that he was a person of good station, sitting in the board of directors of

7. UNITED AIRLINES vs. WILLIE J. UY several top 500 corporations and holding senior executive positions for such
similar firms; that petitioner airline accorded him ill and shabby treatment
to his extreme embarrassment and humiliation; and, as such he should be
FACTS:
paid moral damages of at least P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages of at
Willie J. Uy, a revenue passenger on United Airlines Flight for the San
least P500,000.00, plus attorney's fees of at least P50,000.00. Similarly, he
Francisco - Manila route, checked in together with his luggage one piece of
alleged that the damage to his luggage and its stolen contents amounted to
which was found to be overweight at the airline counter. To his utter
around $5,310.00, and requested reimbursement therefor.
humiliation, an employee of petitioner rebuked him saying that he should
have known the maximum weight allowance to be 70 kgs. per bag and that
United Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
he should have packed his things accordingly. Then, in a loud voice in front
respondent's cause of action had prescribed, invoking Art. 29 of the
of the milling crowd, she told respondent to repack his things and transfer
Warsaw Convention which provides -
some of them from the overweight luggage to the lighter ones. Not wishing
to create further scene, respondent acceded only to find his luggage still
Art. 29 (1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not
overweight. The airline then billed him overweight charges which he offered
brought within two (2) years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the
to pay with a miscellaneous charge order (MCO) or an airline pre-paid
destination, or from the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived,
credit. However, the airline's employee, and later its airport supervisor,
or from the date on which the transportation stopped.
adamantly refused to honor the MCO pointing out that there were
conflicting figures listed on it. Despite the explanation from respondent that
(2) The method of calculating the period of limitation shall be determined
the last figure written on the MCO represented his balance, petitioner's
by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.
employees did not accommodate him. Faced with the prospect of leaving
without his luggage, respondent paid the overweight charges with his
Respondent countered that par. (1) of Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention
American Express credit card.
must be reconciled with par. (2) thereof which states that "the method of
calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the
Respondent's troubles did not end there. Upon arrival in Manila, he
court to which the case is submitted. Interpreting thus, respondent noted
discovered that one of his bags had been slashed and its contents stolen. He
that according to Philippine laws the prescription of actions is interrupted
particularized his losses to be around US $5,310.00. In a letter dated 16
"when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial
October 1989 respondent bewailed the insult, embarrassment and
demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment
humiliating treatment he suffered in the hands of United Airlines
of the debt by the debtor." Since he made several demands upon United
employees, notified petitioner of his loss and requested reimbursement
Airlines: first, through his personal letter dated 16 October 1989; second,
thereof. Petitioner United Airlines, through Central Baggage Specialist Joan
through a letter dated 4 January 1990 from Atty. Pesigan; and, finally,
Kroll, did not refute any of respondent's allegations and mailed a check
through a letter dated 28 October 1991 written for him by Atty. Ampil, the
representing the payment of his loss based on the maximum liability of US
two (2)-year period of limitation had not yet been exhausted.
$9.70 per pound. Respondent, thinking the amount to be grossly
inadequate to compensate him for his losses, as well as for the indignities
The trial court ordered the dismissal of the action.It held that although the
he was subjected to, sent two (2) more letters to petitioner airline,
second paragraph of Art. 29 speaks of deference to the law of the local
demanding an out-of-court settlement of P1,000,000.00. Petitioner United
court in "calculating the period of limitation," the same does not refer to the
Airlines did not accede to his demands.
local forum's rules in interrupting the prescriptive period but only to the
rules of determining the time in which the action may be deemed
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against United Airlines alleging
commenced, and within our jurisdiction the action shall be deemed
"brought" or commenced by the filing of a complaint. Hence, the trial court
concluded that Art. 29 excludes the application of our interruption rules.
The appellate court ruled that the Warsaw Convention did not preclude the
operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. Respondent's failure to
file his complaint within the two (2)-year limitation provided in the Warsaw
Convention did not bar his action since he could still hold petitioner liable
for breach of other provisions of the Civil Code which prescribe a different
period or procedure for instituting an action. Further, under Philippine laws,
prescription of actions is interrupted where, among others, there is a
written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and since respondent Uy sent
several demand letters to petitioner United Airlines, the running of the two
(2)-year prescriptive period was in effect suspended. Hence, the appellate
court ruled that respondent's cause of action had not yet prescribed and
ordered the records remanded to the Quezon City trial court for further
proceedings.
ISSUE: The applicability of Warsaw Convention; Whether the causes of
actions of the respondent is barred.
