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THE MEANING OF THOOE IN THE 'POETICS'
1 E. SCHOTRUMPF, Die Bedeutung des Wortes AGor, in der Poetik des Aristoteles, Zetemata 49
(Munich 1970).
2 Cf. SCHOTRUMPF, 22-25.
3 Cf. E.N. 1139b 13. 31 -32; 1140a 21 -23. b 6- 8. 21. 28 -30 and 1103a 7- 10, cited
above.
4 Cf. E.N. 1145a 15-17 and SCHOTRUMPF, 26 -28.
s Cf. SCHOTRUMPF, 23-24, esp. 24 note 4. For further comments about 8rdvoIa, see
SCHOTRUMPF, 43 and 90.
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The Meaning of i"oc in the 'Poetics' 281
up, as, roughly, moral and intellectual qualities((6. Used in this way, then,
1Mio; and 8tavoua are closely related but distinct: the former does not include
the latter.
In the 'History of Animals' and at least the first two books of the 'Rhetoric'
this is not the case. In H. A. 610 b 20-22 Aristotle includes an intellectual
virtue, intelligence (voi3;), and its corresponding vice, folly (dvoia), in fj03:
Ta 8' fhTI rcov xcov ... 81a(ptp?Et cacTc Ts &kiav xai ntpa6rilra xai dtvpiav
xal gFup6trt xal vov t? xCti 6volav7. In Rh. 2 he includes in ARo; certain
qualities, such as optimism (Frnt?nti8c;: 1389a 19), pessimism (68u0tX?nti8,;:
1390a 5) and love of life ((pnX6lo4ot: 1389b 33) for which there are no corre-
sponding fltahti Ett? in the 'Ethics'8. Here Aristotle also includes piety in
i.og: tv 8' dxolou1i 1icrTotov iGog Tfj csTuXujt, 6tt (ptXk6oi siot xca
AXouoIv tp6p; T6 9i6v ncog, niorts1 ovtF; 8tat rat yiyv6gvca dtn6 Tfi; t6Uj
(1391 b 2 - 4). This is a broader usage of the term than in the 'Ethics' because
there 'o; includes qualities which men manifest in their behavior not toward
the gods, but only toward their fellow men and concerning their own appeti-
tes9. In Rh. 2 Aristotle lists the intellectual virtue, (pp6vlt;, along with
dipFur and Ft'tvoita as the three actta of intiattg v lx fgst ToG Xyovro;'O0.
SCHOTRUMPF concludes that in Rh. 2 >>ist also AGoq nicht gebraucht wie in der
Ethik, sondern umfaB3t auch eine 8tavorlrtxi &p?T1, namlich (pp6vcnt ..
Auch hier ist i'jo; in einem ganz allgemeinen Sinn die menschliche
Eigenart< l l . In Rh. 1 and 2, then, i9o; is a broader term than in the 'Eth
it includes some qualities which there belong to neither Aao; nor tadv
some qualities which there belong only to 8tavota. SCHOTRUMPF nowhere
determines precisely how much of what is included in 8tavota in the 'Ethics' is
included in i'oq in Rh. 1 and 2. His most sweeping statement is the following:
(in Rh. 1 and 2) >>AGog ist also nicht nur die Haltung, die man gegenuber den
Affekten und in seinem Handeln einnimmt, sondern es umfal3t auch unser
Denken und steht hier ganz allgemein fiUr die Wesensart eines Menschen< 2. It
seems to me that Aiaog in Rh. 1 and 2 includes all of what is included in
8iacvota in the 'Ethics'. If 'wo; there includes all the qualities of an orator
which may affect an audience's trust in him, then it should include all
intellectual qualities; for, depending on the topic under discussion, any and all
such qualities, skills, any acquaintance with the arts or philosophy, on the
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282 GEORGE F. HELD
part of a speaker, will affect this trust. In what follows, I will assume that
fj&o; in Rh. 1 and 2 and in H. A. is a collective term referring to all qualities
whatsoever which may belong to a person. One's ilSo4 in this sense is virtually
one's whole person.
