaries and benefits maintained.

The union and BPI entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a close shop agreement. Despite
notice to this kind of agreement, the employees still refused to join the union. After two months of
management inaction, on request, respondent informed petitioner of its decision to refer the issue of the
implementation of the Union Shop Clause of the CBA to the Grievance Committee. However, the issue
remained unresolved at this level and so it was subsequently submitted for voluntary arbitration by the
parties. Voluntary Arbitrator ruled against the Union and concluded that the former FEBTC employees could
not be compelled to join the Union, as it was their constitutional right to join or not to join any organization.

28
Respondent Union filed a motion for reconsideration, but the voluntary arbitrator denied the same. It
appealed to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the voluntary arbitrator. Hence, this
petition.

Issues:

Whether the union shop clauses in a CBA violate one’s freedom or right not to join any labor organization and
hence, invalid.

Ruling:

NO. When certain employees are obliged to join a particular union as a requisite for continued employment,
as in the case of Union Security Clauses, this condition is a valid restriction of the freedom or right not to join
any labor organization because it is in favor of unionism. The Supreme Court, on occasion, has even held that
a union security clause in a CBA is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the
Constitution. Moreover, a closed shop agreement is an agreement whereby an employer binds himself to hire
only members of the contracting union who must continue to remain members in good standing to keep their
jobs. It is “the most prized achievement of unionism.” It adds membership and compulsory dues. By holding
out to loyal members a promise of employment in the closed shop, it wields group solidarity.

The rationale for upholding the validity of union shop clauses in a CBA, even if they impinge upon the
individual employee’s right or freedom of association, is not to protect the union for the union’s sake. Laws
and jurisprudence promote unionism and afford certain protections to the certified bargaining agent in a
unionized company because a strong and effective union presumably benefits all employees in the bargaining
unit since such a union would be in a better position to demand improved benefits and conditions of work
from the employer. This is the rationale behind the State policy to promote unionism declared in the
Constitution.

BOYSCOUTS OF AMERICA VS DALE

FACTS:

The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster James Dale's adult
membership when the organization discovered that Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist. In 1992,
Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging that the Boy Scouts had violated the New Jersey public
accommodation statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public
accommodation. The Boy Scouts, a private, not-for-profit organization, asserted that homosexual conduct was
inconsistent with the values it was attempting to instill in young people.

The New Jersey Superior Court held that New Jersey's public accommodations law was inapplicable because
the Boy Scouts was not a place of public accommodation. The court also concluded that the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment freedom of expressive association prevented the government from forcing the Boy Scouts to
accept Dale as an adult leader.

ISSUE: WON there was valid exercise of the right of freedom of expressive association by the Boy Scouts

HELD: YES, The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s freedom of
expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate
public or private viewpoints. “Dale’s presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the
organization to send a message…that the Boy Scouts accept homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of
behavior,”
The court found that, while the Petitioner’s laws and oaths do not mention sexuality, the purpose of the
organization to foster “morally straight” and “clean” membership would be disregarded if the Petitioner was
forced to accept the Respondent. The Supreme Court of the United States held that to require the Petitioner to
accept Respondent was an abridgment of the Petitioner’s freedom of expression.

29
An organization cannot be compelled to accept a member whose beliefs do not align with the tenants upon,
which the organization stands. To do so would violate the First Amendment constitutional rights of the entire
organization and its members, who also align themselves with the principals on which the organization
stands.

EMINENT DOMAIN

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATION, Respondent.

FACTS:
TCT No. 4211 was cancelled by TCT No. 5261 which was issued in the name of Francisco Gonzales. Inscribed
on the "Memorandum of the Incumbrances Affecting the Property Described in this Certificate" was the sale
executed in favor of Francisco Gonzales dated 3 March 1920. Thus, on 6 April 1920, TCT No. 5261 was issued
in the name of Francisco Gonzales.On 22 August 1938, TCT No. 5261 was cancelled by TCT No. 35486.

The property was later subdivided into seven lots in accordance with subdivision plan Psd-
21154. Partitioning the lots among the co-owners, TCT No. 35486 was eventually cancelled and in lieu thereof
six (6) certificates of titles were individually issued to Francisco Gonzales’s six (6) children, specifically, TCT
Nos. 1368-1373 while TCT No. 1374 was issued in favor of all the children.

However, the properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368-1374 were expropriated by the Republic of the
Philippines and were eventually subdivided and sold to various vendees. Eighteen (18) lots were obtained by
MRI from the years 1965 to 1974, while it acquired the lot covered by TCT No. 165119 in 1988. On the other
hand, MEC acquired from PhilVille Development Housing Corporation Lot No. 19-B by virtue of Deed of
Exchange executed in its favor for which, TCT No. 232568 was issued on 9 May 1991.

The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation proceedings sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth
Act No. 539 for resale to tenants is beyond question, as also enunciated by the Supreme Court in Republic of
the Philippines v. Jose Leon Gonzales, et al.

ISSUE: Whether the fact of expropriation of the property is significant in determining the proper owners of
the estate.

HELD: YES.

The fact of expropriation is extremely significant, for titles acquired by the State by way of
expropriation are deemed cleansed of whatever previous flaws may have attended these titles. As
Justice Vitug explained in Republic v. Court of Appeals, and then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno
reiterated in Reyes v. NHA: "In an rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After
condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title; thus, by giving
notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for
securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance." This
doctrine was derived from the opinion of then Chief Judge (now U.S. Supreme Court Justice) Stephen Breyer
in Cadorette v. U.S., which in turn cited the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carmack that
"[b]y giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process
for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance."

In annulling the Manotok titles, focus was laid on the alleged defects of TCT No. 4211 issued in
September of 1918. However, TCT No. 4211 was issued decades before the property was
expropriated. Thus, any and all defects that may have attended that particular title would have been

30
purged when the property covered by it was subsequently acquired by the State through eminent
domain. The Special Division noted as much:

As it is, the validity of most of MRI’s certificates of title should be upheld because they were derived from the
Republic’s valid certificates of title. In fact, some of the MANOTOKS’ titles can be traced back to the
Government’s titles as a result of the expropriation in 1947.

Relevantly, the titles of the Republic, as the predecessor-in-interest of the MANOTOKS, are presumed valid by
virtue of their acquisition resulting from the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain that need not
be granted even by the fundamental law. Thus, the alleged flaws concerning the certificates of title issued
previous to the exercise of the State of its inherent power did not affect or render invalid the subsequent
transfers after the forced sale. Indeed, when land has been acquired for public use in fee simple
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights
in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title acquired or any reversion to the former owner.

Heirs of JuanchoArdona v. HON. JUAN Y. REYES, Executive Judge and Presiding Judge of Branch I,
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, and the PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY
G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555, October 26, 1983, Gutierrez, Jr., J.

As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. Whatever
may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

Facts:

Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the CFI of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282
hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City for purposes of developing into
integrated resort complexes of selected and well- defined geographic areas with potential tourism value. A
sports complex will be constructed on the said area. The development plan also includes the establishment of
electric power grid, deep wells, and complex sewerage and drainage system for the benefit of the community
and the tourists. Complimentary and support facilities for the project will also be constructed ill create and
offer employment opportunities to residents of the community and further generate income for the whole of
Cebu City.

