People v Hernandez

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL.,

99 Phil. 515.

Facts:

This refers to the petition for bail filed by defendant appellant Amado Hernandez on June 26, 1954, and renewed on
December 22, 1955. The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and has been convicted of, rebellion
complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed,
although the lower court sentenced him merely to life imprisonment. On the other hand, the defense contends,
among other things, that rebellion can not be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.

The amended Information contained the allegation that on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the
said date and continuously thereafter until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating, and cooperating with each other, as well as with the 31 other defendants, being then
officers and/or members of, or otherwise associated with the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly
known as the Committee on Labor Organization (CLO), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously help,
support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' (HMB) or the
Hukbalahaps (“Huks”) to rise publicly and take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate
in such armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the
government and laws thereof, as in fact the said Huks have risen publicly and taken arms to attain the said purpose
by then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army
detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection
therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder,
arson, and planned destruction of private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear
so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose.

Issue: Can Rebellion be made into a complex crime?

Held: No, it cannot.

Wherefore, the aforementioned motion for bail of defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez is hereby granted and,
upon the filing of a bond, with sufficient sureties, in the sum of P30,000, and its approval by the court, let said
defendant-appellant be provisionally released. It is so ordered.

Ratio:

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: "When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."

Pursuant to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code "any person, merely participating or executing the commands of
others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period."

The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for "any person who promotes, maintains
or heads a rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any public office or employment, takes part therein":

1. "engaging in war against the forces of the government",

2. "destroying property", or

3. "committing serious violence",

4. "exacting contributions or"

5. "diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated".

Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one offense, and no more, and
are, altogether, subject to only one penalty — prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000.

One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135, is by "engaging in war
against the forces of the government" and "committing serious violence" in the prosecution of said "war". These
expressions imply everything that war connotes, namely; resort to arms, requisition of property and services,
collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and
the hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake — except that, very often, it is worse than war in the
international sense, for it involves internal struggle, a fight between brothers, with a bitterness and passion or
ruthlessness seldom found in a contest between strangers. Being within the purview of "engaging in war" and
"committing serious violence", said resort to arms, with the resulting impairment or destruction of life and property,
constitutes not two or more offense, but only one crime — that of rebellion plain and simple. Inasmuch as the acts
specified in said Article 135 constitute, one single crime, it follows

necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48, which requires therefor the commission
of, at least, two crimes.

Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be
committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as
common like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the Government the
territory of the Philippines Islands or any part thereof," then said offense becomes stripped of its "common"
complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character
of the latter.

There is one other reason — and a fundamental one at that — why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in
the case at bar: If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately
(assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for
the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending
upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor; and (2) for the crime of
murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present.
In other words, in theabsence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
However, under Article 48, said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a singlea
ggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would
be unfavorable to the movant. Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the
culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts
performed by him were punished separately.
Enrile v Salazar

In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus, Juan Ponce Enrile v. RTC QC Judge Jaime Salazar

G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990

186 SCRA 216

Ponente: Justice Narvasa

Facts:

In the afternoon of 2/27/1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader JPE, and spouses Panlilio, was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the NBI on the strength of a warrant issued by respondent judge
earlier that day, for rebellion and multiple murder during the period of the failed coup attempt from 11/29 to
12/10/1990. JPE was taken and held overnight at the NBI headquarters in Taft Avenue, without bail, none having
been recommended in the information and none fixed in the warrant. The following morning, he was brought to
Camp Karingal in QC. That day, JPE, through counsel, filed a petitione for habeas corpus, alleging he was deprived of
his constitutional rights in being held to answer for a criminal offense nonexistent in statute books and charged with
a crime in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or no preliminary investigation was conducted
(thus no due process), granted. The Solicitor General argued that petitioners’ case does not fall within the
Hernandez ruling because the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes as a necessary
means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and
frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. The court granted JPE and the
Panlilio spouses provisional liberty on bail. Petitioners pray for the abandonment of the Hernandez ruling, rule that
rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes and that Hernandez applies only to offenses committed in furtherance,
or as a necessary means, to commit rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also
constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character.

