Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
DECISION
ZALDIVAR, J.:
These are appeals from the joint decision of the Court of First
(her identity at the time was unknown) were charged in the city
day of February 1963, in Roxas City, the two accused, being private
individuals, conspired and confederated together and mutually
the two accused stated and made it appear in the amended peti-tion
that the same was signed and sworn to by Jovita Carmorin as one of
fact the accused Julia "Doe" who signed and swore to that petition
as Julia Carmorin.
the witnesses under oath before filing the information, the City
for habeas corpus (in Special Proceeding No. V-2669 of the Court
of Jovita Carmorin; and (2) that the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over his person because the warrant issued for his
arrest was illegal, Judge Barrios having issued the same without
3828.
municipal judges and not to city judges; and that the principle
but the same was denied for lack of merit. Thereupon he filed a
City Judge Isidro Barrios and City Fiscal Quirico Abela, contending
quash before the city court, and praying that res-pondent City
during the pendency of the special civil action in the Courtof First
Instance.
same city court of Roxas City (Criminal Case No. 4452) for
The city fiscal also certified that he had conducted the preliminary
over her person because the war-rant of arrest issued for her arrest
and the accused, her reply, on October 15, 1963, City Judge Barrios
quash before the city court, and also praying that respondent City
and denying others; and setting up the affirmative defense that the
two petitioners can not be the subject of the petitions for certiorari
court set the hearing of the two cases for January 24, 1964.
During the hearing of the two cases, which was held jointly,
be."[1]
in Criminal Case No. 4452 before the city court of Roxas City is
these two cases fall within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city
and where the Court of First Instance has taken cog-nizance of such
court, and having concurrent jurisdiction the city court acts with
Special Civil Cases Nos. 2721 and 2723, now appealed to this Court,
cognizance of those cases. The two special civil actions against the
City Judge and the City Fiscal of Roxas City should have been filed
city court. We note, however, that the decision of the Court of First
petitions in question.
Be that as it may, however, We believe that the error of the
proceedings have been pending for more than six years, and were
court of Roxas City in connection with the two criminal cases filed
While petitioners maintain in the court below that the City Fiscal
in their brief that under the existing laws he can commence such
instant case he avers that there was no violation of law. Basis of his
argument is that the petition for habeas corpus not being a
Section 38, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court,[8] enumerates the
writings."
The same principle also obtains in the United States, that
one Soterania Carmorin, and that said petition was duly subscribed
was conducted in his absence or behind his back thus denying him
his day in court. We find, however, in the record - and the
court a quo so found too - that on March 11, 1963, a subpoena was
1963, and on the same day he sent a letter to the city fiscal, which
his request, but because the fiscal's office failed to notify him of the
hearing on March 19, 1963, Bermejo was not present when the
and after finding that there was a prima facie case the city fiscal
which should have been done, it can also be said that Bermejo was
conducted in his absence. It was he himself who set the date of the
what action the city fiscal had taken on his request for
postponement, on any day before the date of the hearing set by him,
although he is living in Roxas City where the city fiscal holds his
office. Moreover, the information was filed five months later, and
the day of the hearing which he himself requested, coupled with his
his rights. If he did not have his day in court, it was because of his
communicate with the city fiscal. This Court had ruled that in the
evidence.[11]
Furthermore, even assuming that the city fiscal did not notify
Section 14, Rule 112 of the new Rules of Court invoked by them has
1963.[13] The Rules of Court are not penal statutes, and they
Having arrived at the conclusion that respondent city fiscal did not
of petitioners that the warrants of arrest issued for their arrest were
rather be submitted and threshed out in the city court during the
First Instance of Capiz in Special Civil Cases Nos. 2721 and 2723 is
set aside for having been rendered by the court without jurisdiction,
of Roxas City, are in accordance with law, and these cases should be
remanded to the City Court of Roxas City for trial on the merits. No
pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his
right to present evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was
committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of
the opinion that the respondent judge did not act in excess of his
jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's
motion to return the record for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito
and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently
promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of the peace had
allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall the
complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary investigation so
that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the
peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the
sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We said
that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the
defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it
or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice,
to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the
truth." chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right,
compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what
they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of
the order of arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the
constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses
against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the
absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right
to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation
may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional
right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry c han robles vi rt ual law li bra ry
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
FERNANDO SANTIAGO,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
fault of the plaintiff, such dismissal is without prejudice to the right of the
holding that the fact of the dismissal of the complaint was sufficient to
Saavedra had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent,
cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees
pay damages.
thereof since the 1930s.[8] They alleged that as far back as 1968,
respondents had already been ordered ejected from the properties after a
complaint for forcible entry was filed by the heirs of Edmundo Pinga. It
was further claimed that respondents application for free patent over the
By July of 2005, the trial of the case had not yet been completed.
June 2005, which took into account the assurance of respondents counsel
petitioner) opposed the move for postponement and moved instead for the
dismissal of the case. The RTC noted that it was obvious that respondents
had failed to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time, in fact
not having presented their evidence yet. On that ground, the complaint
was dismissed. At the same time, the RTC allowed defendants to present
issued in open court on 27 July 2005, opting however not to seek that
their complaint be reinstated, but praying instead that the entire action be
adjudication.
Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in an
action, and a conversu, the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the
for Review under Rule 45 on a pure question of law, the most relevant
Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does
motion for reconsideration without need for a court order to that effect;
than the merits of the counterclaim, despite the provisions under Rule 17
reviewing the assailed orders of the RTC, it is inevitable that the Court
complaint due to the plaintiffs fault, as in the case for failure to prosecute,
contrast to the provisions under Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court which
Evidently, the old rule was silent on the effect of such dismissal due to
v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.,[26] all of which were decided more than five
decades ago. Notably though, none of the complaints in these four cases
were dismissed either due to the fault of the plaintiff or upon the instance
of the defendant.[27]
governs the dismissals due to the failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the
Rule 17, which then, and still is now, covered dismissals ordered by the
trial court upon the instance of the plaintiff.[28] Yet, as will be seen in the
have cited in support of their claim that the counterclaim should have
been dismissed even if the dismissal of the complaint was upon the
in order.
particularly Section 2, Rule 17, which stated that in instances wherein the
Rule 17, noted that [t]here are instances in which a counterclaim cannot
remain pending for independent adjudication, as, where it arises out of, or
Court was called for, such as in Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete,[32] and Dalman v.
