R.A.

9165
People vs. Goco. G.R. No. 219584. October 17, 2016
Facts:
1) Goco was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs defined and penalized under
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, respectively.
2) PO2 Emano served as the poseur-buyer who, together with other police members, arrested Goco in a buy-bust
operation.
Issue: Whether there is a proper chain of custody of the seized items establishing beyond reasonable doubt the
identity of the prohibited drugs.
Ruling: NO. In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must establish the following: (a) the identities of the buyer, seller, object, and consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. What remains material for conviction is proof that the transaction
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. On the other hand, in order to convict an
accused for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the accused was in possession
of an item or object identified as dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
In both cases, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. In order
to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken
chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous
drug, from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
As a general rule, the apprehending team must strictly comply with procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and
the IRR. However, their failure to do so does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and
invalid if: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved.
In order to fulfil the chain of custody requirement, the prosecution must identify the persons who handled the seized
items from seizure up until their presentation in court as evidence. To do so, the prosecution must present testimonies
about every link in the chain, in such a way that every person who touched the illegal drugs would describe how and
from whom they were received. Where they were and what happened to them while in his or her possession, the
condition in which he or she received them, and their condition upon delivery. The witnesses must describe the
precaution taken to ensure that there was no change in the condition of the illegal drugs and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possessed the said items. Also, crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking
of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused.
In this instance, the prosecution failed to show who handled the seized items after PO2 Emano took hold of them,
how their custody was transferred to another, who marked the seized sachets of drugs, and when and how they were
marked.
Taken together, the lapses committed by the police officers in accounting for the procedure laid out in Section 21 of
RA 9165 and the IRR, more so their questionable handling of the seized drugs cast serious doubt on the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items. As the said drugs presented before the court as evidence constitute the corpus
delicti of the offenses charged, it must be proven with moral certainty that there are the same items seized from Goco
during the buy-bust operation and the ensuing search. As the prosecution failed to do so, Goco must be acquitted on
the ground of reasonable doubt.
R.A. 9165
People vs. Guillergan. G.R. No. 218952. October 19, 2016
Facts:
1) By virtue of a search warrant, the police officers recovered 39 plastic sachets of shabu from Guillergan’s room.
2) Guillergan appealed from the decision of the CA affirming the RTC’s decision convicting him for violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
3) Guillergan insists that there had been procedural deviations from the mandatory requirements in Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 since (1) no photographs were taken of the illegal drugs; (2) the seized items were not
immediately marked; (3) no evidence show the seized items were managed, preserved, and recorded from the
forensic chemist until their presentation in court; and (4) the apprehending officers did not immediately deliver
the seized items and the inventory to the judge who issued the search warrant.
Issue: Whether there is compliance with the mandatory procedural requirements of Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165.
Ruling: YES. In ascertaining the identity of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia presented in court as the
ones actually seized from the accused, the prosecution must show that: (a) the prescribed procedure under Section
21(1), Article II of RA 9165 has been complied with or falls within the saving clause provided in Section 21(a),
Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165; and (b) there was an unbroken link in the
chain of custody with respect to the confiscated items.
In People v. Dimaano, we held that xxx Section 21 cannot be used to thwart the legitimate efforts of law enforcement
agents. Slight infractions or nominal deviations by the police from the prescribed method of handling the corpus
delicti should not exculpate an otherwise guilty defendant. Substantial adherence to Section 21 will suffice as long
as the integrity and the evidentiaty value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.
In People v. Kamad, we held that the following links must be established in the chain of custody:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
From the recitation of facts, as well as the evidence on record, we believe that the chain of custody had been
sufficiently observed by the PDEA officers. The links in the chain are the following:
(1) At the house of Guillergan where the illegal drugs were found, the apprehending officer listed each of the
seized items in the presence of the barangay officials, media representative, and Guillergan himself even if
no photographs were taken and the items were not maker after seizure. The items were then turned over by
the apprehending officer to the custody of PDEA’s exhibit custodian for safekeeping.
(2) The next day, the seized items were marked at the office of PDEA and brought to the Iloilo City Prosecution
Office where they were inventoried and photographed then returned to the judge who issued the warrant;
(3) After the seized items were presented in court, the items were brought to the crime laboratory for examination;
and
(4) Chemical and confirmatory tests revealed that the specimens contained shabu as indicated in the forensic
chemist’s report.
R.A. 9165
Luy vs. People. G.R. No. 200087. October 12, 2016
Facts:
1) Petitioner, whose husband, Nestor, was a detainee in the Olongapo City jail, was arrested in flagrante delicto for
the illegal possession of shabu as she was entering the gate of the jail compound by JO3 Joaquin, the female
guard, during the latter’s routine inspection of her person and personal belongings.
2) During trial, petitioner denied that the shabu belonged to her arguing that a certain Melda had requested her to
bring the jar of strawberry juice inside the jail compound for her husband, Bong, also a detainee.
3) In her appeal, petitioner insists that CA erred in affirming her conviction despite the failure of the prosecution to
show that arresting officer JO3 Joaquin had faithfully complied with the requirements on the chain of custody
under Sec. 21 of RA 9165
Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty of violation of Sec. 11 of RA 9165.
Ruling: YES. xxx, a successful prosecution for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 11
of RA No. 9165 requires that the following essential elements of the offense be established, namely: (a) the accused
was in possession of an item or object identified as dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law;
and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
The RTC after the trial and the CA on appeal rejected petitioner’s denial and explanation. We also reject them now.
Denial, aside from being easily fabricated, had been the common excuse tendered by those arrested and prosecuted
for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Under Section 11 of RA No. 9165, however, the mere possession of
the dangerous drugs was enough to render the possessor guilty of the offense.
In fine, all the essential elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs were established. To start with, she was
caught in the voluntary possession of the shabu. And, secondly, she presented no evidence about her being authorized
to possess the shabu. Worthy to reiterate is that her mere possession of the shabu constituted the crime itself. Her
animus possidendi - the intent to possess essential in crimes of mere possession like this was established beyond
reasonable doubt in view of the absence of a credible explanation for the possession.
Thirdly, the petitioner insists that the State did not prove the chain of custody of the shabu. In our view, however,
her immediate admission of the possession of the shabu following her arrest in flagrante delicto bound her for, under
the rules on evidence, the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact was admissible against her. Her
admission renders her insistence irrelevant and inconsequential.
R.A. 9165
People vs. Zacaria. G.R. No. 214238. September 14, 2016
Facts:
1) Subsequent to a buy-bust operation, accused-appellant Zacaria was arrested and then charged for sale and
possession of dangerous drugs punishable under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA No. 9165.
2) Accused-appellant contended that the accusations were baseless because the prosecution failed to prove that there
was indeed a sale of shabu as there was no simultaneous actual exchange of the money and the shabu.
Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty of violation of Secs. 5 and 11 of RA 9165.
Ruling: YES. As correctly held by the lower courts, the elements of Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165 or sale of
illegal drugs: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment for it, are present. Also, the prosecution adequately established the existence of all the elements of
the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of the same Act, to wit: (1) the
accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized
by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
Finding no reversible error in the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower courts, the Court resolves to
Affirm in toto the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
xxx. The CA rejected Zacaria’s contention that because there was no simultaneous actual exchange of the money
and shabu, and the prosecution failed to present in evidence the buy-busy money, an acquittal is in order. The CA
held that contrary to the defense’s averments, it is enough that the prosecution was able to present evidence that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. “What is
material in prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. This has been complied with by the prosecution. As
borned by the records, SPO2 Montederamos testified on the sale transaction and identified the shabu in court – SPO2
Montederamos identified Zacaria as the seller.
The CA averred that the fact that no money changed hands is not a fatal defect. There is no requirement that in buy-
bust operations, there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between the
poseur-buyer and the pusher.
The failure to present the buy-bust money is likewise not fatal. “The marked money used in the buy-bust operation
is not indispensable, but merely corroborative in nature. xxx Neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation
of any money used in the buy-bust operation.
With regard to the arresting officers’ failure to immediately conduct an inventory, take photographs, and conduct the
same in Zacaria’s presence or his representative, the CA held that the inventory and laboratory examination
conducted on 17 May 2004 or two days after the arrest, which is beyond the 24-hour period required by law, were
