EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y.
2018-2019
(​21) DE CASTRO VS PEOPLE [G.R. No. 171672, February 2,
2015]
“Unauthorized withdrawal by a BPI teller who later admitted to
her superiors”
Principle: It was an act of conscience that compelled her to speak, a
true mental and moral catharsis that religion and psychology
recognize to have salutary effects on the soul. In this setting, the
invocation of the right to remain silent or to counsel is simply
irrelevant.
Facts:
As culled from the evidence, Matuguina and Cornejo left their
savings account passbooks with the accused within the space of a
week in October – November 1993 when they went to the bank’s
Malibay branch to transact on their accounts. Matuguina, in
particular, withdrew the sum of P500 on October 29 and left her
passbook with the accused upon the latter’s instruction. She had to
return two more times before the branch manager Cynthia Zialcita
sensed that something wrong was going on. Learning of
Matuguina’s problem, Zialcita told the accused to return the
passbook to her on November 8. On this day, the accused came up
with the convenient excuse that she had already returned the
passbook. Skeptical, Zialcita reviewed Matuguina’s account and
found three withdrawal slips dated October 19, 29 and November 4,
1993 containing signatures radically different from the specimen
signatures of the depositor and covering a total of P65,000. It was
apparent that the accused had intervened in the posting and
verification of the slips because her initials were affixed thereto.
Zialcita instructed her assistant manager Benjamin Misa to pay a
visit to Matuguina, a move that led to the immediate exposure of the
accused. Matuguina was aghast to see the signatures in the slips
and denied that the accused returned the passbook to her. When
she went back to the bank worried about the unauthorized
withdrawals from her account, she met with the accused in the
presence of the bank manager. She insisted that the signatures in
the slips were not her, forcing the accused to admit that the
passbook was still with her and kept in her house.
Zialcita also summoned Juanita Ebora, the teller who posted and
released the November 4 withdrawal. When she was asked why
she processed the transaction, Ebora readily pointed to the
accused as the person who gave to her the slip. Since she saw the
accused’s initials on it attesting to having verified the signature of
the depositor, she presumed that the withdrawal was genuine. She
posted and released the money to the accused.
On the same day, November 8, Zialcita instructed Misa to visit
another depositor, Milagrosa Cornejo, whom they feared was also
victimized by the accused. Their worst expectations were
confirmed. According to Cornejo, on November 3, she went to the
bank to deposit a check and because there were many people there
at the time, she left her passbook with the accused. She returned
days later to get it back, but the accused told her that she left it at
home. Misa now showed to her a withdrawal slip dated November
4, 1993 in which a signature purporting to be hers appeared.
Cornejo denied that it was her signature. As with the slips affecting
Matuguina, the initials of the accused were unquestionably affixed
to the paper.
Zialcita reported her findings posthaste to her superiors. The
accused initially denied the claims against her but when she was
asked to write her statement down, she confessed to her guilt. She
started crying and locked herself inside the bathroom. She came
out only when another superior Fed Cortez arrived to ask her some
questions. Since then, she executed three more statements in
response to the investigation conducted by the bank’s internal
auditors. She also gave a list of the depositors’ accounts from which
she drew cash and which were listed methodically in her diary.
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The employment of the accused was ultimately terminated. The
bank paid Matuguina P65,000, while Cornejo got her refund directly
from the accused. In the course of her testimony on the witness
stand, the accused made these further admissions:
(a) She signed the withdrawal slips Exhibits B, C, D and H which
contained the fake signatures of Matuguina and Cornejo
(b) She wrote and signed the confession letter Exhibit K
(c) She wrote the answers to the questions of the branch cluster
head Fred Cortez Exhibit L, and to the auditors’ questions in
Exhibit M, N and O
(d) Despite demand, she did not pay the bank.
Issues:
WON her conviction was invalid because her constitutional rights
against self-incrimination, to due process and to counsel were
denied.
Ruling:
The petitioner has accepted the findings of fact about the
transactions that gave rise to the accusations in court against
her for four counts of ​estafa through falsification of a
commercial document. She raised no challenges against such
findings of fact here and in the CA, being content with limiting
herself to the supposed denial of her rights to due process and to
counsel, and to the inadmissibility of the evidence presented
against her. In the CA, her main objection focused on the denial of
her right against self-incrimination and to counsel, which denial
resulted, according to her, in the invalidation of the evidence of her
guilt.
Debunking the petitioner’s challenges, the CA stressed that ​the
rights against self-incrimination and to counsel guaranteed
under the Constitution applied only during the custodial
interrogation of a suspect. In her case, she was not subjected to
any investigation by the police or other law enforcement agents.
Instead, ​she underwent an administrative investigation as an
employee of the BPI Family Savings Bank, the investigation
being conducted by her superiors. She was not coerced to give
evidence against herself, or to admit to any crime, but she
simply broke down bank when depositors Matuguina and
Cornejo confronted her about her crimes​.
The accused in the case before us may not be said to be under
custodial investigation. She was not even being investigated by any
police or law enforcement officer. She was under administrative
investigation by her superiors in a private firm and in purely
voluntary manner. She was not restrained of her freedom in any
manner. She was free to stay or go. There was no evidence that
she was forced or pressured to say anything. ​It was an act of
conscience that compelled her to speak, a true mental and
moral catharsis that religion and psychology recognize to have
salutary effects on the soul. In this setting, the invocation of
the right to remain silent or to counsel is simply irrelevant​.
The accused makes a final argument against her conviction by
contending that she did not get effective legal representation from
her former counsel who was already old and feeble when the case
was being heard. In fact, the records show, her counsel died during
the pendency of the case, an octogenarian at that. One can truly
make a case from one’s lack of a competent and independent
counsel, but we are not prepared to say that the accused was so
poorly represented that it affected her fundamental right to due
process. Except for the several postponements incurred by her
counsel, there is really no showing that he committed any serious
blunder during the trial. We have read the transcripts of the trial and
failed to get this impression. The evidence against the accused was
simply too overwhelming. We may take note that once, the trial
court admonished the accused to replace her counsel due to his
absences, but she did not. She must live by that.
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of ​estafa through
falsification of a commercial document was established beyond
reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she took advantage of the bank
depositors who had trusted in her enough to leave their passbooks
with her upon her instruction. Without their knowledge, however,
she filled out withdrawal slips that she signed, and misrepresented
to her fellow bank employees that the signatures had been verified
in due course. Her misrepresentation to her co-employees enabled
her to receive the amounts stated in the withdrawal slips. She
thereby committed two crimes, namely: ​estafa​, by defrauding BPI
Family Savings, her employer, in the various sums withdrawn from
the bank accounts of Matuguina and Cornejo; and falsification of a
commercial document, by forging the signatures of Matuguina and
Cornejo in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor
concerned had signed the respective slips in order to enable her to
withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were complex crimes,
because the ​estafa would not have been consummated without the
falsification of the withdrawal slips.
(22)​ ​HOMAR VS PEOPLE [G.R. No. 182534, September 2, 2015]
“No Jaywalking”
Doctrines:
1) The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the
warrantless arrest from which the corpus delicti of the crime -
shabu- was obtained. F ​ or, without a valid warrantless arrest, the
alleged confiscation of the shabu resulting from a warrantless
search on the petitioner’s body is surely a violation of his
constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. As a
consequence, the alleged shabu shall be inadmissible as
evidence against him.
2) The filing of a criminal charge is not a condition precedent to
prove a valid warrantless arrest.
3) A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest.
FACTS:
Petitioner was accosted; not arrested, by a police officer and a
civilian agent when the latter saw petitioner crossing a “No
jaywalking” portion of Roxas Boulevard and was told to cross at the
designated area by pointing to him the right place for crossing. After
petitioner was accosted, petitioner picked up something from the
ground, prompting Tangcoy (civilian agent) to frisk him resulting in
the recovery of a knife. Thereafter, Tancoy conducted a thorough
search on petitioner’’s body and found a sachet containing what is
suspected to be shabu.
The petitioner was the sole witness for the defense. He testified that
on August 20, 2002, he was going home at around 6:30 p.m. after
selling imitation sunglasses and other accessories at the BERMA
Shopping Center.
After crossing the overpass, a policeman and a civilian stopped and
frisked him despite his refusal. They poked a gun at him, accused
him of being a holdupper, and forced him to go with them. They
also confiscated the kitchen knife, which he carried to cut cords. He
was likewise investigated for alleged possession of shabu and
detained for one day. He was criminally charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 77 for the
possession of the kitchen knife but he was eventually acquitted
ISSUE:
1) WON there is a lawful warrantless arrest
2) WON the waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest also means a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest
RULING:
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First Issue: No. The prosecution failed to prove that a lawful
warrantless arrest preceded the search conducted on the
petitioner’s body.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must
concur:
1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and
2) such overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of
the arresting officer
The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the
warrantless arrest from which the corpus delicti of the crime -
shabu- was obtained. ​For, without a valid warrantless arrest, the
alleged confiscation of the shabu resulting from a warrantless
search on the petitioner’s body is surely a violation of his
constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. As a
consequence, the alleged shabu shall be inadmissible as evidence
against him.
The prosecution did not proffer any other proof to establish that the
requirements for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest were complied
with. ​Particularly, the prosecution failed to prove that the
petitioner was committing a crime.
The respondent failed to specifically identify the area where the
petitioner allegedly crossed. Thus, Tan merely stated that the
petitioner "crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard, in a place not
designated for crossing." Aside from this conclusion, the respondent
failed to prove that the portion of Roxas Boulevard where the
petitioner crossed was indeed a "no jaywalking" area. The petitioner
was also not charged of jaywalking. These are pieces of evidence
that could have supported the conclusion that indeed the petitioner
was committing a crime of jaywalking and therefore, the subsequent
arrest and search on his person was valid. Unfortunately, the
prosecution failed to prove this in the present case.
We clarify, however, that ​the filing of a criminal charge is not a
condition precedent to prove a valid warrantless arrest. Even if
there is a criminal charge against an accused, the prosecution is
not relieved from its burden to prove that there was indeed a valid
warrantless arrest preceding the warrantless search that produced
the corpus delicti of the crime.
Presumption of Regularity
Presumption of Regularity in the performance of official duty cannot
save the prosecution’s lack of evidence to prove the warrantless
arrest and search. This presumption cannot overcome the
presumption of innocence or constitute proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an
accused, the most primordial yet often disregarded is the
presumption of innocence.
Accost vs Arrest; Intent to Arrest
The police testified that they “accosted” Homar when he jaywalked/
However, this is different from an actual arrest as contemplated by
the Rules on warrantless arrests.
Clearly, no arrest preceded the search on the person of the
petitioner. When Tan and Tangcoy allegedly saw the petitioner
jaywalking, they did not arrest him but accosted him and pointed to
him the right place for crossing. In fact, according to the RTC, Tan
and Tangcoy "immediately accosted him and told him to cross [at]
the designated area.
Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner under
custody or to restrain his liberty. This lack of intent to arrest him was
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
bolstered by the fact that there was no criminal charge that was
filed against the petitioner for crossing a "no jaywalking" area.
The Court held in Luz vs People of the Philippines that the shabu
confiscated from the accused in that case was inadmissible as
evidence when the police officer who flagged him for traffic violation
had no intent to arrest him. According to the Court, due to the lack
of intent to arrest, the subsequent search was unlawful.
This is notwithstanding the fact that the accused, being caught in
flagrante delicto for violating an ordinance, could have been
therefore lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers.
In the light of the discussion above, the respondent’s argument that
there was a lawful search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest for
jaywalking appears to be an afterthought in order to justify a
warrantless search conducted on the person of the petitioner. In
fact, ​the illegality of the search for the shabu is further
highlighted when it was not recovered immediately after the
alleged lawful arrest​, if there was any, but only after the initial
search resulted in the recovery of the knife. Thereafter, according to
Tan, Tangcoy conducted another search on the person of the
petitioner resulting in the alleged confiscation of the shabu. ​Clearly,
the petitioner's right to be secure in his person was callously
brushed aside twice by the arresting police officers.
Second Issue: No, the waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not timely
object to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment as
required by the Rules.1âwphi1 In addition, he actively participated
in the trial of the case. As a result, the petitioner is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any
defect in his arrest.
However, ​this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects
the jurisdiction of the court over his person​. It is well-settled that
a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest.
Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its
inadmissibility as evidence precludes conviction and justifies the
acquittal of the petitioner
(23) PDIC vs Casimiro [G.R. No. 206866, September 2, 2015]
“Advance Warning; Hearsay Evidence”
Doctrine: Probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable
cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is
merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties.
FACTS:
Petitioner PDIC, through its duly-authorized agents, filed a
Joint-Affidavit charging private respondents Cu (as the 85.99%
owner of Bicol Development Bank, Inc. (BDBI), Zate (as
Chairman/President of BDBI), and Apelo (as a former employee of
the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) who acted as Bank
Officer-In-Charge that examined BDBI’s books and records, of the
crimes of Direct Bribery and Corruption of Public Officials, as well
as violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
It averred that after the BSP Monetary Board ordered BDBI's
closure, PDIC started to perform its functions as statutory receiver,
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which includes, among others, the control, management, and
administration of BDBI as well as investigating the causes of BDBI's
closure. In the course of the receivership, Gomez — a former
Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI — came forward
and through her affidavit, reported the purported scheme
perpetrated by private respondents that fraudulently concealed
BDBI's true condition as a banking entity.