It is not clear to me whether SCHOTRUMPF considers iwo; in Rh. 3 to
include tadvota. His statements on this point seem to me contradictory. How
it is used there reflects upon its meaning in the 'Poetics' because of the
similarity of one passage in Rh. 3 (1417 a 16- 19) to a passage in the 'Poetics'
(50b 8- 12). I believe that iwo; is used in Rh. 3 in the same sense as in Rh. 1
and 2, but will postpone my discussion of this matter until the end of this
essay.
SCHiOTRUMPF holds that iOo; in the 'Poetics' means what it does in the
'Ethics'13. I will argue that it generally has the meaning which it does in Rh. 1
and 2. I will dispute SCHOTRUMPF'S opinion on the basis of common sense,
the text of the 'Poetics' and the doctrine of the 'Ethics'. None of my argu-
ments do I consider self-sufficient, but they are mutually supportive, and to-
gether, I believe, afford a high probability to my thesis. The primary difficulty
with SCHtJTRUMPF'S position is that common sense demands that iGo; in
Poet. ch. 15 include intellectual qualities. Aristotle there recommends that the
fihT of the tragic characters be good (XpTora), suitable (Ta dtpg6trrovta),
similar to our own (t6 6jotov) and consistent (T6 6gaX6v). Surely, he means
to proscribe such blunders as the portrayal of characters as intelligent in one
scene but stupid in the next, savages as possessing great artistic skills and
learning, children as wise beyond their years, etc. His words however can
make this proscription only if fijil here includes intellectual qualities. That it
does is given explicit support by Aristotle's remark in this same passage that it
is not suitable for a woman to be portrayed as clever (8sivfv: 54 a 24). Since,
as I will presently show, cleverness (8Elv6tI14) is an intellectual quality or
ability'4, Aristotle's mention of it indicates that he is here concerned as much
13 Cf. SCHOTRUMPF, 52 - 53 and 83 note 2. SCHOTRUMPF'S opinion about the meaning of fGoO
in the 'Poetics' is also basically that of DALE, LUCAS and ELSE. See DALE (above, note 6) 3 - 8;
Aristotle, 'Poetics', ed. D. W. LUCAS (Oxford 1968), ad 48a 2; and G. F. ELSE, Aristotle's
Poetics: the Argument (Cambridge, Mass. 1957) 245. ELSE, 270, attempts to reconcile this view of
the meaning of '90o with its definition in 50b 8-9 as a type of speech, one which manifests
itpoaipesot. He there concludes that n>under this dispensation character also is ... a subdivision,
as it were, of thoughto. This statement can be true only if both >>character<< and >>thought(( in it
refer to types of speeches. I understand them to carry this meaning. i'9o;/character in this sense
can be a subdivision of &tdvoia/thought because the latter is defined as a very broad type of
speech, one which presents either facts or opinions (50a 7 - 8) or which presents anything at all
(SOb 11 - 12: fi xaa16Xou rT dtno(pciivovrat).
14 Oddly, DALE (above, note 6) 8 takes note of Aristotle's remark about cleverness in women,
but in the very same paragraph criticizes him because >>No obligation is laid on the poet to make
his dianoia characteristic of the person uttering it, because by definition what is characteristic
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The Meaning of Ago; in the 'Poetics' 283
belongs to ethos((. Aristotle does not say that 8tdvota, in the sense of expressed thoughts, should
be characteristic of the person uttering it. But that would follow naturally if Ago; in Ch. 15 is
understood to include 8tdvota, in the sense of intellectual qualities. Aidvoict, in the first sense, is
simply a manifestation of Stdvota, in the second sense.
