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Metodología de la Investigación I
Introducción a la epistemología, basado en el capítulo 1 del texto de
Nicholas Rescher (2003)
Intencionalmente en Spanglish
Agosto 2018
EPISTEMOLOGIA
TEORIA DEL CONOCIMIENTO
El primer paso es reconocer que “conocer” (to know) tiene ambos sentidos, uno proposicional y otro
procedimental: hay una lado intelectual de “conocer que algo u otro es el caso” (that-knowledge) y
un lado práctico de conocer cómo desempeñar alguna acción y realizarla hasta el final (how-to-
knowledge).
Knowledge claims (afirmaciones) can be regarded from two points of view, namely, internally
and committally, subject to an acceptance there of as correct and authentic, and externally and
detachedly, viewed from an “epistemic distance” without the commitment of actual acceptance,
and seen as merely representing purported knowledge.
Hay una amplia variedad de representaciones cognitivas: realizar, notificars, recordar, preguntar – y
algunas veces existen sus negativos: ignorar, olvidar, etc.
The idea of limits of knowledge lies outside our ken. We cannot be specific about our ignorance in
terms of knowledge: It makes no sense to say “p is a fact that I do not know” for if we know
something in specific to be a fact we can, for that very reason, no longer be in ignorance about it.
However, “Q is a question that I cannot answer” poses no difficulty.
Lo que la gente sabe – o creen ellos mismos saber – es simplemente la suma total de
respuestas que ofrecen a preguntas que pueden resolver.
La urgencia básica del ser humano es dar sentido a las cosas (to make
sense) como aspecto característico de nuestra composición – no
podemos vivir una vida satisfactoria en un ambiente que no
entendemos.
MODOS DE CONOCIMIENTO
¿Es el conocimiento una creencia
verdaderamente justificada?
The basic idea is that there can be no problem in crediting x with knowledge of p if:X
believes p on grounds sufficient to guarantee its truth and realizes this to be the case.
Actually, to have knowledge is one sort of thing, something that goes well beyond is
required for its being the case that you or I have adequate grounds for claiming that it is the
case. With claims appropriate, assurance of all sorts stops well short of guaranteeing actual
truth. And this is so with our subjectively justified knowledge claims as well.
Use conditions are geared to the world’s operational realities. They bear not on what must
invariably be in some necessitarian manner, but on what is usually and normally the case.
And here—in the realm of the general rule, the ordinary course of things—it is perfectly
acceptable to say that “knowledge is true justified belief.”
MODOS DE CONOCIMIENTO
PROPOSICIONAL
¿El agua moja?
Potencial, probable
Ocurrencial (eventual)
Accesible (accessibility)
Disposicional
Disponible (available)
For our concern in epistemology is less with the impersonal question of what people
do accept than with the normative question of what, in the circumstances, it is both
appropriate and practicable for them to accept. Thus in attributing knowledge we look
not only to the information that people have in a more or less explicit way but also to
what they are bound to be able to infer from this.
Which turns on not what the individual themselves can derive from their knowledge
but on what we can derive from it, so that something is “known” in this sense
whenever (∃q)(Kxq & q⌐p).We arrive here at a disjunctive specification of
fundamentally recursive nature:
•X conoce p ocurrencialmente
•X conoce p disposicionalmente
•P puede ser derivado inferencialmente usando solo el hecho de que X lo conoce.
A person cannot be said to know that
something is the case when this individual is
OTROS PRINCIPIOS BASICOS
not prepared to “accept” it in this sort of Principio de Veracidad (Verosimilitud)
way.
If Kxp, then p.
Si K conoce que Ki conoce p, en efecto: Si K conoce (la existencia del conocimiento) K conoce p, entonces K
conoce p.
Los colombianos conocen que García Márquez conoce Macondo, en efecto: es porque los colombianos
conocen Macondo (conocen que Macondo existe) entonces García Márquez conoce Macondo.
If KiKyp, then Kip; and more generally: if Kx(∃y)Kyp, then Kxp
Si Juan conoce finanzas y Juan conoce comercio, comercio y finanzas son conocidas por
Juan. A menos que Juan no conozca finanzas o no conozca comercio.
Ojo con el “y”; si no conoce una de las dos, no puedo decir que conoce las dos.
Postulado de la posibilidad del
conocimiento de p
Posiblemente (existe conocimiento) K conoce p ◊(∃x)Kxp
difiere a decir “alguien posiblemente conoce p” (∃x)◊Kxp.
Si existe el hecho de que posiblemente García Márquez conozca Macondo, entonces Macondo existe.
Entonces (2) es una tesis verosimil (plausible), mientras que (1) no.