SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS What is cruel and unusual, according to the SC, is not
UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE dependent on the gravity of the punishment, but more on the nature
WHAT ACTS CANNOT BE CRIMINALIZED
1. MERE BELIEFS AND ASPIRATIONS
Art III, Sec. 18 (1) “No person shall be detained by
reason of his political beliefs or aspirations”.
Note that the protection is on political beliefs and
aspirations. This is included in the freedom of thought, for so long
as the belief or aspiration does not result into overt acts which would
violate existing laws. This is one of the basis for the repeal of RA
1700, or the Anti-Subversion Law, because the proponents of the
repeal argued that this law penalizes political beliefs and aspiration.
2. NON-PAYMENT OF DEBTS AND CIVIL OBLIGATIONS
Art. III, Sec. 20 “No person shall be imprisoned for
non-payment of debts”.
This also includes non-payment of poll taxes.
In the cases of Lozano and Nitapan, there is a question on
the constitutionality of BP 22, which penalizes two acts:
a) issuance of the check which, if presented for
payment within 90 days from date, the check is not
funded within such period of 90 days. Therefore, the
check cannot be encashed because of a closed
account or the fund is insufficient;
b) At the time of the issuance of the check, the person
already knew that he has insufficient fund or that his
account is closed even if the check is deposited or
encashed outside the 90 day period, in which case,
he will still be liable for the same offense.
When the law took effect, there was a question whether or
not this violates the provision that no person shall be imprisoned for
non-payment of debt.
According to the SC in Lozano, what is penalized in BP 22
is not the non-payment of the obligation, but the issuance of
worthless check being circulated in the business community. The
check under the Negotiable Instruments law have become a very
important business document. Checks are issued and circulated
just like legal tenders. That is why the purpose of the law is to put a
stop to the practice of circulating worthless checks in the hope that
the public may not loose trust in the practice of isuuing or paying
through checks.
3. ACTS WHEN DONE WERE INNOCENT (EX POST FACTO LAWS)
already discussed in the preceeding sections.
PUNISHMENTS THAT CANNOT BE IMPOSED
1. INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
One cannot be compelled to serve somebody without or
against the latter’s consent. The constitution, however, provides
some exceptions:
a) one penalized by reason of a commission of an
offense
b) citizens may, under certain circumstances be required
to render military or civil service to defend the state.
2. EXCESSIVE FINES
To be excessive, the fine must be grossly disproportionate
to the crime committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable
men as to what is right and proper.
In the case of Dela Cruz vs. People, there was a need to
control the prices, thus validating the imposed fine which, in
ordinary circumstances, could be considered as excessive.
3. CRUEL, DEGARDING AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENTS
of the penalty. If by nature, the penalty is acceptable even if grave,
there is no constitutional violation. E.g. Death Penalty is acceptable
if done by electric chair or lethal injection. But if it is done through
musketry or dismembering the body parts of the convict, then that is
considered cruel, degrading and inhuman, the practice being not
acceptable to social norms.
4. INDEFINITE IMPRISONMENTS
People vs. Dacuycuy
The Magna Carta for public school teachers penal
provisions provide the fine of P100-P1,000 or imprisonment in the
discretion of the court. According to the SC, such provision is
questionable because it allows the judge to fix the penalty of
imprisonment without certain limits. Whereas the law allows the
delegation of powers to a certain body or agency, the delegation
must be limited by sufficient standards. If the law allows the judge
to impose penalty of imprisonment based on his own discretion, that
makes the law unlimited or without standards, making it
constitutionally repugnant to the so-called indefinite imprisonment.
PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense”
2 Situations Contemplated:
1. Same offense
2. Same act
2 General Elements
A. The first jeopardy must have attached
B. The second jeopardy must be for the same offense
A. It is required under the first jeopardy to be attached or
considered to have attached but there must be (Requirements)
1. a court of competent jurisdiction
2. an information or complaint filed sufficient to convict
the accused
3. an arraignment and plea
4. the accused has been acquitted, convicted or
otherwise the case is dismissed without his express
consent.
From the terms of the double jeopardy rule, the mere
filing of two information for the same offense will not afford the
accused protection from double jeopardy, because there is as yet no
jeopardy which has attached. It is required that the first jeopardy
must have attached.
Court of Competent Jurisdiction
It must be determined which court has jurisdiction over
the offense. The MTC now has jurisdiction over criminal cases
punishable up to six years of imprisonment. Example: a case of
murder against an accused filed, tried and decided before the MTC,
and later, another case for the same murder is filed against him
before the RTC, the accused cannot claim his right against double
jeopardy. The first jeopardy has not attached because the MTC has