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284 GEORGE F. HELD
used here and in 50 a 2 in the same sense as in the 'Ethics'. I agree with
SCHOTRUMPF that they are, but believe that this is the only passage in the
'Poetics' where they are so used. That Aristotle intends to use both of them
generally in senses different from those which they have here I infer from his
definitions of these words which follow in 50 a 5 -7, where neither word is
given the meaning which it has above. Auavota is defined as a type of speech,
and iwog is said to be that with regard to which the dramatic agents are of a
certain sort. Since we have just been told in 49 b 37-38 that these agents must
be of a certain sort with regard to both Ago; and b6avota, for the two passages
to be consistent, ?Sj in 50 a 5 should include what is meant by both AGo; and
8tavota together in 49 b 37-38. And since iGog and 8tavota there are used as
in the 'Ethics', IGn1 in 50 a 5 ought to include both ilo; and tatvota as used in
the 'Ethics'. 'HtH in 50 a 5, then, carries the broad meaning which it has in
the 'Rhetoric'. This interpretation is strongly supported by the fact that
8tavoua in the next sentence is defined as a type of speech. Why, if it is given a
different meaning than it has above, should we expect AGog to be given the
same meaning as above? Why should 8idvota in the sense which it has in the
'Ethics' suddenly be introduced into the discussion and just as suddenly drop
out of it? If my interpretation is accepted, it does not drop out of it, but its
meaning is included in that of i,hi in 50 a 5, and has been and will be included
in that of iGog elsewhere in the 'Poetics'.
SCHCTRUMPF, who perhaps saw the difficulty which this definition of ?Gn
creates for his view about the meaning of fjog in the 'Poetics', concludes
what no one before him ever has, that fGTl at 50 a 5 must be a type of speech
inasmuch as 6tdvota in the following clause is a type of speech'5. Now, gog
may, as others also have thought'6, be employed at 50 b 8 to refer to a type of
speech, one which manifests character, and therefore be equivalent to itx6;
X6yog, but igr at 50 a 5 is surely not a type of speech. The construction which
follows iSn there (xaG' 6) is different from that which follows tadvotav in the
next line (Av 6ooit)17. The construction with tv after 6tczvotctv may, as SCHO-
TRUMPF asserts 18, indicate that taivotav there is a type of speech; but the con-
struction with xacat after ihTI rather is similar to the constructions with xata
before i'Oog at 49 b 37 - 38 and h1 at 50 a 19 where, according to SCHO-
TRUMPF himself, A&o; and GhTI mean >>die menschliche Eigenschaft, 'Charak-
ter'<< 19. These similarities of construction make it highly likely that fjog and
'ihil in all three loci are used in similar, if not identical, senses: in all three they
mean >>die menschliche Eigenschaft, 'Charakter'<, not a type of speech.
15 SCHOTRUMPF, 90.
16 Cf. DALE (above, note 6) 8 and ELSE (above, note 13) 270.
17 SCHOTRUMPF, 90, reads tv ot;, which must be a misprint.
18 SCHOTRUMPF, 90.
19 Cf. SCHOTRUMPF, 90, esp. note 5.
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The Meaning of 'go; in the 'Poetics' 285
In this context one should also keep in mind that, as Lucas says in com-
menting on 50 b 4: )>In the last resort they [sc. AVo; and 5tacvota] are not com-
pletely separable.<< They are not completely separable in theory, and much less
so in concrete fact. Aristotle can reasonably draw the theoretical distinctions
between them that he does in the 'Ethics', but the iGor of particular men or
dramatic characters is not completely separable from their tatvota. If they are
of the better sort with regard to iVGog they are thereby necessarily better also to
some extent with regard to &davota. The close association of ijog and 85a-
vota is implied in Aristotle's second definition of 1',og (50 b 8). There i&o;,
seemingly conceived of as a type of speech, is defined as that which manifests
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286 GEORGE F. HELD
20 See my article, EflOYAA1MO and Teleology in the Poetics, T.A.P.A. 114 (1984)
172- 173.
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The Meaning of 40or, in the 'Poetics' 287
21 oXOXfi. (VERMEHREN) rather than onou68i should be probably be read at 1177 a 19.