Gomez's affidavit outlines such scheme as follows:
1) Apelo would provide Cu an "advance warning" of any
impending surprise bank examinations on BDBI by BSP;
2) upon receipt of the "advance warning," Cu would then make
the necessary steps to misrepresent BDBI's status, such as
instructing BDBI employees on how to cover the possible
findings/exceptions of the BSP examiner on the books of
BDBI, as well as infusing cash into BDBI's vault in order to
make it appear that the cash listed in the books reflect the
actual cash in vault, and thereafter returning such cash to the
source;
3) in exchange for such "advance warnings," Cu and/or Zate
gave Apelo as "professional fees" the aggregate amount of
P140,000.00 by depositing the same to the latter's bank
account; and
4) to cover up such amounts given to Apelo, Cu and/or Zate,
instructed Gomez to initially cover the unofficial and unbooked
cash disbursements in favor of Apelo by placing such amounts
in BDBI's books as "Other Cash Items," and thereafter,
regularize and remove from BDBI 's books such
disbursements by including them in the other accounts of BDBI
until they were completely covered. To support such
statements, Gomez provided copies of deposit slips showing
that such amount was indeed deposited to Apelo's bank
account. She likewise asserted that in the course of her
employment at BDBI, she does not know of any official or
legitimate transactions that BDBI had with Apelo that would
warrant the disbursement of the aforesaid amount in the
latter's favor.
Cu denied having ordered or instructed Gomez to make such
deposits to Apelo's bank account. He pointed to the lack of
evidence to prove that Apelo was aware or made aware of any
alleged bank deposits made to her bank account, thus, negating the
charge of Direct Bribery against her and Corruption of Public
Officials against him. For her part, Zate likewise denied the
allegations hurled against her, countering that Gomez's statements
should not be relied upon for being unfounded. Apelo did not file
any counter-affidavit despite the Ombudsman's orders.
The Ombudsman’s Ruling
The Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of
probable cause, finding that while it may be said that certain
amounts were indeed deposited to Apelo's bank account, there is
no proof that Apelo subsequently withdrew the same.
PDIC moved for reconsideration, which was denied. The
Ombudsman found Gomez's affidavit showing Apelo as the source
of the "advance warnings" received by Cu in connection with the
BSP examinations to be ​inadmissible in evidence for being
hearsay.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
finding no probable cause to indict private respondents of the
crimes charged.
2. Whether the Ombudsman was correct in discrediting Gomez’s
affidavit as inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay.
HELD:
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
1. Yes. ​Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal
information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. It
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction​. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.
Verily, preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of
discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that
a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be
held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether
there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. The presence or
absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is
a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial
on the merits. Hence, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or
accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence,
are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level.”
In view of the grave accusations against them, Cu and Zate
resorted to mere denials, while Apelo ignored the complaint by not
filing a counter- affidavit despite due notice, thus, miserably failing
to debunk the charges hurled against them. Indubitably, the
foregoing establishes probable cause to believe that private
respondents may have indeed committed such acts constituting the
crimes charged against them. As such, they must defend
themselves in a full-blown trial on the merits.
2. NO. ​Owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be
applied in the course of its proceedings​. In the recent case of
Estrada v. Ombudsman​, the Court declared that ​hearsay evidence
is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary
investigations because such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties. Further, the determination of probable
cause can rest partially, or even entirely, on hearsay evidence, as
long as the person making the hearsay statement is credible.
Thus, ​probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay. ​Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable
cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is
merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties.
In this case, assuming ​arguendo ​that Gomez's statements, as
written in her affidavit are indeed hearsay, there is nevertheless
substantial basis to credit the same, considering that she was a
former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI — a
high-ranking officer that may be privy to delicate transactions such
as the purported "under-the-table" deal involving private
respondents. In this regard, it must be emphasized that in
determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of
arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to
support a ​prima facie c​ ase against the respondents are required,
not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of
guilt, ​i.e.​, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than
evidence that would justify a conviction. To reiterate, the validity of
the merits of a party's defense or accusations as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidences are better ventilated
during the trial stage than in the preliminary stage.
(24) PEOPLE VS ADRIAN GUTING [G.R. No. 205412, September
9, 2015]
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FACTS:
Accused was charged with parricide of killing his father
According to the corroborated testimonies of officers PO1 Fidel
Torre (Torre) and PO1 Alexis Macusi (Macusi), on the rainy
afternoon of July 30, 2005, at around 5:00 o'clock, PO1 Torre and
PO1 Macusi were standing in front of the Camiling Police Station
when accused-appellant Adrian Guting y Tomas, all wet from the
rain and with a bladed weapon in his hand, suddenly approached
them. Accused-appellant proclaimed that his father Jose Guting y
Ibarra (Jose) was already dead
(irrelevant but interesting )
Doctor Valentin Theodore Lomibao (Dr. Lomibao) conducted the
autopsy of Jose's body. Dr. Lomibao reported that ​Jose suffered
around 39 stab wounds on the head, neck, thorax, abdomen, and
extremities. Jose's internal organs were heavily damaged by the
stab wounds, resulting in his instantaneous death. Dr. Lomibao also
showed several pictures of Jose's body which were taken before he
conducted the autopsy.
Unsuspecting, PO1 Macusi asked who killed accused-appellant's
father. Accused-appellant answered, "Sinaksak ko po yong tatay
ko! Napatay ko na po!"Hearing accused-appellant's statement, PO1
Torre immediately got the bladed weapon from accused-appellant
and turned it over to PO1 Macusi for proper disposition.
Several police officers then went to the residence of Jose to verify
the reported crime, while other officers informed Flora Guting
(Flora), Jose's wife (also accused-appellant's mother), who was still
in the market with Emerlito Guting (Emerlito), Jose and Flora's other
son (accused-appellant's brother). Police officers inquired from the
neighbors if anybody had witnessed the crime, but no one did.
When Flora and Emerlito arrived, they saw Jose's lifeless body and
immediately brought Jose to the hospital where he was pronounced
dead on arrival.
In an information, accused-appellant was charged before the RTC
with Parricide. The RTC found the accused-appellant guilty of
Parricide based on his verbal admission that he killed his father,
Jose. Even assuming that accused-appellant's admission was
inadmissible in evidence, the RTC adjudged that the prosecution
was still able to establish sufficient circumstantial evidence which,
taken collectively, pointed to accused-appellant as the perpetrator
of the brutal killing of his father. Accused-appellant appealed his
conviction before the Court of Appeals and was denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in convicting the
accused-appellant on the basis of his ​extrajudicial
admission​.
2. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in convicting the
accused-appellant on the basis of insufficient ​circumstantial
evidence.
HELD:
1. NO. MAIN ISSUE OF THE CASE
Accused-appellant argues that his oral confession to PO1 Torre and
PO1 Macusi, without the assistance of counsel, is inadmissible in
evidence for having been made in blatant violation of his
constitutional right under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution. This provision pertains to "​custodial investigation.​"
This commences when a person is taken into custody and is
singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under
investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the
suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission.
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Accused-appellant ​was not under custodial investigation because
his verbal confession was so spontaneously and voluntarily given
and was not elicited through questioning by the police authorities.
He was not a suspect and was not yet in police custody.
Moreover, the verbal confession falls under Rule 130, Section 26 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that "[t]he act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him." This rule is based upon the notion that no man would
make any declaration against himself, unless it is true.
Accused-appellant's declaration is admissible for being part of the
res gestae. A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when
these three requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is
a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. All the requisites are present in this case.
2. NO.
To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no
reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the
accused. Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
conditions when circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction.
The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found that the
conditions have been satisfied in this case given the following
circumstantial evidence: 1. On or about 4:50 o'clock in the afternoon
of July 30, 2006, the victim was stabbed to death. 2. Thirty minutes
later, [accused-appellant] personally went to Camiling Police Station
and surrendered himself and the bladed weapon he used in killing
his father to the police authorities of the said police station. 3. When
his mother learned about the incident, [accused-appellant] did
nothing to appease his responding mother. "It has always been said
that criminal case are primarily about human nature." Here is a case
of a son doing nothing to explain the death of his father to his
grieving mother. Such inaction is contrary to human nature. 4.
When he was detained after police investigation,
[accused-appellant] did not object to his continued detention.
These circumstances constitute an ​unbroken chain ​which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to
accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.
(25) PEOPLE VS LAUGA [G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010]
Drunk father rapes minor daughter
FACTS:
Antonio Lauga was accused of the crime of qualified rape by his
13-year old daughter which he allegedly committed on the evening
of 15​th​ day of March 2000 in the province of Bukidnon.
AAA, the daughter, testified that in the afternoon, she was left along
at home while his father was having a drinking spree at the
neighbors place. Her mother decided to leave because when
appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAAs mother. Her
only brother BBB also went out in the company of some neighbors.
At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up,
removed his pants, slid inside the blanket covering AAA and
removed her pants and underwear, warned her not to shout for help
while threatening her with his fist and told her that he had a knife
placed above her head. He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her
repeatedly, and inserted his penis inside her vagina.
BBB also testified that when he arrived home, he found AAA crying.
It was claimed by their father that he scolded her for staying out
late. BBB decided to take AAA with him. While on their way to their
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maternal grandmother’s house, AAA recounted her harrowing
experience with their father. Upon reaching their grandmothers
house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident after
which, they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting.
Moises Boy Banting testified that he found appellant in his house
wearing only his underwear. He invited appellant to the police
station to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he
admitted to him that he raped AAA because he was unable to
control himself.
On the other hand, appellant believed that the charge against him
was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife
in front of their children after engaging in a heated argument, and
beats the children as a disciplinary measure. He alleged that on 15
March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at lunchtime.
Shortly after, AAA arrived. She answered back when confronted.
This infuriated him that he kicked her hard on her buttocks.
Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 oclock
in the afternoon. Finding nobody at home, he prepared his dinner
and went to sleep. Later in the evening, he was awakened by the
members of the ​Bantay Bayan h ​ eaded by Moises Boy Banting.
They asked him to go with them to discuss some matters. He later
learned that he was under detention because AAA charged him of
rape.
RTC rendered its decision finding appellant guilty of rape qualified
by relationship and minority.
CA affirmed with modifications the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
The admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a
bantay bayan ​and the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution.
RULING:
Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED
Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before
a Bantay Bayan
A barangay-​ based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch
groups, as in the case of the ​bantay bayan​, are recognized by the
local government unit to perform functions relating to the
preservation of peace and order at the ​barangay ​level. Thus,
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy
Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities
delegated to a ​bantay bayan​, particularly on the authority to conduct
a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a
state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a
suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda
Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which
was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution
Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and
her brother BBB.
The testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both
testified that they sought the help of a ​bantay bayan.​ Their
respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought
for, which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the
testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAAs testimony that
dispensed with a detailed account of the incident. At any rate, the
Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed
inconsistency is too trivial to affect the veracity of the testimonies. In
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fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential
circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as
they erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or
rehearsed.
Appellants contention that AAA charged him of rape only because
she bore grudges against him is likewise unmeritorious. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is unbelievable for a
daughter to charge her own father with rape, exposing herself to the
ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial and subjecting her
private parts to examination if such heinous crime was not in fact
committed. No person, much less a woman, could attain such
height of cruelty to one who has sired her, and from whom she
owes her very existence, and for which she naturally feels loving
and lasting gratefulness.
(26) PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK VS SENATE IMPEACHMENT
COURT [G.R. No. 200238, February 9, 2012]
FACTS:
PSBank through representative President Pascual M. Garcia III filed
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to set nullify and set
aside the Resolution of the Senate, sitting as impeachment court.
The resolution granted the prosecution’s request for subpoena
duces tecum ad testificandum to PSBank requiring them to testify
and produce before the impeachment court documents on the
foreign currency accounts that were alleged to belong to then SC
Chief Justice Renato Corona.
ISSUE:
Should a TRO be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it
from further implementing the subpoena with respect to the alleged
foreign currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona?
RULING:
YES, a TRO should be issued against the impeachment court to
enjoin it from further implementing the subpoena with respect to the
alleged foreign currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona.
There are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction:
(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and
(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right.
It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would
cause an irreparable injustice.
A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency
deposits of the Chief Justice is provided under Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act of the Philippines (RA 6426). This law establishes the
absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits:
Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy
of foreign currency deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed only upon
the written permission of the depositor. In Intengan v. Court of
Appeals, the Court ruled that where the accounts in question are
U.S. dollar deposits, the applicable law is not Republic Act No. 1405
but RA 6426. Similarly, in the recent case of Government Service
Insurance System v. 15th Division of the Court of Appeals, the
Court also held that RA 6426 is the applicable law for foreign
currency deposits and not Republic Act No. 1405.
The written consent under RA 6426 constitutes a waiver of the
depositor’s right to privacy in relation to such deposit. In the
present case, neither the prosecution nor the Impeachment Court
has presented any such written waiver by the alleged depositor,
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Also, while impeachment may be
an exception to the secrecy of bank deposits under RA 1405, it is
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not an exemption to the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency
deposits under RA 6426.
(27) GAANAN VS IAC [145 SCRA 112 (1986)]
Doctrine: Extension phone is not wiretapping.
FACTS:
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were
in the living room of Pintor’s residence discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault against Leonardo
Laconico. After they finalized the conditions, Pintor called Laconico.
Laconico’s regular lawyer Atty. Leon Gonzaga was on a business
trip. Thus, Laconico called Atty. Edgardo Gaanan and asked him to
come to his office. There, he requested Gaanan to secretly listen to
his phone call with Pintor, using a telephone extension. Gaanan
overheard Pintor give numerous demands for money, public
apologies and secrecy.
Having earlier alerted Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation
Service of the Philippine Constabulary, Laconico insisted that he
and Pintor should meet to exchange the money. Pintor was later
arrested at the Igloo Restaurant. Gaanan executed an affidavit
stating that he heard Pintor demand P8,000 for the withdrawal of
the case. This was attached to the complainant for robbery /
extortion against Pintor. Since Gaanan listened to the telephone
conversation without his consent, Pintor charged the former and
Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
The lower court found them guilty of violating Section 1 of RA No.
4200. In affirming this decision, the IAC held that the telephone
extension is covered in the term "device or arrangement”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a telephone extension falls within the phrase “device
or arrangement” under Section 1 of RA No. 4200.
RULING:
NO. The petition is GRANTED, and the petitioner is ACQUITTED.
This case involves the interpretation of a penal statute and not a
rule of evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of evidence.
