A.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

ONG CHIA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127240, March 27, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner was born in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the
vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually
started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66,
he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization Law.
The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. On appeal, CA reversed the
trial court and denied petitioner’s application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance of
naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and
brought up for the first time on appeal.
Petitioner’s principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely
been annexed by the State to its appellant’s brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial
court’s decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence during the trial, they are mere
"scraps of paper” devoid of any evidentiary value

ISSUE: Whether or not the rules on evidence applies to a petition for naturalization.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Rule 1, Sec. 4 provides that: “These rules shall not apply to land registration,
cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided
for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.”
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by petitioner
is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said
rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is
not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact,
appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not
preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.

CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta, wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin, entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor
of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport,
and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and
for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
petitioner. After trial, RTC rendered judgment for private respondent. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier
issued was made final and petitioner. Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from
"using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

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ISSUE: whether or not documents and/or correspondence taken by one spouse without the consent of the
owner spouse may be used by former against the latter as evidence in an action for disqualification to practice a
profession.

HELD:
The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order
from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of
the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received
in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom
of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this
has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT

G.R. NO. 150224, May 19, 2004

FACTS:
Appellant Yatar was charged and convicted of Rape with Homicide by the trial court. The basis of the conviction
rest on circumstantial evidence gathered from the testimony of various witnesses, to: (1) the presence of the
accused at the crime scene within the timeframe of the approximate time of death of the victim; (2) at one point
prior to the commission accused was seen wearing a white shirt with collar; (3) latter on he was seen wearing a
dirty white shirt with collar; (4) when the body of the victim was found, a dirty white shirt was seen beside her; (5)
the dirty white shirt with collar found at the crime scene was stained by blood; (6) when the blood stain and
accused’s blood was subjected to DNA testing, it was found that it contained the same DNA; (7) that when
semen found inside the victim’s body was subjected to DNA testing, it was found to be identical to that of
accused’s DNA.
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as well
as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-
incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not, taking of accused’s blood sample and subjecting the same to DNA testing is
inadmissible in evidence as it amounts to violation of his right against self-incrimination.

HELD:
Accused’s contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of
the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.
It was held in People v. Rondero that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken
from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may
be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress. Hence, a person may be compelled to submit

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to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under
People v. Gallarde, where immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused
without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The
accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of
which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted in
open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

NENA LAZALITA* TATING vs. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, et al.


G.R. NO. 155208, March 27, 2007

FACTS:
On 1969, Daniela sold her property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating. As a
consequence, title thereto was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her name for tax
purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972 to 1988.
Daniela died on July 29, 1988. On 1989, Daniela’s heirs herein respondents found a sworn statement executed
by Danila stating that she had actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and
Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by
mortgaging the subject property.
On September 6, 1989, Respondents filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the nullification of the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and
issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela.
RTC rendered its judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. CA Affirmed its decision. Petitioner asserts that the sole
evidence which persuaded both the RTC and the CA in holding that the subject deed was simulated was the
Sworn Statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. However, petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement
should have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that Daniela has long been dead when the
document was offered in evidence, thereby denying petitioner the right to cross-examine her.

ISSUE: Whether or not a sworn statement/affidavit of a deceased may be given probative value for purposes of
deciding a complaint.

HELD:
In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving their allegation that the
subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is the sworn statement of Daniela
dated December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private respondents’
evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative weight to this document.
There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince
and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on
judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified
as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one
writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. For this
reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the
witness stand to testify thereon. The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the
sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is
already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for
purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a
consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.
Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation that Daniela, in
fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject deed of sale in favor of
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petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his complaint and
he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant. Aside
from Daniela’s sworn statement, private respondents failed to present any other documentary evidence to prove
their claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when
she entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.
In Suntay v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is the complete
absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his rights of ownership over the
disputed property. In the present case, however, the evidence clearly shows that petitioner declared the property
for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA Y BELLO


G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012

FACTS:
The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports
Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to
walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine
General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estao that it was Salafranca who had
stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention;
and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years,
who was in the complex at the time.
Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged and convicted of murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon. On
appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the CA. The basis of the conviction is the testimony of the victim’s uncle
Rodolfo B. Estaño that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told him that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him.

ISSUE: Whether or not a statement made to another person by a victim of murder before he died is admissible
as evidence.

HELD:
Yes. An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions of
admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or
as a part of the res gestae, or both.
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless
be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is
under a consciousness of an impending death - There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in
the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence,
such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician; (c) that
the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide,
murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estaño, identifying
Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his
impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on
the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal
prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to
illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea
of deliberation and fabrication. A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time
to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.

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The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the
identity of the assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by
Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to
contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was
made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it
identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.

SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.


G.R. No. 128538, February 28, 2001

FACTS:
SCC Chemicals Corporation obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc. (SIHI). Upon failure of SCC to
pay, SIHI filed an action for a sum of money. During Pre-Trial, SCC admitted the existence of the loan executed
through its officers. SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was
postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was calendared
several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally
declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was
deemed submitted for decision.
Trial court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI. The appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment. SCC
elevated the case before the SC with the following contentions: (1) that SIHI introduced documentary evidence
through the testimony of a witness whose competence was not established and whose personal knowledge of
the truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated in violation of Sections 36, Rule 130; and (2) that
due execution and authenticity of private documents evidencing the loan was not proved during trial.

ISSUE:
(1)  Whether or not a defendant who failed to conduct cross-examination due to its own fault may questioned
the admissibility of the evidence for violation of hearsay rule. 


(2)  Whether or not the due execution of loan documents is necessary when the existence of the loan had
already been admitted during pre-trial. 


HELD:
(1)

Petitioner’s reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is
excluded and carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to
object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible. The rationale for this exception is to be found in the
right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross- examine which negates the
claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. However, the right to cross-examine may be waived.
The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was
afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party’s witness. Petitioner repeatedly
failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent court when it
sustained the trial court’s finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross- examine the opposing party’s
witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
(2)

No. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial
admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is
now too late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these documents
was sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of
payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation.

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 B. WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPS. VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL
G.R. NO. 143276, July 20, 2004

FACTS:
Spouses Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19+ hectares of agricultural land situated in
Camarines Norte. A portion of the land was compulsorily acquired by DAR pursuant to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Petitioner Landbank valued the expropriated portion at P173,918.55.
Unsatisfied with the Landbank valuation and the subsequent affirmance of such by PARAD, Respondents filed
before the RTC a petition for determination of just compensation impleaded as respondents were the DAR and
the Landbank.
After the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and directing the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. Trial court computed the just compensation for a total of P703,137.00, which is beyond
respondents valuation of P623,000.00. In concluding that the valuation of respondents property, RTC merely
took judicial notice of the average production figures in another case pending before it and applied the same to
instant case without conducting a hearing.

ISSUE: Whether or not a court may take judicial notice of the records of one case pending before it and apply
the same to another case also pending with it without conducting trial and without the knowledge or consent of
the parties.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court
or before the same judge. They may only do so in the absence of objection and with the knowledge of the
opposing party, which are not obtaining here.
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court
takes judicial notice of a certain matter, to wit:
SEC. 3.Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or
on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request
of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such
matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAILON KULAIS et al.

G.R. Nos. 100901-08, July 16, 1998

FACTS:
Appellants were charge with five (5) counts of kidnapping for ransom and three (3) counts of kidnapping before
the RTC. Trial court convicted the seven accused positively identified by the victims.
Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice of the testimony
given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of the government troops that
captured him and his purported cohorts. Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross- examine a
material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the latter’s testimony should not be used
against him.

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ISSUE: Whether or not a court may take judicial notice of the testimony of one witness in a case pending before
it and use the same to another case also pending with it.

HELD:
No. As a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even
if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before
the same judge. This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the testimony of
Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant
Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made by some
of the kidnap victims. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross- examinations conducted by
appellant’s counsel.

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED

G.R. No. 114776. February 2, 2000

FACTS:
Sometime in 1978, plaintiff is an expatriate employed by Respondent Singapore Airlines Limited on a contractual
basis which is stipulated to last for five (5) years. However, due to recession, Respondent decided to terminate
some of their pilots, included in the termination is herein plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the court a
quo. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and
in the course of plaintiff’s employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction
pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects
of his employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore
laws should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not courts may take judicial notice of foreign law.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The
defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The defendant
has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.

G.R. NO. 195649, July 2, 2013

FACTS:
Arnado filed herein Motion for Reconsideration assailing the previous decision of the Supreme Court as to his
disqualification to run as mayor. Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the
United States as having the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American
Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not courts may consider applicability of foreign laws to a case upon reference to it by one of
the parties.

HELD:
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The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public documents of a foreign
country and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof." Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading
does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GAMAL BAHARAN , et al.

G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011

FACTS:
Herein accused were charged of multiple murder in relation to the Valentines Day bombing. The prosecution
presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that shortly before the explosion, the
spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group - Abu Solaiman - announced over radio station DZBB that the group had
a Valentine's Day "gift" for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio
and warned of more bomb attacks.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview sometime
after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentine's Day bombing incident. In another exclusive
interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused
Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005
bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two
men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
Accused were convicted largely due to the testimony of Asali who turned state witness and the testimony of the
conductor who identified the two accused to be those who alighted from his bus shortly before the bomb
exploded.
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a co-conspirator made during a televised interview and repeated during trial
may be admissible as evidence against a co- conspirator.

HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. Section 30. Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration.
While Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rule of Court provides that statements made by a conspirator against a co-
conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy, if the declarant repeats the
statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible
as to both conspirators.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony
at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
Distinction must be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be
given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity
to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant's co-accused since the latter are
afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN et al.

G.R. No. 152375, December 16, 2011

FACTS:
In 1993, SB ordered the consolidation cases related to the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos Family and
cronies. At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion stating that petitioner wishes to adopt in

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Civil Case No. 0009 testimonies and the documentary exhibits presented and identified by them in another
related case. This motion partly denied insofar as the adoption of testimonies on oral deposition of Maurice V.
Bane and Rolando Gapud for the reason that said deponents are not available for cross-examination in this
Court by the respondents.
Petitioner then filed another motion asking SB to take judicial notice of the facts established by the Bane
deposition, together with the marked exhibits appended thereto. This was again denied by the SB, to wit: Judicial
notice is found under Rule 129. This provision refers to the Court’s duty to consider admissions made by the
parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in resolving cases before it. The duty of
the Court is mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon the Court. Such being
the case, the Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice as something which need not be
acted upon as the same is considered redundant.
Petitioner’s 3rd motion was again denied by SB. Hence, petitioner filed the instant motion alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of SB’s refusal to take judicial notice of or to admit the Bane deposition as part of its
evidence. Petitioner asserts that the case where the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced and
admitted in evidence is but a "child" of the "parent" case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence
offered and admitted in any of the "children" cases should be considered as evidence in the "parent" case.

ISSUE: Whether or not courts in trying consolidated cases may take judicial notice of testimony and evidence
presented in one of the cases consolidated.

HELD:
In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. This rule
though admits of exceptions.
As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a
case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, and
absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in
some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any
part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the
parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.
Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis exists in the
records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case.
The petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve
issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioner’s argument, we would be espousing judicial
confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found
competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases.

MONICO LIGTAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200751. August 17, 2015.

Facts:
Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) was charged for theft for taking of the harvest of Abaca in the plantation of belonging to
Anecita Pacate, having feloniously harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00
per kilo, without the consent of said owner. Where Ligtas pleaded not guilty, alleging himself as the owner of the
said property as he is the one who cultivated such, he further alleged the following defenses; setting an alibi that
the alleged taking did not happen since he claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres attending a barangay
fiesta at Sitio Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, when the alleged harvesting happened but later on
when confronted he admitted harvesting the abaca but claimed as plantation owner, being a tenant of 1.5 to two
hectares of land that he just prevented the men to harvest from the land which he himself cultivated.

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Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of
Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on November 21, 2000. On January 22, 2002,
the DARAB rendered the Decision ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land. While records are bereft
as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before the trial court, records are clear that
the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and without any objection on
the part of the People of the Philippines. In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held
that “the prosecution was able to prove the elements of theft” Ligtas’ “defense of tenancy was not supported by
concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between him and Anecita Pacate duly
corroborated by any witness.”

Issue: Whether the DARAB Decision, finding Ligtas as tenant of the conclusive or can be taken judicial notice of
in a criminal case for theft?

Held:
YES. The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and private
complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the owner’s consent. The
DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution, therefore,
failed to establish all the elements of theft. No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be
presumed innocent of the crime until proven guilty. “It is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one
innocent person.” Thus, courts must consider “every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence.”
Equally settled is that “where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, and
the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt and should be acquitted.”
In adjudicating a case on trial, courts are not authorized to take a judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court and notwithstanding that
both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge; Rule admits of exceptions.
(Republic vs. Sandiganbayan [Fourth Division], 662 SCRA 152 [2011])

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 C. RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY

1. Object / Real Evidence

JUNIE MALILLIN Y. LOPEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008

FACTS:
On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure, a team of five police officers raided the residence of
petitioner. The search allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets
containing residual morsels of the said substance. Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165.
Accused was convicted. He appealed from the said decision and averred that there was irregularity on the
conduct of the search.
During the trial, the following persons were presented as witnesses: (1) two members of the raiding team, i.e.,
Esternon and Bulanon; and (2) the forensic chemist who examined the seized items. The member of the raiding
team who conducted the recording and marking of the seized items were not presented. Furthermore the item
seized was immediately sent to the laboratory without presenting the same to the judge who issued the warrant.
Furthermore, the forensic chemist admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon
in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed. The items seized were not presented to the
judge who issued the warrant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not testimony of the raiding team and the forensic chemist is sufficient to establish the identity of the
seized items by virtue of a search warrant.

HELD:
No. Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a
prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized
by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is
vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established beyond doubt. Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 mandates
that the officer acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search warrant must conduct the photographing and the
physical inventory of the item at the place where the warrant has been served. The chain of custody rule
requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the object seized was picked up
to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched it would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
Esternon deviated he brought the seized items immediately to the police station for the alleged purpose of
making a "true inventory" thereof, but there appears to be no reason why a true inventory could not be made in
petitioner's house.
Likewise, Esternon's failure to deliver the seized items to the court demonstrates a departure from the directive
in the search warrant that the items seized be immediately delivered to the trial court with a true and verified
inventory of the same, as required by Rule 126, Section 1246 of the Rules of Court. People v. Go characterized
this requirement as mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of or tampering with said items by interested
parties. Thus, as a reasonable safeguard, People vs. Del Castillo declared that the approval by the court which
issued the search warrant is necessary before police officers can retain the property seized and without it, they
would have no authority to retain possession thereof and more so to deliver the same to another agency. Mere
tolerance by the trial court of a contrary practice does not make the practice right because it is violative of the
mandatory requirements of the law and it thereby defeats the very purpose for the enactment.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIMON PAGADUAN y TAMAYO
G.R. No. 179029, August 12, 2010

FACTS:
Captain de Vera, SPO1 Balido and PO3 Almarez conducted a buy-bust operation which resulted to the
apprehension of the herein accused. Thereafter, the buy-bust team brought the appellant to the Diadi Police
Station for investigation. At the police station, Captain de Vera prepared a request for laboratory examination.
The appellant was transferred to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he was detained. Two days later, or on
December 29, 2003, PO3 Almarez transmitted the letter-request, for laboratory examination, and the seized
plastic sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were received by PO2 Fernando Dulnuan. Police Senior
Inspector (PSI) Alfredo Quintero, the Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted an examination
on the specimen submitted, and found it to be positive for the presence of shabu.
The accused was charged with violation of RA 9165 and was convicted. Accused appealed the decision of the
RTC and claimed that: (1) his guilt was not prove beyond reasonable doubt due to failure of the police did not
conduct a prior surveillance on him before conducting the buy-bust operation; and (2) a period of two days had
elapsed from the time the shabu was confiscated to the time it was forwarded to the crime laboratory for
examination.

ISSUE: Whether or not chain of custody was sufficiently established when the two day period which lapsed
between the day of apprehension and day of turn- over to the laboratory was not explained.

HELD:

No. The chain of custody rule requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
object seized was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched it
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in
the chain.
The strict compliance to the chain of custody rule may not always be possible under field conditions. For this
reason, the implementing rules provides that "non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items."
Thus, noncompliance thereof is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case; police procedures in the handling
of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the present case. These lapses, however, must be
recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.
In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to justify the failure of the police to
conduct the required physical inventory, photographing of the seized drugs and the details of the turn over during
the two day period.
The records show that the seized specimen was forwarded by PO3 Almarez to the PNP Crime Laboratory on
December 29, 2003, where it was received by PO2 Dulnuan, and later examined by PSI Quintero. However, the
person from whom PO3 Almarez received the seized illegal drug for transfer to the crime laboratory was not
identified. As earlier discussed, the identity of the duty desk officer who received the shabu, as well as the
person who had temporary custody of the seized items for two days, had not been established.

NARCISO SALAS vs. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM

G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013

FACTS:
Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso Salas and claimed
that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas. In his answer, Petitioner denied paternity of the child
Christian Paulo.
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At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Murillo corroborated respondent’s testimony as to
the payment by petitioner of apartment rental, his weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her, his
presence during and after delivery of respondent’s baby, respondent’s attempted suicide through sleeping pills
overdose and hospitalization for which she paid the bill, her complaint before the police authorities and meeting
with petitioner’s wife at the headquarters. Respondent also presented the following evidence: (1) certificate of
live birth of Christian Paulo which she allegedly filled up with entries supposedly dictated by the Petitioner; and
(2) baptismal certificate.
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent. CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari on the ground that CA erred in holding that the
filiation of Christian Paulo was duly established pursuant to article 175 in relation to article 172 of the Family
Code and existing jurisprudence and therefore entitled to support from the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not illegitimate filiation may be proved by mere testimonial evidence that the alleged father provided
financial support and unsigned birth certificate and love letters.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may
be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did
not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is
incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public
instrument and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.
Furthermore, while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence
of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence
of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.
The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and
photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit are not sufficient to establish
Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of
admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not
qualify under Article 172 (2) vis- à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of
illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERIC ROSAURO Y BONGCAWIL

G.R. No. 209588, February 18, 2015

FACTS:
On July 3, 2004, the police authorities received information that drugs were being distributed at Purok 3,
Barangay Poblacion, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. Thus, at 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon, the Provincial Anti-
Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Unit (PAID-SOTU) elements led by SPO4 Lorenzo Larot and PO3 Juancho
Dizon positioned themselves in the house of their confidential agent.
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There, they saw Rosauro negotiate with the confidential agent and in exchange for the one (1) sachet of shabu
given by Rosauro to the confidential agent, the latter gave him a marked 100-peso bill with serial number YZ7
12579. After the transaction, Larot and Dizon came out of their hiding place and arrested Rosauro. Thereafter,
the confidential agent handed the sachet to Larot, who taped it, marked it with the marking “Exhibit A”, and
placed it inside his pocket. He also took pictures of Rosauro and the drugs. In the police station, he prepared a
Certificate of Inventory and a Request for Laboratory Examination. Both the drugs and Rosauro were then
turned over to the Crime laboratory. Upon re-arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged and claimed that he was merely a victim of instigation. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits
ensued. Finding the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant, the RTC
rendered a judgment of conviction
After a review of the records, the CA affirmed the RTC Judgment. The appellate court ruled that what transpired
in the case at bar was an entrapment and not an instigation

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant when his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:
NO. This Court laid down the essential elements to be duly established for a successful prosecution of offenses
involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs, like shabu, under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the
receipt of the marked money by the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material,
therefore, is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti.
Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution was not able to prove the corpus delicti, and that the statutory
safeguards provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not followed.
The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral certainty. It must also be established with the same
degree of certitude that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in
court as exhibit.
In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, the confidential informant gave the seized item to SPO4
Larot who placed tape on the sachet and marked it “Exhibit A.” Upon reaching the police station, SPO4 Larot
executed the Certificate of Inventory, as well as the request for laboratory examination. The request, the
specimen, as well as the marked money and accused-appellant were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for examination. They were received by SPO2 Ricardo Maisog, the Receiving Clerk of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Office, who then forwarded them to Police Inspector Ma. Leocy Jabonillo Mag-abo, the Forensic
Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Moreover, the seized item was duly identified by SPO4 Larot in
open court as the same item seized from accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant’s guilt having been established, we likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC and the
CA.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DISMISSED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA

G.R. No. 203984 June 18, 2014

FACTS:
On November 13, 2003, at around 5:30 in the afternoon, while PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO
RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and asked for police assistance
regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that while driving a towing truck and traversing
along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic dispute with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said
vehicle until they reached along 8th Avenue Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of
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said taxi cab and fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but continued his driving until he
reached a police station nearby where he reported the incident. The police officers on duty immediately
responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where they found the
white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them and
ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from
Calantiao a black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38
stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiao’s companion a .38 revolver. Thereafter, said
specimen were forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination
conducted by P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the same was positive for marijuana, a dangerous
drug.
RTC rendered its Decision giving credence to the prosecution’s case. The Court of Appeals found no reason to
overturn Calantiao’s conviction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marijuana found in Calantiao’s possession was inadmissible as evidence against him on the
grounds of either it was discovered via an illegal search, or because its custodial chain was broken?

HELD:
NO. The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the
arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and
to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach." It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s
police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have
lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the
arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his immediate
control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As
the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s possession, it was within the permissible area that the
apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless search.
This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, such as
immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody because what is
of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from the time the police
officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it was brought to
the forensic chemist for laboratory examination. This Court has no reason to overrule the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of the seized drugs to have not been broken so as to render the
marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence. Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and
convincing evidence that the apprehending officers were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their
duties, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the January 17, 2012 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04069.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMANOS CONSTANTINO, JR. y BINAYUG, a.k.a. “JOJIT,"
G.R. No. 199689               March 12, 2014

FACTS:
On January 20, 2005, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Police Superintendent Mariano Rodriguez, the Chief of
Police of Tuguegarao City, received a report from a confidential informant (CI) that a certain Jojit was selling
illegal drugs in the said city. P/Supt. Rodriguez immediately formed a buy-bust group. The buy-bust money,
consisting of one ₱500.00 bill and five ₱100.00 bills, were dusted with fluorescent powder and their respective
serial numbers were recorded in the police blotter.

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Around 8:00 in the evening of the same day, the team proceeded to Reynovilla St., Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao
City, the place where, according to the CI, Jojit was selling shabu. Thereafter, Constantino was brought to the
police station where the recovered drugs and money were turned over to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang. The
recovered drugs were then marked with the initials "A-1" and "A-2." The incident was recorded in the police
blotter with an inventory of the recovered drugs and money.
Later that evening, at around ten o’clock, P/Supt. Rodriguez and SPO2 Tamang submitted to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Services, Camp Marcelo Adduru, Tuguegarao City, a request for
laboratory examination of two plastic sachets with white crystalline substance marked as "A-1" and "A-2" to
determine the presence of dangerous drugs; as well as both hands of Constantino, one piece ₱500.00 bill, and
five pieces ₱100.00 bills, to determine the presence of the ultra violet powder. Per Chemistry Report No.
D-08-200511 and Physical Identification Report No. PI-04-2005,12 prepared by Police Senior Inspector (P/
SInsp.) Mayra Matote Madria,Forensic Chemist, the contents of the two plastic sachets tested positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride; while the other specimens tested positive for the presence of bright-yellow
ultraviolet fluorescent powder.
Constantino denied the accusation against him and asserted that he was merely framed-up.
The following day, January 21, 2005, the police officers again brought Constantino to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Along the way, one of the police escorts forced Constantino to hold a certain amount of money. Constantino tried
to resist but he could not really do anything because he was handcuffed. After his examination, Constantino was
detained and was told that he was suspected of selling shabu.
RTC found Constantino guilty as charged. It was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Constantino contests his conviction, averring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
particularly, on the circumstances of the marking of the two plastic sachets containing shabu allegedly
confiscated from him. Different people claim to have made the marking "NBT" on the two plastic sachets and
gave various explanations as to what the initials "NBT" stand for.

