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World An Encyclopedia of Political Violence from Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 Era James Ciment,
World
An Encyclopedia of Political Violence from
Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 Era
James Ciment, Editor

Terrorism

World

Terrorism

Volume 1 -3

Page Intentionally Left Blank

World

Terrorism

An Encyclopedia of Political V iolence fr om Ancient T imes to the Post-9/11 Era

Second Edition

Volume 1 -3

James Ciment, Editor

of Political V iolence fr om Ancient T imes to the Post-9/11 Era Second Edition Volume

First published 2011 by M.E. Sharpe

Published 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright © 2011 Taylor & Francis. All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Notices No responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use of operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the material herein.

Practitioners and researchers must always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating and using any information, methods, compounds,or experiments described herein. In using such information or methods they should be mindful of their own safety and the safety of others, including parties for whom they have a professional responsibility.

Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

World terrorism: an encyclopedia of political violence from ancient times to the post-9/11 era / James Ciment, editor—2nd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7656-8284-0 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Terrorism—History—Encyclopedias. I. Ciment, James.

HV6431.W67 2011

363.32503—dc22

2011006073

ISBN 13: 9780765682840 (hbk)

Contents

VOLUME 1

France: Anarchism, 1880s–1890s France: Anti-German Resistance,

73

Alphabetical List of Entries

xi

1940–1945

75

Editors and Contributors

xv

France: Paris Commune, 1871

77

Introduction

xix

France: Revolution, 1789–1815 France and Italy: German Occupation,

79

Definitions, Types, and Categories

1

1940–1945

82

 

Germany: Waffen SS, 1939–1945

85

Introduction

3

Germany: World War II Atrocities and

Problems of Defining Terrorism

7

Crimes, 1939–1945

88

Domestic vs. International Terrorism

14

Germany and Japan: War Crimes Trials,

Ethnonationalist Terrorism

17

1945–1948

90

Islamist Fundamentalist Terrorism

22

India: Anti-British Struggle, 1900–1947

92

Left-Wing and Revolutionary Terrorism

26

Ireland: Independence Struggle,

Religious (Non-Islamist) Terrorism

29

1916–1923

96

Right-Wing and Reactionary Terrorism

33

Japan: Atomic Bomb, 1945

98

State vs. Nonstate Terrorism

35

Macedonia: Anti-Turkish Resistance,

Urban vs. Rural Terrorism

37

1893–1939

101

Historical Roots—Terrorism Through

Middle East, Middle Ages: Assassins’ Cult

103

World War II

39

Norway: German Occupation, 1940–1945

105

Introduction

41

Ottoman Empire (Turkey): Armenian Massacres and Genocide, 1894–1896,

Ancient World: Greece and Rome

43

1914–1916

107

Asia, Middle Ages: Mongols

47

Palestine, British: 1920–1947

110

Asia and the Pacific: Japanese Occupation,

Romania: Nazi Collaboration, 1940–1942

117

1931–1945

49

Russia: Anarchism, 1878–1881

119

British Empire: Counterterrorism Before

Russia: Civil War, 1917–1921

121

1945

52

Soviet Union: Stalinism, 1928–1953

123

Eastern Europe and Soviet Union:

Soviet Union: Wartime Atrocities and

Anti-German Resistance, 1939–1945

54

Crimes, 1941–1945

125

Eastern Europe and Soviet Union: German Occupation, 1939–1945

56

United States: Conflict with Native Americans, Seventeenth to Nineteenth Centuries

127

Europe: Holocaust, 1933–1945

58

United States: Molly Maguires,

Europe, Middle Ages

62

1860s–1870s

129

Europe and Japan: German and Allied

World War I: Assassination at Sarajevo,

Bombing, 1939–1945

65

1914

131

European Colonial Expansion Conquests, Eighteenth to Twentieth Centuries

69

World War I: Atrocities, 1914–1918 Yugoslavia: Anti-German Resistance,

134

Finland: Civil War, 1918

71

1941–1945

136

v

vi

|

Contents

Modern Terrorism—The Post–World War II Era

139

Introduction

141

Afghanistan: Rise of the Taliban, 1990s

144

Afghanistan: Soviet War, 1979–1989

146

Afghanistan: Terrorist Haven Under the Taliban, 1994–2001 Afghanistan: U.S. Invasion and War,

148

2001–Present

151

Algeria: Fundamentalist Conflict,

1980s–Present

157

Algeria: Liberation War Against France,

1954–1962

162

Angola: Civil and Separatist Wars,

1975–2000s

164

Argentina: Leftist Terrorism and the “Dirty War,” 1960s–1980s

167

Bahrain: Shiite Struggle, 1980s–Present

171

Bosnia: Civil Conflict, 1991–1995

173

Brazil: Military Dictatorship, 1964–1985 Cambodia: Genocide and Civil Conflict,

177

1975–1978

180

Canada: International Terrorism,

1970s–Present

184

Canada: Quebec Separatism, 1960s–1970s Central Asian Republics: Islamist Terrorism,

187

1991–Present

190

Chile: Coup and Dictatorship, 1965–1989 China: Uighur and Muslim Unrest,

196

1990s–Present

199

Colombia: Guerrilla Warfare and Narco- Terrorism, 1960s–Present Cyprus: Anti-British Struggle,

202

1954–1958

209

Egypt: Fundamentalist Struggle,

1980s–2000s

211

El Salvador: Civil War, 1970s–1992

217

Eritrea: Anti-Ethiopian Struggle and Somali Civil War, 1961–2000s

220

France: Ethnic, Nationalist, and Separatist Struggles, 1960s–1990s

224

France: Islamist Terrorism, 1990s France: Left-Wing Terrorism and Activism,

228

1970s–2000s

229

France: Response to Anti-Colonial Struggles,

1946–1962

232

France: Right-Wing Terrorism,

1960s–1990s

234

Germany, West: Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Gang), 1960s–1980s

Anti-French Conflict, 1946–1954

235

Greece: Civil War, 1944–1953

239

Greece: Domestic and International Terrorism, 1973–2000s

241

Guatemala: Civil War, 1960s–1996

245

India: Kashmir Struggle, 1947–Present

249

India: Sikh Nationalism, 1970s–1990s

254

Indochina (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam):

258

Indonesia: Islamist Militancy, 1990s– Present

260

Iran: Revolution and Postrevolution Violence, 1970s–Present Iran: State Sponsorship of Terrorism,

264

1980s–Present

269

Iraq: Saddam Hussein Regime, 1968–2003 Iraq: State Terrorism Against the Kurds,

273

1968–2003

278

Iraq: U.S. Invasion and Post-Saddam Hussein Era, 2003–Present Israel/Palestine: Jewish Terrorism,

280

1940s–Present

284

Israel: Raid on Entebbe, 1976

290

Israel: Raids on the PLO, 1960s–1980s

293

Israel: Response to Terrorism, 1948– Present

295

Israel: War of Independence, 1948–1949

301

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1960s–Present

304

Italy: Red Brigades, 1969–1984 Japan: Aum Shinrikyo Terrorism,

309

1980s–1990s

313

VOLUME 2

 

315

Japan: Radical Attacks, 1960s–1980s Jordan: Palestinian Nationalism and Islamic Fundamentalism, 1960s–2000s

317

Kenya: Mau Mau Uprising, 1952–1956

322

Contents

|

vii

Kenya and Tanzania: Embassy Bombings,

Rwanda: Genocide, 1994–2000s

427

1998

324

Saudi Arabia: Domestic and International

Korea: Korean War, 1950–1953

327

Terrorism, 1980s–2000s

430

Korea, North: WMD Threat, 1980s–Present

331

Serbia: Kosovo Conflict, 1990s

435

Lebanon: Civil War, 1975–1990

334

Sierra Leone: Civil War, 1997–2002

438

Lebanon: Hezbollah, 1982–Present

339

Somalia: Failed State Conflict and Rise of

Lebanon: Post–Civil War Era, 1987–Present Libya: State Sponsorship of Terrorism,

343

Islamist Militants, 1977–2000s South Africa: Antiapartheid Struggle,

441

1970s–2000s

346

1948–1994

445

Malaysia (Malaya): Anti-British Conflict,

South Africa: Postapartheid Violence,

1948–1960

351

1994–2000s

449

Mexico: Narco-Terrorism, 2000s–Present

353

Spain: Conflict with ETA, 1959–2000s

452

Mexico: Zapatista Uprising, 1994–2000s Namibia: Anti–South African Struggle,

357

Spain: Islamist Terrorism, 2004 Sri Lanka: Tamil Tiger Uprising, Late

458

1960–1990

360

1970s–2009

461

Nepal: Maoist Uprising, 1996–2006

362

Sudan: Conflicts in South Sudan and Darfur,

Nicaragua: Revolution and Counter-

Late 1950s–2000s

466

revolution, 1974–1990 Nigeria: Antigovernment Violence and

366

Sudan: Terrorist Haven, 1989–2000s Syria: State Sponsorship of Terrorism,

470

Christmas Day Bomber, 1960s–2000s

370

1979–2000s

473

Pakistan: Islamist Struggle, 1947–Present

374

Timor Leste (East Timor): Independence

Palestine: Beginning of International

Struggle, 1975–2002

476

Terrorism, 1968–1970

380

Turkey: Kurdish Struggle, 1984–2000s

480

Palestine: Birth of Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization, 1948–1969

382

Uganda: Lord’s Resistance Army and Other Terrorist Groups, 1996–2001

485

Palestine: First Intifada, 1987–1992

389

Uganda: State Terrorism Under Idi Amin,

Palestine: Islamist Fundamentalism,

1971–1979

489

1980s–Present

392

United Kingdom: Decolonization and Post-

Palestine: PLO and the Arab States,

Decolonization Struggles, 1945–1970s

491

1970s–Present

397

United Kingdom: Islamist Terrorism,

Palestinian Terrorism: Hijacking of the

2000s

495

Achille Lauro, 1985

401

United Kingdom: Northern Ireland

Palestinian Terrorism: Raids on Kiryat

Troubles, 1968–2000s

498

Shmona and Ma’alot, 1974

404

United States: Animal Rights, 1970s–2000s

506

Peru: Shining Path and Leftist Uprisings,

United States: Anthrax Attacks, 2001

508

1970s–2000s

406

United States: Antiabortion Violence,

Philippines: Marxist and Islamist Struggles,

1973–Present

510

1940s–2000s

412

United States: Aryan Nations and White

Portuguese Africa (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique): Liberation

Supremacists, 1970s–2000s United States: Black Panther Violence,

513

Struggles, 1961–1975

418

1966–1971

514

Russia/Soviet Union: Ethnic and Nationalist Conflict in the Transcaucasus Region and

