G.R. No.

L-34666 October 30, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, MERCEDES L. JAVELLANA, petitioner,

vs.
ITONG AMISTAD respondent.

DE CASTRO, J.:

The legal question raised in this petition for certiorari is whether from a decision of acquittal, the complainant in
a criminal action for estafa, may appeal with respect to the civil aspect of the case.

The criminal action in this case was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, under an
information which reads:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Acting 1st Assistant City Fiscal accuses ITONG AMISTAD of the crime of
Estafa penalized under Article 316 Paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:

That on or about January 30, 1965, October 11, 1965, and December 23, 1965, in
the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously —

(1) (January 30, 1965) sell, convey, transfer and deliver by way of a deed of sale in favor of Ben
Palispis an unsegregated portion of 42,326 square meters of that parcel of land described in

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE No. 0-105

A parcel of land (Lot 1, plan Psu-203086-Amd., Civil Reservation Case No. 1,

L.R.C. Civil Reservation Record No. 211), situated in the Res. Sec. "J", City of
Baguio. Bounded on the NE., by property of Honor Kingdoms; on the SW., by
Lot 2; on the W and NW., by Public land. ... containing an area of EIGHTY
FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY THREE (84,653) Square
meters, more or less, ... in the names of spouses I tong Amistad and Luisa
Tengdan.

(2) (October 11, 1965) sell, convey, transfer and deliver by way of a deed of sale in favor of
Teodoro Mat-an the remaining 42,326 square meters of the above-described parcel of land; and

(3) (December 23, 1965) execute a supplemental deed of sale over the entire area covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-105 in favor of vendees Ben Palispis and Teodoro Mat-an
which effected the issuance of two separate titles in favor of said vendees —

knowing fully well and purposely withholding the information that on or about February 10,
1962, he had previously entered into an agreement with one MERCEDES L. JAVELLANA to
convey to her an area of 10,000 square meters from the above-described parcel of land for the
sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS and had already received from her the sum of
FIVE THOUSAND ( P5,000.00) PESOS, thereby causing damage and prejudice to said
Mercedes L. Javellana in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency.

All contrary to law.

After trial, decision was rendered dated February 8, 1971, and promulgated on March 18, 1971 acquitting the
accused, respondent herein, the Court holding that "the case of the prosecution is civil in nature" and that "the
guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt."

From the judgment of acquittal, the complainant, the petitioner herein, appealed to the Court of Appeals insofar
as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. Without awaiting the completion of the transcript of the
stenographic notes in the case, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal merely on the legal proposition that
an appeal by the complainant from a judgment of acquittal should be disallowed.

The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1971, is set forth in full as follows:
 This refers to an appeal against the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, in
Criminal Case No. 4205, wherein the accused Itong Amistad who was prosecuted for the crime
of estafa paragraph 2, Article 316 R.P.C.), was acquitted. The decision was promulgated on
March 18, 1971 and on that same day, the complainant, through counsel, filed a Notice of
Appeal from said judgment, "insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned."
Apparently the appeal was approved by the trial court, the records of the case were elevated to
this Court, and this Court required the completion of the same.

Now, while the right of the offended party to intervene in the criminal action (Section 15, Rule
110, Rules) as well as to appeal from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made after
judgment affecting the substantial rights of the appellant (Section 2, Rule 122, Rules) is
recognized, the offended party however, cannot appeal if the accused is acquitted as matters are
(People vs. Herrera 74 Phil. 21). indeed, the trial court in acquitting the herein defendant stated:

In the mind of the court, the case of the prosecution is civil in nature. In fact, the
supervening acts of the parties after the execution of Exhibit A until the execution
of Exhibit D are clear and unequivocal which ineluctably lead this court to believe
that the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

An appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance would perforce require a new
determination of defendant's criminal liability. This cannot be done. Besides, the offended party
has the remedy of bringing a civil action independently of the criminal action.

Indeed, this question is not new. It has already been so ruled by the Supreme Court in several
cases (People vs. Flores, G.R. No. L-7523, December 18, 1957, citing People vs. Velez, 77 Phil.
1026; People vs. Benjamin Liggayu et al., No. 8224, October 31, 1955; People vs. Joaquin
Lipana 72 Phil. 166; People vs. Florendo, 73 Phil. 679 [decided under the new Rules of Court];
Ricafort vs. Fernan, 101 Phil. 575, 572).

Considering that the complainant is appealing from a judgment acquitting the accused in a
criminal case, her appeal should be disallowed.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby ordered dismissed. The stenographers who were required to
submit their respective transcripts of stenographic notes in this case are hereby excused
therefrom. (pp. 6-7, Brief for the Respondent, p. 78, Rollo).

A motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals was filed but was denied on January 4,
1972. From both aforesaid Resolutions dismissing the appeal and the order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, the petitioner came to this Court on a petition for certiorari with prayer that the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals be reversed, and that judgment be rendered in favor of petitioner and against respondent
insofar as the latter's hability is concerned —

(a) Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner such sum as this Court shall adjudge to rightfully
represent the value of the one hectare portion of the land involved agreed to be conveyed to
petitioner by respondent in accordance with the Agreement to Convey Real Property (Exhibit
"A");

(b) Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner the expenses of litigation actually incurred by the
latter; and

(c) Ordering respondent to pay the costs of suit. (p.28, Brief for the Petitioner, p. 60, Rollo).

The sole legal question for determination as stated at the outset, is whether an appeal by the complainant for
estafa, may be allowed from a decision acquitting the accused of the crime charged, only insofar as the latter's
civil liability is concerned.

In support of her affirmative position on the issue above stated, petitioner cites Section 2, Rules 122 of the
Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 2. Who may appeal.—The People of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would
be placed thereby in double jeopardy. In all other cases either party may appeal from a final
judgment or ruling or from an order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the
appellant. (p. 12, Brief for the Petitioner, p. 60, Rollo).

Additionally, she cites Section 3 of Rule 111, from which she quotes the following:
 SEC. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses.—In all cases not included in the preceding
section the following rules shall be observed:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in
the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for
restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered. (Rule 111, Rules of
Court in the Philippines.) (pp. 13-14, Id)

Finally, she cites Article 29 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which reads:

ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion
of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case
the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. (p. 14, id).