Issue:

Whether or not rebellion can be complexed with murder.

Held:

No. Hernandez stands. Murder is absorbed in rebellion. If murder were punished separately from rebellion, and the
two crimes were separately punished, then 2 penalties would be imposed, and so the extreme penalty could not be
imposed, which would be unfavorable. The purpose of RPC48 is to favor the culprit, not of sentencing him to a
penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished
separately. If one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than
that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in
such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty
lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. When two or more crimes are the
result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and
distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum
of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate
penalties for each offense. Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion
with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. Also, since the information does not charge an offense,
and disregarding phrasing that rebellion be complexed, indictment is to be read as charging only simple rebellion.
Hence, entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right.
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin

September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 573

Facts:

An information was charged against Senator Juan Ponce Enrile for having committed rebellion complexed with
murder with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Another information was subsequently filed with the Regional
Trial Court 9of Makati, charging the former with a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 for willfully and
knowingly obstructing or delaying the apprehension of Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan.

Allegedly, Senator Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Gringo Honasan by giving him food and comfort on
December 1, 1989 in his house and not doing anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. It was the
prosecution’s contention that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while rebellion is
based on Revised Penal Code; thus, the two crimes can be separately punished.

Issue: Can a separate crime of a violation of PD 1829 be charged against the petitioner?

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court used the doctrine that if a person cannot be charged with the complex crime of rebellion, he
can neither be charged separately for two different offenses, where one is a constitutive or component element or
committed in furtherance of rebellion.

It was also noted that petitioner was already facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with Honasan. Being in
conspiracy thereof, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of
rebellion or an act done in furtherance of rebellion. It cannot be made the basis of a separate charge.

Also, the High Court reiterated that in cases of rebellion, all crimes committed in furtherance thereof shall be
absolved. Hence, the other charge of rebellion complexed with murder cannot prosper. All crimes, whether
punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in
furtherance of rebellion, become absorbed and it cannot be charged as separate crimes.
OCAMPO V. ABANDO - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

FACTS:

A mass graveyard was found at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte by the43rd Infantry Brigade
containing 67 skeletal remains of those believed to be victims of “Operation Venereal Disease (VD)” by the
Communist Party of the Philippines/ New People’s Army/National Democratic Front (CPP/NPA/NPDF) of the
Philippines. This was done to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.

Members of the Scene of the Crime Operation team conducted forensic crime analysis to identify the bodies by way
of DNA sample. The initial report of the PNP Crime Laboratory on their identities remained inconclusive, but, in a
Special Report, the Case Secretariat of the Regional and National Inter-Agency Legal Action Group came up with ten
names of possible victims after comparing the testimonies of relatives and witnesses.

Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu sent undated letters to Pros.
Vivero, requesting for legal action on the twelve attached complaint affidavits. These were from relatives of the
alleged victims of Operation VD who all swore that their relatives had been abducted or last seen with members of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP.

Charging them with murder, the affidavits were directed to 71 named members of the group, including the
petitioners. Namely, the petitioners were Ocampo, Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad who were all pointed out to be
members of the Central Committee that ordered the campaign to be carried out in 1985.

On this basis, Pros. Vivero issued a subpoena requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and Ocampo
complied. However, Echanis and Baylosis did not do so because allegedly they were not served the copy of a
subpoena. As for Ladlad, though his counsel made formal appearance during the preliminary investigation, he also
did not submit for the same reason as the two.

Pros. Vivero, in a resolution, directed the filing of information for 15 counts of multiple murder against the 54
named members, including the petitioners. He also caused some respondents to be used as state witnesses for their
testimony is vital to the prosecution. Said information was filed before RTC Hilongos, Leyte branch 18 presided by
Judge Abando.

Prior to receiving the resolution, Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Hearing. Judge
Obando found probable cause and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended
bail.