justifiable because the presence of a DOJ representative could not be met on the day of the arrest and the following
days, being a Saturday and a Sunday, What is of utmost importance in the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused:
xxx.
While the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with Section 21, the seized items were marked and kept to
preserve their integrity before their inventory. There is nothing to indicate that the seized items were tampered.
R.A. 9165
People vs. Lintag. G.R. No. 219855. September 6, 2016
Facts:
1) Subsequent to the buy-bust operation, Lintag was arrested and two plastic sachets each containing white
crystalline substance from Lintag were seized, leading to the charges of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA
9165 against the latter.
2) The buy-bust team, organized by PSI Baybayan and SPO3 Valdez, was composed of PO3 Dimacali as the poseur-
buyer, and three other police officers as back-ups.
Issue: Whether there is compliance with the chain of custody rule justifying the conviction of the accused of violation
of Sec. 5 of RA 9165.
Ruling: NO. To secure conviction under the aforesaid provision, the prosecution must establish the concurrence of
the following elements: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Material for such conviction is proof that the transaction actually took
place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the corpus delicti. As the dangerous drug itself forms an
integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential that the identity of the prohibited drug
be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in
court as proof of the corpus delicti.
In view of the importance of ensuring that the dangerous drug seized from an accused is the same as that presented
in court as evidence against him, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides for a “chain of custody rule,” or a
standard protocol which the police officers must adhere to in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized contraband. xxx
After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the
substance allegedly confiscated from Lintag due to unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus, militating against
a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
It is, thus, clear that PO3 Dimacali had custody of the seized items from the time of seizure until their arrival at the
police station. Thereupon, PO3 Dimacali marked the seized items and, subsequently, turned them over to SPO2
Gonzales. The items were then delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory for confirmatory test on their contents. xxx.
An examination of the records, however, reveals that as indicated in the PNP Crime Laboratory’s receiving stamp
on the request for laboratory examination, it was SPO3 Valdez – and not SPO2 Gonzales – who delivered such
request and presumably, the seized plastic sachets as well, to Forensic Chemical Officer PI Mariano. This
immediately puts in to question how SPO3 Valdez came into possession of the seized items, which was neither
explained by the prosecution through presentation of testimonial or documentary evidence, nor sufficiently addressed
by the courts a quo. Thus, absent any adequate explanation on the matter, there arises a substantial gap in the chain
of custody of the plastic sachets seized from Lintag. Undoubtedly, this compromises the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti of the crime charged. It is settled that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the
presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral
certainty that they are the same seized items. Failing in which, the acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable
doubt becomes a matter of right, as in this case.
R.A. 9165
People vs. Bombasi. G.R. No. 211608. September 7, 2016
Facts:
1) According to the version of facts of the prosecution, following the information of the location of the accused
Bombasi, a buy bust operation was conducted whereupon PO1 Signap gave two 100-peso bills to Bombasi who,
in turn, handed to the former a small plastic sachet containing substance suspected to be shabu.
2) PO1 Signap testified for the prosecution where he said that he is able to identify the specimen or the object of
the buy bust operation through the markings he personally placed.
Issue: Whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the illegal drugs.
Ruling: NO. xxx, We inescapably note the prosecution’s failure to give even a simple indication that the substance
that was being presented in court was identified to be the same substance sold by the appellant. In fact it was not
presented or show to the witness for the intended identification.
Recall that PO1 Signap categorically testified that he marked the seized substance placed in a small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet with appellant’s initial “M.B.”. However, when the same substance was brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination, per written request, the specimen submitted bore a different marking “MB-B.”
Precisely, this is the same substance with the corresponding marking that was examined by PCI Tria and eventually
offered in court as evidence which undoubtedly is not the same substance marked by the poseur-buyer. Worse, there
was no explanation given on the discrepancy in the markings.
To recapitulate, for a successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs like shabu, the
prosecution is bound not only to establish the following elements: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
and consideration of the sale and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor but also it is equally
essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in
court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite
to make a finding of guilt. This requirement is found wanting in this case. It is evident that the identity of the corpus
delicti has not been properly preserved and established by the prosecution. We therefore find that the prosecution
has not been able to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty invoked by the prosecution and relied upon by the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome
the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
R.A. 9165
People vs. Dela Cruz. G.R. No. 212171. September 7, 2016
Facts:
1) Pursuant to a buy-bust operation, the police officers gave 2 marked P100.00 bills to accused Dela Cruz who, in
return, handed to PO1 Reales a small plastic containing white crystalline substance.
2) When the back-up police officers rushed to the scene and eventually got hold of Dela Cruz, the latter shouted for
help and resisted arrest.
3) Dela Cruz was able to run and evade arrest with the help of Ortega who blocked the way of the police officers.
4) Upon arresting Ortega for obstruction of justice, PO1 Reales handed to PO3 Batobalonos the small plastic
containing the substance.
5) Thereafter, upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Bartobalonos marked the seized item.
Issue: Whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the illegal drugs.
Ruling: NO. It is therefore clear beyond any shadow of doubt that the buy-bust operation had been substantially
completed and consummated. The fact that the accused-appellant was able to evade the arrest immediately after the
sale and that she was arrested only after, by virtue of a warrant of arrest, did not change the fact that the crime she
committed earlier had been consummated.
We agree with the lower courts that in the absence of any intent or ill-motive on the part of the police officers to
falsely impute commission of a crime against the accused-appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty is entitled to great respect and deserved to prevail over the bare, uncorroborated denial and self-
serving claim of the accused of frame-up.
Also, we reject the appellant’s contention that the police officers failed to comply with the provisions of Section 21,
paragraph 1 of RA No. 9165, which provides for the procedure in the custody and disposition of seized drugs.
Anent accused-appellant’s contention that the drugs were marked not at the place where she was apprehended but at
the police station and that there was no physical inventory made on the seized item nor was it photographed, we find
the same untenable. The alleged non-compliance with Section 21 of RA No. 9165 was not fatal to the prosecution’s
case because the apprehending team properly preserved the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized drugs.
xxx Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of custody in the handling of evidence, “substantial
compliance with the legal requirements on the handling of the seized item” is sufficient. xxx What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized
in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In other words, to be admissible in evidence, the
prosecution must be able to present through records or testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the
time these were seized from the accused by the arresting officers; turned-over to the investigating officer; forwarded
to the laboratory for determination of their composition; and up to the time these are offered in evidence.
In the instant case, the failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Sec. 21 of RA No. 9165 was satisfactorily
explained by the apprehending officers. They testified that a commotion erupted when accused-appellant resisted
and shouted for help while she was being arrested. xxx
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or
proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant bears the burden of showing that the evidence
was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by
public officers and the presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties. Accused-appellant in this
case failed to present any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers.
R.A. 9165
People vs. Ando. G.R. No. 212632. August 24, 2016
Facts:
1) Resulting from a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers, the two accused, husband and wife, was
arrested and sued for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165.
2) The accused appeal their conviction contending that the police officers failed to comply with the provisions of
Section 21, paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 9165, the physical inventory and marking of the seized items not being done
at the place of arrest.
Issue: Whether the unbroken chain of custody rule was properly complied with, justifying the conviction of the
accused for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165.
Ruling: YES. To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the prosecution is able
to establish the following essential elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. Then delivery of
the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the
buy-bust transaction. Here, all the aforesaid elements necessary for accused-appellants' prosecution have been
sufficiently established, clearly showing that they indeed committed the offense charged. PO1 Vargas, the designated
poseur-buyer, testified during trial how she was able to purchase from accused-appellants P500.00 worth of shabu.
The prosecution was able to duly establish that the sale between PO1 Vargas and accused-appellants actually took
place. The item seized, which tested positive for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, was likewise
positively and categorically identified during trial.
Indeed, what is important in prosecutions for illegal sale of prohibited drugs is that the prohibited drug sold and
delivered by the accused-appellants be presented before the court and that the accused-appellants be identified as the
offender by the prosecution witnesses.9 We note that in the instant case these were successfully done by the
prosecution.