ISSUE: W/N the prosecution failed to establish a crucial link in the chain of custody of the shabu.

HELD:
YES. The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turn over of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn over by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn
over and submission of the marked illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court. As held in People
vs. Zakaria, crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon seizure is the starting point in
the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of
marking of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating
switching, “planting” or contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils
the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires.
The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence’s chain of custody is fatal to its case as the Court can no
longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drug
were properly preserved. In light of the foregoing, Constantino is acquitted of the crime charged, not because the
Court accords credence to his defense of frame-up, but because the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of
proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERCURY DELA CRUZ ALIAS “DEDAY"

G.R. No. 212171, September 07, 2016

FACTS:

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At around 7:15 o'clock in the evening of November 10, 2006, PO3 Batobalonos, PO1 Reales, PO1 Bullido and
their civilian asset proceeded to Sitio Cogon, A. Lopez St., Barangay Labangon. When the team went inside the
interior portion of Sitio Cogon, PO1 Reales together with the civilian asset approached the house of Dela Cruz,
while PO3 Batobalonos and PO1 Bullido were strategically hidden more or less ten (10) meters away. The
civilian asset called Dela Cruz and told her that they will buy shabu worth P200.00. Thereafter, Dela Cruz
handed PO1 Reales a small plastic containing white crystalline substance and in exchange he handed to the
former the P200.00 bills. Upon getting hold of the money, PO3 Batobalonos and PO1 Bullido, who saw the
consummation of the transaction rushed to the scene. When PO3 Batobalonos got hold of Dela Cruz, the latter
shouted for help and resisted arrest. Dela Cruz was able to run and so the team chased her, however, her
neighbor Arthur Tabasa Ortega ("Ortega") blocked their way. The team introduced themselves as policemen but
Ortega did not listen, so PO3 Batobalonos fired a warning shot as the people likewise started to gather around
them. Meanwhile, Dela Cruz was able to evade arrest. The team then arrested Ortega for obstruction of justice.
On their way to the police station aboard their patrol car, PO1 Reales handed to PO3 Batobalonos the small
plastic containing white crystalline substance which he purchased from Dela Cruz. Thereafter, upon arrival at the
police station, PO3 Batobalonos marked the seized item with "DDM 11/10/06."
Afterwards, a Request for Laboratory Examination of the seized item was prepared by PO3 Batobalonos. The
Request and the seized item were delivered to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office-7, Camp Sotero Cabahug,
Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City by PO1 Reales at around 1:10 o'clock in the morning of November 11, 2006.
Thereafter Forensic Chemist PCI Salinas issued Chemistry Report No. D-1771-2006," with the finding that the
specimen gave positive result for the presence of Methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 58, Cebu City, found the accused-appellant guilty of illegal sale of shabu
under Sections 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 91653 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

ISSUE:
W/N appellant’s case should be dismissed due to failure of the police officers to comply with the procedure in the
custody and disposition of seized drugs (chain of custody).

HELD:
We agree with the lower courts that in the absence of any intent or ill motive on the part of the police officers to
falsely impute commission of a crime against the accused-appellant, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty is entitled to great respect and deserves to prevail over the bare, uncorroborated
denial and self-serving claim of the accused of frame-up. Also, we reject the appellant’s contention that the
police officers failed to comply with the provisions of Section 21, paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 9165, which provides
for the procedure in the custody and disposition of seized drugs.
Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of custody in the handling of evidence, “substantial
compliance with the legal requirements on the handling of the seized item” is sufficient.  This Court has
consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the requirements under Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in
evidence. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.  In other
words, to be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through records or testimony, the
whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were seized from the accused by the arresting officers;
turned over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the laboratory for determination of their composition; and up
to the time these are offered in evidence. For as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case,
even though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not faithfully observed,
the guilt of the accused will not be affected.
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will,
or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant bears the burden of showing that the
evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of
exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties.  Accused-
appellant in this case failed to present any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting
officers. Thus, the testimonies of the apprehending officers deserve full faith and credit.  In fact, accused-

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appellant did not even question the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. She simply anchored her defense on
denial and alibi.

SPOUSES EDUARDO and LYDIA SILOS vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

G.R. No. 181045               July 2, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioners secured a revolving credit line of P150,000 from PNB which was increased to P1.5million then
subsequently increased to P2.5 million. These were secured by real estate mortgage of petitioner’s properties
and in addition, petitioners issued eight Promissory Notes8 and signed a Credit Agreement. This July 1989
Credit Agreement contained a stipulation on interest which provides as follows:
1.03. Interest. (a) The Loan shall be subject to interest at the rate of 19.5% per annum. Interest shall be payable
in advance every one hundred twenty days at the rate prevailing at the time of the renewal.
(b) The Borrower agrees that the Bank may modify the interest rate in the Loan depending on whatever policy
the Bank may adopt in the future, including without limitation, the shifting from the floating interest rate system to
the fixed interest rate system, or vice versa. Where the Bank has imposed on the Loan interest at a rate per
annum, which is equal to the Bank’s spread over the current floating interest rate, the Borrower hereby agrees
that the Bank may, without need of notice to the Borrower, increase or decrease its spread over the floating
interest rate at any time depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future. (Emphases supplied)
The eight Promissory Notes, on the other hand, contained a stipulation granting PNB the right to increase or
reduce interest rates "within the limits allowed by law or by the Monetary Board."
The Real Estate Mortgage agreement provided the same right to increase or reduce interest rates "at any time
depending on whatever policy PNB may adopt in the future."
Petitioners claim that interest rates imposed by it are null and void for the reasons that 1) the Credit Agreements
and the promissory notes were signed in blank; 2) interest rates were at short periods; 3) no interest rates
could be charged where no agreement on interest rates was made in writing; 4) PNB fixed interest rates on the
basis of arbitrary policies and standards left to its choosing; and 5) interest rates based on prime rate plus
applicable spread are indeterminate and arbitrary
Respondent argued that this issue (signed in blank) was never raised in the lower court and besides,
documentary evidence prevails over testimonial evidence; Lydia Silos’ testimony in this regard is self-serving,
unsupported and uncorroborated, and for being the lone evidence on this issue. The fact remains that these
documents are in proper form, presumed regular, and endure, against arbitrary claims by Silos – who is an
experienced business person – that she signed questionable loan documents whose provisions for interest rates
were left blank, and yet she continued to pay the interests without protest for a number of years.

ISSUE: W/N the interest rates are null and void.

HELD:
YES. In a number of decided cases, the Supreme Court (SC) struck down provisions in credit documents issued
by Philippine National Bank (PNB) to, or required of, its borrowers which allow the bank to increase or decrease
interest rates “within the limits allowed by law at any time depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the
future.”
It is basic that there can be no contract in the true sense in the absence of the element of agreement, or of
mutual assent of the parties. If this assent is wanting on the part of the one who contracts, his act has no more
efficacy than if it had been done under duress or by a person of unsound mind. Similarly, contract changes must
be made with the consent of the contracting parties. The minds of all the parties must meet as to the proposed
modification, especially when it affects an important aspect of the agreement. In the case of loan contracts, it
cannot be gainsaid that the rate of interest is always a vital component, for it can make or break a capital
venture. Thus, any change must be mutually agreed upon, otherwise, it is bereft of any binding effect.Any
modification in the contract, such as the interest rates, must be made with the consent of the contracting parties.

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By requiring the petitioners to sign the credit documents and the promissory notes in blank, and then unilaterally
filling them up later on, respondent violated the Truth in Lending Act, and was remiss in its disclosure obligations.

a. Best Evidence Rule

MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP. vs. MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP.

G.R. No. 201001               November 10, 2014

FACTS:
MCMP Construction and Monark Equipment Construction Corporation agreed to the lease of heavy equipment
by MCMP from Monark thru a Rental Equiptment Contract (Contract). Thus, Monark delivered five pieces of
heavy equipment to MCMP’s project site in Tanay Rizal, evidenced by Documents Acknowledgment Recipt No.
04667 and 5706, received by MCMP representatives Jorge and Rose.
During trial, Reynaldo, Monark’s representative, testified that there were two original copies of the contract, one
for MCMP and one for Monark; however, Monark’s copy was lost and despite diligent efforts, cannot be located,
hence he presented photocopy of the Contract which he had on file. MCMP objected to the presentation of the
secondary evidence to prove the contents thereof, since there were no diligent efforts to locate it, but did not
produce MCMP’s copy of the contract despite a directive from the trial court to produce it.
After trial, the RTC ruled in favour of Monark, ordering MCMP to pay the balance of the rental fees inclusive of
interest as well as 25% attorney fees. MCMP appealed to the Court of Appeals when its motion for
reconsideration was denied by the RTC, but the appeal was also denied, hence it elevated its case to the
Supreme Court, on the issue of whether or not secondary evidence may be presented in the absence of the
original. It argues that the custodian of the original document was not presented to prove its loss; its loss was not
even reported to the police; it was only searched by Monark for purposes of the instant case.

ISSUE:
Whether the appellate court should have disallowed the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the
existence of the Contract, following the Best Evidence Rule.
HELD:
No. “Petitioner’s contention is erroneous.
The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of the original document whenever its
contents are the subject of inquiry, is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:
“Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in
the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Relative thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant rules on the presentation of secondary
evidence to prove the contents of a lost document:
“Section 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the
cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of
its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

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 Section 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control. — If the document is in the
custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such
notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence
may be presented as in the case of its loss.”
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman, the Court set down the requirements before a party may
present secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original document whenever the original copy has been
lost:
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror
must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of
the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of
bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as
follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.
In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are present. Both the CA and the RTC gave
credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of Monark has been lost and
that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail. Such testimony has remained uncontroverted.
As has been repeatedly held by this Court, “findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are
matters best left to the trial court.” Hence, the Court will respect the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility
of Peregrino.
MCMP, to note, contends that the Contract presented by Monark is not the contract that they entered into. Yet, it
has failed to present a copy of the Contract even despite the request of the trial court for it to produce its copy of
the Contract. Normal business practice dictates that MCMP should have asked for and retained a copy of their
agreement. Thus, MCMP’s failure to present the same and even explain its failure, not only justifies the
presentation by Monark of secondary evidence in accordance with Section 6 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
but it also gives rise to the disputable presumption adverse to MCMP under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court that “evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.”

WILGEN LOON et al. vs. POWER MASTER, INC.et al.

G.R. No. 189404, December 11, 2013

FACTS:
Respondents employed and assigned the petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various PLDT offices in Metro
Manila area. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money claims and illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter
(LA) partially ruled in favor of the petitioners. Both parties appealed the LA’s ruling with the NLRC.
6 months after filing their notice of appeal, Respondents filed an unverified supplemental appeal. They attached
photocopied and computerized copies of list of employees with automated teller machine (ATM) cards to the
supplemental appeal. This list also showed the amounts allegedly deposited in the employees’ ATM cards. On
the other hand, petitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion where they asked for the deletion of the
supplemental appeal from the records because it allegedly suffered from infirmities. First, the supplemental
appeal was not verified. Second, it was belatedly filed six months from the filing of the respondents’ notice of
appeal with memorandum on appeal. The petitioners pointed out that they only agreed to the respondents’ filing
of a responsive pleading until December 18, 2002. Third ̧ the attached documentary evidence on the
supplemental appeal bore the petitioners’ forged signatures.
NLRC giving weight to the photocopy of computerized payroll records ruled in favor of respondent. It maintained
that the absence of the petitioners’ signatures in the payrolls was not an indispensable factor for their
authenticity. The CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not mere photocopies as documentary evidence filed 6 months from notice of appeal are
admissible in evidence where there is an allegation of forgery by the adverse party.

HELD:

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NO. While strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not required in labor cases, the liberality of
procedural rules is qualified by two requirements: (1) a party should adequately explain any delay in the
submission of evidence; and (2) a party should sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven.
Respondents, in this case, failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. Why the respondents’
photocopied and computerized copies of documentary evidence were not presented at the earliest opportunity is
a serious question that lends credence to the petitioners’ claim that the respondents fabricated the evidence for
purposes of appeal.
While courts generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in administrative
proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the original
documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the respondents to present the originals, especially in this case
where the petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents effectively deprived the
petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged spurious evidence by not adducing the
originals. Failure to present the originals raises the presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced.

THERESITA DIMAGUILA et al. vs. JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO

G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014

FACTS:
Respondent spouses filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages against the petitioners. Later on the
complaint was amended to an action for recovery. Respondent alleged: (1) that the disputed property was
originally owned by Buenaseda; (2) had long been partitioned between her two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano
Dimaguila; and (3) that owned 1/3 of the portion of Perfecto’s share by virtue of a deed of sale executed between
them and one of Perfecto’s heir, Pedro.
While in their original answer, petitioner alleged that the subject property had already been extra-judicially
partitioned between the heirs of Vitaliano and Perfecto, they subsequently changed their position when the
complaint was amended. They now claimed that the property was not partitioned with specific metes and
bounds. What is cleared among the heirs is their respective shares thereof.
RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The CA found that Spouses Monteiro
had established their case by a preponderance of evidence thru their presentation of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition, the certified true copy of cadastral map and the municipal assessor's records. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari where petitioners argued that the cadastral map, which serves as the basis of the alleged
partition, is inadmissible in violation of the best evidence rule and hearsay rule.

ISSUE: Whether or not a certified true copy of cadastral map is inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it
violates the best evidence rule and hearsay rule.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Anent violation of Best Evidence Rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document
is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public
documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record. Certified
true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the area covered by the map
were presented by two public officers.
As to the Hearsay Rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official
records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of
the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience
and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the
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course of his duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty.
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise
and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the
corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as
mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HON. JESUS M. MUPAS

G.R. No. 181892 September 08, 2015

Facts:
On October 5, 1994, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Government - through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)and the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA)- for the construction and development of the NAIA-IPT III under a build-
operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement. The DOTC and the MIAA invited the public to submit competitive and
comparative proposals to AEDC's unsolicited proposal in accordance with the BOT Law  and its implementing
rules. Paircargo consortium also submitted their competitive proposal to build the NAIA-IPT III. Both AEDC and
Paircargo offered to build, however, Paircargo submitted a bid superior to AEDC’s unsolicited proposal, thus
DOTC awarded the project to Paircargo (PIATCO).
PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka, as well as, Asahikosan, both foreign corporations organized in
Japan, for the construction of the NAIA-IPT, however, PIATCO defaulted on its obligations, and to settle the
problem Takenaka and Asahikosan agreed to defer PIATCO’s payments until June 2003. Trial ensued, there has
been an issue as to the attendant costs of the construction, PIATCO was required to submit the original
documents to the court, however PIATCO argues that his non-submission is justified under Sec. 3 rule 130 of the
ROC, referring to the submission of numerous accounts.

Issue: W/N the non-submission of original documents is justified.

Held:
The court held in the negative, that although the contention of non-submission due to numerous accounts of the
document is justifiable under the rule. However, as a condition precedent to the admission of a summary of
numerous documents, the proponent must lay a proper foundation for the admission of the original documents
on which the summary is based. The proponent must prove that the source documents being summarized are
also admissible if presented in court.
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a written document, the
original of the document must be produced in court.—Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry
relates to the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In
proving the terms of a written document, the original of the document must be produced in court.
Thus, PIATCO having failed to establish that the photocopied documents he presented in courts are authentic,
theses photocopied documents are deemed as hearsay, and shall not be admissible as evidence, or reference to
the claimed attendant costs of the project.

b. Parol Evidence Rule

RAFAEL S. ORTAÑEZ vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. 107372. January 23, 1997

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FACTS:
Private respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land for a consideration of P35,000.00 and
P20,000.00, respectively as evidence by two (2) deed of sale.
Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the titles to
petitioner. When the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles, Private respondents, refused on
the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person, and petitioner’s acquisition of the
title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In their answer with
counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the existence of the following oral conditions which were never
reflected in the deeds of sale .

ISSUE: Whether or not parol evidence relating to certain stipulated condition made orally may be admitted in
evidence in addition to those expressly provided in a contract.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement
were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of
such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof.
Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said
instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties. Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot
even make an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the
parties. Oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the
case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken
words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language.
Parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid
instrument, hence, contrary to the rule that “the parol evidence rule forbids any addition to the terms of a written
instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different
terms were orally agreed upon by the parties.”
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the
writing unless there has been fraud or mistake." No such fraud or mistake exists in this case.

LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING
CORP.
G.R. No. 126006, January 29, 2004

FACTS:
Respondent bank filed instant collection suit against Petitioner Foundation and previous president Tan for failure
to pay four matured loan as evidenced by promissory notes signed by Tan in his capacity as president of the said
Foundation.
In disclaiming any liability for the loans, the petitioner Foundation maintains that said loans were contracted by
petitioner Tan in his personal capacity. On the other hand, while admitting that the loans were his personal
obligation, petitioner Tan avers that the same is not yet due as he had an unwritten agreement with the
respondent Bank that these loans would be renewed on a year-to-year basis and paid from the proceeds of his
shares of stock in the Lapulapu Industries Corp.
Trial Court ruled petitioners are liable to the bank solidarily. On appeal, the CA affirmed the judgment of the court
a quo. CA likewise rejected petitioner Tans assertion that there was an unwritten agreement between him and
the respondent Bank that he would pay the loans from the proceeds of his shares of stocks in the Lapulapu
Industries Corp.

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ISSUE: Whether or not an alleged unwritten agreement between the creditor and the debtor which is not
reflected on the promissory note (PN) evidencing the loan is admissible in evidence in addition to the terms of
the PN

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject petitioner Tans
claim regarding the purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the payment of the
obligation. Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and the respondent Bank. Nowhere was it
stated therein that they would be renewed on a year-to-year basis or rolled-over annually until paid from the
proceeds of petitioner Tans shares in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this purported unwritten
agreement could not be made to vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the promissory notes.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or
defeat the operation of a valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written
contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions
which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. No such allegation had been
made by the petitioners in this case.

MODESTO LEOVERAS vs. CASIMERO VALDEZ

G.R. No. 169985, June 15, 2011

FACTS:
Respondent and the petitioner executed an Agreement, allotting their portions of the subject property, to wit:
Petitioner Modesto Leoveras – 3,020 square meters and Respondent Casimero Valdez – 7,544.27 square
meters.
In 1996, the respondent learned that the petitioner had already obtained in his name two TCTs: one - covering
an area of 3,020 square meters; and two - covering an area of 1,004 square meters. Thus, respondent filed a
complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against the petitioner, seeking the reconveyance
of the 1,004-square meter portion on the ground that the petitioner is entitled only to the 3,020 square meters
identified in the parties' Agreement.
In his defense, the petitioner claimed: (1) that the parties has agreed that the extent of their ownership would be
based on their actual possession; (2) that he actually possessed and subsequently acquired has a total area of
4,024 square meters, which he subdivided into two portions and caused to be covered by the two TCTs in
question; and (3) that respondent participated in executing an Affidavit of confirmation of subdivision, which
corrected the mistake in the previously executed Agreement and confirmed the petitioner's ownership over the
disputed property.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the RTC. CA noted the discrepancy between the respondent's
signatures as appearing in the Affidavit, on one hand, and the documents on record, on the other.

ISSUE: Whether or not an allegation of ownership that is contrary to those expressly stated in an agreement
may be used as evidence

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity the
Agreement entered into between him and the respondent. However, he claims that since the Agreement does
not reflect the true intention of the parties, the Affidavit was subsequently executed in order to reflect the parties'
true intention. Factual findings of the CA holding that such affidavit is spurious due to discrepancy of

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respondent’s signature therein leads us to rely only on the agreement as the basis for the claim of ownership of
both parties.
The petitioner's argument calls to fore the application of the parol evidence rule, i.e., when the terms of an
agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no
evidence of these terms can be admitted other than what is contained in the written agreement. Whatever is not
found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned.
To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present evidence
modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this
case, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of
the written agreement to express the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable
conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties.

SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS vs. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 171601 April 8, 2015

Facts:
Lucia was a concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit and Kimwa is a construction firm that sells concrete
aggregates to contractors and haulers. On December 6, 1994, Lucia and Kimwa entered into a contract where
40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were "allotted" by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa. Kimwa was to pick up the
allotted aggregates at Lucia’s permitted area in Toledo City at ₱240.00 per truckload.
Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates. Sometime after this, however,
Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates. Claiming that in so doing, Kimwa violated the Agreement, Lucia filed the
Complaint for breach of contract with damages.
In its Answer, Kimwa alleged that it never committed to obtain 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates from Lucia. It
argued that the controversial quantity of 40,000 cubic meters represented only an upper limit or the maximum
quantity that it could haul. Kimwa asserted that the Agreement articulated the parties’ true intent that 40,000
cubic meters was a maximum limit and that May 15, 1995 was never set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol
Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras were barred from introducing evidence which would show that the
parties had agreed differently.

Issue: Whether Spouses Paras were able to establish that Kimwa was obliged to haul a total of 40,000 cubic
meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995.

Held:
YES. Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the remainder of the quantity which it was obliged to acquire from Paras.
Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol Evidence Rule, the rule on
admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it
is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in
issue in his pleading:
a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
c) The validity of the written agreement; or
d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution
of the written agreement.

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Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally imperative that the parol evidence sought to be introduced
points to the conclusion proposed by the party presenting it. That is, it must be relevant, tending to "induce belief
in [the] existence" of the flaw, true intent, or subsequent extraneous terms averred by the party seeking to
introduce parol evidence.
In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence of any of
the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse
party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion
proposed by the presenting party.
Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, Spouses Paras pleaded in the Complaint they filed before the trial
court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement’s failure to express the true intent of
the parties. Further, Kimwa, through its Answer, also responded to petitioners Spouses Paras’ pleading of these
issues. This is, thus, an exceptional case allowing admission of parol evidence.
It is true that petitioners’ Complaint does not specifically state words and phrases such as "mistake,"
"imperfection," or "failure to express the true intent of the parties." Nevertheless, it is evident that the crux of
petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint is their assertion that the Agreement "entered into . . . on 6 December
1994 or thereabouts" was founded on the parties’ supposed understanding that the quantity of aggregates
allotted in favor of Kimwa must be hauled by May 15, 1995, lest such hauling be rendered impossible by the
rechanneling of petitioner Lucia Paras’ permitted area.
The Special Permit’s condition (issued to Paras) that a total of only about 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates
may be extracted by petitioner Lucia Paras from the permitted area lends credence to the position that the
aggregates "allotted" to respondent Kimwa was in consideration of its corresponding commitment to haul all
40,000 cubic meters. This is so, especially in light of the Agreement’s own statement that "the said Aggregates is
for the exclusive use of [respondent Kimwa.]"57 By allotting the entire 40,000 cubic meters, petitioner Lucia
Paras bound her entire business to respondent Kimwa. Rational human behavior dictates that she must have
done so with the corresponding assurances from it. It would have been irrational, if not ridiculous, of her to oblige
herself to make this allotment without respondent Kimwa’s concomitant undertaking that it would obtain the
entire amount allotted.
Likewise, the condition that the Special Permit shall be valid for only six (6) months from November 14,1994
lends credence to petitioners Spouses Paras’ assertion that, in entering into the Agreement with respondent
Kimwa, petitioner Lucia Paras did so because of respondent Kimwa's promise that hauling can be completed by
May 15, 1995. Bound as she was by the Special Permit, petitioner Lucia Paras needed to make it eminently
clear to any party she was transacting with that she could supply aggregates only up to May 15, 1995 and that
the other party's hauling must be completed by May 15, 1995. She was merely acting with due diligence, for
otherwise, any contract she would enter into would be negated; any commitment she would make beyond May
15, 1995 would make her guilty of misrepresentation, and any prospective income for her would be rendered
illusory.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated July 4, 2005 and Resolution dated
February 9, 2006 of the Court of Appeals Special 20th Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 74682 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City dated May 16, 2001 in Civil
Case No. MAN-2412 is REINSTATED.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. GAYAM PASIMIO

G.R. No. 205590, September 02, 2015

Facts:
Pasimio filed suit against PNB for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, she alleged having a peso and
dollar time deposit accounts with PNB in the total amount of P4,322,057.57 and US$5,170.80, respectively; that
both investment placements have matured; and when she sought to withdraw her deposit money with accrued
interests, PNB refused to oblige.
PNB admitted the fact of deposit placement but it claimed that Pasimio is without right to insist on their
withdrawal, the deposited amount having already been used in payment of her outstanding loan obligations to
the bank. PNB narrated how the set off of sort came about: Pasimio and her husband took out three "loans
against deposit hold-out" from the PNB Sucat branch, as follows: Three Million One Hundred Thousand Peso
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(P3,100,000) loan on March 21, 2001; a One Million Seven Hundred Thousand Peso (P1,700,000) loan on April
2, 2001; and a Thirty-One Thousand One Hundred US Dollar (US$31,1 00) loan on December 7, 2001.
During the trial following the joinder of issues, Pasimio denied obtaining any loan from PNB, let alone receiving
the corresponding loan proceeds. While conceding signing certain documents which turned out to be the Peso
Loans Against Peso/FX Deposit Loan Applications, the Promissory Notes and Hold-out on Savings Deposit/
Peso/FX Time Deposit and Assignment of Deposit Substitute and the Disclosure Statements of Loan/Credit
Transaction (Loan Documents), she professed not understanding what they really meant. She agreed to affix her
signature on these loan documents in blank or in an incomplete state, she added, only because the PNB Sucat
branch manager and Customer Relations Officer led her to believe that what she was signing were related to
new high-yielding PNB products. Pasimio would also deny re-lending the loan proceeds to Paolo Sun.
The RTC ruled in favor of Pasimio. The disposition is predicated on the postulate that Pasimio had proven by
convincing evidence that she did not obtain any loan accommodation from PNB. As a corollary, the trial court
held that there was no evidence showing the release by PNB of the loan proceeds to Pasimio. CA affirmed the
RTC decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision granting Pasimio's complaint for a sum of money.