no jurisdiction over murder cases.
Compalint or Information Sufficient to Sustain a Conviction
The rules on the sufficiency of information or complaint
embodied in the Rules of Court must be observed. Example: when
one is charged for rape but the private offended party did not
institute the complaint, that will not be sufficient to convict the
accused, because rape is a private offense and it can be instituted
only by the private offended party.
The Accused Must Have Been Arrainged and Must Have Entered His
Plea
If the accused has not been arraigned and has not
entered his plea, the case will be dismissed, and that is without
prejudice to refiling. It is different if there is already an arraignment
and plea, that will not constitute as first jeopardy if eventually the
first case is dismissed without the expressed consent of the accused.
The Accused is Acquitted or Convicted, or the Case is Dismissed
Without His Expressed Consent
 Express consent under the case of People vs. Vergara: It is
required that it is either viva voce or in writing which is considered to
be positive, direct and unequivocal, that the accused wants the case
to be dismissed. That should be the tenor of the express consent.
There are only two instances in that case where, even with
the express consent of the accused or upon motion of the accused,
it is considered as an acquittal:
1. the accused invokes the right to a speedy trial
2. the accused moves to dismiss the case based on a
demurer to the evidence
People vs. Vergara
After the information was filed, the accused asked that the
case be reinvestigated. During the reinvestigation, the fiscal found
out that the case should not have been filed. Thus, upon the
resumption of the proceedings, the fiscal moved for the dismissal of
the case, without the participation of the accused. The judge
granted the motion by the fiscal. Thereafter, the Secretary of Justice
ordered the fiscal to refile the case. It was refiled. This time the
accused invoked the right against double jeopardy. The prosecutor
argued that they could not invoke double jeopardy because it was
dismissed on a motion for reinvestigation asked by the accused.
SC said that the motion for reinvestigation is not a motion
to dismiss asked by the accused. When the accused filed a motion
for reinvestigation, what they were asking merely was for the fiscal
to reevaluate the case. Although impliedly, they would ask that it be
dismissed if there is no case.
Galvez vs. CA
Initially, three information were filed. One for homicide
and two for frustrated homicide. Before Mayor Galvez and the other
accused were arraigned, the fiscal moved to dismiss the cases
against them and refiled informations for murder and frustrated
murder. Mayor galvez questioned the refiling on several issues, one
of which was it violated the double jeopardy rule.
SC said the first jeopardy has not attached yet becaused
they were not yet arraigned. The information was not sufficient
because there was a mistake in the charging of the correct crime.
Why was the case appealed despite acquittal? It is a new
theory by the people at the department of justice as well as the
solicitor general that it would not violate double jeopardy because
there was a denial of due process on the part of the state.
State vs. Moro
Gorion vs. RTC
In these cases, the charges against the accused were all
dismissed without their expressed consent. Common in these cases
was the fact that these were dismissed in violation of due process on
the part of the state.
In the case of State vs. Moro, the eleven charges against
Imelda Marcos were dismissed by the judge without notice and
hearing, and without giving the prosecution the opportunity to
question the dismissal, because according to the judge, he has read
in the news that there are particular laws which are already enacted
which make the acts of Imelda justified.
SC said that the revocation of the order of dismissal by the
SC will not amount to violation of the double jeopardy rule because
there was a violation on the due process right of the state.
In the case of Gorion, during the initial trial, the fiscal and
the witnesses appeared but the accused did not appear. The fiscal,
not wanting to take advantage of the absence of the accused, asked
the prosecution to agree to reset it on Oct. 4. The following day, the
case was called again. Obviously, the fiscal did not have any
witnesses because he told them to come back on Oct. 4. The judge
issued an order for the dismissal of the case.
SC said that it was an erroneous order because the case
should have not been called that day but on Oct. 4. It being an
erroneous order, it did not ousted the court of jurisdiction to dismiss
the case. Therefore, the case should not be dismissed, it should be
reinstated without violation against double jeopardy.
B. The second element is that the accused must be placed in
jeopardy of being punished for the same offense.
Situations contemplated:
1. literally, the same offense
 Ex. Murder committed on Feb. 1; case dismissed
without his consent, or the accused convicted or
acquitted; the same case of murder committed on
Feb. 1 is refiled
2. an attempt to commit the same
3. Frustration of the offense charged
 Ex. An earlier case for consummated homicide is
filed. It turned out after the case was dismissed,
without the consent of the accused, or the accused
was acquitted or convicted, that the victim did not die
after all, so an attempted or frustrated homicide case
is filed. That will be covered under the rule on
double jeopardy.