22 E.N. 1177 b 27-78 a 9. Aristotle at one point (1178 b 27-28) even identifies happ
with contemplation; and on this basis he denies that animals can be happy. This identificati
most problematic: how can it be reconciled with what else Aristotle says about happiness
question and the general nature of Aristotle's conception of happiness have been the subj
much recent discussion. See R. KRAUT, Two Conceptions of Happiness, Ph. R. 88 (1979) 167 -
W. F. R. HARDIE, Aristotle on the Best Life for a Man, Philosophy 54 (1979) 35-50, esp. 36;
K. JACOBI, Aristoteles' Einfilhrung des Begriffs 'etU8atjovia' im I. Buch der 'Nikomachischen
Ethik', Philosophisches Jahrbuch 86 (1979) 300- 325; J. L. ACKRILL, Aristotle on 'Eudaimonia'
(London 1975); S. R. L. CLARK, Aristotle's Man (Oxford 1975); J. M. COOPER, Reason and
Human Good in Aristotle (Boston 1975).
23 LUCAS (above, note 13) ad loc. rightly comments on 52 b 32-36: )>Nothing could be less
manifest than the truth of this extraordinary statement.(( Not only is it not manifest that the fall
of the kitirxsig will not arouse pity and fear in us, but Aristotle's statement contrasts markedly,
if not conflicts, with Rh. 1385 b 34 - 86 a 1 where he says that >)and men feel pity if they think that
some persons [in misfortune] are virtuous ltnetxtctl, for he who thinks that no one is will think
that all deserve misfortune(( (LOEB trans.). Aristotle here implies that the possession of tnitixeua
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288 GEORGE F. HELD
is not merely conducive to one's obtaining the pity of others, but even essential to it. Is it not,
then, odd that in the 'Poetics' he should exclude the intsE1x?c, from tragedy on the grounds that
their fall will not arouse pity and fear? Of course, there he is thinking of those with an excess of
tnirtixstat; but even so?
24 J. VAHLEN, Beitrage zu Aristoteles' Poetik, Neudruck bes. v. H. SCHONE (Leipzig-Berlin
1914) 267.
25 C. H. REEVES, The Aristotelian Concept of the Tragic Hero, AJP 73 (1952) 179.
26 SCHOTRUMPF, 102.
27 E.N. 1137a 31 f.
28 See E.N. 1137a35-b2.
29 See Rh. 1386 a 27 - 29.
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The Meaning of 'So; in the 'Poetics' 289
19
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290 GEORGE F. HELD
32 Cf. also Plat. Lgg. 10 908e 5-6; Cra. 407b 8-9; Rep. 3, 400e 3; Ep. 10 358c 2 and 7.
33 SCHOTRUMPF, 83 note 2.
34 SCHOTRUMPF, 31.
35 SCHOTRUMPF, 31.
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The Meaning of ij9o0 in the 'Poetics' 291
36 LUCAS (above, note 13) ad loc. also believes the passage to be an interpolation.
19*
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292 GEORGE F. HELD: The Meaning of 1,So; in the 'Poetics'
And what about 1417 a 24 - 28? Aristotle here obviously means to advise
speakers to imply that they have moral and not just intellectual (= selfish)
reasons for the choices they make. Unfortunately, he expresses this idea rather
oddly - for an Aristotelian. The contrast here between the pp6vigo; and the
&iya9G6g is inconsistent with his more considered usage of these terms in the
'Ethics'. Cf. E.N. 1144a 36-37: 60aTs (pavsp6v 6tI &&t8'vatov (pp6vtjtov
sivc 6v1ra &VyaG6v and 1 144b 30-32: 6filov oi'v tx trv sipiljF'VWv 6OTI
ouX ol6v T? 6&yaG6v F{vat xupiw;)o dvsu (ppovijosw;, oUt8& (pp6vigov &ZVEU dji;
tXi dpsTi1C,;. Dp6vitgo; in Rh. 1417 a 24 -28 seems to mean virtually what
6&Fv6; does in the 'Ethics'. The 6stv6; there (cf. 1 144 b 12 - 17, cited above) is
someone with (pquow, but not xupia, &pFtii. He is good at obtaining the ends
he chooses to pursue (= t6 (bX)F'tgov), but does not choose to pursue proper
ends. The pp6vtIgog, on the other hand, possesses xupia, not just puotx',
&pstin, pursues proper ends, and is good at obtaining them. 4lp6vtiog in this
passage of the 'Rhetoric', then, is used very peculiarly and does not seem
to indicate the possession of the intellectual virtue, pp6vilat;. Correspond-
ingly, though 8tavoica; in the phrase a'nt 8tavoia; Myctv seems to have its
collective sense and therefore would normally include all the intellectual
virtues, it cannot here include pp6vnotg. If a'c 8icavoiag XFyctv means to
seem to derive one's opinion from just the intellectual virtues, i. e., the intel-
lectual virtues divorced from the moral virtues, 8tavoia in this phrase cannot
include ppovrjcn; since pp6vlct; cannot be divorced from the moral virtues.
