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xinyan jiang
Abstract
I.
has such a kind of courage stands firm against great danger due to the
fact that he knows that he is not really in danger since his skill can
help him get out from the danger. The valor of a professional soldier
may be a case of this kind of courage.8 The third kind is “the courage
of emotion.” The person who possesses such a kind of courage stands
firm against great danger due to irrational feeling such as love or
anger. When one is in love or anger, he can face great danger fear-
lessly, for passion is beside him. Once his emotion is under control, he
will be no longer able to face great danger firmly. Children and
animals can have this kind of courage.9 The fourth kind is “the
courage of hope.” The person who has such a kind of courage stands
firm against great danger due to the fact that he disbelieves that he is
in danger and believes that nothing really bad could happen to him.
Once the thing turns out differently than he has expected, he will flee.
Drunks often have this kind of courage.10 The fifth kind is “the
courage of ignorance.” The person who has such a kind of courage
stands firm against great danger due to the fact that he does not know
he is in danger since he is inexperienced and ignorant. When he
realizes that he is in danger, he will run away. In all of these five cases,
the agent is not truly courageous, because either he does not act from
a noble motive, does not actually face great danger, or does not realize
his being in great danger.
Briefly speaking, Aristotelian courage is both a martial and moral
virtue. Furthermore, this means that Aristotelian courage is a unity of
a physical and mental quality that is required for one to stand firm
against great danger.
Unlike Aristotle’s, Confucius’s conception of courage is defined in
a much broader sense. This is shown in two aspects: (i) it has both
military and civilian meanings, and emphasizes the latter more; and
(ii) it does not make a moral motive a necessary condition for courage
per se, although it entails that courage is a necessary condition for
being a junzi.
Compared with Neo-Confucians, Confucius has given more signifi-
cance to courage in human life. As is well known, courage is one of
three cardinal virtues of Confucius’s junzi.11 Confucius says: “The way
of junzi is threefold; . . . Those who are wise are free from perplexi-
ties; those who are humane (ren ) are free from anxiety; those who
are courageous are free from fear.”12 “Junzi” has a broad meaning
that refers to both military and nonmilitary persons of virtue.
However, the image of Confucian junzi is usually associated with a
person of letters more than a military man. The courage of junzi is
connected with doing what is right at great risk. Courage enables a
junzi to do what is right when doing so means risking what he holds
dearly such as life, career, friends, etc.Without courage, one will not be
confucius’s view of courage 47
II.
III.
external threats that may take away what she holds dear. No matter
which society we are living in, we all have occasions to test our
courage of this kind.52
Courage of this kind is not outdated in contemporary life at all.
Such courage is demanded everywhere. Confucius has famously criti-
cized those who have no courage to stand by moral principle but only
try to please everyone around him. He calls such persons “good
villagers” (xiangyuan ).53 Many people feel that today there are
even more “good villagers” and courage is in more demand than in
the past. For example, according to a recent survey conducted in
Taiwan, 50.9% of people think that Taiwan citizens are less morally
and socially courageous than ten years ago,54 57.7% think that Taiwan
politicians do not have enough courage to carry out their policy,55
5.6% believe that people in Taiwan in general are very courageous in
defending social justice.56 It has been worried that courage is a quality
that is disappearing in Taiwan: less and less people are able to do what
is right under great pressure to do otherwise; it is getting harder and
harder not to be “good villagers” but stand out for justice.57 The
similar worry does not exist in Taiwan alone. In the United States,
people have increasingly paid more attention to the issue of courage
as well. As Rushworth M. Kidder and Martha Bracy have observed,
“It’s also a term that appears to be growing in public favor, at least
across American culture early in the twenty-first century. Where a
casual mention of the need for ethics brings knowing nods, a mention
of the need for moral courage can bring people to their feet in enthu-
siastic agreement.”58
As long as doing what is right involves great risk in societies,
courage to face external treats is needed. The worse a society is, the
more difficult one becomes courageous, and the greater demand there
is for courage. If more people have courage to be morally right, our
society will be a much better place. It is because very few people are
courageous that there is often silence or nonresistance when unfair-
ness and injustice occur and when the weak and powerless are bullied.
