TEODORO R. REGALA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR No.

105938, 1996-09-20
Facts:
Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the
principal... defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in
the named corporations
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara,
Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and
Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then... partners of the
law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the
ACCRA Law Firm).
In the course of their dealings with their clients, the... members of the law firm acquire information
relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances.
As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they
assisted in the organization and acquisition... of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in
keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said
corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.[2]... espondent Presidential Commission on Good
Government (hereinafter referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended
Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" which excluded  private respondent Raul S. Roco from
the complaint in PCGG
Case No. 33 as party-defendan... undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom
he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in
PCGG Case No. 33.
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated
October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to
them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of
petitioners, namely:  (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the... deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.[9]... respondent
Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in
PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG
Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari,... The Honorable Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client
privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the
other information requested by the
PCGG.
Issues:
whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the
case at bar.
Ruling:
the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or... identity of his client
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. 
The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary.
the general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions.
1)  Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would
implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3. Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing
the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is... privileged.
there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule.
information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the
client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences.
Summarizing these exceptions, in
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal
that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule.  First, disclosure of the
alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's... connection with the very fact in issue of the
case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter
or the substance (without which there would be no attorney-client relationship
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide
the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists.  It is the link, in
the words of Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of... testimony necessary to convict the
(client) of a... crime."[47]
An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of an
attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of
committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he might have previously... committed
something illegal and consults his attorney about it.  The first case clearly does not fall within the
privilege because the same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal.  The second case falls within the
exception because whether or not the act for which the... advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot
be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which
might lead to possible  action against him.
There are, after all, alternative sources of information available to the prosecutor which do not depend
on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of information in the
building of a case against the latter.  Compelling disclosure of... the client's name in circumstances such
as the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy
prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will not countenance.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain
of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall
within recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is... not privileged information.
respondents failed to show -... and absolutely nothing exists in the records of the case at bar - that
private respondent actually revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG.
We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their
exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege.
.  The condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents
Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.[64] It is grossly unfair to
exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the
others.
.  Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only... touches upon the question of the identity of their clients
but also on documents related to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of the attorney-client
privilege but also of the constitutional right against self-incrimination.  Whichever way one looks at
it,... this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights.
Principles:
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20.  It is the duty of an attorney:
(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with
his knowledge and approval.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:
Canon 17.  A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client  and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:
The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be
taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally... applied.  No fear of judicial disfavor
or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty.  In the judicial forum the
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land, and he may... expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.  But it is steadfastly to be
borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of
the law.  The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of... him for any client,
violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery.  He must obey his own conscience and not that of
his client.
An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely... dependent upon the degree of confidence which
exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and
fruitful exchange and flow of information.  It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective
representation, the lawyer... must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty
and professional responsibility.
Justice Benjamin Cardoz
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior,"

WILLIAM S. UY vs. ATTY. FERMIN

L. GONZALES
A.C. No. 5280 : March 30, 2004
FACTS:
Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a
new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding the lost title and
discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed
before the Regional Trial Court.
When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to complainant’s office demanding a certain
amount other than what was previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after reasoning with him.
Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that instead of filing the petition
for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint against him with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor for Falsification of Public Documents. The letter-complaint contained facts and
circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition which
respondent was supposed to have filed.
Respondent claims that he gave complainant a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing
the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the petition thereby
terminating the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant; that there was no longer any
professional relationship between the two of them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of
public document; that the facts and allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were culled
from public documents procured from the Office of the Register of Deeds.
The IBP found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility
and recommended for his suspension for 6 months.
ISSUE:  Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the CPR?
HELD:
No. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents filed
by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with
complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the land
he has redeemed from complainant.  Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent
and complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their
personal transaction.
Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his
professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and
therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily
involved alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21.
There is no way we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a
misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from
instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.
PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Hadjula vs. Atty Madiana [A.C. No. 6711. July 3, 2007]

16
OCT
Ponente: GARCIA, J.

FACTS:

[C]omplainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of
Fire Protection (BFP), claimed that she approached respondent for some legal advice and further
alleged that in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential she
disclosed personal secrets only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would
refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have
refused handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.

[R]espondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the
supposed confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common
knowledge in the BFP.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Atty. Madiana breached her duty of preserving the confidence of a client and
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:

YES. Respondent was reprimanded and admonished.

RATIO:

The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable
lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain
restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that
which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information
acquired or revealed during legal consultations.

The seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Supreme Court feels that there is
room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without
meaning to condone the error of respondent’s ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former
friends becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using
whatever convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information
respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the
score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to the Court that respondent was actuated by the urge to
retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was
violating the rule on confidentiality.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24163               April 28, 1969
REGINO B. ARO, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HON. ARSENIO NAÑAWA, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Laguna,
LUIS MAGTIBAY, PABLO MAGTIBAY, AURELLO MARTINEZ, GREGORIO LONTOK, MARIA
MENDOZA, MAXIMO PORTO and ROSARlO ANDAYA, respondents.
Regino B. Aro in his own behalf as petitioner. 
Enrique C. Villanueva for respondents.
BARREDO, J.:
Original petition: (1) for certiorari to annul the order of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, dated
November 21, 1964, dismissing its Civil Case No. SC-525 "without prejudice to the right of Atty. Regino B.
Aro (petitioner herein) to file a separate action against both the plaintiffs and defendants (private
respondents herein) with respect to his alleged attorney's fees", as well as its order dated January 9, 1965,
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof for lack of merit and (2) for mandamus to compel
respondent Judge to take cognizance of petitioner's opposition and countermotion or petition dated
November 3, 1964 and to resolve the same on the merits.
There appears to be no dispute as to the following facts alleged in the petition:
2. That the services of herein petitioner, as practising attorney, was engaged by respondents Luis
Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay for the prosecution of their claim, as heirs, in the estate of their
deceased uncle Lucio Magtibay, consisting of properties which were in the possession of the
respondents Aurelia Martinez,1spouses Gregorio Lontok and Maria Mendoza and spouses Maximo
Porto and Rosario Andaya.
3. That being without means to prosecute their claim against the persons concerned, respondents
Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay agreed with herein petitioner to avail of his services and entrust
the prosecution of their claim on a contingent basis as shown in the agreement, copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex 'A' and is made an integral part hereof. 2
4. That by virtue of said agreement, herein petitioner took the necessary steps to gather the needed
papers and documents for the filing of a petition to litigate as pauper and a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, in which respondents Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay were the
plaintiffs and the other respondents, excepting the respondent Judge, were the defendants, ....
5. That said petition to litigate as pauper filed by herein petitioner for respondents Luis Magtibay
and Pablo Magtibay was granted by the respondent Judge as per the order dated September 10,
1964, .....
6. That to plaintiffs' complaint in Civil Case No. SC-525, the defendants in said case interposed a
motion to dismiss dated September 29, 1964....3
7. That to the said motion to dismiss herein petitioner, as attorney for the plaintiffs (now
respondents Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay) filed an opposition dated October 5, 1964..... 4
8. That after the hearing of the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants and the opposition thereto
by the plaintiffs, which finally took place on October 24, 1964, the respondent Judge issued its
resolution or order dated October 24, 1964, denying the motion to dismiss, .... 5
9. That on the very day of and after the hearing of the motion to dismiss, or on October 24, 1964,
before receipt of a copy of the said order (Annex 'G'), there was a conversation which took place
between herein petitioner and the attorney of the defendants, Atty. Rustico de los Reyes, Jr., in the
civil case and one who was then acting as a sort of spokesman for the defendants (Ex-Mayor
Cordova of Sta. Maria, Laguna) for the amicable settlement of the case between the plaintiffs and
the defendants to the effect that a certain property of the spouses Lucio Magtibay (deceased) and
respondent Aurelia Martinez, worth P3,000.00, would be given to the plaintiffs in full settlement of
their claim, as share in the properties left by their deceased uncle Lucio Magtibay, it having been
agreed by herein petitioner and Atty. de los Reyes and the spokesman of the defendants that for
the purpose of said amicable settlement, the plaintiffs or one of them and herein petitioner would go
to Sta. Maria, Laguna, on October 23, 1964.
10. That having given notice to the plaintiffs (now respondents Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay)
at their given address in Calauag, Quezon to come to Candelaria for the purpose of going to Sta.
Maria, Laguna on October 23, 1964, petitioner had waited for said plaintiffs to go to his office on or
before said date for the engagement mentioned, but due to their (plaintiffs') failure to come to
Candelaria, petitioner had to send a telegram to Ex-Mayor Cordova notifying him of his (petitioner's)
and plaintiffs' not being able to go to Sta. Maria because of the failure of any of the plaintiffs to
come to Candelria, ....
11. That it was only on October 28, 1964, when herein petitioner received a copy of the order dated
October 24, 1964 (Annex "G") and to his surprise he also received on the said day a second motion
to dismiss dated October 26, 1964; together with Annex "A" of said motion, which is entitled
KASULATAN NG PAGHAHATIAN NA LABAS SA HUKUMAN AT PAGPAPALABI, dated October 23,
1964 at Sta. Cruz, Laguna and signed by the plaintiffs and defendant Aurelia Martinez (the three
being now respondents in this case), it having been made to appear in said Annex "A" of the
second motion to dismiss, among others, that the plaintiffs and defendant Aurelia Martinez had
made an extrajudicial partition of the properties of the deceased Lucio Magtibay and the said
Aurelia Martinez adjudicating to the plaintiffs one-fourth (¼) share in the properties of the spouses
and three-fourth (3/4) share of the defendant Aurelia Martinez, but making it appear also that said plaintiffs waived their share in favor of
Aurelia Martinez, ..., thru which fraudulent waiver, herein petitioner was deprived of his contingent fees, agreed upon, as evidenced by Annex "A" of
this petition.6