Ocampo went to the Supreme Court by way of special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 and
asked for the abovementioned order and the prosecutor’s resolution to be annulled. He said that a case for rebellion
against him and 44 others was then already pending before RTC Makati and so, the crime of murder was absorbed
by the rebellion in line with the political offense doctrine.
The Court ordered the Solicitor General to comment on the issue and also ordered the parties to submit their
memoranda. From the oral arguments, the Court found that the single Information charging them all of 15 counts
of murder was defective. The prosecution moved to admit amended and new information, but Judge Abando
suspended the proceedings during the pendency of the case before the Court.

Meanwhile, Echanis was arrested and he, along with Baylosis, filed a Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/
Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend
Service of Warrant, but it was dismissed by Judge Abando. Around this time, Ladlad filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss
with the RTC Manila.

Echanis and Baylosis moved to reconsider but it was not acted because, as per request of the DOJ Secretary to
change the venue of the trial, the records were transmitted to RTC Manila. Echanis and Baylosis continued to seek
relief from the Supreme Court in response to Judge Abando’s orders. Echanis also prayed for his release.

Both Ocampo and Echanis were granted provisional release by the Supreme Court under cash bonds.

As to Ladlad’s Motion to Quash, it was denied by respondent judge and the same happened to his Motion for
Reconsideration. Ladlad sought to annul the latter’s orders by way of special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

As to their bail, Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail whereas Baylosis filed a Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post
Bail which were granted, with no opposition from the OSG (bec. they’re consultants of the NDFP negotiating team,
then having talks with the GRP peace panel).

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ right to due process was violated.

HELD: NO. Petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the
warrants of arrest.

A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is conducted to protect the innocent from the embarrassment,
expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory
rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the administration of criminal
justice.

In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the opportunity to be heard. It
serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to the accusation.
Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief
that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating
officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.

"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one's
defense." What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to
present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.

As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis that they were denied due process, we quote the pertinent
portion of Prosecutor Vivero’s Resolution, which states:
In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[,] the respondents were
issued and served with Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit their counter-affidavits and that of
their witnesses.

Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no longer be found in their
last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen
Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem
failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance by their respective counsels.

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the
evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made,
and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid. The
rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.In
this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named respondents at their
last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority of them could no longer be
found at their last known addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and the attached documents
or evidence.

Moreover, Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the complaint after his
counsel’s formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he
refused to participate.

We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit
back, relax and await the outcome of their case."106 Having opted to remain passive during the preliminary
investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot now claim a denial of due process, since their failure to file a
counter-affidavit was of their own doing.

As to Ocampo’s claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of
Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of the Resolution, it must be pointed out that the period for
filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of receipt of
the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This is clear from Section 3 of the 2000
National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:

Sec. 3. Period to appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution, or of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration/ reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the assailed resolution. Only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero on 12 March 2007,108 the former had
until 27 March 2007 within which to file either a motion for reconsideration before the latter or an appeal before
the Secretary of Justice. Instead, petitioner Ocampo chose to file the instant petition for certiorari directly before
this Court on 16 March 2007.
Case of People of the Philippines vs. Elias Lovedioro y Castro G.R.No. 112235 29November1995 (People vs.
Lovedioro 250 SCRA 389)

Case of People of the Philippines vs. Elias Lovedioro y Castro

G.R.No. 112235 29November1995 (People vs. Lovedioro 250 SCRA 389)

Rebellion -- Art.134 of the Revised Penal Code

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Elias Lovedioro with 3 other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus Lucilo while Lucilo was walking along Burgos St.
away from Daraga, Albay Public Market. The victim died on the same day from massive blood loss. On November 6,
1992, Elias Lovedioro was then charged of the crime of murder, and subsequently found guilty. Lovedioro then
appealed the decision, contesting the verdict of murder instead of rebellion. It was confirmed by the prosecution’s
principal witness that Lovedioro was a member of the New People’s Army.

ISSUES OF THE CASE: Was the RTC correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of murder, instead of rebellion?

- Yes. Because, overt acts and purpose are essential components of the crime of rebellion, with either of these
elements wanting, the crime of rebellion does not exist.

