Valentine Simpson

A QUESTION OF VALENCE: EXPLORING FEAR’S POSITIVE SIDE

1. INTRODUCTION

In the philosophical study of emotion, different aspects of it have been the object of inquiry: its
status as a natural kind, its connection to action and values, its biological basis, etc. One
dimension of emotion, which has motivated division among philosophers in the field, is that of
“valence”, by which we attempt to make a distinction between “positive” and “negative”
emotions.

In the literature on emotion, we find thinkers like Robert Solomon, who has argued, not that
valence does not exist, but that we can extract many valences, many polarities from any one
emotion (Solomon, 2003, p. 136). On the other hand, we have philosophers who have tried to
construct a coherent notion of valence, one that can neatly classify emotions into positive and
negative. Jesse Prinz, for instance, has done so by showing how valence can be considered an
“inner reinforcer” (Prinz, 2004, 2010). Drawing from the literature on animal learning theory,
Prinz describes valence as promoting (positive emotions) or detracting (negative emotions)
certain behaviors, through our experiencing emotion in the face of certain stimuli.

In this essay, I will explore both of these philosophers’ works on the topic of valence, to reach a
further conclusion regarding the valence of fear. First, I will present Solomon’s arguments
against a singular conception of valence which can neatly divide emotions into positive and
negative ones. These arguments are partly shared by Prinz, who also rejects many of the
attempts to construct a unified notion of valence. Nevertheless, Prinz elaborates his own idea of
valence, which he thinks survives Solomon’s criticisms, and overall fares better than the
alternatives. With this notion of valence in hand, I will delve into the “paradox of horror”,
which can be summarized in the following question: “why are audiences attracted to horror if it
generates emotions that we avoid in real life?” (Bantinaki, 2012, p. 383). We typically regard
fear as a negative emotion (negative valence); the question, then, is why we pursue it in our
experiences of horror fiction. Prinz’s notion of valence can help solve the paradox of horror, as
the notion of valence qua inner reinforcer has the necessary tools to explain our approach to
horror fiction and the apparently negative emotions it causes1.

2. SOLOMON AGAINST VALENCE

In Solomon’s 2003 book, Not Passion’s Slave, there is an entire chapter devoted to the topic of
valence. Here, Solomon aims to challenge the notion of valence. He thinks that the attempt to
find a unified notion of valence that can categorize emotions into positively or negatively
valenced is doomed to fail.

From such ethical notions as found in Aristotle’s works on psychology and the Church’s
discussions of virtues and vices, emotions receive their “good and bad” distinction. “There are
good emotions and there are bad emotions” (Ibid, p. 138). Nevertheless, this can mean very
different things, sometimes referring to consequences of emotions (health and illness, or
happiness and unhappiness, for instance), sometimes to causes, others to context and
circumstances, etc. And all these aspects of emotion, Solomon claims, are too often mistaken
for the emotion itself. He considers the case of fear, an emotion we take to be negative (bad
1
While I will mostly deal with fear in this essay, all of what is said on the topic of the paradox of horror also applies
to disgust.
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 emotion) as the circumstances which bring about an episode of fear are threatening or harmful
to the subject experiencing fear. But, Solomon says, it does not follow from this, that fear in
itself is bad for us. He thus points out to people who chase fear in safe conditions (as do the
audiences of our paradox of horror, to which he hints at subsequently). But, again, leaving
circumstance aside, we should also consider the moral (or immoral) consequences of emotion,
the satisfaction (or frustration) that it leaves in the subject, and many other aspects of emotion,
all of which deliver different results regarding our valuing of emotions. Because of these,
valence cannot be reduced to one single thing, not one single criteria by which to sort emotions.
Next, Solomon sets out to refute the specific theories of valence that have been developed with
the idea of valence as an intrinsic feature of emotion in mind.

Solomon’s first target is, what we might call, “hedonic valence”. The contrast between pleasure
and pain has often been taken as the foundation for the positive-negative polarity. Valence,
Solomon suggests, in its technicality “makes it quite evident that pleasure and pain are intended
as quantifiable features of an emotion” (Ibid, p. 140). The worry, for Solomon, is “the question
of in what sense pleasures and pains are comparable at all” (Idem). When considering pleasure,
we first find it difficult to compare pleasures known to us. Furthermore, it is implausible to
hold that it can constitute a basis for positive emotions, as many pleasurable aspects of concrete
emotions certainly don’t qualify them as positive emotions, e.g. emotions involving vengeance.
On the other hand, we find trouble in comparing different sorts of pain, such as physical pain 2,
suffering or anguish. Concluding, pleasure and pain do not form a straightforward polarity.
Such a rich phenomenon as emotion resists being reduced to a single category of pleasure or
pain; an episode of anger (generally considered negative) can either be pleasurable (as when it
is righteous, Solomon points out) or painful (as when we are betrayed, I would suggest).