Held:
YES. In upholding the RTC's finding respecting Pasimio's never having received any loan proceeds, the CA
doubtless disregarded the rule holding that a promissory note is the best evidence of the transaction embodied
therein; also, to prove the existence of the loan, there is no need to submit a separate receipt to prove that the
borrower received the loan proceeds. Indeed, a promissory note represents a solemn acknowledgment of a debt
and a formal commitment to repay it on the date and under the conditions agreed upon by the borrower and the
lender. As has been held, a person who signs such an instrument is bound to honor it as a legitimate obligation
duly assumed by him through the signature he affixes thereto as a token of his good faith. If he reneges on his
promise without cause, he forfeits the sympathy and assistance of this Court and deserves instead its sharp
repudiation.
The Court has also declared that a mere denial of the receipt of the loan, which is stated in a clear and
unequivocal manner in a public instrument, is not sufficient to assail its validity. To overthrow the recitals of such
instrument, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence is necessary. A contrary rule would throw
wide open doors to fraud. Following this doctrine, Pasimio's notarized promissory notes bearing her signature
and that of her husband must be upheld, absent, as here, strong, complete, and conclusive proof of their nullity.
The promissory notes, bearing Pasimio's signature, speak for themselves. To repeat, Pasimio has not
questioned the genuineness and due execution of the notes. By signing the promissory notes, she is deemed to
acknowledge receipt of the corresponding loan proceeds. Withal, she cannot plausibly set up the defense that
she did not apply for any loan, and receive the value of the notes or any consideration therefor in order to
escape her liabilities under these promissory notes.
But the foregoing is not all. PNB presented evidence that strengthened its allegation on the existence of the
loan. Here, each promissory note was supported by a corresponding loan application form and disclosure
statement, all of which carried Pasimio's signatures. Isolated from each other, these documents might not prove
the existence of the loan, but when taken together, collectively, they show that Pasimio took the necessary steps
to contract loans from PNB and was aware of their terms and conditions.
Finally, it is well to consider this rule: that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to
be considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their
successors-in-interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing.
Under this rule, parol evidence or oral evidence cannot be given to contradict, change or vary a written
document, except if a party presents evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of a written agreement and
puts in issue in his pleadings: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the
failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties; (c) the validity of the
written agreement; and (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest
after the execution of the written agreement.

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Such evidence, however, must be clear and convincing and of such sufficient credibility as to overturn the written
agreement. Since no evidence of such nature is before the Court, the documents embodying the loan agreement
of the parties should be upheld.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 23, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 94079 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Ligaya M.
Pasimio's complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0195 before the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City, Branch
196 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

c. Electronic Evidence

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN vs. ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA et al.

G.R. No. 152807, August 12, 2003

FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for unlawful detainer against respondents and alleged that the disputed property was
owned by Marcos Saez, predecessor of petitioners; that Marcos’ son Adolfo, for humanitarian reasons, allowed
respondents to occupy a portion of Marcos Saez’ land without paying any rental. On 7 May 1998, a formal
demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and
claimed that they were the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful possessors of the premises.
MTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. On appeal, RTC reversed the said decision. Affirming the RTC,
the CA upheld the right of respondents as claimants and possessors. The CA lend credence to the Certification
issued by the DENR’s community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the
cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person. Therefore,
respondents after sufficiently proving their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and
uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960 have better right to possess alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
Hence, this Petition, petitioners avers that CA gravely abuse its discretion in giving weight to the CENR Officer’s
Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda.

ISSUE: Whether or not a certification issued by a public officer bearing a facsimile signature is inadmissible in
evidence.

HELD:
The rule stated in Garvida v. Sales Jr that – “Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and
are at best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether
they are genuine or authentic” is not applicable to the instant case.
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer
Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one
mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means
but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.
Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has
acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998. If the Certification were a sham as
petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would
have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was under the
former’s direct control and supervision.

ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR)
G.R. No. 193531, December 14, 2011

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FACTS:
Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) who was terminated due to his alleged participation in padding of Credit Meter Readings
(CMR) or slot machines at Casino Filipino-Hyatt.
Petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR for illegal dismissal. CSC held that petitioner's
appeal had already prescribed. The CSC did not give credit to petitioner's claim that he sent a facsimile
transmission of his letter reconsideration within the period prescribed by the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service. It found that a verification of one of the telephone numbers where petitioner allegedly
sent his letter reconsideration disclosed that such number did not belong to the PAGCOR's Office of the Board of
Directors; and that petitioner should have mentioned about the alleged facsimile transmission at the first instance
when he filed his complaint and not only when respondent PAGCOR raised the issue of prescription in its
Comment.
Petitioner contends that he filed his letter reconsideration of his dismissal on August 13, 2007, which was within
the 15-day period for filing the same; and that he did so by means of a facsimile transmission sent to the
PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors. He claims that the sending of documents thru electronic data
message, which includes facsimile, is sanctioned under Republic Act No. 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000. Petitioner further contends that since his letter reconsideration was not acted upon by PAGCOR, he then
filed his complaint before the CSC.

ISSUE: Whether or not a letter reconsideration filed through facsimile is allowed

HELD:
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims was sent
through a facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by
petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or
personal delivery.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., it was held inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and
ruled that: “x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all
the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile
pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a
sham pleading. x x x”
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce
Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, it was held that a facsimile transmission
cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best
Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD
G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010

FACTS:
Rustan Ang was charged of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act for purposeful
sending Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who
was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another
woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic
picture thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish
Sagud.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document.
Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

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ISSUE: Whether or not text messages to be admissible as evidence in a criminal case must be authenticated
following the Electronic Evidence Rule.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Electronic Evidence Rule do not apply to the present criminal action. The said
Rules applies only to civil actions, quasi- judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. (A.M. No.
01-7-01-SC, Rule 1, Section 2.)
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first time before the
Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such
ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for
objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence
applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. In conclusion, the Court
finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL ENOJAS Y HINGPIT

G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014

FACTS:
The defendant, taxi driver Enojas, was stopped by police while parked suspiciously in front of a glass shop.
Enojas provided the police with identification that the officers suspected to be fake. The officers then asked
Enojas to accompany them to the police station. Enojas agreed.
On the way, the officers stopped at a 7/11 to use the restroom. The officer who went into the store apprehended
two robbers, one of whom shot and killed the officer. The other officer got out of the car upon hearing the
gunshots. Returning to the police car, he found that Enojas had fled the scene. Later, the police searched his
abandoned taxi car and found Enojas’ phone. They monitored the messages on the phone and communicated
with the other suspects, resulting in an entrapment operation.
Enojas, along with several other defendants, was charged with murder in 2006 before the Las Pifias Regional
Trial Court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction. The accused then appealed
to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly identified.
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to attain a conviction.

HELD:
1. As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Courtâ™s earlier
Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi,
posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap
them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had
personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
2. This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that meets the
evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for
the conviction of all the accused.

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RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG vs. TERESITA D. RIVERA
G.R. No. 200148               June 4, 2014

FACTS:
Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private complainant and defendant in the instant case. Syhunliong is
the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF) while Rivera, citing personal and family
matters, tendered her resignation as Accounting Manager of BANFF, effective on February 3, 2006 and
continued working for BANFF until March of the same year to complete the turn-over of papers under her
custody to Jennifer Lumapas (Lumapas). Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the
payment of her remaining salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be
paid, but the check representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by
Syhunliong. Hence, on April 6, 2006, Rivera sent libelous text message to one of BANFF's official cellular
phones held by Lumapas. Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the National Labor Relations
Commission a complaint against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month and incentive pay,
gratuities and tax refund. On April 16, 2007 pending the resolution of the aforecited labor case, Syhunliong
instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel, and the public prosecutor finds probable cause to indict Rivera the
crime of libel.

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the facts charged in the information do not constitute the
offense of libel? Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in ordering the outright dismissal of the
complaint of Syhunliong on the putative ground that the allegedly libelous text messages were privileged
communication?

Held:
There is no merit in the instant petition. Prescription had set in. Well settled rule in statutory construction that the
liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes emanates from the liberality of the State, any doubt
on this matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee thereof, the accused. As prescription of the crime is the
loss by the State of the right to prosecute and punish the same. In the case at bar, it is extant in the records that
Syhunliong filed his complaint against Rivera more than one year after the allegedly libelous message was sent
to Lumapas. Whether the date of the filing of the complaint is April 16, 2007 or August 18, 2007, it would not alter
the fact that its institution was made beyond the prescriptive period provided for in Article 90 of the RPC. In
relation thereto, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the prescription of crime has the effect of
totally extinguishing the criminal liability. Prescription of the crime is already a compelling reason for this Court to
order the dismissal of the libel information, but the Court still stresses that the text message which Rivera sent to
Lumapas falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication. The rule on privileged communication
means that a communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an
interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty. In
order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under Article 354,
No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or
social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his
own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior,
having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the
statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice. Presiding from the above, the
Court thus finds no error in the CA' s declaration that Rivera's text message falls within the ambit of a qualified
privileged communication since she was speaking in response to duty, to protect her own interest, and not out of
an intent to injure the reputation of Syhunliong. Besides, there was no unnecessary publicity of the message
beyond that of conveying it to the party concerned.

3. Testimonial Evidence
a. Qualifications
b. Disqualifications

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LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS* vs. THE HEIRS OF THE LATE DR. ANDRES NAVARRO, JR
G.R. No. 198240, July 03, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents based
their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property where Andres, Sr. (common ascendant of both petitioner
and respondent) donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr. Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters,
requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez
found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not
written by one and the same person.
Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation. After the pre-trial, respondents
moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting
examination of the affidavit. RTC granted respondents’ motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
Petitioners elevated the case before the CA by way of petition for certiorari. CA denied the petition

ISSUE:
Whether or not expert’s testimony who is not authorized by the trial court is disqualified from being a witness.

HELD:
No. A witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of
Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides the qualifications of a witness, i.e., all persons
who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
The disqualifications are as follows: (1) Section 19, Rule 130 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated
and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses; (2) Section 20 of the
same rule provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship; (3) Section 21 provides
for disqualification based on privileged communications; and (4) Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on
disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against
whom he was called. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of
disability other than those mentioned in the Rules.
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her perception to others.
We have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she
possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules. Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should
have been denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification.
The RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight of her testimony.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert witness may be
received in evidence

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALVADOR GOLIMLIM @ “BADONG"

G.R. No. 145225, April 2, 2004

FACTS:
Accused was charged and convicted of the crime of rape committed against Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), a
mental retardate who is the niece of the accused’s wife. The trial court in convicting the accused gave credence
to the testimony of Evelyn

ISSUE: Whether or not a mental retardate is not qualified to become a witness due to her mental state.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Sections 20 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that all persons
who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. On the other
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hand, Section 21 of the same rule provides that the following persons cannot be witnesses: (a) Those whose
mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently
making known their perception to others; (b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable
of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of truth. A
mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition
not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what
form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly
intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to. It cannot then be gainsaid that a mental retardate
can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his or her testimony is
coherent, the same is admissible in court.

MAXIMO ALVAREZ vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ

G.R. NO. 143439, October 14, 2005

FACTS:
Accused was charged with arson for setting fire in his sister-in-law’s house while the latter’s family is inside
including the former’s estranged wife . During trial, his wife Esperanza was presented as witness to prove that
the accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the crime being charged.
Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court on marital disqualification. Trial court granted the motion and disqualified Esperanze. The
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19,
1999. This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez to file with the CA a Petition for Certiorari. On May 31, 2000,
the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not a wife is disqualified to testify against her husband to prove a crime committed purposely
committed to injure the former.

HELD:
No. Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that during their marriage, neither the husband
nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case
by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants. The reasons given for the rule are: (1) There is identity of interests between
husband and wife; (2) If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury; (3)
The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional
failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and (4) Where there is want of domestic
tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions
between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. For instance, where
the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case,
identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be
nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well
that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the
harmony and confidences of marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. MARIANO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR. and BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO
G.R. No. L-46306, February 27, 1979
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FACTS:
Benjamin Manaloto sold the conjugal lot without his wife’s consent by forging the latter’s signature in a contract
of sale. Hence, Benjamin was charged with falsification of public document by his wife.
At the trial, the prosecution called the complainant-wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify
her as a witness, invoking the Marital Disqualification Rule under Sec. 20, Rule 130. The prosecution opposed
said motion to disqualify on the ground that the case falls under the exception to the rule, contending that it is a
"criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other."

ISSUE: Whether or not a wife may testify against her husband in a criminal case for falsification of public
document done by forging the signature of the wife a contract of sale of conjugal property.

HELD:
The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal case for a crime committed by the
accused-husband against the witness wife.
The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the accused
of his wife’s signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife consented to the sale of
a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be noted that
had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife’s name by her husband in the deed of sale,
been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband. Clearly,
therefore, it is the husband’s breach of his wife’s confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this
same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule,
therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one spouse against the other is to
advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.

ENRIQUE RAZON vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN

G.R. No. 74306, March 16, 1992

FACTS:
Respondent, as administrator of the estate Juan Chuidian, filed an action for specific performance against
petitioner praying that the later be compelled to deliver the stock certificate representing the share holdings of
Juan Chuidian in E. Razon, Inc. (ERI).
During trial, petitioner testified that: (1) all the shares of stock in the name of stockholders of record of the
corporation were fully paid for by defendant, Razon; (2) said shares are subject to the agreement between
defendants and incorporators; (3) petitioner distributed shares of stock previously placed in the names of the
withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends including Juan T. Chuidian; (4) the shares of stock were
actually owned and remained in the possession of Razon; and (5) Thus, the stock certificate under the name of
the late Chuidian actually belongs to the petitioner with the understanding that he shall remain in possession
thereof until such time as he was paid therefor by the other nominal incorporators/stockholders.
Trial court ruled that the real owner of the stocks is the petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the
trial court. CA ruled that petitioner is disqualified from being a witness under the dead man’s statute (Section 20
(a) Rule 130). Petitioner, assailing CA’s decision, contends that: (1) dead man’s statute is inapplicable in this
case; (2) respondent did not object to his oral testimony; and (3) the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross
examination regarding such testimony.

ISSUE:
(1)Whether or not dead man’s statute disqualifies a defendant from testifying against the claims of an
administrator in relation to a transaction entered into by the deceased during his lifetime.

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 (2)Whether or not failure to object to a testimony on the ground of dead man’s statute rule constitutes as a
waiver to object to the admissibility of such testimony. 


HELD:
(1) The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or his properties
were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted
to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly
subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to
‘guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the
surviving party. The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against
the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of petitioner as defendant in an action
commenced by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon,
Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not
within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed
upon claims against the estate.
(2) Granting that the petitioner’s testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20 (a), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule. It is also settled that the court cannot disregard
evidence which would ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure
of a party to object thereto.

LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA vs. LAMBERTO T. CHUA

G.R. No. 143340, August 15, 2001

FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners who are the daughter and wife of the deceased Jacinto L.
Sunga, for "Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with
Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims, contending that
respondent does not have a cause of action against them, and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
nature of the action, the SEC being the agency that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As
counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
During trial Respondent testified that: (1) in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the
distribution of LPG in Manila; (2) for business convenience, respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register
the business name of their partnership under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship; (3) upon Jacinto’s
death, petitioners took over the operations and control of the partnerhsip without respondent’s consent; (4)
despite respondent’s repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up and
restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply; and (5) on March 31, 1991, petitioner
disbursed out of the partnership funds the amount of P200,000.00 representing partial payment of the former’s
share in the partnership, with a promise that the former would make the complete inventory and winding up of
the properties of the business establishment.
The trial court, giving weight to Respondent’s testimony which was corroborated by another witness who work
with the deceased during his lifetime, ruled in favor of the Respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial
court’s decision. Petitioners assails the finding of the trial court and the CA and argued that these courts were
proscribed from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged
partnership three years after Jacinto’s death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the "Dead Man’s
Statute" or "Survivorship Rule" under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not dead man’s statute applies to a complainant/witness who is also a defendant due to
counterclaim of the original defendant.

HELD:

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The answer is in the negative. The "Dead Man’s Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the
undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. But before this
rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that: (1) the
witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted; (2) the action
is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound
mind; (3) the subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against person of unsound mind; (4) the testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of
such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man’s Statute" to this case. First, petitioners filed a
compulsory counterclaim against respondent in their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their
counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the "Dead Man’s Statute."
Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets
up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased
to defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from
testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been brought
against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man’s Statute" for the simple reason that she is
not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Records show
that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between
respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners’ insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her
an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and
not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen." Plainly then, Josephine is merely a
witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.

TERESITA P. BORDALBA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME

G.R. No. 112443, January 25, 2002

FACTS:
Lot 1242 was originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme. In 1947,
the property was extraj-judicially partitioned in the following manner: 1/3 to their grandchild Nicanor Jayme; 1/3
to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez; and 1/3 to an unidentified party.
Petitioner, daughter of Elena, filed an application for issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot 1242. When
the application was granted and corresponding OCT was issued, petitioner subdivided the property into 6 lots
and disposed the two parcels thereof. Upon learning of the issuance of the Free Patent and OCT, as well as the
conveyances made by petitioner, respondents filed with RTC the instant complaint for annulment and
cancellation of the Free Patent and OCT against petitioner and purchasers.
Petitioner averred that Lot No. 1242 was acquired by her through purchase from her mother, who was in
possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since 1947. However, on cross-examination, petitioner admitted
that the existence of the above-mentioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. She, however, identified one of the
signatures in the said Deed to be the signature of her mother.
The trial court, giving weight on the testimony of witnesses as to the existence of the extra-judicial partition and
finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent and OCT, declared said patent and title
void and ordered its cancellation. CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. Thus, petitioner
filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of the CA. Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the
witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should
not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead man’s statute.

ISSUE: Whether Dead Man’s Statute applies to disqualify the testimony of all witnesses attesting to the
existence of an agreement entered into by the deceased during her lifetime.

HELD:
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Dead Man’s Statute finds no application in the present case. The dead man’s statute does not operate to close
the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal
dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is based, inter
alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and communications
with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.

JOSIELENE LARA CHAN vs. JOHNNY T. CHAN

G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013

FACTS:
Josielene Lara Chan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre- marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny attached to his
answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a
physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from “methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.” Following up on
this point, on August 22, 2006 or before trial, Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there
confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to “be allowed to submit in evidence” the records sought by
subpoena duces tecum.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. RTC
sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. Josielene of course claims that the hospital records
subject of this case are not privileged since it is the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded
as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician “cannot in a civil case, without the consent of
the patient, be examined” regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not
cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not a motion for issuance of subpoena duces tecum may be done prior to the trial.
(2) Whether or not hospital records may not be the subject of a subpoena duces tecum before trial on the
ground of privilege communication.

HELD:
(1)

Yes. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the
hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to
trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. But the right to compel the production of documents has
a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are “not privileged.”
Considering that hospital records may not be a subject for motion for production of documents, it can only be
offered during trial. Hence, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for
trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital
records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just
to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.
(2)

The answer is in the affirmative. The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a
physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined
without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is intended to
encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to
his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure.
Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired
between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.

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Disclosing hospital records would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters
he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests that the
physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him— would be to
allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these
information in the patient’s records.

JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM v. ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA
A.C. NO. 5921, March 10, 2006

FACTS:
Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The
antecedent facts are as follows: (1) respondents law firm acts as the counsel in the unlawful detainer case
appealed to the sala of Judge Lacurom; (2) Judge Lacurom reversed the decision of the MTC and ruled against
the counsels’ client; (3) the losing party filed an MR signed by Velasco-Jacoba; (4) the MR contains scathing
remarks against the Judge; (5) Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain
why she should not be held in contempt of court for the contents of her motion; (6) Velasco-Jacoba explained
that she is not the author of the motion as she merely signed the same as it was the practice between her and
her husband, her co-counsel in the law firm; (7) Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt; (8)
Velasco-Jacoba filed a petition for certiorari assailing the decision of Judge Lacurom; (9) Judge Lacurom issued
another order directing Jacoba (husband of Velasco-Jacoba) to explain why he should not be held in contempt;
(10) Jacoba, in his answer, denied that he prepared the motion; (11) as to against Velasco-Jacoba's statements
implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence; (12) Judge Lacurom later rendered a
decision finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court.

ISSUE: Whether or not marital privilege rule may be invoked against a statement made by one spouse against
the other without actually denying the contents of the statement.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Jacoba’s Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his
wife's account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion.
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its
presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver applies to Jacoba who
impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.

CLARITA J. SAMALA vs. ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA

A.C. No. 5439, January 22, 2007

FACTS:
Samala filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia for serving on two separate occasions
as counsel for contending parties. Records show that Valencia acted as counsel for Valdez in three separate
cases. In of the cases Valencia represented Valdez and Alba against Bayuga and Bustamante. However, on a
subsequent estafa case between Valdez and Alba, Valencia represented Valdez against Alba his previous client.
In his defense Valencia, respondent, avers that he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter
charged respondent with estafa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the termination of lawyer-client relationship allows a counsel to act as counsel against a
previous client.

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HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is
that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional employment.
Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will
injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or
use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.
The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and good
taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the
client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the
privileged communications of his client.

COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE et al. vs. HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED
CITIZENS
G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995

FACTS:
Pursuant to his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled
positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed, Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring
petitioners as chief accountant and record custodian of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all evidence such as
vouchers from enforcing his orders.
Petitioners do not question the power of the Ombudsman to issue a subpoena duces tecum nor the relevancy or
materially of the documents required to be produced, to the pending investigation in the Ombudsman's office.
Petitioners claimed that they cannot be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary
vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified. Disclosure of the documents in
question is resisted on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds
and its plantilla . . . will necessarily lead to knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and
tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB."