- Political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime- alleging rebellion in order to
lessen the possible imposable penalty- could benefit from the law’s relatively benign attitude towards political
crimes. If no political motive is established or proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and
not of rebellion.

- In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the
furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself suffice.

- The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, offered no contribution to the achievement of the
NPA’s subversive aims, in fact, there were no known acts of the victim’s that can be considered as offending to the
NPA.

- Evidence shows that Lovedioro’s allegation of membership to the N.P.A was conveniently infused to mitigate the
penalty imposable upon him.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused
of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.
People vs Umali

People vs Umali

G.R. No. L-5803

November 29, 1954

Facts:

The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, et. al were found guilty was said to have been committed
during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951,
by armed men. The raid took place resulting in the burning down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor
Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the
house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan,
and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians.

During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house and two
Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers
stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellants are liable of the charges against them of complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery?

Held:

Yes. The appellants were guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. For the
crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000;
for each of the three murders, each of the appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of
each victim in the sum of P6,000; and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article
321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in setting fire to the buildings,
particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more persons, because they even
and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating circumstances
of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the
decision of the lower court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy penalties already
imposed and their long duration, the court finds it unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences
corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega,
Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below will stand. With these modifications, the decision appealed
from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
PEOPLE vs CABRERA

GR ## GR No. 17748

Plaintiff/Appellee

: The People of the Philippine Islands,

Defendant/Appellant

: Graciano L. Cabrera et al. Date January 1, 2013

DOCTRINE

Sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state.

(SHORT VERSION)

Because of certain incidents, the Philippine constabulary and the Police of Manila had a rough relationship with each
other. The constabulary force had grudges against the Police force of Manila. One night, the constabulary force went
to attack the Police force, killing and wounding several policemen and civilians.

FACTS

The Philippine Constabulary has grudges against the police of Manila and they want to inflict revenge for the
following reasons: (1) On December 13, 1920, a Manila police arrested a woman who is a member of the household
of a constabulary soldier and was allegedly abused by the said policeman. (2) Private Macasinag of the Constabulary
was shot by a Manila police and was mortally wounded. A day after the incident, a rumor spread among the
Constabulary that the Police who shot Macasinag was back to his original duties while Macasinag was declared
dead. There were also rumors that the said shooting was ordered. On the night of December 15 some members of
the Constabulary escaped their barracks through a window (the saw out the window bars). They had rifles and
ammunitions and were organized in groups under the command of their sergeants and corporals. They attacked
some Manila policemen in these specific instances: (1) On Calle Real, Intramuros, a group of the Constabulary shot
and killed an American Policeman and his friend. (2) The Constabulary indiscriminately shot at a passer- by, causing a
death and wounding most of the passengers. (3) While riding a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, Captain
William E. Wichman (asst. chief of police in Manila) was shot and killed together with Saplala

ISSUES/HELD

(1) Is there connivance/conspiracy between the accused-

YES

(2) Are the accused properly convicted of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law-

YES
RATIO

(1) Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances which vary
according to the purposes to be accomplished. If it be proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the same
object, one performing one part and another another part of the same, so as to complete it, with a view to the
attainment of the same object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to the
effect that object. It is incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued with the same purpose, which was to
avenge themselves on the police force of Manila. A common feeling of resentment animated all. (2) Sedition, in its
more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The Philippine law on the subject
makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force of outside of legal
methods any one of five objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property
of any official or agent of the Insular government or of a provincial or municipal government. The counsel contested
that it is necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public functioinary, and
what really happened was a fight between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government. The court held that this
contention is without foundation.

The Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies. What is important is
that there is a public rising to incite or inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or
agent of the Insular government or of a provincial or municipal government. DECISION

Judgment

affirmed
Inciting to Sedition

US v. TOLENTINO

FACTS:

On 14 May 1903, Aurelio Tolentino and others presented a theatrical work written by the former entitled, “Kahapon
Ngayon at Bukas” in Tagalog language at the Teatro Libertad in Manila. The piece contained seditious words and
speeches, and scurrilous libels against the Government of the US and the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands which were uttered during the presentation as if tending to obstruct the lawful officers in the execution of
their offices, instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, suggest and incite rebellious
conspiracies and riots and disturb the peace, safety and order of the community.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the theatrical performance of Tolentino were acts of inciting to sedition.

HELD:

YES. The theatrical performance of Tolentino were acts of inciting to sedition.

RATIO:

The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time, place, and manner of its presentation, was to
inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the American people and the Government of the United States in the
Philippines, and we are satisfied that the principal object and intent of its author was to incite the people of the
Philippine Islands to open and armed resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce them to conspire
together for the secret organization of armed forces, to be used when the opportunity presented itself, for the
purpose of overthrowing the present Government and setting up another in its stead.
Espuelas vs People

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!

Espuelas vs People

G.R. No. L-2990

December 17, 1951

Facts:

On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had
his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the
limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his
photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general
circulation and other local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for
their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide,
Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay
and administration of President Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his wife
his dear wife to write to President Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the government
is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.

Issue:

Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the Government of the Philippines?

Held:

Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to the legality of the
penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.
Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written bybthe accused, cannot fail to impress
thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort
to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to
particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances,
the rationable of free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the
constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and his
men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of
the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer of least to the
President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were
naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld.

Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up people against
the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who may seek to silence the writer. Which is the
sum and substance of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of
illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the
Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds.
MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN petitioner,vs.

THE HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, and THE CITY WARDEN OF
MANILA, respondents.

G.R. Nos. L-34046-7 March 24, 1972

FACTS:

The question raised in these certiorari proceedings is the scope to be accorded the constitutional immunity of
senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in going to and
returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace.

Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr., as delegate of the present Constitutional
Convention would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the above constitutional provision, if
considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer or employee who
shall, during the sessions of Congress, "arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has
committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor."

Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, for falsification of a public document and for violation of the
Revised Election Code.

The Solicitor General dispute such a contention on the ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any
criminal prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that insofar as
a provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it would be unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not senators should be immune from the criminal charges.

HELD:No. As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution, the immunity from arrest does not cover
any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war against the
Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether
defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute.

It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and any breach thereof renders
one susceptible to prosecution. There is a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge
their vital responsibilities.

When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without
justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune
during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent
from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need
for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any
other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.
People v Beltran (1985) case digest

G.R. Nos. L-37168-69 September 13, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.

DELFINO BELTRAN, alias Minong, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ, alias Doming; CEFERINO BELTRAN, alias Ebing; MANUEL
PUZON alias Noling; CRESENCIO SIAZON, alias Ising; and ROGELIO BUGARIN, alias Boy, accused-appellants.

RELOVA, J.:

FACTS:

Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran and others were indicted for murder and double attempted murder with direct
assault evidence shows that in Ballesteros, Cagayan, Ernesto Alvarado was bringing Calixto Urbi home in a jeep.
Passing by the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran shouted at them, "Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of your mother).

They proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After Alvarado had brought Urbi to his house he went to the
house of Mayor. The newly elected Mayor told the Chief of Police that something should be done about it.

When they came near the compound, they saw appellants and suddenly there was a simultaneous discharge of
gunfire, The mayor's son, Vicente, and Mayor also suffered injuries.

I: W/N appellants guilty of attempted murder with direct assault.