Auavoia here, then, includes only the other intellectual virtues, but this fact
does not entail that these are excluded from 'jGo; as used in the passage.
THGo; here ought to include all intellectual qualities and virtues since all may
be involved in the act of itpoaipcot;; it ought especially to include (pp6vilst;
if what Aristotle says in 1144 b 30-32 (cited above) holds true.
The meaning of iwog, of course, might vary within the particular books of
the 'Rhetoric', as well as from book to book (SCHOTRUMPF sometimes seems
to assume consistency within the particular books 37). There is, however, at least
a greater likelihood of consistency in proximate passages. My interpretation
of 1417 a 16 -28, therefore, is supported by the fact that 'Go; seems to have a
broad meaning in two of its three other occurrences in Rh. 3. In 1414 a 22 its
meaning is ambiguous, whether broad or narrow; but in 1408 a 32 and 1411 b
31 it seems much more likely to have its broad sense. In the former it refers to
the different impression created by the educated and uneducated through their
choice of words while speaking: Fav otuv xai ta 6v6oxa' oixsia Myif ti E, t,
7OUct t6 iG0g- o05 y'ap txt5Ta' oi'' Ca 5co erypOIXo0, &v Xa'
?naiat86,UgFt'VO; EnCYIttV. In the latter it refers to the ?>character<< of one's
delivery in speaking.
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KARLHANS ABEL: Der historische Ort einer stoischen Schmerztheorie 293
A last few observations on these words. Atdvota occurs four other times in
Rh. 3, besides that just discussed: 1404 a 19, 1410b 26 and 28, 1415 a 13. In
none of its other occurrences does it have its collective sense: in all its means
>>thoughte< or >)intention<< or the >>meaning(< of something said. It occurs only
twice in Rh. 1 and 2. In the first case (1374b 13) it means >>intention(<. In the
second (1403 a 36) it seems to have its collective sense - though, more
precisely, it there refers specifically to thought as manifested in various kinds
of argument: Ui5cp gv ncapa8c6syaircov xai yvcoj.Wv xal tvauljla, I(cov xcii
6Xog tCiv 7t?pi tv 8u1i volav. This second case occurs in the very last sentence
of Rh. 2, and napcit8syatca, yvcbtat and twvuggacia there stand for what
was the subject matter of Rh. 1 and 2. I know of twenty-one occurrences of
AGog in Rh. 1 and 2. Since BONITz does not provide a complete list of loci for
very common words like AGog, the following list is not necessarily complete
(seven of these are not in BONITZ): 1356a 3. 5. 23. 27; 1359b 11; 1366a 12.
13. 15; 1384a7; 1389a 35. b 13. 15; 1390a 17. 18. b29; 1391a21. 23. b2. 7;
1393 b 30; 1395 b 14. As already shown, i'jo; in several of these loci ought to
have a broad meaning; in most cases it is ambiguous whether it has a broad or
narrow meaning, but in none need it have a narrow one. There are no
hardfast conclusions to be drawn from this data. I collected it in the hope of
finding a passage in Rh. 1 and 2 where ',o; and &davota were used together in
the way they are in 1417 a 16-28, but there is no such passage. Auavotca is
used there very rarely altogether and only in the last sentence of Rh. 2 in a
collective sense. But it still seems to me that the meanings of iGo; and 6iLvola
do not change in Rh. 3 from what they were in Rh. 1 and 2.
v V. ARNIM, Stoic. 3,168; 181; Stoic. 1 P. V; III; ZELLER 3a, 264f.; R. P. HAYNEs, A. J. Ph.
83 (1962), 412ff.
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