Rather, it is whether or not the person called over the telephone
and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line
should be penalized. An affirmance of this conviction would mean
that a caller can force the listener to secrecy no matter how
obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. Because of
technical problems, telephone users often encounter what are
called "crossed lines". An unwary citizen who overhears the details
of a crime might hesitate to inform authorities if he knows that he
could be accused under RA No. 4200. Surely the law was never
intended for such mischievous results.
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be
punishable was discussed on the floor of the Senate. Yet, when the
bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones
in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or
however otherwise described." The omission was not a mere
oversight; telephone extension or party lines were intentionally
deleted. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable. There must be
either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate
installation of a. In contrast, a telephone extension is not installed
for that purpose. It is there for ordinary office use.
It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the
true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of
the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Thus, the
phrase "device or arrangement"—although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein—should be construed to cover instruments the
use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line. Their
presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being
overheard, since they are not of common usage and their main
purpose is to tap, intercept or record. An extension telephone is an
instrument which is very common. A person should safely presume
that the party he is calling probably has an extension telephone and
there is the constantly present risk of a third party listening.
Finally, in case of doubt, penal statutes must be construed strictly in
favor of the accused. Thus, the phrase “device or arrangement”
should not be construed as including a telephone extension. In the
construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary
rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A
perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that our
lawmakers intended to discourage persons such as government
authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing
devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate
or blackmail. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be
punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices
in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature.
(28) SALCEDO-ORTANEZ VS COURT OF APPEALS [235 SCRA
111 (1994)]
Doctrine: If evidence obtained through wiretapping is admitted, the
extraordinary writ of certiorari is allowed.
FACTS:
Respondent Rafael Ortañez filed with the RTC of Quezon City a
complaint for annulment of marriage on the grounds of lack of
marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of his wife, with
damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortañez. Among
exhibits offered by Rafael were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
phone conversations between Teresita and unidentified persons.
The RTC admitted all of the evidence, despite Teresita’s argument
that the tapes are inadmissible under RA No. 4200. She filed a
petition for certiorari, which was denied by the CA on the ground
that certiorari was an inappropriate remedy to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy is an ordinary
appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the
grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court was properly availed of.
RULING: ​YES. The CA ruling is SET ASIDE. The tapes are
declared INADMISSIBLE.
Where the assailed interlocutory order of the trial court is patently
erroneous, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate or
expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress. Rafael’s tape recordings were obtained when he allowed
his friends from the military to wiretap his home telephone. Sec. 4 of
RA No. 4200, also known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible as evidence. Absent a
clear showing that both parties consented to the recording, the
inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory. Additionally, the
same law imposes the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six
(6) months and up to six (6) years.
(29) RAMIREZ VS COURT OF APPEALS [248 SCRA 590 (1995)]
“Party to a conversation is not excluded from coverage”
FACTS:
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part
of a civil case filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
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alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a
manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy.”.
Private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An
Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related violations
of private communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a
Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said
motion agreeing with the petitioner that the violation punished by
R.A. 4200 refers to the taping of a communication by a person other
than a participant to the communication.
The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with
the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals
in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision declaring the trial court’s order as null and void, after
subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by the
petitioner.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari, arguing in chief that:
1. RA 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation
by one of the parties to the conversation;
2. The facts charged do not constitute a violation of RA 4200 for
the substance or content of the conversation was not alleged
in the Information;
3. RA 4200 penalizes the taping of a “private communication”
and not a “private conversation”
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200
does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of
the parties to the conversation
2. Whether the substance or content of the conversation need to
be alleged in the Information.
3. Whether there is a difference between private communication
and private conversation.
RULING:
1. ​No. It covers the ​taping of a private conversation by one of the
parties to the conversation.
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized
Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized
by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word,
to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal
for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of
a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those involved in the private communication.
The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
2. No. The substance of the conversation need not be specifically
alleged in the information.
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The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged
in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly ​overhearing, intercepting or recording p ​ rivate
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The
mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed."
3. There is no such difference
Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations"
narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a
point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word ​communicare​, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing
or imparting, as in a ​conversation,​ 15
​ or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals
through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)" 16​ These definitions are broad enough to include verbal
or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings
or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the
legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication"
are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation"
and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator
Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill.
In ​Gaanan vs​. Intermediate Appellate Court​, 18
​ a case which dealt
with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a
telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200
because a telephone extension devise was neither among those
"device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 ​ following the
principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of
the accused."​20 The instant case turns on a different note, because
the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of
R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly
mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications
with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
(30) PEOPLE VS NAVARRO [G.R. No. 121087 (1999)]
“Wiretapping at a police station”
FACTS:
In the evening of February 4, 1990, reporters Jalbuena and Lingan
went to the police station to report an incident in one of the night
clubs in the city. Upon arrival to the police station, the two reporters
encountered Navarro, a member of the Lucena Police, who had a
heated exchange with them. As a result, Navarro assaulted Lingan
inside the Lucena police headquarters, by boxing the said Lingan in
the head with the butt of a gun and thereafter when the said victim
fell, by banging his head against the concrete pavement, as a
consequence of which said Lingan suffered cerebral concussion
and shock which directly caused his death.
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on
tape the heated exchange between petitioner and the deceased. In
the trial, Jalbuena presented in evidence the voice recording. This
was challenged as inadmissible for violating the Anti-Wiretapping
Act.
ISSUES:
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WON the voice recording is admissible in evidence.
HELD:
Yes. The tape is admissible since the law prohibits only the
overhearing, intercepting, or recording of ​private communications​.
The exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan, ​occurred in
a public place (police station)​. As such, its recording is not
prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice
recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he
personally recorded the conversations; (2) that the tape played in
the court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the
tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.30 In the
instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice
recording;31 that the tape played in the court was the one he
recorded;32 and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner
Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the
authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
(31) PEOPLE VS YATCO [97 Phil 940 (1955)
“Confession of a co-conspirator”
Principles:
● The exclusion of the proffered confessions was not made of
the basis of the objection interposed by defense counsel, but
upon an altogether different ground which the Court issued
motu proprio. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right
to object is a privilege which the parties may waive; and if the
ground for objection is known and not seasonably made, the
objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its
own motion, to disregard the evidence
● The practice of excluding evidence of doubtful objections to its
materiality or technical objections to the form of the question
should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible
for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the
development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether
testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of
bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the
court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the
statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be
connected later. At any rate, in the final determination and
consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to
distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject
what, under the rules of evidence, should be excluded. There
is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases
where questions arises as to admissibility of evidence for the
prosecution for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead
to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.
Facts:
Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is
still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the
murder of one Jose Ramos.
During the trial, while the prosecution was questioning one of its
witnesses, who is Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), in connection with the making of an
extra-judicial confession by accused Juan Consunji to the witness,
the counsel for the other accused Alfonso Panganiban interposed a
general objection to any evidence on such confession on the
ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against
the other accused.
The Trial Court ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to,
but on a different ground: that the prosecution could not be
permitted to introduce the confessions of accused Juan Consunji to
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
prove conspiracy without prior proof of such conspiracy by a
number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances.
According to the transcript, the following remarks were made:
1) Fiscal Lustre: May we know from counsel if he is also
objecting to the admissibility of the confession of Consunji
as against the accused Consunji himself?
2) Court: That would be premature because there is already
a ruling of the Court that you cannot prove a confession
unless yon prove first conspiracy thru a number of
indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as required
by law.
The prosecution then moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this petition for certiorari was brought before the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether the complete exclusion of the confessions amounted to
grave abuse of discretion
Ruling:
Yes.
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if
Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his
co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove
conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established
by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless,
admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt and should have
been admitted as such.
Section 12 of Rule 123, provides: "The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may
be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy
is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration." This
refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency
of the unlawful enterprise ("during its existence") and in furtherance
of its object, and not to a confession made long after the conspiracy
had been brought to an end.
The exclusion of the proffered confessions was not made of the
basis of the objection interposed by defense counsel, but upon an
altogether different ground which the Court issued motu proprio. By
so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a privilege
which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is
known and not seasonably made, the objection is deemed waived
and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the
evidence
The practice of excluding evidence of doubtful objections to its
materiality or technical objections to the form of the question should
be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of
first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to
know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and
where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney
offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safety accept the
testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered
will be connected later. At any rate, in the final determination and
consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to
distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what,
under the rules of evidence, should be excluded. There is greater
reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions
arises as to admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the
unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which
the People can no longer appeal.
(32) YAO-KEE VS SY-GONZALES [167 SCRA 736 (1988)]
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“Children in Phils v Children in China; Chinese law on
marriage not proven; processual presumption”
FACTS:
Sy Kiat was a Chinese national who died on January 17, 1977 in
Caloocan City where he was then residing. He left behind real and
personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe
and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of letters of
administration alleging that:
a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego;
b) that Sy Kiat died intestate;
c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to
Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and
d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho
and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that:
a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on
January 19, 1931 in China;
b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the
deceased with Yao Kee; and,
c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent,
willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate
of Sy Kiat
Probate Court (PC): held in favor of the petitioners (Yao Kee et al.)
and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix.
CA: modified the PC’s decision by declaring that:
a) Respondents as acknowledged natural children of Sy Kiat with
Asuncion Gillego
b) Legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China
had not been proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese
People's Republic of China
ISSUE:
W/N the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee was conclusively proven
valid in accordance with the laws of the People’s Republic of China.
RULING:
No.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil
Code which states that:
Art. 71.All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine law.
This Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two
things must be proven, namely:
(1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and
(2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of
Court. With respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45
states that:
Sec. 45.Unwritten law. — The oral testimony of witnesses,
skilled therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of
a foreign country, as are also printed and published books of
reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for
under Rule 132 section 25, thus:
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Sec. 25.Proof of public or official record. — An official record or
an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by
the seal of his office.
In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent
evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The
testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of
China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing
that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure
to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of
the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage
between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.
Furthermore, well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They
must be alleged and proved as any other fact.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on
marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours. Since
Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing
officer as is known here in the Philippines when her alleged
marriage to Sy Kiat was celebrated, it therefore follows that her
marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.
(33) ATIENZA VS BOARD OF MEDICINE AND SIOSON [G.R. No.
177407, February 9, 2011]
“Wrong kidney”
Facts:
On Feb. 4, 1995, Private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal
Medical Center (RMC) due to her lumbar pains for check-up. In
1999, she underwent diagnostic laboratory tests which revealed
that her right kidney is normal. However, her left kidney is
non-functioning and non-visualizing. She then underwent a kidney
operation.
Private respondent’s husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant),
filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before
the BOM against the doctors who allegedly participated in the
fateful kidney operation. It was alleged that the gross negligence
and/or incompetence committed by the doctors consists of the
removal of private respondent’s fully functional right kidney, instead
of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.
Private respondent Editha Sioson, also named as complainant, filed
her formal offer of documentary evidence attached to it are Exhibits
A to D, which she offered for the purpose of proving that her
kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time
she was operated.
· Ex. A - photocopy for the X-Ray request form (Dec 12, 1996)
with interpretation of ultrasound results which is identical to
the certified photocopy of the document marked as Annex 2
of Dr. Lantin’s counter-affidavit
· Ex. B - a certified photocopy of the X-ray request form (Jan 30,
1997) which also happens to be the same as or identical to
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the certified photocopy of the document marked as Annex 3
to the counter-affidavit of Dr. Pedro Lantin, III.
· Ex. C - the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form
(March 16, 1996) also marked as Annex 4, on which are
handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results
of the examination.
· Ex. D - the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form (May
20, 1999), which is also marked as Annex 16 which are
appended as Annexes 4 and 1 respectively to the
counter-affidavits filed by Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro
Lantin, III in answer to the complaint.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by
Editha are mere photocopies and (1) violate the best evidence rule;
(2) have not been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are
completely hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their purpose
and petitioner also contends that the exhibits are inadmissible
evidence.
Nevertheless, BOM admitted Editha Siosons (Edithas) Formal Offer
of Documentary Evidence and denied petitoner’s subsequent
motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA which was dismissed.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
W/N Editha need to prove that her kidneys were both in their proper
places
Ruling:
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas
exhibits, that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical
locations at the time of her operation, need not be proved as it is
covered by mandatory judicial notice.
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for
ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact.Thus, they likewise
provide for some facts which are established and need not be
proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory
and discretionary.Laws of nature involving the physical sciences,
specifically biology, include the structural make-up and composition
of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take
judicial notice that Edithas kidneys before, and at the time of, her
operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper
anatomical locations.
(34) PEOPLE VS CABIGQUEZ [G.R. No. 185708, September 29,
2010]
“Mother raped in front of her kids.”
FACTS:
AAA and her 3 children – BBB, CCC and DDD slept inside AAA’s
sari-sari store which was annexed through the exterior balcony of
their house. At around 3:30am, AAA was awakened when clothes
fell on her face. When she looked up, she saw a man whose face
was covered with a handkerchief and wearing a camouflage jacket
and cycling shorts. He immediately poked a gun at her and AAA
shouted rousing her three children from sleep. Despite the cover on
the burglar's face, BBB was able to identify him as Romulo
Grondiano, one of their neighbors, based on the hanging mole
located below his left eye. Armed with a stainless handgun,
Grondiano ordered AAA and her children to lie face down. Though
stricken with fear, BBB noticed that Grondiano had a companion
who stayed at the balcony keeping watch. Grondiano then
ransacked the store, taking with him P3,000.00 cash from the
cabinet and P7,000.00 worth of grocery items. Before he left,
Grondiano pointed the gun at AAA's back and warned them not to
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
make any noise.
As soon as Grondiano left the store, the other man entered. BBB
identified the man as appellant Juanito Cabigquez as the latter did
not conceal his face. Armed with Grondiano's gun, Cabigquez
raped AAA in front of her children. Before he left, Cabigquez
threatened to kill AAA and her children if they would tell anyone
about the incident.
AAA and her children decided to proceed to the house of AAA’s
older son. AAA failed to disclose the identities of the 2 men.