Next, Solomon argues against valence as a behavioral criteria, couched in the “approach-
avoidance” polarity. To Solomon, “this seemingly straightforward criterion is also shot through
with ambiguities” (Ibid, p. 142). Many emotions can be both explanations of approach behavior
as well as avoidance behavior. Again, it is mostly a question of context, circumstances, and
consequences. Anger might certainly lead a subject to avoid the object that causes it, but it
could equally cause him to approach it, possibly according to how the subject evaluates the
cause of his emotion, or other surrounding factors. In addition to this, describing such
behaviors as positive or negative constitutes a further evaluation; one that might, or might not,
be appropriate, for what is positive or negative of a flight behavior, as opposed to a fright
behavior. Lastly, and it is a significant objection, “many emotions are called positive and
negative in the absence of any behavior” (Ibid, p. 143).

The last of Solomon’s targets takes an essential aspect of emotion as its basis: appraisal.
Emotions are taken to involve appraisals, of objects, situations, etc. From here, one can think of
valence as the overall appraisal involved in the emotion, a sort of “meta-appraisal”; if the
emotion involves an overall good appraisal, it is positive, if it includes an overall appraisal of
something as bad, it is negative. But, Solomon objects, this is simple-minded. Emotions include
a wide array of appraisals, of many different aspects of emotion, and we might even find
combinations of good and bad appraisals in an episode of emotion. Solomon then refers to the
scientific studies that back up a multidimensional appraisal theory of emotion. The very idea of
a multidimensional appraisal already undermines a simple-minded notion of valence, according
to Solomon, as no single way of cataloging emotions into positive and negative will work if
emotions include “a matrix of many dimensions of appraisal that make up (in part) the
cognitive content of the emotion” (Ibid, p. 144).

2
To Solomon, emotions and physical pain seem straightforwardly incompatible, as physical pains are physically
localizable sensations, and emotions are not. Therefore, “In this strict sense, no emotion is painful” (Ibid, p. 141).
2
 Conclusively, while admitting that valence “recognizes something essential about emotions
(that is, that they involve appraisals and evaluations of the world […])”, Solomon maintains
that it “is an idea that we should abandon and leave behind. It serves no purpose but confusion,
and perpetrates the worst old stereotypes about emotion” (Ibid, p. 147). Nevertheless, this has
not stopped other thinkers in trying to develop new notions of valence, in an effort to capture
the positivity and negativity (allegedly) essential to emotion.

3. PRINZ: VALENCE AS AN INNER REINFORCER

Prinz concurs with Solomon in that traditional accounts of valence don’t succeed. Prinz neatly
summarizes their flaws in the following way:

“Success would consist in finding a construct that has three features: (1) it should apply to all
emotions; (2) it should sort emotions into categories that roughly conform to the pretheoretical
classification of negative and positive emotions, at least for clear cases; and (3) it should make
sense of what makes negative emotions qualify as negative and positive emotions qualify as
positive. The accounts we have been reviewing fail on one or more of these requirements.”
(Prinz, 2010, p. 9)

The hedonic account of valence fails in (1), as not all emotions feel pleasurably or painfully.
The behavioral criteria of approach and avoidance violates (2), as its dependence on contextual
cues does not conform to the intuitions of folk psychology. Finally, the meta-appraisal account
breaks down by (1) if we take it as presupposing that emotions contain appraisals (for the
reasons Solomon considers), or by (3), if the appraisals are not constrained by the emotion’s
intrinsic features, as they cannot explain why the emotion is positive or negative on the basis of
our positive or negative attitudes towards it, respectively. As an avid defender of valence, he
recognizes that an alternative is required.

He first proposes his account of valence in his 2004 book, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory
of Emotion. Here, he surveys the investigation project of animal learning theory and behavior
conditioning, and their study of behavior reinforcers, i.e. stimuli that push or pull the subject to
or from a certain action. Drawing from this, Prinz identifies valence with these reinforcers.
These “reinforcers”, however, are not the behaviorist’s external stimuli. Prinz speaks of internal
states that represent the stimuli; hence, “inner reinforcers”. These inner reinforcers, in turn,
come in two flavors: inner positive reinforcers and inner negative reinforcers. Thus, Prinz
speaks of valence “markers”, as an inner positive reinforcer marks a positively valent state, and
the same for negatively valent states. This all stems from the fact that, as Prinz notes, “The
brain needs a way of keeping track. It needs a way of recording which stimuli are positive
reinforcers and which are negative” (Prinz, 2004, p. 173). Valence markers, in the form of inner
reinforcers, are the way to do this.