City Court of Dipolog City.[33] The latter case warrants brief elaboration.
Therein, the plaintiff in a civil case for damages moved for the
withdrawal of her own case on the ground that the dispute had not been
the defendant, who feared that her own counterclaim would be prejudiced
by the dismissal, plaintiffs motion was granted, the complaint and the
broad nature of that statement gave rise to the notion that the mandatory
dismissal of the counterclaim upon dismissal of the complaint applied
dismissals by order of the court, and not Section 3, Rule 17. As stated
motion of the defendant or upon motu proprio action of the trial court,
successfully moved before the trial court for the dismissal of the
could no longer have been heard after the dismissal of the complaint.
question does not depend upon the adjudication of the claims made in the
not available to plaintiffs like the petitioners, who prevent or delay the
hearing of their own claims and allegations.[37] The Court, through Justice
what had happened in Sta. Maria, fell within the coverage of Section 3,
Rule 17. On the other hand, Section 2 was clearly limited in scope to
complaint not only if such dismissal was upon motion of the plaintiff, but
at the instance of the defendant as well. Two decisions from that period
Appeals.[41]
In Metals, the complaint was expunged from the record after the
adjudication. The Court, in finding for the plaintiff, noted that the
to the proceeding in the original suit and derived its jurisdictional support
discourage multiplicity of suits.[43] Also, the Court noted that since the
filed against the defendant, and there was thus no more leg for the
which was granted by the trial court. The defendants counterclaim was
dismissed as well. The Court summarized the key question as what is the
answer.[45] Then it ruled that the counterclaim did not survive such
Court noted that [i]t is obvious from the very nature of the counterclaim
that it could not remain pending for independent adjudication, that is,
suit and merely derives its jurisdictional support therefrom. [48] Express
counterclaims not be dismissed along with the main complaint was for
strong objection to the theory of the majority. They agreed that the trial
court could no longer hear the counterclaim, but only on the ground that
was filed after the order dismissing the complaint had already become
necessarily dismissed along with the main complaint, pointing out that a
Rule 17, and not Section 2 of the same rule. Justice Regalado, who
Justice Regalado also adverted to Sta. Maria and noted that the objections
raised and rejected by the Court therein were the same as those now
relied upon by the plaintiff. He pointed out that Dalman and International
Committee tasked with the revision of the 1964 Rules of Court. Just a few
provide that the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of the plaintiff
[Justice Regalado] then proposed that after the words upon the
courts own motion in the 6th line of the draft in Sec. 3 of Rule 17, the
following provision be inserted: without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action. The Committee agreed with the proposed
amendment of Justice Regalado.
Justice Herrera observed that under Secs. 1 to 3 of Rule 17, it is not the
action that is dismissed but the complaint. He asked whether there is
any distinction between complaint and action. Justice Regalado opined
that the action of the plaintiff is initiated by his complaint.
counterclaims.[52]
when the Court itself approved the revisions now contained in the 1997
Section 3, Rule 17 remain intact, but the final version likewise eliminated
of the counterclaim.
In his commentaries on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Justice
of Rule 17:
2. Under this revised section [2], where the plaintiff moves for the
dismissal of his complaint to which a counterclaim has been interposed,
the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action or to have the same resolved in the
same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should
render the corresponding order granting and reserving his right to
prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose to have
his counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint
had been dismissed, he must manifest such preference to the trial court
within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiffs motion to
dismiss. These alternative remedies of the defendant are available
to him regardless of whether his counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive. A similar alternative procedure, with the same underlying
reason therefor, is adopted in Sec. 6, Rule 16 and Sec. 3 of this Rule,
wherein the complaint is dismissed on the motion of the defendant or,
in the latter instance, also by the court motu proprio.
xxxx
the defendant to move for the dismissal of the complaint and to prosecute
whether the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the
Procedure, including the amended Rule 17, those previous jural doctrines
that were inconsistent with the new rules incorporated in the 1997 Rules
dismissed along with the complaint, clearly conflicts with the 1997 Rules
as far back as 1997, when the Court adopted the new Rules of Civil
Procedure. If, since then, such abandonment has not been affirmed in
and now, and we thus rule that the dismissal of a complaint due to fault of
action. We confirm that BA Finance and all previous rulings of the Court
that are inconsistent with this present holding are now abandoned.
Accordingly, the RTC clearly erred when it ordered the dismissal of the
Reversal of the RTC is in order, and a remand is necessary for trial on the
It would be perfectly satisfactory for the Court to leave this matter at that.
Still, an explanation of the reason behind the new rule is called for,
considering that the rationale behind the previous rule was frequently
elaborated upon.
