Philosophy Compass 11/11 (2016): 716–729, 10.1111/phc3.

12357

Neurosexism and Neurofeminism

Ginger A. Hoffman1* and Robyn Bluhm2
1
Saint Joseph’s University
2
Michigan State University

Abstract
As neuroscience has gained an increased ability to enchant the general public, it has become more and
more common to appeal to it as an authority on a wide variety of questions about how humans do and
should act. This is especially apparent with the question of gender roles. The term ‘neurosexism’ has been
coined to describe the phenomenon of using neuroscientific practices and results to promote sexist con-
clusions; its feminist response is called ‘neurofeminism’. Here, our aim is to survey the phenomena of
neurosexism and neurofeminism using a largely philosophical approach, incorporating concepts from
the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of science, ethics, and feminist philosophy. First, we delineate
how neuroscientific studies purporting to show sex brain differences may be prone to bias at a number
of methodological levels – including the choice of categories to be studied, and the choice of tools for data
gathering, analysis, and presentation. Then, we show how interpretations of such studies may wrongly
assume the notion of ‘hard-wiring’. Furthermore, lack of attention to distinctions within philosophy of
mind may result in a mistaken supposition that brain differences lead to mental and/or psychological
and/or behavioral ones. It is not difficult to see how these forms of neurosexism, leading to claims of
‘hard-wired’ gender differences that map onto traditional and harmful gender stereotypes, raise ethical
questions. We conclude by brief ly considering one: are the harms caused by neurosexist studies and their
interpretations outweighed by their potential benefits?

1. Introduction

‘If men and women are identical, … how could men ever have achieved such total dominance over the
world? The study of how the brain works now gives us many answers.’ (B. Pease and A. Pease 6).

This question and answer couplet, from the relationship self-help book Why Men Don’t Listen
and Women Can’t Read Maps, acutely exudes neurosexism. Neurosexism, according to a first-
pass definition from Cordelia Fine, is ‘the ugly rush to cloak old-fashioned sexism in the respect-
able and authoritative language of neuroscience’ (Fine ‘Will Working Mothers’’ 69). Thus,
neurosexism arises from a collection of neuroscientific studies, along with their myriad interpre-
tations within scientific publications and popular media, that promote sexist conclusions. Here,
‘sexist’ refers not only to the parroting and buttressing of harmful gender stereotypes that
devalue women and their abilities – for example, women’s role is in the home, not in the
workplace – but the insistence that such devalued feminine traits are ‘hard-wired’: a problematic
term often taken to imply ‘permanent’, ‘innate’, ‘natural’, and even ‘good’.
In this article, we review the phenomenon of neurosexism by outlining the forms it
frequently takes, along with copious strategies, combined under the label ‘neurofeminism’, with
which to combat it. Our survey sets itself apart from other useful surveys (Rippon et al.; Schmitz
and Höppner) by integrating philosophical perspectives grounded in contemporary analytic
philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, feminist philosophy, and ethics.1

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2. Forms of Neurosexism
Neurosexism dates back to at least the late 19th century, with neuroscientific studies looking
to corroborate women’s presumed intellectual inferiority by reference to differences in the
size and/or shape of their brains (see Tavris). And it is in full force today; dozens of studies
comparing the differences between women’s and men’s brains are published every year, and
many of these studies have become fodder for self-help books proclaiming essential differ-
ences between genders (e.g., Brizendine; Gray; B. Pease and A. Pease), a multitude of news
stories accentuating such differences (e.g., Holland; Sample), and, ultimately, popular sexist
beliefs.
Often, neurosexism fuels itself via a central premise of difference between two sexes/genders.
Although the presence of a difference between two groups need not imply an inequality of value
between them, neurosexism nevertheless tends to promote this implication. This is partly in
virtue of the fact that it exists in a social, political, and personal environment that is eager to
associate any gender difference with pre-existing value-laden gender stereotypes with which
we are all familiar.
These gender stereotypes, along with an insistence on their ‘hard-wiring’, are harmful to
women in at least two ways. First, the value-laden content of the stereotypes is problematic,
almost always implying that women are specifically suited to inferior and less valuable roles. For
example, women are considered less adept at highly socially valued activities like science, math,
logical and technical pursuits, and even leadership in general (see Prentice and Carranza; Eagly
and Sczesny; Carli et al.).
Second, these stereotypes are restrictive: not only do they imply that women (and men) are
‘naturally suited’ to certain types of activities, projects, and modes of expression and communi-
cation, but the accompanying claim of hard-wiring aggravates this sequestration by implying
that such destinies cannot be changed. Thus, women (and men), even regardless of the value-
laden content of the stereotypes about them, are likely to be shut off from ways of behaving
and living that may have otherwise promoted heightened f lourishing. Furthermore, the claim
of hard-wiring is often used as a reason to deny progressive social and educational programs
or political changes that could, in reality, liberate women from various forms of oppression
(e.g., Sayers).
What are the forms that neurosexism may take? In general, neurosexism draws upon the
authority of science to either directly support gender stereotypes, or to more indirectly
aggrandize the basic sex/gender differences that fuel them. Thus, one form of neurosexism
exaggerates or even fabricates brain differences between two sexes/genders. A second form
seeks to show that these putative brain differences are permanent. A third form cements the
assumption that gendered brain differences imply gendered mental and behavioral ones, and
do so in a manner that is consistent with pre-existing gender stereotypes. And yet other
forms, often mistakenly thought to logically follow from the first three, broadcast that such
supposed differences are natural, good, and should be honored. Below, we survey the first
three forms in some detail, leaving the others to future work.