It is very hard to have courage, especially courage to be moral, but
courage is indispensable for good life and just society. Therefore,
courage is one of the most admirable virtues in both ancient and our
own time. Winston Churchill once said, “Courage is rightly esteemed
the first of human qualities . . . because it is the quality which guaran-
tees all others.”59 Although Confucius might not agree with him com-
pletely, at least he would say that without courage there is no junzi
who exemplifies virtue.
UNIVERSITY OF REDLANDS
Redlands, California
confucius’s view of courage 57
Endnotes
The earlier and shorter version of this article, entitled “What Is Courage—A Comparative
Study of Confucius’ and Aristotle’s Views,” was presented at the 17th International
Conference on Chinese Philosophy organized by the International Society for Chinese
Philosophy in Paris, July 4–8, 2011. I would like to thank the audience at the conference,
especially Dr. Richard King and Mr. David Machek, for their helpful questions and
discussions. My special appreciation goes to Professor Chung-ying Cheng, Dr. Linyu Gu,
and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments and suggestions on the latest
draft of this article. In addition, I also would like to thank everyone who commented on
my unpublished article, “Confucius on Courage,” which was written around 1999 and
slightly overlapped with the current article. Their criticisms and suggestions on that article
greatly helped me rethink Confucius’s view of courage and produce a new article on the
same topic.
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (NE), 1115a10-30, trans. W. D. Ross (revised by J. O.
Urmson), in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. II,
Bollingen Series LXXI 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1984), 1760.
2. For a more detailed discussion, see Xinyan Jiang,“Courage and the Aristotelian Unity
of Action and Passion,” Philosophical Inquiry 22 (2000): 24.
3. J. O. Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 63.
4. NE, 1115a10-13.
5. Sarah Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 92.
6. Xinyan Jiang, Courage, Passion, and Virtue (PhD diss., University of Cincinnati, 1994;
Ann Arbor: U.M.I., Order No. 9520101, 1995), 18.
7. See NE, 1116a8-35, and Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics (EE), 1229a12, 1230a16-30. The
edition of EE that I rely on is the one translated by J. Solomon in Jonathan Barnes,
ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. II, Bol-
lingen Series LXXI 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
8. NE, 1116b5-20; EE, 1130a13-14, 1129a13-16.
9. NE, 1116b23-1117a6; EE, 1229a21-30.
10. NE, 1117a8-20; EE, 1229a19-20.
11. There have been discussions of whether Confucius considers courage a virtue. For
example, Manyul Im has argued that courage presented in the Analects is not a virtue
at all but something instrumental to the pursuit of virtuous ends. Some others disagree
with him. Their counterarguments include, but not limited to, that Confucius indeed
lists courage along with other virtues, and that a virtue could be used for bad ends, but
it characteristically makes people better. For their detailed arguments, see Manyul
Im’s Chinese Philosophy Blog at http://manyulim.wordpress.com/2008/01/25/
courage-yong- -a-confucian-virtue (accessed August 26, 2011). Richard King has
questioned whether Confucius has a concept of virtue, given the way in which “virtue”
is understood in the Aristotelian sense (he made the point during our conversation on
Confucius’s conception of courage). In this article, I do not intend to get into the
debate in the existing literature over whether courage in Confucianism is virtue or
whether Confucius regards it as a virtue, but I will consider courage a virtue in a
broader sense than that defined by Aristotle, namely, regard it as a desirable quality
that in general helps human flourishing. It is courage but not cowardice that more
benefits human beings. I believe that Confucius would not disagree with this. For him,
although courage needs to be guided by yi and li , it is still a desirable quality in
general.