Petitioners challenged that the taking is not for public use under the Constitution for there is no specific
constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes; hence,
unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether the public use requirement under the power of eminent domain is satisfied.

Ruling:

YES. The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that public
use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has been discarded.

The taking to be valid must be for public use. Before the requirement is that a literal meaning should be
attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case
of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not any more. As long as the purpose of the
taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

31
TAKING

HACIENDA LUISITA V. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL

G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.

“Taking” does not only take place upon the issuance of title either in the name of the Republic or the
beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). “Taking” also occurs when agricultural
lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by PARC for CARP coverage through the stock
distribution scheme.

Facts:

In its July 5, 2011 Decision, the Supreme Court denied the petition for review filed by Hacienda Luisita Inc.
(HLI) and affirmed the assailed Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) Resolutions with the
modification that the original 6,296 qualified farmworker-beneficiaries of Hacienda Luisita (FWBs) shall have
the option to remain as stockholders of HLI.

Upon separate motions of the parties for reconsideration, the Court, by Resolution dated November 22, 2011,
recalled and set aside the option thus granted to the original FWBs to remain as stockholders of HLI, while
maintaining that all the benefits and homelots received by all the FWBs shall be respected with no obligation
to refund or return them. HLI filed a Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November 22, 2011 dated
December 16, 2011 contending among others, that since the Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) is a modality
which the agrarian reform law gives the landowner as alternative to compulsory coverage, then the FWBs
cannot be considered as owners and possessors of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita at the time the
SDP was approved by PARC on November 21, 1989. It further claims that the approval of the SDP is not akin
to a Notice of Coverage in compulsory coverage situations because stock distribution option and compulsory
acquisition are two (2) different modalities with independent and separate rules and mechanisms.
Concomitantly, HLI maintains that the Notice of Coverage issued on January 2, 2006 may, at the very least, be
considered as the date of taking as this was the only time that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita were
placed under compulsory acquisition in view of its failure to perform certain obligations under the SDP.

Issue:

Whether the Court erred in ruling that the time of “taking” was on November 21, 1989 and not January 2,
2006.

Ruling:

NO. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, 631 SCRA 86 (2010), the Court held that the ‘time of taking’ is
the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is
transferred to the Republic. It should be noted, however, that “taking” does not only take place upon the
issuance of title either in the name of the Republic or the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). “Taking” also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and
approved by PARC for CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the instant case. Thus,
HLI’s submitting its SDP for approval is an acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of Hacienda
Luisita are covered by CARP. However, it was the PARC approval which should be considered as the effective
date of “taking” as it was only during this time that the government officially confirmed the CARP coverage of
these lands.

TAKING AND QUESTIONS OF NECESSITY

THE CITY OF MANILA V. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL.,

G.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919

32
FACTS
The City of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands,
therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. The
petitioner alleged that for the purpose of constructing an extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for
the plaintiff to acquire ownership of certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo.

The defendants – the Chinese Community of Manila, Ildefonso Tambunting, and Feliza Concepcion de Delgado
– alleged in their Answer (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question
was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and
monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes. One of the
defendants, Ildefonso Tampbunting, offered to grant a right of way for the said extension over other land,
without cost to the plaintiff, in order that the sepulchers, chapels and graves of his ancestors may not be
disturbed.

The Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the
particular strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the
complaint, without any finding as to costs. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the city of Manila has
authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes. Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of
Manila) provides that "the city (Manila) . . . may condemn private property for public use."

ISSUE
WON the City of Manila can condemn private property for necessity and convenience of public use

HELD
No. It is true that Section 2429 of Act No. 2711, or the Charter of the City of Manila states that "the city
(Manila) . . . may condemn private property for public use." But when the statute does not designate the
property to be taken nor how it may be taken, the necessity of taking particular property is a question for the
courts. When the application to condemn or appropriate property is made directly to the court, the question
of necessity should be raised (Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry, etc., Co. [72 Ohio St., 368]). The necessity
for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is
admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is
exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question
which the courts have the right to inquire into.

The impossibility of measuring the damage and inadequacy of a remedy at law is too apparent to admit of
argument. To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life sometimes becomes the sad duty of
the living; but, except in cases of necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting
place of our friends, should be maintained, and the preventative aid of the courts should be invoked for that
object. (Railroad Company vs. Cemetery Co., 116 Tenn., 400; Evergreen Cemetery Association vs. The City of
New Haven, 43 Conn., 234; Anderson vs. Acheson, 132 Iowa, 744; Beatty vs. Kurtz, 2 Peters, 566.)

Whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a public street,
especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a
question of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully
established that the greatest necessity exists therefor. In the present case, even granting that a necessity
exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the
same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered by
Tambunting to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.

The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.

RATIO/DOCTRINES FOUND IN THE CASES

1. The taking of private property for any use, which is not required by the necessities or convenience of
the inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain, and beyond
the power of the legislature to delegate. (Bennett vs. Marion, 106 Iowa, 628, 633; Wilson vs.

33
 Pittsburg, etc. Co., 222 Pa. St., 541, 545; Greasy, etc. Co. vs. Ely, etc. Co., 132 Ky., 692, 697.) To justify
the exercise of this extreme power (eminent domain) where the legislature has left it to depend upon
the necessity that may be found to exist, in order to accomplish the purpose of the incorporation, …
the party claiming the right to the exercise of the power should be required to show at least a
reasonable degree of necessity for its exercise (New Central Coal Co. vs. George's etc. Co. [37 Md.,
537, 564]).
2. The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to
exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations
and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot
be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be
confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation
or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions
accompanying the authority.
3. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can
exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to
determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the
right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with
the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the
City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court,
upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it
cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law.
4. The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents,
is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be
strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is
guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants.
When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the
land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by
doubtly interpretation. (Bensely vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am.
Dec., 576].)

De Knecht v. Bautista
Doctrine: the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily' choose what private property should be
taken.
FACTS:
government through the Department of Public Workmen's and Communication (now MPH) prepared a to
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to Roxas Boulevard; that the proposed extension, an adjunct of building
program, the Manila — Cavite Coastal Read Project, would pass through Cuneta Avenue up to Roxas
Boulevard that this route would be a straight one taking into account the direction of EDSA;

Shortly thereafter the Department of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension go through
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets which are lined with old substantial houses

Notwithstanding the said report and recommendation, the Ministry of Public Highways insisted on
implementing the plan to make the extension of EDSA go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets

Government filed complaint for expropriation against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein
and Del Pan Streets, among them the herein petitioner

The herein petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the choice of properties to be expropriated
made by the Ministry of Public Highways was arbitrary and erroneous

The respondent judge issued a writ of possession dated June 14, 1979 authorizing the Republic of the
Philippines to take and enter upon the possession of the properties sought be condemned

34
HELD:
it is clear that the choice of Fernando Rein — Del Pan Streets as the line through which the Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval.
The respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the Republic of the Philippines to
take immediate possession of the properties sought to be expropriated.