We agree with the lower courts that in the absence of any intent or ill-motive on the part of the police officers to
falsely impute commission of a crime against the accused-appellants, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty is entitled to great respect and deserves to prevail over the bare, uncorroborated denial
and self-serving claim of the accused of frame-up. This presumption in favor of the apprehending officers can be
rebutted only if clear and convincing evidence is presented to prove either of two things: (1) that they were not
properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any improper motive. None of these were presented
to overturn the presumption.
The alleged non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal to the prosecution's case because the
apprehending team properly preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs. In People v.
Ganguso,this Court held that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment operation
especially when the buy-bust team members were accompanied to the scene by their informant. Further, there is
nothing in the Rules which say that the arrest is invalid and the seized item inadmissible in evidence, if the physical
inventory and marking was not done at the place of arrest. In fact, in People v. Sanchez, the Court instructs that in
case of warrantless seizures such as a buy-bust operation, the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted
at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable.
R.A. 9165
People vs. Tumulak. G.R. No. 206054. July 25, 2016
Facts:
1) Pursuant to a planned buy-bust operation, Senior Inspector (SI) Oliveros, who acted as poseur-buyer, met with
the accused in a café where the latter will sell ecstasy.
2) At the café, the accused pulled out one ecstasy tablet and gave it to SI Oliveros so he could examine it.
3) When SI Oliveros asked about the other 29 ecstasy tablets, the accused demanded that he give her the payment
first so she could count it inside the restroom, to which SI Oliveros complied by handing a white envelope
containing two pre-marked P500-bills and the boodle money.
4) Before the accused can enter to the restroom, SI Oliveros and his companion introduced themselves as NBI
agents and arrested her, inspected her bag, and found all 30 pieces of ecstasy tablets.
5) Consequently, the RTC found Mitch guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs.
Issue: Whether the accused is liable for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Ruling: NO. In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established:
(1) proof that the transaction took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence. To prove that a sale transaction had taken place, the following elements must be proved: (1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.