Under Act No. 190, or the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions
plaintiff had the right to seek the dismissal of the complaint at any time
Nonetheless, a new rule was introduced when Act No. 190 was replaced
since the rights of the parties arising out of the same transaction should be
wherein it was the defendant with the pending counterclaim, and not the
thought that informs the broad proposition in Dalman that if the civil case
the complaint;[65] and that if the court dismisses the complaint on the
The first point is derived from Section 4, Rule 9, of the 1964 Rules of
Court, while the two latter points are sourced from American
set up in the same proceeding remains extant under the 1997 Rules of
another. The main difference lies in that the cause of action in the
the converse holds true with the complaint. Yet, as with a complaint, a
general rule. More often than not, the allegations that form the
than the plaintiffs very act of filing the complaint. Moreover, such
occurred prior to the filing of the complaint itself. The only apparent
that the very act of the plaintiff in filing the complaint precisely
matter of the opposing partys claim, does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties, and stands within the jurisdiction of the
court both as to the amount involved and the nature of the claim. [68] The
fact that the culpable acts on which the counterclaim is based are founded
within the same transaction or occurrence as the complaint, is insufficient
of time to undo the act or omission of the plaintiff against the defendant,
litigation
initiative or fault. If the defendant similarly moves for the dismissal of the
itself. The theory is correct, but there are other facets to this subject that
counterclaim could have very well been lodged as a complaint had the
defendant filed the action ahead of the complainant.[69] The terms
not detract from the fact that both of them embody causes of action that
party with a valid cause of action against another party cannot be denied
the right to relief simply because the opposing side had the good fortune
of filing the case first. Yet this in effect was what had happened under the
judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not
2005 and 10 October 2005 of Branch 29, Regional Trial Court of San
Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur in Civil Case No. 98-012 are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 135384. April 4, 2001]
MARIANO DE GUIA and APOLONIA DE GUIA, petitioners,
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of pretrial must be served
separately on the counsel and the client. If served only on the counsel, the notice must
expressly direct the counsel to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of
the pretrial conference. The absence of such notice renders the proceedings void, and
the judgment rendered therein cannot acquire finality and may be attacked directly or
collaterally.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the February 17, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
42971. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
The record shows that on October 11, 1990, plaintiffs Mariano De Guia, Apolonia De
Guia, Tomasa De Guia and Irene Manuel filed with the court below a complaint for
partition against defendants Ciriaco, Leon, Victorina and Pablo De Guia. They alleged
x x x that the real properties therein described were inherited by plaintiffs and
defendants from their predecessors-in-interest, and that the latter unjustly refused to
have the properties subdivided among them. Shortly after defendants filed their
traverse, an amended complaint was admitted by the lower court, in which plaintiff
Tomasa De Guia was impleaded as one of the defendants for the reason that she had
become an unwilling co-plaintiff.
It is further shown in the record that on June 11, 1992, the Branch Clerk of Court issued
a Notice setting the case for pre-trial conference on June 18, 1992 at 8:30 a.m. Copies
of said notices were sent by registered mail to parties and their counsel. It turned out
that both defendants and counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference. Hence, upon
plaintiffs motion, defendants were declared as in default and plaintiffs were allowed to
present their evidence ex-parte.
It appears that on July 6, 1992, defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the
June 16, 1992 Order which declared them as in default. They explained therein that
they received the Notice of pre-trial only in the afternoon of June 18, 1992, giving them
no chance to appear for such proceeding in the morning of that day. The Motion was
opposed by plaintiffs who pointed out that per Postal Delivery Receipt, defendants
counsel actually received his copy of the Notice on June 17, 1992 or one day before the
date of pre-trial. Citing Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, plaintiffs further urged
that counsels receipt of the said notice on June 17, 1992 was sufficient to bind
defendants who received said notice on the next day. Finally, they faulted defendants
for failing to support their Motion for Reconsideration with an affidavit of merit
showing among others that they had a meritorious defense.
In an Order dated August 19, 1992, plaintiffs motion for reconsideration was denied
and on June 11, 1993, judgment was rendered ordering the partition of the controverted
parcels of land.[4]
The CA Ruling
The CA sustained respondents claim that the trial court had improperly declared
them in default. It held that the Notice of pretrial received by their counsel a day
before the hearing did not bind the clients, because the Rules of Court in effect at the
time mandated separate service of such Notice upon the parties and their counsel. Said
the appellate court:
In fine, we hold that the lower court committed a reversible error in declaring appellants
as in default for their failure to attend the pre-trial conference [of] which they were not
properly served x x x notice and in subsequently rendering the herein appealed
judgment. And while we commend the lower court for its apparent interest in disposing
of the case with dispatch, the imperatives of procedural due process constrain us to set
aside the default order and the appealed judgment, both of which were entered in
violation of appellants right to notice of pre-trial as required by the Rules.[5]
The Respondent Court of Appeals, with grave abuse of discretion, erred in not finding
private respondents as in default despite the existence of fraud, for being contrary to
law, and for being contrary to the findings of the trial court.
II
The Respondent Court, with grave abuse of discretion, erred in reversing the trial courts
Decision notwithstanding private respondents violations of Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5
and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and Revised Circular No. 28-91.
III
The Respondent Court of Appeals, with grave abuse of discretion, erred in not
affirming the compromise agreement which has the effect and authority of res judicata
even if not judicially approved.
IV
The Respondent Court gravely erred in not applying Rule 135, Section 8 as warranted
by the facts, admission and the evidence of the parties.[7]
In the main, petitioners raise the following core issues: (1) the propriety of the
trial courts order declaring respondents in default; and (2) petitioners allegation of
procedural prejudice.
The Courts Ruling
When the present dispute arose in 1992, the applicable rule was Section 1, Rule
20 of the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provided as follows:
SECTION 1. Pre-trial mandatory. -- In any action after the last pleading has been filed,
the court shall direct the parties and their attorneys to appear before it for a conference
to consider:
x x x x x x x x x.
This provision mandated separate service of the notice of pretrial upon the
parties and their lawyers.[8] In Taroma v. Sayo,[9] the Court explained:
For the guidance of the bench and bar, therefore, the Court in reaffirming the ruling that
notice of pre-trial must be served separately upon the party and his counsel of record,
restates that while service of such notice to party may be made directly to the party, it is
best that the trial courts uniformly serve such notice to party through or care of his
counsel at counsels address with the express imposition upon counsel of the obligation
of notifying the party of the date, time and place of the pre-trial conference and
assuring that the party either appear thereat or deliver counsel a written authority to
represent the party with power to compromise the case, with the warning that a party
who fails to do so may be non-suited or declared in default. (emphasis supplied)
In this case, respondents received the notice on the afternoon of June 18, 1992, or
after the pretrial scheduled on the morning of that day.Moreover, although the Notice
was also sent to their counsel, it did not contain any imposition or directive that he
inform his clients of the pretrial conference. The Notice merely stated: You are hereby
notified that the above-entitled case will be heard before this court on the 18th day of
June, 1992, at 8:30 a.m. for pre-trial.[12]
Such belated receipt of the notice, which was not attributable to respondents,
amounted to a lack of notice. Thus, the lower court erred in declaring them in default
and in denying them the opportunity to fully ventilate and defend their claim in court.