It is recognized, was, that the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily' choose what private property
should be taken. In J. M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure administration 31 SCRA, 413, 433, the Supreme
Court said:

For the purpose of obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, it is enough if the respondents or
defendants named be the government officials who would give operation and effect to official action
allegedly tainted with unconstitutionality. Thus, where the statute assailed was sought to be enforced
by the Land Tenure Administrative and the Solicitor General, the two officials may be made
respondents in the action without need of including the Executive Secretary as a party in the action

The failure to meet tile exacting standard of due process would likewise constitute a valid objection
to the exercise of this congressional power. That was so intimated in the above leading Guido Case.
There was an earlier pronouncement to that effect in a decision rendered long before the adoption of
the Constitution under the previous organic law then in force, while the Philippines was still an
unincorporated territory of the United States.

It is obvious then that a landowner is covered by the mantle of protection due process affords. It is a
mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it is the antithesis of any governmental act that smacks
of whim or caprice. It negates state power to act in an impressive manner. It is, as had been stressed
so often, the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play. In that sense, it stands as a guaranty of
justice. That is the standard that must be met by any government talk agency in the exercise of
whatever competence is entrusted to it. As was so emphatically stressed by the present Chief Justice,
'Acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under pain of nullity, ...

In the same case the Supreme Court concluded:

With due recognition then of the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken
and how much thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a
judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is the
victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will not allow. (p. 436)

In the instant case, it is a fact that the Department of Public Highways originally establish the extension of
EDSA along Cuneta Avenue. It is to be presumed that the Department of Public Highways made studies before
deciding on Cuneta Avenue. It is indeed odd why suddenly the proposed extension of EDSA to Roxas
Boulevard was changed to go through Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets which the Solicitor General con- cedes
"... the Del Pan — Fernando Rein Streets line follows northward and inward direction. While admit "that both
lines, Cuneta Avenue and Del Pan — Fernando Rein Streets lines, meet satisfactorily planning and design
criteria and therefore are both acceptable ... the Solicitor General justifies the change to Del Pan — Fernando
Rein Streets on the ground that the government "wanted to the social impact factor or problem involved." 8

It is doubtful whether the extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue can be objected to on the ground of social
impact. The improvements and buildings along Cuneta Avenue to be affected by the extension are mostly
motels. Even granting, arguendo, that more people be affected, the Human Setlements Commission has
suggested coordinative efforts of said Commission with the National Housing Authority and other
government agencies in the relocation and resettlement of those adversely affected

Republic v vda de castellvi

FACTS:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement

35
over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the
lease in 1956, the AFP refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost
P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property. She then instituted an ejectment
proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the
land in question.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the “taking” should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation
should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.
The requisites for taking are:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him
of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Only requisites 1, 3, and 4 were present. It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic
commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.
Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent
to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by
authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining
the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for
eminent domain was filed.

TAKING AND QUESTIONS OF NECESSITY

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V.CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

1. As early as 1977, the National Government through DPWH started the westward extension of EDSA
outfall (or outlet) of the Manila and suburbs flood control and drainage project and the Estero Tripa de
Gallina. These projects were aimed to ease traffic congestion and for flood control.

2. The petitioner failed to negotiate through sales agreement with de Knecht whose holding is hardly 5%
of the whole route area subject to the extension project of the Government.

3. Republic of the Philippines then filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Pasay City an
expropriation proceedings against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets
among them Cristina De Knecht et. al.

4. De Knecht filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the President
of the Philippines, prematureness of complaint and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the properties.

5. The Republic then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property to be
expropriated on the ground that it had made the required deposit with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) of

36
10% of the amount of compensation stated in the complaint which the lower court granted.

6. De Knecht then, filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition directed against the order
of the lower court dated June 14, 1979 praying that the respondent be commanded to desist from further
proceeding in the expropriation action and from implementing said order.

7. The SC then issued a decision setting aside the lower court’s order authorizing the Republic of the
Philippines to take c enter upon the possession of the properties sought to be condemned.

8. After the issuance of the SC of the said decision, the Congress passed BP BILANG 340 expropriating the
very properties subject of the present proceedings, and for the same purpose, it appears that it was based on
supervening events that occurred after the decision of this Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980
justifying the expropriation through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets.
Issue: WON an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of this Court may be the
subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation?

Ruling:

The court ruled that an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of this Court can
still be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation because under the laws and our Constitution,
expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the Government not only by voluntary negotiation with the
land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.

The Court finds justification in proceeding with the said expropriation proceedings through the Fernando
Rein-Del Pan streets from ESDA to Roxas Boulevard due to the aforestated supervening events after the
rendition of the decision of this Court in De Knecht.

The said SC decision, is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter (over two years
later in this case) making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the
propriety of undertaking the expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by enacting the
corresponding legislation as it did in this case.

JUST COMPENSATION

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v. HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY

G.R. No.L-59603, April 29, 1987, Gutierrez, Jr., J.

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.

Facts:

The Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) filed a complaint for expropriation against San Antonio
Development Corporation (San Antonio) to expropriate 4 parcels of land owned and registered in the name of
San Antonio pursuant to P.D. No. 66 in relation to Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of establishing the
Mactan Export Processing Zone. The respondent judge issued an order declaring the petitioner as having the
lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the filing of the complaint. He also issued a second order appointing certain persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be
expropriated. Petitioner contended that under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1533, which is the applicable law herein,
the basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
Hence, there is no more need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

37
Issue:

Whether the court has the power to appoint commissioners to determine just compensation in expropriation
cases.

Ruling:

YES. The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decree constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the Court inutile in a matter which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. The determination of "just compensation" in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property
may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can
mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS ZABALA

FACTS:
National Power Corporation (Napocor) filed a complaint for Eminent Domain against defendants spouses
Zabala before the RTC Bataan alleging that: defendants-appellees Spouses Zabala and Baylon own parcels of
land located in Balanga City, Bataan; it urgently needed an easement of right of way over the affected areas
for its 230 KV Limay-Hermosa Transmission Line[s]; the said parcels of land have neither been applied nor
expropriated for any public use, and were selected in a manner compatible with the greatest public good and
the least private injury; it repeatedly negotiated with the defendants-appellees for the acquisition of right of
way easement over the said parcels of land but failed to reach an agreement with the latter; it has the right to
take or enter upon the possession of the subject properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 42, which
repealed Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court upon the filing of the expropriation complaint before the
proper court or at anytime thereafter, after due notice to defendants-appellees, and upon deposit with the
Philippine National Bank of the amount equal to the assessed value of the subject properties for taxation
purposes which is to be held by said bank subject to the orders and final disposition of the court. It prayed for
the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to enter and take possession of the subject property, to
demolish all the improvements thereon, and to commence with the construction of the transmission lines
project on the subject properties.

Spouses Zabala moved to dismiss the complaint averring that: the Balanga City proper is already crowded
and needs additional space to meet the housing requirements of the growing population; the only direction
the city proper could expand is the side where their subject property is located; they incurred a considerable
expense in the preparatory development of the subject property into a subdivision to serve the interest and
well being of the growing population of Balanga; the said growing need for housing and said preparatory
development would necessarily increase the value of the said property; the just compensation would be
higher if the proposed transmission lines of plaintiff-appellant Napocor is installed or made to pass or
traverse through their property rather than through the parcels of land farther from the existing city proper
and away from their property which was tapped to meet the expansion requirements of the Balanga City
proper.