4. The second offense necessarily includes the first offense
 Some of the elements of the second offense
constitute all the elements of the first offense.
 Ex. First offense is homicide; the second offense is
murder. Some of the elements of murder constitute
all of the elements of homicide.
5. The second is necessarily included in the first offense
 (It is the reverse of the preceding number)
 Ex. First offense is less serious physical injuries; the
second offense is for slight physical injuries, still
covering the same act. All of the elements of slight
physical injuries constitute some of the elements of
less serious physical injuries. So the second is
necessarily included in the first offense.
6. The accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense, if it is valid.
 It is allowed under our rules in criminal procedure
that the accused will enter into a plea bargaining.
For a plea bargaining to be valid, the offended party,
as well as the prosecutor, must both agree to the
plea bargaining. The plea bargaining involves the
plea of guilt of the accused to a lesser offense.
 Ex. Charged for serious physical injuries. If the
complainant and the fiscal agrees that you plea guilty
to a lesser offense of slight physical injuries, the
case for serious physical injuries will be dismissed,
you will become guilty for slight physical injuries,
thus, convicted. The private complainant cannot
refile the case for serious physical injuries.
7. Similar or same act circumstance
 This situation contemplates an act punishable by a
statute as well as an ordinance.
 People vs. Relova. Theft of electricity is both
punishable under the Penal Code for Theft, as well as
by an ordinance in that municipality of Batangas for
theft of electricity. he was charged under the city
ordinance. It was dismissed based on the ground of
prescription. Another case, this time, was filed
against him for theft under the penal code. He
invoked double jeopardy.
SC said the contention is valid. Under
the constitution, no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy in punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.
 Note: The act must be punished by an ordinance and
a statute. If punished by two statutes or two
ordinances, it will not be covered.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. Supervening fact/event
- If the graver offense develop due to a supervening event/fact.
Melo vs. People
The accused was charged for frustrated homicide. When the
accused was arraigned on Dec. 29, 8:00 A.M., he pleaded not guilty.
At 10:00 A.M. on the same day, the victim died. On Jan.4, a charged
for consummated homicide was filed against the same accused. The
accused contended that the consummated homicide charged could
not be filed for it violates his rights against double jeopardy.
SC said that this is a supervening event. When the accused
was arraigned , the victim had not yet died. Therefore is as yet no
consummated homicide to talk about. Since there was this
supervening fact which developed after the arraignment of the
accused, it will not amount to the validation of the double jeopardy.
 A supervening fact is not yet existing at the time of the
arraignment of the accused.
People vs. Yorac
The accused was prosecuted for frustrated murder for an
act which he has been previously charged for slight physical injuries.
The victim, after being mauled by the accused, went to a medical
doctor for examination. The doctor gave a medical certificate stating
that the victim had been confined since Apr. 8 up to the present for
head injury. He was charged for slight physical injuries. On Apr. 16,
the accused was arraigned and pleaded guilty and was penalized
accordingly. On Apr. 18, prosecution filed another information, this
time, for frustrated murder, because according to the prosecution
the medical certificate shows contusion with lacerated wound and
cerebral concussion. Is this a supervening event.
SC said NO. That fact of the injury was already present
when the accused was arraigned on Apr. 16 (only the doctor failed to
mention it). It was not a supervening fact. It was the mistake of
the prosecution in not charging the correct offense. And since the
accused already pleaded guilty, it is already covered by the rule on
double jeopardy.
By reason of such ruling in the above case, the SC in the Rules of
Court provided for a second exception:
2. The facts constituting the graver charge became known or were
discovered only after the filing of the former information.
So even if it is not a supervening fact, but at the time the
first information was field, or the accused had pleaded guilty, these
facts were not yet discovered with reasonable diligence, although not
covered by the first exception on supervening fact, but under the
second exception, this will now be considered as an exception.
What happened in the Yorac case is now covered by this
second exception.
3. In cases where the accused enters a plea of guilt to a lesser
offense such is not valid, because the offended party and the
prosecutor both had not agreed in writing.
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Art. III, Sec. 15
“The privilege of the writ shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion and public safety requires it.”
This must be understood in the light of Art. VII, Sec. 18 on
the Commander-In-Chief powers of the President. In cases of
invasion or rebellion and public safety requires it, the president may
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Writ of Habeas Corpus
- an order issued commanding the person detaining