Of course, this situation would not have arisen under Section 3,[13] Rule 18 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It specifically provides that notice of pretrial shall be
served on counsel, who is charged with the duty of notifying the client. Considering
the milieu of the present case, however, such amended proviso is not applicable.
Second Issue: Allegation of Procedural Bias
Petitioners allege that, to their detriment, the appellate court disregarded
established procedural precepts in resolving the case, and that it did so for three
reasons. First, respondents Manifestation and Motion to Lift the Order of Default,
filed with the trial court, was merely pro forma because the former lacked the
requisite notice of hearing. Second, it also lacked an affidavit of merit. Third,
respondents Appeal Brief did not contain a certificate of non-forum shopping.
Granting that respondents Manifestation and Motion to Lift the Order of Default
was pro forma, this issue has become moot, not only because the trial court had
denied such Motion, but also because what was appealed was the judgment rendered
by the lower court. For the same reason, we must also reject petitioners insistence that
an affidavit of merit was absent. In any case, there was no need to attach an affidavit
of merit to the Motion, as the defenses of respondents had been set out in their
Answer.
One last point. Petitioners fault the CA for remanding the case to the trial court,
arguing that the appellate court should have resolved the case on its merit.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
[ GR Nos. 99289-90, Jan 13, 1992 ]
VASQUEZ +
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Act No. 3019, Section 3(e); Criminal Case No. 91-94555 for
Contrary to law."
functions.
Contrary to law."
'not only useless but the most corrupt unit in the CID',
the latter.
Contrary to law."
No. 46. This Court, in issuing the said restraining order, took into
provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be
she sustained in a vehicular accident, and only after three (3) years
from the time the sixteen (16) charges were initially filed in 1988 by
the sequence of events which led to the filing of the three (3)
submitted its draft resolution only on March 29, 1990. After the
1991.
Trial Court x x x.
1991.
"With respect to the libel case which was filed with the
to blame."[5]
which he granted and caused him to defer action for some time on
will not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that
specified cases among which are to prevent the use of the strong
arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to
from 1990 to 1991, the filing of the information's against her will
verisimilitude.
We have carefully gone over the records of the case and, contrary to
impute, much less prove, any ill-motive on the part of herein public
raises the following defenses: that the donations received were not
raffle held during the CID Christmas party; that the legalization of
324 and was intended to assure family unity; and that the
self-defense.
the same in the proceedings before and/or during the trial of these
cases in the lower courts which would be the proper stages and fora
applicable thereto.
ground of self-defense."[11]
SO ORDERED.
[ GR NO. 157866, Feb 14, 2007 ]
PAREDES +
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Mangahas and Marilou Verdejo seeks to nullify and set aside the 14
without his knowledge and consent and that several demands were
made, but the same fell on deaf ears as petitioners refused to vacate
the MeTC.
lot with the knowledge and conformity of the true owner thereof,
part of the Tala Estate and that the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85,
Caloocan City because both cities are situated within the National
Capital Region.
issued by the Quezon City RTC has binding effect only within the
whether the MeTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case, and
private respondent. Since they possessed the property for that long,
land lasted for a period of not more than one year. In addition,
a fictitious title.
name was an indefeasible proof of his ownership of the lot and his
them as follows:
to the plaintiff;
that the writ of the latter court is limited only to its territorial area,
City. It sustained the MeTC's ruling that the latter court has
jurisdiction over the case as the same has been filed within the
2001.
65076.
In a Decision[3] dated 25 April 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed
13 December 2002.
the RTC a motion for execution pending appeal which was opposed
2002.
with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals.[5] Such
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court.
At any rate, since the complete records of this case have already
on the merits.
Caloocan City and its Decision dated 16 November 2000 on the sole
ground that the said court is precluded from issuing said Order and
injunction order originating from the Quezon City RTC had already
been litigated and finally decided when the Court of Appeals in
Case No. C-19097. Said Decision had become final and executory
Taking Our bearings from the above pronouncement, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City could not be deemed to have committed a reversible error when it denied the petitioners'
Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Apparently, the extent of the enforceability of an injunction
writ issued by the Regional Trial Court is defined by the territorial region where the magistrate
presides.[11]
Consequently, the issue involving the binding effect of the injunction issued by the Quezon
City RTC became the law of the case between the parties. Under this legal principle,
whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the parties
in the same case continues to be the law of the case, so long as the facts on which the decision
was predicated continue.[12] Stated otherwise, the doctrine holds that once an appellate court
has declared the law in a case that declaration continues to hold even in subsequent
appeal.[13] The reason lies in the fact that public policy dictates that litigations must be
terminated at some definite time and that the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of
Petitioners are therefore barred from assailing the ruling that the injunction issued by the
Quezon City RTC has no binding effect to the courts of Caloocan City as this issue had already
been passed upon with finality. Issues should be laid to rest at some point; otherwise there
conclusiveness of judgment.
Quite conspicuously, the instant petition assailing the order of the RTC denying petitioners'
motion to suspend execution is a ploy to deprive private respondent of the fruits of his hard-won
case. It must be stressed that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial
duty of the presiding judge to issue a writ of execution except in certain cases, as when
subsequent events would render execution of judgment unjust.[16] Petitioners did not allege
nor proffer any evidence that this case falls within the exception. Hence, there is no reason to
vacate the writ of execution issued by the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 124, Caloocan City, denying petitioners' Motion to Supend Execution dated 14
February 2003 in Civil Case No. C-19097 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[ GR NO. 157866, Feb 14, 2007 ]
PAREDES +
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Mangahas and Marilou Verdejo seeks to nullify and set aside the 14
without his knowledge and consent and that several demands were
made, but the same fell on deaf ears as petitioners refused to vacate
the MeTC.
lot with the knowledge and conformity of the true owner thereof,
part of the Tala Estate and that the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85,
Caloocan City because both cities are situated within the National
Capital Region.
issued by the Quezon City RTC has binding effect only within the
whether the MeTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case, and
private respondent. Since they possessed the property for that long,
land lasted for a period of not more than one year. In addition,
a fictitious title.
name was an indefeasible proof of his ownership of the lot and his
them as follows:
to the plaintiff;
that the writ of the latter court is limited only to its territorial area,
City. It sustained the MeTC's ruling that the latter court has
jurisdiction over the case as the same has been filed within the
2001.