Meanwhile, BBB, fearing retaliation from the 2 men, decided not to
divulge their identities.
They went to the police station but no information was filed because
the wrongdoers are not identified. Dr. Villapaes examination
revealed that the smear recovered from AAA’s vagina was positive
for spermatozoa.
Cabigquez and Grondiano were arrested for possession of illegal
drugs and illegal firearms, and with the 2 men incarcerated, BBB
finally had the courage to reveal their identities to her mother. 2
informations were filed. (Robbery and Rape)
RTC & CA – convicted both of the crimes charged.
(Note: The specimen obtained from the vaginal swabs failed to
match with accused’s DNA profile. NBI Forensic Chemist III Aida
Viloria Magsipoc testified that the sample collected from AAA did
not match Cabigquezs DNA profile since the specimen submitted to
them were mere vaginal discharges from AAA. Wala nay sperm na
nakuha since mej dugay na nahitabo ang crime)
ISSUE/s:
1) Whether the court erred in convicting the accused despite
failure of prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
2) Whether the court erred in giving weight to the inconsistent
testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
3) Whether the court erred in finding that there was conspiracy.
RULING:
1. We sustain the ruling of the CA. Rape is committed by a man
who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat
or intimidation. The commission of rape was clearly shown by
testimonial and documentary evidence. Appellant cannot seek
acquittal on the basis of the negative result of the DNA test on the
specimen conducted by the NBI. A positive DNA match is
unnecessary when the totality of the evidence presented before the
court points to no other possible conclusion, i.e., appellant raped
the private offended party. A positive DNA match may strengthen
the evidence for the prosecution, but an inconclusive DNA test
result may not be sufficient to exculpate the accused, particularly
when there is sufficient evidence proving his guilt. Notably, neither a
positive DNA match of the semen nor the presence of spermatozoa
is essential in finding that rape was committed. The important
consideration in rape cases is not the emission of semen but the
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. The totality of
evidence satisfactorily established that it was indeed appellant who
raped AAA.
AAA's daughter, BBB, who witnessed the entire incident which
happened inside their store on the night in question, positively
identified appellant as the one who raped her mother against the
latter's will by threatening her and her children with a handgun he
was then carrying. BBB's unflinching and consistent testimony,
when taken together with Dr. Villapañe's findings and AAA's own
declarations in court, provides sufficient basis for the conviction of
appellant for rape.
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2. Appellant asserts that it is significant that AAA herself did not
recognize him and his co-accused despite her familiarity with them
as they were her customers in her store. It was pointed out that the
identification of the perpetrators was supplied solely by her
daughter BBB, who should not have been given any credence in
view of her inconsistent declarations such as when she testified that
when she woke up, her mother was kneeling contrary to the latter's
testimony that when clothes fell on her face, she was awakened
and that her mother shouted but a gun was pointed to her.
While it is true that the most natural reaction for victims of crimes is
to strive to remember the faces of their assailants and the manner
in which the craven acts are committed, in this case, AAA cannot be
faulted for failing to recognize appellant as her rapist though the
latter was their neighbor. It must be recalled, as narrated by AAA
and BBB, they were all still lying face down when appellant
suddenly entered the store right after his co-accused Grondiano
exited through the balcony taking the loot with him.
Neither would BBB's delay in revealing the identities of the
perpetrators to the police taint her identification of appellant as the
one who raped her mother and conspirator of Grondiano in robbing
their store. Failure to immediately reveal the identity of a perpetrator
of a felony does not affect, much less impair, the credibility of
witnesses, more so if such delay is adequately explained. She was
afraid that the assailants would make good their threat that they will
return and kill their family if they reported the incident to anybody.
3. With respect to the charge of robbery, we hold that the CA
correctly ruled that conspiracy was sufficiently proven by
circumstantial evidence on record, thus: We also find that the trial
court correctly appreciated conspiracy against Cabigquez with
respect [to] the crime of robbery. There is conspiracy when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement
to commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be shown
through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred upon the
acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action, and community of interest. Neither
[AAA] nor [BBB] saw Cabigquez acting as a lookout outside the
store. However, the creaking sound coming from the balcony and
the fact that [BBB] saw Cabigquez go inside the store, as soon as
Grondiano left, reasonably verify a discernment that someone stood
by outside and close to the store's entrance during the looting, and
that such person was Cabigquez. The fact that only Grondiano
concealed his face reasonably indicates a prior agreement between
the two (2) malefactors for Cabigquez to act as a lookout in the
commission of robbery. After raping [AAA], Cabigquez also warned
of killing [AAA and her children] if they told anyone about the
incident, which threat contributed to the common sentiment of
concealing both crimes of robbery and rape. These circumstances
sufficiently establish a joint purpose and design, and a community
of interest, between Cabigquez and Grondiano, in committing the
crime of robbery.
This Court ruled that the trial court has the power to take judicial
notice of the value of stolen goods because these are matters of
public knowledge or capable of unquestionable demonstration.
Judicial cognizance, which is based on considerations of
expediency and convenience, displace evidence since, being
equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is
intended to achieve. Surely, matters like the value of the
appliances, canned goods and perfume are undeniably within public
knowledge and easily capable of unquestionable demonstration.
Here, what is involved are common goods for everyday use and
ordinary stocks found in small sari-sari stores like private
complainants store, i.e., milk, soap, coffee, sugar, liquor and
cigarettes. The RTC was thus correct in granting the reasonable
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
amount of P10,000.00 as computed by the private complainant
representing the value of stolen merchandise from her store.
(35) ELAYDA VS CA [199 SCRA 349 (1991)]
“Can’t change your facts”
Principle: "Familiar Doctrine" - "an ​admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted ​by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs
submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should
be ​ignored​, whether objection is interposed by the party or not”
Facts:
Elayda filed a complaint with the RTC seeking recovery of loans
extended to Spouses Roxas in the aggregate sum of P90,000, with
interest. The loans were secured by PDCs issued by the spouses
and receipts signed by them showing that they received jewelry to
be sold on commission. Spouses Roxas admitted that they received
loans but claimed that it had already been paid in full, and in fact,
had exceeded the total obligation, and were required to pay
usurious interests.
Upon trial, different facts were offered by the two parties. Spouses
Roxas showed evidence which showed that they had received the
loans aggregating ​P90,000.00 o ​ n two separate occasions –– one in
the sum of P40,000.00 and the other, in the amount of P50,000.00;
that they were required to give, and did give, a "kickback" of
P10,000.00 and to pay, as they did pay, interest at the rate of four
percent (4%) a month; and that the total payment made by them to
Elayda amounted to P112,674.00.
To counteract this evidence of the Roxases, Elayda tried to submit
a statement prepared by her accountant to the effect that the total
loan given by her to the spouses amounted to ​P186,000.00,​ not
P90,000.00 ​(as stated in her complaint and as sought to be
established by her in her evidence-in-chief); that the payments
made by the spouses on account thereof came up to only
P110,474.00 –– of which the sum of P14,223.81 was charged to
interest at 14% ​per annum ​and P96,250.19, to principal –– thus
leaving a balance due from them of P89,749.81.
Trial court rejected Elayda’s statement, on objection of the Roxas,
contending that the loan amounting to P186,000 is contrary to the
P90,000 judicially admitted in her complaint. RTC ruled for the
defendant as the preponderance of evidence tilted towards them.
This was confirmed by the CA, which now leads us to this case.
Issue:
Whose version of the material facts of the case has been
established by a preponderance of evidence?
Ruling:
Respondents – Spouses Roxas
The issue raised by Elayda is a factual adjudication ruled by the
RTC and CA are considered conclusive and cannot be reviewed by
the SC. What Elayda is trying to let the SC do is to go over all the
evidence presented, analyze and weigh them to see if the RTC and
the CA were correct. SC cannot do this.
Elayda also raises the issue of the rejection of her accountant’s
statement where it was said that the loan was in fact P186,000 and
not P90,000 as stipulated in the complaint. The matter of whether a
particular item of proof was properly admitted or rejected in light of
the rules of evidence, is an issue of law. The rejection was rightfully
done. Such rejection is entirely in accord with the "familiar doctrine"
that "an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by
the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and
that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent
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therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the
party or not.”
Section 2, Rule 129 of the RoC reads as follows:
Judicial admissions.​ — Admissions made by the parties in the
pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not
require proof and can not be contradicted unless previously shown
to have been made through palpable mistake.
Nothing in the record shows that Elayda's admissions in her
complaint were indeed "made through palpable mistake."
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on ​certiorari i​ s DENIED and
the challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals, upholding that of
the Trial Court, is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
(36) PEOPLE VS NEWMAN [G.R. No. L-45354, July 26, 1988]
“Taxi driver’s intestines came out”
FACTS:
The two-accused were charged and convicted with the crime of
Robbery with Homicide.
Rosita Empio was selling coffee in her store when a taxi stopped in
front of her store. The driver asked her for help saying that he had
been held-up on the other side of the bridge. She asked him if he
had other wounds and the driver pointed to his stomach. She got a
towel from her house to bind the wound but when she saw
intestines coming out of the big wound on the stomach, she was
frightened. She called other persons for assistance. Upon their
arrival in the hospital, Eduardo Yanson, a police investigator,
happened to be in the vicinity. Sensing that the wounded man was
in a serious condition, he immediately took a piece of paper and
began investigating by asking questions. He was able to obtain the
victim’s name, address, and the facts that he was held up by two
men not known to him, but one was a short fellow with long hair and
the other was tall and stout.
Dr. Orville Paez, resident physician of the Corazon Locsin
Montelibano Memorial Hospital in Bacolod City treated Efren
Bantillo for two stab wounds, one at the 10th intercoastal space, left
front side, and another at the abdomen below the navel.According
to the doctor, the victim suffered other minor injuries, such as a stab
wound at the middle left forearm, an incised wound at the left 3rd
finger and the thumb, which injuries could have been caused by a
sharp knife. The doctor confirmed the fact that a policeman
interrogated the victim at the emergency room before the operation
took place .
The Police Officers, pursuant to confidential information given, were
able to arrest the two suspects. Taken from the suspects were the
watch of the victim and his driver’s license. When already taken into
custody, the two accused were investigated thoroughly. They also
went to the crime scene and asked to reenact the incident. After the
reenactment, police took the written statements of the two accused.
But before their statements were taken, the police informed them of
their constitutional rights to remain silent and assistance of a
counsel. Both, however, admitted that they knew their rights but
were waiving them as they would only tell the truth. They agreed to
sign a waiver of their rights to counsel or to remain silent.
While both accused executed extra-judicial confessions, they have,
however, repudiated them. Upon arraignment, duly assisted by
counsel ​de​ ​oficio, b
​ oth accused entered a plea of not guilty.
The accused-appellants argued that they had not been duly
informed of their constitutional rights. They contend that their oral
and written extra-judicial confessions and the photographs showing
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
the alleged re-enactment of the crime, are inadmissible in evidence.
They further claim that they were not accorded the right to due
process.
ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial admission and the re-enactment of the
crime are admissible in evidence? Whether the two accused were
guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide?
HELD:
The Court agrees with the contention of the appellants that the
questioned extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence
against them.
In the case at bar, the two (2) extrajudicial statements and waivers
carry the same quoted prefatory statement. This, to the mind of the
Court, indicates that lack of zeal and initiative on the part of the
investigating officers to fully and truly inform the accused of their
rights to remain silent and to counsel during the custodial
investigation. The "informing" done by the police in the case at bar
was nothing more than a superficial and mechanical act, performed
not so much to attain the objectives of the fundamental law, as to
give a semblance of compliance therewith. The right of a person
under interrogation to be informed of his rights to remain silent and
to counsel, implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain and contemplates an effective
communication that results in an understanding of what is
conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot
truly be said that the accused has been "informed" of his rights.
The record also shows that the interrogations were conducted
incommunicado in a police-denominated environment. When the
accused gave their confession, their companions in the room were
police officers. Indeed, the Court is far from certain or satisfied that
the waivers of counsel and the subsequent confessions were
indeed voluntary and free. Thus, even if the confession of the
accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of
counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the
absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
Conviction, therefore, cannot be based thereon.
As to the reenactment of the crime,​ the Court notes that appellant
Dionisio Tolentino testified that he participated in such reenactment
after he was directed to do so by the policemen. Such reenactment
was scripted, to say the least. Besides, pictures reenacting a crime
which are based on an inadmissible confession are themselves
inadmissible
All the foregoing notwithstanding, the guilt of the appellants
has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Their conviction
must be affirmed.
Recovered from the accused Newman at the time of his arrest by
the police officers was a watch borrowed by the victim from his
close friend; on the other hand, taken from the accused Tolentino
was the Driver's license of the deceased Bantillo but whose picture
was replaced with the picture of Tolentino. In other words, the
two-accused were positively Identified as the persons in
possession of the stolen properties — the watch and the Driver's
license. ​Both accused offered no satisfactory explanation as to the
fact of their possession of the stolen properties. Such evidence
abundantly incriminates them and proves that they took them with
animus lucrandi. ​A disputable presumption exists that a person
found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act. Appellants
offered no evidence to overcome or contradict such presumption.
Not even an alibi was presented for their defense.
It is not also disputed that the victim, before he died, told Police
Investigators Yanzon and Rosita Empio that he was held-up by two
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men — one was tag and stout and the other was a short fellow with
long hair — descriptions which fit the two (2) accused; that he was
stabbed twice; and that P60.00 were forcibly taken from his person.
The ante-mortem ​statement, taken together with the other
evidence, especially, the stolen watch and the driver's license of the
victim found in the possession of the accused, points to a
conclusive finding that indeed the accused are guilty of the crime of
robbery with homicide.
The appellants contend, however, that the dying declaration was
not made by the deceased under consciousness of an impending
death. The Court holds otherwise. The victim was brought to the
hospital in a very serious condition. The nature of the two (2) stab
wounds was fatal. When the victim opened the bandage (towel
given by Rosita Empio,) his intestines came out.