Commissioners submitted their Report/Recommendation fixing the just compensation for the use of
defendants-appellees Spouses Zabala’s property as easement of right of way at P150.00 per square meter
without considering the consequential damages.
Napocor prayed in its Comment to the commissioners’ report, the substantiation of the same with reliable
and competent documentary evidence based on the value of the property at the time of its taking.

RTC rendered its Partial Decision,9 ruling that Napocor has the lawful authority to take for public purpose and
upon payment of just compensation a portion of spouses Zabala’s property. Thus, it fixed the just
compensation at P150.00 per square meter for the 6,820 square meters.

38
Napocor appealed to the CA. It argued that the Commissioners’ reports upon which the RTC based the just
compensation are not supported by documentary evidence. Necessarily,the just compensation pegged by the
RTC at P150.00 per square meter also lacked basis. Napocor likewise imputed error on the part of the RTC in
not applying Section 3A of Republic Act (RA) No. 6395 11 which limits its liability to easement fee of not more
than 10% of the market value of the property traversed by its transmission lines.
CA affirming the RTC’s Partial Decision.

ISSUE: WON such compensation is the fair market value of the property

HELD: Petition is partially meritorious. Section 3A of RA No. 6395 cannot

restrict the constitutional power of the courts to determine just compensation.
Sec. 3A. In acquiring private property or private property rights through expropriation proceedings
where the land or portion thereof will be traversed by the transmission lines, only a right-of-way
easement thereon shall be acquired when the principal purpose for which such land is actually
devoted will not be impaired
The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is guaranteed no less by our
Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights. As such, no legislative enactments or executive issuances can
prevent the courts from determining whether the right of the property owners to just compensation has been
violated. It is a judicial function that cannot "be usurped by any other branch or official of the government."
Thus, we have consistently ruled that statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of
computing just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines in
ascertaining the amount thereof.
The just compensation of P150.00 per square meter as fixed by the RTC is notsupported by evidence.
It has likewise been our consistent ruling that just compensation cannot be arrived at arbitrarily. Several
factors must be considered, such as, but not limited to, acquisition cost, current market value of like
properties, tax value of the condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But before these factors can be
considered and given weight, the same must be supported by documentary evidence.
Lastly, it should be borne in mind that just compensation should be computed based on the fair value of the
subject property at the time of its taking or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.

Republic v. Gingoyon
Facts:
This case is a motion for reconsideration for a previous decision of the SC. In the assailed decision of the SC, it
ruled that PIATCO should be justly compensated before the Government can take over the NAIA Terminal 3.
Now, the Government is arguing that PIATCO should not be paid because it has pending obligations with
Takenaka Corporation (Takenaka) and Asahikosan (Asahikosan) Corporation for services rendered by the
said corporations in building the Terminal. It argues that the said corporations still has pending liens on the
Terminal. The situation the Republic now faces is that if any part of its Php3,002,125,000 deposit is released
directly to PIATCO, and PIATCO, as in the past, does not wish to settle its obligations directly
to Takenaka, Asahikosan and Fraport, the Republic may end up having expropriated a terminal with liens and
claims far in excess of its actual value, the liens remain unextinguished, and PIATCO on the other hand, ends
up with the Php3,0002,125,000 in its pockets gratuitously.
Issue:
Should the Government pay PIATCO just compensation before taking over the Terminal?
Held:
Yes.
The Court is wont to reverse its previous rulings based on factual premises that are not yet conclusive or
judicially established. Certainly, whatever claims or purported liens Takenaka and Asahikosan against
PIATCO or over the NAIA 3 have not been judicially established. Neither Takenaka norAsahikosan are parties
to the present action, and thus have not presented any claim which could be acted upon by this Court. The
earlier adjudications in Aganv. PIATCO made no mention of either Takenaka or Asahikosan, and certainly
made no declaration as to their rights to any form of compensation. If there is indeed any right to
remuneration due to these two entities arising from NAIA 3, they have not yet been established by the courts
of the land.

39
It must be emphasized that the conclusive ruling in the Resolution dated 21 January 2004 in Agan v.
PIATCO (Agan 2004) is that PIATCO, as builder of the facilities, must first be justly compensated in accordance
with law and equity for the Government to take over the facilities. It is on that premise that the Court
adjudicated this case in its 19 December 2005 Decision.

While the Government refers to a judgment rendered by a London court in favor

of Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO in the amount of US$82 Million, it should be noted that this
foreign judgment is not yet binding on Philippine courts. It is entrenched in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure that a foreign judgment on the mere strength of its promulgation is not yet conclusive, as it
can be annulled on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. It is likewise recognized in Philippine jurisprudence and international law that a
foreign judgment may be barred from recognition if it runs counter to public policy.

Assuming that PIATCO indeed has corresponding obligations to other parties relating to NAIA 3, the Court
does not see how such obligations, yet unproven, could serve to overturn the Decision mandating that the
Government first pay PIATCO the amount of 3.02 Billion Pesos before it may acquire physical possession over
the facilities. This directive enjoining payment is in accordance with Republic Act No. 8974, and under the
mechanism established by the law the amount to be initially paid is that which is provisionally determined as
just compensation. The provisional character of this payment means that it is not yet final, yet sufficient
under the law to entitle the Government to the writ of possession over the expropriated property.

There are other judicial avenues outside of this Motion for Reconsideration wherein all other claims relating
to the airport facilities may be ventilated, proved and determined. Since such claims involve factual issues,
they must first be established by the appropriate trier of facts before they can be accorded any respect by or
binding force on this Court.

Republic v C.C. Unson Company Inc.

Facts:
Petitioner, through the TRB, sought to implement the South Luzon Tollway Extension Project (SLEP),
particularly the Calamba City, Laguna – Sto. Tomas, Batangas Section, which aimed to extend the South Luzon
Expressway for faster travel in the region

Respondent C.C. Unson Company, Inc. (Unson) was the owner of the affected properties which were
described as follows: (1) Lot No. 6-B (Lot 6B) under Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. T-57646,7 covering
an area of 8,780 sq.m; and (2) Lot 4- C-2 (Lot 4C2) under TCT No. T-51596,8 covering an area of 16,947 sq.m.
It sought to expropriate Lot 6B and Lot 4C2 in the amount of P2,250.00 per square meter (sq.m.)
On November 15, 2006, petitioner filed its Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and to Admit
Attached Amended Complaint. 9 In the Amended Complaint,10 petitioner indicated that Lot 4C2 should have
a lower zonal value of P1,050.00 per sq.m instead of P2,250.00 per sq.m., pursuant to the certification11 and
tax declaration12 issued by Revenue District Office No. 56 and the City Assessor’s Office.
In its Answer,13 as well as in its Answer to Amended Complaint,14 Unson, by way affirmative defense,
alleged that both properties had been classified and assessed as residential. Thus, Lot 4C2 should have a
higher value ranging from P5,000.00 to P10,000.00 per sq.m
On December 4, 2006, Unson filed the Urgent Twin Motion: To Release Initial Deposit and to Order Plaintiff to
make Additional Deposit (twin motion).15 It reiterated that Lot 4C2 should have a higher valuation because
the affected areas were classified as residential with zonal value in the amount of P2,250.00 per sq.m.
Accordingly, Unson sought the release of an additional amount of P20,336,400.00 to complete the total of
P38,130,750.00 which was required for Lot 4C2. It also prayed that petitioner release the amount of
P37,549,350.00 pending compliance with the additional deposit of P20,336,400.00.
On December 20, 2006, petitioner filed the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession16
(December 20, 2006 Motion) alleging that it had already deposited P37,549,350.00 or 100% of the total zonal
value for the said properties with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). It prayed that a writ of
possession be issued in its favor and that the RTC order the Register of Deeds of Calamba City to register the
said writ and annotate the same in the subject TCTs.
On December 21, 2006, the RTC issued the Order17 granting the December 20, 2006 motion and the motion