65076.
In a Decision[3] dated 25 April 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed
13 December 2002.
the RTC a motion for execution pending appeal which was opposed
2002.
with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals.[5] Such
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court.
At any rate, since the complete records of this case have already
on the merits.
Caloocan City and its Decision dated 16 November 2000 on the sole
ground that the said court is precluded from issuing said Order and
injunction order originating from the Quezon City RTC had already
been litigated and finally decided when the Court of Appeals in
Case No. C-19097. Said Decision had become final and executory
Taking Our bearings from the above pronouncement, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City could not be deemed to have committed a reversible error when it denied the petitioners'
Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Apparently, the extent of the enforceability of an injunction
writ issued by the Regional Trial Court is defined by the territorial region where the magistrate
presides.[11]
Consequently, the issue involving the binding effect of the injunction issued by the Quezon
City RTC became the law of the case between the parties. Under this legal principle,
whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the parties
in the same case continues to be the law of the case, so long as the facts on which the decision
was predicated continue.[12] Stated otherwise, the doctrine holds that once an appellate court
has declared the law in a case that declaration continues to hold even in subsequent
appeal.[13] The reason lies in the fact that public policy dictates that litigations must be
terminated at some definite time and that the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of
Petitioners are therefore barred from assailing the ruling that the injunction issued by the
Quezon City RTC has no binding effect to the courts of Caloocan City as this issue had already
been passed upon with finality. Issues should be laid to rest at some point; otherwise there
conclusiveness of judgment.
Quite conspicuously, the instant petition assailing the order of the RTC denying petitioners'
motion to suspend execution is a ploy to deprive private respondent of the fruits of his hard-won
case. It must be stressed that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial
duty of the presiding judge to issue a writ of execution except in certain cases, as when
subsequent events would render execution of judgment unjust.[16] Petitioners did not allege
nor proffer any evidence that this case falls within the exception. Hence, there is no reason to
vacate the writ of execution issued by the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 124, Caloocan City, denying petitioners' Motion to Supend Execution dated 14
February 2003 in Civil Case No. C-19097 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[ GR No. 93262, Nov 29, 1991 ]
DAVAO LIGHT v. CA +
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
application of the plaintiff (Davao Light & Power Co.), before the
P4,600,513.37.
issue the same because at the time the order of attachment was
promulgated (May 3, 1989) and the attachment writ issued (May 11,
1989), the Trial Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
following disposition:
ordered DISCHARGED."
act coercively against the defendant or his property * *; " and that
affirmative and that consequently, the petition for review will have
to be granted.
the validity of acts done during this period should be dependent on,
over the person of the defendant is one thing; quite another is the
thereof.
thus that the court acquires jurisdiction over said subject matter or
over his person.[7] On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person
between the day of the filing of the complaint and the day of service
any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken
into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any
the date of the filing of the complaint -- which, as above pointed out,
filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and
other fees -- the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of
laid down by law, and that he may do so at any time, either before
substance.
enforced by the action, and that the amount due to the applicant, or
recover, is as much as the sum for which the order (of attachment)
writ shall issue upon the applicant's posting of "a bond executed to
exceeding the plaintiff's claim, conditioned that the latter will pay
all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all
court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled
thereto."[24]
defendant, for the reason that this "would defeat the objective of
the remedy ** (since the) time which such a hearing would take,
against them and the probable seizure of their properties, and thus
give them the advantage of time to hide their assets, leaving the
are secured by law to the defendant. The relative ease with which a
That separate opinion stressed that there are two (2) ways of
1.1. When property has already been seized under attachment, the
defendant need not wait until his property is seized before seeking
the discharge of the attachment by a counterbond. This is made
supplied)
Section 13 of Rule 57. Like the first, this second mode of lifting an
attachment may be resorted to even before any property has been
sought out by the attaching creditor instead of the other way, which,
supra.,[28] to wit:
Phil. 886)."
withdrawn."
personal property (Rule 60), the rule is the same: they may also
issue ex parte.[29]
It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court
however valid and proper they might otherwise be, these do not
and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless
made."
issue ex parte provided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court
provides:
information.
x x x[1]
Manuel Dy Awiten.[3]
Corporation.[4]
stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As
long as the evidence presented shows a prima facie case against the
funds and closed account; that petitioner and his co-accused, being
its activities and transactions. These are all that need to be shown
arrest. It need not be shown that the accused are indeed guilty of
the crime charged. That matter should be left to the trial. It should
explains the bases for his findings that there is probable cause to
charge all the accused with violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the
The general rule is that this Court does not review the factual
exceptional cases where this Court sets aside the conclusions of the
that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm
exception.
entitled to seek relief from this Court nor from the trial court as he
jurisdiction, thus:
plaintiff or petitioner.
tribunals.[11]
arrest is to place the accused under the custody of the law to hold
him for trial of the charges against him. His evasive stance shows
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
P e t i t i o n e r,
Present:
PUNO,
Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
BONGBONG andVALENTINO
R e s p o n d e n t s.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1996 and 28 June 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17,
Palompon, Leyte, in Civil Case No. PN-0016, dismissing his complaint
before the RTC on 11 January 1996 to contest his dismissal with the
of justice and a fatal denial of his constitutional right to due process for
the grounds relied upon therein to terminate him were never made a
subject of a complaint nor was he notified and made to explain the acts he
was said to be guilty of. Fundamental is the rule and also provided for in
the Civil Service Rules and Regulations that no officer or employee in the
Violation of Civil Service Law and Rules and for Illegal Dismissal.[11]
respondents from the charge of violating the Civil Service Law when they
the Palompon, Leyte Water District. Thus, the CSC dismissed[13] the
yielded to the decision of the trial court and dismissed the appeal filed by
petitioner, viz:
not mandamus will lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon,
Leyte Water District to reinstate the General Manager thereof, and (2)
whether or not the CSC has primary jurisdiction over the case for illegal
dismissal of petitioner.