another to produce the body of the person detained in court at the
designated time and day and to explain why the person detained
should not be released.
It has nothing to do with other issues (as, is he charged
for a crime?), but only as to the reason for the detention.
Effects when the privilege is suspended:
1. Even if the privilege is suspended, the writ is still issued upon
application if the petition is sufficient in form and in substance.
Meaning, even if there is a suspension of the privilege and
the person is detained, you apply for a writ, the judge will
issue the writ. The only thing that will happen is that, if
the person detained is detained for an offense covered by
the suspension (rebellion and offenses inherent in
invasion), the detention becomes valid. But if otherwise,
he should be released, the detention being invalid.
2. The right to bail shall not be affected. The accused can still
apply for bail.
3. If you are detained for a covered offense, it legitimizes the
detention only for three days.
The periods under Art. 172 on Arbitrary detention are
extended. From the 12-18-36 hours, for slight- less grave-
less grave felonies, if the offense is covered by the
suspension, it is extended to three days (72 hours).
Under Art. VII, Sec. 18, even if the privilege has been
suspended and you are arrested for rebellion or any other
offense inherent in or connected with invasion, you must
be judicially charged within three days.
It does not mean that with the suspension of the
privilege, one can be detained without charge for more
than three days. You must be charged in court within a
period of three days. If you are not charged, even if
arrested for rebellion, you must be released. If you are
not released, then you can file a petition for habeas
corpus.
FUNCTIONS OF THE WRIT
1. It is the only effective remedy to question any form of
involuntary restraints.
Villavicencio vs. Lukban
In this case, several women in the red districts of Manila
were rounded up, forced to board a steamer and some of whom
reached Davao City. The essential object of the writ is to look into
all forms of involuntary restraints, whether it be a restraints on
freedom of locomotion.
Note: Those arrested by virtue of a valid warrant could
not question or file a petition for a writ, the
warrant being the justification for such detention
(as in Jalosjos case).
In this case of Lukban, the women were merely rounded
up, compelled to board a steamer and were brought to Davao. The
restraint here is not actually physical detention for they could come
back IF they have the means. But could have not been there in the
first place had they not been forced. Is there a validity for a petition
for habeas corpus?
SC said YES, because it is a form of involuntary restraint.
Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
Moncupa vs. Ponce Enrile
The petitioner was arrested and detained but subsequently
released on several conditions. One is that she has to regularly
report to the Ministry of Defense. Second: she could not give
interviews to local and foreign media without the approval of the
Ministry of national Defense. Third: she could not change residence
without the approval of the Ministry. She filed a petition for Habeas
Corpus.
Respondents argued that she’s no longer detained; she
has been released.
SC said, it is not limited to physical incarceration. A
release from detention with condition, is a form of involuntary
restraint on the freedom of action or locomotion. That can be
inquired into by a writ of habeas corpus.
2. As a post-conviction remedy.
This has something to do with the jurisdiction of the court
to order the continued detention of the convict.
Chavez vs. Court of Appeals
The conviction was based on an evidence which is not
admissible. So, by reason of the application of the exclusionary rule,
the evidence which was the basis of his conviction should not have
been admitted. So, what is now the justification for the continued
detention of the accused?
SC said, since there was already no valid justification, the
accused should be released. If the accused is not released, despite
want of evidence by reason of the exclusionary rule, then the court is
ousted of jurisdiction. That is grave abuse of discretion. So, a
petition for habeas corpus is a valid remedy.
Gumabon vs. Dir. of Prisons
The petitioner was charged of a complex crime of rebellion
with murder and other crimes. He was found guilty and made to
suffer a penalty for life imprisonment. This was in 1953.
In 1956, the case of Amado V. Hernandez was decided by
the SC, it ruled that there is no such crime as rebellion complexed
with murder, the latter being necessarily included in the crime of
rebellion.
Gumabon wanted to avail of that ruling because the
penalty is only prision mayor. Can he avail of that?
The first question was, should judicial decisions be given
retroactive effect?
YES, because judicial decisions form part of the law of the land and
specially if it is favorable to the accused. So, it should be applied to
the petitioner in this case.
The other question is, should the decision in the prior case
of Humabon be changed in that it should be prision mayor and not
life imprisonment?
SC said NO, it cannot be changed because the decision has
already been final. What can be done is when the prision mayor
minimum at least has already been served, then the court is ousted
of jurisdiction to order the continued detention of the accused
outside of that prision mayor penalty. So, after he has served the
prision mayor, he can file a petition for habeas corpus to question his
continued detention.