40
to release initial deposit. The RTC further directed the parties to submit their nominees to the commission
who would determine just compensation.
On January 3, 2007, petitioner filed its Motion for Issuance of Order of Expropriation18 praying that an order
for expropriation be issued in its favor.
Through a motion,20 dated August 14, 2007, Unson asked the trial court to include the remaining 750 sq.m.
dangling lot in the expropriation proceedings. Although by no means a small area, the said 750 sq.m. lot had
been rendered without value to Unson considering its resultant shape.

On November 12, 2009, during the deliberation of the Board on the just compensation, Chairman Hilbero
directed the two other commissioners to state their respective positions. Commissioner Oscianas
recommended the amount of P4,400 per sq.m.
In addition, Commissioner Oscianas opined that the consequential damages suffered by Unson should also be
taken into consideration. The expropriation left two dangling lots which could no longer be utilized. It would
be unfair for Unson to continue paying taxes on the lots as industrial when these could no longer be utilized
for such purposes.
Commissioner Amata, on the other hand, posited that Unson was already fully compensated and that the
amount of P2,250.00 per sq.m. for the two lots should be enough.

The Ruling of the RTC

The RTC, after carefully considering the recommendation of the Board, fixed the amount at P3,500.00 per
sq.m, as just compensation in its Decision, dated December 23, 2009.
In rendering judgment, the RTC emphasized that the Board did not only rely on the potential use of the
properties as basis for just compensation, but also considered all the factors set forth in Section 5 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8974.25

The Ruling of CA
The CA found no reversible error in the RTC’s determination of just compensation and held that the
conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court were entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed
unless there appeared some fact or circumstance of weight which had been misinterpreted and that, if
considered, would had affected the result of the case.
The CA concurred with the RTC that the highest and best use of the land would be where it was best suited in
terms of profitability and utility.27 Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the highest and best use of the land did
not equate to potential use. The RTC was able to take into account several other factors in determining just
compensation. The CA further held that petitioner placed too much premium on the value of the lots adjacent
and similar to the subject parcels of land but there was no evidence to show that such lots were similar to the
property under expropriation.

SC Ruling:
In Republic v. Asia Pacific Integrated Steel Corporation,38 the Court defined just compensation “as the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s
gain, but the owner’s loss. The word ‘just’ is used to intensify the meaning of the word ‘compensation’ and to
convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full, and ample. Such ‘just’-ness of the compensation can only be attained by using reliable and
actual data as bases in fixing the value of the condemned property. Trial courts are required to be more
circumspect in its evaluation of just compensation due the property owner, considering that eminent domain
cases involve the expenditure of public funds.”39

The Court further stated in National Power Corporation v. Tuazon, 40 that “[t]he determination of just
compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be
usurped by any other branch or official of the government. This judicial function has constitutional raison
d’être; Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no private property shall be taken for public use
without payment of just compensation.”41 Legislative enactments, as well as executive issuances, fixing or
providing for the method of computing just compensation are tantamount to impermissible encroachment on
judicial prerogatives. They are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines in
ascertaining the amount of just compensation.

41
In this case, petitioner has repeatedly imputed error on the part of the RTC when it pegged the amount of just
compensation at P3,500.00 per sq.m. after it took into consideration the commissioners’ report. Contrary to
petitioner’s contention, the RTC did not only rely on the potential use of the subject properties. Absent any
showing, however, that there was any serious error on the part of the trial court, its ruling and discretion
should not be interfered with.
To emphasize, the RTC, after hearing, had the option either to (1) accept the report and render judgment in
accordance therewith; (2) for cause shown, it may (a) recommit the same to the commissioners for further
report of facts; or (b) it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or
(c) it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and (d) it may make such order or render such
judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation,
and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken.45
The determination of the amount of just compensation by the RTC was even affirmed by the appellate court,
which had the opportunity to examine the facts anew. Hence, the Court sees no reason to disturb it.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

HENRY L. SY VS. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY

GR. NO. 202690; JUNE 5, 2013;

Doctrine: A previous law only requires a resolution for expropriation of land for public use, but the discussion
now reiterated that a new law requires an ordinance for expropriation of land for public use.

FACTS:
On November 7, 1996, the City, through then Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., filed a complaint for expropriation
with the RTC in order to acquire a 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land, owned and registered under the name of Henry
L. Sy, which was intended to be used as a site for a multipurpose barangay hall, day-care center, playground
and community activity center for the benefit of the residents of Barangay Balingasa, Balintawak, Quezon
City. The requisite ordinance to undertake the aforesaid expropriation namely, Ordinance No. Sp-181, s-94,
was enacted on April 12, 1994.

On March 18, 1997, pursuant to Section 198 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160), otherwise known as the
“Local Government Code of 1991,” the City deposited the amount of P241,090.00 with the Office of the Clerk
of Court, representing 15% of the fair market value of the subject property based on its tax declaration.

During the preliminary conference on November 8, 2006, Sy did not question the City’s right to expropriate
the subject property. Thus, only the amount of just compensation remained at issue.

On July 6, 2006, the RTC appointed Edgardo Ostaco (Commissioner Ostaco), Engr. Victor Salinas
(Commissioner Salinas) and Atty. Carlo Alcantara (Commissioner Alcantara) as commissioners to determine
the proper amount of just compensation to be paid by the City for the subject property. Subsequently,
Commissioners Ostaco and Alcantara, in a Report dated February 11, 2008, recommended the payment of P5,
500.00 per sq. m., to be computed from the date of the filing of the expropriation complaint, or on November
7, 1996. On the other hand, Commissioner Salinas filed a separate Report dated March 7, 2008,
recommending the higher amount of P13, 500.00 per sq. m. as just compensation.

RTC: just compensation for 5,500/sq m and no basis for award of damages
CA: affirmed RTC but with additional exemplary damages worth 200,000

ISSUE:
WON the the award of exemplary damages is justified

HELD:

42
YES. The Court finds the grant of exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 as well as attorney’s fees
equivalent to 1% of the total amount due amply justified, square as it is with existing jurisprudence.


In Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees should be
awarded to the landowner if the government takes possession of the property for a prolonged period of time
without properly initiating expropriation proceedings.

the Court held that a government agency’s prolonged occupation of private property without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings undoubtedly entitled the landowner to damages:
Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the form of actual or compensatory
damages, which in this case should be the legal interest (6%) on the value of the land at the time of
taking, from said point up to full payment by the MIAA. This is based on the principle that interest “runs
as a matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can
accomplish, as of the date of the taking x x x.
xxxx
 For more than twenty (20) years, the MIAA
occupied the subject lot without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and without the MIAA exerting
efforts to ascertain ownership of the lot and negotiating with any of the owners of the property. To our mind,
these are wanton and irresponsible acts which should be suppressed and corrected. Hence, the award
of exemplary damages and attorneys fees is in order. x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)

DELAY IN PAYMENT AND ABANDONMENT OR CHANGE OF INTENDED USE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICENTE G. LIM

G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the
land but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking.