Emotions, therefore, involves a pair of components 3 Prinz calls “reward” and “punishment”
markers. The inner positive reinforcer works as an inner reward, some kind of signal that calls
for more of the stimulus which causes the emotion. Inner negative reinforcers, on the other
hand, serve as inner punishments, which signal to a reduction in stimuli, so as to reduce the
negative emotion. Prinz insists that nor are these reinforcers propositionally structured (they are
not evaluative judgements), nor are they consciously felt. Rather, the signal constituting the
valence marker is an unconscious mechanism that influences behavior. Also, he notes that the
valence marker does not attach to the representation of that which causes the emotion, to the
stimulus. The marker relates directly to the emotion. As such, “it is the emotion itself that is
3
I do not wish to say that every emotion contains one (or more) of each of these components. An emotion will be
valenced one way or the other according to which inner reinforcers is activated, when the emotion is undergone.
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 rewarding, and activities gain their status as rewarding indirectly and contingently by eliciting
rewarding emotions” (Prinz, 2010, p. 10).

While he admits that the inner markers are theoretical posits, in no way observable or
experienced, Prinz does claim some positive upshots of his account of valence, over the
alternatives both he and Solomon consider. First, Prinz remarks, they are apparently present in
all emotions, thus upholding the first condition of success, mentioned above. While, again, this
is theoretical and speculative, there doesn’t seem to be any evidence against the fact that
emotions like grief, fear4, and guilt (all negative emotions) tend to bring about an inclination to
seek out their reduction, and the opposite for positive emotions. Further, reward and
punishment markers are friendly to folk psychology’s sorting of emotions. Lastly, they are able
to explain the positive and negative natures of emotions, as their inner reinforcer components
are specifically “designed” to mark them as something to pursue or reduce. Overall, Prinz’s
account fares better than the reviewed alternatives.

To close this section and to open the next, where I will explore the paradox of horror and fear
as a positive emotion, I would note a further remark by Prinz, a possible objection he considers
which would come from Solomon himself. Seeking out tragedies and horror films appears to be
in stark contrast with Prinz’s marker theory of valence, as we are literally seeking out negative
emotions when, really, their punishment markers should make us avoid them. The paradox of
horror, then, presents itself as an objection to Prinz’s account of valence, as it cannot account
for our pursuit of negative emotions. Prinz gives a, in my opinion, weak way of answering to
this objection. The theory, he claims, is not committed to a fixed valence for each emotion. Fear
could, in some circumstances, be considered a positive emotion. Unfortunately, he only adds
that “Ideally, the theory would just be able to explain what makes these emotions positive when
they are, and it would lead to testable predictions about their effect on conditioning” (Idem).
Regardless, as we will now see, there is a more “sophisticated” way to utilize Prinz’s account of
valence to render fear a positive emotion in the context of horror, thus solving the paradox
without forgoing Prinz’s proposal.

4. POSITIVE FEAR OR THE PARADOX OF HORROR?

In a 2012 paper, Katerina Bantinaki attempts to answer to the question raised by the paradox of
horror. To do so, she develops something she calls “an integrationist moderate hedonic account
of the attraction of horror” (Bantinaki, p. 383). Integrationist refers to its tracing the attraction
of horror to the emotional experience itself, an experience that is rewarding and beneficial. The
moderate hedonism refers to the fact that the experience is enjoyable, understood “as a
welcoming stance that the subject has towards her experience rather than as a positive affect”
(Idem); she later refines this as “attitudinal hedonism”, as opposed to affective. This draws on
Prinz’s theory of valence, as fear will be experienced as a positive emotion on the grounds of an
inner positive reinforcement, as the subject has an overall experience of enjoyment. A final
analysis of the benefits and rewards of the experience of horror helps to clarify this point.

Bantinaki adopts her integrationist perspective as opposed to Noël Carroll’s “cognitive

pleasure” theory, which holds that the emotions experienced in response to horror are
intrinsically unpleasant (even painful), and the pleasure derived from horror is due to our
attraction to the beings typical of horror fiction: monsters, beings which lie “outside our
standing conceptual schemes” (Ibid, p. 384). This theory fails, as it’s implausible to hold that
audiences experience cognitive but dispassionate pleasure from horror. Also, our “perceived

4
As far as Prinz is concerned. We will now see a different possible treatment for fear.
4
control” over our own experiences helps ease the challenge that the emotions surrounding
horror are intrinsically unpleasant; being in control helps make the experiences pleasant.