The connection between the appellants' unexplained possession of
the stolen personal properties taken from the victim and the
homicide committed or the attack on Efren Bantillo, is too close and
too obvious. It can only lead to the inevitable conclusion that the
men who stole the wristwatch and driver's license of deceased
Bantillo were the very same persons who stabbed and killed him.
Logic and experience easily allow such inference.
Appellants' claim of absence of conspiracy is without merit.
Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence, it may be
inferred from the acts of the assailants. The circumstances of riding
the PU Minica together as passengers; the taking along with them
of a stainless knife of Newman; the militant dispatch and precision
in stabbing the victim; their hiding together in Newman's place of
work; the finding that they were together immediately preceding the
commission of the crimes up to the time of their arrest two days
later; their apparent haste in departing from the crime scene after its
perpetration to the point of leaving behind the wallet of the victim
containing P50.00; and the simple fact that they were present
together during the commission of the crimes, thus giving unto each
other moral and physical aid and assistance — taken together —
clearly manifest a concerted action in the pursuit of a common
design to kill and, subsequently, to steal. Conspiracy being present,
it does not really matter that the prosecution had failed to show who
as between the two (2) accused actually stabbed the victim.
(37) CONCEPCION VS CA [468 SCRA 438 (August 31, 2005)]
“Bigamous marriage;​ Who’s the father?​”
FACTS:
In December 1989, petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private
respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte got married. They lived in
Fairview, Quezon City. In December 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth
to Jose Gerardo. In December 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to
have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of
bigamy. He alleged that 9 years before he married Ma. Theresa,
she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was
residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa's marriage to Mario was valid
and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her
marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo
to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was
awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation
rights.
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their
marriage annulled. She held him responsible for the ‘bastardization’
of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration "INSOFAR ONLY as
that portion of the ‘visitation rights’. She argued that there was
nothing in the law granting "visitation rights in favor of the putative
father of an illegitimate child." She further maintained that Jose
Gerardo’s surname should be changed from Concepcion to
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate
child shall use the mother’s surname. Applying the "best interest of
the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresa’s motion.
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the CA. The CA held that Jose
Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario
during her first marriage. The appellate court brushed aside the
common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo
was their son and it gave little weight to Jose Gerardo's birth
certificate showing that he was born a little less than a year after
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married. Gerardo moved for a
reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the child is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario
or the illegimate child of Ma. Theresa and Gerardo.
HELD:
Jose Gerardo, is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario
Gopiao.
Presumption of Legitimacy
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article
164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born
during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in
favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167
of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in
favor of legitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from
the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of
conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article
166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the
husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed
where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption
is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by
the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband
and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child. To rebut the presumption, the
separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital
intimacy impossible. This may take place, for instance, when they
reside in different countries or provinces and they were never
together during the period of conception. Or, the husband was in
prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual
union took place through the violation of prison regulations.
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living
together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola
Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights
are only a scant four kilometers apart. Not only did both Ma.
Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence
at all was presented to disprove personal access between them.
Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma.
Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as
to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital
act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to
defeat the assumption should be presented by him who asserts the
contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of
legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage
between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
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A mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never
uncertain. Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question
Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy. For reasons of public decency and
morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse
with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. The
proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family
solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward
the legitimacy of children.
Proof of Filiation
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo's birth certificate is
misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in this case because it was
not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the
court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally
offered. Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child
from the moment of his birth. Although a record of birth or birth
certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a
child, as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of
filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being
questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days
following the termination of marriage is sought to be established.
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not
under attack as it could not be contested collaterally and, even
then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs.
Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was
improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein. As prima facie evidence, the statements in
the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence.
It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the
statements made therein by the interested parties. Between the
certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardo's
illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable
only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter
shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more
conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with
the purpose of the law.
(38) DATALIFT MOVERS VS. BELGRAVIA REALTY and
SAMPAGUITA BROKERAGE [G.R. No. 144268, August 30,
2006]
FACTS:
PNR leased a lot to Sampaguita pursuant to a written contract.
Sampaguita then entered into a special agreement with its sister
company, Belgravia, whereby the latter would construct a
warehouse for its own use on the leased lot. However, instead of
using the warehouse, Belgravia sublet it to Datalift, represented by
its president Jaime B. Aquino, pursuant to a 1-year lease contract
subject to extension by mutual agreement of the parties. By the
terms of lease, Datalift shall pay Belgravia a monthly rental of
P40,000.00. After the one year contract period expired, Datalift
continued in possession and enjoyment of the leased warehouse by
verbal understanding of the parties. Subsequently, Belgravia
unilaterally increased the monthly rental to P60,000.00. Monthly
rental was again increased from P60,000.00 to P130,000.00,
allegedly in view of the increased rental demanded by PNR on
Sampaguita for the latter’s lease of the former’s lot whereon the
warehouse stands. Because of the rental increase made by
Belgravia, Datalift stopped paying its monthly rental for the
warehouse. Thereafter, Sampaguita addressed demand letters to
Datalift asking the latter to pay its rental in arrears in the amount of
P4,120,000.00 and to vacate and surrender the warehouse in
dispute. The demands having proved futile, Belgravia and/or
Sampaguita filed with the MeTC of Manila their complaint for
ejectment against Datalift.
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants interposed the
following defenses:
1) Sampaguita has no cause of action against them, not being a
party nor privy to the Datalift-Belgravia contract of lease;
2) Under the PNR-Sampaguita contract of lease over the PNR lot,
Sampaguita is prohibited from subleasing the property;
3) The same PNR-Sampaguita contract had allegedly expired;
4) Lessor Belgravia likewise has no cause of action because it was
neither the owner nor lessee of the lot whereon the warehouse
stands.
As counterclaim, Datalift is asking for refund of the amount they
paid to Belgravia for the entire period of the lease plus damages.
MeTC, RTC and CA: All in favor of Belgravia/Sampaguita
ISSUE/S:
1) W/N there was an implied new lease created between PNR and
respondents when the former did not take positive action to eject
the latter from the subject premises
2) W/N Datalift has no personality to question whether an implied
new lease was created between PNR and respondents
RULING:​ Yes to both.
There was no definite showing that the lease contract between PNR
and Sampaguita had been effectively terminated. As held by the
CA: By PNR not taking a positive action to eject Sampaguita from
the leased premises up to the present, again, there is a tacit
renewal of the lease contract between PNR and Sampaguita.
The Rules of Court already sufficiently shields respondent
Belgravia, as lessor, from being questioned by Datalift as lessee,
regarding its title or better right of possession as lessor because
having admitted the existence of a lessor-lessee relationship,
Datalift is barred from assailing Belgravia's title of better right of
possession as their lessor.
Section 2, Rule 131, of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions. -- The following are instances of
conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or
omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in
any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be
permitted to falsify it;
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his
landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of
landlord and tenant between them.
Conclusive presumptions have been defined as inferences which
the law makes so peremptory that it will not allow them to be
overturned by any contrary proof however strong. As long as the
lessor-lessee relationship between Datalift and Belgravia exists as
in this case, the former, as lessee, cannot by any proof, however
strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that Belgravia has valid
title to or better right of possession to the subject leased premises
than they have.
The the application of the rule on conclusive presumption under
Section 2, Rule 131 strengthens the position of the MeTC that the
petitioner may be validly ordered to vacate the leased premises for
nonpayment of rentals. Likewise, the logical consequence of the
operation of this conclusive presumption against the petitioners is
that they will never have the personality to question whether an
implied new lease was created between PNR and the respondents,
because so long as there is no showing that the lessor-lessee
relationship has terminated, the lessors title or better right of
possession as against the lessee will eternally be a non-issue in
any proceeding before any court.
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Additionally, as correctly pointed out by the CA, being non-privies to
the contract of lease between PNR and respondent Sampaguita,
the petitioners have no personality to raise any factual or legal issue
relating thereto.
The SC, however, adjusted the rental from P130,000.00 to
P80,000.00
(39) BLUE CROSS HEALTH VS OLIVARES [G.R. No. 169737
February 12, 2008]
“Neomi”s Stroke — non-payment — disputable presumption —
privileged communication”
Principle:
Disputable presumptions does not apply if:
a. The evidence is at the disposal of both
b. Suppression was not wilful
c. Evidence is merely corroborative or cumulative
a. The suppression is an exercise of a privilege
Facts:
Neomi Olivares applied for a health care program with petitioner
Blue Cross Health Care Inc. She paid for the coverage in full and
her application was approved. In the health care agreement,
ailments due to “pre-existing conditions” were excluded from the
coverage. However, after the member has been continuously
covered for 12 months, the pre-existing provision shall no longer be
applicable except for illnesses specifically excluded by an
endorsement.
Barely 38 days from the effectivity of her health insurance, Neomi
suffered a stroke and was admitted to medical City, an accredited
hospital of petitioner. She incurred 34,217.20 for her medical bills.
When she requested petitioner to issue a letter of authorization in
order to settle her medical bills, petitioner refused to issue such and
suspended payment pending the submission of a certification from
her attending physician that the stroke suffered was not caused by
a pre-existing condition. She was constrained to pay for the medical
bills herself and thereafter filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money against petitioner.
The attending physician replied to petitioner’s request and
maintained that he will not be releasing any medical information
regarding her status as the patient invokes patient-physician
confidentiality.
Petitioner argues that respondents prevented the physician from
submitting his report regarding the medical condition of Neomi.
Hence, it contends that the presumption that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced should apply in its favor.
Issue: W/N the disputable presumption invoked should be applied
in petitioner’s favor
Held:
NO.
Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions
are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced.
However, this presumption does not apply if:
a. The evidence is at the disposal of both
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
d. Suppression was not wilful
e. Merely corroborative or cumulative
f. The suppression is an exercise of a privilege
Hence, respondent’s refusal to allow the presentation of the
physician’s report was justified as it is a privileged communication
between physician and patient.
Since petitioner had the burden of proving exception to liability, it
should have made its own assessment of whether respondent had
a pre-existing condition when it failed to obtain the physicians
report. Furthermore, it is in the nature of a non-life insurance and as
it is an established rule in insurance contracts that when their terms
contain limitations on liability, they should be construed strictly
against the insurer. This doctrine is equally applicable to health care
agreements.
(40) BPI VS REYES [G.R. No. 157177 February 11 2008]
“Transfer of BPI accounts; 200k, 100k; testimonial v physical
evidence”
FACTS:
On December 7, 1990, respondent Jesusa Reyes together with her
daughter, went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an ATM account.
Reyes informed one of BPI’s employees, Mr. Capati, that they
wanted to open an ATM account for the amount of P200,000.00,
P100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her existing savings
account with BPI and the other P100,000.00 will be given by her in
cash.
Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for
P200,000.00 to be withdrawn from her existing savings account
with said bank and Reyes believing in good faith that Capati
prepared the papers with the correct amount signed the same
unaware of the mistakes in figures. Minutes later after the slips
were presented to the teller, Capati returned to where the
respondent was seating and informed the latter that the
withdrawable balance could not accommodate P200,000.00.
Reyes explained that she is withdrawing the amount of
P100,000.00 only and then changed and correct the figure two (2)
into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto signifying the
change, after which the amount of P100,000.00 in cash in two
bundles containing 100 pieces of P500.00 peso bill were given to
Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing the same. Thereafter
Capati prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00 in the name of
Jesusa Reyes with the new account and brought the same to the
teller's booth. After a while, he returned and handed to the
respondent her duplicate copy of her deposit to the new account
reflecting the amount of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing
December 7, as the date.
Later on, Reyes become aware that her ATM account only
contained the amount of P100,000.00 with interest. Hence, she filed
an action before the RTC.
BPI claimed that there was actually no cash involved with the
transactions which happened on December 7, 1990 as contained in
the bank’s teller tape. On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a
Decision upholding the versions of respondent Reyes. Aggrieved,
petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision with
modification.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's finding that respondent
Jesusa made an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her newly opened
Express Teller account on December 7, 1990.
RULING:
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Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her
daughter, that the former deposited P100,000.00 cash in addition to
the fund transfer of P100,000.00, is not established by physical
evidence. While the duplicate copy of the deposit slip was in the
amount of P200,000.00 and bore the stamp mark of teller Torneros,
such duplicate copy failed to show that there was a cash deposit of
P100,000.00. An examination of the deposit slip shows that it did
not contain any entry in the breakdown portion for the specific
denominations of the cash deposit. This demolishes the testimonies
of respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove
his own affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence required
by law. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by preponderance of evidence, or that evidence
which is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in
opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means
that the testimony of one side is more believable than that of the
other side, and that the probability of truth is on one side than on
the other.
For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand,
it must first be stressed that the judge who had heard and seen the
witnesses testify was not the same judge who penned the decision.
Thus, not having heard the testimonies himself, the trial judge or the
appellate court would not be in a better position than this Court to
assess the credibility of witnesses on the basis of their demeanor.
Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts
of the witnesses' testimonies and examined the pieces of evidence
on record.
After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence
presented by the parties, we find that respondents failed to
successfully prove by preponderance of evidence that respondent
Jesusa made an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her Express Teller
account.
Torneros testified that when she was processing respondent
Jesusa's withdrawal in the amount of P200,000.00, her computer
rejected the transaction because there was a discrepancy; thus, the
word BIG AMOUNT appeared on the tape. Big amount means that
the amount was so big for her to approve, so she keyed in the
amount again and overrode the transaction to be able to process
the withdrawal using an officer's override with the latter's approval.
The letter J appears after Figure 288 in the fourth column to show
that she overrode the transaction. She then keyed again the
amount of P200,000.00 at 3 o'clock 13 minutes and 9 seconds;
however, her computer rejected the transaction, because the
balance she keyed in based on respondent Jesusa's passbook was
wrong; thus appeared the phrase balance error on the tape, and the
computer produced the balance of P229,257.64, and so she keyed
in the withdrawal of P200,000.00. Since it was a big amount, she
again had to override it, so she could process the amount.