Facts:

The Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of
establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name
of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon.

For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots the Denzons, successors-in-interest, Valdehueza and Panerio,
filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and AFP
officers in possession of the property. The CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio,
holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the Republic’s
failure to pay the amount adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, the petition.

Issue:

Whether the Republic has retained ownership of the property despite its failure to pay respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest the amount adjudged for expropriation.

Ruling:

NO. The Republic disregarded the Section 9, Article III of our Constitution when it failed and refused to pay
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. The length of time and the
manner with which it evaded payment demonstrate its arbitrary high-handedness and confiscatory attitude.

43
More than half of a century has passed, yet, to this day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-
handed. Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair.

Just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the
land but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. The Republic’s failure to pay
just compensation for 57 years cannot but be construed as a deliberate refusal to pay which makes the
recovery of possession in order.

While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private
landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, in cases where the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the
owner concerned shall have the right to recover possession of his property.

MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v.

BERNARDO L. LOZADA, SR., et al.
G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010, Nachura, J.

If the particular public purpose or intent for which an expropriation was sought is not initiated or not at all
pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of
the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. Should the expropriator
commit to use the property for a purpose other than that stated in the petition for expropriation filed, then it
should file another petition for the new purpose.

Facts:

Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Lahug, Cebu City. The said lot
was expropriated by the Republic in connection with its program for the improvement and expansion of the
Lahug Airport. The projected expansion and improvement of the Airport, however, did not materialize
because the general aviation operations at the Lahug Airport were transferred to the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority. Subsequently, Lozada sought to repurchase his property from the Republic.

Issue:

Whether Lozada may repurchase the disputed property after the purpose for which the same was
expropriated has been abandoned.

Ruling:

YES. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Governments power of eminent domain is
subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just
compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions
that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated. For this reason, the
taking of private property, consequent to the Government's exercise of its power of eminent domain, is
always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was
taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the
return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent
domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.

In sum, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then
incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to
reacquire the same.

44
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. HEIRS OF
SATURNINO Q. BORBON, and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015, Bersamin, J.

It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained throughout the proceedings for
expropriation. To continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public
purpose of the project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the expropriator due to
the absence of the essential element of public use.

Facts:

National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) filed a complaint for expropriation seeking the acquisition of an
easement of right of way over a portion of the property. The respondents maintained that NAPOCOR should
compensate them for the entire property since even if the area being expropriated only covered the portion
directly affected by the transmission lines, the remaining portion of the property was also affected because
the transmission line passed through the center of the land, thereby dividing the land into three lots and that
the presence of the high tension transmission line had rendered the entire property inutile for any future use
and capabilities. RTC ordered NAPOCOR to pay the respondents just compensation for the whole area. The
case was appealed before CA which affirmed with modification the ruling of RTC. The case was then elevated
to SC. Pending appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings,
contending that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose because
of the intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed on the respondents’ property and that
because the public purpose for which such property would be used thereby ceased to exist, the proceedings
for expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was now duty-bound to return the property to its
owners.

Issue:

Whether the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed by reason of the fact that the
public purpose of the expropriation ceased to exist.

Ruling:

YES. It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained throughout the proceedings
for expropriation. Here, NAPOCOR seeks to discontinue the expropriation proceedings on the ground that the
transmission lines constructed on the respondents’ property had already been retired. Verily, the retirement
of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of the element of public use. To
continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the
project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the expropriator due to the absence of
the essential element of public use.

In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the respondents,
there is no need to pay just compensation to them because their property would not be taken by NAPOCOR.
Instead of full market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the
disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of restoration of the
possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory damages.

NPC v POSADA
Doctrine: The expropriation case is not automatically dismissed when the property ceases to be for
public use
FACTS:
The National Power Corporation instituted expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of a right-of-way
easement over parcels of land located in Barangay Marinawa, Bato,Catanduanes owned by respondents

45
The expropriation was for the construction and maintenance of its Substation Island Grid Project. RTC
granted

In a turn of events, the National Power Corporation informed its counsel on July 24, 2014 that it no longer
needed the properties as it was set to acquire an alternative site. It also requested its counsel to withdraw
Civil Case No. 0008 before the trial court because "it [was] impractical to pursue the acquisition of the
original site[.]"

Thus, the National Power Corporation, through counsel, filed the present Motion to Withdraw Appeal,42
praying for the withdrawal of its appeal before this court and, ultimately, for its Amended Complaint before
the trial court to be dismissed.43

We are asked to decide whether the National Power Corporation may be allowed to withdraw its Petition for
Review and whether the withdrawal has the effect of dismissing its Amended Complaint before the trial court.

HELD:
The National Power Corporation now requests this court for leave to withdraw this Petition on the ground
that it was in the process of acquiring a vacant lot owned by FICELCO. Considering that eminent domain is the
taking of private property for public use, no expropriation proceeding can continue if the property to be
expropriated will not be for public use.

Respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File Comment to Petitioner’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal.85 They
argue that the grant of a Motion to Withdraw would be unjust. From their point of view, the National Power
Corporation cannot resort to a withdrawal of an appeal in order to invalidate a judgment duly rendered by
the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. They state that they have no objection to the withdrawal
of the appeal, but they object to the dismissal of the Amended Complaint before the trial court. They propose
that the effect of withdrawing the Petition for Review is to make the Court of Appeals’ Decision final and
executory.86
In National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Guivelondo:87

In the early case of City of Manila v. Ruymann, the Court was confronted with the question: May the
petitioner, in an action for expropriation, after he has been placed in possession of the property and before
the termination of the action, dismiss the petition? It resolved the issue in the affirmative and held:

The right of the plaintiff to dismiss an action with the consent of the court is universally recognized with
certain well-defined exceptions. If the plaintiff discovers that the action which he commenced was brought
for the purpose of enforcing a right or a benefit, the advisability or necessity of which he later discovers no
longer exists, or that the result of the action would be different from what he had intended, then he should be
permitted to withdraw his action, subject to the approval of the court. The plaintiff should not be required to
continue the action, subject to some well-defined exceptions, when it is not to his advantage to do so.
Litigation should be discouraged and not encouraged. Courts should not require parties to litigate when they
no longer desire to do so. Courts, in granting permission to dismiss an action, of course, should always take
into consideration the effect which said dismissal would have upon the rights of the defendant.