2.1. FIRST FORM: EXAGGERATION (OR FABRICATION) OF BRAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SEXES

2.1.1. Claims of brain differences rely upon a gender binary

Any sort of statement of difference between two categories must presuppose the existence of
those categories in the first place. Furthermore, such statements are fueled by the notions
that those categories are clear, mutually exclusive, and exhaustive. But these notions, applied

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to the categories of ‘female’ and ‘male’ (or ‘women’ and ‘men’) have been vigorously chal-
lenged by neuro- and other feminists (Fausto-Sterling, ‘The Five Sexes, Revisited’; Ayala
and Vasilyeva 727–728; Butler). Fausto-Sterling, for example, has argued that some of the
most intuitive ways to bifurcate humans into two genders ( for example: necessary conditions
for being male include the presence of a Y chromosome, a penis, and testicles) are met with
counter-examples in nature (‘The Five Sexes, Revisited’). Thus, neatly dividing individuals
into categories of ‘male’ and ‘female’ is not as straightforward as many would like to believe.
Fausto-Sterling has also challenged the idea that these two categories exhaust the range of
possibilities by famously arguing for the existence of at least five sexes – not two (she has
since championed the idea of a much greater number) (‘The Five Sexes, Revisited’; see also
Butler). Neuroscientific studies comparing two sexes/genders almost always ignore this
contestability of the female/male binary, and thus ignore the possibility that they are funda-
mentally structured around a tenuous way to categorize humans. Thus, the assumption of
this binary can contribute to neurosexism by making possible the very conditions for exag-
geration of ‘essential’ gender difference, and thus the corresponding harmful gender stereo-
types that accompany it.

2.1.2. Claims of categorical brain differences may be exaggerated because ‘mosaicism’ and ‘overlap’ are
neglected
Just as neurosexism fuels itself via a central premise of categorical difference between two types
of people – females and males, it embraces a mirroring tenet of categorical difference between
two types of brains: distinct ‘female’ and ‘male’ brains. That is, this form of neurosexism tends
to enforce the view that brains come in sexually dimorphic prototypes, rather than as points
on a continuum, further echoing and underscoring the notion of essential difference between
sexes/genders.
However, neurofeminists and others have offered very good reasons to challenge this two-
brain picture. For example, Daphna Joel and her colleagues have examined structural differences
between the brains of women and men, focusing on the subset of brain areas that show the larg-
est average sex differences. They found at least two reasons that the existence of such sex differ-
ences fails to imply that entire brains come in distinct male and female forms. First, there is
significant overlap in the form of the structure in men and in women; in other words, some
women have a structure that resembles the ‘masculine’ average, and vice versa for men. The ex-
istence of some overlap is, of course, compatible with dimorphism. For example, most people
would agree that having developed breasts is a sexually dimorphic characteristic in human be-
ings, even though some women have very small breasts and some men have significant devel-
opment of breast tissue, such that some women’s breasts are smaller than some men’s. Yet in
cases where the degree of overlap is substantial, it is less plausible to suggest that a characteristic
comes in distinct dimorphic forms in women and in men, even though there may be statistically
significant average differences. Joel’s results suggest that this latter case holds for the brain struc-
tures she examined.
Second, brains are not internally consistent: knowing that an individual has the ‘male
form’ of one structure (x) does not allow us to predict that they will have the ‘male’, the
‘female’, or the intermediate form of another structure (y). Joel therefore claims that we
should think of each individual’s brain as a mosaic of ‘male’, ‘female’, and intermediate forms
(Joel et al.). This more nuanced picture of the brain helps deconstruct broad-strokes claims
about male and female brains being starkly and categorically different, but is often
overlooked in various neurosexist interpretations of studies comparing the brains of men
and women.