xxx     xxx     xxx
14. That petitioner filed by registered mail, on November 4, 1964, his "OPPOSITION TO THE
SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS AND COUNTER-MOTION OR PETITION TO SET ASIDE DEED
OF EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION AND WAIVER DATED OCTOBER 23, 1964 AND TO RECORD
ATTORNEY'S LIEN", dated November 3, 1964, wherein he (petitioner) prayed, among others,
invoking the provisions of Section 5(d) and Section 6, Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court, for
the protection of the rights of herein petitioner as an officer of the Court, to wit:
(a) to deny the second motion to dismiss and get aside and annul the deed of extrajudicial
partition and waiver dated October 23, 1964;
(b) to fix the compensation of herein counsel in the proportion of one-third ( 1/3) of the shares of
plaintiffs, if in land, or in the amount of P1,000.00, if in cash, and to record the same and expenses advanced by him for the plaintiffs in the
sum of P22.15 as lien in favor of herein claimant-petitioner over the properties in litigation, particularly over the one-fourth (1/4) share of
the plaintiffs in all the properties of the spouses;

xxx     xxx     xxx
(d) as an alternative to prayer (a) above, to grant the second motion to dismiss, subjecting,
however, the properties in litigation and subject-matters of the extrajudicial partition and
waiver to the lien for attorney's fees and expenses in favor of herein claimant-petitioner,
after fixing said attorney's fees as prayed for in (b) above.
xxx     xxx     xxx
15. That on the day f finally set for the hearing of the second motion to dismiss, as well as of the
counter-motion or petition, or on November 21, 1964, because of the inquiries or interpellation
made by respondent Judge to herein petitioner as to whether there is a Philippine precedent which
allows or directs the protection by the Court of the rights of any of its officers (lawyer) against any
collusion perpetrated by the parties in a case to defraud or cheat an attorney of his compensation
agreed upon by him and his clients, and his answer that insofar as his researches were concerned,
he could not find any, although there are a number of cases to that effect in American jurisdiction,
the respondent Judge had opined in open court that the claim for and the fixing of the attorney's
fees should better be done in a separate action and, in spite of petitioner's memorandum citing
American authorities to the effect that,
Though a party may without the consent of his attorney money make a bona fide
adjustment with the adverse party and dismiss an action or suit before a judgment or a
decree has been rendered thereon, if it appears, however, that such settlement was
collosive and consummated pursuant to the intent of both parties to defraud the attorney,
the court in which the action was pending may interfere to protect him as one of its officers,
by setting aside the order of dismissal, .... (Jackson vs. Stearns, 48 Ore. 25, 84 Pac. 798).
 ... the respondent Judge, instead of denying the second motion to dismiss and fixing his attorney's
fees in the said case and recording the same as lien, ... dismissed the case and refused to give
herein petitioner any kind of immediate protection to safeguard his rights ... in said Civil Case No.
SC-525 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
16. That by the express terms of the agreement, Annex "A" of this petition, plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. SC-525 had expressly ceded to herein petitioner one-half (½) [later verbally reduced to one-
third (1/3) or P1,000.00] or whatever share they would get from the estate of their deceased uncle
Lucio Magtibay, and the defendants in said Civil Case had full knowledge of said right of herein
petitioner in the properties in controversy from and after the time they were served with summons
and copies of the complaint in said civil case — because of the allegations contained in par. 10
thereof. 7 [Emphasis by the Court]
18. That on December 5, 1964, herein petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration dated
December 4, 1664 asking for the reconsideration of the order dated November 21, 1964, ....
19. That the motion for reconsideration was denied by the court, thru the respondent Judge, as per
the order dated January 9, 1965, ....
Upon these facts, petitioner tries to make out before this Court a case of  certiorari for grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Judge in dismissing the case on the basis of the compromise
agreement of the parties, entered into at the back of petitioner notwithstanding the reservation made in his
favor to file an action against both parties "with respect to his alleged attorney's fees", as well as a case of
mandamus "to order and command the said respondent judge" to take cognizance of and resolve his
opposition and counter-motion for the court to fix the compensation he should be paid. Unable to find any
local precedent to support his position, he cites American authorities thus:
In the American jurisdiction, it would seem that, even without the specific provisions of the rules of
court cited above, courts had always intervened, in the mere exercise of their inherent powers, to
protect attorneys against collusive agreements or fraudulent settlements entered into by the parties
in a case to cheat attorneys out of their costs or of their fees. Thus, it was held or had been stated
in:
(a) Coughlin vs. N.Y. Cont. & H.R.R. Co., 71 N.Y. 443, 27 Am. Rep. 75.
... But since the time of Lord Mansfield, it has been the practice of courts to intervene to
protect attorneys against settlement made to cheat them out of their costs. If an attorney
has commenced an action, and his client settles it with the opposite party before judgment,
collusively, to deprive him of his costs, the court will permit the attorney to go on with the
suit for the purpose of collecting his costs. Swain v. Senate, 5 Bos. & Pul. 99; Cole v.
Bennett, 6 Price, 15; Moore v. Cook, 13 Id. 473; Talcott v. Bronson, 4 Paige, 501; Rusquin v.
The Knickerbocker Stage Col., 12 Abb. Pr 324; Ward v. Syme, 9 How. Pr. 16; McDonald v.
Napier, 14 Ga. 89.
There are many cases where this had been allowed to be done. It is impossible to ascertain
precisely when this practice commenced, nor how originated, nor upon what principle it was
based. It was not upon the principle of a lien, because an attorney has no lien upon the
cause of as it upon the action before judgment for his costs; nor was it upon principle that
his services had produced the money paid his client upon the settlement, because that
could not be known, and in fact no money may have been paid upon the settlement. So far
as I can perceive, it was based upon no principle. It was a mere arbitrary exercise of power
by the courts; not arbitrary in the sense that it was unjust or improper, but in the sense that it
 was not based upon any right or principle recognized in other cases. The parties being in
court, and a suit commenced and pending, for the purpose of protecting attorneys who were
their officers and subject to their control, the courts invented this practice and assumed this
extraordinary power to defeat attempts to cheat the attorneys out of their costs. The
attorney's fees were fixed in definite sums, easily determined by taxation and this power
was exercised to secure them their fees. (pp. 76-77)
(b) Randall v. Van Wagenan et al., 22 N.E. 361, 362. lawphi1 .nêt