However, the withdrawal was again rejected for the reason TOD,
overdraft, which meant that the amount to be withdrawn was more
than the balance, considering that there was a debited amount of
P30,935.16 reflected in respondent Jesusa's passbook, reducing
the available balance to only P198,322.48.
Torneros then called Capati to her cage and told him of the
insufficiency of respondent Jesusa's balance. Capati then motioned
respondent Jesusa to the teller's cage; and when she was already
in front of the teller's cage, Torneros told her that she could not
withdraw P200,000.00 because of overdraft; thus, respondent
Jesusa decided to just withdraw P100,000.00.
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Teller Torneros testified that Capati went to her cage bringing with
him a withdrawal slip for P200,000.00 signed by respondent
Jesusa, two copies of the deposit slip for
P200,000.00 in respondent Jesusa's name for her new Express
Teller account, and the latter's savings passbook reflecting a
balance of P249,657.64 as of November 19, 1990. Thus, at first
glance, these appeared to Torneros to be sufficient for the
withdrawal of P200,000.00 by fund transfer. Capati then got her
teller's stamp mark, stamped it on the duplicate copy of the deposit
slip, and gave the duplicate to respondent Jesusa, while the original
copy of the deposit slip was left in her cage. However, as Torneros
started processing the transaction, it turned out that respondent
Jesusa's balance was insufficient to accommodate the P200,000.00
fund transfer as narrated earlier.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and
it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. We have, on
many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in
ascertaining the truth. Where the physical evidence on record runs
counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses,
we consistently rule that the physical evidence should prevail.
(41) VICTORY SHIPPING LINES v. WORKMEN’S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION [G.R. No. L-9268, November 21
1959]
KEY WORDS: Man overboard; mag-fire alarm ka na sa gising,
huwag lang sa bagong gising; presumption of death
PRINCIPLE​: When the rule on presumption of death does not
apply, the rule on preponderance of evidence applies instead to
establish the fact of death. Where a person was last seen in a state
of imminent peril that might probably result in his death and has
never been seen or heard from again, though diligent search has
been made, inference of immediate death may be drawn.
FACTS: ​Pedro Icong was an employee of Victory Shipping Lines.
While on board M/V “Miss Leyte,” the vessel of Victory Shipping
was razed by a fire. Awakened by the fire, Pedro jumped
overboard. Since then, he has not been heard of. As such, Juan
Icong, his father, who was his partial dependent, filed a claim for
death compensation against Victory Shipping before the Workmen's
Compensation Commission. The Commission rendered an award in
favor of respondent Juan Icong in the sum of P2,038.40, plus
P200.00 for burial expenses and P20.00 as legal fee. Aggrieved,
Victory Shipping filed an appeal.
The shipping lines that in the absence of proof of the death of Pedro
Icong, the nearest approach to the matter, from the facts of his
case, is the provision on the presumption of death established in
Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, according to which
the person to be presumed dead must be unheard of ​for at least
four years​; that inasmuch as ​Pedro Icong had been missing ​only
for a few months from the alleged accident, there is as ​yet ​no
legal presumption of death on which to base any award for
compensation​.
ISSUE:
W/N the presumption of death of persons lost during sea voyage
applies in this case. -​NO​.
RULING:
Article 391 ​of the Civil Code of the Philippines relating to
presumption of death of persons aboard a vessel lost during a sea
voyage ​applies to a case ​wherein the vessel cannot be located
nor accounted for, or when its fate is unknown or there is no
trace of its whereabouts, inasmuch as the word ​"lost" used in
referring to a vessel must be given the same meaning as "missing"
employed in connection with an aeroplane, the persons taking both
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means of conveyance being the object of the rule expressed in the
same sentence. ​In the instant case, none of the foregoing
conditions appear to exist​. The fate of Victory Shipping’s vessel
is not unknown. It was not lost or missing. ​As a matter of fact,
it had been definitely destroyed by fire and washed ashore.
And in view of the further fact that when Victory Shipping’s vessel
caught fire, Pedro Icong jumped overboard and since then had not
been heard from, the aforementioned rule on presumption of death
does not apply. ​Instead the rule on preponderance of evidence
applies to establish the fact of death. ​In the same case of
Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc., we said:
Where a person was last seen in a state of imminent peril that
might probably result in his death and has never been seen or
heard from again, though diligent search has been made,
inference of immediate death may be drawn.
NOTE: ​The ​Commission did not apply the rule on presumption of
death because in the employer's report of the accident submitted by
the shipping lines, laborer Pedro Icong was reported as the only
casualty, and in transmitting said report ​petitioner's counsel had
implicitly admitted the fact of Pedro Icong's death.​
(42) EASTERN SHIPPING v. LUCERO [124 SCRA 1983]
KEY WORDS: vessel sunk by a storm; radio messages; wife
wants the salary over the death benefits; presumption of death
PRINCIPLE​: Presumption of death may arise even before the
periods provided for by law if there exists strong indications that the
death did in fact occur. The rule on presumption of death under
Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of
preponderance of evidence.
FACTS: M/V Eastern Minicon, a vessel of Eastern Shipping Lines
Inc, [Company] encountered a very strong storm ​en route to its
destination. As the weather worsened, Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr.
sent 3 radio messages to Eastern Shipping’s Manila Office, asking
for assistance and detailing the grave situation of the ship and crew.
The vessel, however, was never found again after the incident.
Acting on these radio messages, the Company immediately
reported the matter to the Philippine Coast Guard for search and
rescue operation and the same was coordinated with the U.S. Air
Force based at Clark Air Base. However, the collective efforts of all
parties concerned yielded negative results.
Subsequently, the insurer of the M/V Eastern Minicon through its
surveyors, ​confirmed the loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the
Company paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the
crew members, ​except respondent Josephine Lucero, who refused
to accept the same.
The wife instead filed a case before the he National Seamen Board
argued that the contract of employment entered into his husband
was voyage-to-voyage which would only terminate upon the
vessel’s arrival. Hence, ​she claimed that his husband’s wages still
accrued since the presumption of his husband’s death has not yet
taken effect, and that for all intents and purposes, his wages must
be paid as if he was still alive until the said period arrives.
Upon the other hand, the Company maintained that Mrs. Lucero
was no longer entitled to such allotments because: [a] ​the insurer,
through its surveyors, had already confirmed the total loss of the
vessel and had in fact settled the company's insurance claim and
[b] the Company, with the approval of the Board, had likewise paid
the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the other seamen.
The Board and NLRC held in favor of the wife and concluded that
the presumption of death cannot be applied since it is evidently
premature to presume Capt. Lucera dead as four years has not yet
expired.
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
ISSUE: ​W/N the presumption of death under the Civil Code
applies? ​–NO.
RULING:
There is enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the
loss of the M/V Eastern Minicon and the death of its crew. Capt.
Lucero’s 3 radio message, the last of which, received at 9:50 p.m.
of that day, was a call for immediate assistance in view of the
existing "danger,” claiming that the "sea water was entering the
hatch," that the vessel "was listing 50 to 60 degrees port," and that
they were "preparing to abandon the ship any time”; was proof of
the inevitability of their doom. After this message, nothing more has
been heard from the vessel or its crew until the present time.
There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances
attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon
and its crew. ​There is moral certainty that the vessel had sunk
and that the persons aboard had perished with it. ​Upon this
premise, the rule on presumption of death under Article 391 (1)
of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of
evidence.
In fact, in some criminal cases decided by the Court, the accused
were convicted or multiple murder, homicide and treason despite
the failure to recover the bodies of the victims.
In ​People vs. Ansang where, in open sea, the appellant aboard a
vinta ignited three home-made bombs and threw them at the boat
occupied by the victims, and the said boat was later washed ashore
and the passengers thereof were never heard or seen again by
anybody, this Court convicted the appellant of multiple murder,
holding that the victims were dead.
Similarly, in ​People vs. Sasota​, the claim of the appellants therein
that there was no conclusive evidence of death of the victim
because his body was never found was overruled by this Court in
this wise:
In a case of murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover
the body or to show where it can be found. 'Mere are cases
like death at sea, where the finding or recovery of the body is
impossible. It is enough that the death and the criminal
agency be proven. There are even cases where said death
and the intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may
be presumed or established by circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, it may be remembered that in several treason
cages decided by this Court, where besides the act of treason
the accused is held responsible for the death of persons he
had or tortured and later taken away, where the victims were
never later seen or heard from, it has been presumed that
they were lulled or otherwise criminally disposed of or
liquidated by the accused this, for the purpose of fixing the
penalty.
If in the foregoing criminal cases, where the proof required for
conviction must be beyond reasonable doubt, the rule of
presumption was not applied and the fact of death was deemed
established, with more reason is this Court justified in entering a
finding of death. Indeed, ​We cannot permit Article 391 to
override, or be substituted for, the facts established in this
case which logically indicate to a moral certainty that Capt.
Lucero died shortly after he had sent his last radio message at
9:50 p.m. on February 16, 1980.
(43) ROMEO F. EDU v. AMADOR E. GOMEZ [G.R. No. L-33397]
Keywords: Carnapping Incident
One Liner/s: A person in possession of a thing in the concept of an
owner is presumed to be the owner and she cannot be compelled to
prove her title.
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The acquirer or the purchaser in good faith of a chattel of movable
property is entitled to be respected and protected in his possession
as if he were the true owner until a competent court rules otherwise.
Facts:
On 29 June 1970, the 1968 model Volkswagen bantam car, owned
by Lt. Walter A. Bala was stolen. On 2 February 1971, the stolen
car was herein seen in the possession of respondent Lucila Abello
and was immediately seized and impounded the car as stolen
property by agents of Anti-Carnapping Unit (ANCAR). Likewise,
herein petitioner Romeo F. Edu, then Commissioner of Land
Transportation, seized the car pursuant to Section 60 of Republic
Act 4136 which empowers him to seize the motor vehicle for
delinquent registration aside from his implicit power deducible from
Sec. 4(5), Sec. 5 and 31 of said Code, "to seize motor vehicles
fraudulently or otherwise not properly registered."
On 15 February 1971, Ms. Abello filed a complaint for replevin with
damages in the respondent court. It was found out that the car was
purchased by Abello from its registered owner, Marcelino Guansing
for PhP9,000.00 dated 11 August 1970. CFI ruled in favor of
Respondent Abello.
Issue:
W/N the ANCAR agents are justified in the seizure of the car
despite Abello being a purchaser in good faith? NO.
Ruling:
There is no merit in the petition considering that the acquirer or the
purchaser in good faith of a chattel of movable property is entitled to
be respected and protected in his possession as if he were the true
owner thereof until a competent court rules otherwise. In the
meantime, as the true owner, the possessor in good faith cannot be
compelled to surrender possession nor to be required to institute an
action for the recovery of the chattel, whether or not an indemnity
bond is issued in his favor. The filing of an information charging that
the chattel was illegally obtained through estafa from its true owner
by the transferor of the bona fide possessor does not warrant
disturbing the possession of the chattel against the will of the
possessor.
The claim of petitioners that the Commission has the right to seize
and impound the car under Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 which
reads:
Sec. 60. The lien upon motor vehicles. Any balance of fees for
registration, re-registration or delinquent registration of a motor
vehicle, remaining unpaid and all fines imposed upon any vehicle
owner, shall constitute a first lien upon the motor vehicle concerned.
is untenable. It is clear from the provision of said Section 60 of
Republic Act 4136 that the Commissioner's right to seize and
impound subject property is only good for the proper enforcement of
lien upon motor vehicles. The Land Transportation Commission
may issue a warrant of constructive or actual distraint against motor
vehicle for collection of unpaid fees for registration, re-registration
or delinquent registration of vehicles.
(44) JUANITA ERMITAÑO v. LAILANIE M. PAGLAS [G.R. No.
174436, January 23, 2013]
Keywords: Tenant-Landlord Relationship
One Liner​: The general rule is that a tenant is estopped from
denying is the title of his landlord ​at the time of the commencement
of the landlord-tenant relatio​n. If the title asserted is one that is
alleged to have been acquired ​subsequent to the commencement
of that relation, the presumption will not apply.
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Facts:
Lalaine Paglas (Respondent), and petitioner, through her
representative, Isabelo Ermitano, executed a contract of lease
wherein petitioner leased in favor of respondent a residential house
and lot for a period of 1 year. Subsequent to the execution of the
lease contract, petitioner mortgaged the subject property in favor of
a certain Charlie Yap and later on the property was foreclosed in an
extrajudicial foreclosure with Yap as the purchaser. The subject lot
was later sold to respondent evidenced by a deed of sale of real
property executed by the parties with the stipulation that the
property was still subject to petitioner’s right of redemption.
Prior to respondent’s purchase of said property, petitioner filed a
suit for declaration of nullity of the mortgage she executed in favor
of Yap as well as the sheriff’s provisional certificate of sale which
was issued after the property was sold on a foreclosure sale.
Meanwhile, Petitioner sent demand letters to respondent asking her
to pay the rentals which are due and to vacate the leased premises.
After her two demands for payment of rentals went unheeded,
petitioner filed another case of unlawful detainer against
respondent.
MTCC dismissed the case. RTC affirmed the dismissal of unlawful
detainer but ordered respondent to pay 10 months equivalent of
unpaid rentals.
The defense interposed by the tenant in refusing to pay the rental
was that, after the commencement of the lease, the title of the
lessor was conveyed to a third party and that third party in turn sold
it to him (tenant). Thus, being the new owner, he cannot be
compelled to pay. The original owner however, argued that the
tenant is estopped from denying his (original owner) title.
Issue:
Whether the conclusive presumption known as ​estoppel against
tenants​ is applicable in this case? NO.
Ruling:
The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, known as estoppel against tenants, provides as
follows:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are instances of
conclusive presumptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the
time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them.
It is clear from the above quoted provision that what a tenant is
estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the landlord-tenant relation.
If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been ​acquired
subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption
will not apply​. Hence, the tenant may show that the landlord's title
has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not
estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted
by title paramount.
In the present case, what respondent is claiming is her supposed
title to the subject property which she acquired subsequent to the
commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between her and
petitioner. Hence, the presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court does not apply.