From the aforequoted provisions, petitioners contend that the remedy of appeal is expressly granted to her
inasmuch as the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
Criminal Case No. 4205 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, there having been no reservation
to file a separate civil action or a waiver of the right to file one. She had in fact hired a private prosecutor to
handle, primarily the civil aspect of the case, the prosecution of the crime remaining under the direction and
control of the prosecuting Fiscal. The private prosecutor presented evidence bearing on the civil liability of the
accused. In a memorandum he filed, he also discussed extensively the civil liability of the accused, despite
which, the trial court failed to rule on the latter's civil liability to the complainant.

It is this omission, as alleged by petitioner herein, that con constitutes the thrust of her first assignment of error,
the only one We feel called upon to rule on, among her three assigned errors, the other two having relation to
how the trial court evaluated the evidence, and the extent of damages petitioner alleges to be entitled to under
such evidence, which evidently may not be passed upon in the instant proceedings, the evidence presented
during the trial not having been elevated to this Court, nor even to the Court of Appeals, at least not fully or
completely.

Confining ourselves, therefore, to the first assigned error, We find no ground to reverse the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals on the purely legal question of whether the petitioner, as complainant in Criminal Case No.
4025 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, for estafa, can appeal from the judgment acquitting
the accused, because the trial court failed to declare the latter's civil liability to the complainant, which was
allegedly proven by the evidence.

The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioner clearly requires the institution of a
separate action by the filing of the proper complaint. To such complaint, the accused as the defendant therein,
may file the appropriate responsive pleading, which may be an answer or a motion to dismiss. In a criminal
action, notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted therewith, if not
reserved or waived, the accused is not afforded the same remedy. Neither is the mandatory pre-trial held as is
required of all civil actions. The obvious reason is that the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one
solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense, with respect to which pre-trial
is never held to obtain admission as to the commission thereof, except on the occasion of arraignment. This is
the kind of civil liability involved in the civil action deemed filed simultaneously with the filing of criminal
action, unless it is reserved or waived, as so expressly provided in Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and
as held in People vs. Herrera, 74 Phil. 21.

If the civil liability arises from other sources than the commission of the offense, such as from law or contract
or quasi-delict, its enforcement has to be by an ordinary civil action, which, as expressly provided in Article 29
of the Civil Code may be disposed of as a mere preponderance of evidence would warrant. Then, all the
defenses available, such as prescription, lack of jurisdiction, set-off, and the other grounds for a motion to
dismiss may be availed of, as may be proper under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, complete
with pre-trial after issues have been joined. Upon these considerations, it becomes clear that the argument of
petitioner invoking the rule against multiplicity of action may not forcefully or convincingly be put forth.
In the Resolution of the Court of Appeals several cases have been cited which held that an appeal from the
dismissal of the criminal case on motion by the fiscal may not be taken by the offended party (People vs. Lipana
72 Phil. 168; People vs. Florendo, 73 Phil. 679). In the case of People vs. Herrera, et al., 74 Phil. 21, the
accused was acquitted without the court making any pronouncement as to his civil liability, in exactly the same
manner that the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in Criminal Case No. 4025, was charged with a
similar omission in the case at bar. The Supreme Court did not permit an appeal by the offended party, the
Court saying:

The decision of the justice of the peace court which acquitted the defendant of the charge and did
not make any pronouncement holding the defendant civilly liable put an end to the case, not only
by freeing the defendant from criminal responsibility but also by rejecting all liability for
damages arising from the alleged crime of malicious mischief. The offended parties not having
reserved their right to bring a separate civil action, the aforesaid decision of acquittal covered
both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case under Rule 107, section l (a) of the new Rules
of Court. An appeal from that decision to the Court of First Instance, as intended by the offended
parties, would reopen the question of defendant's civil liability arising from the alleged crime.
And considering that such civil liability must be based on the criminal responsibility of the
defendant (art. 100, Revised Penal Code), any review or re-examination of the question of civil
liability would perforce require a new determination of defendant's criminal liability. But another
trial upon defendant's criminal responsibility cannot be held, in view of his previous acquittal in
the justice of the peace court. So the appeal from the decision of the justice of the peace court is
not authorized by law.

Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted ruling is that what is impliedly brought simultaneously with the
criminal action is the civil action to recover civil liability arising from the offense. Hence, the two actions may
rise or fall together. However, if the civil action is reserved, or if the ground of acquittal is reasonable doubt as
to the guilt of the accused, a separate civil action may be filed, the complainant alleging a cause of action
independent of, and not based on, the commission of an offense. Only preponderance of evidence would then be
required.

The futility of petitioner's instant recourse becomes all too evident upon consideration of the principles
enunciated, particularly in the Herrera case, since if the civil liability recoverable in a criminal action is one
arising from the crime charged, no longer may the respondent be found criminally liable upon a review of the
evidence, after the verdict of acquittal has been handed down by the trial court. Again, petitioner tries to show
that the cases cited by the Court of Appeals are not in point. But she has not cited one single case faintly
supporting her position as she has tried to maintain in the instant case.

Nevertheless, petitioner may not complaint, as she does of being denied due process for disallowing her appeal.
She can institute a separate civil action if her cause of action could come under the category of quasi-delict or
one arising from law, contract or any other known source of civil liability, but certainly not anymore from the
offense of which petitioner had already been acquitted. It is but fair to require petitioner to take this course of
action, not only because she would have to pay for the lawful expenses for instituting the action to obtain the
relief she seeks from respondent, from which she is spared in the prosecution of a criminal case, but also for the
respondent or defendant to avail of all defenses and remedies as are open to him in a separate civil action not
otherwise available in a criminal action that carries with it the civil action when deemed simultaneously filed
with it, to recover civil liability arising from the crime charged.

For all the foregoing, the Resolution appealed from is affirmed, and the instant petition is, accordingly,
dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 80194. March 21, 1989.]

EDGAR JARANTILLA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING, Respondents.

Corazon Miraflores and Vicente P. Billena for Petitioner.

Manuel S. Gemarino for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL PROCEDURE; "LAW OF THE CASE" ; CONCEPT. —" ‘Law of the case’ has been defined as the
opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established,
as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the
case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court (21 C.J.S. 330)." (Emphasis supplied). "It need not be stated
that the Supreme Court being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought
before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that particular case. . ." (Emphasis
supplied).