... But where such settlement is made collusively for the purpose of defrauding the attorney
out of his costs, courts have been accustomed to intervene, and to protect the attorney by
permitting him to proceed with the suit, and, if he is able to establish a right to recover on
the cause of action as it originally stood, to permit such recovery to the extent of his costs in
the action. Coughlin v. Railroad Co., 71 N. Y. 443, and pages cited. And the court will set
aside an order of discontinuance if it stands in the way. This is an adequate remedy, and we
think the exclusive remedy where the suit has been fraudulently settled by the parties
before judgment to cheat the attorney out of his costs. We have found no case of an
equitable action to enforce the inchoate right of an attorney, under such circumstances, and
no such precedent ought, we think, to be established.
(c) Jackson v. Stearns, et al., 43 Ore 25, 84 Pac. 798.
... Though a party may, without the consent of his attorney, make a bona fide adjustment
with the adverse party, and dismiss an action or suit before a judgment or a decree has
been rendered therein, if it appears, however, that such settlement was collusive and
consummated pursuant to the intent of both parties to defraud the attorney, the court in
which the action or suit was pending may interfere to protect him, as one of its officers, by
setting aside the order of dismissal and permitting him to proceed in the cause in the name
of his client to final determination to ascertain what sum of money, or interest in the subject-
matter, if any, is due him for his services when fully performed. Jones v. Morgage 99 Am.
Dec. 458; Randall v. Van Wagenen (N.Y.) 22 N.E. 361, 12 Am. St. Rep. 828. (p. 800)
Before a court will set aside an order dismissing a suit or an action, made upon stipulation
of the parties, without the consent of plaintiff's attorney, and allow the latter to proceed with
the cause in the name of his client, to determine the amount of fees due him, it must appear
that the defendant participated in the fraudulent intent to deprive the attorney of his
compensation. Courtney v. McGavock, 25 Wis. 619. When no adequate consideration is
given by the defendant for the settlement and discharge of an action or a suit, the
insufficiency of the inducement to the contract affords evidence of his bad faith. Young v.
Dearborn, 27 N.E. 324. It will be remembered that the complaint alleges that the value of
the real property in question is $3,000.00, and that Stearns executed to Wilson a deed to
the premises for a nominal consideration. This is a sufficient averment of the defendant's
intent to deprive the plaintiff of his compensation thereby imputing to Wilson bad faith. (p.
800)
(d) Desaman v. Butler Bros., 188 Minn. 198, 136 N.W. 747.
We have recently held that a client has always the right to settle his cause of action and
stop litigation at any stage of the proceeding, subject, however, to the right of the attorney to
receive compensation for services rendered. Burho v. Camichael 135 N.W. 386. It is
therefore contended by defendant that a litigant retains the unrestricted right to determine
for what amount the cause of action may be settled, and, having so done, the lien of his
 attorney for services is measured by the amount determined on and actually settled for.
Conceding, without deciding, that this may be true of any time prior to the rendition of a
verdict in the action which the attorney has been employed to bring, we are of opinion that
after verdict fixing the amount of a plaintiff's cause of action a secret and collusive
compromise between parties litigant does not affect the amount of the attorney's lien...; but
therein is also clearly indicated by Mr. Justice Brown that, if there be fraud and collusion to
deprive the attorney of his lien, the settlement will not be permitted to accomplish such
result. (p. 748)
To be sure, these authorities are quite persuasive, but contrary to petitioner's impression, there is already a
precedent setting decision of this Court handed down way back in 1922 in a case very similar to his, that in
Rustia vs. the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, et al., 44 Phil. 62. As it is very brief, it can
be quoted in full:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari, the petitioner alleging that the respondent Judge of the Court
of First Instance exceeded his jurisdiction in dismissing a pending action at the instance of the
parties but without the intervention of the attorney for the plaintiff in the case, the herein petitioner.
It appears from the record that on July 31, 1921, the respondent Justo Porcuna, for himself and on
behalf of his wife, the respondent Rosa H. de Porcuna, by means of a written contract, retained the
petitioner to represent them as their lawyer in case No. 1435 then pending in the Court of First
Instance of Batangas and in which Rosa H. de Porcuna was the plaintiff and one Eulalia
Magsombol was the defendant. The contract fixed the petitioner's fee at P200 in advance with an
additional contingent fee of P1,300. It was also provided in the contract that Justo Porcuna should
not compromise the claim against the defendant in the case without express consent of his lawyer,
the herein petitioner.
After trial, the petitioner then being plaintiff's attorney of record, the Court of First Instance, under
date of December 24, 1921, rendered judgment in favor of Justo Porcuna and Rosa H. de Porcuna
ordering the defendant Eulalia Magsombol to return to them 602 pieces of cloth or in default thereof
to pay to them the sum of P3,250. On January 14, 1922, Eulalia Magsombol filed her exception to
the judgment and on the following day presented a motion for a new trial, which was denied on the
21st of the same month. She thereupon gave notice of appeal and presented a bill of exceptions
which was approved on February 20, 1922. On March 2, 1922, and before the transmission of the
bill of exceptions to this court, the plaintiffs presented the following motion in the Court of First
Instance:
The plaintiffs, without any further intervention of their attorney, now appear before this
Honorable Court and respectfully aver:
That, through Mr. Miguel Olgado they already settled this case with the herein defendant.
That the basis of the compromise is that we, the plaintiffs, finally agree that we should be
paid the amount of eight hundred pesos (P800) in two installments; P300 to be paid on this
same date, and the remaining five hundred pesos (P500) at the end of March, 1922.
That we, the plaintiffs, recognize not to have any further rights in this case than to the
aforesaid amount of eight hundred pesos (P800) and that this is the total amount the
defendant Eulalia Magsombol should pay us, and we have no right whatever to any other
amount than the aforementioned.
That we have not sold to any other person our rights as plaintiffs in this case.
 Wherefore, the plaintiffs respectfully request the dismissal of this case, without any
pronouncement as to costs, and that the appeal interposed by the defendant be further
dismissed.

          Batangas, Batangas, P.I., March 2, 1922.