United States: Ecoterrorism, 1980s–2000s United States: Ku Klux Klan Violence,

516

Ukraine: 1980s–2000s

420

1860s–1990s

518

Russia: Chechnya Conflict, 1994–Present

422

United States: Millennium Bomb Plot, 1999

520

viii

|

Contents

United States: Oklahoma City Bombing

Imprisonment and Legal Status of Detainees 611

and the Militia Movement, 1990s

521

Torture

614

United States: Puerto Rican Separatism,

U.S. Economic Impact

617

1950s–1980s

525

Victim Relief

619

United States: Response to Terrorism Before

Security and Defense

620

September 11: 1960s–2001

527

Airport Security

621

United States: Symbionese Liberation Army

Armed Forces Missions

624

Violence, 1970s

532

Homeland Defense: Organization

United States: Tax Protesters, 1970s–Present United States: Weathermen Violence,

534

and Policy Hunt for al-Qaeda and Terrorist Networks,

626

1960s–1970s

536

2001–Present

631

United States: World Trade Center Bombing,

Pursuit and Death of Osama bin Laden,

1993

538

1998–2011

636

Uruguay: Tupamaro Uprising, 1960s–1985

540

Immigration Policy and Border Defense

639

Venezuela: Guerrilla Uprising, 1962–1979

544

Intelligence Community: Pre-9/11

Vietnam: American War, 1959–1975

547

Failures and Successes

640

Yemen: Civil War and Islamist Terrorism,

Intelligence Community: Response to 9/11

641

1990s–2000s

551

Legislation

646

Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): Liberation Struggle and

National Guard Missions

648

Postliberation Violence, 1965–2000s

555

Special Events Security

650

 

Terror Threat Warnings

651

September 11, 2001—Attacks and Response

559

VOLUME 3

Introduction

561

Tactics, Methods, and Aims of Modern

Al-Qaeda

568

Terrorism

655

Bin Laden, Osama

573

Emergency Response: Police, Firefighters,

Introduction

657

and Medical Personnel

576

Assassination

660

The Hijackers

579

Collaboration Among Terrorists

664

Media Coverage

581

Cyberterrorism and Information Warfare

666

National Political Response

583

Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime

New York City and State Political Response 585

Connections

670

Shock and Mourning

586

Freelance, Contract, and Lone Zealot

Victims and Survivors

587

Terrorists

673

International Reaction

589

Hijacking

678

Global Economic Impact

591

Ideological Orientations: Anti-Western

U.S. Aid and Relief

593

and Anti-U.S.

683

U.S. Foreign Policy

594

Internet, Terrorist Use of

685

U.S. Foreign Relations

597

Kidnapping and Extortion

688

Political, Legal, and Social Issues

602

Mass-Casualty Attacks and Strategic Targets

693

Anti-Muslim Sentiment

603

Media Coverage and Manipulation

696

Civil Liberties, Civil Rights, and National

Money: Raising, Laundering, and Transfer

700

Security

605

Organization of Terrorist Groups

705

Cleanup and Rebuilding

608

Psychology of Terrorists

707

Government Spying and Privacy Issues

610

Recruitment and Training

710

Contents

|

ix

Safe Havens, Terrorist

715

International Law and the War on Terrorism

774

State-Sponsored Terrorism

719

Law Enforcement, Counterterrorist

777

Suicide Attacks

723

Media and Propaganda in Counterterrorism

780

Victims, Use of

728

Special Operations

782

Weapons, Chemical and Biological

732

Technology, Terrorist and Counterterrorist

786

Weapons, Conventional

738

U.S. Response to Weapons of Mass

Weapons, Nuclear and Radiological

742

Destruction

788

Counterterrorism

745

Appendices Chronology of Major Terrorist Events:

791

Introduction

747

1945–2011

793

Asymmetric Warfare

750

Directory of Terrorist Groups and

Drone Attacks and Assassinations,

Individuals

837

Counterterrorist

754

Glossary

875

Financial Counterterrorism

757

Hostage Negotiations

760

Bibliography

889

Intelligence, Counterterrorist

762

Index

I-1

International Cooperation Against Terrorism

767

Page Intentionally Left Blank

Alphabetical List of Entries

Afghanistan: Rise of the Taliban, 1990s

144

Cyberterrorism and Information Warfare

666

Afghanistan: Soviet War, 1979–1989 Afghanistan: Terrorist Haven Under the Taliban,

146

Cyprus: Anti-British Struggle, 1954–1958

209

1994–Present

148

Definitions, Types, and Categories: Introduction

3

Afghanistan: U.S. Invasion and War,

Domestic vs. International Terrorism

14

2001–Present

151

Drone Attacks and Assassinations,

Airport Security

621

Counterterrorist

754

Algeria: Fundamentalist Conflict, 1980s–Present

157

Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime

Algeria: Liberation War Against France,

Connections

670

1954–1962

162

Al-Qaeda

568

Eastern Europe and Soviet Union: Anti-German

Ancient World: Greece and Rome

43

Resistance, 1939–1945

54

Angola: Civil and Separatist Wars, 1975–2000s

164

Eastern Europe and Soviet Union: German

Anti-Muslim Sentiment (post–9/11)

603

Occupation, 1939–1945

56

Argentina: Leftist Terrorism and the “Dirty War,”

Egypt: Fundamentalist Struggle, 1980s–2000s

211

1960s–1980s

167

El Salvador: Civil War, 1970s–1992

217

Armed Forces Missions (post–9/11)

624

Emergency Response: Police, Firefighters,

Asia, Middle Ages: Mongols Asia and the Pacific: Japanese Occupation,

47

and Medical Personnel (9/11) Eritrea: Anti-Ethiopian Struggle and Somali

576

1931–1945

49

Civil War, 1961–2000s

220

Assassination

660

Ethnonationalist Terrorism

17

Asymmetric Warfare

750

Europe: Holocaust, 1933–1945

58

 

Europe, Middle Ages

62

Bahrain: Shiite Struggle, 1980s–Present

171

Europe and Japan: German and Allied Bombing,

Bin Laden, Osama

573

1939–1945

65

Bosnia: Civil Conflict, 1991–1995

173

European Colonial Expansion Conquests,

Brazil: Military Dictatorship, 1964–1985

177

Eighteenth to Twentieth Centuries

69

British Empire: Counterterrorism Before 1945

52

 

Financial Counterterrorism

757

Cambodia: Genocide and Civil Conflict,

Finland: Civil War, 1918

71

1975–1978

180

France: Anarchism, 1880–1890s

73

Canada: International Terrorism, 1970s–Present

184

France: Anti-German Resistance, 1940–1945

75

Canada: Quebec Separatism, 1960s–1970s

187

France: Ethnic, Nationalist, and Separatist

Central Asian Republics: Islamist Terrorism,

Struggles, 1960s–1990s

224

1991–Present

190

France: Islamist Terrorism, 1990s

228

Chile: Coup and Dictatorship, 1965–1989

196

France: Left-Wing Terrorism and Activism,

China: Uighur and Muslim Unrest,

1970s–2000s

229

1990s–Present

199

France: Paris Commune, 1871

1946–1962

77

Civil Liberties, Civil Rights, and National Security (post–9/11)

605

France: Response to Anti-Colonial Struggles,

232

Cleanup and Rebuilding (post–9/11)

608

France: Revolution, 1789–1815

79

Collaboration Among Terrorists Colombia: Guerrilla Warfare and Narco-

664

France: Right-Wing Terrorism, 1960s–1990s France and Italy: German Occupation,

234

Terrorism, 1960s–Present

202

1940–1945

82

Counterterrorism: Introduction

747

Freelance, Contract, and Lone Zealot Terrorists

673

xi

xii

|

Alphabetical List of Entries

Germany: Waffen SS, 1939–1945

85

Iraq: U.S. Invasion and Post-Saddam Hussein Era,

Germany, West: Red Army Faction (Baader-

2003–Present

280

Meinhof Gang), 1960s–1980s

235

Ireland: Independence Struggle, 1916–1923

96

Germany: World War II Atrocities and Crimes,

Islamist Fundamentalist Terrorism

22

1939–1945

88

Israel: Raid on Entebbe, 1976

290

Germany and Japan: War Crimes Trials,

Israel: Raids on the PLO, 1960s–1980s

293

1945–1948

90

Israel: Response to Terrorism, 1948–Present

295

Global Economic Impact (of 9/11)

591

Israel: War of Independence, 1948–1949

301

Government Spying and Privacy Issues

Israel/Palestine: Jewish Terrorism, 1940s–Present

284

(post–9/11)

610

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1960s–Present

304

Greece: Civil War, 1944–1953 Greece: Domestic and International Terrorism,

239

Italy: Red Brigades, 1969–1984

309

1973–2000s

241

Japan: Atomic Bomb, 1945

98

Guatemala: Civil War, 1960s–1996

245

Japan: Aum Shinrikyo Terrorism, 1980s–1990s

313

 

Japan: Radical Attacks, 1960s–1980s

315

The Hijackers (9/11)

579

Jordan: Palestinian Nationalism and Islamic

Hijacking

678

Fundamentalism, 1960s–2000s

317

Historical Roots—Terrorism Through World War II: Introduction

41

Kenya: Mau Mau Uprising, 1952–1956

322

Homeland Defense: Organization and Policy

626

Kenya and Tanzania: Embassy Bombings, 1998

324

Hostage Negotiations

760

Kidnapping and Extortion

688

Hunt for al-Qaeda and Terrorist Networks,

Korea: Korean War, 1950–1953

327

2001–Present

631

Korea, North: WMD Threat, 1980s–Present

331

Ideological Orientations: Anti-Western

Law Enforcement, Counterterrorist

777

and Anti-U.S.