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2.1.3. The prevalence of claims of brain differences may be exaggerated due to a publication bias
Even if one accepts the mainstream assumptions of two categorically different sexes/genders and
two categorically different ‘female’ and ‘male’ brains, there are many ways in which neurosci-
entific literature may exaggerate or otherwise misrepresent the magnitude and prevalence of
differences between these categories. One way is that studies that fail to find sex differences sim-
ply tend not to be published. This type of bias is ubiquitous in the general scientific literature
and has been dubbed the ‘file drawer’ problem (Rosenthal; see also Fine, Delusions of
Gender 132–133). Rosenthal points out that, given the standard cut-off for statistical signifi-
cance, p < .05, it is entirely possible for scientific journals to be filled only with that 5% of studies
that report false positive results (in this context, a result falsely showing a sex difference when
there is none). Of course, this is an extreme interpretation that assumes that all positive results
are false. However, an additional reason to think that at least some of the published studies are
false positives is that there is often a striking failure to replicate previous ‘positive’ results in many
areas of science (e.g., Open Science Collaboration; Boekel et al.). Thus, because of both the
file-drawer problem and the potential unreplicability of published results, we may be simply un-
aware of potentially vast counter-possibilities that contradict these results, including the possibil-
ity that there is much greater evidence of sex/gender similarities than differences.
We want to be clear that the file-drawer and failure-to-replicate problems are potential prob-
lems for all published research, including the studies we ourselves cite below to support our
claims (see, for example, endnote 9). However, our point here is that such problems likely pose
a deeper risk for sex difference research, because researchers, editors, and peer reviewers all tend
to harbor deep assumptions that sex differences are intuitively plausible. This may result in their
being (perhaps unconsciously) less critical of studies that confirm their assumptions. To see this,
imagine how difficult it would be to get a study published that showed significant brain differ-
ences between tall and short people. Admittedly, one obvious response to this suggestion is that
we have neither theoretical reason nor prior evidence to accept that reported differences be-
tween the tall and short indicate a real phenomenon. But in the case of sex differences, a central
project of feminist criticism has been to show that neither the purported theoretical differences
nor the prior evidence are as strong as commonly believed, as we review below. Furthermore,
strikingly, some of the ‘analyses used to establish sex difference in brain activation can also ‘dis-
cover’ brain activation differences between randomly created groups’ (Fine 135 citing Ihnen
et al.). Thus, a study comparing short and tall people using these analyses could very well show
a similar magnitude of difference in brain activation to those that are currently seen in published
sex/gender studies. The fact that we tend not to see such tall/short results published suggests that
biases inf luence not only what gets published, but what questions get asked in the first place.

2.1.4. Claims of brain differences may be exaggerated by the choice of certain experimental methodologies
Additionally, brain differences may be exaggerated, or even fabricated, by fundamental choices
in data gathering, including choices of what gets measured and how it gets measured. Both
Elizabeth Fee and Carol Tavris have documented the methodological contortions engaged in
by 19th century scientists who aimed to explain women’s assumed intellectual inferiority by
demonstrating differences in the size and shape of the brain, its parts, or even the skull. When
a given method failed to yield anatomical data that confirmed scientists’ deep-seated beliefs,
they chose another. For example, initial research showed that women had smaller frontal lobes
and larger parietal lobes relative to men, ref lecting the commonly held belief that the frontal
lobes were the seat of intelligence, and that women were less intelligent than men. But when
new evidence suggested that intelligence resided in the parietal lobes instead, new methods
were employed to yield the conclusion that women’s parietal lobes were smaller than men’s

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(Tavris). Similarly, Anne Fausto-Sterling’s analysis of research on sex differences in the corpus
callosum shows that scientists, in an attempt to confirm their convictions about women’s and
men’s different cognitive strengths, tried a wide variety of methods for subdividing and measur-
ing the structure, and persisted in doing so despite their failure to detect any consistent anatom-
ical differences (Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body).

