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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Napa County Superior Court
Appellate Division
Gary Lieberstein
District Attorney,
SBN 928 12
Kathryn Susemihl
Deputy District Attorney,
SBN 242909
93 1 Parkway Mall
Napa, CA 94559
Phone: (707)253-4211
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
11. STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
111. ISSUES ON APPEAL 1
V. ARGUMENT 2
I. JUDGE I(R0YER DID NOT ERR BY NOT
ASKING APPELLANT IF HE WANTED TO
TESTIFY IN HIS OWN DEFENSE 2
11. WHETHER THE HONORABLE MONI UE
LANGHORNE-JOHNSON COMMITE %
ERROR WITH REGARDS TO APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO UASH IS NOT A PROPER
8.
SUBJECT OF HIS APPEAL 5
111. A MOTION TO SUPPRESS WAS HEARD
BY THE HONORABLE STEPHEN T.
KROYER AT THE COURT TRIAL AND
RULED W O N EVEN THOUGH THE MOTION
WAS UNTIMELY 5
IV. APPELLANT'S CITATION FOR DRIVING
WITHOUT A LICENSE IN ADDITION TO
- TWO VEHICLE CODE ~ R A C T I O N SWAS
PROPER AND HIS DETENTION WAS ~ O T
VIOLATIVE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 6
V. SERGEANT HUNTER FOLLOWED PROPER
STATUTORY PROCEDURES AND APPELLANT
WAS PROPEKY BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT 9
VI. CONCLUSION 10
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CALIFORNIA STATUTES
California Penal Code Section 19.7
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 8, 2010 a Court Trial was conducted in which
Appellant, Rik Wayne Munson, was found guilty of violating
California Vehicle Code Sections 12500, driving without a license,
and 16028(a), failure to provide evidence of financial
responsibility.
On April 2,2010 a Notice of Appeal was filed and on August
23, 2010 a copy of Appellant's Opening Brief was delivered to The
People of the State of California, the Respondent.
Appellant's Appeal is baseless and without merit and should be
denied for the reasons set forth below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent respectfully requests that the Court refer to the
Reporters Transcript of Proceedings for the full account of the
Court Trial.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Was it error for the learned trial judge not to sua sponte ask
the pro per defendant if he wanted to testify in his own
defense?
2. Did the Honorable Monique Langhome-Johnson commit
error by not considering sua sponte appellant's motion to
quash as either a common law suppression motion or a
motion in arrest of judgment?
3. Did the Honorable Stephen T. Kroyer err in not sua sponte
treating appellant's motion to quash as either a common law
suppression motion or a motion in arrest of judgment?
4. Are vehicle code infractions subject to the general criminal
law under penal code section 19.7?
5. Assuming that vehicle code infractions are not subject to
the penal code, was the defendant's detention violative of
the fourth amendment as an arrest without a warrant?
6. Did the prosecution prove that Sergeant Hunter as a deputy
sheriff had the authority to enforce traffic laws in American
Canyon?
ARGUMENT
Appellant does not cite any legal authority which states a judge
is required to ask the pro per defendant if he wants to testify in his
own defense. Appellant concludes that this is a structural enor and
therefore reversible per se, even though he gives no authority for
that other than analogizing it to other stsuctural errors. He,
however, fails to establish that he was not given an opportunity to
testify in his own defense.
At the trial on March 8,2010, during cross examination of
Sergeant Hunter, Appellant disagreed with an answer that was
given and was informed, by the Court, that his chance to testify
would come. (R.T. 44:4-8). The Court also told Appellant that at
this point in the trial he was just, "creating evidence, so to speak."
(R.T. 53:20-24).
Once the People rested, the Appellant was given the opportunity
to make an opening statement, which he waived. (R.T. 55:24-26).
He was then asked if he would like to present any additional
evidence today, at which point he produced a document and offered
it into evidence. It was discussed at length and eventually admitted
into evidence. (R.T. 55:27 - 589). The Court then again asked the
Appellant, "are there any other items of evidence you want to
present?'to which he responded, "no, I think that's going to do it."
(R.T. 58:9-11) At which point, the case went to closing arguments.
At no time did Appellant call himself as a witness or indicate that
he wished to do so.
It is well settled that a pro per defendant who chooses to
exercise his right to self-representation will be held to the same
standard as other attorneys in the case and they will not be given
special treatment by the coud. Faretta v. California (1975) 422
U S . 806, held that a defendant has a constitutional right to proceed
without counsel, although it might not always be a wise choice.
Appellant in this case was provided and signed a Record of
Faretta Warnings, on December 7,2009, which indicated that he
would not receive special treatment from the court and would be
required to comply with all the rules of criminal procedure and
evidence, as if he was an attorney.
During the course of the trial, Appellant made legal objections
which were sustained by the Court. He demonstrated to the Court
his knowledge of the legal system and the rules of procedure and
evidence. He was told by the Court that his chance to testify would
come later and when asked if he had any other evidence to present
he indicated that he did not. He did not call himself as witness. He
cannot now blame the trial court for not asking him, using specific
words, if he wished to testify in his own defense.
Appellant was not denied the right to testify. The only reason
the trial court did not hear testimony from Appellant is because he
did not offer any testimony to the trial court.
This Court does not need to address the issue of whether this is
a trial error subject to the harmless error rule or structural error
requiring reversal because there was never a denial of the right to
testify.
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11. WHETHER THE HONORABLE MONIQUE
LANGHORNE-JOHNSON COMMITTED ERROR WITH
REGARDS TO APPELLANT'S MOTION TO QUASH IS
NOT A PROPER SUBJECT 0 P THIS APPEAL
infractions and Penal Code section 19.7, is moot, as he was cited for
Hunter, "was only entitled to write the ticket for which appellant
infractions only to discover and arrest the person for driving under
further supports the notion that an officer can detain and arrest a
746.)
violated the California Vehicle Code may stop the vehicle involved
538-539.)
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle code was being violated based
18). He contacted the driver of the vehicle, the Appellant, and asked
Appellant did not provide him with those documents and told him
that the vehicle code had been vioIated and he therefore issued a
that a county sheriff does not have legal authority to enforce traffic
upon which he relies does not apply to Napa County, as the county
Sheriff with the County of Napa and that on the date in question he
ION LAUGHRIDGE
IEFENSE COUNSEL
is follows:
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California
hat the foregoing is true and correct.
7 M a . m
Pamla J. ant