HELD:
No. Within our jurisdiction we have held that the Warsaw Convention can
be applied, or ignored, depending on the peculiar facts presented by each
case. Thus, we have ruled that the Convention's provisions do not regulate
or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier or
misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or
exceptional type of damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to
justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a
passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said
Convention. Likewise, we have held that the Convention does not preclude
the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not
regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for
violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage,
especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is
found or established.
In this case respondent has (2) causes of action: (a) the shabby and
humiliating treatment he received from petitioner's employees at the San
Francisco Airport which caused him extreme embarrassment and social
humiliation; and, (b) the slashing of his luggage and the loss of his personal
effects amounting to US $5,310.00.
While his second cause of action - an action for damages arising from theft
or damage to property or goods - is well within the bounds of the Warsaw
Convention, his first cause of action -an action for damages arising from the
misconduct of the airline employees and the violation of respondent's rights
as passenger - clearly is not.
Consequently, insofar as the first cause of action is concerned, respondent's
failure to file his complaint within the two (2)-year limitation of the Warsaw
Convention does not bar his action since petitioner airline may still be held
liable for breach of other provisions of the Civil Code which prescribe a
different period or procedure for instituting the action, specifically, Art.
1146 thereof which prescribes four (4) years for filing an action based on
torts.
As for respondent's second cause of action, indeed the travaux
preparatories of the Warsaw Convention reveal that the delegates thereto
intended the two (2)-year limitation incorporated in Art. 29 as an absolute
bar to suit and not to be made subject to the various tolling provisions of
the laws of the forum. This therefore forecloses the application of our own
rules on interruption of prescriptive periods. Article 29, par. (2), was
intended only to let local laws determine whether an action had been
commenced within the two (2)-year period, and within our jurisdiction an
action shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of a complaint. Since it is
indisputable that respondent filed the present action beyond the two (2)-
year time frame his second cause of action must be barred. HOWEVER, it
cannot be doubted that respondent exerted efforts to immediately convey
his loss to petitioner, even employed the services of two (2) lawyers to
follow up his claims, and that the filing of the action itself was delayed
because of petitioner's evasion.
In this case of PAL, private respondent filed an action for damages against
petitioner airline for the breakage of the front glass of the microwave oven.
Petitioner averred that, the action having been filed seven (7) months after
her arrival at her port of destination, she failed to comply with par. 12,
subpar. (a) (1), of the Air Waybill which expressly provided that the person
entitled to delivery must make a complaint to the carrier in writing in case
of visible damage to the goods, immediately after discovery of the damage
and at the latest within 14 days from receipt of the goods. Despite non-
compliance therewith the Court held that by private respondent's
immediate submission of a formal claim to petitioner, which however was
not immediately entertained as it was referred from one employee to
another, she was deemed to have substantially complied with the
requirement.
In the same vein must we rule upon the circumstances brought before us.
Verily, respondent filed his complaint more than two (2) years later, beyond
the period of limitation prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for filing a
claim for damages. However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled
from immediately filing an action because petitioner airline gave him the
runaround, answering his letters but not giving in to his demands. Thus,
private respondent's second cause of action cannot be considered as time-
barred under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention.
8. LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Tirso V. Antiporda, Sr. was an associate director of the Central Bank of the
Philippines and a registered consultant of the Asian Development Bank, the
World Bank and the UNDP. He was, contracted by Sycip, Gorres, Velayo &
Co. (SGV) to be the institutional financial specialist of the Development Bank
of Malawi in Africa. For the engagement, Antiporda would be provided one
round-trip economy ticket from Manila to Blantyre and back . Lufthansa,
issued ticket for Antiporda's confirmed flights to Malawi, Africa with the
following itinerary: Manila to Singapore, Singapore to Bombay,(on board
lufhasa) Bombay to Nairobi, Nairobi to Lilongwe, Lilongwe to Blantyre (on
board Air Kenya)
Antiporda took the Lufthansa flight to Singapore from where he proceeded
to Bombay on board the same airline. He arrived in Bombay as scheduled
and waited at the transit area of the airport for his connecting flight to
Nairobi which was, per schedule given him by Lufthansa, to leave Bombay in
the morning of September 26, 1984. Finding no representative of Lufthansa
waiting for him at the gate, Antiporda asked the duty officer of Air India how
he could get in touch with Lufthansa. He was told to call up Lufthansa which
informed him that somebody would attend to him shortly.