2.1.5. Claims of brain differences may be exaggerated by the choice of certain modes of data analysis and
presentation
Another factor that contributes, in many cases, to the exaggeration of reported neurological sex
differences is the choice of manner in which data are analyzed and presented. Performing data
analysis is almost always unavoidable: raw data are usually too unwieldy to be communicated
in any meaningful way. But there is often no scientific consensus on which way of analyzing
data is the best or most ‘objective’. Thus, if a scientist harbors assumptions (implicit
or otherwise) that substantial gender differences exist, she is prone to choose a method of analysis
that will emphasize a difference. Not only will she likely believe that her chosen technique most
clearly ref lects the truth, but it will also increase the likelihood that her data will be published
(see Section 2.1.3 on the file drawer problem, above).
For example, a scientist seeking to find the specific effect of sex on the size of the amygdala
may assume that the purest data would be obtained by factoring out overall brain volume. After
all, she is interested in the isolated effect of sex on the size of this part of the brain, and not the
effect of sex combined with the effect of overall brain volume. But perhaps sex ‘exerts’ its inf lu-
ence on amygdala size via overall brain volume. If this were the case, then overall brain volume
should not be factored out. In other words, it is unclear whether overall brain volume is truly
significant in understanding sex differences in smaller regions of the brain. A further complica-
tion arises because one could also factor out a third variable – overall body size. In fact, some
assume that factoring out this third variable is the correct scientific practice, and that failure to
do so ‘must undermine the validity of any reports of sex differences in brain structure…’
(Rippon et al. 6). But, again, what if whatever is important about sex’s effects on amygdala size
is ‘exerted’ via brain volume, which is ‘exerted’ via overall body size? It is simply not obvious
which type of presentation yields the ‘clearest window onto the truth’.2
Note that this is true not only for the ways in which numerical data is analyzed, but also for
the language and images one chooses to convey her results. Regarding language, it is clear that
certain words and phrases may accentuate differences more than others (think of the choice be-
tween the phrases ‘striking difference’, ‘notable difference’, and ‘difference’). Regarding images,
there are a vast number of choices that must be made in modes of presentation of visual depic-
tions of brain activation ( for example, the particular color scale that should be used to represent
differing levels of brain activity), many of which are open to inf luence by scientists’ biases
(Schmitz and Höppner 4; Roskies; Meynell; Dumit).
The above examples concern choices scientists make in data analysis that do not have an ob-
viously ‘right’ answer. But in addition to these nebulous cases, sometimes scientists make choices
that actively f lout accepted standards of scientific practice. Consider Bluhm’s example of fMRI
studies (Bluhm ‘New Research, Old Problems’). The correct procedure for identifying statisti-
cally significant differences between women and men necessitates a between-group analysis: a sta-
tistical test directly comparing activation of women’s brains (after factoring out control activation)
to men’s brains (after factoring out control activation). Instead, certain studies reporting brain
differences between genders have only performed (or reported) within-group analyses (e.g.,
Schirmer et al.; Shirao et al.; see also Kaiser et al. p. 54 for a review of studies that use
this approach). This means that (a) within one group (women or men), researchers found a

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statistically significant difference in levels of brain activation between the test and control con-
ditions. And, separately, (b) within the other group, they did not find a statistically significant
difference in levels of brain activation between the test and control conditions. From this, they
then concluded that men’s and women’s levels of brain activation were different from each
others’. But this conclusion does not necessarily follow. For example, if women’s activation
(in (a)) was just above the threshold for significance, and men’s (in (b)) was just below, direct
comparison between women and men may not yield any significant difference. Bluhm
explains:

an area that is statistically significantly active in one group but not in the other may not be significantly
different in activity between the groups, particularly in cases where there is a great deal of variability
within each group (‘New Research, Old Problems’ 324).

In this example, then, a f lagrant violation of accepted scientific practice has occurred, pre-
sumably to protect the assumption that men and women are, indeed, very different.3

2.2. SECOND FORM: INSISTENCE ON PERMANENCE OF BRAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SEXES

A further form of neurosexism fosters a tendency to think of sex/gender characteristics as being