overlooked the fact that mandamus may lie to compel the performance of
a discretionary duty in case of non-observance of due process. He
resort to court action for relief as due process was clearly violated.[18]
for illegal dismissal against them with the CSC after obtaining an
RTC.[19] Not only is petitioner guilty of forum shopping; he, too, is guilty
certification he appended with the present petition omitted the fact that he
say.[20] Respondents theorize, as well, that the instant case has already
stance that it was fitting for the Court of Appeals to affirm the trial courts
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 128 indeed clearly states that the
be denied.
discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public
officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be
Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 was later amended by P.D. No. 768 on
termination are clearly within the wide arena of discretion which the
legislature has bestowed the appointing power, which in this case is the
for any cause and following Orcullo there is no need of prior notice or
due hearing before the incumbent can be separated from office. Hence,
Water Districts under Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 falls under Section 14
servants who serve at the pleasure of the appointing power and whose
in Orcullo
sphere on the matter of the wisdom of Section 23 of P.D. No. 198. One of
not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a
law Republic Act No. 9286, which amended Section 23 of P.D. No. 198
not be removed from office, except for cause and after due process. Rep.
...
Sec. 5. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.[31]
Unfortunately for petitioner, Rep. Act No. 9286 is silent as to the
First, there is nothing in Rep. Act No. 9286 which provides that it
should retroact to the date of effectivity of P.D. No. 198, the original
law. Next, neither is it necessarily implied from Rep. Act No. 9286 that it
or any of its provisions should apply retroactively. Third, Rep. Act No.
Districts who, under the then Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, shall serve at
the pleasure of the Board. Under the new law, however, said General
Manager shall not be removed from office, except for cause and after due
process. To apply Rep. Act No. 9286 retroactively to pending cases, such
as the case at bar, will rob the respondents as members of the Board of
the Palompon, Leyte Water District of the right vested to them by P.D.
accountable for actions which were valid under the law prevailing at the
of P.D. No. 198 prior to its amendment by Rep. Act No. 9286.
subscribing to the trial courts view that the petition for mandamus was
belong to the civil service. Thus, [t]he hiring and firing of employees of
Service Law and Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Tanjay was
jurisdiction, to wit:
and functions of the CSC, being the central personnel agency of the
Government, to carry into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law
and other pertinent laws,[39] including, in this case, P.D. No. 198.
and 01 April
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 136048. January 23, 2001]
MERCADER, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Manchester ruling requiring the payment of docket and other fees as a
condition for the acquisition of jurisdiction has no retroactive effect and applies only
to cases filed after its finality.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the April 17, 1998 Decision[1] and the October 28, 1998 Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 40772. The decretal portion of said Decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing premises considered, the DECISION appealed
from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the loss of earnings of the late
Dominador Mercader is reduced to P798,000.00.[3]
(b) For the loss of earnings of the late Dominador Mercader -- P1,660,000.00, more or
less, based on the average life span of 75 years from the time of his death who earned a
net income of P5,000.00 monthly out of his business;
(d) 25% of whatever amount is collected by [respondents] from [petitioners] but no less
than P50,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per hearing by way of attorneys fees;
The Facts
The antecedents of the case are succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals in
this wise:
The original complaint was filed against JB Lines, Inc. [Petitioner JB Lines, Inc.] filed
a motion to dismiss complaint, to strike out false-impertinent matters therefrom, and/or
for bill of particulars on the primary grounds that [respondents] failed to implead Jose
Baritua as an indispensable party and that the cause of action is a suit against a wrong
and non-existent party. [Respondents] filed an opposition to the said motion and an
amended complaint.
In an Order dated December 11, 1984 the trial court denied the aforesaid motion and
admitted the amended complaint of [respondents] impleading Jose Baritua and alleged
the following:
(10) The late Dominador Mercader is a [b]usinessman mainly engaged in the buy and
sell of dry goods in Laoang, N. Samar. He buys his goods from Manila and bring[s]
them to Laoang, Northern Samar for sale at his store located in the said locality;
(11) Sometime on March 16, 1983, the late Dominador Mercader boarded [petitioners]
bus No. 142 with Plate No. 484 EU at [petitioners] Manila Station/terminal, bound for
Brgy. Rawis, Laoang Northern Samar as a paying passenger;
(12) At that time, Dominador Mercader had with him as his baggage, assorted goods
(i.e. long pants, short pants, dusters, etc.) which he likewise loaded in [petitioners] bus;
(13) The late Dominador Mercader was not able to reach his destination considering
that on March 17, 1983 at Beily (Bugco) Bridge, Barangay Roxas, Mondragon,
Northern Samar, while he was on board [petitioners] bus no. 142 with Plate No. 484 EU,
the said bus fell into the river as a result of which the late Dominador Mercader died. x
x x.
(14) The accident happened because [petitioners] driver negligently and recklessly
operated the bus at a fast speed in wanton disregard of traffic rules and regulations and
the prevailing conditions then existing that caused [the] bus to fall into the river.
[Respondents] then filed a motion to declare [petitioners] in default which motion was
opposed by [petitioners]. [Respondents] withdrew the said motion prompting the trial
court to cancel the scheduled hearing of the said motion to declare [petitioners] in
default in an Order dated January 23, 1985.
In its answer, [petitioners] denied specifically all the material allegations in the
complaint and alleged the following:
2. The alleged person of Dominador Mercader did not board bus 142 at [petitioners]
Manila station/terminal x x x as a (supposed paying passenger). There is even no
statement in the complaint that Dominador Mercader (if it were true that he was a
passenger of bus 142 at the [petitioners] Manila station/terminal) was issued any
passenger-freight ticket conformably with law and practice. It is a fact of public
knowledge that, in compliance with existing rules and laws, [Petitioner] Baritua, as a
public utility operator, issues, thru his conductors, in appropriate situations, to a true
passenger, the familiar and known passenger and freight ticket which reads in part:
NOTICE
xxxxxxxxx
Whole Fare Paid P ______________
Signature of Owner.