The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling
transaction which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. So long as the police officer went
through the motion as a buyer and his offer was accepted by the seller and the drug was delivered to the police officer,
the crime was consummated by the delivery of the goods. In other words, what is important is that the poseur-buyer
received the drug from the accused.

In the present case, Mitch did not deliver to SI Oliveros all thirty (30) ecstasy tablets; instead they were merely
confiscated when she was arrested before she could go to the restroom of Café Adriatico. xxx it can be seen that the
element of delivery of the dangerous drug is missing because Mitch never handed SI Oliveros, the poseur-buyer, all
thirty (30) ecstasy tablets, the object of the illegal sale.

[However] [u]nder the rule on variance, while Mitch cannot be convicted of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs because the sale was never consummated, she may be convicted for the attempt to sell as it is necessarily
included in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

A crime is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution, which should produce the felony, by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance.

In the present case, Mitch intended to sell ecstasy and commenced by overt acts the commission of the intended
crime by showing the substance to SI Oliveros. To our mind, showing a sample is an overt act of selling dangerous
drugs since it reveals the intention of the offender to sell it to the poseur-buyer. Also, in requiring SI Oliveros to
show the P60,000.00 before she delivers the ecstasy tablets, Mitch’s intent to sell was established.

More importantly, the only reason why the sale was aborted is because the police officers identified themselves as
such and placed Mitch under arrest – a cause that is other than her own spontaneous desistance.

All told, all elements for the offense of attempted sale of dangerous drugs was established in this case.
R.A. 9165
People vs. Bartolini. G.R. No. 215192. July 27, 2016
Facts:
1) Pursuant to a buy-bust operation, accused Bartolini was arrested by the police officers who recovered the marked
money and three stalks of marijuana from the accused
2) The buy-bust team, together with Bartolini, went to the Tagoloan Police Station where the seized items were
marked by SPO4 Larot, and the Certificate of Inventory, prepared by SPO4 Larot, was signed by SPO4 Larot,
Bartolini, and Barangay Kagawad Abenque.
3) On appeal, the accused argues that there is non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 which cause
the failure to establish the corpus delicti of the offense which must result in the reversal of his conviction.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of the offense justifying the reversal of the conviction.
Ruling: YES

In a case involving dangerous drugs, the substance itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the
fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. In People v. Gatlabayan, this Court held that it is of
prime importance that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt; and that it must be
proven with exactitude that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is exactly the same substance offered
in evidence before the court.

We find that the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of the crime beyond reasonable doubt as there were
significant gaps in the chain of custody. xxx The prosecution has the duty to prove every link in the chain, from the
moment the dangerous drug was seized from the accused until the time it is offered in court as evidence. The marking
of the seized item, the first link in the chain of custody, is crucial in proving an unbroken chain of custody as it is the
starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as a reference point. xxx

In this case, we find that the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish the first link in the chain of custody. There
was a failure to mark the drugs immediately after the items were seized from Bartolini. The items were marked only
at the police station and the prosecution offered no reasonable explanation as to why the items were not immediately
marked after seizure. We have previously held that the failure to mark the drugs immediately after seizure from the
accused cast doubt on the prosecution’s evidence, which warrants an acquittal on reasonable doubt.

There have been cases when the Court relaxed the application of Section 21 and held that the subsequent marking at
the police station is valid. However, this non-compliance is not fatal only when there are (1) justifiable grounds and
(2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. And while the amendment of RA
9165 by RA 10640 now allows the conduct of physical inventory in the nearest police station, the principal concern
remains to be the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. In this case, however, the
prosecution offered no explanation at all for the non-compliance with Section 21, more particularly that relating to
the immediate marking of the seized items. xxx The prosecution also failed to offer any explanation as to why no
media representative was present, despite the fact that the police had already conducted a test-buy operation a few
days before.