unchangeable, especially by the environment. Although contemporary sex difference re-
searchers do acknowledge that different kinds of experiences can sometimes modify both brain
function and structure, some of them insist that the malleability (‘plasticity’) of the brain is quite
limited. For example, Larry Cahill states that the brain ‘is plastic only within the limits set by
biology’ (Cahill), with the clear implication that plasticity is working on either a ‘male’ or a
‘female’ template.
The seeming naturalness of this idea of ‘limits set by biology’ is buttressed by two areas of sci-
ence: evolutionary biology and developmental endocrinology. With regard to the former, re-
searchers draw on Darwinian theory to argue that the kinds of sex differences examined by
neuroscientists have their distal cause in different selection pressures experienced by our male
and female ancestors, thereby attempting to ground sex differences in a genetic basis. Develop-
mental endocrinology comes in to explain how these genetic differences result in sex differences
in the brain. Brief ly, ‘brain organization theory’ claims that differences in exposure to ‘male’ and
‘female’ sex hormones during fetal development permanently inf luences (‘organizes’) the struc-
ture, and thus the function, of the brain (Baron-Cohen).
But even though this picture of biological limits is familiar and natural, there are four impor-
tant points to note. First, the above conclusions from evolutionary biology and developmental
endocrinology are far from incontestable (see Richardson for a critique of the genetic basis of sex
differences and Jordan-Young for a critique of brain organization theory). Second, Cahill and
others may be conf lating or exaggerating the link between how a difference was caused, and
whether it can, henceforth, be altered. At least theoretically, whether or not a brain characteristic
(a pattern of activity or a structure) can be altered need not have anything to do with how it was
caused (e.g., Hoffman 33–36). Third, even though there are likely ‘limits’ to plasticity, as Cahill
suggests, we are currently unsure just how widespread those limits are. Fourth, it is worth noting
that there have been several examples of fairly dramatic plasticity in other domains in the neu-
roscientific literature, providing evidence that brains are at least capable of extreme plasticity. For
example, learning to juggle can change grey matter volume (Draganski et al.) and taxi drivers in
London, who must develop complex skills in spatial navigation, show distinct structural changes
in the hippocampus (Maguire et al.). Additionally, extensive use of certain fingers may result in

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reorganization of certain parts of the cerebral cortex (Jenkins et al.; see also Buonomano and
Merzenich; Elbert et al.).
Most of the above examples concern plasticity of brain structure; it is even easier to show mal-
leability of brain activity. Here is just one example particularly relevant to neurosexism: changes
in neural activity may result from exposure to particular beliefs about gender. Study participants
who were primed with either positive or negative beliefs about women’s abilities, relative to
men’s, showed differences in both brain activity patterns and performance levels on cognitive
tasks (Wraga et al.; Krendl et al.).
Thus, even if a bona fide brain difference is observed between men and women, this says
nothing about whether it is stable or permanent. Some such differences may even be sensitive
to something as ‘f leeting’ as an individual’s exposure to certain messages immediately preceding
the experiment.

2.3. THIRD FORM: EXAGGERATION (OR FABRICATION) OF MENTAL AND BEHAVIORAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
SEXES

Reviewed above are various forms of neurosexism that exaggerate brain differences between
sexes/genders. But another important incarnation of neurosexism assumes that these
(supposed) brain differences actually translate to gender-stereotyped mental and behavioral differ-
ences. Philosophy reminds us, however, that such a translation is far from straightforward; for
centuries, philosophers have worked to map the conceptual space of possible ways the brain
and mind relate to one another. In this section, we examine forms of neurosexism that paper
over this significant conceptual question.
2.3.1. Brain differences are assumed to imply mental differences in the first place
Some neurofeminists have contested the assumption that brain differences are indicative of any
mental/behavioral differences. There are at least two ways to ground this contestation, using
two different concepts within the philosophy of mind: multiple realization and the thesis of
the extended mind.
2.3.1.1. Multiple realization. Today, most neuroscientists and contemporary analytic philoso-
phers offer a physicalist answer to the question of how the mind and brain relate: the mind
and brain are identical.4 Given physicalism, it may prima facie seem that any difference in brain
activity would necessarily imply a difference in mental activity, since the mind and brain are
one and the same. However, this conclusion neglects a further distinction between different
forms of physicalism, one of which allows for one type of mental activity to be identical to
one type of brain activity in one context, and a different type of brain activity in a different context.
For example, the mental activity of ‘spatial reasoning’ could be identical to (or, ‘realized by’)
brain state A in women, and identical to (‘realized by’) brain state B in men. If this ‘multiple
realization across genders’ is indeed the correct way to describe the relation between the mind
and brain, then seeing a sexed brain difference in the relevant regions would not provide
evidence for the relevant sexed mental difference (Hoffman). As Fine says, ‘the brain can get
to the same outcome in more than one way’ (Delusions of Gender 143).
But why think that multiple realization across genders is the correct way to (at
least sometimes) describe the relation between the mind and brain? First, there is evidence from
studies in non-human animals that certain sex differences in the brain are actually working to
preserve behavioral similarities, likely by compensating for other brain sex differences that man-
ifested during development (De Vries 1064). For example, work on rats shows that septal argi-
nine vasopression (AVP) innervation is different in males and females, while social recognition