683

Lebanon: Civil War, 1975–1990

334

Immigration Policy and Border Defense

639

Lebanon: Hezbollah, 1982–Present

339

Imprisonment and Legal Status of Detainees

Lebanon: Post-Civil War Era, 1987–Present

343

(post–9/11)

611

Left-Wing and Revolutionary Terrorism

26

India: Anti-British Struggle, 1900–1947

Anti-French Conflict, 1946–1954

92

Legislation (security and defense, post–9/11)

646

India: Kashmir Struggle, 1947–Present

249

Libya: State Sponsorship of Terrorism,

India: Sikh Nationalism, 1970s–1990s

254

1970s–2000s

346

Indochina (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam):

Indonesia: Islamist Militancy, 1990s–

258

Macedonia: Anti-Turkish Resistance, 1893–1939 Malaysia (Malaya): Anti-British Conflict,

101

Present

260

1948–1960

351

Intelligence Community: Pre-9/11 Failures

Mass-Casualty Attacks and Strategic Targets

693

and Successes

640

Media and Propaganda in Counterterrorism

780

Intelligence Community: Response to 9/11

641

Media Coverage (9/11)

581

Intelligence, Counterterrorist

762

Media Coverage and Manipulation

696

International Cooperation Against Terrorism

767

Mexico: Narco-Terrorism, 2000s–Present

353

International Law and the War on Terrorism

774

Mexico: Zapatista Uprising, 1994–2000s

357

International Reaction (to 9/11)

589

Middle East, Middle Ages: Assassins’ Cult

103

Internet, Terrorist Use of

685

Modern Terrorism—The Post–World War II Era:

Iran: Revolution and Postrevolution Violence,

Introduction

141

1970s–Present

264

Money: Raising, Laundering, and Transfer

700

Iran: State Sponsorship of Terrorism,

1980s–Present

269

Namibia: Anti–South African Struggle,

Iraq: Saddam Hussein Regime, 1968–2003

273

1960–1990

360

Iraq: State Terrorism Against the Kurds,

National Guard Missions (post–9/11)

648

1968–2003

278

National Political Response (to 9/11)

583

Alphabetical List of Entries

|

xiii

Nepal: Maoist Uprising, 1996–2006

362

New York City and State Political Response (to 9/11) Nicaragua: Revolution and Counterrevolution,

585

1974–1990

366

Nigeria: Antigovernment Violence and Christmas Day Bomber, 1960s–2000s

370

Norway: German Occupation, 1940–1945

105

Organization of Terrorist Groups

705

Ottoman Empire (Turkey): Armenian Massacres and Genocide, 1894–1896, 1914–1916

107

Pakistan: Islamist Struggle, 1947–Present Palestine: Beginning of International Terrorism,

374

1968–1970

380

Palestine: Birth of Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization, 1948–1969

382

Palestine, British: 1920–1947

110

Palestine: First Intifada, 1987–1992 Palestine: Islamist Fundamentalism,

389

1980s–Present

392

Palestine: PLO and the Arab States,

1970s–Present

397

Palestinian Terrorism: Hijacking of the Achille Lauro, 1985

401

Palestinian Terrorism: Raids on Kiryat Shmona and Ma’alot, 1974 Peru: Shining Path and Leftist Uprisings,

404

1970s–2000s

406

Philippines: Marxist and Islamist Struggles,

1940s–2000s

412

Political, Legal, and Social Issues (post–9/11) Portuguese Africa (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea- Bissau, Mozambique): Liberation Struggles,

602

1961–1975

418

Problems of Defining Terrorism

7

Psychology of Terrorists Pursuit and Death of Osama bin Laden,

707

1998–2011

636

Recruitment and Training

710

Religious (Non-Islamist) Terrorism

29

Right-Wing and Reactionary Terrorism

33

Romania: Nazi Collaboration, 1940–1942

117

Russia: Anarchism, 1878–1881

119

Russia: Chechnya Conflict, 1994–Present

422

Russia: Civil War, 1917–1921

121

Russia/Soviet Union: Ethnic and Nationalist Conflict in the Transcaucasus Region and Ukraine: 1980s–2000s

420

Rwanda: Genocide, 1994–2000s

427

Safe Havens, Terrorist

Introduction

715

Saudi Arabia: Domestic and International Terrorism, 1980s–2000s

430

Security and Defense (post–9/11)

620

September 11, 2001—Attacks and Response:

561

Serbia: Kosovo Conflict, 1990s

435

Shock and Mourning (post–9/11)

586

Sierra Leone: Civil War, 1997–2002

438

Somalia: Failed State Conflict and Rise of Islamist Militants, 1977–2000s South Africa: Antiapartheid Struggle,

441

1948–1994

445

South Africa: Postapartheid Violence,

1994–2000s

449

Soviet Union: Stalinism, 1928–1953 Soviet Union: Wartime Atrocities and Crimes,

123

1941–1945

125

Spain: Conflict with ETA, 1959–2000s

452

Spain: Islamist Terrorism, 2004

458

Special Events Security

650

Special Operations Sri Lanka: Tamil Tiger Uprising, Late

782

1970s–2009

461

State vs. Nonstate Terrorism

35

State-Sponsored Terrorism

719

Sudan: Conflicts in South Sudan and Darfur, Late 1950s–2000s

466

Sudan: Terrorist Haven, 1989–2000s

470

Suicide Attacks Syria: State Sponsorship of Terrorism,

723

1979–2000s

473

Tactics, Methods, and Aims of Modern Terrorism:

Introduction

657

Technology, Terrorist and Counterterrorist

786

Terror Threat Warnings Timor Leste (East Timor): Independence Struggle,

651

1975–2002

476

Torture (post–9/11)

614

Turkey: Kurdish Struggle, 1984–2000s

480

Uganda: Lord’s Resistance Army and Other Terrorist Groups, 1996–2001 Uganda: State Terrorism Under Idi Amin,

485

1971–1979

489

United Kingdom: Decolonization and Post- Decolonization Struggles, 1945–1970s

491

United Kingdom: Islamist Terrorism, 2000s United Kingdom: Northern Ireland Troubles,

495

1968–2000s

498

xiv

|

Alphabetical List of Entries

United States: Animal Rights, 1970s–2000s

506

Urban vs. Rural Terrorism

37

United States: Anthrax Attacks, 2001

508

Uruguay: Tupamaro Uprising, 1960s–1985

540

United States: Antiabortion Violence,

U.S. Aid and Relief (post–9/11)

593

1973–Present

510

U.S. Economic Impact (of 9/11)

617

United States: Aryan Nations and White

U.S. Foreign Policy (post–9/11)

594

Supremacists, 1970s–2000s

513

U.S. Foreign Relations (post–9/11)

597

United States: Black Panther Violence,

U.S. Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction

788

1966–1971

514

United States: Conflict with Native Americans,

Venezuela: Guerrilla Uprising, 1962–1979

544

Seventeenth to Nineteenth Centuries

127

Victim Relief (post–9/11)

619

United States: Ecoterrorism, 1980s–2000s

516

Victims, Use of

728

United States: Ku Klux Klan Violence,

Victims and Survivors (of 9/11)

587

1860s–1990s

518

Vietnam: American War, 1959–1975

547

United States: Millennium Bomb Plot, 1999

520

United States: Molly Maguires, 1860s–1870s

129

Weapons, Chemical and Biological

732

United States: Oklahoma City Bombing and the

Weapons, Conventional

738

Militia Movement, 1990s

521

Weapons, Nuclear and Radiological

742

United States: Puerto Rican Separatism,

World War I: Assassination at Sarajevo, 1914

131

1950s–1980s

525

World War I: Atrocities, 1914–1918

134

United States: Response to Terrorism Before September 11: 1960s–2001

1960s–1970s

527

Yemen: Civil War and Islamist Terrorism,

United States: Symbionese Liberation Army

1990s–2000s

551

Violence, 1970s

532

Yugoslavia: Anti-German Resistance,

United States: Tax Protesters, 1970s–Present

534

1941–1945

136

United States: Weathermen Violence,

536

Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): Liberation Struggle and

United States: World Trade Center Bombing,

Postliberation Violence, 1965–2000s

555

1993

538

General Editor

James Ciment

First Edition and Supplement Editors

Martha Crenshaw John Lalla (documents)

John Pimlott

Contributors

Jeffrey A. Adams

Ashley Brown

Anser Analytic Services, Inc.

Independent Scholar

Kristian Alexander

Javed Ali

Robert P. Anderson

Steve Brumwell

Zayed University (Abu Dhabi,

Independent Scholar

United Arab Emirates)

Robert J. Bunker Independent Scholar

Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute

Independent Scholar

Cenap Cakmak Eskisehir Osmangazi University, Turkey

R. Scott Appleby University of Notre Dame

Peter Calvert University of Southampton, United Kingdom

Raymond Picquet Frank G. Shanty

Russell Crandall

Davidson College

William Cuddihy

Independent Scholar

Gregor Dallas

Independent Scholar

Michael Dartnell Laurentian University, Canada

Joseph L. Derdzinski U.S. Air Force Academy

Richard Drake University of Montana

James David Ballard California State University, Northridge

Steven Camarota Center for Immigration Studies

Sophal Ear Naval Postgraduate School

Christopher J. Baxter Independent Scholar

Gavin Cameron University of Calgary, Canada

James O. Ellis, III Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism

Nigel Cawthorne

Ian F.W. Beckett

Independent Scholar

John Erickson

University College, Northampton,

Independent Scholar

United Kingdom

Richard J. Chasdi Wayne State University

Riccardo Fabiani

John Bowyer Bell Independent Scholar

Irwin M. Cohen

Independent Scholar

Simon Fraser University, Canada

Fred Feer

Mark S. Bittinger

Independent Scholar

Science Applications International

John Collis

Corporation

Independent Scholar

John Finlayson University of Leeds

Tore Bjorgo Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Christopher W. Cook Independent Scholar

Peter A. Flemming Independent Scholar

John Cooley

James Borders U.S. Air Force Academy

Independent Scholar

Chrism Flood University of Surrey, United Kingdom

W.B. Brabiner

Raymond R. Corrado Simon Fraser University, Canada

Hugo Frey

Independent Scholar

University of Surrey, United Kingdom

xv

xvi

|

Contributors

Noemi Gal-Or

Colin Jones

Edward Mickolus

Kwantlen Polytechnic University, Canada

Queen Mary University, University of London, United Kingdom

Independent Scholar

John Gearson King’s College, University of London,

James T. Kirkhope Council for Emerging National

Mark C. Milewicz Gordon College

United Kingdom

Security Affairs

R.