H: Yes. considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at
the time was in his uniform, and both were performing their official duties to maintain peace and order in the
community, the finding of the trial court that appellants are guilty. For the double attempted murder with direct
assault, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed on the aforesaid appellants is reduced to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum.
PEOPLE v DOLLANTES (151 SCRA 592) June 30, 1987 G.R. 70639

FACTS

Marcos Gabutero at the time of his death was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental.
The Barangay Captain delivered a speech to start a dance for an approaching fiesta in the evening of April 21, 1983.
While the Barangay Captain was delivering a speech, the accused Pedro Dollantes went to the middle of the dancing
floor, making a dance movement known in the visayan as "nagkorantsa", brandishing his knife and challenging
everyone as to who was brave among the people present; the Barangay Captain approached Pedro Dollantes and
reprimanded him to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance. However, the accused, instead of heeding to the
advice of the Barangay Captain, stabbed the latter on the left arm. Immediately thereafter, accused Hamlet
Dollantes, who rushed towards the Barangay Captain, stabbed the Barangay Captain at the back and the other co-
accused also took turns in stabbing the Barangay Captain; the Barangay Captain at that time was not armed. When
the Barangay Captain fell to the ground and died, the accused took turns in kicking the dead body of the Barangay
Captain and were dancing around said dead body. The Barangay Captain suffered eleven (11) wounds in the
different parts of his body, two of which happened to be at the back of his dead body. According to the attending
physician, Dr. Rogelio Kho who examined the body of the deceased, the victim died of severe hemorrhage and
cardiac tamponade due to stab wounds.

ISSUE

WON, the accused is guilty of the complex crime of assault upon a person in authority resulting to murder

HELD

When a Barangay Captain is in the act of trying to pacify a person who was making trouble in the dance hall, he is
therefore killed while in the performance of his duties. As the Barangay Captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws
and ordinances within the Barangay and if in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who
thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority.
JUSTO v COURT OF APPEALS (99 PHIL 453) June 28, 1956 G.R. L-8611

FACTS

Nemesio de la Cuesta is a duly appointed District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools stationed at Sarat, Ilocos
Norte. On October 16, 1950, he went to Laoag to answer a call from the office to revise the plantilla of his district. At
about 11:25 am, de la Cuesta was about to leave his office to take his meal when he saw Severino Justo conversing
with Severino Caridad, an Academic Supervisor. Justo requested de la Cuesta to go with him and Caridad to the
office of the latter. In the office, Justo asked about the possibility of accommodating a certain Miss Racela as a
teacher. Caridad said that there was no vacancy except the position of shop teacher, Justo abruptly said “shet, you
are a double crosser. One who cannot keep his promise”, Justo grabbed a lead paper weight and challenged de la
Cuesta to go out. They left the office, when they’re in front of the table of Carlos Bueno, de la Cuesta asked Justo to
put down the paper weight but instead Justo grabbed the neck and collar of the polo shirt of de la Cuesta, which was
torn as a result. Carlos Bueno separated de la Cuesta, but not before de la Cuesta had boxed Justo several times.
Justo argued that when de la Cuesta accepted his challenged to fight outside and followed him out of the room of
Mr. Caridad where they had a verbal clash, de la Cuesta disrobed himself of the mantle of authority and waived the
privilege of protection as a person in authority.

ISSUE

WON, the de la Cuesta is still a person in authority after accepting the challenge to “go out” and fight

HELD

The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a public official until he ceases
to be in office. Assuming that the complainant is not actually performing the duties of his office when assaulted, this
fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault upon a person in authority, so long as the impelling motive of
the attack is the performance of official duty. Also, where there is a mutual agreement to fight, an aggression ahead
of the stipulated time and place would be unlawful since to hold otherwise would be to sanction unexpected
assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty and fair play.
ALBERTO and INTIA vs. HON. DE LA CRUZ and ORBITA

READ IPAD Print Screen

TOPIC: Crimes Against Public Order: Evasion of Service of Sentence

Tanega v Masakayan

GR No. L-27191

Date of Promulgation: February 28,1967

Ponente: Sanchez, J.

Petitioner: Adelaida Tanega

Respondent: Hon. Honorato B. Masakayan, In His Capacity As Judge Of The Court Of First Instance Of Rizal, Branch V,
And The Chief Of Police Of Quezon City

Nature: original petition for certiorari and prohibition

Digest By:PSPambid

Doctrine: Art 157. Elements of evasion of service of sentence include: (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping
during the term of his sentence. Prescription of penalties commences only if the convict escapes.