(Sgd) ROSA H. PORCUNA           

Plaintiff          

JUSTO M. PORCUNA           
Plaintiff          
The defendant, through her attorney, Jose Mayo Librea, having signified her assent to the motion,
the Court of First Instance on the same day, March 2, dismissed the action without notice to
counsel for the plaintiffs.
The petitioner alleges that he did not discover the dismissal of the action until April 4, 1922. After an
unsuccessful effort to obtain a reconsideration of the order of dismissal from the trial court, he filed
the present petition for a writ of certiorari. By resolution dated October 24, 1922, this court denied
the petition and upon motion of the petitioner we shall now briefly state our reasons for such denial.
The burden of the petitioner's contention is (1) that he, as attorney of record, was entitled to notice
of his client's motion to dismiss the case, and (2) that after the approval of the bill of exceptions the
lower court had lost jurisdiction of the case and had no power to dismiss it. A moment's reflection
should make it clear that neither of these propositions is tenable.
Both at the common law and under section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure a client may dismiss
his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings and there is nothing to prevent a litigant
from appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation. (Sec. 34, Code of Civil Procedure.)
The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer.
Though there is a valid agreement for the payment to the attorney of a large proportion of
the sum recovered in case of success this does not give the attorney such an interest in the
cause of action that it prevents plaintiff from compromising the suit. (4 Cyc. 990, and
authorities cited in Note 6; see also Louque vs. Dejan 129 La. 519; Price vs. Western Loan
& Savings Co., 19 Am. Cas. 589 and Note.)
In the present instance the clients did nothing that they did not have a perfect right to do. By
appearing personally and presenting a motion they impliedly dismissed their lawyer. The petitioner's
contingent interests in the judgment rendered did not appear of record. Neither as a party in interest
nor as and attorney was he therefore entitled to notice of the motion.
As to the second proposition that the court below could not dismiss the case after the bill of
exceptions had been approved, it is very true that upon such approval the lower court loses its
jurisdiction over all contentious matters connected with the issues in the case. But there is nothing
to prevent all of the parties by agreement to withdraw the bill of exceptions with the consent of said
court and resubmit the case to the jurisdiction of the court. That was all that was done in this case.
A valid agreement between the parties to a case is the law of the case in everything covered by the
agreement. (Civil Code, art. 1091; Compania General de Tabacos vs. Obed, 13 Phil. 391.) The
 petitioner might have protected his interests by entering an attorney's lien under section 37 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of certiorari was therefore properly denied. So ordered.
The difference We perceive, however, between petitioner's case, on the one hand, and that of Atty. Rustia,
in the above decision, on the other, is that in the latter's case, neither the court nor the party adverse to his
clients were aware of the exact agreement as to his fees, whereas in the case of petitioner, both the court
and the other parties knew the terms of the contract for professional services between petitioner and his
clients, the Magtibay brothers, because the written contract therefor, Annex A, was made part of the
complaint, and none seriously disputes its authenticity. Besides, the court had already dismissed the case
when Atty. Rustia raised the question of his fees before the court; in petitioner's instance, he opposed the
motion to dismiss and pleaded with the court to protect his rights as officer of the court before the first order
in question was issued by respondent judge. Were it not for these differences, We would have inclined
towards denying the herein petition in line with the Rustia ruling that, in any event, certiorari is not the
appropriate remedy, the American authorities cited by petitioner not withstanding.
Withal, there is another Philippine case which Us to sustain petitioner. In the case of Recto vs. Harden, 100
Phil. 440, Atty. Claro M. Recto found himself practically in the same situation as petitioner herein. After Atty.
Recto had rendered services to Mrs. Esperanza P. de Harden in a protracted suit against her husband for
the purposes of securing an increase of her and her daughter's monthly support, (the spouses were
separated), to P10,000.00 and of protecting and preserving her rights in the properties of the conjugal
partnership, which suit lasted from 1941 to 1949, and after the Court of First Instance of Manila had
rendered a judgment favorable to Mrs. Harden acknowledging, inter alia, her rights to the assets of the
conjugal partnership, which turned out to be P4,000,000, and awarding her a monthly support of P2,500,
practically as prayed for in Atty. Recto's pleadings, while the case was already pending on appeal before
this Court, Mrs. Harden and her husband, Mr. Fred Harden, entered into a compromise of their case,
without the knowledge of Atty. Recto, whereby said spouses "purportedly agreed to settle their differences
in consideration of the sum of P5,000 paid by Mr. Harden to Mrs. Harden, and a monthly pension of $500 to
be paid by him to her; (2) Mr. Harden created a trust fund of $20,000 from which said monthly pension of
$500 would be taken; and (3) Mr. and Mrs. Harden had mutually released and forever discharged each
other from all actions, debts, duties, accounts, demands and claims to the conjugal partnership, in
consideration of the sum of $1." (p. 435)
Whereupon Atty. Recto filed a motion with this Court praying that:
a) Pending the resolution of this motion, the receiver appointed herein be authorized to continue
holding the properties above mentioned in his custody in order not to defeat the undersigned's
inchoate lien on them;
b) A day set aside to receive the evidence of the undersigned and those of the plaintiff and the
defendant Fred M. Harden, in order to determine the amount of fees due to the undersigned, by the
appointment of a referee or commissioner for the reception of such evidence;
c) After due hearing, the undersigned be declared entitled to the sum of P400,000 as his fees for
services rendered in behalf of the plaintiff in this case, under paragraph 3 of the contract, Annex "A"
and to that end a charging lien therefore be established upon the properties above-mentioned;
d) And the receiver be ordered to pay to the undersigned the full amount of the fees to which the
latter is found to be entitled.
This motion was objected to by Mr. Hardens counsel, who in turn, moved for the dismissal of the case, to
which Atty. Recto objected. Under these circumstances, this Court acceded to Atty. Recto's prayer that the
case be not dismissed, that the receivership be maintained except as to certain properties not material to
mention here, and that the case be remanded to the lower court so that his fees may be determined and
ordered paid. Upon the remand of the case to the lower court, a commissioner was appointed to hear the
matter of the amount of the fees in question, and after the commissioner had submitted a report
recommending the payment to Atty. Recto of the 20,70 attorney's fees stipulated in the contract for his
services, equivalent to P369,410.04, the court rendered judgment as follows:
The contingent fee to which the claimant is entitled under paragraph 3 of the contract, Exhibit JJJ or
20, is 20% of P1,920,554.85 or the sum of P384,110.97.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the recommendation of the Commissioner with the
above-stated modification, and finds that Attorney Claro M. Recto is entitled to the sum of THREE
HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND TEN PESOS AND NINETY-SEVEN
CENTAVOS (P384,110.97), representing 20% of Esperanza P. de Harden's share in the conjugal
properties owned by her and her husband, Fred M. Harden, as contingent fee stipulated in
paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services, Exhibit JJJ or 20, and the said Esperanza P.
de Harden is hereby ordered to pay the said amount above-stated.
On appeal from this judgment to this Court, the same was affirmed, the decision stating pertinently in part:
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant thereto, one who seeks equity
must come with clean hands (Bastida et al. vs. Dy Buncio & Co., 93 Phil. 195; 30 C.J.S. 475), and
appellants have not done so, for the circumstances surrounding the case show, to our satisfaction,
that their aforementioned agreements, ostensibly for the settlement of the differences between
husband and wife, were made for the purpose of circumventing or defeating the rights of herein
appellee, under his above-quoted contract of services with Mrs. Harden. Indeed, having secured a
judgment in her favor, acknowledging her rights to the assets of the conjugal partnership, which
turned out to be worth almost P4,000,000 in addition to litis expensae in the sum of P175,000, it is
inconceivable that Mrs. Harden would have waived such rights, as well as the benefits of all orders
and judgments in her favor, in consideration of the paltry sum of $5,000 allegedly paid to her by Mr.
Harden and the additional sum of $20,000 to be paid by him in installments, at the rate of $500 a
month. In fact, no explanation has been given for this moat unusual avowed settlement between Mr.
and Mrs. Harden. One can not even consider the possibility of a reconciliation between the
spouses, the same being inconsistent with the monetary consideration for said alleged settlement.
What is more, the records show that the relations between said spouses — which were bad indeed,
not only in July, 1941, when Mrs. Harden engaged the services of the appellee, but, even, before,
for Mr. and Mrs. Harden were separated since 1938 — had worsened considerably thereafter, as
evidenced by an action for divorce filed by Mr. Harden in New Jersey, in July 1948, upon the ground
of repeated acts of infidelity allegedly committed by Mrs. Harden in 1940 and 1941.
On the same considerations of equity, and for the better protection of lawyers, who, trusting in the good
faith of their clients, render professional services on contingent basis, and so that it may not be said that
this Court, sanctions in any way the questionable practice of clients of compromising their cases at the
back of their counsel with the consequence that the stipulated contingent fees of the lawyer are either
unreasonably reduced or even completely rendered without basis, as in this case — wherein the clients
waived the whole of their rights in favor of their opponent after the latter had acknowledged, in effect, the
correctness of said clients' contention — We have decided to grant the herein petition, in so far as the
rights of petitioner have been prejudiced by the questioned compromise agreement. While We here
reaffirm the rule that "the client has an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his
lawyer", 8 We hold that when such compromise is entered into in fraud of the lawyer, with intent to deprive
him of the fees justly due him, the compromise must be subject to the said fees, and that when it is evident
that the said fraud is committed in confabulation with the adverse party who had knowledge of the lawyer's
contingent interest or such interest appears of record and who would benefit under such compromise, the
better practice is to settle the matter of the attorney's fees in the same proceeding, after hearing all the
affected parties and without prejudice to the finality of the compromise in so far as it does not adversely
affect the rights of the lawyer. Surely, "the client cannot, by setting, compromising or dismissing his suit
during its pendency, deprive the attorney of his compensation for the agreed amount, unless the lawyer
consents to such settlement, compromise or dismissal", (Legal and Judicial Ethics by Martin, 1967 Rev. Ed
p. 121) for the, attorney is or "Shall be entitled to have and recover from his client - a reasonable
compensation (not more) for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject-matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney", (Sec. 24,
Rule 138, on Attorney and Admission to Bar) albeit, under Canon 12 of the Canons of Professional Ethics,
"in fixing fees, it should not be forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and
not a mere money-getting trade."
True it is also that "a client may, at anytime, dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place", (Sec.
26, Rule 138) but it must be emphasized that the same provision, which is an incorporation of Republic Act
636 into the Rules of Court, also provides that "if the contract between client and attorney had been
reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to
recover from the client full compensation ..." In the case at bar, by entering into the compromise agreement
in question and even inserting therein a prayer to the court to dismiss their case filed by petitioner, (see
footnote 6, ante) petitioner's clients impliedly dismissed him. (Rustia vs. the Court, etc., supra.) Such
implied dismissal appears to Us to have been made without justifiable cause, none is urged anywhere in
the record, and so, the above-quoted provision of Section 26, Rule 138 applies here. The terms of the
compromise in question, as spelled out in Annex A of Annex I of the petition, indicate clearly that Aurelia
Martinez, the defendant aunt in-law of petitioner's clients, acknowledged that the rights of said clients were
practically as alleged by petitioner in the complaint he filed for them. In other words, through the services of
petitioner, his clients secured, in effect, a recognition, which had been previously denied by their aunt-in-
law, that they were entitled to a ¼ share in the estate left by their uncle. We hold that under these
circumstances, and since it appears that said clients have no other means to pay petitioner, since they
instituted their case as paupers, and that their aunt-in-law was aware of the terms of their contract of
professional services with petitioner', said clients had no right to waive the portion of their such
acknowledged rights in favor of their opponent to the extent that such waiver would prejudice the stipulated
contingent interest of their lawyer and their aunt-in-law had no right to accept such waiver unqualified. The
Civil Code enjoins that:
ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Under the circumstance extant in the record, it is clear that the compromise agreement in question falls
short of the moral requirements of this quoted article of the Civil Code. If for this reason alone, it should not
be allowed to prejudice the rights of petitioner. Accordingly, as all of these circumstances were presented to
respondent judge before he issued the challenged order of dismissal and all the parties were heard
thereon, it was incumbent upon His Honor, in equity and to avoid multiplicity of suits, particularly, because
the amount claimed by petitioner is only P1,000.00, to have directly passed upon petitioner's claim, and not
having done so, it would appear that the court a quo abused its discretion gravely enough to warrant the
writ of certiorari herein prayed for in so far as the questioned orders prejudiced petitioner's right to the fees
for the professional services which appear to have been creditably rendered by him. Respondents allege
that the judgment of dismissal in question is already final because no appeal was taken therefrom, but
since We hold that the same was rendered with enough grave abuse of discretion to warrant
the certiorari prayed for, such alleged finality could not have materialized; obviously, petitioner could not
have appealed, not being a party in the case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the orders of the respondent court dated November 21, 1964 and January
9, 1965 in Civil Case No. SC-525 are hereby set aside in so far as they prejudice the payment of
petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the form of either one-third of the ¼ share acknowledged as his
clients in the compromise in question or P1,000.00, which should constitute as a lien on the said share, in
spite of the waiver thereof in favor of respondent Aurelia Martinez. It is unnecessary to consider the petition
for mandamus. Costs against, private respondents.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon,: Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Castro, J., are on leave.
Capistrano, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1Widow of the deceased Lucio Magtibay and aunt-in-law of petitioner's clients.