2. TORTS AND DAMAGES; CREATION OF DUAL LIABILITY FROM THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION
OF THE OFFENDER. — The settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping
of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex
delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or
to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to
the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both
types of liability.

3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COURT OBLIGATED IN CASE OF ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED ON

REASONABLE DOUBT TO MAKE PRONOUNCEMENT ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE
ACCUSED. — Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable
doubt, it could very well make a pronouncement on the civil liability of the accused and the complainant could
file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal.

4. ID.; ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED ION REASONABLE DOUBT; INSTITUTION OF SEPARATE CIVIL

ACTION FOR THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION PROPER. — We have ruled in the relatively recent case of
Lontoc v. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., Et. Al. "In view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz was
acquitted on the ground that ‘his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt’ the plaintiff-appellant has the
right to institute a separate civil action to recover damages from the defendants-appellants (See Mendoza v.
Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113). The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still be civilly
liable.’The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist’. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 558 cited in People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, Et Al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987; Filomeno
Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988).

5. ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF THE COURT TO MAKE ANY PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO CIVIL LIABILITY
OF THE ACCUSED; RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO INSTITUTE SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION
ACCORDED COMPLAINANT. — Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the
failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused
amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The
rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable.

6. ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF THE COMPLAINT TO RESERVE HIS RIGHT TO FILE SEPARATE CIVIL
ACTION, NOT A FORECLOSURE OF RIGHT TO FILE SEPARATE ACTION FOR DAMAGES. — Since
this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case
and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages. The
Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano v. Hill that the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec.
3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. . . ."

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "sideswiped by a vehicle in the evening of July 7,
1971 in Iznart Street, Iloilo City." 1 The respondent Court of Appeals concurred in the findings of the court a
quo that the said vehicle which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car, was then driven by
petitioner Edgar Jarantilla along said street toward the direction of the provincial capitol, and that private
respondent sustained physical injuries as a consequence. 2

Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207 thereof. 3 Private respondent, as the complaining witness therein, did
not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case
through a private prosecutor. 4 Petitioner was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt." 5

On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the former Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, 6 docketed therein as Civil Case No. 9976, and which civil action involved the
same subject matter and act complained of in Criminal Case No. 47027. 7 In his answer filed therein, the
petitioner alleged as special and affirmative defenses that the private respondent had no cause of action and,
additionally, that the latter’s cause of action, if any, is barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207
inasmuch as when said criminal case was instituted the civil liability was also deemed instituted since therein
plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect and actively participated in the criminal case. 8

Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the trial court issued on April 3, 1975 an order of
denial, with the suggestion that" (t)o enrich our jurisprudence, it is suggested that the defendant brings (sic) this
ruling to the Supreme Court by certiorari or other appropriate remedy, to review the ruling of the court." 9

On June 17, 1975, petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which was
docketed as G.R. No. L-40992, 10 assailing the aforesaid order of the trial court. Said petition was dismissed for
lack of merit in the Court’s resolution of July 23, 1975, and a motion for reconsideration thereof was denied for
the same reason in a resolution of October 28, 1975. 11

After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the herein private respondent and
ordering herein petitioner to pay the former the sum of P6,920.00 for hospitalization, medicines and so forth,
P2,000.00 for other actual expenses, P25,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees, and costs. 12

On July 29, 1987, the respondent Court of Appeals 13 affirmed the decision of the lower court except as to the
award for moral damages which it reduced from P25,000.00 to P18,000.00. A motion for reconsideration was
denied by respondent court on September 18, 1987. 14

The main issue for resolution by Us in the present recourse is whether the private respondent, who was the
complainant in the criminal action for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and who participated in the
prosecution thereof without reserving the civil action arising from the act or omission complained of, can file a
separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission where the herein petitioner was acquitted
in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of
acquittal.

Prefatorily, We note that petitioner raises a collateral issue by faulting the respondent court for refusing to
resolve an assignment of error in his appeal therein, said respondent court holding that the main issue had been
passed upon by this Court in G.R. No. L-40992 hereinbefore mentioned. It is petitioner’s position that the
aforesaid two resolutions of the Court in said case, the first dismissing the petition and the second denying the
motion for reconsideration, do not constitute the "law of the cases which would control the subsequent
proceedings in this controversy.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

1. We incline favorably to petitioner’s submission on this score.

The "doctrine of the law of the case" has no application at the aforesaid posture of the proceedings when the
two resolutions were handed down. While it may be true that G.R. No. L-40992 may have involved some of the
issues which were thereafter submitted for resolution on the merits by the two lower courts, the proceedings
involved there was one for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing an interlocutory order of the court a
quo, specifically, its order denying therein defendant’s motion to dismiss. This Court, without rendering a
specific opinion or explanation as to the legal and factual bases on which its two resolutions were predicated,
simply dismissed the special civil action on that incident for lack of merit. It may very well be that such
resolution was premised on the fact that the Court, at that stage and on the basis of the facts then presented, did
not consider that the denial order of the court a quo was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 15 To repeat, no
rationale for such resolutions having been expounded on the merits of that action, no law of the case may be
said to have been laid down in G.R. No. L-40992 to justify the respondent court’s refusal to consider
petitioner’s claim that his former acquittal barred the separate action.

"‘Law of the case’ has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means
that whatever is once irrevocably established, as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties
in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court (21 C.J.S.
330)." (Emphasis supplied). 16

"It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal
questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that particular
case. . ." (Emphasis supplied). 17

"It is a rule of general application that the decision of an appellate court in a case is the law of the case on the
points presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the case in both the trial and the appellate courts,
and no question necessarily involved and decided on that appeal will be considered on a second appeal or writ
of error in the same case, provided the facts and issues are substantially the same as those on which the first
question rested and, according to some authorities, provided the decision is on the merits.’ . . ." 18
2. With the foregoing ancillary issue out of the way, We now consider the principal plaint of petitioner.

Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the negligent
sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil
liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict
or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the
culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover
damages under both types of liability." 19

We also note the reminder of petitioner that in Roa v. De la Cruz, Et Al., 20 it was held that where the offended
party elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal case through her intervention as
a private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constituted a bar to the subsequent civil action based
upon the same cause. It is meet, however, not to lose sight of the fact that the criminal action involved therein
was for serious oral defamation which, while within the contemplation of an independent civil action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code, constitutes only a penal offense and cannot otherwise be considered as a quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. And while petitioner draws attention
to the supposed reiteration of the Roa doctrine in the later case of Azucena v. Potenciano, Et Al., 21 this time
involving damage to property through negligence as to make out a case of quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code, such secondary reliance is misplaced since the therein plaintiff Azucena did not
intervene in the criminal action against defendant Potenciano. The citation of Roa in the later case of Azucena
was, therefore, clearly obiter and affords no comfort to petitioner.

These are aside from the fact that there have been doctrinal, and even statutory, 22 changes on the matter of
civil actions arising from criminal offenses and quasi-delicts. We will reserve our discussion on the statutory
aspects for another case and time and, for the nonce, We will consider the doctrinal developments on this
issue.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In the case under consideration, private respondent participated and intervened in the prosecution of the
criminal suit against petitioner. Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the
accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a pronouncement on the civil liability of the accused 23
and the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in
the judgment of acquittal. 24

Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil action after such acquittal. This is allowed under
Article 29 of the Civil Code. We have ruled in the relatively recent case of Lontoc v. MD Transit & Taxi Co.,
Inc., Et. Al. 25 that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz was acquitted on the ground that ‘his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt’ the plaintiff-appellant has the right to institute a separate civil action to
recover damages from the defendants-appellants (See Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113). The well-settled
doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable.’The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist’. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 cited in People v. Rogelio
Ligon y Tria, Et Al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987; Filomeno Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 72964, January 7, 1988). The ruling is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code which provides:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

‘When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence.’ . . ." 26

Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the failure of the court to make any
pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the
right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if
the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable. 27

Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through the application of Article 29 is
no longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive logic in the view that, under
such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code which presupposes the existence of criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense
charged. Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a
quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can
be proved by mere preponderance of evidence. 28 Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates
the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt
for the same criminal act or omission.
The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent supports and is constitutive of a case for a
quasi-delict committed by the petitioner, thus:chanrobles law library : red

"3. That in the evening of July 7, 1971 at about 7:00 o’clock, the plaintiff crossed Iznart Street from his
restaurant situated at 220 Iznart St., Iloilo City, Philippines, on his way to a meeting of the Cantonese Club at
Aldeguer Street, Iloilo City and while he was standing on the middle of the street as there were vehicles coming
from the Provincial Building towards Plazoleta Gay, Iloilo City, he was bumped and sideswiped by
Volkswagen car with plate No. B-2508 W which was on its way from Plazoleta Gay towards the Provincial
Capitol, Iloilo City, which car was being driven by the defendant in a reckless and negligent manner, at an
excessive rate of speed and in violation of the provisions of the Revised Motor Vehicle (sic) as amended, in
relation to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code as well as in violation of existing city ordinances, and by
reason of his inexcusable lack of precaution and failure to act with due negligence and by failing to take into
consideration (sic) his degree of intelligence, the atmospheric conditions of the place as well as the width,
traffic, visibility and other conditions of Iznart Street;" 29

Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate
civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for
damages. 30 The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano v. Hill 31 that —

". . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is also actually charged
criminally, to recover damages on both scores; and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as
a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

The aforecited case of Lontoc v. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., Et. Al. involved virtually the same factual
situation. The Court, in arriving at the conclusion hereinbefore quoted, expressly declared that the failure of the
therein plaintiff to reserve his right to file a separate civil case is not fatal; that his intervention in the criminal
case did not bar him from filing a separate civil action for damages, especially considering that the accused
therein was acquitted because his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the two cases were
anchored on two different causes of action, the criminal case being on a violation of Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code while the subsequent complaint for damages was based on a quasi-delict; and that in the judgment
in the criminal case the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved. Consequently, said civil case
may proceed as authorized by Article 29 of the Civil Code.

Our initial adverse observation on a portion of the decision of respondent court aside, We hold that on the issues
decisive of this case it did not err in sustaining the decision a quo.cralawnad

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED, without costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165496 February 12, 2007

HUN HYUNG PARK, Petitioner,

vs.
EUNG WON CHOI, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner, Hun Hyung Park, assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions dated May 20, 2004 1 and September
28, 20042 in CA G.R. CR No. 28344 dismissing his petition and denying reconsideration thereof, respectively.

In an Information3 dated August 31, 2000, respondent, Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing on June 28, 1999 Philippine
National Bank Check No. 0077133 postdated August 28, 1999 in the amount of ₱1,875,000 which was
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.

Upon arraignment, respondent, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged.
Following the pre-trial conference, the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief.
After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence
to which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of
dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.4

By Order5 of February 27, 2003, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati, Branch 65 granted the
Demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. 6

Petitioner appealed the civil aspect7 of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, contending that
the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect.

By Decision of September 11, 2003, Branch 60 of the RTC held that while the evidence presented was
insufficient to prove respondent’s criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It
accordingly granted the appeal of petitioner and ordered respondent to pay him the amount of ₱1,875,000 with
legal interest.8

Upon respondent’s motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand
of the case to the MeTC "for further proceedings, so that the defendant [-respondent herein] may adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case."9 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the remand of the case
having been denied, he elevated the case to the CA which, by the assailed resolutions, dismissed his petition for
the following reasons:

1. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the petition does not fully
comply with Section 4, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Court, because it
does not give the assurance that the allegations of the petition are true and correct based on authentic
records.

2. The petition is not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings and other material portions of the
record, (i.e., motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, demurrer to evidence and the opposition
thereto, and the Municipal [sic] Trial Court’s Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 294690) as would
support the allegations of the petition (Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.).

3. The Decision dated September 11, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court attached to the petition is an
uncertified and illegible mere machine copy of the original (Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.).

4. Petitioners failed to implead the People of the Philippines as party-respondent in the petition.10

In his present petition, petitioner assails the above-stated reasons of the appellate court in dismissing his
petition.