Matias returned with one Leslie Benent, duty officer of Lufthansa, who
informed Antiporda that his seat in Air Kenya had been given to a very
important person of Bombay who was attending a religious function in
Nairobi. Antiporda protested, stressing that he had an important
professional engagement in Blantyre, Malawi. He requested that the
situation be remedied but Air Kenya Flight 203 left for Nairobi without him
on board. He arrived in Blantyre at 9:00 o'clock in the evening of September
28, 1984, more than a couple of days late for his appointment.
Antiporda's counsel wrote the general manager of Lufthansa in Manila
demanding P1,000,000 in damages for the airline's "malicious, wanton,
disregard of the contract of carriage."
ISSUE: Was there a breach of obligation by the defendant in failing to
transport the plaintiff from Manila to Blantyre, Malawi, Africa?
In its defense, Lufhasa contends that its obligation to transport the plaintiff
is only up to Bombay. And that it is Air Kenya which shoyl be laible for the
breach of contract of carriage.
On his part, private respondent Antiporda insists that he entered with
Lufthansa an exclusive contract of carriage, the nature of which is a
continuous carriage by air from Manila to Blantyre Malawi; that it did not
enter into a series of independent contracts with the carriers that
transported him for the remaining leg of his trip.
ISSUE: 1. Whether Lufhasa German Arilines should be held liable.
2. Whether Art. 30 par(2) of the Warsaw Convention is applicable.
HELD:
1. Yes. The basis for such claim is well-founded. As ruled by the trial court,
with the Court of Appeals concurring favorably, Antiporda was issued a
confirmed Lufthansa ticket all throughout the five-leg trip. The fourth
paragraph of the "Conditions of Contract" stipulated in the ticket
indubitably showed that the contract of carriage was considered as one of
continuous air transportation from Manila to Blantyre, Malawi, thus:
"4. . . . carriage to be performed hereunder by several successive carriers is
regarded as a single operation."
In light of the stipulations expressly specified in the ticket defining the true
nature of its contract of carriage with Antiporda, Lufthansa cannot claim
that its liability thereon ceased at Bombay Airport and thence, shifted to the
various carriers that assumed the actual task of transporting said private
respondent.
We, therefore, reject Lufthansa's theory that from the time another carrier
was engaged to transport Antiporda on another segment of his trip, it
merely acted as a ticket-issuing agent in behalf of said carrier. In the very
nature of their contract, Lufthansa is clearly the principal in the contract of
carriage with Antiporda and remains to be so, regardless of those instances
when actual carriage was to be performed by various carriers. The issuance
of a confirmed Lufthansa ticket in favor of Antiporda covering his entire five-
leg trip abroad successive carriers concretely attests to this. This also serves
as proof that Lufthansa, in effect guaranteed that the successive carriers,
such as Air Kenya would honor his ticket; assure him of a space therein and
transport him on a particular segment of his trip. This ruling finds
corroboration in the Supreme Court decision in KLM , 12 where the same
issues were confronted.
2. In order to escape from liability, Lufhasa cited the Warsaw Convention,
particularly Section 2, Article 30 thereof which provides:
"Art. 30 (1). In the case of transportation to be performed by various
successive carriers and falling within the definition set out in the third
paragraph of Article I, each carrier who accepts passengers, baggage, or
goods shall be subject to the rules set out in the convention, and shall be
deemed to be one of the contracting parties to the contract of
transportation insofar as the contract deals with that part of the
transportation which is performed under his supervision.
The applicability of the Warsaw Convention presupposes the occurrence of
either an accident or a delay.. . ."
Lufthansa prays this court to take heed of jurisprudence in the United States
where the term "delay" was interpreted to include "bumping-off" or failure
to carry a passenger with a confirmed reservation. These decisions in the
United States are not controlling in this jurisdiction. The ordinary language
of a statute must be given its ordinary meaning and limited to a reasonable
interpretation." In its ordinary sense, "delay" means to prolong the time of
or before; to stop, detain or hinder for a time, or cause someone or
something to be behind in schedule or usual rate of movement in
progress. "Bumping-off," which is the refusal to transport passengers with
confirmed reservation to their planned and contracted destinations,
totally forecloses said passengers' right to be transported, whereas delay
merely postpones for a time being the enforcement of such right.
Consequently, Section 2, Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention which does
not contemplate the instance of "bumping-off" but merely of simple delay,
cannot provide a handy excuse for Lufthansa as to exculpate it from any
liability to Antiporda. The payment of damages is, thus, deemed warranted
by this Court.

(2) In the case of transportation of this nature, the passenger or his

representative can take action only against the carrier who performed the
transportation during which the accident or the delay occurred, save in the
case where, by express agreement, the first carrier has assumed liability for
the whole journey.

However, the court agrred the Court of Appeals in ruling in the negative.
Citing the case of KLM,