1.0 G.R. No. 139539.

February 5, 2002
CEROFERR REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ERNESTO D. SANTIAGO, respondents.

The Facts

Plaintiff Ceroferr filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint against defendant Santiago for
damages and injunction. Plaintiff prayed that Santiago and his agents be enjoined from claiming
possession and ownership over Lot No. 68 of the Tala Estate Subdivision, prevent them from
making use of the vacant lot used as a jeepney terminal and order them to pay Ceroferr P650.00
daily as lost income for the use of the lot.

Santiago alleged that the vacant lot referred to in the complaint was within Lot No. 90 of the Tala
Estate Subdivision which he has its own land title.

In a verification survey, it appeared that the vacant lot is inside Lot No. 68. This was vigorously
objected by defendant insisting that the vacant lot is inside the boundaries of Lot No. 90.
Defendant also asserted a superior claim as against that of the plaintiff because his title has been
confirmed through judicial reconstitution proceedings, whereas plaintiffs title does not carry any
technical description of the property except only as it is designated in the title as Lot No. 68 of the
Tala Estate Subdivision.

For the defendant, the case would no longer merely involve a simple case of collection of
damages and injunction but a review of the title of defendant vis-a-vis that of plaintiff. At this
point, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint premised primarily on his
contention that the trial court cannot adjudicate the issue of damages without passing
over the conflicting claims of ownership of the parties over the disputed portion.

RTC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction holding that plaintiff
was in effect impugning the title of defendant which could not be done in the case for damages
and injunction before it. The court cited the hoary rule that a Torens certificate of title cannot be
the subject of collateral attack but can only be challenged through a direct proceeding.

The CA dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff and likewise denied its motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint filed states a sufficient cause of action.

HELD:
The Court granted the petition. The decision of CA was reversed and the case was remanded to
RTC for further proceedings.

RATIO:
The rules of procedure require that the complaint must state a concise statement of the ultimate
facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot
be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states
a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right in favor
of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation
on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of
the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery
of damages.
These elements are present in the case at bar.
The complaint alleged that petitioner Ceroferr owned Lot 68 covered by TCT No. RT-90200
(334555) where he used a portion of Lot 68 as a jeepney terminal. The complaint further alleged
that respondent Santiago claimed the portion of Lot 68 used as a jeepney terminal since he
claimed that the jeepney terminal was within Lot 90 owned by him and covered by TCT No. RT-
781 10 (3538) issued in his name.
Petitioner Ceroferrs cause of action has been sufficiently averred in the complaint. If it were
admitted that the right of ownership of petitioner Ceroferr to the peaceful use and possession
of Lot 68 was violated by respondent Santiagos act of encroachment and fencing of the same,
then petitioner Ceroferr would be entitled to damages.

2.0 G.R. No. 183398 June 22, 2015

CLODUALDA D. DAACO, Petitioner,
vs.
VALERIANA ROSALDO YU, Respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner Daaco filed a complaint against respondent Yu et al before the RTC in
Tacloban City for Annulment of Title, Recovery of Property and Damages. After the answer had
been filed and preliminary matters disposed of, the RTC set the pre-trial conference on October
4, 2007 at 8:30am. Petitioner failed to appear, thus upon motion, the trial court dismissed the
case.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that she was not properly notified of
the pre-trial because she received the notice only at 5:30pm of October 3, 2007, or merely
15hrs before the scheduled conference. RTC denied the MR holding that under Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court, failure to comply the order of the court is a ground to dismiss plaintiff’s
complaint. The court noted that it was just 20 minutes away from petitioner’s residence.
Hence, the instant petition was filed where petitioner maintained that the sheer
impossibility for her to prepare for the scheduled conference deemed the 15-hour notice as if no
notice was given at all and hence the impropriety of the trial court’s dismissal.

ISSUE:
WON the RTCs dismissal of the case for petitioner’s failure to appear in the pre-trial conference
is contrary to law, rules and existing jurisprudence.

HELD:
Petition was devoid of merit.

RATIO:
Under Section 4 and 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the parties and their counsel has
the duty to appear at the pre-trial. Non-appearance may be excused only on a valid cause or if a
representative appear in their behalf fully authorized in writing. Failure of the plaintiff to appear
shall be cause for dismissal of the action with prejudice unless otherwise ordered by the court.
While failure of the defendant to appear shall cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence
ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
While non-appearance of a party may be excused if a valid cause is shown, it is subject
to the sound discretion of a judge.
 In this case, petitioner’s reasoning that she had yet to secure the services of a counsel is
specious. As per records, petitioner comes to the SC still unrepresented by any counsel. Thus,
the SC is under the impression that petitioner never really intended on securing the services of
counsel.
It was also noted that petitioner had more than a year from the filing of respondent’s
Answer on May 2006 to prepare for the pre-trial conference. During that period, petitioner was
able to file several motions and petitions subsequently denied by the court. It is clear, therefore,
that petitioner’s rather active participation in the proceedings during the period leading up to the
pre-trial conference contradicts her defense of unpreparedness.
Indeed, while a 15-hour notice may be quite impulsive, this fact, standing alone, fails to
excuse petitioner’s absence. The fact remains that notice was received by petitioner before the
date of the pre-trial, in compliance with the notice requirement mandated by the Rules.
Pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It is more than a simple marking of evidence. It is
not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it serves a vital objective: the simplification,
abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. Hence, it should not be
ignored or neglected, as petitioner had.
In view of the foregoing, this Court does not find that the facts in the case at hand
warrant a liberal construction of the rules. Considering that the petitioner failed to offer sufficient
justification for her failure to appear at the pre-trial conference, this Court finds no compelling
reason to disturb the findings of the trial court.