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memory, a behavior associated with this brain property, is performed equally well by both sexes.
Moreover, minimizing the brain difference with AVP antagonists disrupts ‘social recognition
memory in males but not in females, thereby inducing a [behavioral] sex difference where there
was none before’ (De Vries 1064). In other words, it seems that, in this case, minimizing a brain
difference serves to exaggerate a behavioral one, and this may indicate that this brain difference
was originally functioning to preserve behavioral similarity. Furthermore, according to De
Vries, this phenomenon of brain difference preserving behavioral similarity is likely to happen
in humans as well (1065).
Second, there in fact seem to be actual examples of multiple realization across genders in the
empirical literature. For example, Keller and Menon found that women and men performed
with equal speed and accuracy on an arithmetic task, but also found that they had different patterns
of brain activation thought to correspond to that task (Keller and Menon; Hoffman). And other
studies also provide evidence for multiple realization across genders for different types of mental
states (Bell et al.; Koch et al.; Gorbet and Sergio).5
In sum, if multiple realization across genders obtains, then gender differences in the brain may
not actually indicate differences in thinking or behavior. Indeed, it is possible that these brain
differences are evidence of mental and behavioral similarity between women and men.
2.3.1.2. The theory of the extended mind. The theory of the extended mind (‘ExM’) (along with
related theories of extended and scaffolded cognition) is another concept within the philosophy
of mind that can cast doubt on the utility of using purported brain differences to evidence men-
tal and behavioral ones. ExM says, plainly, that our minds extend beyond our brains into the rest
of our bodies, and even beyond our skin into entities like iPhones, computers, and perhaps
other human bodies.6 Although it may sound far-fetched at first, ExM has received ample phil-
osophical support (Clark; Clark and Chalmers; Menary; Wilson).
If ExM is true, then restricting one’s search for mental differences to the nervous system alone
will fail to disclose the whole story. That is, even if a brain difference across genders is observed,
this difference might be paired with compensatory differences in the mind outside of the brain,
yielding an overall mental similarity (Hoffman, in progress).7
This application of ExM to neurofeminism may be further supported by recent attempts to
substantiate the idea of ‘extended sex’ (Merritt; Ayala and Vasilyeva). It may also pave the
way towards addressing Schmitz and Höppner’s concerns that neurofeminists must consider
other models of the relationship between the brain and the environment/culture, since ‘…
brain and culture [should be] understood as being indivisibly intertwined in an assemblage of
reciprocal exchange, constituting and continuously re-shaping each other’ (Schmitz and
Höppner 5).
2.3.2. Brain differences are assumed to imply mental differences conforming to gender stereotypes
Even if multiple realization and ExM fail to obtain in gendered contexts, and gendered brain
differences do translate to mental ones, it is not always clear how they translate. One key insight
of philosophy of science has been that theories are underdetermined by the available data
(Stanford) and that this ‘gap’ is one area where scientists’ values (including sexist values) can
and do seep in (Longino; see also the discussion in Intemann, and Reiss and Sprenger). In fact,
in instances where neuroscientific data of gendered brain differences may just as easily confirm or
challenge oppressive gender stereotypes in mental functioning, sexist values often encourage the
former.
Consider the stereotypes that women are more emotional than men and that men are more
rational than women. As discussed above, these stereotypes are clearly value-laden: rationality
has long been privileged in Western society, while emotion has been considered to be a ‘more

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primitive’ mental activity (e.g., Lloyd; Bluhm ‘New Research, Old Problems’). Given that the
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is one brain area commonly thought to realize one aspect of
rationality,8 if one were to assume prevailing gender stereotypes, one would likely predict that
the activity of the mPFC would be greater in men than in women. After all, the canonical as-
sumption when interpreting fMRIs is that greater brain activity translates to greater mental skill
(in this case, greater rationality). However, when McRae et al. found that men showed less ac-
tivity in mPFC than did women, they abandoned this canonical assumption, positing instead
that greater brain activity translates to less mental skill. Specifically, they surmised that more ‘ef-
fort’ needs to be exerted by women’s mPFCs to achieve the same level of rationality as men
(Bluhm ‘Self-Fulfilling Prophecies’ 881). The fact of the matter is that it is not clear whether
the canonical assumption is right or wrong. But it is clear that McRae et al., given a choice of
two viable options, chose the one that affirmed existing gender stereotypes.
Simply put, there is no obvious ‘right answer’ regarding how to translate brain activity to
mental activity. Fine reminds us that ‘the obscurity of the relationship between brain structure
and psychological function means that just-so stories can be all too easily written and rewritten’
(Delusions of Gender 144). The above example reveals one instance of such a ‘just-so story’.