ISSUE: Whether or not privilege communication may be invoked against a subpoena duces tecum enjoining the
production of records relating to personal services funds on the ground that they are state secrets.

HELD:
For information to be accorded confidentiality on the ground that such are state secrets, the necessity of
according such treatment must be shown. Governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect
to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of
such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even
though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.
Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even most
compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets
are at stake. A fortiori, where necessity is dubious, a formal claim of privilege, made under the circumstances of
this case, will haw to prevail.
Where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic or other national
security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined
to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena considered essential to the
enforcement of criminal laws.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of
records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of
intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not
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limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which
involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production,
no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations unless it falls under statutorily-
created ones such as the Government's privilege to withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of
violations of laws.

c. Testimonial Privilege

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA

G.R. No. 169777             April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464
“Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege
and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police
(PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to
appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election
fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section
3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

HELD:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be
kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to
outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert
it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.

ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE

G.R. No. 180643             September 4, 2008

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FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an investigation
regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon.
He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However,
when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up
the NBN Project,  (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,  and (c) whether or not she directed him to
approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege.

RULING:
The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege.  It pertains
to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and
that the President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential communications privilege  applies
to  decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the
President’s unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. The
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Elements of presidential communications privilege:
1)      The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential  and non-delegable presidential power.” - i.e.
the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into  executive agreements  without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence.  
2)         The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or
the President himself.  The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
3)                 The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the  unavailability  of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. 

d. Admissions

OSCAR CONSTANTINO et al. vs. HEIRS OF CONSTANTINO

G.R. No. 181508, October 02, 2013

FACTS:
In this case, there are two (2) deed of extrajudicial settlement involving estate properties of Pedro Constantino,
Sr., i.e., one in 1968 involving the 192 sqm and another in 1992 involving the 240 sqm. The separate Deeds
came into being out of an identical intention of the signatories in both to exclude their co-heirs of their rightful
share in the entire estate of Pedro Sr.
Respondent, who are grandchildren of Pedro Sr. from Pedro Jr., filed a complaint seeking to annul the 1992
extrajudicial settlement involving the 240sqm lot on the ground that they, who are also heirs of Pedro Sr., were
excluded thereto. On the other hand, Petitioners alleged that the respondents have no cause of action against
them considering that the respondents’ already have their lawful share over the estate of Pedro Sr. by virtue of
the 1968 Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver. During the pre-trial, respondents admitted that they

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executed the 1968 Deed to partition the 192 sqm which is the share of their predecessor Pedro Jr., in Pedro Sr.’s
Estate.
RTC rendered a Decision finding both plaintiffs and defendants in pari delicto. On appeal, CA rule in favor of
respondent and declared that the 1968 Deed covering the 192 sq m lot which actually belongs to Pedro Jr.,
hence, not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. Hence, heirs of Pedro Jr. (herein respondent), did not adjudicate the
192 sqm lot unto themselves to the exclusion of all the other heirs of Pedro Sr. Petitioners now assails the
erroneous disregard by the CA of stipulations and admissions during the pre-trial conference

ISSUE: Whether or not admissions made during pre-trial are binding upon the parties.

HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-
trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7,
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the
subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried. A party who judicially
admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence
is dispensed with.
However, the general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the
dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows
one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission. However, respondents failed to
refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and during the trial.

CONRADO C. DOLDOL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 164481, September 20, 2005

FACTS:
Provincial Auditor conducted an audit of the cash and cash account of Conrado C. Doldol, the Municipal
Treasurer of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. The State Auditors discovered that Doldol had a shortage of P801,933.26.
The State Auditors submitted their Report to the Provincial Auditor on their examinations showing his shortages.
On the same day, Doldol wrote the Provincial Treasurer requesting that a re-audit be conducted on his cash and
cash account, taking exception to the findings of the State Auditors.
Instead of pursuing his request for a re-audit, Doldol opted to refund the missing funds. On September 15, 1995,
he remitted P200,000.00 to the Acting Municipal Treasurer for which he was issued Official Receipt No. 436756.
Doldol promised to pay the balance of his shortage, as follows: P200,000.00 on October 31, 1995, and
P884,139.66 on or before November 30, 1995. However, he reneged on his promise.
Two informations for malversation of public funds were then filed against Doldol in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Carlos City. Doldol was convicted.

ISSUE: Whether or not, person convicted of malversation may assail his conviction when he had already
partially paid the alleged shortage.

HELD:
The said payment, particularly when taken in conjunction with appellant's commitment to gradually pay the
remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of compromise which must be treated as an implied admission of
appellant's guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds to his personal use.

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 e. Confessions

JOSUE R. LADIANA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 144293, December 4, 2002

FACTS:
Accused, a member of the Integrated National Police (now PNP), was charged with murder before the
Sandiganbayan (SB) for the death of Fancisco San Juan.
During the trial, Cortez, the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, testified that the accused
executed before him a counter-affidavit admitting the commission of the crime. Before Cortez was presented as
witness, Defense counsel made an admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness of the
execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was subscribed and sworn to before Cortez.
However, Accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense.
The same counter-affidavit became the basis of SB in convicting the accused. The court a quo held that his
Counter-Affidavit, in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused the victim’s death, may be
used as evidence against him.
On appeal with the SC, petitioner argued that the counter-affidavit cannot be considered an extrajudicial
confession as the same was executed during custodial investigation with the assistance of a counsel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of the commission of an offense while invoking self-defense in a Counter-
affidavit executed during preliminary investigation without the assistance of a counsel may be admitted as an
extrajudicial confession against him.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows:
"SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given
in evidence against him.
"SEC. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of
any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him."
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement of fact not
directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which one is
charged. 26 Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the accused admitting the commission of the act charged
against him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is an admission, not a confession.
Petitioner admits shooting the victim — which eventually led to the latter’s death — but denies having done it
with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a
confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against him as the voluntariness of the execution
thereof was admitted by the defense.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO ULIT y TAMPOY

G.R. NOS. 131799-801, February 23, 2004

FACTS:
Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano, four Information were filed against her uncle, the
appellant for qualified rape.
The records also show that the appellant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the barangay hall
where he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and March 2, 1997. However, the trial court did
not ask the appellant whether he was assisted by counsel when he was brought to the Office of the Public

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Prosecutor for inquest investigation. Neither did the court a quo inquire about the circumstances and the
appellants reasons for refusing to execute the said waiver.
The records show that when the prosecution offered the appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay in evidence to prove
that he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and March 2, 1997, the appellant objected thereto
on the ground that he was not assisted by counsel and that he was coerced into signing the same.
The trial court convicted the appellant of rape on the basis of Lucelles sworn statement, the testimony of her
mother, the appellants statement executed in the Barangay Chairmans Office, and the testimony of Dr. Armie
Soreta-Umil.

ISSUE: Whether or not an admission made before a Barangay Chairman without the assistance of a counsel
may be used against the accuse.

HELD:
Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his statement to the barangay chairman
and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against him because he was not under arrest nor
under custodial investigation when he gave his statement.
The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere
and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and
psychological, is forcefully apparent. As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers
investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police,
the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government. The barangay chairman is not deemed a
law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Under
these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that the appellants statement before the barangay
chairman is inadmissible.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA et al.

G.R. No. 147201, January 15, 2004

FACTS:
Herein accused were charged with murder. He was arrested pursuant to the testimony of two (2) eyewitnesses.
During his custodial investigation the accused made an extrajudicial confession after the following was recited to
him:
“I would like to inform you Mr. Sayaboc that questions will be asked to you regarding an incident last December
2, 1994 at the Rooftop, Brgy. Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, in connection with the shooting of Joseph Galam,
owner of the said Disco House as a result of his death. Before questions will be asked of you I would like to
inform you about your ri[g]hts under the new Constitution of the Philippines, as follows: That you have the right to
remain silent or refuse to answer the questions which you think will incriminate you; That you have the right to
seek the services of a counsel of your own choice or if not, this office will provide you a lawyer if you wish.”
The appellants argue that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may not be admitted in evidence against him
because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer who was his counsel during the custodial investigation, was not a
competent, independent, vigilant, and effective counsel. He was ineffective because he remained silent during
the entire proceedings.

ISSUE:
(1)  Whether or not an extrajudicial confession made during custodial investigation wherein the rights of the
accused were merely recited to him may be admissible in evidence against such accused.
(2)  Whether a counsel who remain silent at the time the extrajudicial confession was made qualifies as an
independent counsel. 


HELD:
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(1)

The answer is in the negative. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is
missing. The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." It should allow the suspect to
consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights. More so when the suspect
is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had
already been under the control of the police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another
offense.
(2)

A counsel who remains silent all through-out the investigation shows that there is lacking of a faithful attempt at
each stage of the investigation to make Sayaboc aware of the consequences of his actions.
The right to a competent and independent counsel means that the counsel should satisfy himself, during the
conduct of the investigation, that the suspect understands the import and consequences of answering the
questions propounded. Counsel should be able, throughout the investigation, to explain the nature of the
questions by conferring with his client and halting the investigation should the need arise. The duty of a lawyer
includes ensuring that the suspect under custodial investigation is aware that the right of an accused to remain
silent may be invoked at any time.

CARLOS L. TANENGGEE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The prosecution alleged that:
(1) the petitioner as branch manager caused the preparation of promissory notes (PN) and cashier’s check in the
name of one of their valued client; (2) that by forging the signature of such client, petitioner was able to obtain
the proceeds of the loan evidenced by the PN.
After the discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was conducted and an administrative investigation
was held in the Head Office of Metrobank, during which appellant signed a written statement in the form of
questions and answers admitting the commission of the allegations in the Information. Trial court convicted the
accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed his conviction.
Elevating the case before the SC, petitioner avers that the written statement should not be admitted as evidence
against him as it was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly of
his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same should
not have been admitted in evidence against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not a statement of an accused-employee made during administrative investigation conducted
by his employer may not be admitted an evidence against the former on the ground that it was made without the
assistance of a counsel.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession
of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution is applicable only in custodial
interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.
In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement regarding an
anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a
law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither
arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot
be said to be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the
taking of his written statement. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence
and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its
admissibility.
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MARIA PAZ FRONTRERAS y ILAGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 190583. December 7, 2015.

FACTS:
An Information for Qualified Theft was filed before the RTC against the petitioner, Salazar, and Carpon. The
prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner unlawfully deprived Cebuana of cash/
money when she took out pawned items and released them to redeeming pledgors in exchange for redemption
payments which she, however, did not turnover to the pawnshop, and instead pocketed them for her own gain.
She gravely abused the confidence concurrent with her sensitive position as a vault custodian when she
exploited her exclusive and unlimited access to the vault to facilitate the unlawful taking. Her position entailed a
high degree of confidence reposed by Cebuana as she had been granted daily unsupervised access to the vault.
Also, the petitioner knew the combinations of the branch’s vault and nobody was allowed to enter the vault
without her presence. Without the authority and consent of her employer, she repeatedly took and appropriated
for herself the redemption payments paid for the pawned items with the aggregate appraised value of
₱414,050.00.
The accused submitted pawn tickets which were surrendered, together with the redemption payment by their
respective pledgors. She submitted them during the spot audit along with a confession letter stating that portions
of the ₱1,250,800.00 missing value of jewelry were actually already redeemed.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial written confession was admissible.

HELD:
YES. A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made, constitutes evidence of a high
order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately
and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. The
admissibility and validity of a confession, thus hinges on its voluntariness, a condition vividly present in this case.
The language of the confession letter was straightforward, coherent and clear. It bore no suspicious
circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity and it was replete with details which could only be known
to the petitioner. Moreover, it is obvious that losing one’s job in an administrative case is less cumbersome than
risking one’s liberty by confessing to a crime one did not really commit. It is thus implausible for one to be cajoled
into confessing to a wrongdoing at the mere prospect of losing his/her job. The petitioner’s declarations to
Talampas show that she fully understood the consequences of her confession. She also executed the letter even
before Finolan came to the Old Balara branch, thus, negating her claim that the latter threatened her with an
administrative sanction.

f. Conduct and Character

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL SANTOS y NARCISO

G.R. Nos. 100225-26, May 11, 1993

FACTS:
Santos was charged and convicted of murder and frustrated murder. On appeal, accused makes the following
assignment of errors: (1) his identification in the police line-up by the two witnesses is inadmissible as he was
not afforded his right to counsel; (2) he questions the trial court for admitting a sworn statement by one Ronaldo
Guerrero, a witness in another criminal case accused was also charged with the murder which had taken place
in the very same site where Bautista and Cupcupin were ambushed as such accused contends that the affidavit
of Ronaldo Guerrero was hearsay evidence, considering that the prosecution did not present Ronaldo Guerrero
as a witness during the trial.

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ISSUE:
(1)  Whether or not identification in the police line-up is not admissible on the ground that the accused was
not provided with a counsel.
(2)  Whether the trial court may not admit a sworn statement of a witness taken from another criminal case
wherein the accused for both cases are one and the same. 


HELD:
(1)

There is "no real need to afford a suspect the service of counsel at police line- up. The customary practice is, of
course, that it is the witness who is investigated or interrogated in the course of a police line-up and who gives a
statement to the police, rather than the accused who is not questioned at all at that stage. In the instant case,
there is nothing in the record of this case which shows that in the course of the line-up, the police investigators
sought to extract any admission or confession from appellant Santos.
(2)

Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did or
did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like."
Trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero affidavit for the limited purpose for proving
knowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that appellant knew that the particular corner of two (2)
particular streets in Malabon was a good place to ambush a vehicle and its passengers. As in fact, both in the
instant case, as well as the case where Guerrero’s testimony was originally presented, the scene of the crime is
one and the same.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO NARDO y ROSALES

G.R. No. 133888, March 1, 2001

FACTS:
Herein accused was charged of raping his eldest daughter. The prosecution presented the victim as its main
witness, while, the defense presented a number of witnesses who testified to different occasion for which the
victim was caught lying.
After the trial, trial court, giving credence to the testimony of the victim, convicted the accused. On appeal, the
accused presented series of letters allegedly written by the victim to the defense counsel asking said counsel to
help her father be acquitted.

ISSUE:
(1)  Whether or not a minor witness’ credibility may be assailed by proving that she lies on a number of occasion
(2) Whether or not letters written by the witness after trial containing details that is contrary to testimony made
in open court constitutes recantation of said testimony. 


HELD:
(1) NO. Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that: "Evidence that one did or did not do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at another time;
but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like." While lying may constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn,
assuming them for the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging
one’s own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.
Furthermore, as a rule, findings by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are not to be disturbed, for the
trial court is in a better position to pass upon the same. Lastly, jurisprudence dictates that testimonies of child-
victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been
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raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity.
(2) An affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the testimony given
in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice simply because
the witness who gave it later on changed his/her mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make a
solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
Recantations are frowned upon by the courts because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through
intimidation or for monetary consideration. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration.
Especially, recantations made after the conviction of the accused deserve only scant consideration.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR.

G.R. No. 146030, December 3, 2002

FACTS:
Respondent Felipe Alejaga, Sr. filed Free Patent Application. In relation to the said application, Recio, Land
Inspector, submitted a report of his investigation to the Bureau of Lands. Less than 3 months after the
application, free patent was issued.
Sometime in April 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang requested for an investigation for irregularities in the
issuance of the title of a foreshore land in favor of respondent. Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special
Investigator, submitted his Report. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not actually conducted
an investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land. Thereafter, government instituted an action for
Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against respondent.
Trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. In reversing the RTC, CA brushed aside as hearsay Isagani
Cartagena’s testimony that Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free patent
application of Felipe Alejaga Sr.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony based on a report which relates an admission of a third person who was not
presented as witness is inadmissible in evidence for being a hearsay.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person — the latter’s
knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith — and the former’s statements may then be regarded as independently
relevant without violating the hearsay rule. Recio’s alleged admission may be considered as "independently
relevant."
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross- examination, the Investigation
Report he had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his testimony. Those portions
of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not hearsay. On the
other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio may be considered as independently relevant.
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a witness by a
third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence
as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or
(b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact.
Since Cartagena’s testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted, his testimony was
not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.

g. Hearsay Evidence Rule

ANNA LERIMA PATULA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012

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FACTS:
Petitioner, a sales representative at Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, was charged with estafa for failure to account
for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company. During the trial, prosecution, in order
to prove that collectibles lawfully belonging to the company where misappropriated by the accused, submitted
the following documentary evidence: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers
upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding
notations of the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by
Guivencan herself. The ledgers and receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive. Prosecution also presented Guivencan to testify on the entries in the documentary
evidence. Petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the figures entered in
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries
were not themselves presented in court.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness pertaining to entries in a document made by another person
constitutes hearsay and may not be admitted as evidence.

HELD:
Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she
knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise
provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting
testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the
disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit
accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source
of her information.
The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the person from whom the witness derived the
information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined.
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the
fact asserted, the credit of the assert or becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be
received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross- examination. However,
if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to
the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution
witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not
to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This
kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the
fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts
asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.
Hence, as Guivencan’s testimony intends to prove an asserted fact, i.e., misappropriation on the part of the
accused through documentary evidence of which the witness has no personal knowledge, the same is
inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence.

Dying Declaration

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs SONNY GATARIN y CABALLERO @ "JAY-R" and EDUARDO QUISAYAS
G.R. No. 198022               April 7, 2014

FACTS:
On November 3, 2004, at 8 o’clock in the evening, Umali was riding a bicycle on his way home when he saw
Januario being mauled by two persons opposite Dom’s Studio in Poblacion, Mabini, Batangas. Upon seeing the
incident, he stayed in front of the church until such time that the accused ran away and were chased by
policemen who alighted from the police patrol vehicle.

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On the same night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol vehicle performing their routine
patrol duty when they met two men, later identified as the accused, who were running at a fast speed. When
asked why they were running, the accused did not answer prompting the policemen to chase them. The
policemen, however, were unsuccessful in catching them and when it became evident that they could no longer
find them, they continued patrolling the area. There they saw Januario lying on the street in front of Dom’s
studio. As he was severely injured, the policemen immediately boarded Januario to the patrol vehicle and
brought him to the Zigzag Hospital. While inside the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He
answered that it was "Jay-R and his uncle" who stabbed him. The uncle turned out to be the appellant herein,
while Jay-R is his co-accused who remains at-large.
At the Zigzag Hospital, Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa who found him in critical condition. Three fatal
wounds caused by a bladed weapon were found in Januario’s body which eventually caused his death.
CA affirmed RTC decision hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether Dying Declaration by the victim on this case is admissible evidence.

HELD:
No. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may
nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the declaration concerns the cause
and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent
and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to
testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry
involves the declarant's death.
In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. From the records, no
questions relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not appear that the declarant was
under the consciousness of his impending death when he made the statements. The rule is that, in order to
make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the
declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders a
dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked
on death as certainly impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be considered as a dying
declaration.
However, even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his statements may still
be appreciated as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that
grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with
the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part
of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with
the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.  BERNABE P. PALANAS ALIAS “ABE"

G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015

FACTS:
At around 6:40 in the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2 Borre took his five (5)-month-old grandson outside his
residence at Block 14, Kenneth Street corner Eusebio Avenue, Pasig City. PO3 Leopoldo Zapanta (PO3
Zapanta), who slept at SPO2 Borre's residence, was watching television when four (4) successive gunshots rang
out. PO3 Zapanta looked through the open door of SPO2 Borre's house and saw two (2) men armed with .38
caliber revolvers standing a meter away from SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas deliver the fourth shot to SPO2
Borre, but he could not identify the other shooter. Thereafter, the two (2) assailants fled on a motorcycle.

PO3 Zapanta, together with SPO2 Borre's stepson Ramil Ranola (Ramil), brought SPO2 Borre to the Pasig City
General Hospital. On the way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre told Ramil and PO3 Zapanta that it was "Abe,"
"Aspog," or "Abe Palanas" - referring to his neighbor, Palanas -who shot him. This statement was repeated to his
wife, Resurreccion Borre (Resurreccion), who followed him at the hospital. At around 11 o'clock in the morning of
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even date, SPO2 Borre died due to gunshot wounds on his head and trunk.

The RTC found that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that Palanas and his companion
were the ones who killed SPO2 Borre through the positive identification of the eyewitnesses to the incident.
Moreover, SPO2 Borre's statements that Palanas shot him constituted an  ante mortemstatement and formed
part of the  res gestae, and, thus, admissible as evidence against Palanas. It further opined that treachery
attended SPO2 Borre's killing as he had no inkling that the attack would take place, and that he was in no
position to mount any feasible defense.12 The RTC, however, did not appreciate evident premeditation because
of the absence of the following elements: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an
act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between
determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
CA affirmed the RTC's ruling with modification increasing amounts awarded to the heirs of SPO2 Borre to
F75,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

ISSUE: Whether Palanas's conviction for the crime of Murder should be upheld on the basis of Dying declaration
And as part of the res gestae.

HELD:
Yes. For a dying declaration24  to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule,25  four (4) conditions
must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his impending death; (c) the
declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder,
or Parricide where the declarant is the victim.26 On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of
the  res gestae,27  and thus, constitute another exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the principal act, the  res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern
the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre's statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they pertained to the
cause and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the number and severity of his wounds, it
may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his own death was already
imminent.29  This declaration is considered evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence
since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.30 Verily, because
the declaration was made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive of
falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law
deems this as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an
oath administered in court.

In the same vein, SPO2 Borre's statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the  res gestae. "Res
gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate
its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of
deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the  res gestae  is, therefore,
whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony."32 In this case, SPO2 Borre's statements refer
to a startling occurrence, i. e., him being shot by Palanas and his companion. While on his way to the hospital,
SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is relevant because it
identified Palanas as one of the authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2 Borre, perpetrated by
Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution.

Declaration against interest

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. THEODORE BERNAL et al.

G.R. No. 113685, June 19, 1997

FACTS:
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Accused was charged with Kidnapping Openda, Jr. During trial, the prosecution, in order to prove that accused
has a motive in perpetrating the alleged crime, presented Enriquez, a common friend of both the accused and
the victim, as witness. Enriquez testified that Openda, Jr. confided to him that the latter is having an affair with
accused’s wife.
The trial court, giving credence to Enriquez’s testimony as well as testimony of other witnesses attesting to the
circumstances prior to the alleged abduction, convicted the accused. Accused assailing the decision of the trial
court and for admitting the testimony of Enriquez.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony made by a witness as to a statement made a deceased person that is against
the interest of the latter may be admissible in evidence as against a third person.

HELD:
Openda, Jr.’s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal’s wife is admissible in evidence,
pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
"Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far
contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration
unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and
against third persons."
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit:" (1) that the declarant is
dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he
made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that
the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to
Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is
admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.

Declaration about pedigree

CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON & RENE R. DEZOLLER vs. COURT OF APPEALS & TEODORA DOMINGO
G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997

FACTS:
Martin Guerrero, the surviving spouse and only heir of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero (TDG), sold the property
originally owned by the latter to herein respondent Teodora Domingo. Thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
374012 was issued in the latter’s name. When Martin Guerrero died, herein petitioners, alleging to be TDG’s
niece and nephew, filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the
property in question by right of representation from TDG. During the trial, Corazon, one of the petitioners,
testified that she is the niece of TDG and submitted documentary evidence such as pictures, baptismal
certificate etc. to prove the alleged filiation.
Private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their
legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero. The trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to
evidence. In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence
presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all
inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation

ISSUES:
(1)  Whether or not a trial court may dismissed an action for reconveyance on the ground of complainant’s
failure to prove his alleged filiation on which the cause of action is anchored.

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 (2) Whether or not testimony as to filiation to a deceased person is inadmissible for being a hearsay
evidence. 