3. It is also a fact of public knowledge that [Petitioner] Baritua does not have any
Manila station/terminal, because what he has is a Pasay city station.
4. [Petitioner] Baritua had no prior knowledge that, on or about March 17, 1983, and/or
previous thereto, the Bugko Bailey Bridge (across Catarman-Laoang road) in Barangay
Roxas, Mondragon, Northern Samar, was in virtual dilapida[ted] and dangerous
condition, in a state of decay and disrepair, thus calling for the concerned government
and public officials performance of their coordinative and joint duties and
responsibilities, to repair, improve and maintain that bridge, in good and reasonably
safe condition, but, far from performing or complying with said subject duties and
responsibilities, the adverted officials concerned, without just cause, not only failed and
neglected to cause such needed repair, improvement and maintenance of the Bugko
Bailey Bridge, on or prior to March 17, 1983, but also failed, and neglected to either
close the Bugko Bridge to public use and travel, and/or to put appropriate warning and
cautionary signs, for repair, improvement, maintenance, and safety purposes. So that,
as a proximate and direct consequence of the aggregate officials nonfeasance, bad faith,
negligence, serious inefficiency, and callous indifference to public safety, that Bugko
Bridge collapsed inward and caved in ruin, on that March 17, 1983, while Barituas bus
142 was cautiously and prudently passing and travelling across the said bridge, as a
result of which the bus fell into the river and sea waters, despite the exercise and
compliance by Baritua and his driver of their duties in the matter of their requisite
degree of diligence, caution and prudence, Baritua also exercised and complied with
the requisite duty of diligence, care, and prudence in the selection and supervision over
his driver, contrary to the baseless imputation in paragraphs 14 and 20 of the original
and amended complaints. Moreover, Baritua and his driver did not violate any traffic
rule and regulation, contrary to plaintiffs insinuation.
5. Furthermore, [Petitioner] Baritua and his driver have no causative connection with
the alleged death of Dominador Mercader who, according to a reliable source, was
already seriously suffering from a lingering illness even prior to his alleged demise.
Baritua also learned lately, and so it is herein alleged that Dominador Mercader
contributed considerably, to, and/or provided the proximate and direct cause of his own
death, hence, he himself is to be blamed for whatever may have happened to him or for
whatever may have been sustained by his supposed heirs, vis--vis the suit against the
wrong party.
6. Baritua and his driver, as earlier stated, did not commit any actionable breach of
contract with the alleged Dominador Mercader or the latters supposed heirs.
7. There is no factual nor any legal basis for plaintiffs proffered claims for damages.
8. Based on the preceding averments, plaintiffs have neither a cause nor a right of
action against [Petitioner] Baritua and his driver.
8.1. The allegation that supposedly the x x x [p]laintiffs are the compulsory heirs of the
late DOMINADOR MERCADER x x x (par. 8, complaint) is too vague and too broad,
as the subject allegation is a bare and pure conclusionary averment unaccompanied by
the requisite statement of ultimate facts constitutive of a cause or right of action.
8.2.b. The allegation on supposed minimum life of 75 years and on he expects to earn
no less than P1,680,000.00 x x x is false, a pure hyperbole, and bereft of factual and
legal basis. Besides, what jurisprudential rule refers to is only net earning. The law
abhors a claim, akin to plaintiffs allegation, which is manifestly speculative, as it may
not exist at all. Furthermore, the questioned allegation in the plaintiffs original and
amended complaints is not preceded by the requisite statement of definitive facts, nor
of any specific fact, which could possibly afford a rational basis for a reasonable
expectation of supposed earning that could be lost, or impaired.
8.2.c. Likewise, the allegations that allegedly x x x the late Dominador Mercader
boarded x x x Bus No. 142 x x x and that supposedly the latter had a baggage x x x
containing drygoods x x x in which case [petitioners have] to pay the value thereof in
such amount as may be proven by [respondents] in court during the trial x x x, apart
from being false, are offensive to the rule on concise statement of ultimate facts. The
assailed allegations also contravene Interim Rule 11, (i)f any demand is for damages in
a civil action the amount thereof must be specifically alleged. In consequence of this
averment, [respondents] have not yet paid the correct docket fee, for which reason,
[respondents] case may be dismissed on that ground alone.
8.3. In violation also of the same Interim Rule 11, regarding the requisite definitive
amount of claim, the allegation on the supposed funeral expense x x x does not also
indicate any specific amount. So with the averment on supposed moral damage which
may not be warranted because of absence of allegation of fraud or bad faith, if any,
there was, apart from want of causative connection with the defendant.
8.4. The allegation in paragraph 15 of the original and amended complaint is also a pure
conclusionary averment, without a factual premise.
The RTC, after due trial, rendered the aforesaid assailed Decision.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts award of
monetary damages in favor of respondents, except the amount of Dominador
Mercaders lost earnings, which it reduced to P798,000. It held that petitioners failed
to rebut the presumption that in the event a passenger died or was injured, the carrier
had acted negligently. Petitioners, it added, presented no sufficient proof that they had
exercised extraordinary diligence.
Did the honorable Court of Appeals (CA) gravely abuse its discretion when it allowed
to pass sub silencio the trial courts failure to rule frontally on petitioners plea for a bill
of particulars, and ignored the nature of respondents prayer in the complaint pleading
for an award of --
a) P12,000.00 -- representing the death compensation;
II
Did the CA also ignore the fact that the trial court was not paid the correct amount of
the docket and other lawful fees; hence, without jurisdiction over the original and
amended complaints or over the subject matter of the case;
III
IV
In awarding excessive and extravagant damages, did the CA and the trial court adhere
to the rule that their assailed decision must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the
laws on which they are based?[7]
Distilling the alleged errors cited above, petitioners raise two main issues for our
consideration: (1) whether the CA erred in holding that the RTC had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case, and (2) whether the CA disregarded petitioners
procedural rights.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners contend that since the correct amounts of docket and other lawful fees
were not paid by respondents, then the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case.