2Annex A is the written agreement dated July 10, 1964 by which respondent Luis and Pablo
Magtibay contracted the services of petitioner and under which it was stipulated that petitioner
would been titled to a contingent fee of one-half of whatever his clients might be awarded either by
the court or by extrajudicial agreement.
3The motion to dismiss was based on the ground that the complaint failed to alleged that earnest
efforts towards compromise had been made, the suit being one between members of the same
family, citing Section 1 (j) of Rule 16.
4Petitioner claimed that the suit was by nephews-in-law against their aunt-in-law and, therefore, not
between members of the same family within the contemplation of the rule cited by movants.
5Petitioner's contention indicated in footnote 4 was upheld by the court.

6Paragraph 8 of the Kasulatan contains a request to the court to dismiss the case in the following
words: "8. Matapos maipaliwanag sa amin ang lahat, ay wala na kaming hangad na maghabol pa
sa aming mana kaya't hinihiling namin sa Hukuman ng Unang Dulugan ng Laguna, Sangay IV
(Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch IV), na putulin na ang aming sakdal na kaso Civil Blg.
525, sapagkat ang nais namin ay katahimikan at iwasan ang usapin sa hukuman."
7The contract Annex A, for professional services, was also annexed to the complaint as part of
Paragraph 10 thereof.
8Laid down in Rustia vs. the Court, etc., et al., supra.

Rustia v CFI of Batangas (44 Phil. 62)