HELD:
(1)

The answer is in the negative. The court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the
universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code actually
fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The
legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties,
and within the period limited by law. The burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of
the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the same.
(2)

The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in
1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora’s niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration
about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the
declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown
by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only
before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy
has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is the third
element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborate the declaration
made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison
or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.
Distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration
itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The
general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both
claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant’s estate, the relationship of the
declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent
proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the
declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself
and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family.
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general requirement
on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself.

Family Reputation

FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON

G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998

FACTS:
Monina Jison filed a petition for recognition as an illegitimate child of petitioner Francisco Jison. In her complaint,
she alleged that: (1) at the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F.
Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes); (2) MONINA was born on 6
August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo; (3) since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an
illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family; and (4) that FRANCISCO gave her support
and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public accountant
(CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner.
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented as documentary evidence letters written by Francisco’s relatives as
proof of her recognition as illegitimate daughter of the latter. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal,
CA reversed the ruling of the trial court and held that Monina was able to establish her filiation as FRANCISCO's

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illegitimate daughter not just preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record. Francisco elevated the case
before the SC and assailed the admissibility of the letters of his relatives.

ISSUE: Whether or not letter of the relatives of a putative father is admissible in evidence as part of the family
reputation.

HELD:
NO. Under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being no showing
that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants
and MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in question.
Neither may it be admitted under under Rule 130, Section 40. Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family
previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if
the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family
bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like may be received as
evidence of pedigree. (emphasis supplied)
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first underscored
clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question may not be admitted as
the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the section containing the second underscored phrase.
What must then be ascertained is whether letter presented in this case as private documents, fall within the
scope of the clause "and the like" as qualified by the preceding phrase "entries in family bibles or other family
books or charts, engravings on rights and family portraits,"
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of
ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as "family possessions," or those articles
which represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been
described as objects "openly exhibited and well known to the family," or those "which, if preserved in a family,
may be regarded as giving a family tradition." Plainly then, letters, as private documents not constituting "family
possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40.
Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common reputation, it
having been observed that: the weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general
repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a material
element of evidence going to establish pedigree. Thus, matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the
family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is marriage
which may be proved by common reputation in the community.

Res Gestae

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO FELICIANO

G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014

FACTS:
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity
were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines,
Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them
sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries. An
information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity, with the Regional Trial
Court. A separate information were also filed against them for the attempted murder and another for frustrated
murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible.

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HELD:
Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive value in this case. According to
the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the scene, he interviewed the bystanders who
all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since they were all masked. This, it is argued, could be
evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae.
As a general rule, "a witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception, x x x."  All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as
evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is when
the evidence is part of res gestae, thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as
part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a
legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca, this court has previously discussed the admissibility of testimony taken as part
of res gestae, stating that:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is
a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c)
the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. x x x x
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undersigned incidents of a
particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers
to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character
and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of
the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore,
whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a startling
occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the startling
occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
In People v. Albarido, however, this court has stated that "in accord to ordinary human experience:"
x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective points of reference. Therefore,
almost always, they have different accounts of how it happened. Certainly, we cannot expect the testimony of
witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all aspects because different persons have different impressions and
recollections of the same incident. x x x
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since the bystanders
could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points in time. Even Frisco
Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that the attackers had their masks on at first, but
later on, some remained masked and some were unmasked.
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the entirety of the
incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely corroborative of the fact that an attack
occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be given considerably less weight than that of the
victims.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GILBERTO VILLARICO et al.

G.R. No. 158362, April 04, 2011

FACTS:
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Accused were charged of murder for the death of Haide Cagatan. During the trial, prosecution presented the
following witnesses: (1) Remedios, sister-in-law of the victim, who testified that she saw accused pointing their
gun at the victim; (2) Lolita Cagatan, mother of the victim, who testified that she was at the sala when she heard
gunshots followed by seeing the victim wounded and asking for help stating that he was shot by Berting
(accused); (3) Francisco, father of the victim; who testified that he also heard gunshots and saw accused aiming
their guns upward and were about to leave.
RTC convicted the four accused of homicide aggravated by dwelling. The RTC accorded faith to the positive
identification of the accused by the Prosecution's witnesses. On intermediate review, the CA modified the RTC's
decision and convicted the accused with murder. The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses did not
actually see who had shot Haide and that Lolita’s testimony is a hearsay.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony relating the last statement of the victim immediately after the shooting incident
is admissible in evidence.

HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. The statement was admissible against the accused as an exception to the
hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides: “Statements made by a person
while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying
an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res
gestae.”
The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated
act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestaeincludes the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and
which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of
the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is
so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded a
part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony. A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the
res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
We find that the requisites concurred herein. Firstly, the principal act - the shooting of Haide - was a startling
occurrence. Secondly, his statement to his mother about being shot by the group of Berting was made before
Haide had time to contrive or to devise considering that it was uttered immediately after the shooting. And,
thirdly, the statement directly concerned the startling occurrence itself and its attending circumstance (that is, the
identities of the assailants). Verily, the statement was reliable as part of theres gestae for being uttered in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMAN PALARCA y MERCADO alias “Bong”

G.R. No. 146020 May 29, 2002

Facts:
At the time of the incident, private complainant Concepcion C. Javier, was a 70 year old widow who personally
tended her 24-hour sari-sari store located at 101 Rosal Street, Alido Heights Subdivision, Bulacan. She was
suffering from recurrent insomnia, thus, she regularly took sleeping pills to ward off her sleeping problem.
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Twenty-eight year old accused-appellant, single, was then working as a keyboardist and sequencer of an
establishment that produces “minus one” music. He was a resident of the same subdivision and a frequent buyer
at private complainant’s store during the wee hours of the morning.
Suddenly, accused-appellant entered through the kitchen door. He swiftly darted towards private complainant;
shoved her on the forehead and pushed her against the kitchen counter. When she attempted to run, he
grabbed her arm and punched her twice on the abdomen, causing her to fall to the ground. Though private
complainant was reeling from the physical assault as well as from the effects of the sleeping pill, she felt
accused-appellant raise her duster and remove her underwear. She saw him unzip his pants and pull down his
briefs. Then, accused-appellant forced her legs open and raped her. She felt pain and bled, but she could do
nothing as she was feeling very weak. Moments later, accused-appellant put on his pants and pointed the blood
on the floor to private complainant.
After accused-appellant left, private complainant struggled to get up and wiped the blood on the floor. Then, she
proceeded to the bedroom where one of her daughters, Teresa, was sleeping. Teresa woke up and saw the
bloodied underwear of her mother. Private complainant told her that she was raped by accused-appellant but
failed to give the details as she dozed off to sleep. The following day, May 20, 1998, private complainant
submitted herself for physical examination at the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory in Malolos, Bulacan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence for the prosecution established the guilt of accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.

HELD:
At any rate, private complainant’s thorough narration of the rape incident on the witness stand, which remained
firm and consistent under exhaustive cross-examination by the defense, convinces us that she was indeed
raped. It is settled jurisprudence that when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has been committed. It is hard to believe that a 70-year old woman who was not
shown to have any grudge against accused-appellant would concoct a humiliating rape story and spend the
remaining days of her life in sending a man to prison if her motive was not to avenge her honor and have her
ravisher punished. Bolstered by the medical findings showing that private complainant sustained multiple
abrasions on the vaginal wall, as well as bruises on the abdomen and right arm which confirmed that she was
indeed boxed and grabbed by accused- appellant, we see no reason to doubt her testimony.

Entries in the course of business

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. JAIME J. RAMOS et al.

G.R. No. 92740, March 23, 1992

FACTS:
Respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner alleging the following: (1) they are passengers of
PAL Flight No. 264 on September 24, 1985; (2) they check-in at least one (1) hour before the published
departure time; (3) no one was at the check-in counter until 30 minutes before departure; (4) upon checking-in,
they were informed that their tickets were cancelled and the seats awarded to chance passengers; (5) they have
to take the bus instead; and (6) they suffered damages due to the cancellation.
Petitioner disclaims any liability, claiming that the non-accommodation of Respondent on said flight was due to
their having check-in late for their flight. During the trial, defendant presented the check-in counter clerk at their
Naga Branch on the date of respondent’s scheduled flight. The clerk testified that: (1) the respondents were late
and that he noted the time of check-in on their tickets; and (2) there were other passengers who came late
before the respondents. In relation to the testimony, two documentary evidence were offered, namely: (1) the
ticket bearing the notation “late 4:02” of the clerk; and (2) the passenger manifest showing the other names of
other passengers who were also late.
Respondent objected to the documentary evidence submitted and argued that those are self-serving.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the entries made on a ticket by employees of a party in the course of their business may
not be given weight on the ground that the same is self-serving.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The plane tickets of the private respondents with the notation "late 4:02" stamped
on the flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of private respondents and the
passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264 which showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go and the private
respondents are entries made in the regular course of business which the, private respondents failed to
overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their testimonies.
Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or document made contemporaneously with a
transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily
regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such
facts based upon memory and recollection Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written
document that speaks a uniform language
Private respondents’ only objection to these documents is that they are self- serving cannot be sustained. The
hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with
the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are
admissible as part of the res gestae.

Entries in Official Records

RUDY LAO vs. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC.

G.R. No. 140023, August 14, 2003

FACTS:
Petitioner Lao, owner of a Fuso truck insured by respondent Standard Insurance Co., Inc., filed a claim with the
latter. However, the claim was denied by the insurance company on the ground that the driver of the insured
truck, Leonardo Anit, as stated in the Police Blotter, did not possess a proper driver’s license at the time of the
accident. The restriction in Leonardo Anit’s driver’s license provided that he can only drive four-wheeled vehicles
weighing not more than 4,500 kgs. Since the insured truck he was driving weighed more than 4,500 kgs., he
therefore violated the "authorized driver" clause of the insurance policy.
Thus, petitioner filed an action for breach of contract and damages. During trial, Respondent offered as evidence
the police blotter and presented the investigating police officer who made the entries on the said blotter report.
On the other hand, petitioner offered in evidence the Motor Vehicle Accident Report stating that the driver at the
time of the accident is not Anit but Giddie Boy. The said report was made three days after the accident or on April
27, 1985.
RTC dismissed the complaint and this was affirmed by CA on appeal. Petitioner assails the admissibility and
evidentiary weight given to the police blotter, as a basis for the factual finding of the RTC and the CA. He
contends that the same entry was belied by the Motor Vehicle Accident Report and testimony of the investigating
policeman himself.

ISSUE: Whether or not admissibility of a police blotter may be assailed on the ground that it contains entries that
is contrary to another police report made by the same investigating officer who made the blotter.

HELD:
Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are
prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified
by other competent evidence. Although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless
admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein.
The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court. Under the said rule, the
following are the requisites for its admissibility: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another
person, specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public
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officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by
him personally or through official information.
In this case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence. The person who made the entries
was likewise presented in court; he identified and certified as correct the entries he made on the blotter. The
information was supplied to the entrant by the investigating officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy
when the blotter was presented to him in comparison to the accident report he made three (3) days after the
accident. No explanation was likewise given by the investigating officer for the alleged interchange of names.

MEYNARDO SABILI, PETITIONER, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FLORENCIO LIBREA

G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012

FACTS:
When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a
resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Private respondent Florencio Librea filed a “Petition to
Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some
Grounds for Disqualification. He alleged that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement
under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.
In order to prove his compliance with the residency requirement, petitioner presented as evidence his barangay
certificate. The COMELEC in disqualifying the petitioner did not consider the Certification issued by Pinagtong-
ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade. COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that the said
Certification was not sworn to before a notary public and, hence, “cannot be relied on.” Subsequently, petitioner
presented another, substantially identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, save for
the fact that it had now been sworn to before a notary public.

ISSUE: Whether or not barangay certificate is inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it is not notarized.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides: Entries in official records
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be admissible in evidence: (a) The entry was
made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public
officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law; and (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts
must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to “keep an updated
record of all inhabitants of the barangay.” Regarding the second requisite, it is the business of a punong
barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay. Anent the third requisite, the BarangayCaptain’s
exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to these records kept by the
Barangay Secretary.

SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA vs. VICENTE CERCADO, JR.

G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015

FACTS:
Petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga (Simplicia) and Ligaya Cercado-Belison (Ligaya) claimed that they are the
legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who were married last 9 October 1929 in
Pililla, Rizal. In support of the existence thereof, petitioners presented a copy of the Contrato Matrimonial which
was issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente church. Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public
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document because it is required by law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office
(NSO). Petitioners claim to have in their possession a duplicate original of the Contrato Matrimonial which should
be regarded as original. Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document, petitioners maintain that
said document should be considered an ancient document which should be excluded from the requirement of
authentication.

In their Answer, respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and Leonora, who were married
on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage certificate registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Binangonan,
Rizal. In their Comment, respondents submit that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document and the fact
that marriages are required to be registered in the local civil registrar does not ipso facto make it a public
document. Respondents assert that the certificate of baptism is likewise a private document which tends to
prove only the administration of the sacrament of baptism and not the veracity of the declarations therein.
Respondents moreover refute the certification issued by the local civil registry arguing that it does not prove
filiation but only the fact that there is no record of Ligaya on file with said office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial is sufficient to prove the fact of marriage.

HELD:
Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be
authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged,
any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the
signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. As
observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia
testified that her mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately however, she was not present during its
execution nor could she identify Benita’s handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate.
While petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now argue that it is an ancient
document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’ argument still has no merit. Section 21, Rule 132
defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it
would naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion.
The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30-years old. On its face,
there appears to be no evidence of alteration.

The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.

Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which they might
reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if the
circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is found where
it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for.

Commercial Lists

Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY

G.R. No. 142943, April 3, 2002

FACTS:
Meralco team conducted their inspection at petitioner’s meter and found alleged meter tampering, they
immediately disconnected petitioners' electrical supply. During the inspection the following persons were
present, four (4) MERALCO inspection personnel and the secretary of appellees.
Plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. On the other hand, MERALCO filed a counterclaim with respect to the unpaid bills of herein plaintiff.
During the trial, MERALCO presented as witness its Senior Billing Computer Officer to testify as to the unpaid
bills of the plaintiff. The said testimony as corroborated with the documentary evidence showing unpaid bills as
well as the laboratory test results proving the tampering.
Trial court ruled that immediate disconnection was illegal due to lack of due process. On appeal, the CA
reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the complaint. CA likewise upheld respondent's counterclaim for
the billing differential representing the value of petitioners' used but unregistered electrical consumption, which
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had been established without being controverted. Petitioner elevated the case before the SC by way of petition
for review on certiorari. In their memorandum, petitioner assailed ruling upholding the validity of the
disconnection and denying their claim for damages. The petitioner did not questioned the computation of the
differential billing both during the trial as well as in their memorandum submitted before the SC. The only
defense presented by petitioner is that they cannot be held liable thereof because the bills are already
outstanding when they transferred to their residence.

ISSUE: Whether or not a party may be held liable for unpaid bills based on the uncontroverted documentary and
testimonial evidence.

HELD:
Yes. The mere presentation by petitioners of a Contract to Sell with Assumption of Mortgage does not
necessarily mean that they are no longer liable for the billing differential. There was no sufficient evidence to
show that they had not been actually residing in the house before the date of the said document. Lorna
Quisumbing herself admitted that they did not have any contract for electrical service in their own name. Hence,
petitioners effectively assumed the bills of the former occupants of the premises.
The evidence it presented, both documentary and testimonial, sufficiently proved the amount of the differential.
Not only did respondent show how the meter examination had been conducted by its experts, but it also
established the amount of P193,332.96 that petitioners owed respondent. The procedure through which this
amount was arrived at was testified to by Meralco's Senior Billing Computer Officer. His testimony was
corroborated by documentary evidence showing the account's billing history and the corresponding
computations. Neither do we doubt the documents of inspections and examinations presented by respondent to
prove that, indeed there had been meter tampering that resulted in unrecorded and unpaid electrical
consumption.

Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LANIE ORTIZ-MIYAKE

G.R. Nos. 115338-39, September 16, 1997

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale on a complaint initiated
by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario.
In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court adopted a previous decision of Branch
78 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque as a basis for the judgment. Said previous decision was a
conviction for estafa involving the same circumstances in the instant case, wherein complainants Generillo and
Del Rosario charged appellant with two counts of estafa. This decision was not appealed and had become final
and executory.
On appeal, the OSG argued that the Makati court could not validly adopt the facts embodied in the decision of
the Parañaque court to show that illegal recruitment was committed against Generillo and Del Rosario as well.
Illegal recruitment was allegedly proven to have been committed against only one person, particularly, Elenita
Marasigan. Appellant, therefore, may only be held guilty of simple illegal recruitment and not of such offense in
large scale.

ISSUE: Whether or not a trial court may adopt the findings of fact and decision of another court involving the
same parties and incidents.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Trial court’s utilization of and reliance on the previous decision of the Parañaque
court must be rejected. Every conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to
its appreciation of the evidence before it. A conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact of another
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court, especially where what is presented is only its decision sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses
who testified therein and upon which the decision is based.
A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence may only prove that an accused was previously
convicted of a crime. 30 It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a
subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous decision
is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation
of the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.

HARRY L. GO, et al. vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., et al.
G.R. NO. 185527, July 18, 2012

FACTS:
Petitioners were charged before the MTC for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The
prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia.
The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he
was being treated for lung infection. Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTC granted the motion.
Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting petitioners to file a Petition for
Certiorari before the RTC.
RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void.11The RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23
on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a
specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in
criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the
witness against him face to face.
The prosecution elevated the case to the CA. CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness is a criminal case may be taken by way of oral deposition.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The procedure for testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution witness
is covered under Section 15, Rule 119. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open
court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public
trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face.
The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test
the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however,
as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as
testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least
before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Child Witness Rule

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWIN IBAÑEZ Y ALBANTE and ALFREDO NULLA Y IBAÑEZ
G.R. No. 197813, September 25, 2013

FACTS:
Appellants were all charged in an Information for Murder of Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog. The prosecution
presented the victim’s wife, Rowena and minor daughter, Rachel (10 years old) as witnesses. Rachel testified
that she saw the appellants killed her father. The defense, on the other hand, presented Aniceta as witness

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whose testimony discredit that of Rachel. Aniceta testified testified that she and Rachel were out on that day
selling doormats and only returned at 6:00 p.m. Thus, Rachel could not have witnessed the murder of Wilfredo.
The trial court convicted the accused. The conviction was affirmed by the CA. Appellant, on appeal with the SC,
tried to further discredit Rachel’s testimony by arguing that Rachel was a mere child who had studied only until
the first grade of elementary school and could barely read, and did not know how to tell time.

ISSUE: Whether or not a child witness may be disqualified on the ground that she does not know how to read
and tell time.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative.e With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even buttressed by the
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To
rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Only when
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth
from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party,
conduct a competency examination of a child. Thus, petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s lack of education
and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of
Rachel as to who killed her father.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA

G.R. No. 195244 June 22, 2015

FACTS:
That on or about the 22nd day of October 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, the above-named
accused, with intent to gain, with the use of a bladed weapon, by means of force and violence, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to ₱13,000.00
belonging to JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of the latter; that by reason or on
occasion of said robbery, accused did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
with the said bladed weapon said JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, thereby inflicting upon her physical
injuries which directly caused her death.
Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident, he, his younger sister
Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their house. He saw appellant, whom
he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair.
Although there was no light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his father
chased the appellant. Carl saw blood come out of his mother’s lower chest. His father then brought her to the
hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their house, as the one who
stabbed his mother. On cross-examination, he related that the assailant took money from his father’s pocket. He
likewise admitted that he did not see very well the perpetrator because there was no light.
Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was no light when his mother was stabbed,
he was sure of what he saw since there was light at their second floor, which illumined the ground floor through
the stairway.
Next to testify was Dennis, husband of the victim. He narrated that he and the victim were married for nine years
before the incident and that they have four children: Monica, 11 years old; Mary Joy, 9 years old; Carl, 5 years
old; and Cherry Ann, 7 months old. At about 9 p.m. on October 21, 2003, he and his wife were sleeping
downstairs in their sala, with their baby, while their other children slept upstairs. Their sala measures 3 by 3
meters. At around 2 a.m., his son Carl woke up crying and went downstairs to sleep with them. Fifteen to thirty
minutes later, he heard someone shout "magnanakaw!" He turned on the light and saw that their door was open.
He got their bolo and ran outside. When he did not see anybody, he returned and heard his wife moaning. He
embraced and carried her and saw blood on her back. He shouted for help and his brother-in law helped him
bring the victim to the hospital where she eventually died. He spent ₱23,000.00 for the funeral and ₱44,500.00

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for the wake and burial. On cross-examination, he admitted that he has no personal knowledge as to who
stabbed his wife since he did not actually see the perpetrator and that it was his son who saw the appellant.
Sharon, sister-in-law of the victim, testified that she and her husband were sleeping upstairs when they were
roused from their sleep at around 2 a.m. of October 22, 2003 by Dennis’ cry for help. She saw that there was
blood on the victim’s chest. After the victim was brought to the hospital, she noticed that the victim’s children
were trembling in fear and were crying. They got outside and went to the billiard hall in front of their house. She
took Carl and had him sit on her lap. Then Carl said, "Tita, sya pasok bahay namin" pointing to someone but she
did not see who it was since there were many people passing by. Later, the police asked Carl whether he saw
somebody enter their house and he answered yes and demonstrated how his mother was stabbed. Carl also
said that the person who stabbed his mother was present in the vicinity. He then pointed to appellant and said "
siya po yung pumaso k sa bahay namin." As a resident there, appellant often goes to the billiard hall and
sometimes watches the television at the house of the victim.
PO1 Fabela also testified that after it was reported to him that there was a stabbing incident, he went to the
hospital then to the crime scene and interviewed the persons thereat. Later, Carl pinpointed and positively
identified the appellant as the one who stabbed his mother and robbed them of their money. Appellant was
arrested and brought to the police station.
In turn, the appellant denied the accusation. The RTC pronounced the Accused- appellant guilty of the crime.
The appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the composite crime of
robbery with homicide based solely on the testimony of Carl, a 5-year old witness whose recollections could only
be the product of his imagination.
However, The Court of Appeals sustain such decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with homicide was
credible and competent considering that the identifying witness was Carl, a 5-year old?

HELD:
Yes, The Court states that the qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others the acts
and events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes clear who may and may not be
witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who
can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. (l8 a)
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following persons cannot be
witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can communicate such
awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational
attainment, or social status are not necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not
possess any of the disqualifications as listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows
people to testify is apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds for disqualification.
That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the
testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of
a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a
witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only
when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish
truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a
party, conduct a competency examination of a child.

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 g. Opinion Rule

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL et al.

G.R. No. 123137, October 17, 2001

FACTS:
Herein accused was charged and convicted of murder by the trial court. On appeal, appellants argue that the
prosecution’s circumstantial evidence against them is weak, ambiguous, and inconclusive. Specifically,
appellants contend that the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel Caser, the prosecution’s ballistics expert, clearly
shows that: (1) He is ignorant about such ballistics instruments such as the micrometer, goniometer, and
pressure barrel. (2) He is not conversant with "the required references concerning ballistics," particularly books
on the subject by foreign authorities. (3) He could not "scientifically determine the caliber of a bullet." Since P/
Inspector Caser lacked adequate training and expertise in ballistics, they claim that his opinion that the test
bullets and cartridges matched the slugs and cartridges recovered from the scene of the crime was not reliable.
Appellants also assail Caser’s failure to take the necessary photographs to support his findings.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of an expert witness which was given credence of the trial court may be
assailed on appeal on the ground of incompetence.