Reuben Miller

Allison J. Gough Hawai’i Pacific University

Tadashi Kuramatsu Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan

University of Colorado, Denver

T. Lindsay Moore

U.S. Naval War College

James Gow King’s College, University of London,

Michael L. Largent Independent Scholar

Tim Moreman

United Kingdom

Independent Scholar

Rohan Gunaratna Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Karen Y. Lau Independent Scholar

Matthew A. Levitt

David Morgan University of Wisconsin

Michael M. Gunter Tennessee Tech University

Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Peter Morris University of Exeter, United Kingdom

Nadine J. Gurr Independent Scholar

David E. Long Independent Scholar

Angus Muir University of St. Andrews, United Kingdom

Henry Longstreet

Russell A. Hart Hawai’i Pacific University

Independent Scholar

Wayman C. Mullins Texas State University

Stephen A. Hart Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst,

Robert Looney Naval Postgraduate School

Salvador Jimenez Murguia Miyazaki International College, Japan

United Kingdom

Leah Wilds Magennis University of Nevada, Reno

Vivek C. Narayanan

Christopher Hewitt University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Stephen C. Malone Independent Scholar

International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

Bruce Hoffman University of St. Andrews, United Kingdom

M. Christopher Mann Independent Scholar

Daria J. Novak ERUdlyne LLC

Chris Marshall

James G. Otte

Elaine M. Holoboff

Nick Hostettler

Independent Scholar

Independent Scholar

King’s College, University of London, United Kingdom

Queen Mary University, University of London, United Kingdom

Evan Mawdsley University of Glasgow, United Kingdom

Thomas G. Otte University of the West of England, United Kingdom

Neil Partrick

Kimberly A. McCloud Monterey Institute of International

Independent Scholar

Matthew Hughes

Studies

Independent Scholar

Stewart S. Johnson

Douglas G. McKenzie Grand Valley State University

Donald A. Pearson Independent Scholar

California State University, Los Angeles

George Michael

Gary Perlstein Portland State University

Independent Scholar

Contributors

|

xvii

Sarah E. Peter Independent Scholar

Alex P. Schmid University of St. Andrews, United Kingdom

Rhiannon M. Talbot University of Newcastle, United Kingdom

Raymond Picquet

Independent Scholar

Julian Schofield Concordia University, Canada

Amin Tarzi Marine Corps University

John Pimlott

Independent Scholar

Stephen Prince Naval Historical Branch of the

Theo J. Schulte Anglia Ruskin University, United Kingdom

John G. Taylor South Bank University, United Kingdom

Royal Navy’s Naval Staff, United Kingdom

Marcus Schulzke State University of New York, Albany

Helene Thibault University of Ottawa, Canada

Robert Pringle

John Thompson

Independent Scholar

Frank Shanty

Mackenzie Institute

Cobra Institute

Chris Quillen Advanced Technical Intelligence Center

Antony B. Shaw Independent Scholar

Heinz Tittmar Queen’s University, Belfast, United Kingdom

Martyn Rady University College London, United Kingdom

Michael J. Siler California State University, Los Angeles

Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay University of Victoria, Canada

Jorge Ramirez

Matthew H. Wahlert

Independent Scholar

Ajith Silva

Miami University, Ohio

Independent Scholar

Surinder Rana Naval Postgraduate School

Priyanthi Silva

Paul Wallace University of Missouri

Westat Inc.

Magnus Ranstorp Swedish National Defence College,

Gregory Simpson

James Walsh JFK School of Government,

Sweden

Independent Scholar

Harvard University

Jean-Francois Ratelle

Joshua Sinai

Steve Weiss

University of Ottawa, Canada

Virginia Polytechnic Institute

Independent Scholar

Andrew Rathmell

and State University

Ian Westwell

Libra Advisory Group

Elizabeth Skinner Naval Postgraduate School

Independent Scholar

Bertrande Roberts

Paul Wilkinson

Independent Scholar

Stephen Sloan University of Oklahoma

University of St. Andrews, United Kingdom

Manuel S. Romo Santa Rosa Community College

Andrew Douglas Stewart

Lee Wolosky

Independent Scholar

Independent Scholar

Jeffrey Ian Ross University of Baltimore

John P. Sullivan Center for Advanced Studies on

Paul Szuscikiewicz

Malgorzata Zachara Jagiellonian University, Poland

Thomas M. Sanderson Center for Strategic and International Studies

Terrorism

Independent Scholar

Page Intentionally Left Blank

Introduction

Terrorism is a term that defies easy definition. It is at once elusive and protean. It can be so inclusive as to encompass virtually any act of violence or threat of violence—war, crime, bullying—or exclusive to the point of applying only to those actions undertaken by one’s enemies—as the old saying goes, “one person’s ter- rorist is another person’s freedom fighter.” The term also varies according to who is using it, as Alex Schmid points out in his essay, “Problems of Defining Terrorism.” Aca- demics apply one meaning, governments another, the public and media still a third, and the terrorists—or agents of terrorism—yet another. Terrorism’s meaning has also changed over the course of history. Because this encyclopedia aims at comprehensiveness —across time, geography, and the conceptual landscape —it applies the broadest definition of terrorism: the use of violence or the threat of violence to effect political change through fear, in which the victims of the violence (to take one example, those who died in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks) are not necessarily the same as the targets of the violence (the U.S. populace at large). By instilling mass fear in that target populace, the 9/11 terrorists aimed to bring about change in the policies of the U.S. government that spoke for that populace, specifi- cally, change to its policies in the Middle East. In short, terrorism as understood by the editors of this encyclopedia is an operational term rather than an ideological one, a means to an end rather than the end itself. One of the most difficult questions facing anyone attempting to put together a survey of terrorism over the span of history and across the ideological spectrum is whether the agents of terrorism must be exclusively nonstate agents or can include those acting on behalf of governments. We have opted to include both, as long as the operational parameters described above are met. As Schmid points out, this makes sense in a text that attempts to cover terrorism from ancient times through the present, as the term “terrorism,” when given its modern political meaning at the time of the French Revolution, was applied exclusively to the state. Thus, in the historical portion of these volumes there are articles on Robespierre’s reign of terror, the violence associated with European colonial expansion and conquest, and the Holocaust, all perpetrated by state actors. As the ency-

clopedia explores terrorism in the post–World War II era, however, the term takes on its more widely accepted, contemporary interpretation—violence perpetrated by nonstate agents. The encyclopedia is divided into six parts. The first— titled Definitions, Types, and Categories—provides essays that attempt to explain the meaning of terrorism, as well as the various ways terrorist methods have been exploited by different kinds of groups, be they religious, ethnonationalist, or ideological. There are also essays that explore the differences between domestic and in- ternational terrorism, urban versus rural terrorism, and terrorism committed by state versus nonstate actors. Two subsequent sections cover terrorism through the course of history, the former exploring the period through the end of World War II and the latter taking up the subject from 1945 through the present day, minus the September 11 terrorist attacks, which are the subject of their own section. The portion of the encyclopedia devoted to September 11 is divided into subsections discussing the attacks; the international reaction to the attacks; the legal, social, and political issues associated with the attacks; and security and defense questions that the attacks raise. The portion that follows focuses on the means and ends of modern terrorism, especially since the 1990s, and the rise of transnational terrorism groups, such as al-Qaeda. Essays explore terrorist methods, mo- tivations, tactics, and strategies. Finally, the last section examines the ways in which national governments and the international community have tried to investigate, prosecute, and punish those who commit or conspire to commit terrorist acts, as well as preventive measures to stop such actions from taking place. This work also includes a number of ancillary ma- terials, including a chronology of terrorist events since 1945, a directory of major terrorist groups and the most significant terrorists of the modern era, and a general bibliography. The encyclopedia also contains an index of names, events, terms, concepts, and so forth. Each article contains its own list of useful sources for those seeking to do further reading and research on the topic, as well as cross references to other related articles.

James Ciment

xix

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D E F I N I T I O N S ,

T Y PE S ,

A N D C AT EG OR I E S

Page Intentionally Left Blank

Definitions, Types, and Categories:

Introduction

During the last half of the twentieth century, terror- ism became recognized as a major problem in domestic and international affairs. Almost every country in the world had experienced this type of political crime and violence, though some areas and actors were more ex- tensively targeted and affected than others. The prob- lem intensified in the first decade of the twenty-first century, most notably in a series of mass-casualty at- tacks on the West that began with the September 11, 2001, terrorist assaults on New York and Washington, D.C. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf conflict, the election of Nelson Mandela, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian peace accords—all in the 1980s and early 1990s—a number of issues that had led to persistent political con- flict came to an end. Consequently, many observers and analysts hoped that oppositional political terrorism was a thing of the past and might even end altogether. The Oklahoma City bombing and the sarin gas at- tack in the Tokyo subway, both in 1995, and frequent suicide bombings by Hamas in Israel renewed interest in terrorism among governments, the media, and the public. Then came 9/11, when four planes were hijacked, by members of Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization, and slammed into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a rural field in Pennsylvania causing, in total, close to 3,000 deaths. In the years since those attacks, terrorism has come to dominate the news, especially in the wake of large-scale attacks abroad and failed attempts here in the United States. Today one cannot pick up a newspaper or watch or listen to a newscast without seeing or hearing some refer- ence to terrorism. Predictably, many people are becoming exhausted with the continuing coverage of the 9/11 attack or are waiting for the other shoe to drop.

Confusion over the Term

In most quarters, terrorism is like a baseball umpire’s reasoning: “I calls ’em as I sees ’em.” Indeed, terror- ism has become a value-laden term. Phrases such as “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” are often used by reporters, policy makers, politicians, and many academics to clarify situations and at other times to muddy them. This approach can be regarded as the “relativity” definition. It implies, political scientist Alex Schmid states, that “all attempts to formulate the concept will be hopelessly compromised by essentially

3

arbitrary personal or political bias. Consequently, any analysis based on such dubious conceptual foundations will be distorted and most likely vacuous.” Indeed, the proper definition of terrorism has drawn

considerable debate. As terrorism expert Peter C. Seder-

berg puts it, “A variety of problems

to develop an analytically useful definition of terrorism. First, an understandable, but confusing, tendency to in- termingle explanation, justification, and condemnation mars many definitions. Second, the confusion between the action (terrorism), the actors (the terrorists) and the effect (terror) detracts from the ability to distinguish be- tween terrorism and the larger class of coercive behavior of which it is a part. In this regard, definitions should focus on the act, and recognize that issues of actors and effects are areas for inquiry, not definitional attributes.” Bruce Hoffman and David Claridge in their article, “The Rand-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorist and Noteworthy Domestic Incidents, 1996,” expressed this same view as the basis of their definition, which stated in part: “terrorism is defined by the nature of the act not by the identity of the perpetrator or the nature of the cause.” Subsequent writers have also adopted this viewpoint. Similarly, Thomas H. Mitchell, a political scientist by training, suggests that “the term terrorism itself contains an implicit condemnation”; it “is a profoundly heterogeneous phenomenon”; “a definition of terrorism must clearly establish what terrorism is not”; and “a definition of terrorism must take into account the con- stantly changing nature of tactics, targets, and strategies, as well as the impact of technological innovations such as new techniques of media coverage and advanced types of weapons.” One reason for the definitional confusion is that ter- rorism invokes extreme emotions such as fear, anger, and rage. Another problem is that there appear to be many different types of terrorism, which may confuse the casual observer into assuming that they lack an overall unify- ing theme. Mitchell suggests that “many scholars who undertake research on terrorism tend either to regard the development of a general definition as a hopeless endeavor and simply dodge the issue by embracing” the relativity definition or to “blithely devise a narrow operational definition suitable to the requirements of their specific methodology or approach.” According to Jonathan White, professor of criminal justice at Grand Valley State University in Michigan, “no