Subsequently, in Metropolitan Water District v. De Los Angeles, the Court had occasion to apply the above-
quoted ruling when the petitioner, during the pendency of the expropriation case, resolved that the land
sought to be condemned was no longer necessary in the maintenance and operation of its system of
waterworks. It was held:
It is not denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to acquire the land in question for a public use. The
fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent
domain, is public use. That being true, the very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that
the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the
reason that the action cannot be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some public use. That

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must be true even during the pendency of the appeal of [sic] at any other stage of the proceedings. If, for
example, during the trial in the lower court, it should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that
the expropriation is not for some public use, it would be the duty and the obligation of the trial court to
dismiss the action. And even during the pendency of the appeal, if it should be made to appear to the
satisfaction of the appellate court that the expropriation is not for public use, then it would become the duty
and the obligation of the appellate court to dismiss it.88 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent landowners had already been prejudiced by the expropriation case. Petitioner cannot be
permitted to institute condemnation proceedings against respondents only to abandon it later when it finds
the amount of just compensation unacceptable. Indeed, our reprobation in the case of Cosculluela v. Court of
Appeals is apropos:

It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a person’s
property, allow the judgment of the court to become final and executory and then refuse to pay on the ground
that there are no appropriations for the property earlier taken and profitably used. We condemn in the
strongest possible terms the cavalier attitude of government officials who adopt such a despotic and
irresponsible stance.89 (Emphasis supplied)

The rule, therefore, is that expropriation proceedings must be dismissed when it is determined that it is not
for a public purpose, except when:

First, the trial court’s order already became final and executory;

Second, the government already took possession of the property; and

Lastly, the expropriation case already caused prejudice to the landowner.

The expropriation case is not automatically dismissed when the property ceases to be for public use. The
state must first file the appropriate Motion to Withdraw before the trial court having jurisdiction over the
proceedings. The grant or denial of any Motion to Withdraw in an expropriation proceeding is always subject
to judicial discretion.

Respondents have not yet been deprived of their property since the National Power Corporation was never
able to take possession. We cannot determine whether damages have been suffered as a result of the
expropriation.

This case needs to be remanded to the trial court to determine whether respondents have already been
prejudiced by the expropriation. The withdrawal of the Petition before this court will have no practical effect
other than to make the trial court's order of condemnation final and executory. In order to prevent this
absurdity, the National Power Corporation should file the proper Motion to Withdraw before the trial court. It
is now the burden of the National Power Corporation to plead and prove to the trial court its reasons for
discontinuing with the expropriation. Respondents may also plead and prove damages incurred from the
commencement of the expropriation, if any.

OVERHEAD OR AERIAL AND SUBTERRANEAN TAKINGS

Cabahug V. National Power Corporation

Facts:

1. The Spouses Cabahug is the owners of two parcels of land situated in Barangay Capokpok, Tabango,
Leyte.

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2. A suit for expropriation was filed by NPC before the RTC, in connection with its Leyte-Cebu
Interconnection Project involving the lands owned by the petitioners.

3. The suit was later dismissed when the petitioner and the respondent come into an agreement that the
respondent would pay easement fee equivalent to the 10% vale of the property.

4. The land, due to conflicting land value, Leyte Provincial Appraisal Committee, upon request of NPC,
fixed the valuation of the affected properties at P45.00 per square meter.

5. The petitioners executed two documents denominated as Right of Way Grant in favor of NPC. For and
in consideration of the easement fees in the sums of P112, 225.50 and P21, 375.00, Jesus Cabahug granted
NPC a continuous easement of right of way for the latter’s transmissions lines and their appurtenances. Under
their easement agreement, the petitioners reserved the option to seek additional compensation for easement
fee.

6. However, the petitioners filed the complaint for the payment of just compensation, damages and
attorney’s fees against NPC. Claiming to have been totally deprived of the use of their lands the petitioners
alleged, among other matters, that in accordance with the reservation provided under paragraph 4 of the
aforesaid grant, they have demanded from NPC payment of the balance of the just compensation for the
subject properties which, based on the valuation fixed by the Leyte Provincial Appraisal Committee,
amounted to P1,202,404.50.8

7. In its answer, on the other hand, NPC averred that it already paid the full easement fee mandated
under Section 3-A of RA 6395 and that the reservation in the grant referred to additional compensation for
easement fee, not the full just compensation sought by the petitioners

8. The RTC granted the complaint of the petitioner however the CA reversed the said decision reasoning
that because the petitioners already accepted the payment under the easement contract, the NPC can no
longer be required to pay the full just compensation because it will violate the contract of easement and will
amount to unjust enrichment on the part of the petitioner. The petitioner raised the case to SC.

Issue: WON the petitioner can claim the full just compensation despite the fact that there was no actual taking
of the said property but only easement?

Ruling:
The court ruled that the petitioner is entitled to the full just compensation. Despite the fact that the
petitioners already collected the amount agreed upon in the easement agreement, they can still seek for
additional payment because they expressly reserved this right in the said agreement.

Furthermore, it has been ruled that the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the
land if, as here, the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary
rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the
property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of
ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the
probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary.26
Measured not by the takers gain but the owners loss, just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.

Lastly, the determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is a judicial function and no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's
findings. Any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle
or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as
to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.

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NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. LUCMAN G. IBRAHIM, OMAR G. MARUHOM, ELIAS G. MARUHOM,
BUCAY G. MARUHOM, FAROUK G. MARUHOM, HIDJARA G. MARUHOM, ROCANIA G. MARUHOM,
POTRISAM G. MARUHOM, LUMBA G. MARUHOM, SINAB G. MARUHOM, ACMAD G. MARUHOM,
SOLAYMAN G. MARUHOM, MOHAMAD M. IBRAHIM, and CAIRONESA M. IBRAHIM
G.R. No. 168732, June 29, 2007, Azcuna, J.

Where the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of the property’s normal beneficial use,
notwithstanding the fact that the expropriator only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not
merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land.

Facts:

Respondent Ibrahim and his co-heirs filed a complaint against NAPOCOR for recovery of possession of land
and damages before the RTC of Lanao del Sur alleging that they were the owners of several parcels of land
and that NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without respondents’ knowledge and prior consent, took
possession of the sub-terrain area of said lands and constructed therein underground tunnels. The existence
of the tunnels was only discovered sometime in July 1992 by respondents. The tunnels were apparently being
used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCOR’s Agus Projects.
The RTC ordered defendant NAPOCOR to pay to plaintiffs the fair market value of said 70,000 square meters
of land. Hence, the present petition. NAPOCOR contended that respondents were not denied the beneficial use
of their subject properties to entitle them to just compensation by way of damages.

Issue:

Whether the respondents are entitled to just compensation.

Ruling:

YES. Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case constitute an easement upon the property
of respondents which does not involve any loss of title or possession. The manner in which the easement was
created by petitioner, however, violates the due process rights of respondents as it was without notice and
indemnity to them and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. Petitioner could have, at any
time, validly exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire the easement over respondents’ property as
this power encompasses not only the taking or appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated
property but likewise covers even the imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of the condemned
property. Significantly, though, landowners cannot be deprived of their right over their land until
expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is for public
use, that there is payment of just compensation and that there is due process of law.

Where the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of the property’s normal beneficial use,
notwithstanding the fact that the expropriator only occupies the sub- terrain portion as in this case, it is liable
to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. In determining the just
compensation, the valuation of the property should be based on the value on the date when the landowners
discovered the presence of the huge underground tunnels beneath their lands, not the value on the date on
which the latter constructed the tunnels.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS TARCELO

FACTS:

Felicisimo (Tarcelo) and the heirs of Comia (Santos) are the owners of two lots situated in Bgy. Tabangao-
Ambulong, Batangas City. In 2000, the National Power Corporation filed for Expropriation of the two lands to
the extent of 1,595.91 square meters which will be affected by the construction and maintenance of the NPC’s
Natural Gas Project.