HELD:
An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject matter of the inquiry
relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express an opinion." There
is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in order to
testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training and education; (2) particular,
first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and (3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which his
opinion is based. The question of whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics
rests with the discretion of the trial court.
In the instant case, P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert. He is a licensed criminologist, trained at the
Ballistics Command and Laboratory Center in Fort Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, and
in the National Bureau of Investigation. He had previously testified as an expert witness in at least twenty-seven
(27) murder and homicide cases all over the country. An expert witness need not present comparative
microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to support his findings. Examination under a comparison
microscope showing that the test bullet and the evidence bullet both came from the same gun is sufficient.
Moreover, the ballistician conclusively found similar characteristic markings in the evidence, test cartridges and
slugs.

LAURA and ERIBERTO BAUTISTA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FERNANDO MORELOS
G.R. NO. 158015, August 11, 2004

FACTS:
During his lifetime, Cesar Morelos sold and conveyed a parcel of land in favor of his niece, petitioner Laura
Morelos Bautista, as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondent Fernando Morelos, claiming to be the
illegitimate child of Cesar Morelos, instituted a complaint for the declaration of nullity of sale and title with
damages.
At the trial, Respondent presented testimonies of expert witnesses who claimed that the signature of Cesar
Morelos on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the fingerprint appearing on his Residence Certificate were not his.
Petitioners countered that the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid.
On the other hand, petitioner presented Carmelita Marcelino who testified that she saw Cesar Morelos and
petitioner Laura Bautista sign the Deed in question. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA
relying on the testimony of the expert witness reversed the trial court’s decision.

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ISSUE: W/N the testimonies of expert witnesses are conclusive to be a strong basis to nullify a duly executed
and notarized deed of absolute sale as against the testimony of one who witness the signing of the deed.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. It is well-settled that a duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption
of authenticity and due execution as well as the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. To
overturn this legal presumption, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant to
establish that there was forgery that gave rise to a spurious contract.
A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts. Although such testimony
may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the signatures
under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert.
In the case at bar, the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. As
against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the
contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or
circumstantial evidence at best. Carmelita Marcelino, the witness to the Deed of Absolute Sale, confirmed the
genuineness, authenticity and due execution thereof. Having been physically present to see the decedent Cesar
Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista affix their signatures on the document, the weight of evidence
preponderates in favor of petitioners.

BOBBY “ABEL” AVELINO Y BULAWAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 181444, July 17, 2013

FACTS:
Herein accused was charged with murder. During the trial, the defense presented as one of its witness Scene of
the Crime Operative (SOCO) PSI Lito D. Cabamongan to testify on the possible position of the gunman based
on the wounds sustained by the victim. With Cabamongan’s testimony, the defense intends to assail the
testimony of the eye-witnesses, Manalangsang and Cañada, as to the position of the gunman. Cabamongan’s
testimony was offered as an ordinary witness.
On appeal, the CA sustained the conviction of the accused and disregarded the testimony of soco Cabamongan.
Aggrieved, petitioner now seeks to reverse his conviction, arguing that the CA erred in relying on the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses Manalangsang and Cañada and disregarding the inconsistencies between the
statements of Manalangsang and the findings of the medico-legal and SOCO PSI Cabamongan as to the
position of the gunman.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of an expert presented as an ordinary witness may be admitted as evidence
and be considered against testimony of eye- witnesses.

HELD:
No. Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise, and (b)
the witness has been qualified as an expert. In this case, counsel for the petitioner failed to make the necessary
qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMILIANO DURANAN

G.R. Nos. 134074-75, January 16, 2001

FACTS:

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Herein accused was charged with two (2) counts of rape. Complainant Nympha Lozada, who was 25 years old
at the time of the incidents in question, is considered to be retarded and finished up to the sixth grade only.
During the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, complainant Nympha Lozada y de Lara,
complainant’s mother Virginia de Lara Lozada, and the attending medico-legal officer at Camp Crame, Dr.
Rosalina O. Cosidon. Accused was convicted by the trial court.
On appeal, Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victim’s mental age was
not proven. He argues that an essential element for the prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a
psychiatric evaluation of the complainant’s mental age to determine if her mental age is under twelve. He further
claims that only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical deformities
symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived. In this case, only the mother of the
complainant testified as to the latter’s metal age and fitness.

ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinary witness’ testimony on the mental fitness of the complainant who is a mental
retardate may be admissible in evidence.

HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. Rule 130, Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: the opinion of
a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in evidence regarding — (a) the identity of a person
about whom he has adequate knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the
mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon
conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing
upon his mental condition, with the witness’ own knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such
conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion. In the case at bar,
Virginia Lozada testified on the mental condition of her daughter.

i. Character Evidence

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN

G.R. No. 130601, December 4, 2000

FACTS:
Accused was charged with Robbery with Rape. During the trial, the accused was positively identified by the
victim as her assailant. The trial court formally rejected his defense of alibi and convicted him of the crime
charged; consequently, accused-appellant is now before us on appeal. Accused-appellant in his brief, maintains
that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime charged since he is a person of good moral character,
holding as he does the position of "Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and that he
is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of
God.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused may be acquitted on the ground of his god moral character.

HELD:
An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and exemplary
conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the
prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of
the crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of accused-
appellant is unavailing.The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies
the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of "Ministerial
Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed,
religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the
impulse to rob and rape.
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 D. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

1. Burden of Proof vs. Burden of Evidence

FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY (FEBTC) vs. ROBERT MAR CHANTE

G.R. No. 170598, October 09, 2013

FACTS:
Instant complaint was filed by petitioner against Chante to recover from Chan the principal sum of P770,488.30
representing the unpaid balance of the amount fraudulently withdrawn from Chan’s ATM. FEBTC alleged that
between 8:52 p.m. of May 4, 1992 and 4:06 a.m. of May 5, 1992, Chan had withdrawn funds totaling
P967,000.00 from the PNB-MEGALINK ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel in Manila; that the withdrawals
were done in a series of 242 transactions with the use of the same machine, at P4,000.00/withdrawal; and that
the transactions were processed and recorded by the respective computer systems of PNB and MEGALINK
despite the following circumstances, namely: (a) the offline status of the branch of account (FEBTC Ongpin
Branch); (b) Chan’s account balance being only P198,511.70 at the time; (c) the maximum withdrawal limit of the
ATM facility being P50,000.00/day; and (d) his withdrawal transactions not being reflected in his account, and no
debits or deductions from his current account with the FEBTC Ongpin Branch being recorded. FEBTC asserted
further that defendant took advantage of a system bug which allowed the excessive withdrawals.
Chan denied liability and instead insisted that he had been actually home at the time of the withdrawals. He
alluded to a possible “inside job” as the cause of the supposed withdrawals, citing a newspaper report to the
effect that an employee of FEBTC’s had admitted having debited accounts of its depositors by using his
knowledge of computers as well as information available to him. Chan claimed that it would be physically
impossible for any human being like him to stand long hours in front of the ATM facility just to withdraw funds.

ISSUE: Whether or not a civil action may be decided in favor of the plaintiff where the defendant relies on bare
and uncorroborated denial of the former’s allegation.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it because
mere allegation of the fact is not evidence of it. Verily, the party who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side.
This is because our system frees the trier of facts from the responsibility of investigating and presenting the facts
and arguments, placing that responsibility entirely upon the respective parties. The burden of proof, which may
either be on the plaintiff or the defendant, is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the
complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly
the essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses, that, if proved, would exculpate him from
liability.
Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts, namely: (a) the risk of non-
persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden; and (b) the duty of producing evidence,
or the burden of going forward with the evidence, or simply the production burden or the burden of evidence.
In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or issue by such a quantum of
evidence as the law demands in the case at which the issue arises. In its other concept, it is the duty of
producing evidence at the beginning or at any subsequent stage of trial in order to make or meet a prima facie
case. Generally speaking, burden of proof in its second concept passes from party to party as the case
progresses, while in its first concept it rests throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue.
Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead of upon the weakness of Chan’s
evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to preponderantly demonstrate that his ATM card had been used to
make the withdrawals, and that he had used the ATM card and PIN by himself or by another person to make the
fraudulent withdrawals. Otherwise, it could not recover from him any funds supposedly improperly withdrawn
from the ATM account.

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2. Presumptions
a. Conclusive Presumptions

IBAAN RURAL BANK INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MR. and MRS. RAMON TARNATE
G.R. No. 123817, December 17, 1999

FACTS:
Respondent spouses entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage of the lots in question
from its original owner Spouses Reyes. As, Private respondents failed to pay the loan and the bank extra-
judicially foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. At the public auction, the bank was the sole bidder. Consequently, a
certificate of sale was issued. The said certificate stated that redemption period expires two (2) years from the
registration of the sale. Certificate of sale was registered on October 16, 1979.
Within the two (2) year period, private respondents offered to redeem the foreclosed lots and tendered the
redemption amount. However, petitioner Bank refused and argued that the right to redeem had prescribed, as
more than one year had elapsed from the registration of the Certificate of Sale. Private respondents filed a
complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of the foreclosed lots. They argued that they were
entitled to redeem the foreclosed lots because they offered to redeem and tendered the redemption price before
October 16, 1981, the deadline of the 2-year.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure to previously contest the redemption period stated on the certificate of sale
precludes the bank from asserting it as a defense to oppose the exercise of right of redemption.

HELD:
By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to believe that they had two years within which
to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two years, petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period for
redemption was only one year and that the period had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his
acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through
culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on
such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.
When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its contents. For two years, it did not
object to the two-year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be said that petitioner
consented to the two-year redemption period specially since it had time to object and did not. When
circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence
can be construed as consent.

SPOUSES REYNALDO ALCARAZ and ESMERALDA ALCARAZ PEDRO M. TANGGA-AN et al.

G.R. No. 128568, April 9, 2003

FACTS:
Petitioners leased a building from Respondent’s predecessor (Virginia). At the time of the perfection of the
contract, the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were aware that the NHA, and not Virginia, the lessor, owned the
land on which the rented house stood yet they signed the same, obliged themselves to comply with the terms
thereof for five years and performed their obligations as lessees for two years.
After two years from the effectivity of the lease contract, Respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, with
damages against petitioner for failure to pay rent. On the other hand, the petitioner spouses alleged that they
paid the rent to the new owners (Virgilio and Angelita) of the lot where the building stood and not to respondents
since the latter supposedly no longer had the legal right to collect rentals. Petitioner claimed that the lease
contract ceased to be effective because Virgilio’s assumption of ownership of the land stripped the respondents
of ownership of the building.
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MTC rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs. MTC ruled that petitioner failed to show that the subject house
belonged to Virgilio. On the other hand, the respondents proved that the property in question is registered in their
name. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC based on the petitioner’s failure to present any
documentary evidence modifying or amending the contract of lease to justify the transfer of payment of the
monthly rental to Virgilio Tanga-an who claims only as the registered owner of the lot on which the leased house
is located.

ISSUE: Whether or not a defendant is a suit, to which the cause of action arises from a contract may assailed
the operation of such contract by disputing a previously affirmed fact.

HELD:
No. Petitioner were aware that the lot in question was not owned by the lessors at the time the lease contract
was entered into. After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are
barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents lost
ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot. Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides
as a conclusive presumption that:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it;

UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO, INC. v. BANGKO SENTRAL PILIPINAS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 194964-65, January 11, 2016

FACTS:
Guillermo Torres (G) who chaired the board of Trustees of University of Mindanao (UM) and previously operated
a thrift bank First Iligan Savings & Loan Associations (FISLAI) requested and was granted by BSP an emergency
credit of 1.9M for FISLAI. As mortgage for said loan UM through its vice president for finance Saturnino
petalcorin, executed a deed of real estate mortgage (REM) over UM’s property in Cagayan de Oro in favor of
Banko Sentral (BSP). BSP extended to FISLAI another loan in the amount of Php600k over which a REM was
executed over UMs properties in Iligan City. Thereafter FISLAI became subject of a merger and became
Mindanao Savings and Loan Association(MSLAI). G died. Thereafter BSP sent a demand letter for payment of
the loan. UM denied receiving any loan and thereafter filed two complaints for nullification and cancellation of
mortgage, one with RTC Cagayan de Oro and the other with RTC Iligan City.  The RTC of CDO decided in favor
of UM declaring the REM involving properties in CDO be cancelled reasoning that there was no board resolution
giving Saturnino authority to execute the mortgage on behalf of UM and upon Aurora de Leon’s testimony that
there was no board resolution and that she signed the certificate only upon G’s orders. The RTC of iligan City
also rendered a similar decision to which BSP appealed. The CA reversed the decision of the two trial courts and
upheld the right to foreclose of BSP reasoning that there is a presumption of regularity in the decisions of
corporations absent any sign of fraud. That this presumption is proved by the certificate executed by aurora de
leon as secretary, which had clothed saturnino with apparent authority to execute the mortgage and that BSP
relied in good faith on the said certificate. UM therefore is estopped from denying saturnino’s authority.

ISSUE: Was the execution of the mortgage contract was ultra vires. 

HELD:
Yes it was ultra vires because a corporation may exercise only powers given by law and as provided in its
charter. Securing loans from third persons is not among the purposes for which petitioner UM was established.
As an educational institution, it is limited to developing human capital through formal instruction. It is not a
corporation engaged in the business of securing loans of others The Court ruled that The RTC decision of
November 23, 2001 and December 7, 2001 are reinstated.
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 b. Disputable Presumptions

HOSPICIO D. ROSAROSO et al. vs. LUCILA LABORTE SORIA et al.

G.R. No. 194846, June 28, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for nullity of the SPA authorizing Respondent to sell the subject disputed lots to
Meridian, as well as the deed of sale entered into pursuant to the said SPA. Petitioner alleged that the said lot
had already sold to them by their predecessor Luis Rosaroso.
During trial the second wife of Luis, Lourdes testified deed of sale in favor of petitioners, was obtained through
fraud, deceit and trickery. She explained that they signed the prepared deed out of pity because petitioners told
them that it was necessary for a loan application.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. The CA ruled that
the first deed of sale in favor of petitioners was void because they failed to prove that they indeed tendered a
consideration for the four (4) parcels of land. It relied on the testimony of Lourdes that petitioners did not pay her
husband. The price or consideration for the sale was simulated to make it appear that payment had been
tendered when in fact no payment was made at all.

ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of a contract may be assailed on a mere testimony that it has no
consideration.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable
presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been
followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract. These presumptions operate against an
adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut
the prima facie case they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail.
The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the
time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place of
evidence unless rebutted.
In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside from their bare allegation that the sale
was made without a consideration, they failed to supply clear and convincing evidence to back up this claim. It is
elementary in procedural law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof
under the Rules of Court.
The CA decision ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable presumption. It relied heavily on the
account of Lourdes who testified that the children of Luis approached him and convinced him to sign the deed of
sale, explaining that it was necessary for a loan application, but they did not pay the purchase price for the
subject properties. This testimony, however, is self- serving and would not amount to a clear and convincing
evidence required by law to dispute the said presumption. As such, the presumption that there was sufficient
consideration will not be disturbed.

HEIRS OF CIPRIANO TRAZONA vs. HEIRS OF DIONISIO CAÑADA

G.R. No. 175874, December 11, 2013

FACTS:
Cipriano Trazona owned Lot No. 5053–H covered by Tax Declaration No. 07764. Sometime in 1997, when the
heirs of Cipriano, herein petitioners, tried to secure a copy of Tax Declaration No. 07764, they were informed that
Tax Declaration No. 07764 had been cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Tax Declaration No. 23959 was issued on 24
June 1996 in the name of Dionisio, the owner of the property adjacent to Cipriano’s lot. Apparently, respondents
had caused the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 23959 by submitting a Deed of Absolute Sale supposedly
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executed by Cipriano in favor of Dionisio. The deed of sale covers a portion of Cipriano’s property which was
encroached upon by Dioniso during the former’s lifetime, but the new tax declaration issued covers the whole
property of Cipriano.
Consequently, petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents for quieting of title, annulment of deed of sale,
cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 23959. Petitioners alleged therein that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27
June 1956 was a forgery. During the trial, petitioners presented an expert witness testifying to the forgery of
Cipriano’s signature on the assailed deed.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. Based on RTC Judge’s observation Cipriano’s signature on the assailed deed
bares a difference as compared to other documents bearing his signature. On appeal, CA ruled that petitioners
had failed to prove by requisite evidence their allegation that the assailed deed was a forgery. The deed, being a
notarized document, enjoyed the presumption of authenticity and due execution. Also, the fact that it was an
ancient document that “remained unaltered after so many years, bodes well for its authenticity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption of regularity of a notarized ancient document may be assailed by the
testimony of an expert witness and independent observation of the trial court as to the forgery of signature
therein.

HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards
their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this
presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant.
In this case, clear and convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of regularity of the
assailed deed was presented. First, the document examiner determined that the signature of Cipriano in the
assailed deed had been forged. No issue has been raised about his expertise. Second, the RTC did not just rely
on expert testimony in ruling that the signature was forged. It likewise supported its finding that the signature was
forged through independent observation.
Lastly, when the record management analyst from the Bureau of Archives presented the assailed deed, the
paper was noted to be white, while its supposed contemporaries in the bunch from where it was taken had
turned yellow with age. Further, when the analyst was asked the question of when the assailed deed was
received by the Bureau of Archives, she answered that it was forwarded to them only on 28 September 1987 by
RTC Region 7, Notarial Division.

LUIS UY vs. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA* MENDOZA

G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015

FACTS:
Luis Uy (Uy) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with
Damages against respondents Petra Rosca (Rosca), and spouses Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza
(Spouses Lacsamana). Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together
as husband and wife from the time they were married in until they separated and lived apart. Uy contends that
the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone in favor of Spouses Lacsamana over a property he alleges to be a
part of their marital property regime is not valid for being simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration and
consent.
Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real properties using her
paraphernal funds. She added that she and Uy cohabited and attempted to formalize their marital union with a
marriage ceremony. However, the celebration was not consummated because of the bombings which occurred
on the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were unable to secure a marriage contract.
Spouses Lacsamana also filed their Answer with Counterclaim dated claiming that they were buyers in good faith
and for value and that they relied on the Torrens title which stated that Rosca was the owner of the subject
property.

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Uy died and is two daughters, Lydia Uy Velasquez (Lydia) and Shirley Uy Macaraig (Shirley) substituted him in
the case. Rosca and respondent Jose Lacsamana also died. Meanwhile Spouses Lacsamana sold the property
to Corazon Buena (Buena). Thus, both Rosca and the Spouses Lacsamana were substituted by Buena as
respondent in this case.
Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents.

ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in favor of Spouses
Lacsamana, is valid.

HELD:
YES. Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is anchored on
whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. However, this presumption may be contradicted by a
party and overcome by other evidence.
Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias, we held that testimony by
one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who
officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.
Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced from his own
personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the marriage allegedly took place. Even
the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant evidence that he was actually married to
Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and Rosca were not legally married to
each other.
While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and wife, defendant Rosca's
testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their marriage was not consummated.
In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held that persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed,
absent any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. Consequently, with the
presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It
then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became
necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show that they were legally married. He,
however, dismally failed to do so. Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca,
their property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living
together were not incapacitated from getting married.
The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there is proof
to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and appellate courts that Rosca was able to prove that the subject
property is not co-owned but is paraphernal. Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to
sufficiently overcome the presumption that any property acquired while living together shall be owned by the
couple in equal shares. The house and lot were clearly Rosca's paraphernal properties and she had every right
to sell the same even without Uy's consent.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 September 2011 and Resolution dated
1 March 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.

DOLORES DIAZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 208113, December 02, 2015

FACTS:
An Information for estafa was filed by Leticia S. Arcilla (Leticia) against Dolores Diaz (Dolores) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for her alleged failure to return or remit the proceeds from various merchandise
valued at P32,000.00 received by her in trust - i.e., on consignment basis from respondent.
Leticia alleged that she is a businesswoman engaged in the business of selling goods/merchandise through
agents (one of whom is petitioner) under the condition that the latter shall turn over the proceeds or return the
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unsold items to her a month after they were entrusted. She averred that she entrusted merchandise worth
P35,300.00 to Dolores as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt signed by the latter. However, petitioner was
only able to remit the amount of P3,300.00 and thereafter, failed to make further remittances and ignored
respondent's demands to remit the proceeds or return the goods.
In her defense, petitioner admitted having previous business dealings with respondent but not as an agent. She
clarified that she was a client who used to buy purchase order cards (POCs) and gift checks (GCs) from
respondent on installment basis and that, during each deal, she was made to sign a blank sheet of paper prior to
the issuance of POCs and GCs. She further claimed that their last transaction was conducted in 1995, which had
long been settled. However, she denied having received P32,000.00 worth of merchandise from respondent on
February 20, 1996.
RTC acquitted petitioner of the charge of estafa but held her civilly liable to pay respondent the amount of
P32,000.00. CA upheld petitioner's civil liability. It ruled that respondent was able to establish by preponderance
of evidence her transaction with petitioner, as well as the latter's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the
merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case the items were not sold, the fact of
which having been substantiated by the acknowledgment receipt. To this, the CA rejected petitioner's attempt to
discredit the said receipt which she denied executing on the ground that she was only made to sign blank
documents, finding that even if petitioner was indeed made to sign such blank documents, such was merely a
safety precaution employed by respondent in the event the former reneges on her obligation.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner may be held civilly liable.

HELD:
YES. At the outset, it is noteworthy to mention that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence, or "greater weight of the credible evidence," is required. Thus, an accused acquitted of estafa may still
be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant, as in this case.
Petitioner's claim that she was required to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and a trust receipt in blank
during her transactions with respondent, which she allegedly failed to retrieve after paying her obligations, is a
bare allegation that cannot be given credence. It is well-settled that "[h]e who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence."
On the contrary, espondent was able to prove by preponderance of evidence the fact of the transaction, as well
as petitioner's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the
same to respondent in case such merchandise were not sold. This was established through the presentation of
the acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996, which, as the document's name connotes, shows that
petitioner acknowledged receipt from respondent of the listed items with their corresponding values, and
assumed the obligation to return the same on March 20, 1996 if not sold.
In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal
presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law dictates that the natural
presumption is that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and
consequences. Further, under Section 3 (p) of the same Rule, it is equally presumed that private transactions
have been fair and regular. This behooves every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document
before he signs and delivers it. The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of
presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will
prevail. In this case, petitioner failed to present any evidence to controvert these presumptions. Also,
respondent's possession of the document pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses her claim that the same
has not been extinguished. Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more
convincing than the opposing evidence. All things considered, the evidence in this case clearly preponderates in
respondent's favor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 30, 2013 and the Resolution dated July 10,
2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97571 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, directing
petitioner Dolores Diaz to pay respondent Leticia S. Arcilla the amount of P32,000.00 with legal interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from July 28, 1998 until full payment. SO ORDERED.

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3. Suppression of Testimony

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE

G.R. No. 137664, May 9, 2002

FACTS:
Accused Roberto Padrigone, a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel, Jocel Ibanita, Michael San Antonio and Abel
Triumpante entered the dwelling of the Contridas sisters at 3:00 a.m. of January 3, 1995, and at knifepoint
successively raped Rowena Contridas, a 16 year old lass. The victim became insane after the incident and was
not able to testify in Court. Nimfa Contridas, her fourteen year old sister, who was also present that time narrated
the incident when her elder sister’s innocence was forcibly violated. The trial court, disregarding the Accused’s
defense of denial and alibi, convicted the accused.
On appeal, herein Accused-appellant claims that the prosecution suppressed evidence by not presenting
Rowena, the victim, when the latter should have had her sane moments. As a consequence, the trial court
deprived appellant of the opportunity to cross-examine her when she allegedly declared before the Chief of
Police of Buhi that it was only appellant who raped her which declaration became the basis for the latter’s
conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure to present as witness the victim of a crime who became insane by reason of such
offense amounts to suppression of evidence.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as
suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that "evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced" does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties;
(b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an
exercise of a privilege.
Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the opportunity to subpoena
Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense failed to call her to the
witness stand. Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from "Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition" and
thus "cannot stand judicial proceedings yet." The non- presentation, therefore, of Rowena was not willful. Third,
in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed the violation committed
on her sister.