12. Analects, 14: 29. My translation. Some other translations are referred. All my trans-
lations are made from the Analects in Zhu Xi, ed., Sishu Jizhu (Changsha:
Yuelu Shushe, 1985). Unless indicated otherwise, all references to the Analects are by
book and passage numbers, following the ordering of passages in the Zhu Xi edition.
13. Whalen Lai, “Yung and the Tradition of Shih,” Religion Study 21 (1985): 201.
14. Analects, 2: 24. Confucius’ Analects, trans. D. C. Lau (London: Penguin Books, 1979),
66.
58 xinyan jiang
15. “Shi junzi” refers to a junzi who is also is a shi—a scholar or scholar-official.
16. My translation. Some other translations are referred.
17. See the Analects, 15: 9 where Confucius says: “A man with high ideals or purposes and
a man of humanity will never save his life at the cost of humanity; he may give up his
life for fulfilling humanity” (Zhishi renren, wu qiusheng yi hairen, you shashen yi
chengren. , , ).
18. Ibid., 14: 5. My translation.
19. According to Feng Youlan (Fung Yu-lan), “ren” may refer to “loving others,” or “the
perfect virtue” or “the total of virtue.” See Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese
Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), 42–43.
20. See note 7 for my argument for why courage should be considered a virtue, although
it sometimes may serve a bad purpose.
21. Analects, 17: 8. Lau’s translation. See Lau, 145.
22. Ibid., 8: 2. My translation.
23. Ibid., 8: 10. My translation. Others’ translations are referred.
24. NE, 1117a30-34.
25. EE, 1229a5.
26. David Pears, “Courage as a Mean,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie Oksen-
bery Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 178.
27. For a more detailed argument on the view that sometimes genuine courage is not a
form of self-control, see Xinyan Jiang, “Courage and Self-Control,” in The Proceed-
ings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy,Vol. 1 (Ethics), eds. Harun Tepe
and Stephen Voss (Ankara: Philosophical Society of Turkey, 2007), 59–62.
28. The third person singular pronoun “he” is used in all discussion of the original texts
of Aristotle and Confucius, while “she” is used in other context.
29. S. J. Rachman, Fear and Courage, 2nd ed. (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company,
1990), 3.
30. In general, Aristotle emphasizes that the courageous person has the medial fear that
is neither too much nor too little but appropriate in a given situation. See NE,
1107a31-b2. But in EE he seems to believe that a courageous person is fearless
(1228b20).To reconcile this with his belief that the courageous person has medial fear,
the following interpretations have been made. According to David Pears, by “the
courageous person is fearless,” Aristotle means that the courageous person is emo-
tionally unperturbed and behaves fearlessly although he has fear in the face of the
greatest danger such as death (Pears, “Courage as a Mean,” 178). Charles Young
argues: when Aristotle describes courageous agents as fearless, by “fearless,” he prob-
ably means that courageous agents do not experience the possibly disabling
symptoms of fear: nervousness, rapid heartbeat, and so on (see Charles Young, “Aris-
totle on Courage,” in Humanitas Essays in Honor of Ralph Ross [Claremont: Scripps
College, 1977], 197). Such interpretations of Aristotle’s saying that the courageous
person is fearless seem equally applicable to Confucius’s saying “yong zhe bu ju.”
31. Mike W. Martin, Everyday Morality: An Introduction to Applied Ethics (Belmont:
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1989), 123–124.
32. See Jiang, “Courage and Self-Control,” 59.
33. This is pointed out by Terry Horgan during one of our conversations.
34. Jiang, “Courage and Self-Control,” 59.
35. I borrow the word “silence” from John McDowell. See John McDowell, “Virtue and
Reason,” The Monist, 62 (1979): 331–50.