Fahima G.R. No. L-19695 November 17, 1922
JUAN S. RUSTIA, Petitioner, vs. THE JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
Abobakar
BATANGAS, Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable FRANCISCO
DOMINGUEZ, ROSA H. DE PORCUNA and her husband JUSTO M.
PORCUNA and EULALIA MAGSOMBOL,Respondents.
The petitioner in his own behalf.
The respondents Porcunas in their own behalf.
Jose Mayo Librea for the other respondents.
OSTRAND, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari, the petitioner alleging that the
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance exceeded his jurisdiction
in dismissing a pending action at the instance of the parties but without
the intervention of the attorney for the plaintiff in the case, the herein
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It appears from the record that on July 31, 1921, the respondent Justo
Porcuna, for himself and on behalf of his wife, the respondent Rosa H. de
Porcuna, by means of a written contract, retained the petitioner to
represent them as their lawyer in case No. 1435 then pending in the
Court of First Instance of Batangas and in which Rosa H. de Porcuna was
the plaintiff and one Eulalia Magsombol was the defendant. The contract
fixed the petitioner’s fee at P200 in advance with an additional contigent
fee of P1,300. It was also provided in the contract that Justo Porcuna
should not compromise the claim against the defendant in the case
without express consent of his lawyer, the herein
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After trial, the petitioner then being plaintiffs’ attorney of record, the
Court of First Instance, under date of December 24, 1921, rendered
judgment in favor of Justo Porcuna and Rosa H. de Porcuna ordering the
defendant Eulalia Magsombol to return to them 602 pieces of cloth or in
default thereof to pay to them the sum of P3,250. On January 14, 1922,
Eulalia Magsombol filed her exception to the judgment and on the
following day presented a motion for a new trial, which was denied on
the 21st of the same month. She thereupon gave notice of appeal and
presented a bill of exceptions which was approved on February 20, 1922.
On March 2, 1922, and before the transmission of the bill of exceptions
to this court, the plaintiffs presented the following motion in the Court of
First Instance.
The plaintiffs, without any further intervention of
their attorney, now appear before this Honorable
Court and respectfully aver:chanrobles virtual law
library
That, through Mr. Miguel Olgado, they already
settled this case with the herein
defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
That the basis of the compromise is that we, the
plaintiffs, finally agree that we should be paid the
amount of eight hundred pesos (P800) in two
installments; P300 to be paid on this same date,
and the remaining five hundred pesos (P500) at
the end of March, 1922.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
That we, the plaintiffs, recognize not to have any
further rights in this case than to the aforesaid
amount of eight hundred pesos (P800) and that
this is the total amount the defendant Eulalia
Magsombol should pay us, and we have no right
whatever to any other amount than the
aforementioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
That we have not sold to any other person our
rights as plaintiffs in this
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Wherefore, the plaintiffs respectfully request the
dismissal of this case without any pronouncement
as to costs, and that the appeal interposed by the
defendant be further
dismissed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Batangas, Batangas, P.I., March 2,
1922.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
 (Sgd.) ROSA H. PORCUNA
Plaintiff chanrobles virtual law library
JUSTO M. PORCUNA
Plaintiff .
The defendant, through here attorney, Jose Mayo Librea, having signified
her assent to the motion, the Court of First Instance on the same day,
March 2, dismissed the action without notice to counsel for the
plaintiffs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner alleges that he did not discover the dismissal of the action
until April 4, 1922. After an unsuccessful effort to obtain a
reconsideration of the order of dismissal from the trial court, he filed the
present petition for a writ of certiorari. By resolution dated October 24,
1922, this court denied the petition and upon motion of the petitioner we
shall now briefly state our reason for such
denial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The burden of the petitioner’s contention is (1) that he, as attorney of
record, was entitled to notice of his client’s motion to dismiss the case,
and (2) that after the approval of the bill of exceptions the lower court
had lost jurisdiction of the case and had no power to dismiss it. A
moment’s reflection should make it clear that neither of these
propositions is tenable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Both at the common law and under section 32 of the Code of Civil
Procedure a client may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of
the proceedings and there is nothing to prevent a litigant from appearing
before the court to conduct his own litigation. (Sec. 34, Code of Civil
Procedure.) The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit
without the intervention of his lawyer.
Though there is a valid agreement for the
payment to the attorney of a large proportion of
the sum recovered in case of success, this does
not give the attorney such an interest in the cause
of action that it prevents plaintiff from
compromising the suit. (4 Cyc., 990, and
authorities cited in Note 6; see
alsoLouque vs. Dejan, 129 La., 519;
 Price vs. Western Loan and Savings Co., 19 Ann.
Cas., 589 and Note.)
In the present instance the clients did nothing that they did not have a
perfect right to do. By appearing personally and presenting a motion
they impliedly dismissed their lawyer. The petitioner’s contingent
interest in the judgment rendered did not appear of record. Neither as a
party in interest nor as an attorney was he therefore entitled to notice of
the motion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As to the second proposition that the court below could not dismiss the
case after the bill of exceptions had been approved, it is very true upon
such approval the lower court loses its jurisdiction over all contentious
matters connected with the issues in the case. But there is nothing to
prevent all of the parties by agreement to withdraw the bill of exceptions
with the consent of said court and resubmit the case to the jurisdiction of
the court. That was all that was done in this case. A valid agreement
between the parties to a case is the law of the case in everything
covered by the agreement. (Civil Code, art. 1091; Compañia General de
Tabacos vs. Obed, 13 Phil., 391.) The petitioner might have protected his
interests by entering an attorney’s lien under section 37 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petition for a writ of certiorari was therefore properly denied. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Araullo, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Johns, and
Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4227             January 28, 1952
JOSE BARRAMEDA, DOLORES B. MAGADIA, and JULIAN BARRAMEDA, JR., plaintiffs-appellees, 
vs.
PAULINO BARBARA and MARELA BARBARA, defendants-appellants.
Jose M. Peña for appellees.
Serafin and Abad for appellants.
JUGO, J.:
The facts of this case as gathered from the decision of the Court of first Instance of Camarines Sur, may be
summarized as follows:
In the case entitled Paulino Barbara and Marcela Barbara vs. Julian Barrameda, Civil Case No R-119 of
said court, Paulino and Marcela Barbara (defendants-appellants herein) filed a complaint against Julian
Barrameda (deceased father of the herein plaintiffs-appellees), alleging that Barrameda refused to allow
the redemption of the land in question herein, which according to them had been mortgaged to Barrameda
for the sum of P270, the original mortgagor and mortgagee being Jacoba Buyet and Juan Reis,
respectively. Juan Reis assigned his rights as mortgagee to Julian Barrameda. Jacoba Buyet was
succeeded by heirs Paulino and Marcela Barbara. Julian Barrameda filed an answer alleging that the
transaction between him and Jacoba Buyet was not a mortgage but a sale with  pacto de retro and that
neither Jacoba Buyet nor heir heirs had redeemed the land within the stipulated period of six years, and
consequently, he, Julian Barrameda, had become the absolute owner of the property in question.
After the above pleadings had been filed and while the case was pending hearing, the court, after being
informed that Julian Barrameda had died, ordered the plaintiffs to amend their complaint so as to substitute
the legal representative of Julian Barrameda as defendants. Although seven months had elapsed since the
plaintiffs were notified of said order, they had failed to comply with it.
On May 7, 1947, counsel for the deceased defendant Julian Barrameda filed a motion for dismissal on the
ground that in failing to file an amended complaint, the plaintiffs in said case, R-119 (defendants-appellants
herein), showed lack of interest in prosecuting the case. The court granted the motion, dismissing the case
in its order dated May l3, l947.
The plaintiffs herein, Jose and Julian Barrameda, Jr., and Dolores B. Magadia, heirs of Julian Barrameda,
filed a complaint, dated August 26, l947, in the present case, No. 843 of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, against Paulino and Marcela Barbara (plaintiffs in case No. R-119), alleging the facts
above stated, and praying that they declared the owners of the property in question and that the
defendants be ordered to indemnify them in the sum of P200 per annum as damages from May, 1947 until
the defendants should vacate the land.
The defendants herein Paulino and Marcela Barbara filed an answer, alleging in substance, that the deed
which the plaintiff claim to be of sale with pacto de reto was only of mortgage, which was null and void
because their deceased mother Jacoba Buyet, who executed it, had no authority to do so, as the property
belonged exclusively to their deceased father Pascual Barbara; that they had been in possession of the
land as owners for more than twenty years. The answer of the defendants ends with the prayer that the
document in question be declared null and void; that if it is declared valid, it be considered only as a
mortgage of guaranty of one-half of the property in question; and that they be ordered to pay to the
plaintiffs only half of the sum of P270 with costs against the plaintiff.
The plaintiffs in the present case filed a motion entitled "Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim of the
Defendants and Render Judgment in accordance with the Allegations in the Complaint," based on the
grounds:
1. That the cause of action stated in said counterclaim is barred by prior judgment.
2. That the said counterclaim states no cause of action.
3. That the answer does not allege any valid defense.
The trial court, without receiving evidence and rejecting the allegations of the answer of the ground that the
prior dismissal under Rule 30, section 3, was a final adjudication on the merits, rendered judgment in the
present case declaring the plaintiffs owners of the land in question and ordering the defendants in the
present case to deliver the possession to the plaintiffs, and to pay the costs.
The defendants herein appealed to the Court of Appeals which considering that all the questions raised are
of law and not, of fact, certified the present case to this Court, which accepted it.
The order for dismissal for failure to prosecute in the other case, No. R-119, was based on the failure of the
plaintiffs to comply with the order of the court to amend the complaint so as to substitute as defendants the
heirs or representative of the deceased defendant Julian Barrameda.
Rule 3, section 16, reads as follows:
Duty of attorney upon death or incapacity of the party. — When ever a party to a pending case dies
or becomes insane, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death or
insanity and to give the name and residence of the executor or administrator, guardian, or the legal
representatives of the deceased or insane.
Section 17 of the same rule, reads as follows:
Death of party. — After the party dies and the claims is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted
for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the
legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by
the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing
party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for
the deceased, without requiring of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
It will be seen that it was the duty of the attorney for the deceased Julian Barrameda to inform the court of
Barrameda's death and furnish it with the name and residence of the executor, administrator, guardian, or
legal representative of the deceased. The attorney of the deceased or somebody else, who does not
appear of record, may have informed the court of the death of Julian Barrameda, but said attorney did not
furnish the name and residence of the executor, administrator, guardian, or legal representative of the
deceased client, in accordance with section 16, Rule 3, above quoted. This rule must have taken into
consideration the fact that the attorney for the deceased party is in a better position than the attorney of the
other party to ascertain who are the legal representatives or heirs of his deceased client. This duty should
not be shifted to the plaintiff or his attorney. As a consequence of section 16, the court, under section 17,
orders the legal representative of the deceased party, whose name must have been furnished before hand
by his attorney, to appear and substitute the deceased within thirty days. It is only after the failure of the
legal representative to comply with said order that the court, under section 17, will order the opposing party
to procure the appointment of a legal representative within the time to be specified by the court, to appear
in behalf of the interest of the deceased party. It should be understood that under section 17, the heirs of
the deceased may appear instead of an executor or administrator, with guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs. In the present case, although the attorney for the deceased Barrameda did not furnish the name of
the legal representative of his deceased client, the court directly ordered the plaintiffs to make the
substitution without previously requiring the defendants to do so. Consequently, the order of the court
requiring the plaintiffs to make the substitution without previously ordering the attorney for the defendants
to name the legal representative and ordering the latter to appear, was a violation of Rule 3, sections 16
and 17, and was, therefore, void. The non-compliance with that order could not be considered as failure to
prosecute. The fault of the defendants should not be attributed to the plaintiffs, making the latter suffer the
serious consequences that are claimed to have ensued.
It is stated in the appealed decision:
. . . So on May 7, 1947, counsel for the defendant Julian Barrameda filed a motion for dismissal. . . .
On May 7, 1947, Julian Barrameda was already dead. How could the attorney represent him in finding the
motion? Julian Barrameda, being dead, had no longer any standing in court; he had no personality and
could not have been represented by an attorney. But if it had been the heirs of the deceased Barrameda
who were represented in filing the motion to dismiss (which was not so), then instead of filing a motion for
dismissal they should have appeared as defendants in lieu of the deceased Julian Barrameda. If they had
appeared in court to file a motion for dismissal, they could and should have appeared as defendants as it
was their duty to do under sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3, without shifting this duty to the plaintiffs.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is set aside and the case is ordered returned to the
trial court for further and appropriate proceedings, with costs against the appellees. It is so ordered.
Paras C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
TUASON, J., concurring:
I concur and my concurrence is based on the fact that the dismissal of the action in Civil Case No. R-119
did not bar the plaintiffs, in that case, from renewing that action or using the grounds of that action as a
defense or cross-claim in a subsequent suit. Case No. R-119 when dismissed was not in a state to be
decided on the merits and the court had no jurisdiction in that case beyond that of dismissing it, irrespective
of whether the order to the plaintiffs to make a substitution of party defendant was or was not in accordance
with the prescribed procedure.