3.0 G.R. NO. 172588 : March 13, 2013

ISABEL N. GUZMAN, Petitioner, v. ANIANO N. GUZMAN and PRIMITIVA G.

MONTEALTO,Respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Isabel Guzman filed with the MTC of Tuguegarao a complaint for ejectment
against her children, respondents Aniano Guzman and Primitva Montealto. Petitioner allefed
that she and Arnold Guzman owned the 1,446 sq meter parcel of land under TCT No. T-74707
which the respondents occupied by tolerance, did not comply upon written demand to vacate
the property, and subsequent barangay conciliation proceedings failed to settle the differences
between them.
Respondents countered that the petitioner transferred all her property rights in the
disputed property, except her usufructuary right, in favor of her children in a 1996 document.
MTC found the petitioner to be the lawful owner of the land with a right to its possession
and directed the respondents to vacate the land.
On respondent’s appeal, the RTC ruled for the respondents taking into account that the
petitioner’s transfer of rights in the respondents’ favor could not be unilaterally revoked without a
court action.
Petitioner filed her first motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied the motion for lack
of the required notice of hearing.
Second and third motion for reconsideration were filed and subsequently denied by the
RTC. Petition to CA was also dismissed hence the petition to the SC.

ISSUE:
WON the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in strictly enforcing the requirement of
notice of hearing.
HELD:
No, the RTC did not commit grave abuse.

RATIO:
The requirement of notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process
that seeks to avoid "surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given
time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court." Given the
purpose of the requirement, a motion unaccompanied by a notice of hearing is considered a
mere scrap of paper that does not toll the running of the period to appeal. This requirement of
notice of hearing equally applies to the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The petitioner's
alleged absence of counsel is not a valid excuse or reason for non-compliance with the rules.

4.0 G.R. No. 153667. August 11, 2005

AYALA LAND, INC., Petitioners, vs. HON. LUCENITO N. TAGLE, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, RTC-Imus, Branch 20, ASB REALTY CORP., and E. M. RAMOS & SONS,
INC., Respondent.

FACTS:
E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc. (EMRASON) is a real estate company which owns real estate
properties in Dasmarinas, Cavite, with a total area of 372 hectares. Its chairman and president is
Emerito Ramos Sr, with his wife Susana Ramos, and children as stockholders. ASB Realty Corp
alleged that on May 21, 1994, it entered into a Letter-Agreement with EMRASON for the conditional
sale of 65% of the said land in Cavite for a consideration of P400M payable in five installments.
However, ASB was informed that on May 18, 1994, EMRASON entered into a Contract to Sell
said real estate properties to petitioner Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI). This was annotated on the Transfer
Certificates of Title of the real estate properties in dispute. Thus, ADB filed the Complaint for
nullification of Contract to Sell Real Properties, Cancellation of Annotations on Transfer Certificates of
Title and Damages before the RTC. ALI filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-
Claim.
ASB subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to take testimony by deposition upon oral
examination of Emerito Ramos Sr., citing Section 4(c), Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court stating
that Emerito Ramos, Sr. was already 87 years old and although he was of sound mind, there is
always the possibility that he may not be able to testify on plaintiff’s behalf in the course of the
trial. The motion was granted and the deposition upon oral examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr. was
obtained on six different occasions.
Petitioner ALI filed a Motion to Resolve Objections (In deposition proceedings) on the
propriety, admissibility and conformity of the deposition proceedings to the Rules. ALI contended it
never underwent the process of a valid deposition taken under Rules 23 and 132 of the Rules of Court,
as the deposition was not completed, signed, certified, filed or offered before the court a quo,
hence, under the Rules, considered incompetent evidence. The trial court upheld the propriety of
the presentation of evidence made by plaintiff through deposition and ordered the setting of the cross-
examination of the deponent.
In 1999, Emerito Ramos Sr died at the age of 92. ASB then filed before the RTC a motion to
introduce in evidence the deposition of Emerito Ramos Sr. This was opposed by ALI but the RTC set
aside the opposition and admitted in evidence the deposition of Emerito Ramos Sr. ALI again elevated
the case to the CA but was dismissedfor lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the alleged deposition of Emerito Ramos Sr. is admissible under the Rules.

HELD:
Yes, the deposition is admissible. The purposes of taking depositions are to: 1) Give greater
assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury; 2) Provide
an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims and defenses; 3) Make available
in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not be proved except with
great difficulty; 4) Educate the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and
defenses thereby encouraging settlements; 5) Expedite litigation; 6) Safeguard against surprise;
7)Prevent delay; 8) Simplify and narrow the issues; and 9) Expedite and facilitate both preparation and
trial.
In this case, the trial court permitted the taking of Emerito Ramos, Sr.’s deposition chiefly
because of his advance age which ground is considered valid and justified under the Rules of Court.
While ALI contends that the prerequisites of a valid deposition (Rule 23) were disregarded. It must be
noted that the depositions of Emerito Ramos, Sr., taken, were substantially made in accordance with
the requirements of the Rules. The deposition of the late Emerito Ramos, Sr. was taken inside the
courtroom by the Clerk of Court in the presence of the parties and their lawyers, and the entire
proceedings was transcribed by the stenographers of the Court. Thus, the requirements that the
deposition has to be sealed, examined and signed by the deponent, and also certified, sealed and
signed by the deposition officer would be, to the mind of the court, already superfluous.
Strict compliance with the formal requirements of Rule 23 would hold true in cases of
depositions taken outside the Court. As intimated earlier, the rules on discovery should not be unduly
restricted; otherwise, the perceived advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth
and expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated.
It has been repeatedly held that the deposition – discovery rules are to be accorded a broad
and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters
inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within
the bounds of the law,as in the case at bar.
The instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.