impede our efforts

4

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Definitions, Types, and Categories

definition or approach to American terrorism is gener- ally accepted and the practical implications are very real. The lack of a social or legal definition creates problems. American police and security agencies literally do

not know what terrorism

countering domestic terrorism often have no idea what they are looking for.” In addition, there is a tendency for overinclusivity of both groups labeled terrorist in nature and actions that are interpreted as terrorism. For example, the same so-called culprits are repeatedly mentioned by many scholars and commentators. Some of these groups (e.g., Industrial Workers of the World, Skinheads, Jewish De- fense League) are not necessarily terrorist organizations but are instead largely political, racist, nationalist, or religious groups with a minority of their members, often without leadership or group approval, engaged in terrorist actions. Similarly, other analysts use vague, overinclusive labels to classify actions as terrorism and encourage the reader to infer from their analysis that some groups such as pro-choice, gay rights, feminist, and American nation- alists could very well have been terrorists. This kind of approach is problematical in view of the lack of evidence that the actions of such groups meet the criteria of most definitions of terrorism. We must also be cautious about affixing the terrorist label to groups that are more appropriately identified as political organizations, and we must be cautious about linking particular nationalities with terrorism. For example, contrary to popular conception, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is not a terror- ist organization. It is better understood as a governing institution of various Palestinian factions ranging from educational and health-related bodies to the more military wings (e.g., Fatah). Thus, labeling the PLO a terrorist group is a misnomer—in contrast to organizations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine— General Command. Calling the Irish Republican Army a terrorist group is also problematical because it consists of not only a political but also a military/terrorist wing:

the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Similarly, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia car- ries out the Armenian terrorist struggle, and Dal Khalsa historically conducts Sikh terrorism. Because these struggles are nationalist oriented, an alternative reference would be the use of national- ist categories: Palestinian, Irish, Armenian, and Sikh nationalist-related terrorism. The problem with this approach, however, is that if we identify nationalities as terrorist, we run into the difficulty of unnecessarily fueling prejudices (subtle or overt), including profiling and stereotyping, or infusing racism and bias into our identification and decision making. Not every person from Latin America, for example, is a narco-terrorist, nor is each Arab, Muslim, or Palestinian a terrorist. Unfor-

Agencies charged with

tunately, there have been many recent examples of such loose categories being used in counterterrorist security programs. Poorly constructed and ineptly applied, these categories are often little better than stereotypes or worse, particularly in the wake of 9/11, with the use of large- scale security screening at airports. In short, it is wrong to “judge a book by its cover.” Moreover, many terrorist organizations include members from diverse nationali- ties. Thus, focusing on one nationality to the exclusion of others may unnecessarily prevent antiterrorist agencies from properly scrutinizing appropriate suspects. Finally, categorically linking a nation to terrorist organizations may tend to imply, for some, that members of particular nations and their citizens condone terrorist actions. Where does this leave us? Perhaps if we understand the context of terrorism, we can better appreciate a defi- nition that has a wide applicability.

A Contextual Understanding

What is political terrorism? One of the earliest distinc- tions was developed by Frederick J. Hacker, a psychia- trist and world-renowned expert on terrorism and ag- gression. He suggested that terrorists can be divided among three types of perpetrators: criminals, crazies, and crusaders. This categorization reflects a distinc- tion among perpetrators who primarily have a criminal intent, individuals who are mentally unbalanced, and those who have political or ideological motivations. This is not to suggest that periodically terrorist orga- nizations will not engage in criminal activities or that among their ranks they may not have some mentally disturbed individuals, but for the most part terrorist organizations are concerned with achieving political or ideological goals. Terrorism is also a subset of political violence just like war, revolution, guerrilla warfare, a coup d’état, low-intensity warfare, violent protests, and riots. It is also a type of criminal violence much like homicide or sexual assault. Finally, terrorism is a subset of political crime, like corruption, sedition, espionage, and human rights violations. So, in order to understand terrorism, we need to use an interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary approach integrating, at the very least, the fields of psychology, history, sociology, criminology, political science, and law. The above discussion locates the phenomena, but it is still not a definition. Alternatively, we can examine what the experts, sometimes pejoratively referred to as “terrorologists,” have to say. We all know, however, that if you speak to 100 specialists, you will get a multiplicity of different definitions. In the early 1980s, Alex Schmid conducted an exhaustive analysis of fifty experts’ defini- tions of terrorism. He concluded that there is no “true or correct definition.” Nevertheless, he developed a five-part consensus definition, which will serve our purpose.

Introduction

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5

According to Alex Schmid,

Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as an instrumental target of violence. These instrumental victims share group or class characteristics which form the basis for their selection for victimization. Through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence, other members of that group or class are put in a state of chronic fear (terror). This group or class, whose members’ sense of security is purposefully undermined, is the target of terror. The victimization of the target of violence is considered extranormal by most observers from the witnessing audience on the basis of its atrocity, the time (e.g., peacetime) or place (not a battlefield) of victimization, or the disregard for rules of combat accepted in conventional warfare. The norm violation creates an attentive audience beyond the target of terror; sectors of this audience might in turn form the main object of manipulation. The purpose of this indirect method of combat is either to immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary targets of demands (e.g., a government) or targets of attention (e.g., public opinion) to changes of attitude or behaviour favouring the short- or long-term interests of the users of this method of combat.

Schmid’s definition has garnered a considerable amount of respect from scholars and policy makers. Although he subsequently proposed two revisions—one responding to difficulties critics had with the original 1983 consensus definition and another revised, short legal definition, which equates a terrorist act as the peacetime equivalent of a war crime—many terrorism experts prefer the original formulation, which has distinct advantages. With a few clarifications, the original definition meets the purposes of most researchers, policy makers, and prac- titioners. With two qualifications, this conceptualization meets my purposes. First, not all five elements must exist for an action or a campaign to be labeled terrorism, and second, violent attacks on nonhuman “symbolic” targets, having the other essential traits and objects, should also be considered acts of terrorism. The implication here is that, if indeed a relatively ac- ceptable definition has been constructed, statements like “One man’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter” should probably be interpreted as too relativistic—and thereby rejected.

Illegal Behaviors Confused with Terrorism

Another issue that should be addressed in this context is the role of drug trafficking and the illegal sales of arms, legal documents (e.g., passports), and currencies to fi-

nance terrorist groups. Although these criminal activi- ties may be used to support terrorist organizations, these actions are “not by themselves a terrorist act without the inclusion of the element of premeditated violence. Taking a hostage for ransom in order to finance terror- ist activity, on the other hand, is a terrorist act, because it involves violence”—and the presumed political goals (e.g., to ultimately bring about some sort of political or social change) associated with or subsumed by the group’s primary raison d’être.

September 11 and Beyond

In the aftermath of 9/11, U.S. national security and law enforcement agencies are still struggling with a proper definition of terrorism. This operational diffi- culty, however, has not prevented them from launch- ing a massive counterterrorism offensive supported by enabling legislation in the form of the USA PATRIOT Act. The fruits of these efforts will be felt in the im- mediate future. Although some have suggested that the act of 9/11 is a mass murder and that the perpetrators, if caught, should be charged with committing a war crime, the consensus of the world community’s response to 9/11 has at least shown international acceptance for labeling acts of this level of violence as terrorism. Similarly, claims made by the perpetrators for “freedom fighter” status have been summarily rejected. A substantial segment of the inter- national community has agreed that the perpetrators are terrorists; generating this global consensus is the horrible nature of their act, regardless of any arguments, which the planners and supporters have articulated to justify their actions. Can the international community’s response to the horrors of 9/11 be used to help develop an internation- ally accepted definition of “terrorism”? At least it should be clear that when the shock of an act goes beyond any conceivable threshold of decency or humanity or when it reaches the level of violence of 9/11, the act must be condemned and punished as terrorism by the interna- tional community.

Conclusion

The events of 9/11 appear to satisfy all five criteria of the Schmid definition: the World Trade Center and Pentagon were highly symbolic targets in every respect, both in personnel and facility; it induced a high state of fear throughout the country and abroad, given the daily obituaries of victims in the New York Times and other media; the victimization was by all accounts extraordi- nary; it created a global audience; and it communicated to secondary audiences, such as the U.S. government, the American public, and the Arab and Muslim worlds. Also, none of these criteria violates the two suggested qualifications to the definition mentioned in this article.

6

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Definitions, Types, and Categories

Therefore, we can say that the act was indeed one of terrorism—and that our conceptual definition would meet with consensus. The question now becomes: What has the 9/11 experience provided in the way of validat- ing the definition and the common understanding of the phenomenon? Certainly, it must add to the public’s sense of what it is—even if it is merely akin to the Su- preme Court justice’s comment about pornography: “I can’t define it, but I know what it is when I see it.” Is it not possible that 9/11 has sufficiently seared the public conscience to stimulate unprecedented levels of pressure on both politicians and jurists, both domestically and abroad, to develop a more straightforward understand- ing of the issue and, thereby, more focused and practi- cal applications (i.e., international, trans-ethnonational, and cross-cultural counterterrorism programs) against the perpetrators? Perhaps, but in the wake of 9/11 it appears that a universally acceptable definition of ter- rorism, which is still an important international need, is unfortunately more the problem of some scholars and philosophers than of national security personnel.

Jeffrey Ian Ross

See also: Definitions, Types, Categories—Domestic vs. Interna- tional Terrorism; Ethnonationalist Terrorism; Islamist Fun- damentalist Terrorism; Left-Wing and Revolutionary Terror- ism; Religious (Non-Islamist) Terrorism; Right-Wing and Reactionary Terrorism; State vs. Nonstate Terrorism; Urban vs. Rural Terrorism. Tactics, Methods, Aims—Freelance, Con- tract, and Lone Zealot Terrorists.

Further Reading

Bell, J. Bowyer. “Trends in Terror: The Analysis of Political Violence.” World Politics 29:3 (1997): 447–81. Hacker, Frederick J. Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in Our Time. New York: W.W. Norton, 1976.

Herman, Edward S., and Gerry O’Sullivan. The Terrorism Indus- try. New York: Pantheon, 1989. Hoffman, Bruce, and David Claridge. “The Rand-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism and Noteworthy Domestic Incidents, 1996.” Terrorism and Political Violence 10 (2): 135–80. Hudson, Rex A. Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism. New York:

Nova Science, 2010. Lia, Brynjar. Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions. New York: Routledge, 2005. Livingstone, Neil C. The Cult of Counter-terrorism. Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1990. Mitchell, Thomas H. “Defining the Problem.” In Democratic Responses to International Terrorism, ed. David Charters, 9–16. Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 1991. Ross, Jeffrey Ian. The Dynamics of Political Crime. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002. Sageman, Marc. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty- first Century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,

2008.