The manner of verification for pleadings which are required to be verified, such as a petition for review before
the CA of an appellate judgment of the RTC,11 is prescribed by Section 4 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under
oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are
true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon
"knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. 12
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner argues that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence, hence, he
chose to affirm in his petition he filed before the court a quo that its contents are "true and correct of my own
personal knowledge,"13 and not on the basis of authentic documents.

On the other hand, respondent counters that the word "or" may be interpreted in a conjunctive sense and
construed to mean as "and," or vice versa, when the context of the law so warrants.

A reading of the above-quoted Section 4 of Rule 7 indicates that a pleading may be verified under either of the
two given modes or under both. The veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be affirmed based on either
one’s own personal knowledge or on authentic records, or both, as warranted. The use of the preposition "or"
connotes that either source qualifies as a sufficient basis for verification and, needless to state, the concurrence
of both sources is more than sufficient. 14 Bearing both a disjunctive and conjunctive sense, this parallel legal
signification avoids a construction that will exclude the combination of the alternatives or bar the efficacy of
any one of the alternatives standing alone. 15
Contrary to petitioner’s position, the range of permutation is not left to the pleader’s liking, but is dependent on
the surrounding nature of the allegations which may warrant that a verification be based either purely on
personal knowledge, or entirely on authentic records, or on both sources.

As pointed out by respondent, "authentic records" as a basis for verification bear significance in petitions
wherein the greater portions of the allegations are based on the records of the proceedings in the court of origin
and/or the court a quo, and not solely on the personal knowledge of the petitioner. To illustrate, petitioner
himself could not have affirmed, based on his personal knowledge, the truthfulness of the statement in his
petition16 before the CA that at the pre-trial conference respondent admitted having received the letter of
demand, because he (petitioner) was not present during the conference. 17 Hence, petitioner needed to rely on the
records to confirm its veracity.

Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of
mere expedience or sheer caprice. For what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity of an oath 18
to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading have been made in good faith, or are true and correct
and not merely speculative.19

This Court has strictly been enforcing the requirement of verification and certification and enunciating that
obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if fair results are to be expected therefrom. Utter
disregard of the rules cannot just be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. 20 While the
requirement is not jurisdictional in nature, it does not make it less a rule. A relaxed application of the rule can
only be justified by the attending circumstances of the case. 21

To sustain petitioner’s explanation that the basis of verification is a matter of simple preference would trivialize
the rationale and diminish the resoluteness of the rule. It would play on predilection and pay no heed in
providing enough assurance of the correctness of the allegations.

On the second reason of the CA in dismissing the petition – that the petition was not accompanied by copies of
certain pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition (i.e.,
Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence, Demurrer to Evidence and the Opposition thereto, and the
MeTC February 27, 2003 Order dismissing the case) – petitioner contends that these documents are immaterial
to his appeal.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, however, the materiality of those documents is very apparent since the civil
aspect of the case, from which he is appealing, was likewise dismissed by the trial court on account of the same
Demurrer.

Petitioner, nonetheless, posits that he subsequently submitted to the CA copies of the enumerated documents,
save for the MeTC February 27, 2003 Order, as attachments to his Motion for Reconsideration.

The Rules, however, require that the petition must "be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate original or true
copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court."22

A perusal of the petition filed before the CA shows that the only duplicate original or certified true copies
attached as annexes thereto are the January 14, 2004 RTC Order granting respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration and the March 29, 2004 RTC Order denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The copy
of the September 11, 2003 RTC Decision, which petitioner prayed to be reinstated, is not a certified true copy
and is not even legible. Petitioner later recompensed though by appending to his Motion for Reconsideration a
duplicate original copy.

While petitioner averred before the CA in his Motion for Reconsideration that the February 27, 2003 MeTC
Order was already attached to his petition as Annex "G," Annex "G" bares a replicate copy of a different order,
however. It was to this Court that petitioner belatedly submitted an uncertified true copy of the said MeTC
Order as an annex to his Reply to respondent’s Comment.

This Court in fact observes that the copy of the other MeTC Order, that dated May 5, 2003, which petitioner
attached to his petition before the CA is similarly uncertified as true.

Since both Orders of the MeTC were adverse to him even with respect to the civil aspect of the case, petitioner
was mandated to submit them in the required form. 23

In fine, petitioner fell short in his compliance with Section 2 (d) of Rule 42, the mandatory tenor of which is
discernible thereunder and is well settled. 24 He has not, however, advanced any strong compelling reasons to
warrant a relaxation of the Rules, hence, his petition before the CA was correctly dismissed.

Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus
enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the
application of the rules, this we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the
rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases
and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly
and speedy administration of justice. 25 (Emphasis supplied)

As to the third reason for the appellate court’s dismissal of his petition – failure to implead the People of the
Philippines as a party in the petition – indeed, as petitioner contends, the same is of no moment, he having
appealed only the civil aspect of the case. Passing on the dual purpose of a criminal action, this Court ruled:

Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the
criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff
and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal
aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the
plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of
suits.26 (Underscoring supplied)

It bears recalling that the MeTC acquitted respondent. 27 As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final
and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy.

Either the offended party or the accused may, however, appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the
acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a
decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated as far as he is concerned.
The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused. 28

Technicality aside, the petition is devoid of merit.

When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for judgment on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence.29 At that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved. 30

If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly instituted or the enforcement of civil
liability is not waived, the trial court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or damages caused by
the wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any. 31

For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
(c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was
acquitted.32

The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. 33

In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if
the court denies the demurrer.34 Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there
is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a
court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil
aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then
the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.

On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not
follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the
demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only recognized instance when an
acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil
aspect of the case must perforce continue. Thus this Court, in Salazar v. People,35 held:

If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on
the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist.36

In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Respondent did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand.

Indicatively, respondent stands by his defense that he merely borrowed ₱1,500,000 with the remainder
representing the interest, and that he already made a partial payment of ₱1,590,000. Petitioner counters,
however, that the payments made by respondent pertained to other transactions. 37 Given these conflicting claims
which are factual, a remand of the case would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to ventilate, and for
the trial court to resolve the same.

Petitioner finally posits that respondent waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case (1)
when the grant of the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33, 38 and (2) when respondent
orally opposed petitioner’s motion for reconsideration pleading that proceedings with respect to the civil aspect
of the case continue.