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and G.T.P. DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 122899, June 8, 2000

FACTS:
Mr. Chia and Respondent GTP entered into a contract of sale with assumption of mortgage wherein the latter
assumes the former’s indebtedness with Metrobank. Respondent, pursuant to the balance declared by
Metrobank prior to the execution of the sale, paid Chia’s loan balance with Metrobank in the amount of P116K+.
This notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate mortgage on the subject
property despite repeated requests, thus prompting respondent GTP to file an action for specific performance
against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia. Metrobank refused to discharge of the real estate mortgage on
the claim that the subject property still secures "other unliquidated past due loans” as there exist a stipulation in
subject Deeds of Mortgage that mortgagors’ debts subsequently obtained would be covered by the same
security. Hence, the payment made by GPT does not extinguish the mortgage. The trial court ruled in favor of the
respondent. On appeal, CA reversed the decision. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.

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With this unfavorable turn of events, respondent GTP, filed a motion for reconsideration with alternative prayer to
require METROBANK to furnish appellee (GTP) of the alleged unpaid balance of Mr. Chia." At the re-scheduled
date of oral arguments where METROBANK was supposed to bring before the CA the current statement of the
mortgage debt of Mr. Chia secured by the deeds of mortgage sought to be released, METROBANK’s counsel did
not appear. Consequently, CA reversed its previous decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure of the mortgagee to present the proof of loan secured by the mortgage estopped
him from further asserting the existence of such liability

HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact
which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature
must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence,
the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced, would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of
his adversary.
The scheduled oral arguments before the CA was supposed to be Metrobank’s golden opportunity to prove the
existence the "other unliquidated past due loans" which is the basis of its refusal to release the mortgage
property. But Metrobank failed to appear thereon.
No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved,
would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist."

4. Official Duty

FILOMENA G. DELOS SANTOS vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013

FACTS:
Congressman Cuenco entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical
Center (VSMMC) appropriating to the hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT)
Health Program. It was agreed that Cuenco shall identify and recommend the patients who may availed of the
program.
Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of prescriptions and
referrals for the availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. Consequently, an audit thereof was
conducted and rampant violations of bidding and audit procedure were revealed. Thereafter, Special Audit Team
Supervisor, Boado disallowed the amount of P3,386,697.10 for the payment of drugs and medicines for anti-
rabies with falsified prescription and documents, and holding petitioners, together with other VSMMC officials,
solidarily liable therefor.
By way of defense, petitioners nonetheless argue that VSMMC was merely a passive entity in the disbursement
of funds under the TNT Program and, thus, invoke good faith in the performance of their respective duties,
capitalizing on the failure of the assailed Decisions of the CoA to show that their lapses in the implementation of
the TNT Program were attended by malice or bad faith.

ISSUE: Whether or not assertion of good faith in the performance of a public function prevails over factual
findings revealing violations of rules and regulations in the performance of such function.

HELD:
Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was
violated. Petitioners failed to make a case justifying their non-observance of existing auditing rules and
regulations, and of their duties under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners’ neglect to properly monitor the
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disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified prescriptions
and fictitious claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the patent
irregularities borne out by the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto. Had there been an internal control
system installed by petitioners, the irregularities would have been exposed, and the hospital would have been
prevented from processing falsified claims and unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA

G.R. No. 191263, October 16, 2013

FACTS:
Accused was charged with violation of RA 9165. The prosecution presented Trayvilla, a Non-Uniformed
Personnel of the PNP, who testified that on 31 July 2002 at around 6:30 in the morning, while performing her
duty as a female frisker assigned at the NAIA Terminal I, she frisked the accused Cadidia upon her entry at the
departure area and she noticed something unusual and thick in the area of Cadidia’s buttocks. Upon inquiry,
Cadidia answered that it was only her sanitary napkin which caused the unusual thickness. Not convinced with
Cadidia’s explanation, Trayvilla and her female co-employee Bagsican brought the accused to the comfort room
inside the domestic airport to check. When she and Bagsican asked Cadidia to remove her underwear, they
discovered that inside were two sachets of shabu. The two sachets of shabu were turned over to their supervisor
SPO3 Musalli I. Appang (SPO3 Appang). Trayvilla recalled that Cadidia denied that the two sachets of shabu
were hers and said that she was only asked by an unidentified person to bring the same.
During trial, accused interposed the defense of frame-up. Both the trial court and the CA, on appeal, conviced
the accused. The accused also assails the application of presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
of the witnesses. She claimed that the self- serving testimonies of Trayvilla and Bagsican failed to overcome her
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of a public officer may be assailed by
bare allegations of frame-up.

HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to
prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers.”
In this case, the prosecution witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the police to impute the crime against
Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled the accused who entered
the x-ray machine of the departure area. There was no pre-determined notice to particularly search the accused
especially in her private area. The unusual thickness of the buttocks of the accused upon frisking prompted
Trayvilla to notify her supervisor SPO3 Appang of the incident. The subsequent search of the accused would
only show that the two female friskers were just doing their usual task when they found the illegal drugs inside
accused’s underwear. This is bolstered by the fact that the accused on the one hand and the two friskers on the
other were unfamiliar to each other. Neither could they harbour any ill-will against each other. The allegation of
frame-up and denial of the accused cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of three prosecution witnesses
who corroborated on circumstances surrounding the apprehension.

5. Cohabitation

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS EDUALINO

G.R. No. 119072, April 11, 1997

FACTS:
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Accused Jesus Edualino was charged with consummated rape of a pregnant woman. Prosecution presented
the following witnesses: (1) Rowena Nantiza – victim/complainant; Aileen Yayen – eyewitness; and Dr. Rogelio
Divinagracia – medico-legal. On the other hand, accused-appellant relies on alternative defenses of alibi and
consent on the part of complainant. While accused- appellant's defense before the trial court alleges that he had
left the scene of the incident together with defense witness Calixto Flora, he alternatively raises before this Court
the contention that the elements of the crime of rape have not been established.
Accused-appellant raises the issue of the character of complainant Rowena Nantiza. It is argued that a
responsible and decent married woman, who was then three (3) months pregnant, would not be out at two (2)
o'clock in the morning getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a man to accompany her to drink
beer. It is contended that complainant merely concocted the charge of rape to save her marriage since her
husband had found out that she was using drugs and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle of herself
when she tried to seduce accused-appellant on 11 May 1994 while she was under the influence of drug and
alcohol.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused may question his conviction by assailing the character of the victim.

HELD:
It should be pointed out that the moral character of a rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction
of the accused. The Court has ruled that prostitutes can be the victims of rape.
In the present case, even if accused-appellant's allegations that the victim was drunk and under the influence of
drugs and that she (the victim) cannot be considered a decent and responsible married woman, were true, said
circumstances will not per se preclude a finding that she was raped.
The Court has repeatedly held that a medical examination of the victim is not a prerequisite in prosecutions for
rape. A person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim provided the testimony is
credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the course of things.

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 E. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE

1. Order of Presentation of Evidence

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE

G.R. No. 146697, July 23, 2002

FACTS:
Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the Regional Trial Court of raping his own daughter Marilou Fabre.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Marilou, that of Adela Fabre, her mother and the wife of
the accused, and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the doctor who examined Marilou, along with the medico-legal
certificate issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn statement of Adela, and the criminal complaint signed by both Marilou
and Adela. The defense, during its turn in the presentation of evidence, countered with the testimony of the
accused himself.
On appeal, the defense argues, that the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength for the failure of
the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and to present any rebuttal evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court should give full weight as to the veracity of a testimony which was not
subjected to cross-examination by the adverse party.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the
witness is called. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness
made on direct examination. The party against whom the witness testifies may deem any further examination
unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what
would be believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give full weight
to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is not cross-examined by the other party.

2. Leading and Misleading Questions

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA

G.R. No. 142556, February 5, 2003

FACTS:
For automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Jesus S. Perez guilty of raping
Mayia P. Ponseca and imposing on appellant the death penalty.
On appeal, Appellant contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was highly irregular. Appellant points
out that the prosecutor had already identified him as the man wearing an orange t-shirt when the prosecutor
asked Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. Appellant stresses that when Mayia identified him in open court, she
referred to him as a man named "Johnny" and did not give any description or any identifying mark. Moreover,
appellant claims he was alone in the cell when Mayia identified him after the police arrested him. Appellant
bewails that the identification was not done with the usual police line-up.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the minor-victim should be expunged on the ground that leading
questions were asked during her testimony in court.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for
exceptions when the witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without
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prompting or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips. In the case
at bar, the trial court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently young and
unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if not uncertain.
The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the questioning of a
child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which took effect on
December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that questions are
stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) to protect children from harassment or
undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are
allowed if the same will further the interests of justice."

3. Impeachment

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME CASTILLANO, SR. et al.

G.R. No. 139412, April 2, 2003

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellants Ronald Castillano alias
"Nono" and Jaime Castillano, Jr. of murder of the Diosdado Volante.
On appeal, Appellant Jaime, Jr. avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged. He asserts that the testimony of Luz Volante, the widow of Diosdado, was inconsistent with
her testimony during the preliminary examination in the municipal trial court and her sworn statement before the
police investigators as well as the testimonies of SPO1 Fornillos and SPO4 Jaime Favier, and the physical
evidence on record.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the testimony of Luz, the
prosecution’s principal witness, cannot be impeached via her testimony during the preliminary examination
before the municipal trial court nor by her sworn statement given to the police investigators for the reason that
the transcripts and sworn statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by the appellants nor admitted
in evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the appellants did not confront Luz with her testimony during the
preliminary examination and her sworn statement to the police investigators. Luz was not, therefore, accorded a
chance to explain the purported inconsistencies, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence

ISSUE: Whether or not a testimony made in open court may be impeached by asserting that the said testimony
is inconsistent with those made by the witness in the preliminary examination.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be
impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the
cross- examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to
the witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent
inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were made.51 This
Court held in People v. Escosura that the statements of a witness prior to her present testimony cannot serve as
basis for impeaching her credibility unless her attention was directed to the inconsistencies or discrepancies and
she was given an opportunity to explain said inconsistencies. In a case where the cross-examiner tries to
impeach the credibility and truthfulness of a witness via her testimony during a preliminary examination.
In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her
sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any discrepancies between her present testimony
and her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement. The appellants did not even
mark and offer in evidence the said transcript and sworn statement for the specific purpose of impeaching her
credibility and her present testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and accepted by the trial court,
said transcript and sworn statement cannot be considered by the court.

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4. Reference to Memorandum

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO PLASENCIA y DESAMPARADO

G.R. No. 90198, November 7, 1995

FACTS:
Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin were accused of robbery with homicide. The
Regional Trial Court did not give credence to the defense of alibi. It convicted the three accused of murder
The instant appeal was interposed by the three convicted appellants. Appellants attack the credibility of the
prosecution's lone eyewitness. It is asserted that the testimony of Francisca Espina should not be given worth
since, while testifying, she would at times be seen reading some notes written on her left palm.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness, who during her testimony was seen looking at some notes written
on her palm, should not be given credence

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether
proscribed. Section 16, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court states: A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact
occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that
the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be produced and may be
inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it in
evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the
particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made; but
such evidence must be received with caution. (Emphasis supplied.)
Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the exercise
of that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that she merely wanted to be accurate
on dates and like details.

ROSELLA D. CANQUE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
G.R. No. 96202, April 13, 1999

FACTS:
Petitioner entered into two contracts with private respondent Socor Construction Corporation. Due to Petitioner’s
refusal to pay the amount billed by the Respondent, the latter brought a suit to recover from the former the sum
of P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a month.
To prove the unpaid bills of the petitioner, private respondent presented its Book of Collectible Accounts and their
bookkeeper, Dolores Aday to testify on the entries of the said book. During the trial, Aday admitted that she had
no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. She said she made the entries based on the bills given
to her. But she has no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the bills. The deliveries of the
materials stated in the bills were supervised by "an engineer for such functions.
The trial court, giving due weight to the plaintiff’s Book of Collectible Accounts, as well as Aday’s testimony, ruled
in favor of respondent. On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the CA. Petitioner contends that Aday’s
testimony is considered a hearsay for lack of personal knowledge of the entries made as the information entered
was merely provided to her by the engineers of the respondent.
It is nonetheless argued by private respondent that although the entries cannot be considered an exception to
the hearsay rule, they may be admitted under Rule 132, Section 10 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand,
petitioner contends that evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose for which it was offered cannot be
admitted for another purpose.

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ISSUES:
(1)   Whether or not testimony of a witness as to entries made by her based on bills provided to her is
inadmissible on the ground of hearsay evidence rule.
(2)  Whether or not the testimony of a witness as to entries made by her based on information provided to her
may be admissible as memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness 


HELD:
(1)

The answer is in the affirmative. When the witness had no personal knowledge of the facts entered by him, and
the person who gave him the information is individually known and may testify as to the facts stated in the entry
which is not part of a system of entries where scores of employees have intervened, such entry is not admissible
without the testimony of the informer.
(2)

The answer is in the negative. Assuming that the book of collectible accounts presented by the respondent
would qualify as a memorandum, the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does not
constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the same
to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness has testified independently of or
after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is not
admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written
statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he supports his open-court
declaration with written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute,
unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down. What is more, even where this requirement
has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if
only because it is not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the
witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence

5. Classes of Documents

YASUO IWASAWA vs. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY
G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner, a Japanese national married Private respondent in 2002. In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife
become depressed. Suspecting that something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife
about it. To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband
passed away. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent
as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one
During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following pieces of documentary evidence
issued by the NSO: (1) Certificate of Marriage between petitioner and private respondent to prove the fact of
marriage between the parties on November 28, 2002; (2) Certificate of Marriage between private respondent and
Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on June 20, 1994
Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo; (3) Certification from the NSO to the effect that there are
two entries of marriage recorded by the office pertaining to private respondent
RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove private respondent’s
prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while petitioner offered the certificate of marriage of
private respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified about said marriage.
The RTC ruled that petitioner’s testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of private
respondent’s prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s death which makes him a complete stranger to the marriage
certificate between private respondent and Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. It further ruled that
petitioner’s testimony about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation
of said document.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due execution of the
public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be accorded evidentiary weight.

HELD:
The answer in the negative. There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all
public documents. Art. 410 of the Civil Code provides that “the books making up the civil register and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein contained.”
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and
genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did
not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution
since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said
documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the
private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.

ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. vs. PHILAM INSURANCE CO., INC.

G.R. No. 181163, July 24, 2013

FACTS:
Nichimen Corporation shipped to Universal Motors 219 packages containing 120 units of brand new Nissan
Pickup Truck on board the vessel S/S "Calayan Iris" from Japan to Manila. The shipment was insured with
Philam against all risks. When the package arrived and was unloaded by ATI, it was found that the package
marked as 03-245-42K/1 was in bad order. The shipment was withdrawn by R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage,
Inc., the authorized broker of Universal Motors, and delivered to the latter’s warehouse. Owing to the extent of
the damage to said cargoes, Universal Motors declared them a total loss.
Universal Motors filed a formal claim for damages against Westwind, ATI10 and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage,
Inc. When Universal Motors’ demands remained unheeded, it sought reparation from and was compensated by
Philam. Accordingly, Universal Motors issued a Subrogation Receipt in favor of Philam.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Philam and ordered Westwind and ATI to pay Philam. On appeal, the CA
affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. When the case was elevated to the SC, petitioners objected to
the admission of Marine Certificate and the Subrogation Receipt for being hearsay as they were not
authenticated by the persons who executed them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not certificates and/or receipts offered as evidence required authentication.

HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the
documents may be presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented
as evidence in court.
In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed by a private person without the
intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or
set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a
private document requires authentication in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules:

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SEC. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when
the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules; (b) when the
genuineness and authenticity of the actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the
adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the
document is not being offered as genuine.
Indubitably, Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the Subrogation Receipt are private documents which
Philam and the consignee, respectively, issue in the pursuit of their business. Since none of the exceptions to
the requirement of authentication of a private document obtains in these cases, said documents may not be
admitted in evidence for Philam without being properly authenticated.

6. Offer of Evidence

LOMISES ALUDOS, deceased, substituted by FLORA ALUDOS vs. JOHNNY M. SUERTE

G.R. No. 165285, June 18, 2012

FACTS:
Lomises acquired from the Baguio City Government the right to occupy two stalls in the Hangar Market in Baguio
City. Lomises entered into an agreement with respondent Johnny M. Suerte for the transfer of all improvements
and rights over the two market stalls. Before full payment could be made, however, Lomises backed out of the
agreement and returned the P68,000.00.Thus, Johnny filed a complaint against Lomises for specific
performance with damages.
RTC nullified the agreement between Johnny and Lomises for failure to secure the consent of the Baguio City
Government to the agreement. The RTC found that Lomises was a mere lessee of the market stalls, and the
Baguio City Government was the owner-lessor of the stalls. On appeal, CA agreed with the RTC that the
assignment of the leasehold rights was void for lack of consent of the lessor, the Baguio City Government. The
sale of the improvements, however, was valid because these were Lomises’ private properties.
Lomises, however, objects to the CA ruling upholding the validity of the agreement insofar as it involved the sale
of improvements on the stalls. Lomises alleges that the sale of the improvements should similarly be voided
because it was made without the consent of the Baguio City Government, the owner of the improvements,
pursuant to the May 1, 1985 lease contract.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a document repeatedly mentioned in the pleadings of the parties which was presented only on
appeal may be considered for purposes of adjudicating the case.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The CA has already rejected the evidentiary value of the May 1, 1985 lease
contract between the Baguio City Government and Lomises, as it was not formally offered in evidence before the
RTC; in fact, the CA admonished Lomises’ lawyer, Atty. Lockey, for making it appear that it was part of the
records of the case. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. "The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to
rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and
until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same
is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight." Although the contract was referred to in Lomises’ answer
to Johnny’s complaint and marked as Exhibit "2" in his pre- trial brief, a copy of it was never attached. In fact, a
copy of the May 1, 1985 lease contract "surfaced" only after Lomises filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA
decision.
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WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION vs. AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR. et al.
G.R. No. 194128, December 7, 2011

FACTS:
Respondents filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages arising from their investments
against petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation (Wincorp) and respondent Pearlbank Securities Inc. the
case was set for the presentation of the defense evidence of Wincorp.
On March 7, 2003, three (3) days before the scheduled hearing, Wincorp filed a written motion to postpone the
hearing. The RTC denied Wincorp’s Motion to Postpone and considered it to have waived its right to present
evidence. The Motion for Reconsideration of Wincorp was likewise denied.
On September 27, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Francias and held Wincorp solely liable to
them. The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. Wincorp filed an MR with the CA attaching to the
said motion evidentiary evidence which it was not able to present during trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not documents attached to a motion for reconsideration made before the appellate court may
be considered for purposes of adjudicating the merits of the case.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence states that: "The court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must
be specified."
A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know
the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows
opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the
appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. Evidence
not formally offered during the trial cannot be used for or against a party litigant. Neither may it be taken into
account on appeal.
The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable
period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, any evidence that has not been offered shall
be excluded and rejected.
Prescinding therefrom, the very glaring conclusion is that all the documents attached in the motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the trial court and all the documents attached in the defendant-appellant’s brief
filed by defendant- appellant Wincorp cannot be given any probative weight or credit for the sole reason that the
said documents were not formally offered as evidence in the trial court because to consider them at this stage
will deny the other parties the right to rebut them.

7. Tender of Excluded Evidence

FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. 192024 July 1, 2015

FACTS:
Petitioner is the manufacturer and producer of its cigarette brands and prior to 1997 were subject to ad valorem
tax. However on Jan. 1, 1997 R.A. 8240 took effect and caused a shift from ad valorem tax to specific tax. As a
result of such shift, the aforesaid cigarette brands were subjected to specific tax. Petitioner later on filed a claim
for tax credit or refund under Sec. 229 of the NIRC for illegally collected specific taxes. After trial on the merits
the Court ruled that it was contrary to law and that there is insufficiency of evidence on the claim for refund.
Petitioner elevated the case to the CTA but the latter found no cause to reverse the decision.

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ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant or grant the Petitioner’s claim for tax refund.

HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative. The denial of Petitioners claim for tax refund in this case is based on the ground
that it failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove its claim and amount thereof. As a result, Petitioner seeks the
Court to re-examine the probative value of its evidence and determine whether it should be refunded the amount
of excise taxes it allegedly overpaid.
This cannot be done. The settled rule is that only questions of law can be raised in a petition under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. It is not the function of the SC. to analyze or weight all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below. The Court’s jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only the errors of the law
that may have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of the factual issues is the function of the lower
court whose findings on these matters are received with respect. A question of law which the Court may pass
upon must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.

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 F. WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

1. Hierarchy of Evidence

Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DELFIN CALISO

G.R. No. 183830, October 19, 2011

FACTS:
Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial Court found him guilty of murder for
the killing of AAA, a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced him to death.
On appeal, CA affirmed Caliso’s conviction for murder based on the same ratiocinations the RTC had rendered.
The CA also relied on the identification by Amegable of Caliso, despite his back being turned towards her during
the commission of the crime. The CA ruled that she made a positive identification of Caliso as the perpetrator of
the killing, observing that the incident happened at noon when the sun had been at its brightest, coupled with the
fact that Amegable’s view had not been obstructed by any object at the time that AAA’s body had been
submerged in the water.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of a witness attesting to identifying the perpetrator of a crime by merely
seeing his back constitutes positive identification that warrants conviction.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. No matter how honest Amegable’s testimony might have been, her identification
of Caliso by a sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to generate that
moral certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other reliable circumstances showing him
to be AAA’s killer.
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the
identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction
without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.
There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as
the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes
direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where,although a witness may not have actually seen the
very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim
immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification,
which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence
constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the
author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly
positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless
there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an
accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence
of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of
guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of
direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection.
Amegable’s identification of Caliso as the perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability, the only means by
which it might be said to be positive and sufficient. The test to determine the moral certainty of an identification is
its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, the
identification evidence should encompass unique physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the
dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that set
the individual apart from the rest of humanity.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA
G.R. No. 190178, February 12, 2014

FACTS:
Accused was charged with forcible abduction with rape. During the trial, complainant testified that she was
abducted by the accused and brought to the latter’s residence where the former was repeatedly rape for 8 days.
However, in the course the complainant’s testimony, she testified that in between those 8 days, she was able to
visit her grandmother.
Furthermore, when prosecution presented Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report, he noted the
following observations about AAA: (1) contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark; (2) hymen was intact and
can readily admit a normal-sized erect male penis without sustaining any injury; and (3) vaginal canal was
negative for spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot tell whether it was AAA’s first sexual intercourse
as the vagina was not injured but had healed lacerations.
On the other hand, the defense presented Wilma Enriquez, a friend of the complainant, who testified that after
the dates wherein the latter was supposedly rape, the latter visited her and discussed plans about marrying the
accused. Trial court convicted the accused. On appeal with CA, conviction of the accused was confirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not a person accused of rape may be convicted based solely on the testimony of victim who
positively identified him to be the perpetrator notwithstanding blatant inconsistencies therein.
HELD:
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but
to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2) inasmuch as only two persons
are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. So long as the private complainant’s
testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. The time-honored test
in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its compatibility with human knowledge, observation and
common experience of man. Thus, whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation
and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance.
The following inconsistencies in complainant’s testimony is found to be incompatible to human experience: (1)
the admission that she during her abduction she was brought to accused’s house where 8 family members of the
latter also resides; (2) that she was not able to ask for help from any of the family member nor any of them was
able to realize that accused was keeping her against her will; (3) the discussion of wedding plans with her friend
after her ordeal; (4) admission that she was able to visit her grandmother within the period of the alleged
abduction when she was supposed to be kept inside accused’s house against her will; and (5) lastly, that she
was repeated mauled by accused on their way to his to residence and within the duration of abduction but no
physical injuries was seen during the medical examination conducted after the incident. A conviction in a criminal
case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means a moral certainty that the accused is
guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge
its burden of establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge
of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation.