3. The Ethics of Neurosexism

A central ethical question neurosexism prompts is: ‘Should neuroscientific studies investigating
sex/gender differences even be carried out in the first place?’ To date, most of the scholarship on
neurosexism has shied away from this ethical question, with a few exceptions (including Bluhm,
‘New Research, Old Problems’; Einstein; Rippon et al.). Below, we summarize these excep-
tions in the context of one possible way to tackle this ethical question – with a consequentialist
framing. That is, do the benefits of such studies outweigh their harms?
The nature of these studies’ harms here should be obvious: to the extent that (1) these studies
contribute to gender stereotypes, and (2) these gender stereotypes actually succeed in oppressing
women, such studies are harmful. Regarding (1), there is a great deal of evidence that these stud-
ies do, indeed, contribute to gender stereotypes. They are rampantly cited in both stereotype-
affirming self-help books (Brizendine; Gray; B. Pease and A. Pease) and several other segments
of the popular media (O’Connor and Joffe; Satel and Lilienfield). Furthermore, there is some
evidence that consumers of this media tend to uncritically accept neuroscientific claims, irratio-
nally worshipping neuroscientific data (Bluhm, ‘New Research, Old Problems’ 327; Weisberg
et al., ‘The Seductive Allure’; McCabe and Castel).9 Concerning (2), there is also evidence that
these stereotypes actually do oppress women. Assumptions of ‘biological’, ‘hard-wired’, or
‘fixed’ stereotypical sex differences may promote several deleterious outcomes for women:
lower math performance (as evidenced by studies looking at stereotype threat), decreased per-
sistence and motivation in traditionally coded male tasks, greater resistance to affirmative action
or feminist proposals, and even increased support of sex discrimination in the workplace (Fine,
‘Explaining, or Sustaining’ 289–290; Rippon et al. 9).
On the other hand, the benefits (or value) of studies finding gendered brain differences could
be both instrumental and intrinsic. First, such studies could lead to better therapeutic options
with fewer side effects for various ailments [for both women and men – this is especially impor-
tant in light of the fact that women have been largely left out of relevant biomedical research
(but see Richardson et al.)]. Second, many hold that knowledge, per se, is intrinsically valuable
(see Rose for a similar discussion).
Given these harms and benefits, how can one approach this consequentialist calculation? In-
stead of attempting to directly adjudicate between these two very qualitatively different types of

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 Neurosexism and Neurofeminism 725

benefits and harms, one alternative is to argue that the benefits may be, at least to some extent,
illusory. If this argument for the benefits being illusory is compelling, it may become clear that
such supposed benefits will be unlikely to tip the balance in a variety of adjudication
equations.10
Why think that the benefits of knowledge and better therapeutic options are illusory? If
one believes that the methodological, interpretive, and other f laws of the experiments
reviewed above are serious enough, then there is a real question about whether these
studies are actually yielding bona fide knowledge in the first place. Less drastically, there is
still a question as to whether whatever knowledge they do produce is robust enough to be of
benefit.
In fact, our survey above has offered a variety of reasons to doubt the soundness of knowledge
produced by neurosexist studies:
(1) The collection of published studies may mask a wealth of unpublished studies evidencing an
absence of gendered brain differences (Section 2.1.3 – the file-drawer problem).
(2) The methodology of these studies may be flawed enough to cast serious doubt on their
results (Section 2.1.4).
(3) The way these studies analyze and present their data may exaggerate the magnitude of
gender differences, or fail to reveal statistically significant differences in the first place
(Section 2.1.5).
(4) These studies may fail to produce stable knowledge of gender brain differences. In other
words, since the brain can be changed by the environment, any gender differences in the
brains of women and men observed in these studies are theoretically open to change, for ex-
ample, by societally shifting gender norms (Rippon et al.; Fine, ‘Explaining, or Sustaining’).
Ironically, the very study being done may itself contribute to a future shift, and thus a future
change of brain differences. Rippon et al. remark: ‘the outputs of sex/gender [neuroimag-
ing] can affect the very object of their investigation’ (9) (although one study is likely to be
just a ‘drop in the bucket’ in terms of its overall contributions to such differences)
(Section 2.2).
(5) These studies may not even present knowledge about mental or behavioral differences be-
tween genders to begin with (Section 2.3).
So it may be that, on balance, the benefits promised by neuroscientific studies – both intrinsic
and instrumental – are simply not delivered, at least not to the extent that one would hope. If
this is true, there may be good reason to curtail or even halt such studies, at least until a time
when the science stands a better chance of yielding what it promises.
Of course, there are other options in addition to simply stopping such studies. Rippon et al.,
in particular, offer a number of suggestions to improve research on sex/gender differences. For
example, instead of the current practice of peer-reviewing results, peer-review could be con-
ducted of the methods and background, and articles would be accepted on that basis (known
as ‘in principle acceptance’) (Rippon et al. 8–9). This would presumably (a) increase scrutiny
of studies’ methodologies and (b) prevent the file drawer problem (because publication would
occur whether or not the results were negative). Another possibility would be to urge re-
searchers, in any study looking at gendered brain differences, to also include a condition of
how putative gendered brain differences could be changed or reversed by an environmental in-
tervention (Rippon et al. 7). This could pre-empt any take-home messages of ‘hard-wiring’.
Yet other possibilities include mandating replication of findings in a separate sample (Rippon
et al. 9) and maintaining a database (or publishing) findings of gender similarity rather than dif-
ference (Rippon et al. 9).