Orcino v Gaspar AC 3773

03
Thursday
Apr 2014
Posted by reylangarcia in Uncategorized ≈ Leave a comment
TagsAC 3773, Legal Ethics, Orcino v Gaspar, Orcino v Gaspar AC 3773, Orcino v
Gaspar case digest
TOPIC: Legal Ethics, termination of attorney-client relationship

FACTS:
Orcino engaged the services of Atty. Gaspar to prosecute a criminal case she
intended to file against several suspects in the slaying of her husband. Orcino
bound herself to pay respondent legal fees ofP20,000.00 — P10,000.00 to be paid
upon signing of the contract and the balance to be paid on or before the
conclusion of the case. She was also to pay P500.00 per appearance of
respondent before the court and fiscal. This agreement was embodied in a
contract executed on February 22, 1991. Orcino complied with the contract and
Atty. Gaspar entered into his duties. Atty. Gaspar, however failed to attend the
hearing scheduled in August 1991. It was at this hearing that the court, over
complainant’s objections, granted bail to all the accused. Orcino immediately
went to respondent’s residence and confronted him with his absence. Gaspar
explained that he did not receive formal notice of the hearing. She asked for the
records of the case saying that she could refer them to another lawyer. Gaspar
then gave her the records. Orcino never returned the records nor did she see
Gaspar. On September 18, 1991, Atty. Gaspar filed before the trial court a Motion
to Withdraw as Counsel without the consent of Orcino. The court issued an order
directing Gaspar to secure complainant’s consent to the motion and his
appearance as private prosecutor shall continue until he has secured this
consent. Oricno refused to sign her conformity. Atty. Gaspar did not appear at the
hearings nor did he contact Orcino, thus she was compelled to engage the
services of another lawyer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Gaspar had the right to terminate the attorney-client relation

HELD:

The client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at any
time with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the
relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. An
attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
conclusion. He cannot abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to
withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s
written consent or from a good cause. Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides: “Sec. 26. Change of attorneys — An attorney may retire at any
time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client
filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special
proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the
client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to
retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be
entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice
of the change shall be given to the adverse party.” In the present case, Orcina did
not give her written consent to Gaspar’s withdrawal. He did not even file an
application with the court for it to determine whether he should be allowed to
withdraw.

But granting that respondent’s motion without complainant’s consent was an

application for withdrawal with the court, the Supreme Court found this reason
insufficient to justify the withdrawal. Atty. Gaspar’s withdrawal was made on the
ground that “there no longer exists the xxx confidence” between them and that
there had been “serious differences between them relating to the manner of
private prosecution. Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:

“CANON 22 — A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD

CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. Rule 22.01– A
lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases: a) When the
client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the
matter he is handling; b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct
violative of these canons and rules; c) When his inability to work with co-counsel
will not promote the best interest of the client; d) When the mental or physical
condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment
effectively; e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or
fails to comply with the retainer agreement; f) When the lawyer is elected or
appointed to public office; and g) Other similar cases.” The instant case does not
fall under any of the grounds mentioned. Neither can this be considered similar
or analogous to any. Orcina was upset by Atty. Gaspar’s absence at the hearing
where bail was granted to the suspected killers of her husband and it was thus
natural for her to react by confrontation. Her words were uttered in a burst of
passion and cannot be construed to have intended to terminate Atty. Gaspar’s
services. She made this clear when she refused to sign his “Motion to Withdraw
as Counsel.” Even if Atty. Gaspar was justified in terminating his services, he,
however, cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. The
lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by
the court. Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains
counsel of record.
Return the amount owed to Orcina. Admonished to exercise prudence.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

 
G.R. No. L-35356 May 18, 1973
ONG CHING, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF
OF CEBU, JOSE JAYME, ROSARIO J. SOCO, ADRIANO SOCO, CARMEN J. PEREZ, FULGENCIO M.
PEREZ, TRINIDAD J. LUMAPAS, LUPECINC LUMAPAS, CORAZON J. TRUZ, MATILDE J. YBAÑEZ,
and DOMINGO YBAÑEZ, respondents.
Higinio C. Hermosisima for petitioner.
Esperanza F Garcia for respondents.
Ramon Duterte for private respondents.