Schmid, Alex P. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature. New Brunswick, NJ:

Transaction Books, 1983. Schmid, Alex P., and A.J. Longman. Political Terrorism: A Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature. Rev. ed. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2005. Sederberg, Peter C. Terrorism: Contending Themes in Contemporary Research. New York: Garland, 1991. Stern, Jessica. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. New York: HarperCollins, 2004. Vetter, Harold J., and Gary R. Perlstein. Perspectives on Terrorism. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1991. Wardlaw, Grant. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter- measures. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. White, Jonathan. Terrorism: An Introduction. Pacific Grove, CA:

Brooks/Cole, 1991.

Problems of Defining Terrorism

“Terrorism” is used by different people to describe dif- ferent things. As a label for acts of violence, it reflects negatively on those who are labeled as terrorists. In this sense, the term “terrorist” is comparable to other insult- ing terms in the political vocabulary, such as “racist,” “fascist,” or “imperialist.” Used carelessly, such terms often lose their original meanings and become part of the rhetoric of insults exchanged between political opponents. If one side in a dispute can characterize the enemy in a negative way, and

so win public opinion over to their point of view, they

will not hesitate to do so. Hence the saying “One man’s

terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”

While the use of a word like “terrorism,” as a means

of political insult, is now widespread practice, it is highly

unsatisfactory from both a moral and a legal point of view. Language ought to be a tool for careful thinking, not an instrument of propaganda. It is important to arrive at a clear definition of terrorism. Only then can we be certain

of what is meant by the word, and then design laws to

punish the terrorists.

Origin of the Term

By looking at the uses of the term “terrorism” and at the acts of violence attributed to individual terrorists, terrorist groups, and terrorist organizations, it should be possible to find a precise definition. It is useful to examine the historical origin of the word “terrorism” before moving on to a clarification of its modern mean-

ing, and to place acts of terrorism in the broader context

of political actions and legal practice.

“The purpose of terrorism is to produce terror,” dryly noted Vladimir Lenin, the Russian communist leader responsible for the Red Terror of 1917–1921. Terrorists produce, or aim to produce, terror—extreme fear—among their opponents. Although the word “ter- ror” is of Latin origin (from terrere, to frighten), it entered modern Western vocabularies only in the fourteenth century through the French language. The first English usage was recorded in 1528. The basic mechanism of terror was captured in an ancient Chinese proverb: “Kill one, frighten ten thousand.”

Terror as an Instrument of Government

A clearly political meaning was given to the word dur-

ing the French Revolution. In 1793, France’s revolution- ary government found itself threatened by aristocratic

emigrants who conspired with foreign rulers to invade the country. At the same time, treason at home in sup-

7

port of this reactionary move was suspected. The French legislature, the National Convention—led by a radical faction, the Jacobins, under Maximilien Robespierre— adopted a policy of terror on August 30, 1793, ordering mass executions of suspected traitors. The newspaper Courier de l’Égalité approved: “It is necessary that the terror caused by the guillotine spreads in all of France and brings to justice all the traitors. There is no other means to inspire this terror that will consolidate the Revolution. The Jacobin club has mas- sively adopted this measure—a universal enthusiasm has manifested itself following this order, which will probably mark one of the greatest periods of our history.” Originally conceived as a tool to combat subversion by those who supported the former king and the monarchy, the Terror soon began to make victims of those who had originally been supporters of the Revolution and the republic established after the downfall of the monarchy. Former allies of the Jacobins perished in the wave of executions. The moderate “Indulgents” under Georges Danton and the extremist left-wing “Hébertists” both fell victim to Robespierre’s campaign. Altogether, at least 300,000 people were arrested during the Terror (August 30, 1793–July 27, 1794). Of these, 17,000 were officially executed, but many other people died in prison, often without a trial. Those who had originally supported the harsh mea- sures proposed by Robespierre against counterrevolu- tionaries began to fear for their own lives and conspired to overthrow him. They could not accuse him of terreur (terror) because they themselves had earlier declared terror to be a legitimate instrument of government. Therefore, they accused Robespierre of terrorisme (terrorism), a word that suggested illegal conduct. For this, Robespierre and his associates were guillotined on July 17 and 28, 1794. The political pendulum had finally swung back, and now the agents and partisans of the revolutionary tribunals were termed “terrorists” and thrown into prison.

Terror as Propaganda by the Deed

The term “terrorism” spread fast throughout Europe, into Russia, and even into India. As it spread, the word changed its meaning. By the late nineteenth century, the term “terrorist,” originally used for those who made unjust mass arrests in the name of the state, became more strongly associated with antistate violence. The violent French and Russian anarchists of the 1880s and 1890s were the main groups responsible for this shift in meaning.

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Definitions, Types, and Categories

If the guillotine that beheaded enemies of the Revo- lution had been the symbol of state terror at the end of the eighteenth century, the bomb that exploded in the midst of the political elite became the hallmark of nineteenth- century terrorism. The bomb and the assassin’s pistol were used for two purposes. The so-called exemplary deed directed at government ministers, parliamentarians, and judicial officers was intended to spread terror among state officials. Such violent acts, especially for the Rus- sian terrorists of the period, were also part of a program to bring about political change. The Russian anarchists’ goal was to arouse the masses by acts of violence against targets with a high symbolic value, such as police chiefs or members of the royal family. Terrorist violence used in this way becomes a means of communication. “Propaganda by the deed” was how nineteenth-century revolutionaries, such as the German John Most, described the value of terrorism as a form of communication. Both aims of terrorist murder were established in the late nineteenth century. They were later picked up by post-1945 terrorist groups and remain in use today.

Altered Meanings

The meanings of the words “terror” and “terrorism” have altered only slightly since the late nineteenth century, but the change is significant. In the 1890 edition of Webster’s International Dictionary, the word “terror” is de- fined as “extreme fear, fear that agitates body and mind, violent dread; fright.” As a second meaning Webster’s lists “that which excites dread; a cause of extreme fear.” Today, Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary covers essentially the same meanings, listing: “intense fear; a person or thing that causes intense fear;” but has the important additions: “a period characterized by political executions, as during the French Revolution; a program of terrorism or a party, group, etc. resorting to this.” For “terrorism,” the modern Webster’s dictionary offers the following: “a terrorizing; use of terror and violence to intimidate, subjugate, etc. especially as a political weapon or policy; intimidation and subjugation so produced.” There is some dispute among scholars of the precise meaning of adding the suffix “-ism” to the word “terror” to produce the word “terrorism.” The “-ism” suffix is sometimes added to a word to refer to the theoretical level of a political doctrine. Familiar examples of this include the conversion of “liberal” to “liberal- ism” and “social” to “socialism.” A more practical use of the suffix is where it refers to a manner of acting or an attitude, such as when “fanatic” becomes “fanaticism.” Both meanings have been applied to the word “terror- ism.” While a few experts attribute a doctrinal quality to terrorism, far more define it as a manner of acting or as a method of action. However, the historical root of the “-ism” suffix in

“terrorism” refers to neither of these two possibilities. It originated in the excessive abuse of violence under the Terror of the French Revolution. Because there have been numerous other reigns of terror since the French Revolu- tion, the term “terror” has become increasingly detached from this specific historical period (1793–1794). It has become a generic term applied to regimes that rule by a fear caused by unjust mass arrests and arbitrary trials and executions in which the guilt of the individual matters less than the political intimidation of the populace.

Psychology of Terrorism

The basic purpose of terrorism is to produce terror in a target audience. A civilian population at large may be targeted, or police officers or government officials may be targeted to deter them from carrying out their duties. It is important, therefore, to look at the psychological dimension of terror. However, remarkably little of the literature on terrorism has paid much attention to terror as a state of mind. Only in the more recent literature on hostages has the experience of being terrorized received some attention. When terrorists are able to organize a series of acts of violence into a campaign of terror, they manage to maximize fear. Repeated acts of violence make the ques- tion “Will I be next?” loom large in the minds of target audiences. The suicide-bomber attacks in Israel carried out by the Palestinian Hamas group in 1996 provoked exactly this response among Israelis. When the targeted population is in near panic and confusion, the desired psychological impact has been achieved. Depending on the setting of terrorist acts, prospec- tive victims may be shocked by numbing fear—as in a hostage situation when the deadline for an ultimatum approaches. Alternatively, those who have witnessed a shooting or bombing may panic and flee at the mere hint of a terrorist attack, to avoid becoming victims.

Natural Anxiety Versus Terrorism

The fear created by terrorist acts is not the same as the chronic anxiety caused by natural disasters. Natural di- sasters strike with little warning and have random ef- fects. A pervasive atmosphere of anxiety can exist in the minds of those who live in the shadow of a volcano, near an earthquake fault, or beside a dam. But such natural terror is likely to be less intense than human-made ter- ror, although both are responses to situations in which survival is in doubt. More terrifying than natural terror are wartime or criminal acts, such as mass bombings or armed robbery. Here, however, terror is to some extent an unintended by-product of violence. Only when violence is used to intimidate a wider audience than those immediately af- fected can we speak of terrorism in its pure form. The victim of a terrorist attack is not necessarily

Problems of Defining Terrorism

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the same thing as the target. The choice of the victim may be almost random. A police officer may be gunned down, unaware of the political situation the terrorists are fighting, while a colleague who holds antiterrorist views is ignored. A government building administering social security payments may be bombed because it is easy to park a truck outside it in the street, even though no law enforcement activity takes place within. These victims are chosen to reach a wider target audience that identifies in one way or another with the victim. For a single killing to have a widespread effect, terrorist violence has to be attention grabbing or in some way extraordinary. This impact can be created in a num- ber of ways. The victim may be a particularly famous or prominent person. The method of attack may involve an unusual form of criminal ingenuity. The location of the attack may be important or may involve a maximum number of observers, such as during the Munich Olympic Games of 1972 or the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta. The number of potential victims may be very large, as in the case of the thousands of people affected by the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York. Finally, the ruthlessness of the act may be particularly striking, as was the Oklahoma bombing, which killed fifteen children in

a day care center, among others. In classic terrorist assassinations—as opposed to purely criminal ones—there is a distinct difference be- tween the target and victim. The actual victim of the violence is not the real target of this violence. Individuals, consciously or unconsciously, often identify themselves with people who are prominent in the press or on television. This identification may be made on the basis of shared opinions, or more superficially because of good looks or an attractive manner. In the popular imagination, these people become symbols. When these symbols are hurt, the people who hold them dear share the hurt. The symbol may be a charismatic leader who embodies the aspirations of the followers, such as the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. If the leader is killed, the followers are deprived of their object of identification. They experience a variety of feelings, ranging from grief and powerlessness to outrage and terror. However, the symbolic victim does not have to be

a prominent person. A terrorist attack on a building or religious ceremony, such as the Vietcong assault on the U.S. embassy in Saigon during the 1968 Tet Offensive, can have even stronger effects. The identification felt by the larger audience is normally directed toward the victims. This is especially the case if the victims were in an everyday situation, such as riding on a bus. It may prompt members of the audience to think “it could have been me or my child.” However, if the victim is perceived as a guilty person or organization—perhaps a dictator or an army of occupation—the attack is likely to produce feelings

of relief among those who have suffered because of the victim. Some people might then identify with the terror- ists themselves, seeing them as heroic martyrs who risk their lives to confront an evil force. Terrorism not only

produces terror in an opponent, but it can also produce enthusiasm in the opposite camp, as is indicated in the quote from the Courier de l’Égalité mentioned earlier. This also brings us back to the saying that “one man’s terrorist

is another man’s freedom fighter.” Basques whose desire

for national autonomy was denied by Spanish dictator

Francisco Franco supported nationalist terrorists.