The Court, in Manchester Development Corporation v. CA,[8] held that [t]he court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading. x x x.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not
only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to
comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.[13] (emphasis supplied)
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred when it passed sub silencio on
the trial courts failure to rule frontally on their plea for a bill of particulars.
Section 1. When applied for; purpose. -- Before responding to a pleading, a party may
move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not
averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare
his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filed within ten
(10) days from service thereof. Such motion shall point out the defects complained of,
the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the details desired.[16] (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioners also argue that their right to present evidence was violated by the CA,
because it did not consider their contention that the trial judges who heard the case
were biased and impartial. Petitioners contend, as they did before the CA, that Judge
Tomas B. Noynay based his Decision on certain chosen partial testimonies of
[respondents] witnesses x x x. They further maintain that Judge Fortunato Operario,
who initially handled the case, questioned some witnesses in an overzealous manner
and assum[ed] the dual role of magistrate and advocate.[17]
These arguments are not meritorious. First, judges cannot be expected to rely on
the testimonies of every witness. In ascertaining the facts, they determine who are
credible and who are not. In doing so, they consider all the evidence before them. In
other words, the mere fact that Judge Noynay based his decision on the testimonies of
respondents witnesses does not necessarily mean that he did not consider those of
petitioners. Second, we find no sufficient showing that Judge Operario was
overzealous in questioning the witnesses. His questions merely sought to clarify their
testimonies. In all, we reject petitioners contention that their right to adduce evidence
was violated.
Alleged Failure to State Clearly the Facts and the Law
We are not convinced by petitioners contention, either, that both the trial and the
appellate courts failed to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law involved in
the case. As can be gleaned from their Decisions, both courts clearly laid down their
bases for awarding monetary damages to respondents.
Both the RTC and the CA found that a contract of carriage existed between
petitioners and Dominador Mercader when he boarded Bus No. 142 in Pasay City on
March 16, 1983. Petitioners failed to transport him to his destination, because the bus
fell into a river while traversing the Bugko Bailey Bridge. Although he survived the
fall, he later died of asphyxia secondary to drowning.
We agree with the findings of both courts that petitioners failed to observe
extraordinary diligence[18] that fateful morning. It must be noted that a common carrier,
by the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to carry
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. It is supposed to do
so by using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.[19] In case of death or injuries to passengers, it is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755[20] of the Civil Code.
We sustain the ruling of the CA that petitioners failed to prove that they had
observed extraordinary diligence.
First, petitioners did not present evidence on the skill or expertise of the driver of
Bus No. 142 or the condition of that vehicle at the time of the incident.
Second, the bus was overloaded at the time. In fact, several individuals were
standing when the incident occurred.[21]
Third, the bus was overspeeding. Its conductor testified that it had overtaken
several buses before it reached the Bugko Bailey Bridge.[22]Moreover, prior to
crossing the bridge, it had accelerated and maintained its speed towards the bridge.[23]
Finally, we cannot fault the appellate court in its computation of the damages and
lost earnings, since it effectively computed only net earnings in accordance with
existing jurisprudence.[25]
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Court, seeking to annul the October 29, 1999 Order issued by the
[2]
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Civil Case
No. 3722-O. The decretal portion of the assailed Order reads as
follows:
For the foregoing considerations, this Court is not inclined to approve
and grant the motion to dismiss[,] although the municipality has all the
right to bring the matter or issue to the Supreme Court by way of
certiorari purely on question of law.
[3]
The Facts
To settle the boundary dispute, the City of Ormoc filed before the
RTC of Ormoc City (Branch 35) on September 2, 1999, a Complaint
docketed as Civil Case No. 3722-O.
On September 24, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the following grounds:
(1) That the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim;
(2) That there is no cause of action; and
(3) That a condition precedent for filing the complaint has
not been complied with[.] [5]
Issue
Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of
the Complaint is Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code
(LGC), which provides:
[11]
thereof reads:
Sec. 89. Election of provincial governor and members of the
Provincial Board of the Province of Leyte. The qualified voters of
Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of
the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of
the Province of Leyte.
Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or
highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an independent component city,
because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial
elective officials. It is a city independent of the province. In fact, it is
considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in
Region VIII by both Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a
[14]
provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxxxxxxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions[.]
Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court or agency over the settlement of boundary disputes between a
municipality and an independent component city of the same province,
respondent court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all
controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary
powers. They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of
[21]
a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to
the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not
only original, but also exclusive.
In Mariano Jr. v. Commission on Elections, we held that
[22]
DECISION
73 Phil. 484
MORAN, J.:
This case is certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the
sufficient evidence to show that the protestant has duly filed his
in his counter-protest.
etc. Co., 34 Fed. 228; Starnes vs. Mutual Loan etc., Co., 102 Ga. 597;
the opinion, and so hold, that the issue of jurisdiction which confers
authority which organizes the court and defines its powers (Banco
Espafiol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Perkins vs. Dizon, 40 Off.
life and structure of our judicial system, the law has deemed it wise
to place the power and authority to act thereon in the highest court
court has jurisdiction, but that if such fact is not proven the trial
certain ballots are or are not pertinent to the issue raised in the
jurisdiction over the issue. In order that a court may validly try and
Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Perkins vs. Dizon, 40 Off. Gaz. No.
Hutts vs. Martin, 134 Ind. 587, 33 N.E. 676), meaning thereby that
the issue being tried and decided by the court be within the issues
that issue. (Cf. Atkins etc. Co. vs. Domingo, 44 Phil. 680). At any
rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue
private, interest, and the court may examine all the ballots after the
ballot boxes are opened in order to determine which are legal and
which are illegal, even though neither of the parties raised any
question as to their illegality. (Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil. 781;
41).
further proceedings.