Petitioner’s position is tenuous.

Petitioner’s citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect.1awphi1.net Where a court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial
jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it to resolve.

One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the governing
law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising
from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit. 39

As for petitioner’s attribution of waiver to respondent, it cannot be determined with certainty from the records
the nature of the alleged oral objections of respondent to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the grant of
the demurrer to evidence. Any waiver of the right to present evidence must be positively demonstrated. Any
ambiguity in the voluntariness of the waiver is frowned upon, 40 hence, courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against it.41

This Court therefore upholds respondent’s right to present evidence as reserved by his filing of leave of court to
file the demurrer.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.

The case is REMANDED to the court of origin, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 which is
DIRECTED to forthwith set Criminal Case No. 294690 for further proceedings only for the purpose of
receiving evidence on the civil aspect of the case.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165496 June 29, 2007

HUN HYUNG PARK, petitioner,

vs.
EUNG WON CHOI, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

This resolves petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated March 21, 2007.

For the first time, petitioner raises the matter of inadvertence with respect to the improper verification of his
petition. This Court notes that petitioner has softened his previously adamant stance 1 as he now claims to have
simply overlooked the failure to include the words "or based on authentic records" in verifying the petition.

This Court takes cognizance of petitioner’s humble submission and finds his invocation of honest mistake to be
well-taken in explaining the lapse in the verification.

The relaxation of the rule on verification notwithstanding, petitioner’s motion must nonetheless fail.

In asserting that he was not required to attach the MeTC Orders, petitioner tries to impress upon this Court that
he was not questioning the Orders of the MeTC. Such attempt does not persuade.
Rule 42 explicitly mandates that a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of both lower courts’
judgments or final orders must be attached to the petition, except where, as in the case of Ramos v. Court of
Appeals,2 the MeTC Order was rendered in favor of the petitioner in which case only a true or plain copy
thereof is required to be attached.

In this case, the February 27, 2003 MeTC Order was not submitted to the appellate court when, in fact, such
Order dismissing the entire case was undoubtedly adverse to petitioner. If petitioner deemed the MeTC Order
favorable as he now claims, he should not have appealed to the RTC in the first place. Clearly, petitioner’s
failure to attach the MeTC Order runs counter to the rules.

In insisting on the application of Rule 33 to buttress his claim that respondent waived his right to present
evidence, petitioner underscores the silence of Section 23 of Rule 119 in cases where the demurrer to evidence

was granted by the MeTC but reversed on appeal by the RTC. Suffice it to state that the granting of a demurrer
in criminal cases is tantamount to an acquittal and may not be reversed on appeal without violating the
proscription against double jeopardy. Succinctly stated, there is no waiver to speak of in such case since an
accused’s acquittal on demurrer may not be reversed on appeal.

It must be noted that the RTC decided the appeal only insofar as the MeTC dismissed sub silentio the civil
aspect of the case without finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Since the parties do not even dispute the existence of the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise, there was absolutely no reason for the dismissal of the civil aspect of the case.

A finding of sufficiency of evidence as to the civil aspect, where a demurrer to evidence is filed with leave of
court, does not authorize the trial court to terminate the proceedings and immediately render a decision. As this
Court ruled, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow
that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence.

It was thus incorrect for the MeTC to dismiss the civil aspect of the case without any basis. And it was thus
premature for the RTC, in its initial decision, to adjudicate the merits of the civil aspect of the case.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 151931. September 23, 2003.]

ANAMER SALAZAR, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and J.Y. BROTHERS
MARKETING CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure of the Order 1
of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch 5, 2 dated November 19, 2001, and its
Order 3 dated January 14, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the said court on the
civil aspect thereof and to allow her to present evidence thereon.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and co-
accused Nena Jaucian Timario with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Criminal Case No.
7474 which reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That sometime in the month of October, 1996, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named-accused, conspiring and confederating with each other, with intent to
defraud by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, on the part of accused NENA JAUCIAN
TIMARIO, drew and issue[d] PRUDENTIAL BANK, LEGASPI CITY BRANCH CHECK NO. 067481, dated
October 15, 1996, in the amount of P214,000.00 in favor of J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING
CORPORATION, represented by its Branch Manager, JERSON O. YAO, and accused ANAMER D.
SALAZAR endorsed and negotiated said check as payment of 300 cavans of rice obtained from J.Y.
BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, knowing fully well that at that time said check was issued and
endorsed, Nena Jaucian Timario did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank to cover the
amount called for therein and without informing the payee of such circumstance; that when said check was
presented to the drawee bank for payment, the same was consequently dishonored and refused payment for the
reason of "ACCOUNT CLOSED" ; that despite demands, Accused failed and refused and still fail and refuse to
pay and/or make arrangement for the payment of the said check, to the damage and prejudice of said J.Y.
BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.

The Evidence of the Prosecution

On October 15, 1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing
Corporation, through Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave the private
complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the Prudential Bank, Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15,
1996, by one Nena Jaucian Timario in the amount of P214,000. Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the
petitioner’s assurance that it was a good check. The cavans of rice were picked up the next day by the petitioner.
Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed account ("Account Closed").
The petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the Prudential Bank check with Check No. 365704
drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi Branch, which, however, was returned with the word "DAUD" (Drawn
Against Uncollected Deposit).

After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court 5 alleging
that she could not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following reasons: (a) she was merely an indorser of
the check issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the
check and not the indorser thereof; (b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioner conspired with
the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in order to defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first
check was dishonored, the petitioner replaced it with a second one. The first transaction had therefore been
effectively novated by the issuance of the second check. Unfortunately, her personal check was dishonored not
for insufficiency of funds, but for "DAUD," which in banking parlance means "drawn against uncollected
deposit." According to the petitioner, this means that the account had sufficient funds but was still restricted
because the deposit, usually a check, had not yet been cleared.

The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to the petitioner’s demurrer to evidence.