Judging Terrorists

People judge terrorism by making a comparison either with crimes or with warfare. Those who use comparisons

with criminal acts regard terrorism as illegal. Police, for example, are authorized by law to arrest and imprison

a person, but a terrorist group abducting someone and

holding him or her for ransom has no such approval. The effect in both cases, however, is to deprive a person of his or her liberty. Using a comparison with warfare, on the other hand, draws on the famous statement by the Prus- sian officer Karl von Clausewitz: “War is a continuation of politics by other means.” A political activist who turns to terrorist violence in a struggle against an oppressive regime becomes a “freedom fighter” in a war for liberty. However, these frameworks used by ordinary people tend to become blurred by politicians and scholars of political violence. All too often people make their choice between the war model and the crime model, not on logical grounds, but based on their own opinions of the ethnic or political dispute. For instance, a person from the same ethnic group as the government may share the view that the terrorists are criminals, while a person from the ethnic group of the terrorists may instinctively think of them as soldiers at war. Such contrasting psychological standards do not work well in moral and intellectual terms when judging acts of violence. The reactions of the opposing extremes do not make for calm discussion. There is little or no common ground to offer room for negotiation. In a community divided by acts of terror, such as Northern Ireland, the fact remains that acts of violence are aimed at only one section of society.

Four Views of Terrorism

The objectivity of any discussion of terrorism is limited

by the relationship of the participants to terrorist acts. It

is possible to distinguish four different groups who take

a view of terrorism, each with its own merits. Academics attempt to take an entirely objective view. Ideally, universities offer an intellectual forum in which scholars can discuss terrorism without either being at- tacked by terrorists or being suspected of sympathizing with terrorists.

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Definitions, Types, and Categories

Governments, in contrast, are frequent victims of terrorist activity. The official view of terrorism is pre- sented by press secretaries whose statements are colored by the knowledge that those they represent may become

involved in fighting terrorism. The public may change its opinion dramatically in response to a single incident. In open societies, its view

is articulated and influenced through the media.

The views of the terrorists and their sympathizers reflect the beliefs of people who think they live under a repressive government.

Academic View

When scholars look at terrorism, the distance they can keep from the conflict should allow them an objective perspective. Academics should pursue an intellectual, but not a moral, neutrality between terrorists and vic- tims for the purpose of investigation. The academic

culture of curiosity, skepticism, and methodical inquiry can lead to a more independent, nonpartisan assessment than is usually possible elsewhere. Scholars from various universities have come close to agreement on a definition of terrorism. In 1984, an analysis was made of more than 100 existing definitions.

A new one was drawn up and circulated. The comments

and criticisms made on this were used to amend it until 81 percent of scholars approached could partially, or even fully, agree on it. The resulting academic definition of terrorism was finalized in 1988.

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.

Although the definition is rather long and clumsy, the core elements are now generally accepted. Brian Jenkins, one of the pioneers of empirical research on terrorism, noted in 1992 that “a rough consensus on the meaning of terrorism is emerging without any interna- tional agreement on the precise definition.” However,

this consensus is more obvious among academics than among politicians and civil servants.

Official View

A precise but lengthy definition such as the one devel-

oped by scholars is not likely to be used by governments.

Government officials tend to be clearer and harsher in their views, being actively engaged in countering ter- rorist activity—and being victims of it. The British government was one of the first to at- tempt to draw up a legal definition that distinguishes

a terrorist act from a criminal act. In 1974, the United Kingdom government concluded that “for the purposes of

the legislation, terrorism is the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public, in fear.” This British definition is extremely broad and could be interpreted to include conventional war as well as limited nuclear strikes. The 1975 European Trevi definition (named after

a fountain in Rome near which European ministers of justice and the interior deliberated on terrorism) has been modeled on the British definition, except that it excludes war: “Terrorism is defined as the use, or the threatened use, by a cohesive group of persons of violence (short of warfare) to effect political aims.” The European Convention to Combat Terrorism (1977) did not use any definition of terrorism. It simply listed a number of crimes that would make those com- mitting them liable to extradition from one country to another. However, this avoidance of the problem was no solution—as various controversies concerning extradition have made clear ever since. In 1985, the West German Office for the Protection

of the Constitution stated, “Terrorism is the enduringly

conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended

to

be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property

of

other persons, especially by means of severe crimes as

detailed in article 129a, section 1 of the penal code (mur- der, homicide, extortionist kidnapping, arson, setting off

a blast by explosives) or by means of other acts of violence, which serve as preparation of such criminal acts.” The U.S. government has never issued a formal definition, but its government agencies have proposed unofficial definitions. The Central Intelligence Agency was one of the first, in 1976, with this definition of international terrorism: “The threat or use of violence for political purposes when (1) such action is intended

to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group

wider than its immediate victims, and (2) its ramifica- tions transcend national boundaries (as a result, for example, of the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetra- tors, its locale, the identity of its institutional or human victims, its declared objectives or the mechanics of its resolution).”

Problems of Defining Terrorism

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Over the years, the wording of CIA definitions has fluctuated. In 1980, for instance, terrorism was defined as “the threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for, or in opposi- tion to, established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to shock or intimidate a large group wider than the immediate victims.” In 1983, the U.S. Army used this definition of ter- rorism: “The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals political or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instill- ing fear.” Also in 1983, the Federal Bureau of Investigation used this wording: “Terrorism is defined as the unlaw- ful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian popula- tion, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political and social objectives.” However, the most influential American definition has turned out to be the one proposed by the U.S. Depart- ment of State in 1984. Terrorism was defined as “premedi- tated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” One element that kept recurring in U.S. government debates on defining terrorism was whether or not attacks on U.S. military personnel could be labeled terrorist. On October 23, 1983, 241 American Marines died in their barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, when a suicide bomber in a truck crashed through the base’s security perimeter. Was this terrorism, or was the label “terrorism” to be reserved for attacks against noncombatant civilians? The U.S. Department of State solved this dilemma by interpreting the term “noncombatants” to “include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty.” It also considers “as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against U.S. bases in Europe, the Philippines, or elsewhere.” The many U.S. definitions show that the official discourse varies as circumstances change. At the same time, they share a large common ground.

Public View

The image of terrorism in the media is different from those already examined. A survey among twenty editors of news agencies, television and radio stations, and the press, mostly from Western Europe, provided the fol- lowing responses in answer to the question: “What kind of (political) violence does your medium commonly la- bel terrorism?” The answers show agreement in labeling some but not other acts of violence as terrorism. While the Europe-

Percentage of Editors Using Label “Terrorism”

Type of Violence

Percentage

Hostage-Taking

80

Assassination

75

Indiscriminate Bombing

75

Kidnapping

70

Hijacking for Coercive Bargaining

70

Urban Guerrilla Warfare

65

Sabotage

60

Torture

45

Hijacking for Escape

35

an Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism assumes

that all hijackings are acts of terrorism, editors make a distinction between a hijacking for escape and one for coercive bargaining. In this particular case, the majority

of editors appear closer to the experience of the victims

than do the drafters of the European Convention.

Hijacking Imagine the situation in which an aircraft is hijacked and the hijacker asks the pilot to fly to a different

country than that of the original flight destination. In this instance, the passengers will probably feel less ter- rorized than when the hijacker demands the liberation

of 700 prisoners by a country that may not even be the

home base of the airliner. In the first case, the pilot can,

by altering course, escape the threat of violence. In the

second case, the attitude or behavior of the pilot and crew does not matter, only the behavior of the govern- ment being blackmailed. In the second example, the term “terrorist” is more appropriate since the random victims cannot affect the outcome by compliance with demands.

Kidnapping

In the same way, a kidnapping can be either a terrorist

act or a crime. When, out of personal greed, a kidnapper asks for money in exchange for an abducted millionaire, the situation is clearly criminal. The crime becomes ter- rorism when political concessions are asked from a gov- ernment in return for the victim, as was the case with the German industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer, who was abducted by the Red Army Faction in 1977.

Political Murder

A similar distinction can be made when it comes to

murders of politicians or civil service workers. Criminal political assassinations kill an opponent whose policies are different from those of the murderer. The aim of the murder is simply to remove a rival from the scene. The assassination of President Abraham Lincoln is an exam- ple of this kind of murder. A terrorist political assas- sination, on the other hand, involves more parties than

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Definitions, Types, and Categories

the killer and victim. There is the perpetrator, who may act alone or as part of a conspiracy. Then there is the victim of the attack. Finally, there is the target audience at whom the terrorist message or demand delivered by the killing is aimed. There is a difference, in all political terrorism, between the target of violence and the target of terror. The target of violence is the person who is attacked; the target of terror is the larger audience, whom the terrorist hopes to influence. In a terrorist murder, one victim can be easily substituted for another because the effect on the wider audience is what really counts. Those who study terrorism distinguish between a criminal and a terrorist assassination by labeling the first “individuated” political murder and the second “de-individuated” political murder. In the case of indi- viduated murder, the victim is chosen as an individual, usually one who knows the opponents and the potential threat before being killed. In the case of de-individuated murder, the victim is chosen because of the post he or she holds and is often unaware of being a target. The attack is completely unexpected. This unexpectedness is also the deeper reason why terrorism terrorizes. It does so because the victims are caught by surprise; they are generally victimized arbi- trarily and without apparent provocation. Suddenly, they and those around them are struck with terror. In this form, terror becomes a state of mind. Terrorism intentionally produces a state of extreme anxiety among possible targets of attack, who fear be- coming victims of arbitrary violence. Terrorists exploit this emotional reaction to manipulate the wider target audience.