The failure to immediately mark the seized items, taken together with the absence of a representative from the media
to witness the inventory, without any justifiable explanation, casts doubt on whether the chain of custody is truly
unbroken. Serious uncertainty is created on the identity of the corpus delicti in view of the broken linkages in the
chain of custody.
R.A. 9165
People vs. Ygot. G.R. No. 210715. July 18, 2016
Facts:

1) Accused-appellant was charged before the RTC with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
2) Accused-appellant submits that the arresting officers failed to comply with the procedural requirements in
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II, R.A. No. 9165, alleging that the prosecution erred in not presenting the
confidential informant who appears to be the first person in possession of the items, and the other persons who
received the items prior to its forensic examination.
3) The accused-appellant relied on the ruling of this Court in People v. Habana, to wit: “If the sealing of the seized
substance has not been made, the prosecution would have to present every police officer, messenger, laboratory
technician, and storage personnel, the entire chain of custody, no matter how briefly one's possession has been.
Each of them has to testify that the substance, although unsealed, has not been tampered with or substituted while
in his care.”

Issue:
Whether the prosecution’s failure to present every police officers, and personnel cast doubt on the certainty of the
identity of the seized items.
Ruling: NO
The case cited by accused-appellant is not in all fours with the instant case. In the Habana case, the Court emphasized
the need for everyone who took possession of the items to testify because the seized items were not properly placed
in a container. In the case before us, the Certificate of Inventory of items which was duly signed by a media
representative, a Department of Justice (DOJ) representative, an elected barangay official, as well as accused-
appellant himself clearly reflected that the shabu was contained in two heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets.
Moreover, there is no need for the informant to identify the shabu since it has already been sufficiently and
convincingly identified through the testimonies of other prosecution witnesses. After all, the presentation of an
informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution
because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative. There was also no need for Police Officer 1
(PO1) Telan, the person who received the confiscated specimen at the Bohol Provincial Crime Laboratory, to testify
at the trial because the fact of his possession of the seized items had already been duly testified to by Police Chief
Inspector Pinky Sayson Acog (PCI Acog), the person who eventually received the items and conducted the
examination of the specimen submitted.
R.A. 9165
People vs. Abenas. G.R. No. 210878. July 7, 2016
Facts:

1) Accused-appellant was convicted by the CA of violation of Section 5 (illegal sale of dangerous drugs) and Section
11 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs), Article II of RA No. 9165.
2) Accused-appellant submits, for the first time on appeal, that the prosecution failed to comply with the
requirements of law with respect to the proper marking, inventory and taking of photograph of the seized
specimen.
3) Meanwhile, during trial, the prosecution failed to present as witness PO1 Moyao who was one of the arresting
officers who arrested the accused, and the one who took initial custody of the illegal drugs.

Issue:
Whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of (1) illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
and the (2) illegal possession of dangerous drug.
Ruling: (1) YES (2) NO
In the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements must be proven: "(1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it."

In the present case, these elements were satisfied by the prosecution's evidence. The prosecution witnesses positively
identified appellant as the seller of the white crystalline substance which was found to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Appellant sold the drug to SPO1 Badua, a police officer who acted as poseur-buyer for a
sum of P1,000.00. The prosecution's witnesses likewise positively and categorically testified that the transaction or
sale actually transpired. The subject shabu xxx were also identified by the witnessed when presented in court.

However, it does not escape the Court's attention that appellant failed to contest the admissibility in evidence of the
seized item during trial. In fact, at no instance did she manifest or even hint that there were lapses on the part of the
police officers in handling the seized item which affected its integrity and evidentiary value. "[O]bjection to the
admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." In the present case, the police operatives'
alleged non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 was raised for the first time on appeal before the CA.
In any event, it is "settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to faithfully observe the
requirements provided under Section 21 of RA 9165, for as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken." Here,
it is beyond cavil that the prosecution was able to establish the necessary links in the chain of custody of the specimen
subject of the sale from the moment it was seized from appellant, the delivery of the same to the crime laboratory up
to the time it was presented during trial as proof of the corpus delicti.
While we uphold the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of appellant by the trial court and affirmed by the CA
in the illegal sale of shabu xxx, we are of the considered view, however, that the quantum of evidence needed to
convict, that is proof beyond reasonable doubt, has not been adequately established by the prosecution in the charge
of illegal possession of dangerous drug under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 xxx.
xxx, there was no clear identification of the item allegedly seized from the possession of appellant after the sale. Of
all the people who came into direct contact with the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from appellant, it was only
PO1 Moyao who could directly and possibly observe the uniqueness thereof in court. According to SPO1 Badua and
SPO1 Lag-ey, it was PO1 Moyao who took initial custody of the seized plastic sachet when appellant was frisked at
the time of arrest and who allegedly marked the same with initials. But for no apparent reason, PO1 Moyao was not
even presented in court to identify the plastic sachet and more importantly to acknowledge the alleged marking
thereon as her own.
R.A. 9165
People vs. Abenas. G.R. No. 210878. July 7, 2016
Facts:

1) During a buy-bust operation, accused-appellant was apprehended for allegedly selling one plastic sachet
of shabu to poseur buyer.
2) Subsequent to the buy-bust operation, two more plastic sachets of suspected shabu were seized and accordingly
marked while accused-appellant was handcuffed and brought to the San Juan Police Station.
3) At the police station, PO1 Antazo prepared the booking sheet and arrest report and handed the seized drugs to
PO1 Rio G. Tuyay and then turned them over to the crime laboratory.
4) Meanwhile, accused-appellant asserted that there were gaps in the chain of custody of the seized drugs and non-
observance of the requirements of Section 21, R.A. No. 9165 by the police officers.