However, even though the presumption does not apply against
Paglas, her subsequent acquisition of the property does not justify
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her refusal to pay the rentals due to Ermitaño. Under Act No. 3135,
the purchaser in a foreclosure sale only has an inchoate right and
not the absolute right to the property with all the accompanying
incidents. Ownership becomes full only upon failure of the
mortgagor to redeem the property during the redemption period.
(45) CELEDONIO VS PEOPLE [G.R. No. 209137, July 1, 2015]
Keywords: ​Stolen items inside motorcycle compartment;
Circumstantial evidence supporting conviction; Disputable
presumption
Principles:
● Lack of direct evidence does not ​ipso facto bar the finding of
guilt, as it may be established by credible and sufficient
circumstantial evidence which leads to the inescapable
conclusion that the accused committed the imputed crime.
● Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is
more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
● Sec. 3(j), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court: a person
found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act;
otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises
acts of ownership over, is owned by him. ​(Disputable
Presumption)
Facts: Celedonio was charged in an information with Robbery with
Force Upon Things. He allegedly destroyed the backdoor of
Carmencita De Guzman and took away several pieces of jewelry
and other items, amounting to Php223,000.
Version of the Prosecution:
Adriano Marquez w ​ itnessed the robbery perpetrated in the house of
De Guzman while the latter was away to attend to the wake of her
deceased husband. No one was left in the house. Marquez, whose
house was opposite the house of De Guzman and Celedonio, which
were adjacent to each other, identified Celedonio as the culprit.
Upon learning of the incident, De Guzman reported it to the police
and requested that Celedonio be investigated for possibly having
committed the crime, based on the account of Marquez.
A follow-up operation was conducted by police officers,
accompanied by Marquez. They ​proceeded to Raja Humabon St.,
Navotas, to survey the area for the possible ​identification and
apprehension of the suspect. On their way, Marquez pointed t​ o a
man on a motorcycle and said, "​Sir, siya po si Eduardo Celedonio."​
The​y i​ mmediately flagged down Celedonio. PO1 Roque asked him
if he was ​Celedonio, but he did not reply and just bowed his head.
SPO2 Sugui informed Celedonio of a complaint for robbery against
him. C​ eledonio still remained silent and just bowed his head. SPO2
Sugui asked him, "Where are the stolen items?" Celedonio then
alighted from his motorcycle and opened its compartment where
PO1 Roque saw some of the stolen items, as per report of the
incident, such as the portable DVD player and a wristwatch, among
others. P ​ O1 Roque asked Celedonio if the same were stolen, to
which the latter answered, ​"Iyan po." ​Thus, Celedonio was arrested
and was informed of his constitutional rights. More items were
seized from Celedonio at the police station.
Version of the Accused:
After the prosecution rested its case, Celedonio filed his Demurrer
to Evidence (with leave of court) citing as his ground the alleged
illegality of his arrest and the illegal search on his motorcycle. RTC
denied the demurrer, stating that the question of the legality of
Celedonio's arrest had been mooted by his arraignment and his
active participation in the trial of the case. It considered the seizure
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
of the stolen items as legal not only because of Celedonio's
apparent consent to it, but also because the subject items were in a
moving vehicle.
Celedonio claimed that he was at home with his wife, sleeping, at
the time of the incident. His wife corroborated his statement.
RTC: Celedonio guilty of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
Prosecution clearly established: 1) a robbery had been committed;
2) it was committed recently; 3) several of the stolen items including
cash were found in Celedonio's possession; and 4) Celedonio had
no valid explanation for his possession of the stolen goods.
Celedonio appealed to ​CA​, arguing that RTC erred: 1) in convicting
him of the crime despite the insufficiency of the circumstantial
evidence; 2) in not finding that the search was illegal, rendering the
articles recovered inadmissible; and 3) in not finding that the
prosecution witness Marquez was ill-motivated in testifying against
him.
CA: affirmed RTC. The totality of circumstances warranted the
finding that Celedonio was solely and directly responsible for the
crime. Celedonio was not arrested when he voluntarily opened the
compartment of his motorcycle. He was only brought to the police
for investigation after some of the stolen items were found in his
motorcycle compartment. Further, Celedonio's failure to raise the
issue before his arraignment constituted a waiver on his part to
question the legality of his arrest.
Issues:
1) Whether petitioner's guilt was proven based on circumstantial
evidence - ​YES
2) Whether the search conducted on petitioner was illegal,
rendering the articles recovered inadmissible – ​NO
Held:
Jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the
only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt. Rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on
circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The lack of
direct evidence does not ​ipso facto bar the finding of guilt. As long
as the prosecution establishes participation in the crime through
credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the accused committed the imputed
crime, the latter should be convicted.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
1) there is more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case there was an unbroken chain of events that would lead
the court to a decision that Celedonio was the perpetrator. The
circumstantial evidence are as follows:
1. Accused was a next door neighbor of private complainant;
2. He was seen by another neighbor going over the concrete
fence separating their houses and ransacking a room in
complainant's house;
3. During the time, no one was inside complainant's house as all
of them were at the wake of private complainant's recently
demised husband;
4. Two (2) days after, most of the items discovered to have been
stolen that night were found in the compartment of the
accused's motorcycle which he was riding on when accosted
by the police;
5. The items recovered from him were identified by the
complainant as her stolen property;
6. During the trial accused denied that the stolen items were
found in his possession and claimed that they were "planted"
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by the police investigators to frame him up of the robbery. In
short, the accused could not explain his possession of the
recently stolen items found in his sole possession.
As to the legality of the arrest
He was caught in possession of stolen items when his motorcycle
was flagged down during follow-up operations. He could not explain
how he got into possession of such items. Under Sec. 3(j), Rule 131
of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is
the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which
a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, is owned
by him.
He never claimed ownership of the subject items. When the alleged
stolen items were found in his motorcycle compartment which he
had control over, the ​disputable presumption o ​ f being the taker of
the stolen items arose. He could have overcome the presumption,
but failed to give a justifiable and logical explanation. Thus, the only
plausible scenario that could be inferred therefrom was that he took
the items.
As to legality of search
When the police asked him about the stolen items, this was a mere
general inquiry as apart of follow-up operations. He was not frisked
and there were no signs of intimidation or force on the part of the
police. They had no hint that the items were in his motorcycle.
Celedonio himself voluntarily opened his motorcycle compartment.
He even confirmed it to the police. At that time, the police had
probable cause that he could be the culprit of the robbery. Taking
also into consideration that the items were taken form a moving
vehicle so the police had to immediately act upon it.
As to credibility of Marquez
In this case, if only to discredit Marquez, Celedonio claimed that
they once had a fight over a water meter. Court declared it to be
insignificant. However, a witness cannot be impeached by evidence
of particular wrongful acts, unless there is a showing of previous
conviction by final judgment such that not even the existence of
pending information may be shown to impeach him. No testimony
was presented to show that the reputation of Marquez for truth,
honesty or integrity is bad; no evil motive has been established
against prosecution witness Marquez that might prompt him to
testify falsely against accused.
Alibi and denial were the only defenses of Celedonio. Unless he
can strongly support his claims that the items were "planted" and
that it was physically impossible for him to be in De Guzman's
house other than the mere averment that he was asleep at the time,
his defenses cannot prevail over the strong circumstantial evidence.
(46) REPUBLIC VS KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
[G.R. No. 149576, August 8, 2006]
Keywords: ​Unsigned Pleading = Mere scrap of paper; Adoptive
admission constituting judicial admission
Principles:
● By adoptive admission, a third person's statement becomes
the admission of the party embracing or espousing it.
● Only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel
operates to validly convert a pleading from one that is
unsigned to one that is signed.
Facts:
Kenrick built a concrete perimeter fence around parcels of land
behind the Civil Aviation Traininger Center of the Air Transportation
Office. As a result of this, ATO was dispossessed of huge tracts of
land. Kenrick, on the other hand, claimed that the land was theirs,
showing a TCT issued in its name which was sold to it by Alfonso
Concepcion. The Registrar of Deeds had no record of such TCT nor
of its ascendant TCT. ATO verified the authenticity of Kenrick's titles
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
with the Land Registration Authority. LRA submitted its report.
Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of the TCT and its
ascendant title. The land allegedly covered by Kenrick's titles was
also found to be within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the
Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.
By virtue of a report, OSG filed a complaint for revocation,
annulment and cancellation of certificates of title against Kenrick
and an Answer was filed by the latter which was purportedly signed
by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for respondent.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of
land registration and titling. During the hearing, Atty. Garlitos
(former counsel of Kenrick) testified that he prepared Kenrick’s
answer and transmitted an unsigned draft to Victor Ong (Kenrick’s
President). He further stated that the signature in the answer was
not his and he authorized no one to sign in his behalf and he did not
know who signed the answer.
When the Republic found out about this, they promptly filed an
urgent motion to declare Kenrick in default for failure to file a valid
answer since it was an unsigned pleading which in effect is a mere
scrap of paper and produced no legal effect pursuant to Sec. 3 Rule
7 of the Rules of Court.
Trial court: granted Republic's motion. It found Kenrick's answer to
be sham, false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules. It
ordered the answer stricken from the records, respondent in default
and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex parte.
CA: Granted respondent’s petition for certiorari and directed the
lifting of the order of default against respondent and ordered the
trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch. It found that Atty.
Garlitos' statements in the legislative hearing were unreliable since
they were not subjected to cross-examination. It also scrutinized
Atty. Garlitos' acts after the filing of the answer and concluded that
he assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead
which supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have had.
Issue:
Whether Kenrick should be declared in default
Held: YES
Trial court correctly ruled that respondent's answer was invalid and
of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent was
properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to
present evidence ex parte.
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify
another's statement. Where it appears that a party clearly and
unambiguously assented to or adopted the ​statements of another,
evidence of those statements is admissible against him. This is ​the
essence of the principle of adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a party's reaction to a statement or action
by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party's reaction
as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person.
By adoptive admission, a third person's statement becomes the
admission of the party embracing or espousing it. This may occur
when a party:
a) Expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made
by another
b) Hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it
c) Utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertions of
another
d) Replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised
by another but ignores further points which he or she has
heard the other maker
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e) Reads and signs a written statement made by another
Kenrick accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its
case on them. At no instance did it ever deny or contradict its
former counsel's statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty.
Garlitos' testimony as well as its implications, as follows:
1) While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact
was that the answer was signed. Hence, the pleading
could not be considered invalid for being an unsigned
pleading. The fact that the person who signed it was
neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically authorized
by him was immaterial. The important thing was that the
answer bore a signature.
2) While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be
signed by the party or his counsel, it does not prohibit a
counsel from giving a general authority for any person to
sign the answer for him which was what Atty. Garlitos did.
The person who actually signed the pleading was of no
moment as long as counsel knew that it would be signed
by another, similar to addressing an authorization letter
"to whom it may concern" such that any person could act
on it even if he or she was not known beforehand.
3) Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he
never disowned its contents and he resumed acting as
counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing. These
circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or
ratified the signing of the answer by another.
Kenrick completely adopted Garlitos’ statements as its own. ​The
adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission which was
conclusive on it.
Contrary to respondent's position, a signed pleading is one that is
signed either by the party himself or his counsel. (Section 3, Rule 7)
Only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel
operates to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to
one that is signed. Counsel's authority and duty to sign a pleading
are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any person. The
signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has
read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay.
Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his
signature, who can certify to these matters. The preparation and
signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law
which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal
profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to
another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is not. The
Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by
unqualified persons something the law strongly proscribes.
The blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to
just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was
likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or ratified
by Atty. Garlitos' subsequent acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing
shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of the answer by
another "as long as it conformed to his draft." We give no value
whatsoever to such self-serving statement. No doubt, Atty. Garlitos
could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign
the answer.
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It
maintains that even if it were true that its answer was supposedly
an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could
be set aside.
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly
labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid raison d' etre in
the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside
may result in arbitrariness and injustice.
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only
when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree
of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed
procedure. Respondent failed to show any persuasive reason why it
should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.
The Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty.
Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he
should be made to account for his possible misconduct. Decision is
furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for the commencement of disbarment proceedings
against Atty. Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional conduct not
befitting his position as an officer of the court.
(47) BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS VS LEGASPI [G.R. No.
205966, March 2, 2016]
FACTS:
Petitioner BSP filed a Complaint for annulment of title, revocation of
certificate and damages (w/application for TRO) against Secretary
Atiena, et.al. and respondent Feliciano Legaspi before the RTC.
Respondent, together with his fellow defendants, filed their Answer.
The RTC in an Order mandating the issuance of preliminary
injunction enjoining defendants Engr. ​Ramon C. Angelo, Jr. and
petitioner Feliciano P. Legaspi, and persons acting for and in their
behalf, from pursuing the construction, development and/or
operation of a dumpsite or landfill in Barangay San Mateo,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, in an area allegedly covered by OCT No.
P858/Free Patent No. 257917, the property subject of the
complaint.
Respondent then filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner BSP because
the suit is unauthorized by petitioner BSP itself and that the counsel
representing BSP is not authoried thus cannot bind the same
petitioner. In opposing the motion, BSP that the complaint was filed
in accordance with a Monetary Board Resolution and the complaint
was verified by the Director of Asset Management of BSP.
The RTC denied the Motion to dismiss by respondent.
Respondent Legaspi filed a MR, adding as its argument that
the RTC failed to acquire jurisidiction over the action because
the complaint, a real action, failed to allege the assessed value
of the subject property.
As an opposition to respondent Legaspi's additional
contention, petitioner BSP claimed that since the subject
property contains an area of 4,838,736 square meters, it is
unthinkable that said property would have an assessed value
of less than P20,000.00 which is within the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts. Petitioner BSP further stated that a tax
declaration showing the assessed value of P28,538,900.00 and
latest zonal value of P145,162,080.00 was attached to the
complaint.