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726 Neurosexism and Neurofeminism

Finally, simply recognizing and attempting to avoid the methodological and interpretive
pitfalls mentioned above when designing and conducting studies may go some way towards
reducing biased methodology, and combatting neurosexist interpretations and effects. The pre-
cise solution to exactly what sort (and how much) gender-directed neuroscience should be car-
ried out is clearly beyond the scope of this review. But awareness of the depths of neurosexism
is, we believe, an important first step.

Acknowledgements
We would like to sincerely thank Lauren Ashwell, Edouard Machery, Bhob Rainey, and an
anonymous reviewer for their valuable suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.

Short Biographies

Ginger A. Hoffman is an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at Saint Joseph’s

University. Her research connects philosophical debates in the philosophy of mind, ethics, and
feminist philosophy to neuroscientific and psychiatric practices. She is the author of ‘What, If
Anything, Can Neuroscience Tell Us About Gender Differences?’ in: Neurofeminism: Issues at
the Intersection of Feminist Theory and Cognitive Science, and has published in Neuroethics, Journal
of Social Philosophy, and a number of other philosophical and scientific journals. She holds a doc-
torate in philosophy from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a doctorate in neurosci-
ence from Yale University.
Robyn Bluhm is an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy and in Lyman Briggs
College at Michigan State University. Her research focuses on the relationship between episte-
mological and ethical issues in medicine and in neuroscience. She is a coeditor of Neurofeminism:
Issues at the Intersection of Feminist Theory and Cognitive Science and has published in a variety of
philosophical, medical, and scientific journals. She has a doctorate in philosophy from the Uni-
versity of Western Ontario.

Notes

* Correspondence to: Department of Philosophy, Saint Joseph’s University, 5600 City Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19131,
USA. Email: ginger.hoffman@sju.edu

1
We also refer the reader also to a special issue of the journal Neuroethics (edited by Dussauge and Kaiser), the collections
Neurofeminism: Issues at the Intersection of Feminist Theory and Cognitive Science (edited by Bluhm, Jacobson, and Maibom)
and Gendered Neurocultures: Feminist and Queer Perspectives on Current Brain Discourses (edited by Schmitz and Höppner), and
the canonical monographs Delusions of Gender (Fine) and Brainstorm (Jordan-Young).
2
See Rippon et al. 2, Leonard et al., and Fine, Delusions of Gender 143, for discussions of how correcting for overall brain
volume/body size may affect previous reports of regional brain differences.
3
For a review of other types of bias in presentation, see Schmitz and Höppner, especially 3–4.
4
The contrasting answer is dualism, the theory that the mind and the brain are distinct substances or properties. For
example, the mind may be a soul-like entity.
5
More generally, outside of the context of gender, there are several other putative examples of multiple realization – for
example, across different individuals (Price and Friston). At the same time, it is important to note that empirical evidence
for multiple realization has also been contested (for example: Bechtel and Mundale; Shapiro; Polger). Figdor endeavors to
quell these types of challenges.
6
Note that, consistent with physicalism, many ExM supporters accept that the brain can be identical to the mind, but
maintain that it is only identical to part of the mind.
7
Of course, there might also be environmental differences that exaggerate differences in the brain.

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 Neurosexism and Neurofeminism 727
8
It goes without saying that there are copious philosophical assumptions underpinning this simplistic equation of mPFC
with ‘reason’, and that such assumptions are richly contested. This is not the main subject of our review, but see Hanson
and Bunzl.
9
Although it is important to note that the papers by Weisberg et al., ‘The Seductive Allure’ and McCabe and Castel have
both been accused of being unreplicable (see Farah and Hook). Recent work by Weisberg and colleagues summarizes the
evidence on both sides of the debate (Weisberg et al., ‘Deconstructing the Seductive Allure’).
10
One interesting feature of this approach is that it merges two types of critique. Traditionally, scholars often separate
critique of scientific flaws of studies from critique of ethical ones (cf. Bluhm, ‘New Research, Old Problems’). On this
approach, however, the scientific flaws become directly ethically relevant.

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