On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but
ordering her to remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as payment for her purchase. The trial
court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution did not establish the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable
doubt between the petitioner and the issuer of the check, her co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario, for the purpose
of defrauding the private complainant. In fact, the private complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never
met Nena Jaucian Timario who remained at large. As a mere indorser of the check, the petitioner’s breach of the
warranty that the check was a good one is not synonymous with the fraudulent act of falsely pretending to
possess credit under Article 315(2)(d). The decretal portion of the trial court’s judgment reads as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D. Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged but is hereby held liable for the value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer D. Salazar is therefore
ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation the sum of P214,000.00. Costs against the accused. 6

Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of
the decision with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Court. On
January 14, 2002, the court issued an order denying the motion.

In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial court claiming that after her demurrer to
evidence was granted by the trial court, she was denied due process as she was not given the opportunity to
adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private Respondent. The petitioner invokes the
applicability of Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in this case, contending that before being adjudged
liable to the private offended party, she should have been first accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33.

The Petition Is Meritorious

According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure —

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make
such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the
filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding
filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any
cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the
complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so
alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount
awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the
trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions.

The last paragraph of Section 2 of the said rule provides that the extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil action. Moreover, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished
if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist. 7

The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended
party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the offender. The civil
action is merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that
criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the state and to impose
the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the
other hand, the action between the private complainant and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the
former. 8

Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the
criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff
and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal
aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the
plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of
suits.

The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the case is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while in the civil
aspect of the action, the quantum of evidence is preponderance of evidence. 9 Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the
1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the said rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in action, civil or
criminal.

The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but
also to prove the civil liability of the accused to the offended party. After the prosecution has rested its case, the
accused shall adduce its evidence not only on the criminal but also on the civil aspect of the case. At the
conclusion of the trial, the court should render judgment not only on the criminal aspect of the case but also on
the civil aspect thereof:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. — If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal qualification of
the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances
which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or
damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if
there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to
prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. 10

The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a)
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court
declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise
from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the
delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him.

If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal
case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double
jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the
judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.

After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with
or without leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to (b)
adduce his evidence unless he waives the same. The aforecited rule reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. — After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be
heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.

If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives his right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed
within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose
the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.

If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period of ten
(10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its
receipt.

The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be
reviewable by appeal or, by certiorari before the judgment.

In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss the case for failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the accused files a demurrer to
evidence without leave of court, he thereby waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for
decision on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution. On the other hand, if the accused is granted leave to file
a demurrer to evidence, he has the right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect but also on the civil
aspect of the case if his demurrer is denied by the court.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on
the civil aspect of the case , unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to
evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended
party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right
of the accused to due process is thereby violated. As we held in Alonte v. Savellano, Jr.: 11

Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.

"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."cralaw virtua1aw library
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or
tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b)
that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an
opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

The above constitutional and jurisprudentially postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own
criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are
tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a "law
which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." 12

This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence
both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the
prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to
evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal
after which the parties may adduce their sur-rebuttal evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sec. 11. Order of trial. — The trial shall proceed in the following order:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability.

(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and damages, if any, arising from the issuance of a
provisional remedy in the case.

(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence unless the
court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.

(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the
court directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda.

(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful
defense, the order of trial may be modified.

Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case on the basis of the evidence of the
prosecution and the accused.

In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) off the Revised Penal
Code. The civil action arising from the delict was impliedly instituted since there was no waiver by the private
offended party of the civil liability nor a reservation of the civil action. Neither did he file a civil action before
the institution of the criminal action.

The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The court issued an order granting the
demurrer on its finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil. However, the court
rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the
private complainant even before the petitioner could adduce evidence thereon. Patently, therefore, the petitioner
was denied her right to due process.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 19, 2001 and
January 14, 2002 are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 5, is
hereby DIRECTED to set Criminal Case No. 7474 for the continuation of trial for the reception of the evidence-
in-chief of the petitioner on the civil aspect of the case and for the rebuttal evidence of the private complainant
and the sur-rebuttal evidence of the parties if they opt to adduce any.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006

SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER PAJARILLO, petitioners,

vs.
LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO TANGCO, VON
LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, respondent.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. (Safeguard) and Admer
Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the Decision1 dated July 16, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated October 20, 2004
issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.

On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan
Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen
card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her
residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm
from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun
hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.

Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the
said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated
January 19, 2000.3 On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a
Decision4 dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.

Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint 5 for
damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents
prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

In their Answer,6 petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that
Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set
up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees.

Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, 7 the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco,
and against defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants to
pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:

1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS

(P157,430.00), as actual damages

2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death indemnity;

3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages;

4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;

5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as attorney's fees; and

6. costs of suit.

For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 8

The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in self-
defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to
the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The
RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper
prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her
instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he
also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.

The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled
that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees,
particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it
required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law;
that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of
persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such
regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.

Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued its assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary under
Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to costs. 9

In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not Article
2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising
from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final
and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable
under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the
criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged
and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal
liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike
in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the
employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or
ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil
liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated October 20, 2004.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following assignment of errors, to wit:

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding petitioner Pajarillo liable to respondents for
the payment of damages and other money claims.

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in
holding petitioner Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the payment of damages
and other money claims.

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that petitioner Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, hence, should be
excused from any liability.10

The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline; and (2)
Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents.

Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based on culpa aquiliana under Article 217611 of
the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has
established that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should be
exonerated from civil liability.

We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a separate civil action against
petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages arising from a crime or delict, in which case the liability of
Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code12 is subsidiary and the defense of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee is not available to it.

The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.

The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the same on January 14, 1998.

The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime of homicide, for which he had
already been found guilty of and serving sentence thereof, thus must be governed by the Revised Penal Code.

We do not agree.

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent
civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles
32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted
a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both
causes.13

It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of action. The nature of a cause of action is
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.14 The purpose of an action
or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 15

The pertinent portions of the complaint read:

7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and posted in the Ecology Bank –
Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, who was employed and under employment of Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. hence there is employer-employee relationship between co-defendants.

The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage to herein plaintiffs.

8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her
bag, suddenly without exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the use of his
shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline M. Tangco, killing her instantly. x x x

xxxx

16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly and severally liable for the death of
Evangeline M. Tangco.16

Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to recover damages
against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act of shooting and killing
Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:

ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. In Dulay v. Court of
Appeals,17 we held:

x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence,
but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77
SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:

"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable
by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if
he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case
but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from crime.18 The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or
omission punishable by law.