Brief: Petitioner was convicted of slander and was sentenced to arresto mayor. She failed to show up when a
warrant for her arrest was issued, and was never arrested. After a year, she claims that the prescription of the
penalty has already prescribed. Respondent judge ruled otherwise. SC concurs.

Facts:

• Petitioner was convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City.

• She was found guilty once again by the Court of First Instance where she was sentenced to 20 days of
arresto menor, to indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs.

• The Court of First Instance of Quezon City, on January 11, 1965, directed that execution of the sentence be
set for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's motion, execution was deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the
appointed day and hour, petitioner failed to show up. This prompted the respondent judge, on February 15, 1965, to
issue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest.

• Petitioner was never arrested.

• Petitioner moved to quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March 23, 1965. (Ground:
Penalty has prescribed.)

• On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the penalty imposed upon the accused has to be
served", rejected the plea of prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the issuance of another alias warrant of
arrest. Hence, the present petition.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Issue: WON Prescription of sentence has commenced

Held: NO

Ratio:

• Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a light penalty.

• By Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code, light penalties "imposed by final sentence" prescribe in one year.

• The period of prescription of penalties — so the succeeding Article 93 provides — "shall commence to run
from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence".

• Elements of evasion of service of sentence are:

o the offender is a convict by final judgment;

o he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty";

o he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.

• Article 157: provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken by means of unlawful
entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit,
violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, ... "

• evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking"

• Petitioner was never placed in confinement and the prescription of penalty does not run in her favor.

Dispositive:

Petition DISMISSED.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-1960. November 26, 1948.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENTINO ABILONG, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, Florentino Abilong, the
accused, being then a convict sentenced and ordered to serve destierro during which he should not enter any place
within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila for attempted robbery, evaded the service of said
sentence by going beyond the limits made against him and commit vagrancy.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code,
which does not cover evasion of service of "destierro."

RULING:

It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase
"sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor General
impliedly admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense
that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of
Manila. Under the case of People vs. Samonte, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it is clear that a
person under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the
penalty when he enters the prohibited area."
TORRES v. GONZALES

Petitioner: WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG

Respondents: HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF PRISONS

FACTS:

1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the condition that he shall not
violate any penal laws again. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In
1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’
pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec
Dep’t erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were
not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be
validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence.

HELD: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code, a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial
act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon.

Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a
court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be
charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed.

In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial
scrutiny.

*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was conditionally pardoned it was a generous
exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner
carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the
pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the Government [has] such power been intrusted.
People vs Dioso

132 SCRA 616

FACTS: Accused Dioso and Abarca were members of the" Balang Mindanao" gang. While serving their sentence at
the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, they killed their fellow inmates namely: Gomez and Reyno who were
members of Happy Go Lucky gang who have been suspected as authors of the slaying of their gangmate. Both
accused voluntarily surrendered and entered plea of guilty that they inflicted fatal blows while Gomez was lying
down under a mosquito net and Reyno was taking his breakfast. The trial court found them guilty and imposed
death penalty for the crime of murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not a quasi- recidivist who committed murder be imposed a death penalty despite the presence
of mitigating circumstances.

HELD: Yes, a quasi a recidivist who committed murder be imposed a death penalty despite the presence of
mitigating circumstances.

RATIO: The Supreme Court ruled that it is thus noted that in their briefs, no attempt was made to impugn the lower
court's conclusion as to their guilt. Instead, they seek attenuation of the death sentence imposed by the trial court
by invoking the circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty. The court finds no necessity to discuss at
length the effects of such mitigating circumstances on the penalty imposed. Suffice it to say that the accused are
quasi-recidivist, having committed the crime charged while serving sentence for a prior offense. As such the
maximum penalty prescribed by law for the felony (murder) is death, regardless of the presence or absence of
mitigating or aggravating circumstance or the complete absence thereof. But for lack of the requisite votes, the
Court is constrained to commute the death sentence imposed on each of the accused to reclusion perpetua.