ANTONIO, J.:
Petition for certiorari, with prayer for preliminary injunction, to set aside the order dated July 24, 1972, of
respondent Court of First Instance of Cebu, in Civil Case No. R-10866, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the judgment therein and granting the writ of execution.
In a judgment rendered by the respondent court on April 14, 1972, the complaint of petitioner as lessee
against private respondents, owners of the leased property as defendants for (a) damages — "for the
refusal of the defendants to comply with their obligation to grant a renewal of the contract of lease for
another fifteen (15) years, according to the terms and conditions of the original agreement ..." and (b) for
injunction — "to enjoin the defendants from selling the land subject-matter of the lease agreement, without
first annotating on the certificate of title the lease agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant," was
dismissed, and said party was ordered to vacate the leased premises, surrender the possession thereof to
defendants, remove the improvements he constructed thereon, and pay defendants the rentals from
October 24, 1968, until the date of the judgment, at P1,680.00 per month, and the sum of P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees plus the costs of the suit.
After petitioner (plaintiff) received a copy of the judgment on April 18, 1972, a motion for reconsideration of
the said decision on behalf of petitioner was filed with respondent court on May 18, 1972, not by Atty.
Candido Vasquez, counsel of record of petitioner, but by one Atty. Higinio Hermosisima. This motion was
predicated on two grounds: (1) Under the contract of lease and the supplemental contract of lease, the
lease was renewable at the option of the plaintiff under exactly the same terms and conditions as the
original contract of lease, and (2) the court had no jurisdiction over defendants' counterclaim for ejectment.
This motion for reconsideration, was opposed by the private respondents as defendants in the case,
principally on the following grounds: (a) the "motion for reconsideration" having been filed by a new
counsel, with no formal appearance in the case and without complying with the requirements of Section 26,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court for substitution of attorneys has no legal effect whatsoever and
therefore the filing of such pleading did not suspend the running of the 30 day period to appeal, (b) the
contention of plaintiff is without merit as the court has sufficiently shown in its judgment that while the
contract of lease may be renewed, it was not under the same terms and conditions of the original lease,
and (c) the ejectment of plaintiff from the premises being a necessary and compulsory counterclaim of
defendants to plaintiff's action, was properly within the jurisdiction of the court to decide.
In its order of July 24, 1972, the trial court after reiterating its previous findings and construction of the
renewal system clause of the lease agreement, denied the motion for reconsideration and ruled that there
being no proper substitutions of counsel, the motion filed by Atty. Hermosisima, was without any legal effect
and could not have suspended the running of the period for appeal and consequently considered the
judgment final and granted the issuance of a writ of execution.
On July 31, 1972 when the Provincial Sheriff of Cebu proceeded to levy on execution plaintiffs properties
pursue to the writ of execution, petitioner (plaintiff) filed the present petition for certiorari to annul the
aforesaid order of the court.
On August 17, 1972, We required respondents to file the answer and issued a temporary restraining order
to enjoin the enforcement of the challenged order..
The main issues which this Court is called upon to resolve are: (1) whether the filing of the motion for
reconsideration with the court below suspended the running of the period within which to appeal; and (2)
whether said court has jurisdiction to order petitioner to vacate the premises and surrender the possession
thereof to the private respondents.
1. The settled rule is that in order that there may be a valid substitution of attorneys in a given case, there
must be (a) written application for substitution; (b) a written consent the client; and (c) a written consent of
the attorney to b substituted. In case the consent of the attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained, there
must at least be proof that notice of the motion for substitution has been served upon him in the manner
prescribed by the rules.1
The present case, however, does not involve a substitution of attorneys, but merely the employment by
petitioner of a additional counsel. True it is, as claimed by respondents, that the motion for reconsideration
filed by Atty. Hermosisima gives no indication that he was presenting his motion in collaboration with Atty.
Vasquez; but neither would it indicate that by his filing of the pleading in the case, Atty. Hermosisima was
replacing Atty. Vasquez as counsel for petitioner. In law it is assumed prima facie that every attorney who
appears in court does so with sufficient authority. 2 The fact that a second attorney enters an appearance on
behalf of litigant does not authorize a presumption that the authority of the first attorney has been
withdrawn.3 There is no question that a party may have two or more lawyers working in collaboration as his
counsel in a given litigation. Thus in the case at bar the certificate dated May 16, 1972, executed by Atty.
Vasquez, is to the effect that he, with the consent and authority of petitioner (who signified his confirmity in
writing) was authorizing Atty. Hermosisima to collaborate with him in the case due to his ill health. While the
said certificate was not attached to the motion for reconsideration on May 17, 1972, but was presented in
court rather belatedly on June 16, 1972 as an annex to petitioner's "Rejoinder to Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration," respondents have not shown that the recitals of fact contained therein did not reflect the
truth. At any rate, this case is different from U.S. v. Borromeo,4 Fojas, et al. v. Navarro,5 Ramos v.
Potenciano,6 Baquiran v. Court of Appeals.'7 Here petitioner's counsel, Atty. Vasquez, not only affirmed his
continued connection with the case, but also explained Atty. Hermosisima's appearance as collaborating
counsel. While it may be desirable in the interest of an orderly conduct of judicial proceedings, that a
counsel for a party should file with the court his formal written appearance in the case, before filing a
pleading therein, or mention in said pleading that he is submitting the same in collaboration with the
counsel of record, the mere circumstance that such acts were not done does not warrant the conclusion
that the pleading filed by such counsel has no legal effect whatsoever.
Respondents also claim that petitioner's motion for reconsideration is pro forma and, therefore, did not toll
the period for appeal. A cursory reading of the motion for reconsideration reveals that except for his
contention assailing the jurisdiction of the Court on respondents' counterclaim, petitioner merely amplified
his arguments in support of his theory that the contract of lease was renewableat the option of the lessee
"under exactly, the same terms and conditions" as the original contract of lease. Such argument appears to
have been already considered, weighed and resolved adversely to petitioner, by the trial court in its
decision.
Considering that the motion for reconsideration was filed on the 30th day of the period within which
petitioner could appeal from the questioned judgment, it might be useful to ascertain, if the appeal, if
allowed, would be meritorious and not a futile exertion of judicial authority.
There are certain facts found by the trial court which militate against the contention of petitioner. 8 The lease
contract of October 23, 1953 was drafted and prepared by the lawyer of the petitioner, and although the
same was revised on February 15, 1965 for the purpose of clarifying the terms of the original agreement,
no explanation has been given why the stipulation in the original lease that the "lessor shall have the option
to renew said lease for a like period", was not clarified by adding the phrase "under the same terms and
conditions", if it was true that such was the intention of the parties. A distinction between a stipulation
to renew a lease and one to extend it for an additional period beyond the original term is usually made.
The former usually requires the execution of new lease, while the latter does not. 9 In any event since the
contract was drafted upon the direction of the petitioner, an ambiguity in the option clause should therefore
be construed against said party. 10 Apart from this on October 20, 1968, a day immediately prior to his
sending of his telegram to Jose Jayme, one of the lessors, advising them of his intention to "exercise the
option to renew the lease ... for a like period of fifteen years" and two days before the expiry date of the
lease on October 22, 1963, petitioner had prepared the complaint which he filed in the case at bar.
Certainly if he believed in good faith that he had the right to an extension of the lease, why did he prepare
the complaint even before knowing the action of the lessors, on the renewal of the lease? Moreover,
considering that the area leased was in a commercial zone where it was shown that the real estate
assessments had been progressively increasing to such an extent that in 1963 the assessment of said
property had risen by 321% (P4,531.50 to P19,080.00), it was certainly improbable that the private
respondents would have agreed for an extension of the lease for another period of 15 years at the same
measly rental of only P91.60 monthly. Finally, it was shown that Jose Jayme, who signed the 1953 lease
agreement as attorney in-fact of all of the owners, had no express authority to grant an extension of the
lease another period of 15 years.
Under such circumstances it will not serve any useful purpose to allow the appeal since it can not be
reasonable expected that "the legal conclusions of the trial court, which a apparently in accordance with
law, will be modified substantially to warrant a different result." 11
Petitioner having raised before the court the issue of the validity of his renewal of the lease and
consequently of his right to retain possession of the premises, it is rather late in the day for him now to
question the authority of the Court to order him to vacate the premises after declaring that the lease had
already expired as it was not lawfully renewed by the parties and therefore his continued possession of the
land is an act of unlawful usurpation. The aforesaid order is but the logical and necessary consequence of
such judicial declaration. Having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure an affirmative relief
against his opponents, petitioner may not now be allowed to repudiate or question the same jurisdiction
after failing to obtain such relief. 12 While jurisdiction of tribunal may be challenged at any time, sound
public policy bars petitioner from so doing after having procured that jurisdiction himself, speculating on the
fortunes of litigation. 13
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
Barredo, J., took no part.

 
Footnotes
1 U.S. v. Borromeo, et al., 20 Phil. 189 [1911]; Ramos, et al. v. Potenciano, et al., L-19436,
Nov. 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 589.
2 Tan Lua v. O'Brien, et al., 55 Phil. 53,60.
3 Aznar v. Norris, 3 Phil. 636, 638.
4 20 Phil. 189.
5 L-26365, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 476.
6 9 SCRA 589.
7 2 SCRA 873.
8 Decision of the Court of First Instance dated April 14, 1972 and its order of July 24, 1972
in Civil Case No. R-10866.
9 Thompson on Real Property, 362. See also the following:
A distinction between a stipulation to renew a lease and one to extend it for an additional
period beyond the original term is usually made. The former usually requires the execution
of a new lease, while the latter does not. Whether a provision of a lease constitutes a
covenant for renewal or merely an agreement for an extension of the term depends on the
intention of the parties as manifested by the lease as a whole, or by their practical
construction thereof. (Blanck vs. Kimi and Realty Co., 122 Conn. 317,189 Atl. 176).
A clause in a lease providing for an "extension" operates of its own force to create an
additional term, but a clause providing for a "renewal" does not have a similar effect but
merely creates an obligation to execute a new lease for the additional term (Arnett v. Lewis,
37 O.L.A. 71, 45 N.E. (2d) 313; Add Lexington Flying Service, Inc. v. Andersen's Exr., 239
S.W. (2d) 945).
Where a five-year lease gave the lessee the option of extending the lease for a further term,
it was held that the exercise of the option was but a prolongation of the original lease for a
further term (Levin v. Rose, 19 N.E.(2d) 297).
On the other hand, the expression that the lessor covenants to renew the lease indicates
the intention of the parties to execute a new instrument (Kollock v. Scribner, 98 Wis. 104, 73
N.W. 776).
The determination of whether a clause in a lease is a covenant for renewal or one for an
extension depends upon the intention of the parties as gathered from the entire instrument.
(Freiheit v. Broch, 98 Conn. 166, 118 At]. 828; Kozy Theatre Co. v. Love, 191 Ky. 595, 231
S.W. 249; Edwards-Pickering Co. v. Rodes, 203 Ky. 95, 261 S.W. 884).
Irrespective of whether a clause in a lease is one for the extension or renewal thereof, its
terms and conditions must be sufficiently definite and certain to enable a court to determine
what has been agreed upon, and if it fails in this respect it is not enforceable. (Cohare
Realty Co. v. Stilson, 22 Ohio App. 432, 154 N.E. 53).
The foregoing is certainly not inconsistent with our ruling in previous cases that the word
"extendible", standing without qualification in a contract of lease, means that the lease may
be extended and is equivalent to a promise to extend, made by the lessor to the lessee, and
as a unilateral stipulation, obliges the promisor to fulfill his promise (Legarda Koh v.
Ongsiako, 36 Phil. 185; Cruz v. Alberto, 39 Phil. 991).
10 Art. 1377, New Civil Code; Asturias Sugar Central v. The Pure Cane Molasses Co., 57
Phil. 519; Gonzales v. La Previsora Filipino, 74 Phil. 165.
11 Lucas v. Mariano. 44 SCRA 517.
12 Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al., 23 SCRA 29, 35-36 Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 29
SCRA 419.
13 Crisostomo, et al. vs. Court of Appeals et al., 32 SCRA 54. 58; Libudan v. Palma, 45
SCRA 17.