In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,19 where the issue involved was whether the civil action filed by plaintiff-
appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we held:

x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the reservation made by the
offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court, to file a
separate civil action. Said the trial court:

It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant Pontino's
negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the
validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as
complainants. While that case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate
civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages is reserved, such
civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719,
Oct. 31, 1964.

We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case x x x.

xxxx

In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict
under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer
solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of
the diligence of a good father of the family.

In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The
fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did
not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.20 (Emphasis supplied)

Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already final and executory,
such judgment has no relevance or importance to this case. 21 It would have been entirely different if
respondents' cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case the CA is correct in finding
Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. 22

As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents' cause of action is based on quasi-delict.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or the employer either
in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of
the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove
that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting Evangeline.

The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact, which, as
a general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing errors of law.23 Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings
are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8)
when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on
the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. [24]

A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason for us to deviate from the factual
finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting
Evangeline.
Respondents' evidence established that Evangeline's purpose in going to the bank was to renew her time
deposit.25 On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same at
him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.

Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of about one meter or one arm's
length26 he stepped backward, loaded the chamber of his gun and shot her. 27 It is however unimaginable that
petitioner Pajarillo could still make such movements if indeed the gun was already pointed at him. Any
movement could have prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.

Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his mere apprehension that
Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such claim is befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo
testified that prior to the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about 10 meters
away from the bank28 and saw her talking to a man thereat;29 that she left the man under the fly-over, crossed
the street and approached the bank. However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show
that indeed Evangeline was seen roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the
shooting incident. In fact, there is no evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard or the bank's
branch manager regarding his concerns or that he reported the same to the police authorities whose outpost is
just about 15 meters from the bank.

Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could have already apprised herself
that Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there were two guards inside
the bank30 manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if she really had a companion, she would
leave him under the fly-over which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage a bank robbery all by herself
without a back-up. In fact, she would have known, after surveying the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo
would not ensure entrance to the bank as there were guards manning the entrance door.

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in
itself — such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial
cognizance.31

That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and was actually in the act of pulling
her gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the contentions raised in
petitioners' petition for review where they argued that when Evangeline approached the bank, she was seen
pulling a gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act
as a dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of pure instinct;32 that the act of drawing a gun is a
threatening act, regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to be used against petitioner Pajarillo;33 that
the fear that was created in the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from
her purse was suddenly very real and the former merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.34

Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent, Pajarillo's claim of self-defense
cannot be accepted specially when such claim was uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other
than his testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillo's apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him to stage a
bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment of
Pajarillo's imagination which caused such unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.

Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence. Although she was a licensed firearm
holder, she had no business bringing the gun in such establishment where people would react instinctively upon
seeing the gun; that had Evangeline been prudent, she could have warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun and
did not conduct herself with suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the bank; that she should not have held
the gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the act as hold up or robbery.

We are not persuaded.

As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming outside the
vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangeline's death was merely due to
Pajarillo's negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the bank.

Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately shown that it had exercised the
diligence required in the selection and supervision of its employees. It claims that it had required the guards to
undergo the necessary training and to submit the requisite qualifications and credentials which even the RTC
found to have been complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did not exercise the diligence required
in the supervision of its employee. Safeguard further claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its
personnel, wherein supervisors are assigned to routinely check the activities of the security guards which
include among others, whether or not they are in their proper post and with proper equipment, as well as regular
evaluations of the employees' performances; that the fact that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to
Safeguard's operating procedure is not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of proper
supervision; that it was likewise error to say that Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and
policies were not properly implemented by reason of one unfortunate event.

We are not convinced.

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.

xxxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the
former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of
law. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care
and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records.35 On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the
formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through
his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or
as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their
employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules
should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly
report on their supervisory functions. 36 To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.

We agree with the RTC's finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since
the record shows that Pajarillo underwent a psychological and neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by the St.
Martin de Porres Center where no psychoses ideations were noted, submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing
training course for security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.

The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required in the supervision of its
employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard presented Capt. James Camero, its Director for
Operations, who testified on the issuance of company rules and regulations, such as the Guidelines of Guards
Who Will Be Assigned To Banks,37 Weapons Training,38 Safeguard Training Center Marksmanship Training
Lesson Plan,39 Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,40 it had also been established during Camero's cross-
examination that Pajarillo was not aware of such rules and regulations. 41 Notwithstanding Camero's clarification
on his re-direct examination that these company rules and regulations are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of
the instructors during classroom instructions and not necessary to give students copy of the same, 42 the records
do not show that Pajarillo had attended such classroom instructions.

The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous evaluation of the security
guard's performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota
Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in collaboration with Safeguard. It
was established that the concept of such training was purely on security of equipments to be guarded and
protection of the life of the employees. 43

It had not been established that after Pajarillo's training in Toyota, Safeguard had ever conducted further
training of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a bank which has a different nature of business with
that of Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different from being on duty in a factory
since a bank is a very sensitive area. 44

Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline's act of just depositing her firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of
immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no training or seminar given on how to handle bank clients
and on human psychology.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go around the bank two times
a day to see the daily performance of the security guards assigned therein, there was no record ever presented of
such daily inspections. In fact, if there was really such inspection made, the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline
could have been taken noticed and reported.

Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual damages in the amount P157,430.00
which were the expenses incurred by respondents in connection with the burial of Evangeline were supported
by receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Evangeline is likewise in order.

As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the spouse, legitimate children
and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the
defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante; thus it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. 45 The intensity of the pain experienced by the
relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever
with the wealth or means of the offender. 46

In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by Evangeline's death was so sudden
causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother to six children who were all minors at the time of her
death. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,47 we awarded one million pesos as moral damages to the heirs of a
seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered. In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,48 we
likewise awarded the amount of one million pesos as moral damages to the parents of a third year high school
student and who was also their youngest child who died in a vehicular accident since the girl's death left a void
in their lives. Hence, we hold that the respondents are also entitled to the amount of one million pesos as
Evangeline's death left a void in the lives of her husband and minor children as they were deprived of her love
and care by her untimely demise.

We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the
Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 49 It is awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious
actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.50

Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case,
exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is
SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.