Lamen vs. Director

This is a violation of R.A. 6425 as amended. He was

found guilty of possessing and selling 13.6 grams of marijuana
flowering tops. At that time, the law provided for a penalty of life
imprisonment. He was convicted.
Then came the case of People vs. Simon. where the SC
interpreted for the first time what is the penalty range for the crime
of possessing/selling regulated drug. the heinous crime law says the
penalty is prision correccional to death. So, SC divided the penalty
by grams.
13.6 grams fell within the range of prision correcional. So,
Lamen filed a petition for habeas corpus after serving more than 6
years (Prision correcional). This is his relief post conviction.

SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE

The suspension of the privilege of the writ is now a

justiciable question. In prior cases, it was considered as a political
question. The Lansang vs. Garcia ruling in 1971 made it a justiciable
question. The ruling is: a suspension of the privilege of the writ or
even the declaration of Martial Law should pass the test of
arbitrariness. One can file a petition before the court to determine
whether the declaration or suspension was arbitrary or not.
Arbitrary not in the sense that it is not correct, but that there was no
justification at all.
The question in every case is NOT whether or not the
declaration or the suspension was correctly made by the president.
But the question is whether or not the declaration or suspension was
without any factual basis. Ex. of basis: intelligent information.
The Garcia ruling is now incorporated in Art. VII, Sec. 18.
Any person can now file a petition to test the sufficiency of the
factual basis using the test of arbitrariness.

AFFIRMATIVE RIGHTS

1. Free access to the courts

- includes the appointment of counsel de oficio and legal
aid programs
2. Protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
3. Compensation to and rehabilitation of victims

RA 7309, March 30, 1992

This act created a Board for claims of compensation for

unjust imprisonment and for victims of tortures. One unjustly
imprisoned enloys a benefit of P1,000 for evry month of
imprisonment but in no case shall the entire claim be more than
P10,000.

RA 7438

This expanded the rights of persons under the Miranda

rule. Whereas before, assistance of counsel is only given to those
under custodial interrogation, under this law, the Miranda warnings
and the Miranda rule is afforded to the person as soon as he is
arrested. Also, it now considers instances where persons are invited
by the police for questioning.

Affirmative rights further includes the rule-making power

of the SC and the power of the Commission on Human Rights to
enact legal measures for the protection of human rights.