Issue:
Whether the prosecution complied with the procedural requirements of Sec. 21 of RA 9165.
Ruling: NO

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs embodied in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 also ensures the
identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized. The provision requires that upon seizure of the illegal drug items,
the apprehending team having initial custody of the drugs shall (a) conduct a physical inventory of the drugs and (b)
take photographs thereof (c) in the presence of the person from whom these items were seized or confiscated and (d)
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice and any elected public official (e) who shall all be
required to sign the inventory and be given copies thereof.

In the present case, the requirements of physical inventory and photograph-taking of the seized drugs were not
observed. This non-compliance raises doubts whether the illegal drug items used as evidence in both the cases for
violation of Section 5 and Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 were the same ones that were allegedly seized from appellant.

The apprehending team never conducted an inventory nor did they photograph the seized drugs in the presence of
the appellant or his counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or an elective official
either at the place of the seizure, or at the police station. In People v. Gonzales, this Court acquitted the accused
based on reasonable doubt due to the failure of the police to conduct an inventory and to photograph the seized plastic
sachet. We explained therein that "the omission of the inventory and the photographing exposed another weakness
of the evidence of guilt, considering that the inventory and photographing - to be made in the presence of the accused
or his representative, or within the presence of any representative from the media, Department of Justice or any
elected official, who must sign the inventory, or be given a copy of the inventory - were really significant stages of
the procedures outlined by the law and its IRR."

R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations both state that non-compliance with the procedures would
not necessarily invalidate the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs provided there were justifiable grounds for
the non-compliance, and provided that the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti was preserved.

A review of the records yielded no explanation nor justification tendered by the apprehending team for their non-
compliance with the procedure laid down by Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Considering that the non-
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 in the case at bar had not been explained nor justified, the identity
and integrity of the drugs used as evidence against appellant are necessarily tainted. Corpus delicti is the actual
commission by someone of the particular crime charged. In illegal drugs cases, it refers to illegal drug itself. When
the courts are given reason to entertain reservations about the identity of the illegal drug item allegedly seized from
the accused, the actual crime charged is put into serious question. Courts have no alternative but to acquit on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
PD 1689
Belita vs. Sy. G.R. No. 191087. June 29, 2016
Facts:

1) Petitioners are the incorporators and directors of IBL Realty Development Corporation (IBL), a domestic family
corporation engaged in the buying and selling of real properties.
2) Private respondents filed their respective complaints against petitioners before the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), alleging the following facts: That petitioner Delia sold real properties to respondents who relied on Delia's
representation that she was authorized to sell the same; that respondents paid to Delia or her representatives the
purchase price; that the title was not delivered, and the properties turned out to be owned by persons different from
those claimed by Delia.
3) By virtue of such complaint, State Prosecutor II Juan Pedro C. Navera issued a Resolution finding the existence of a
probable cause for Syndicated Estafa against respondent.
4) In the instant petition, petitioners insist that they are not organized as anyone of the group enumerated in P.D. 1689
nor they soliciting funds from the general public.

Issue:

Whether there is probable cause against petitioners for the commission of syndicated estafa, or specifically, whether
IBL belongs to the corporations punished under Sec. 1 of PD 1689 in relation to Article 315, 4th par., [2][a] of the
RPC.
Ruling: YES

To determine whether there is probable cause in this case, the elements of the crime charged, syndicated estafa in
this case, must be present. Under Section 1 of P.D. 1689, there is syndicated estafa if the following elements are
present: 1) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC was committed; 2)
the estafa or swindling was committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and 3) the fraud resulted in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang
nayon[s]," or farmers associations or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.

Indeed, based on the documentary evidence presented so far, petitioners were swindled into parting with their
money for the purchase of real estate properties upon the representation that petitioners were authorized to sell said
properties. Consequently, respondents suffered, among others, pecuniary losses in the form of the money they paid
to petitioners. All fourteen (14) petitioners are connected to IBL, either as officers, stockholders or agents. They
knowingly received payments from the respondents.

With respect to the third and last element of syndicated estafa, xxx. The law is explicit that it covers defraudations
or misappropriation of funds solicited by corporations from the general public. IBL is such
corporation.1âwphi1The operative phrase is "funds of corporations should come from the general public." IBL is
apparently engaged in the real estate business. Its funds come from buyers of the properties it sells.

In Galvez, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., we held that P.D. 1689 also covers commercial banks "whose fund
comes from the general public. P.D. 1689 does not distinguish the nature of the corporation. It requires, rather, that
the funds of such corporation should come from the general public."