36. See Jiang, “Courage and Self-Control,” 59–60.
37. Analects, 14: 11. My translation.
38. Xunzi once said that people in the state of Qi did not dare to attack the state of Lu,
because they were afraid of Bian Zhuangzi (see Xunzi , “Da Lue” ). For
the folk story about Bian Zhuangzi, see “Courageous Warrior Bian Zhuangzi”
(Yongshi Bian Zhuangzi ), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4ceffd1d0100
gkgo.html (accessed August 31, 2011). About his fighting against tigers, there is a brief
description in Sima Qian , “Shiji: Zhang Yi Liezhuan” . Bian
Zhuangzi’s courageousness on the battlefield and death (after killing 70 enemies)
were mentioned in Han Ying , Han Shi Wai Zhuan, Vol. 10 .
confucius’s view of courage 59
39. For such an argument, see Chen Lisheng, “Courage in the Analects: A Genealogical
Survey of the Confucian Virtue of Courage,” Front. Philos. China 5, no. 1 (2010): 5.
40. Analects, 12: 4. My translation.
41. For a detailed discussion of the Neo-Confucian view of courage, see Chen, “Courage
in the Analects: A Genealogical Survey of Confucian Virtue of Courage,” 12–23.
42. “Great courage” is moral courage. Since it is the only kind of courage that the
Song-Ming Confucians advocated, it is plausible to regard their conception of great
courage as their conception of true courage.
43. See Er Cheng Ji (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981), 211.
44. See Zhuzi Yulei (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1985), 1244.
45. Lu Xiangshan, Lu Xiangshan Quanji (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1992),
48–49.
46. Wang Yangming Quanji (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1992),
249.
47. See Chen, “Courage in the Analects: A Genealogical Survey of Confucian Virtue of
Courage,” 13.
48. The Doctrine of the Mean, chap. 20. My translation.
49. Analects, 13: 20. My translation.
50. For a summary and analysis of feminist critique of traditional heroic courage, see
Linda R. Rabieh, “Feminist Critique of Courage,” in her Plato and the Virtue of
Courage (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 10–17.
51. Except those legendary sage kings such as Yao, Shun, and Yu, according to the existing
historical records, there was no Chinese ruler who was considered truly benevolent
(ren ). Given the brutality of power struggle at Chinese imperial court, this is no
surprise. There were indeed some exceptional Confucian scholars or scholars-officials
who lived up to their Confucian ideal to the greatest degree. For example, Wen
Tianxiang ( 1236–1283) has always been regarded as one of the greatest
Chinese heroes, and Hai Rui ( 1515–1587) has been well memorized as an
incorruptible and caring official. However, there were only few people like them in
Chinese history. Otherwise they would not have been praised so highly.
52. Here I am inspired by John F. Kennedy’s following words: “In whatever arena of life
one may meet the challenge of courage, whatever may be the sacrifices he faces if he
follows his conscience—the loss of his friends, his fortune, his contentment, even the
esteem of his fellow men—each man must decide for himself the course he will
follow” (John F. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage [New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956],
216). A well-known example of courage in contemporary political life discussed by
Kennedy was Edmund G. Ross’s voting “not guilty” in the frenzied trial for acquitting
President Andrew Johnson (see ibid., 122–25). A contemporary Chinese example of
moral courage is Liang Shuming’s resistance to “criticizing Confucius” during the
Cultural Revolution (for details see Liang Shuming, Wo Sheng You Ya
[Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2004], 284).
53. See Analects, 17: 13.
54. See Xu Ren Quan and Hong Ling Rang, Liucheng Minzhong: Zhengtan Zui Quefa
Yongqi , Yuanjian (August 2011), 95.
55. Ibid., 99.
56. Ibid., 95.
57. Ibid., 92.
58. Rushworth M. Kidder and Martha Bracy, “Moral Courage: A White Paper,” http://
www.faulkner.edu/admin/websites/jfarrell/moral_courage_11-03-2001.pdf (accessed
November 1, 2010).
59. Winston Churchill, http://www.great-quotes.com/quote/3124 (accessed August 27,
2011).