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The RTC, in its Order denied the MR of respondent. However,
the CA granted respondent’s Legaspi’s petition. BSP moved
for reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the Civil Case.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7691, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
actions which involve title to possession of real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). Petitioner BSP
insists that the property involved has an assessed value of more
than P20,000.00, as shown in a Tax Declaration attached to the
complaint. Incidentally, the complaint, on its face, is devoid of any
amount that would confer jurisdiction over the RTC.
The non-inclusion on the face of the complaint of the amount
of the property, however, is not fatal ​because attached in the
complaint is a tax declaration (Annex "N" in the complaint) of the
property in question showing that it has an assessed value of
P215,320.00. It must be emphasized that annexes to a complaint
are deemed part of, and should be considered together with the
complaint.11 In Fluor Daniel, Inc.-Philippines v. E.B. Villarosa and
Partners Co., Ltd., this Court ruled that in determining the
sufficiency of a cause of action, the courts should also consider the
attachments to the complaint, thus:
We have ruled that a complaint should not be dismissed for
insufficiency of cause of action if it appears clearly from the
complaint and its attachments that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
The converse is also true. The complaint may be dismissed for lack
of cause of action if it is obvious from the complaint and its annexes
that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief.
Hence, being an annex to BSP's complaint, the tax declaration
showing the assessed value of the property is deemed a part of the
complaint and should be considered together with it in determining
that the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction.
In connection therewith, the RTC, therefore, committed no error in
taking judicial notice of the assessed value of the subject property.
A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the
same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the same
case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between
the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and
of public records on file in the same court.14 Since a copy of the tax
declaration, which is a public record, was attached to the complaint,
the same document is already considered as on file with the court,
thus, the court can now take judicial notice of such.
In holding that the courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed
or market value of the land, the CA cited this Court's ruling in
Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals. This Court's ruling though in
Quinagoran is inapplicable in this case because in the former, the
complaint does not allege that the assessed value of the land in
question is more than P20,000.00 and that there was no tax
declaration nor any other document showing the assessed value of
the property attached to the complaint. Thus, in Quinagoran, the
assessed value of the land was not on record before the trial court,
unlike in the present case.
Moreover, considering that the area of the subject land is four
million eight hundred thirty-eight thousand seven hundred and
thirty-six (4,838,736) square meters, the RTC acted properly when
it took judicial notice of the total area of the property involved and
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
the prevailing assessed value of the titled property, and it would
also be at the height of absurdity if the assessed value of the
property with such an area is less than P20,000.00.
(48) PEOPLE VS PABLITO ANDAN [G.R. No. 116437, March 3,
1997]
FACTS:
Accused Pablito Andan was accused of the crime of rape with
homicide.
The prosecution established that Marianne Guevarra left her home
for her school dormitory. While she was walking along the
subdivision, appellant invited her inside his house on the pretext
that the blood pressure of his wife’s grandmother should be taken.
Marianne agreed as the old woman was her distant relative.
Nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her, brought
her to the kitchen and raped her. He then pulled her body to the
other side of the fence and abandoned it
The following day, the body of Marianne was discovered, naked
from chest down. Her gruesome death prompted the Mayor to form
a crack team of police to look for the criminal.
Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who
found bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They
interviewed the occupants of the house and learned from Romano
Calma, the stepbrother of appellant's wife, that accused-appellant
also lived there but that he, his wife and son left without a word.
Calma surrendered to the police several articles consisting of
pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some reddish
brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The
clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and
allegedly belonged to appellant.
The police located appellant in his parents’ house in Bulacan. They
took him and brought him to the police headquarters where he was
interrogated.
Initially, appellant denied any knowledge on the death of Marianne.
However, when confronted with the concrete block, the victim's
clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented
and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed
Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. He also said that he
knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne.
Immediately, the police took appellant to his house. Larin and
Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there by
the police. Appellant went to an old toilet at the back of the house,
leaned over a flower pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot,
two bags which were later identified as belonging to Marianne.
Thereafter, photographs were taken of appellant and the two other
suspects holding the bags.
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the
headquarters wherein a physical examination was conducted on
the suspects by the Municipal Health Officer.
People and media awaited the results of the investigation. Mayor
Trinidad then arrived and went to the investigation room. Upon
seeing the mayor, appellant approached him that they talk privately.
When they were at the Office of the Chief Police, appellant admitted
to the crime. The mayor opened the room in order that the public
and media may witness the confession. Since no lawyer was
available, the mayor ordered the proceedings to be photographed
and videotaped.
Appellant was detained. He was again interviewed by reporters
wherein he affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted the
crime.
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On arraignment, appellant plead not guilty.
RTC convicted and sentenced him to death. It based its decision on
the testimonies of the three policemen of the investigating team, the
mayor and 4 news reporters to whom appellant gave an
extrajudicial confession. ​It was also based on photographs and
video footages of appellant's confessions and reenactments of the
commission of the crime.
Accused -appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the
policemen, the mayor and the news reporters because they were
made during custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS
BASIS OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND THE MAYOR
ON THE ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING
THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSED NOT BEING
ASSISTED BY COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION;
II WON THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION;
SC:
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS
BASIS OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND THE MAYOR
ON THE ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING
THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSED NOT BEING
ASSISTED BY COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION
The testimonies of the police investigators are inadmissible.
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded
to "[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an
offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular
person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts
interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in
connection with an alleged offense. As intended by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by
police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the
municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police
agencies in our government."
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in
a general inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, appellant
was already a prime suspect even before the police found him at
his parents' house. Appellant was already under custodial
investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the
police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he
was investigated and interrogated. His confession is therefore
inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from
appellant's house.
Appellant’s confession before the Mayor is admissible.
It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and
control" over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3)
of Article III of the Constitution.
However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in
response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did
not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant
to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously,
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The
mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to
him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not
as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him
did not violate his constitutional rights. ​34 Thus, it has been held
that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not
apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning
by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts
or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to
preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the
accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellant's
confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant’s confession to the media are also admissible.
The confessions were made in response to questions by news
reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We
have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to
news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and
are admissible in evidence.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not
covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution.
The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual. ​46 It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions
therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They
confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any
governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by
government, rights that government has the duty to protect. ​47
Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays
down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression
and unwarranted interference by any department of government
and its agencies.
II WON THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION;
No.
Dr. Alberto Bondoc, a Medical Specialist with the Provincial Health
Office, conducted the first autopsy and found no spermatozoa and
no recent physical injuries in the hymen. Allegedly, the minimal
blood found in her vagina could have been caused by her
menstruation.
We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March
1, 1994 by Dr. Dominic L. Aguda, a medico-legal officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation. His findings affirmed the absence
of spermatozoa but revealed that the victim's hymen had
lacerations. We have also ruled in the past that the absence of
spermatozoa in the vagina does not negate the commission of rape
nor does the lack of complete penetration or rupture of the hymen.
What is essential is that there be penetration of the female organ no
matter how slight.
In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the
other circumstantial evidence justify the conviction of
appellant.
Appellant’s defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution
evidence. His alibi cannot even stand the test of physical
improbability at the time of the commission of the crime.
Barangay Tangos is only a few kilometers away from
Concepcion Subdivision and can be traversed in less than half
an hour.
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(49) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL et
al. [G.R. No. 123137, October 17, 2001]
FACTS:
Herein accused was charged and convicted of murder by the trial
court. On appeal, appellants argue that the prosecution’s
circumstantial evidence against them is weak, ambiguous, and
inconclusive. Specifically, appellants contend that the testimony of
P/Inspector Lemuel Caser, the prosecution’s ballistics expert,
clearly shows that: (1) He is ignorant about such ballistics
instruments such as the micrometer, goniometer, and pressure
barrel. (2) He is not conversant with "the required references
concerning ballistics," particularly books on the subject by foreign
authorities. (3) He could not "scientifically determine the caliber of a
bullet." Since P/ Inspector Caser lacked adequate training and
expertise in ballistics, they claim that his opinion that the test bullets
and cartridges matched the slugs and cartridges recovered from the
scene of the crime was not reliable. Appellants also assail Caser’s
failure to take the necessary photographs to support his findings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not testimony of an expert witness which was given
credence of the trial court may be assailed on appeal on the ground
of incompetence.
HELD:
An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling
to which the subject matter of the inquiry relates and who
possesses special knowledge on questions on which he proposes
to express an opinion." There is no definite standard of determining
the degree of skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in
order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the following factors
be present: (1) training and education; (2) particular, first-hand
familiarity with the facts of the case; and (3) presentation of
authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based. The
question of whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert
opinion on ballistics rests with the discretion of the trial court.
In the instant case, P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics
expert. He is a licensed criminologist, trained at the Ballistics
Command and Laboratory Center in Fort Bonifacio, in the PNP
Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, and in the National Bureau of
Investigation. He had previously testified as an expert witness in at
least twenty-seven (27) murder and homicide cases all over the
country. An expert witness need not present comparative
microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to support his
findings. Examination under a comparison microscope showing that
the test bullet and the evidence bullet both came from the same gun
is sufficient. Moreover, the ballistician conclusively found similar
characteristic markings in the evidence, test cartridges and slugs.
(50) AZOLLA FARMS V. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. NO.
138085, November 11, 2004]
FACTS:
Azolla Farms embarked on certain project. In need for case, it
obtained a loan from a bank, through its President. When the loan
was approved, the bank did not release the entire proceeds of the
loan at once, but released the same on installment basis. It came to
the attention of the bank that the president diverted the proceeds of
the loan for purposes other than the project for which the loan was
applied. Thus, the bank refused to release the remaining proceeds
of the loan, resulting in the eventual failure of the project.
A complaint was then filed by Azolla Farms and the President
against the bank. In the complaint, they admitted that the loan
transactions and other collateral agreements that they entered into
were all legal. Their only complaint was the malicious refusal by the
bank to release the remaining proceeds of the loan. However,
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019
during trial, one of the witnesses of the bank testified and disclosed
some facts establishing that the transactions were somehow invalid.
Taking cue from the disclosures made by the witness, Azolla Farms
and the President tried to amend their complaint to now include an
allegation that the transaction was invalid and prayed that it be
declared null and void.
HELD:
Supreme Court sustained Azolla farms applying the rule on
amendment to conform to evidence under Rule 10, Section 5.
SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
evidence —When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but
failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow
the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby
and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or
defense upon the merits.
The foregoing provision envisions two scenarios:
(1) When evidence is introduced on an issue not alleged in the
pleadings and no objection was interjected
(2) When evidence is offered on an issue not alleged in the
pleadings but this time an objection was interpolated.
In cases where an objection is made, the court may nevertheless
admit the evidence where the adverse party fails to satisfy the court
that the admission of the evidence would prejudice him in
maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the court may grant
him a continuance to enable him to meet the new situation created
by the evidence.
It was petitioners’ belief that respondent’s evidence justified the
amendment of their complaint. The trial court agreed thereto and
admitted the amended complaint. On this score, it should be noted
that courts are given the discretion to allow amendments of
pleadings to conform to the evidence presented during the trial.
(51) BELTRAN VS SAMSON [G.R. No. 32025, September 23,
1929]
supra
(52) PEOPLE VS MUSA [G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993]
Marijuana in a plastic bag; Plain view doctrine
Principle: ​The "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the
object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent
from the "plain view" of the object.
Facts:
A Narcotics Command (NARCOM) team based in Zamboanga City,
planned a buy-bust operation to arrest herein accused, Mari Musa.
Amado Ani, the poseur buyer, approached Mari Musa, who came
out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he
wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked
money. After receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his
house and came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper
wrappers containing dried marijuana. Convinced that the contents
were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions and
raised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams on standby sped
towards the location and arrested Musa.
25 | University of San Carlos
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One NARCOM officer frisked Mari Musa but could not find the
P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where
the P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the
money to his wife (who had slipped away). They then searched the
entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized what was
described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the
corner of the kitchen." They asked the appellant about its contents
but failing to get a response, they opened it and found dried
marijuana leaves.
At the trial, the appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic
bag and the marijuana it contains. the trial court issued an Order
ruling that these are admissible in evidence.
Issue: WON the plastic bag containing the marijuana is admissible
in evidence.
Ruling:
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search
and seizure may be effected, exceptions to this rule are recognized.
Thus, in ​Alvero v. Dizon​, the Court stated that. "[t]he most important
exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search
and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's
lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.
Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence.
However, the plastic bag was not within their "plain view" when they
arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure since the NARCOM
agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before
they sighted the plastic bag.
Moreover, even if an object is observed in "plain view," ​the "plain
view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain
view" of the object.
Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came
across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what
may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic
bag and not the marijuana. ​It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag
clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration,
its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an
observer.
(53) THE UNITED STATES vs. ONG SIU HONG [G.R. No.
L-12778 August 3, 1917]
SC: We find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court,
particularly relative to the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution, members of the secret service. On point only requires
consideration.
FACTS:
Counsel for appellant raise​s the constitutional question that the
accused was compelled to be a witness against himself. The
contention is that this was the result of forcing the accused to
discharge the morphine from his mouth.
RULING:
No case exactly in point can be found. But, by analogy, the decision
of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in U. S. ​vs. Tan Tan,
following leading authorities, and the persuasive decisions of other
courts of last resort, are ​conclusive​.
EVIDENCE | Batch 1 (20-53) | Atty. Torregosa | EH501 S.Y. 2018-2019 🐷🐷🐷  
 

To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is

along the same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before the
court;​ or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken from
the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng
case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used
in proving his guilt.

It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine

Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article, substance, or thing
taken from a person accused of crime could not be given in
evidence. The ​main purpose of this ​constitutional provision is to
prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to
extort unwilling confessions f​ rom prisoners implicating them in the
commission of a crime.

Following the practice of this court in cases of this character, the

judgment of the lower court is modified by imposing the minimum
penalty provided by law, i. e., three months imprisonment and a fine
of P300 or, in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment,
with costs.

 
 
26 | University of San Carlos