xxx Its third "whereas clause" states that it also applies to other "corporations/associations operating on funds
solicited from the general public." The foundation fits into these category as it "operated on funds solicited from
the general public." To construe the law otherwise would sanction the proliferation of minor-league schemers who
operate in the countryside. To allow these crimes to go unabated could spell disaster for people from the lower
income bracket, the primary target of swindlers.”
R.A. 8550, Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998
Leynes vs. People. G.R. No. 224804. September 21, 2016
Facts:
1) Petitioners (all surnamed Leyes) were charged for violation of Section 94 of RA No. 8550 for cutting mangrove
trees and for excavating, constructing a dike, and installing an outlet in the mangrove forest without a fishpond
lease agreement.
2) Efren, one of the petitioners, denied the charge contending that the act punishable is “conversion” and that the
construction of dikes and installation of an outlet do not amount to conversion, but a rehabilitation and
improvement of the mangrove forest.
3) He further contend that prior to the introduction of improvements in the mangrove forest, it was already a
fishpond since 1970.
Issue: Whether the petitioners are guilty of violation of Section 94 of RA No. 8550, punishing conversion” of
mangrove forest into fishponds or for any other purposes.
Ruling: YES. For an offense of conversion of mangrove forest to exist, the following elements must concur:
1. The site of the fishpond is a mangrove forest;
2. There was a conversion of the mangrove area into a fishpond; and
3. The appellant made the conversion.
The presence of the first and third elements, i.e. the site of the fishpond is a mangrove forest and the appellant made
the conversion, are undisputed. Now, the discussion of whether or not there was a conversion of the mangrove forest
into a fishpond.
The relevant provisions is Section 94, RA No. 8550, to wit:
It shall be unlawful for any person to convert mangroves into fishponds
or for any other purposes.
As stated, the law punishes “conversion” of mangrove forest into fishponds or for any other purposes.
xxx As defined, conversion means “the act or process of changing from one form, state, etc., to another.” In the case
at bar Efren’s acts of cutting mangrove trees, constructing a dike, installing an outlet, and excavating in the mangrove
forest constitute conversion because it altered the natural structure and form of the mangrove forest. Even if we
consider Efren’s defense that when he inherited the mangrove forest area from his grandfather it was already a
fishpond, such does not absolve him from liability. His continued introduction of improvements and continued use
of the mangrove forest area as a fishpond, despite knowledge of the same being a mangrove forest area, impose upon
him criminal liability.
In any case, what the law prohibits is not only the conversion of the mangrove forest into fishponds, but its conversion
into any other purpose. Indeed, Efren may not have caused the conversion of the mangrove forest into a fishpond,
but his acts of cutting mangrove trees, constructing a dike, installing an outlet, and excavating in the mangrove forest
altered the natural structure and form of the mangrove forest – an act punishable by Sec. 95 of RA No. 8550.
Anent his claim of good faith, this Court, as already held in our past pronouncements, cannot give credence to such
defense. RA No. 8550 is a special aw. It punished conversion of mangrove forests into fishponds and for other
purposes. As a special law, failure to comply with the same being malum prohibitum, intent to commit it or good
faith is immaterial.
R.A. 9208
People vs. Villanueva. G.R. No. 210798. September 14, 2016
Facts:
1) Accused-appellant Villanueva was charged for violation of RA 9208 for the reason that she “recruited and
exploited AAA, a 13-year old minor, to work as a GRO”.
Issue: Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of Qualified Trafficking, defined and punished by RA
No. 9208, as amended.
Ruling: NO. The elements of trafficking in persons, derived from the expanded definition found in Section 3(a) of
RA No. 9208 as amended by RA No. 10364, are as follows:
(1) The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining,
harbouring or receipts or persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders,”
(2) The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving
or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person,” and
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude, or the removal or sale of organs.”
xxx shall still be considered “trafficking in persons” even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the first
paragraph of Sec. 3(a) of RA No. 9208. Given that the person allegedly trafficked in the case at bar is a child, we
may do away with discussion on whether or not the second element was actually proven.
In an attempt to prove the first element, the prosecution stresses the fact the accused-appellant is the registered owner
of the On Tap Videoke Bar. The prosecution insists that by merely being the registered owner, accused-appellant
necessarily committed the act of recruiting, maintaining, or harbouring AAA. Such contention is misplace.
Recruiting, harbouring, or maintaining a person for the purpose of exploitation are acts performed by persons who
may or may not be registered owners of establishments. Thus, being the registered owner per se does not make one
criminally liable for the acts of trafficking committed in the establishment. What the prosecution should have done
was to prove the act of trafficking by other means, and not by mere showing that accused-appellant was the registered
owner.
The prosecution likewise failed to prove the third element – that the recruiting, maintaining or harbouring of persons
is for the purpose of exploitation. Curiously, AAA was seen by the prosecution witnesses at the videoke bar only on
the day the rescue operation was conducted. That AAA was exploited could not be proven by her mere presence at
the videoe bar during the rescue operation. The prosecution should have presented evidence as to the nature of work
done by AAA, if any. Testimonies as to how often AAA was seen in the bar while entertaining customers could have
also lent credence to the prosecution’s contention that she was in the videoke bar because she was being exploited.
We rule that the circumstantial evidence cited by the appellate court does not lead to the inescapable conclusion the
accused-appellant committed the crime, let alone that a crime was actually committed. As previously mentioned, the
mere presence of AAA at the videoke bar does not prove the accused-appellant was maintaining or harbouring her
for the purpose of exploitation. xxx. Nowhere in the text of RA No. 9208 can it be inferred that a presumption arises
by the mere fact of presence of a child in a videoke bar or similar establishment. Our survey of jurisprudence likewise
does not reveal such established presumption. More to the point, the constitutive crime of trafficking through
harbouring or receipt of a person must be specifically for purposes of exploitation. In other words, establishing mere
presence without establishing the purpose therefor cannot be considered as an element of trafficking.
R.A. 9208
People vs. Ybañez. G.R. No. 220461. August 24, 2016
Facts:
1) The four accused-appellants were charged with Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 6 (a) and (c),
in relation to Sections 4 (a) and 3, and penalized under Section 10(a) and (c) of RA No. 9208.
2) The accused-appellants allegedly in conspiracy with one another, and by means of deceit and taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the victims, and for the purpose of exploitation, such as prostitution and
other forms of sexual exploitation, but under the pretext of domestic employment, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly recruit, receive, harbor and employ, four minors as a prostitute in Kiray Bar and
KTV Club Restaurant under the pretext of being employed as GRO's (Guest Relations Officer).
3) One of the accused-appellants denied the charges contending that there was no prostitution or lewd shows in
the bar and the employees were prohibited by their rules to flirt or engage in any indecent activity with the
customers.
4) The minors were taken and the accused-appellants were arrested pursuant to an entrapment operation.
Issue: Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 6 (a)
and (c), in relation to Sections 4 (a) and 3, and penalized under Section 10(a) and (c) of RA No. 9208.