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RTC- fixed the just compensation for the lands at P1,000.00 per square meter

NPC thus appealed to the CA, it cannot be gainsaid that the construction of underground pipeline is a simple
case of mere passage of gas pipeline. It will surely cause damage and prejudice to the agricultural potentials
of appellees’ property. Deep excavation will have to be done whereby plants and trees will be uprooted. A
possible leakage could certainly do harm and adversely restrict the agricultural and economic activity of the
land. This is not to mention that it will create an environmental health hazard dangerous to the occupant’s life
and limb.
Hence, defendants-appellees are entitled for just compensation to the full market value of their property not
just ten percent (10%) of it.

CA- fixed the just compensation at P797.50 per square meters, which judgment became and executory, thus
the respondents filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution.

A writ of execution and Notice of Garnishment was served on the Manager of the Land Bank of the
Philippines, for the satisfaction of the amount of just compensation for the whole of respondents’ 7,015
square meters – and not merely the supposedly affected portions thereof totaling 1,595.91 square meters as
NPC originally sought to acquire.

NPC then moved to quash the writ of execution and notice of garnishment, alleging that the RTC erred in
issuing the writ of garnishment for the whole of the two lots, instead of 1,595.91 square meters only, which is
inconsistent with the RTC and the CA decisions. It pointed out that the appeal before the CA was only on the
issue of fixing the just compensation.

The RTC, however, denied the omnibus motion, ruling that the construction of the underground pipeline
inevitably affected the whole properties, not just the portion thereof claimed by NPC. The ruling that just was
not without precedent, according to the RTC inasmuch as the case of NPC vs. Court of Appeals ruled that when
a property suffered permanent injury as a result of the expropriation, he is entitled to compensation of the
whole property, not just a portion of it.

ISSUE: WON the writ of execution for the payment of the whole subject property valid

HELD: NO, It is a settled general principle that a writ of execution must conform substantially to every
essential particular of the judgment promulgated. Execution not in harmony with the judgment is bereft of
validity.

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, is necessarily in derogation of private rights. It is one of the
harshest proceedings known to the law. The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the
owner and against the condemnor. When the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is
limited to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained

The CA erred in declaring in its assailed Decision that there is nothing in the Decision of the RTC to indicate
that NPC was being ordered to pay just compensation only for the 1,595.91-square meter portion of
respondents’ properties.On the contrary, the evidence is quite clear that NPC has beenmade liable precisely to
such extent only, and not more.The Court observes that contrary to the CA’s appreciation, the June 26, 2007
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 86712 did notparticularly declare that NPC should pay for the entirearea of
respondents’ properties. It merely stated that respondents should be compensated for the full and fair market
value of their property and not merely paid a 10%easement fee therefor; it did not resolve the issue of
whether NPC should pay just compensation for the entire area of 7,015 square meters. It simply said that NPC
should pay for the full per-square meter value of the affected portions, and not just a fraction thereof (or
10%). There could be no other interpretation.
It has always been the rule that "[t]he only portion of the decision that may be the subject of execution is that
which isordained or decreed in the dispositive portion. Whatever may be found in the body of the decision
can only be considered as part of the reasons or conclusions of the court and serve only as guides to
determine the ratio decidendi. "[W]here there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and

50
the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision.
While the body of the decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguityin the manner of the court’s
reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets
conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes corresponding duties or obligation.

INVERSE CONDEMNATION

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY, namely: CEBU, BATOWA-AN,

SAYANA, NASSER, MANTA, EDGAR, PUTRI, MONGKOY and AMIR, all surnamed MACABANGKIT
G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011, Bersamin, J.

It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual
physical taking or appropriation.

Facts:

Respondents were the owners of land with an area of 221,573 square meters situated in Ditucalan, Iligan City
who sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative prayer for the
payment of just compensation. They alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of the underground
tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project
traversed their land and that it had been constructed without their knowledge and consent. As a consequence
of which, the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their
land. They also contended that their land had become an unsafe place for habitation because of the loud
sound of the water rushing through the tunnel and the constant shaking of the ground, forcing them and their
workers to relocate to safer grounds. NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to
compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land
was established; that their cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed due to
the tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the tunnel being an apparent and
continuous easement, any action arising from such easement prescribed in five years.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered NPC to pay them just compensation. NPC appealed
before CA which affirmed the RTC’s decision. Thus, the present petition where NPC contended that it is not
liable to pay the respondents just compensation.

Issues:

1. Whether the respondents are entitled to just compensation.

2. Whether the five-year prescription period applies in this case.

Ruling:

1. YES. Here, like in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, NPC constructed a tunnel underneath the land of
the Heirs of Macabangkit without going through formal expropriation proceedings and without procuring
their consent or at least informing them beforehand of the construction. NPC’s construction adversely
affected the owners’ rights and interests because the subterranean intervention by NPC prevented them from
introducing any developments on the surface, and from disposing of the land or any portion of it, either by
sale or mortgage.

There was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually
dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an
actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title,
physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction,
restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and
enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that
the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from

51
the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands. As a result, NPC should pay just compensation
for the entire land.

2. NO. Prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an action
for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC
cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land.

The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for
damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property
taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain
has been attempted by the taking agency. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.

Constructive Expropriation and Regulatory Taking

US vs Causby

Respondents claim that their property was taken, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, by the regular
army and navy aircraft flights over their house and chicken farm.

Facts. Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondents’
property contained a house and a chicken farm. The end of one of the runways of the airport was 2,220 feet
from Respondents’ property, and the glide path passed over the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above
the house, 63 feet above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest tree. The use by the United States of this
airport is pursuant to a lease beginning June 1, 1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with provisions for renewal
until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is earlier. The United
States’ four motored bombers make loud noises when flying above the property, and have very bright lights.
Respondents’ chicken farm production had to stop, because 150 chickens were killed by flying into walls from
fright. In the Court of Claims, it was found that the United States had taken an easement over the property on
June 1, 1942, and that the val
ue of the property depreciation as the result of the easement was $2,000.00. The United States petitioned for
certiorari, which was granted.

Issue. Has the Respondents’ property been taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment?

Held. Yes. But the case is remanded for a determination of the value of the easement and whether the
easement was permanent or temporary.
The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of land extending to the sky above the land. However,
the court notes that an act of Congress had given the United States exclusive national sovereignty over the air
space. The court noted that common sense made the common law doctrine inapplicable.
However, the court found that the common law doctrine did not control the present case. The United States
had conceded in oral argument that if flights over the Respondents’ property rendered it uninhabitable then
there would be a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment. The measure of the value of the property
taken is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain.
The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the landowner is to have the full enjoyment of his
land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. If this were not
true then landowners could not build buildings, plant trees or run fences.
The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. The court does
not set the precise limits of the line of demarcation. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless, like
here, they are so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment of the
land. The Court of Claims must, upon remand, determine the value of the easement and whether it is a
temporary or permanent easement.

Dissent. The dissent would reverse the decision of the Court of Claims and hold that there has been no taking

52
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. This is because of the modern nature of the airplane, and the
desire to avoid confusion.

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