While Bantinaki’s account is hedonic, it is not an “affective hedonism”. She argues against
Carroll that the emotions experienced in horror are not intrinsically painful or unpleasant, but
this does not give her grounds to adopt affective hedonism as an answer to the paradox, as it is
not the case that we derive pleasure from all the physiological symptoms associated with fear,
or disgust. Nevertheless, we may find an attitudinal pleasure in what we experience, a state of
pleasure that is related to our goals and desires, which puts us in a state of welcoming or
approval towards our experiences and the state of affairs which affords these (regardless of the
negative physiological symptoms that might accompany). This is what Bantinaki will want to
argue for in the case of fear, where, according to her, “the emotions experienced in response to
horror, being potentially beneficial and rewarding, are attitudinally pleasurable or enjoyable,
even if they are accompanied by some negative physiological symptoms” (Ibid, p. 387). At first
glance, this would appear to contrast with traditional views of valence, which do count fear as a
negative emotion, mostly on the grounds of the unpleasant feelings that accompany it. Thus
comes in Prinz’s theory of valence.

The attitudinal pleasure in the experience of an emotion is none other than the inner reward of
Prinz’s theory of valence; the inclination to continue in the emotional state embodies
Bantinaki’s state of welcoming towards our experience. As Prinz did, and Solomon before him,
Bantinaki rejects valence as a question of pain and pleasure (pleasure understood in the
traditional, physiological sense, not moderately or attitudinally). Bantinaki, following Prinz,
thinks it is a question of how the emotion relates to the subject. In the case of horror, the
subject, Bantinaki argues, develops a welcoming stance towards fear, he seeks its continuation,
thus making it a positive emotion.

But why should this be? Why do we develop such a welcoming stance towards the experience
of fear in response to horror? Distancing herself from Prinz now, Bantinaki argues that there are
benefits and rewards in experiencing fear in response to horror, and, furthermore, that these
outweigh the risks, given that the context of fictionalized horror is not threatening (and we are
ultimately always in control of our emotions, in the worst case-scenario by stopping our
encounter with the horror altogether).The most notable benefits in encountering horror “relate
to the management of our own reactions to fear” (Ibid, p. 390); we can confront our fears and
learn to cope with them. A further benefit, although Bantinaki admits more controversial, is the
desensitization effect that exposure to frightening stimuli may have. On the rewards side, we
find the thrill fear involves when one craves stimulation. All these factors, Bantinaki concludes,
“allow us to assume that horror-induced fear (or disgust) is or can be a positive emotion, an
emotion toward which the subject has a positive stance and thus enjoys experiencing” (Ibid, p.
391).

5. CONCLUSIONS

In this essay, I have brought to attention the phenomenon of valence, a feature of emotions by
which they may be regarded as either positive or negative. Some wish to deny that any such
polarization can be effected, while some try to show how such categorization can be carried
out.

In this way, I have presented arguments by Robert Solomon through which he attempts to show
that emotions are too complex to be reduced to a contrast between positive and negative
emotions. He gives arguments to reject three traditional views of valence: the hedonic account,
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the behavioral account, and the meta-appraisal account. Ultimately, Solomon believes we can
simultaneously hold various notions of valence, making the polarity between negative and
positive emotions much more complex than simply this.

Prinz, on the other hand, while agreeing with Solomon in that the traditional views on valence
suffer from fatal flaws, attempts to present a new, plausible way of understanding valence.
What is positive and negative of an emotion is the way the subject relates to his experience of
it. A positive emotion is one which triggers in the subject an inner marker of reward, leading
him to pursue the emotion further. In contrast, negative emotions will trigger markers of
punishment, leading the subject to try to cease it. Prinz’s theory avoids many of Solomon’s
criticisms, and overall fares better than the alternatives.

Nevertheless, there remains the problem of apparently negative emotions that, regardless,
people pursue. An instance of this leads to the paradox of horror, as many people seek out the
experience of fear through an encounter with horror. Katerina Bantinaki explores this theme
and believes Prinz’s account of valence can even serve to explain this phenomenon, not fall by
it. Recognizing that we may find attitudinal pleasure in things, where we develop a welcoming
attitude toward it because of some benefit it provides us with, Bantinaki claims people’s
attraction to horror might be explained by such pleasures. Prinz’s framework for valence allows
us to see the emotion of fear in a new light, no longer a negative but now positive emotion.
There are many rewards and benefits to experiencing fear in a controlled encounter with horror
both on the cognitive and emotional sides and the physical, as we take pleasure in being
stimulated in new, exciting ways.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

 Bantinaki, K. (2012), “The Paradox of Horror: Fear as a Positive Emotion”, The

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 70, No. 4: 383-392.

 Prinz, J. (2004), Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.

 Prinz, J. (2010), “For Valence”, Emotion Review, Vol. 2, No. 1: 5-13.

 Solomon, R. C. (2003), Not Passion’s Slave: Emotions and Choice. New York, NY:
Oxfor University Press.

CONTENTS

1. Introduction 1

2. Solomon Against Valence 1

3. Prinz: Valence as an Inner Reinforcer 3

4. Positive Fear or The Paradox of Horror? 5

5. Conclusions 6