Terrorists’ View

Those involved in terrorism and those who support ter- rorists have a very different viewpoint from all other observers. While in the late nineteenth century many Russian anarchist and socialist bomb throwers did not shrink from being labeled terrorists, this is not the case with contemporary terrorists and their sympathizers. They are aware of the stigma of being called terrorists and so try to avoid the label. During a conference on terrorism organized in Leiden, the Netherlands, in 1989, graffiti was painted by a group calling themselves the Revolutionary Com- mando Marinus van de Lubbe. The group was named after a Dutch communist convicted by the Nazis of a terrorist arson attack on the German parliament in the 1930s, a crime of which he was almost certainly innocent. The Revolutionary Commando sent a letter to the local newspaper expressing solidarity with what they claimed were oppressed people in, among other places, Palestine, Ireland, Central America, and Kurdistan. They wrote, “It is clear that so-called terrorism is the logical and just

resistance of the people against state terrorism, capital- ism, racism, sexism, and imperialism.” Apologists for terrorism often attempt to counter moral objections by comparing their own violence with real or alleged examples of violence by their opponents. By making such a comparison, terrorists and their sup- porters try to place their aims and actions on the same moral level as those of their government enemies. Terrorist groups also use propaganda to achieve the moral high ground in the public’s view. They hope that the public or foreign governments might then put pres- sure on the government or organization they are fighting. To do this, they attempt to justify both themselves and their actions at the same time as putting blame on their opponents. In World War II, the German occupation forces labeled all members of resistance groups as “terrorists”; the latter, however, thought of themselves as patriots and freedom fighters. The attempt to justify acts whose moral standing is doubtful is part and parcel of the terrorist campaign. The father of modern state terror, Maximilien Robespierre, justified his brutal actions in his February 1794 declaration: “Terror is nothing else than immediate

justice, severe, inflexible; it is therefore an outflow of vir- tue, it is not so much a specific principle as a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to the most pressing needs of the motherland.” Nearly 100 years later, in 1879, the Russian terrorist underground organization the People’s Will described terrorism in rather more instrumental terms: “Terrorist activity consists of the destruction of the most harm- ful persons in the government, the protection of the People’s Will from spies, and the punishment of official lawlessness and violence in all the more prominent and important cases where it is manifested. The aim of such activity is to break down the prestige of government, to furnish continuous proof of the possibility of pursuing

a contest with the government, to raise in that way the

revolutionary spirit in the people and, finally, to form a

body suited and accustomed to warfare.” Both of these definitions—by terrorists themselves— emphasize their ultimate aims rather than their tactics. Generally, terrorists try to avoid a discussion of their tactics because this would help label them as criminals; they much prefer a discussion that places their struggle

in a framework of a war for political ends. When the lan- guage describing terrorism used concentrates on crime,

it raises questions of legitimacy very different from when

the terminology of war is used to describe terrorism.

Terrorism as War Crime

Which definition of terrorism is correct? Generally, a good definition of a difficult subject is one with which most people can agree. Many people will object to a broad definition—such as “terrorism is violence for po-

Problems of Defining Terrorism

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litical purposes”—for the simple reason that it turns most practitioners of violence into terrorists. In con- trast, a lengthy academic definition may be too detailed to be of much practical use. An agreed-upon definition could help governments cooperating to stamp out inter- national terrorism by establishing a universal standard that would reduce differences between national codes of law. Such a legal definition already exists for other con- troversial acts, such as war crimes, and there is broad international agreement about what actions should be considered war crimes. A look at how this agreement developed on what defines a war crime may help set up a model for international collaboration against terrorists. Included among the acts considered war crimes are attacks on persons taking no active part in hostilities. This also includes members of the armed forces who have surrendered. This protection of the noncombatant stands at the core of international humanitarian law as codified in The Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions. The rules of war prohibit not only the use of violence against captives but also hostage taking and most of the other acts committed by terrorists. Terrorists have, in fact, elevated practices that are considered crimes in war situations to the level of routine tactics. They do not engage in open combat, as do soldiers. Instead, they prefer to strike against the unarmed. Injury to the defenseless is not an accidental side effect but a deliberate strategy of terrorists. Categorizing acts of terrorism as war crimes is also ap- propriate in the sense that terrorists consider themselves as being at war with their opponents. What makes them different from soldiers is that terrorists do not carry their arms openly nor discriminate between armed adversaries and noncombatants. Because terrorists are not fighting by the rules of war, they are, for all practical purposes, war criminals. Like war crimes, acts of terrorism distinguish themselves from conventional warfare, and to some extent from guerrilla warfare, through the disregard of principles of humanity contained in the accepted rules of war.

Best Definition

If the international community could agree upon a legal definition of acts of terrorism as “peacetime equivalents of war crimes,” a more uniform treatment of terrorists would become possible. A narrow definition of terror- ism, placing it on a par with war crimes, excludes some forms of violence and coercion, such as certain types of attacks on the military and destruction of property, which are currently labeled terrorism by some govern- ments. However, this type of narrow and precise defini-

tion of terrorism is likely to find broader acceptance than one that includes a wider variety of violent protest. Lesser forms of political violence, such as vandal- izing an opponent’s home, are already outlawed by na- tional legislation. Terrorist offenses could be considered international crimes, requiring special treatment. If a definition were accepted that stressed the tactics and not the ends, nobody would be able to confuse terrorists and freedom fighters. Freedom fighters who adhere to the rules of warfare should be treated like soldiers. Those freedom fighters who target civilians, on the other hand, should be dealt with as war criminals. The same categorization applies to those soldiers acting on behalf of a government. A desirable cause does not excuse acts of violence against unarmed civilians and neutral bystanders. By placing narrowly defined acts of terrorism in the same category as war crimes, confusion over whether violence is criminal or political will be minimized. Where national authorities are unable or unwilling to deal with such acts, these could be dealt with, as in the case of war crimes, by a special international penal court with power over terrorist offenses as well as other crimes against humanity.

Alex P. Schmid

See also: Definitions, Types, Categories—Domestic vs. Interna- tional Terrorism; Ethnonationalist Terrorism; Islamist Fun- damentalist Terrorism; Left-Wing and Revolutionary Terror- ism; Religious (Non-Islamist) Terrorism; Right-Wing and Reactionary Terrorism; State vs. Nonstate Terrorism; Urban vs. Rural Terrorism. Tactics, Methods, Aims—Psychology of Terrorists.

Further Reading

Fattah, E.A. Terrorist Activities and Terrorist Targets: A Tentative Typology. New York: Pergamon, 1981. Groth, A. “A Typology of Revolution.” In Revolution and Politi- cal Change, ed. C.E. Welch and M.B. Taintor. Belmont, CA:

Duxbury, 1972. Herbst, Philip. Talking Terrorism: A Dictionary of the Loaded Lan- guage of Political Violence. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2003. Rubin, A.P. “Terrorism and the Law of War.” Denver Journal of International Law and Politics 17:2–3 (Spring 1983):

219–35.

Thackrah, John Richard. Dictionary of Terrorism. New York:

Routledge, 2004. U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994. Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterter- rorism, April 1995.

Domestic vs. International Terrorism

Some terrorist groups are concerned exclusively with affecting politics within a single state. In the United States, such groups include pro-life (antiabortion) ter- rorists, some animal rights activists, and the individuals who bombed the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995. However, most terrorism has some international aspect or element, and it is that dimension that not only makes cooperation among states essential in combating terrorist activity but also makes terrorism so difficult to root out. Since 1945, three major developments on the global scene have fostered the internationalization of terrorism. The first was the collapse of European colonial empires, as a number of states aided the campaigns of terrorists seeking to end colonial dominance. In the 1950s, for example, Morocco and Tunisia helped Algerian National Liberation Front terrorists against the French. The second major development was the Cold War, as both the West and communist states aided groups that they described as freedom fighters but which their opponents described as terrorists. The final element in geopolitical affairs that made terrorism an international activity has been the situation of Israel, a state created within an Arab bloc; as a result, many of the Arab states have at some point assisted terrorist groups against Israel. Within this general climate, international terrorists have operated at several different levels. The first level of international terrorism is one in which some of a country’s population actively help terrorists from another country. The examples of the Basques of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), operating in Spain, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), operating in Northern Ireland, are instructive. Although there was no state aid to either group in neighboring France or the Irish Republic, re- spectively, there was certainly a sizable group of sympa- thizers who were prepared to give help, or at least turn a blind eye, to would-be terrorists. In the case of ETA, there was a large expatriate Basque community in southern France, and many French people were inclined to be sympathetic to ETA while the dictator General Francisco Franco ruled Spain. In the Republic of Ireland, the wish of the IRA to unite the whole of Ireland struck a chord in many hearts. Events such as Bloody Sunday in 1972, when British paratroopers killed thirteen Catholic demonstrators, reinforced such feelings of nationalism.

Sympathy in Another Country

Support and help from elements within states takes many forms. At one level, there is covert protection. At

another, there is fund-raising, lobbying of government, and enthusiastic propagandizing. The Provisional IRA provides a good example of popularity abroad. In the Republic of Ireland and especially in the United States, large groups of people were prepared to do much to help the Provisional IRA and raised millions of dollars to sustain terrorist activity. The attempt to mobilize U.S. public opinion and to gain support from within the U.S. government achieved great success in 1995, when Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams was invited to the White House. Another good example of this kind of international help from sympathetic communities occurred in the case of the Tamil Tigers, who were fighting for a Tamil state in what is now Sri Lanka until the late 2000s. The group had an effective fund-raising organization in Tamil communities worldwide, which gave them the resources to buy whatever weapons and equipment they felt they needed. For a long period, they were also able to smuggle such arms into Sri Lanka with the active help of the Tamil population of southern India, even though there was no help given them by the Indian authorities. When a nation-state, rather than individuals within that state, aids a terror group, then potentially there is a great benefit to the terrorists. In many struggles since 1945 that have involved terrorism, such aid has been available across borders. The communist Chinese gave aid to the Vietminh nationalists in Vietnam in the 1950s. In the 1980s, the South Africans helped guerrillas in neighboring Mozambique to destabilize the government there. State aid to terrorists is confined not only to obvious movement across a border. In the contemporary world, aid from state governments is often sent to terrorists over long distances. For example, in Central America dur- ing the 1980s, the U.S. government aided the Contras in their fight against the Sandinista regime by secretly funneling weapons and money to them. During the Cold War, states in the Soviet Eastern bloc aided terrorists if they considered communism’s interests best served by such terror groups. Since the fall of communist regimes in Europe in 1989, information has emerged detailing many links between Eastern bloc countries and terror- ists. The communist East German regime, for example, gave support to the Baader-Meinhof terrorists operating in West Germany.

State Sponsorship<