Clear and Convincing

SUPREME COURT vs. EDDIE V. DELGADO et al.

A.M. No. 2011-07-SC, October 4, 2011

FACTS:
On 2 June 2011, SC Associate Justice and Second Division Chairperson Antonio T. Carpio caused the
transmittal of two (2) sealed Agenda to the Office of Clerk of Court – Second Division (OCC-SD).
The said Agenda contain an itemized list of cases taken up by the Court’s Second Division during the sessions
held on the concerned date and the handwritten marginal notes of Justice Carpio noting the specific actions
adopted by the division on each case. Owing to the confidential nature of the contents of an Agenda, the OCC-
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SD follows a very strict procedure in handling them.Thus, only a few specified personnel within the OCC-SD are
authorized to have access to an Agenda – e.g., only Ms. Puno is authorized to receive and open; only four (4)
persons are authorized to photocopy.
Herein Respondents were charged with grave misconduct for taking specific pages in the said agenda without
being authorized thereto. The complicity of each respondent are as follows: Madeja and Florendo asked
respondent Delgado for a copy of several items included in the 30 May 2011 Agenda. Acceding to the request,
respondent Delgado removed pages 58, 59 and 70 from a copy of the Agenda entrusted to him for stitching and
gave them to respondents Madeja and Florendo.
During the initial and formal investigation, Delgado admitted that he removed and took the said pages from the
agenda and gave the same to Madeja and Florendo. However, while respondents Madeja and Florendo
admitted during the initial investigation that they asked for and, in fact, obtained the missing pages in the 30 May
2011 Agenda, they vehemently denied having been involved in the taking of the missing Agenda pages during
the formal investigation of the OAS.

ISSUE: Whether or not mere denials made by respondent during formal investigation warrants prevails against
the contrary testimony of their co- respondent implicating them in the alleged deed.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The basic principle in Evidence is that denials, unless supported by clear and
convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of truthful witnesses.
It was never shown that respondent Delgado was motivated by any ill will in implicating respondents Madeja and
Florendo. As a witness, the credibility of respondent Delgado remained unsullied.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA,
JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ
G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007

FACTS:
petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of
private respondent. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was
opposed by petitioner.
Initially, the petition for bail was denied by Judge Bernardo. On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited
himself from further hearing the case. It was then raffled off to Branch presided by respondent judge. On October
30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This
was granted by respondent judge.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
respondent judge in his Order. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being
limited solely to criminal proceedings.

ISSUE: What should be the quantum of evidence needed to grant such bail to a potential extraditee.

HELD:
Clear and convincing evidence. Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created
by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if
the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not
punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its
existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence
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of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its
object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state
from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of
liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is
also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition
Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the
interest of justice." We further note that Section allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the
"provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is
received subsequently."
While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot
likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail
in extradition cases.
According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is
not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO

G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012

FACTS:
Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a
piece of wood called bellang. Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a
piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan,
the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-
law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival. Consequently, Fontanilla was charged with
murder.
At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. Prosecution presented the physician who conducted the autopsy on
the cadaver of Olais. She attested that her post-mortem examination showed that Olais had suffered a fracture
on the left temporal area of the skull, causing his death. She opined that a hard object or a severe force had hit
the skull of the victim more than once, considering that the skull had been already fragmented and the fractures
on the skull had been radiating.
The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense by observing that he had "no necessity to employ a big stone,
inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death" due to the victim attacking him only with bare hands.
It noted that Fontanilla did not suffer any injury despite his claim that the victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla
did not receive any treatment, and no medical certificate attested to any injury he might have suffered, having
been immediately released from the hospital.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of accused alleging self-defense may be given credence amidst gravity of the
injury sustained by the victim.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self- defense to be appreciated, he
had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of
self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for
there is nothing to repel.

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The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and number of
wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from
Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the determined effort of the
accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.

Preponderance of Evidence

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. ANTONIO B. BALMACEDA & ROLANDO RAMOS
G.R. No. 158143, September 21, 2011

FACTS:
PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages against Antonio Balmaceda. PCIB alleged that
Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as branch manager, fraudulently obtained and encashed 34
Manager’s checks amounting to 11M+. PCIB also impleaded Ramos as one of the recipients of a portion of the
proceeds from Balmaceda’s alleged fraud. For failure to file an answer, Balmaceda was declared in default. On
the other hand, Ramos filed an Answer denying any knowledge of Balmaceda’s scheme. Ramos admitted
receiving money from Balmaceda as payment for the fighting cocks that he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained
that he had no knowledge of the source of Balmaceda’s money.
RTC issued a decision in favor of PCIB. On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint against Ramos, holding that
no sufficient evidence existed to prove that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda in the latter’s fraudulent
manipulations.8 According to the CA, the mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the payee in some of the
Manager’s checks does not suffice to prove that Ramos was complicit in Balmaceda’s fraudulent scheme. It was
also observed that other persons were also named as payees in the checks that Balmaceda acquired and
encashed, and PCIB only chose to go after Ramos. With PCIB’s failure to prove Ramos’ actual participation in
Balmaceda’s fraud, no legal and factual basis exists to hold him liable.
PCIB insists that since Ramos’ defense – anchored on mere denial of any participation in Balmaceda’s
wrongdoing – is an intrinsically weak defense, it was error for the CA to exonerate Ramos from any liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellate court may exonerate defendant on the basis of his mere denial of the imputed
wrong in a civil case.

HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. While mere denial by the defendant is intrinsically weak evidence, this does not
mean that the complainant may just rely on the weakness of the defense presented by the former. The rule is
that the party asserting a claim must still provide proof of his allegation. In civil cases, the party carrying the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is
more worthy of belief than the evidence offered in opposition.
On its face, all that PCIB’s evidence proves is that Balmaceda used Ramos’ name as a payee when he filled up
the application forms for the Manager’s checks. But, as the CA correctly observed, the mere fact that Balmaceda
made Ramos the payee on some of the Manager’s checks is not enough basis to conclude that Ramos was
complicit in Balmaceda’s fraud; a number of other people were made payees on the other Manager’s checks yet
PCIB never alleged them to be liable, nor did the Bank adduce any other evidence pointing to Ramos’
participation that would justify his separate treatment from the others.

DRA. LEILA A. DELA LLANA vs. REBECCA BIONG

G.R. No. 182356, December 04, 2013

FACTS:
Joel Primero, a truck driver employed by the Respondent, was involved in a vehicular accident which resulted to
minor injuries of Petitioner Dra. dela Llana. The traffic investigation that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving
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the truck. More than one month after the incident, Petitioner was diagnose with whiplash injury which she
attributed to the accident that had happened.
Petitioner had to undergo physical therapy and eventually a spine surgery to treat the injury. However, while the
surgery was successful, petitioner can no longer practice her profession. Consequently, petitioner sued the
respondent for damages for the medical expenses and loss of earnings
At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile witness. Dra. dela
Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident. To prove her claim, she
identified and authenticated a medical certificate dated issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate stated that
Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash injury.
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana. But on appeal, CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela
Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by
preponderance of evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not mere assertion that damages suffered was caused by a certain event imputable against
the defendant without explaining the causal link between the injury and the imputed act warrants a ruling in favor
of the complainant.

HELD:
No. In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who alleges has the burden of
proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence. The reason for this
rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations
are not evidence.
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela
Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s
negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her
whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.
Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1) damages to
the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant
must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the
damages.
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence: (1) the pictures of her damaged
car, (2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and (3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of
these pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In
other words, Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which
the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed below.

ZACARIA A. CANDAO, et al. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 186659-710, October 19, 2011

FACTS:
COA conducted an expanded audit on the financial transactions and operations of ORG-ARMM for the period
July 1992 to March 1993. The Special Audit Office Report submitted by the audit team shown that illegal
withdrawals were made from the depository accounts of the agency through the issuance of checks payable to
the order of petitioners without the required disbursement vouchers.
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, filed in the Sandiganbayan (SB) criminal cases for malversation of public
funds against petitioners. SB convicted herein petitioners. The prosecution’s lone witness was Heidi L. Mendoza.
On cross- examination, witness Mendoza testified that due to security reasons, the audit team failed to conduct
entry and exit conference. SB convicted the petitioner and held that by their act of co-signing the subject checks
without the required disbursement vouchers of the amounts covered by the 43 checks constitutes illegal
withdrawals.

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Petitioners contend that SB committed a reversible error in not applying the "equipoise rule" which if applied
would have resulted in the acquittal of the accused-petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not equipoise rule finds application in the instant case.

HELD:
There is therefore no merit in petitioners’ argument that the Sandiganbayan erred in not applying the equipoise
rule.
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side
the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test
of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Such is not the situation in this case because the
prosecution was able to prove by adequate evidence that one of the peitioners failed to account for funds under
his custody and control upon demand, specifically for the P21,045,570.64 illegally withdrawn from the said
funds.
Petitioners are both accountable public officers within the meaning of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. No checks can be prepared and no payment can be effected without their signatures on a
disbursement voucher and the corresponding check. In other words, their indispensable participation of
petitioners in the issuance of the subject checks to effect illegal withdrawals of ARMM funds was therefore duly
established by the prosecution and the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that they acted in conspiracy with
petitioner Haron in embezzling and misappropriating such funds.

Substantial Evidence

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. ANTONIO T. REYES

G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011

FACTS:
Reyes and Peñaloza were charged with grave misconduct pursuant to a complaint-affidavit executed by Jaime
Acero. Peñaloza filed a counter-affidavit implicating Reyes as the mastermind behind the practice of extorting
money from those who failed the driver’s licensure exam. In addition to Peñaloza’s affidavit, he submitted two
other affidavits of LTO employees who allegedly had first-hand knowledge of the practice of Reyes of imposing
and pocketing additional fees. Reyes was not furnished with the copies of two other affidavits submitted by
Peñaloza.
Ombudsman convicted Reyes of grave misconduct with penalty of dismissal. Reyes elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review. Court of Appeals granted the petition of Reyes and reversed the
judgment of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. In assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
petitioner avers that the findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are entitled to great weight and must be
accorded full respect and credit as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner argues that it
is not the task of the appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before an administrative body
and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of
evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not findings of substantial evidence of administrative or quasi-judicial body is not subject to
review by appellate courts.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is
necessary to establish the case for or against a party. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of

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evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.
Dadulo v. Court of Appeals reiterates that in reviewing administrative decisions, it is beyond the province of this
Court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its
judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. However, while it is not
the function of the Court to analyze and weigh the parties' evidence all over again, an exception thereto lies as
when there is serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result.
After carefully perusing the records of this case, we find that the above-cited exception, rather than the general
rule, applies herein. Considering that petitioner rendered its Decision on the basis of evidence that were not
disclosed to Reyes, Reyes’ right to due process was violated. A judgment in an administrative case that imposes
the extreme penalty of dismissal must not only be based on substantial evidence but also rendered with due
regard to the rights of the parties to due process.

XAVIER C. RAMOS vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. and/or ALFONSO L. SALCEDO, JR.
G.R. No. 203186, December 4, 2013

FACTS:
Ramos was employed by BPI Family as Vice-President for Dealer Network Marketing/Auto Loans Division. His
duties and responsibilities includes the receipt and approval of applications for auto loans from auto dealers and
salesmen. During his tenure, a person pretending to be their valued client Acosta secured another auto loan
from BPI Family which had remained unpaid. After investigation, BPI Family discovered that: (1) a person
misrepresented herself as Acosta and succeeded in obtaining the delivery of a Toyota Prado pursuant to the
Purchase Order (PO) and Authority to Deliver (ATD) issued by Ramos; (2) Ramos released these documents
without the prior approval of BPI Family’s credit committee.
Consequently, Ramos’ employment was severed and his last pay and benefits were deducted with a portion of
the losses incurred by BPI due to the Acosta incident. Claiming that the deductions made by BPI Family were
illegal, Ramos filed a complaint for underpayment of retirement benefits against BPI. Labor Arbiter (LA)
dismissed Ramos’s complaint. NLRC reversed the LA in a Decision alleged negligence committed by Ramos
was not substantially proven as he was not expected to personally examine all loan documents that pass
through his hands or to require the client to personally appear before him because he has subordinates to do
those details for him.
CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of Ramos, holding that Ramos was remiss in his duty. But it
also attributed negligence on the part of BPI Family since it sanctioned the practice of issuing the PO and ATD
prior to the approval of the credit committee. Finding BPI Family’s negligence to be concurrent with Ramos, the
CA found it improper to deduct the entire P546,000.00 from Ramos ’s retirement benefits and, instead, equitably
reduced the same to the amount of P200,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not findings of fact by a labor tribunal may be assailed by petition for certiorari.

HELD:
As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court does not
assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their
conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However, as an
exception, the appellate court may examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not
supported by substantial evidence.
The Court has not hesitated to affirm the appellate court’s reversals of the decisions of labor tribunals if they are
not supported by substantial evidence . The requirement that the NLRC’s findings should be supported by
substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that "in
cases filed before administrative or quasi- judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion."
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Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the CA to have erred in attributing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that the deduction made from Ramos’s retirement benefits was
improper as BPI was not able to substantially prove its imputation of negligence against Ramos. Well- settled is
the rule that the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue.

Prima Facie Evidence

JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS

G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation specifically seeking a DNA testing
order to abbreviate the proceedings. RTC dismissed the. The court opined that petitioner must first establish
these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and filiation. Petitioner failed to
establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his mother did not personally declare that she had sexual
relations with respondent, and petitioner’s statement as to what his mother told him about his father was clearly
hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent; and (c) although petitioner used the
surname of respondent, there was no allegation that he was treated as the child of respondent by the latter or
his family.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the RTC. On appeal by the respondent to CA,
CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking a DNA testing
order to abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to show that the four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met. The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be
allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE: Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order for purposes
of proving filiation.

HELD:
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual
circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test.
as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must
show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is
contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be
held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which
warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon
the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there
is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative,
the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

Probable Cause

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. AMELIO TRIA and JOHN DOE

G.R. No. 193250, April 25, 2012

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FACTS:
Respondent Tria was a former Branch Manager of PNB-MWSS. MWSS opened a Current Account with the said
PNB Branch and made an initial deposit of PhP 6,714,621.13. On April 22, 2004, PNB-MWSS received a letter-
request from MWSS instructing the deduction of PhP 5,200,000 from C/A and the issuance of the corresponding
manager’s check payable to a certain "Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes." The letter-request, supporting documents, and
Manager’s Check Application Form were then evaluated by the bank’s Sales and Service Officer (SSO),
Bagasani, who found the same to be in order. Thus, a manager’s check was issued payable to Atty. Reyes.
On April 26, 2004, PNB-MWSS received cash delivery from PNB’s Cash Center in the amount of PhP 8,660,000.
Onthe same day, respondent Tria accompanied Atty. Reyes in presenting Manager’s Check No. 1165848 to
PNB’s Circle Branch. SSO, Flandez of PNB-MWSS Sale and Service Head, Veniegas and placement of Tria’s
signature on the check above the handwritten note "PAYEE IDENTIFIED – AMELIO C. TRIA."
It was later on found that MWSS did not authorize the issuance of the said manager’s check. PNB conducted its
own investigation and, at its conclusion, sought to hold Tria liable for qualified theft. During preliminary
investigation, the Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) issued a Resolution finding no probable cause against Tria.
ACP‘s resolution was affirmed both by DOJ and CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is probable cause to prosecute Tria with qualified theft.

HELD:
Yes. While discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a preliminary investigation to ascertain
sufficient ground for the filing of an information rests with the executive branch, such authority is far from
absolute. It may be subject to review when it has been clearly used with grave abuse of discretion. And indeed,
grave abuse of discretion attended the decision to drop the charges against Tria as there was more than
probable cause to proceed against him for qualified theft.
It must be emphasized at the outset that what is necessary for the filing of a criminal information is not proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the person accused is guilty of the acts imputed on him, but only that there is
probable cause to believe that he is guilty of the crime charged.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be
prosecuted. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
The acts of Tria and the relevant circumstances that led to the encashment of the check provide more than
sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause to file an information against him and John Doe/Atty. Reyes for
qualified theft. In fact, it is easy to infer from the factual milieu of the instant case the existence of all the
elements necessary for the prosecution of the crime of qualified theft.

RUBEN DEL CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012

FACTS:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by
SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner,
secured a search warrant from the RTC which was granted. During the implementation of the warrant, petitioner
escaped and illegal drugs were found inside a nipa hut in front of his rented two-story residence.
Consequently, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging him with violation of Section
16, Article III of R.A. 6425. RTC convicted the accused. The finding of conviction was affirmed by the CA. On
appeal with the SC, petitioner assailed the validity of the issuance of the search warrant on the ground that the
police officer who applied for the same as no personal knowledge of the basis for the issuance of such warrant.

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ISSUE: Whether or not validity of the issuance of a search warrant may be questioned on appeal on the ground
that the person applying for the warrant had no personal knowledge of the cause for the issuance thereof.

HELD:
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause
must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it
requires less than evidence which would justify conviction.
The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him
and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. The
existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This
Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the
search warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great
deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis
means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in
connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. A review of the records
shows that in the present case, a substantial basis exists.

Iota of Evidence (Circumstantial)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO ANTICAMARA y CABILLO et al.

G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011

FACTS:
Appellants are charged with the crimes of Murder and of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention in two separate
Information.
During the trial, AAA, one of the victims, testified: (1) that on May 7, 2002, while she and the victim Abad were
sleeping inside the house of the Estrella family, several persons entered to rob the place; (2) Inside the house,
she saw and recognized the appellants, and heard one of them uttering "somebody will die; (3) appellants took
her outside the house and pushed her into the Revo (vehicle); (4) inside the Revo, she saw inside Abad Sulpacio
who was blindfolded and with his hands tied; (5) the last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was
dragged out from the vehicle; (6) during her captivity, AAA was repeatedly rape by the appellants.
RTC found the appellants guilty of the crime of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention of AAA and Murder of Abad.
Considering that the victim AAA was raped during her detention, the maximum penalty of DEATH was imposed.
CA affirmed RTC’s ruling. On appeal with SC, appellants assailed the conviction of murder on the ground that
there was no eye-witness presented that they indeed kill Abad.

ISSUE: Whether or not an accused may be convicted even if there are no eye- witness on the commission of the
offense.

HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing
of Abad, the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the
identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the
main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience . Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to

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sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances
proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to paint a
clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him,
and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly shot and buried.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. EFREN DEOCAMPO et al.

G.R. No. 185212, February 15, 2012

FACTS:
Maritess Alolod, Efren Deocampo, Edwin Deocampo, and Elmer Deocampo were charged with double murder.
RTC convicted them considering the following circumstantial evidence: (1) Efren had always been banned from
the old couple’s house because they strongly disapproved his relationship with Maritess; (2) The old couple were
enjoying good health before of May 27, 1998; (3) On May 28 they suddenly went missing; (4) On the night of
May 27 the security guard at Salaman Institute saw Efren and Edwin standing on the school side of the fence
next to the old couple’s house. The next day, the guard discovered that the fence wire had been cut; (5) At about
2:00 a.m. of May 28 a `neighbor heard the sound of a woman sobbing and what seemed like the butchering of a
pig; (6) At break of dawn, a witness saw Efren in the Alolod kitchen; (7) From then on Efren and his brothers
frequented the old couple’s house, with Efren wearing the old man’s watch; (8) Maritess lied about her adoptive
parents going to Cotabato City / Davao City for medical treatment when people started looking for them; (9) A
witness heard Efren instructing Maritess to plant more camote on a pile of red soil beside the house; and (10)
The bodies of the old couple were found underneath those plants.
On appeal, Accused Efren Deocampo assailed their conviction based on circumstantial evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s finding that accused Efren was responsible for the
murder of the Alolod couple based on circumstantial evidence.

HELD:
The rule of evidence that applies when no witness saw the commission of the crime provides:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a)
There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c)
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair conclusion: the accused
committed the crime to the exclusion of all others.
In this case, the trial court was correct in holding that the accused was guilty due to the following facts: (1) the
presence of the accused in the victim’s house and used of the latter’s things when he had always been banned
therefrom during the lifetime of the victim; (2) the cover-up story of the adopted daughter that her parent went
away for a medical check-up; (3) the planting of camote on the ground where the victim’s where found buried; (4)
testimony of a neighbor hearing a scream the night before the victims went missing then seeing the accused
inside the house of the victims. All these when taken together leads only to one conclusion, i.e., that the accused
is guilty of the crime charged.

EDUARDO CELEDONIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 209137, July 01, 2015

FACTS:
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The evidence for the prosecution shows that on the evening of April 21, 2007, a certain Adriano Marquez
(Marquez) witnessed the robbery perpetrated in the house of Carmencita De Guzman (De Guzman) while she
was away to attend to the wake of her deceased husband. No one was left in the house. Marquez, whose house
was opposite the house of De Guzman and Celedonio, which were adjacent to each other, identified Celedonio
as the culprit. Upon learning of the incident, De Guzman reported it to the police and requested that Celedomo
be investigated for possibly having committed the crime, based on the account of Marquez.

Later, a follow-up operation was conducted by PO1 Rommel Roque (PO1 Roque) and SPO2 Adrian Sugui
(SPO2 Sugui), accompanied by Marquez. They proceeded to Raja Humabon St., Navotas, to survey the area for
the possible identification and apprehension of the suspect. On their way, Marquez pointed to a man on a
motorcycle and said, "Sir, siya po si Eduardo Celedonio." The police immediately flagged down Celedonio. PO1
Roque asked him if he was Eduardo Celedonio, but he did not reply and just bowed his head.

SPO2 Sugui informed Celedonio of a complaint for robbery against him. Celedonio still remained silent and just
bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui asked him, "Where are the stolen items?" Celedonio then alighted from his
motorcycle and opened its compartment where PO1 Roque saw some of the stolen items, as per report of the
incident, such as the portable DVD player and a wristwatch, among others.obleslaw

PO1 Roque asked Celedonio if the same were stolen, to which the latter answered, "Iyan po." Thus, Celedonio
was arrested and was informed of his constitutional rights. More items were seized from Celedonio at the police
station.
RTC found Celedonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Force Upon Things. Insisting
on his innocence, Celedonio appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the RTC erred in convicting him
of the crime despite the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence.

Issue: W/N the honourable Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that the petitioner’s
guilt was proven based on circumstantial evidence.

HELD:
NO. The SC held that, “Jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which
a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on
circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The lack of direct evidence does not ipso factobar the
finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as the prosecution establishes the accused-appellant's participation
in the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that
he committed the imputed crime, the latter should be convicted.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that, when taken together, constituted an
unbroken chain that led to a reasonable conclusion that Celedonio was the perpetrator. The CA opined that:
xxx As correctly pointed out by the trial court, these circumstances are: accused was a next door neighbor of
private complainant; he was seen by another neighbor going over the concrete fence separating their houses
and ransacking a room in complainant's house; during the time, no one was inside complainant's house as all of
them were at the wake of private complainant's recently demised husband; two (2) days after, most of the items
discovered to have been stolen that night were found in the compartment of the accused's motorcycle which he
was riding on when accosted by the police; the items recovered from him were identified by the complainant as
her stolen property; during the trial accused denied that the stolen items were found in his possession and
claimed that they were "planted" by the police investigators to frame him up of the robbery. In short, the accused
could not explain his possession of the recently stolen items found in his sole possession.
xxxx

We find the conviction of accused-appellant based on circumstantial evidence factually and legally tenable, as
the facts from which the aforementioned circumstances arose have been proved through the positive testimony
of Adriano Marquez, POi Rommel Roque and Carmencita de Guzman.
The defense does not refute the existence of the commission of robbery. In fact, Celedonio himself
acknowledged that the prosecution's circumstantial evidence, although weak, ambiguous and inconclusive,
established that 1) a robbery had been committed; 2) it was committed recently; 3) several of the stolen items
including cash were found in his possession; and 4) he had no valid explanation for his possession of the stolen
goods.”

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