Ruling: YES. Trafficking in Persons refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or
use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage
of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs.6 When the trafficked person is a child, a person below 18 years of age or
one who is over 18 but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, the offense becomes
qualified. 7 As supported by their birth certificates, Bonete was merely 15 years old and Antonio was 16 when they
were hired in 2006. Although Turado was more than 18 years old when she started at Kiray, she was found to be
functioning within a mildly retarded level, and therefore, incapable of protecting herself from abuse and exploitation.

The complainants categorically testified that they were hired as GROs and tasked to entertain customers to the extent
of even having sexual intercourse with them, and being paid commissions for said services. The bar was likewise
designed with a stage where the GROs were made to dance in provocative outfits. It had a VIP room where the
customers could caress and grope the girls, and a Super VIP room where they could completely satisfy their lust.
Even if the claims regarding the rules prohibiting flirting and lascivious conduct between the GROs and the
customers were true, the same would still not absolve accused-appellants from any liability. Said rules were merely
posted as meaningless warnings and were never really intended to be implemented, as evidenced by the fact that said
prohibited acts had actually been committed, tolerated, and perpetuated at Kiray.

Even assuming that their main task was to serve as waitresses, the evidence would show that Reyos and Huat did
more than just serve food and beverages to the customers. As Baso claimed, they even offered to bring him and his
team to the Super VIP room and they actually received the amount paid for the "additional service."

Therefore, the courts below aptly found that there was sufficient evidence that accused-appellants were indeed
engaged in the recruitment of young women for the purpose of prostitution or sexual exploitation.
R.A. 7610
Mabunot vs. People. G.R. No. 204659. September 19, 2016
Facts:
1) Petitioner, who was then 19 years of age and a student of Butigue National High School (BNHS), arrived in his
school under the influence of alcohol, and started to hurt his classmates.
2) Thereafter, petitioner boxed Shiva, his 14-year old classmate, on her left flank leaving the latter with a fracture
rib, prompting the charge of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA No. 7610 against petitioner.
3) The testimonies of the defense witnesses averred that the petitioner was actually having a fist fight with his
classmate Dennis when Shiva came to pacify them, but she was shoved, causing her to fall to the ground.
4) The petitioner posited that since he and Dennis were exchanging punches then, he could not have made a
deliberate design to injure Shiva. Without intent to harm Shiva, the petitioner insists that he deserves an acquittal.
Issue: Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of violation Section 10(a), Article VI of RA No. 7610.
Ruling: YES. “When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are
punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the
crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.”
The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA No. 7610, a special law. However,
physical abuse of a child is inherently wrong, rendering material the existence of a criminal intent on the part of the
offender.
In the petitioner’s case, criminal intent is not wanting. Even if the Court were to consider for argument’s sake the
petitioner’s claim that he had no design to harm Shiva, when he swang his arms, he was not performing a lawful act.
He clearly intended to injure another person. However, it was not Dennis but Shiva, who ended up with a fracture
rib. Nonetheless, the petitioner cannot escape liability for his error. Indeed, criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Article 265 of the RPC punishes physical injuries in general. On the other hand, RA No. 7610 is intended to provide
special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and other
conditions, prejudicial to their development.” Child abuse refers to the infliction of physical or psychological injury,
cruelty to, or neglect, sexual abuse or exploitation of a child. Physical injury includes but is not limited to lacerations,
fractured bones, burns, internal injuries, severe injury or serious bodily harm suffered by a child.
It is clear that Shiva was 14 years old when she received the blow, which her rib. Being a child, she is under the
protective mantle of RA No. 7610, which punishes maltreatment of a child, whether the same be habitual or not.
PD No. 442 or the Labor Code of the Philippines
People vs. Camannong. G.R. No. 199497. August 24, 2016
Facts:
1) Sometime, accused Camannong met with four complainants and introduced herself as a recruiter of workers for
deployment to Israel.
2) Upon the accused representations, complainants handed to the former P6,500.00 without asking for receipts.
3) The accused failed to comply with her promises prompting the complainants to demand the return of their money
and papers but accused asked for time to retrieve them.
4) When the accused defaulted again, the complainants returned to the former who told them that the POEA will
sue them if they insist on backing-out.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, penalized under Art. 38 par.
(b), in relation to Art. 39 par. (a), of the Labor Code.
Ruling: YES. The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are: (1) that the accused engaged
in acts of recruitment and placement of workers as defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or in any prohibited
activities listed under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the she had not complied with the guidelines by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment with respect to the requirement to secure a license or authority to recruit and deploy
workers, and (3) the she committed the unlawful acts against three or more persons.
We affirm the findings by the CA. xxx Both the courts below unanimously found that the accused-appellant had
misrepresented to the complainants her capacity to send workers abroad for employment. Believing her
misrepresentation, they parted with their money for her to process their deployment papers. It was established that
she did not have the necessary license or authority to engage in recruitment in the Province of Pangasinan, including
the Cities of Dagupan, San Carlos and Urdaneta, a fact duly attested to by a competent employee of the Department
of Labor and Employment. In this connection, the Prosecution did not even need to establish that she had not been
issued any license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Under the law, even
a licensee or holder of the authority to engage in recruitment who failed to reimburse the amounts received as
placement or related fees upon her failure to deploy the victim could be criminally liable for the crime.
One of the constant lessons from our experience as judges is that the non-issuance of receipts by the illegal recruiters
was also essential to the scheme to defraud the victims. By all means, then, should the lack of receipts not hinder the
courts from vindicating the victims of the fraud.
B.P. Blg. 22
Dela Cruz vs. People. G.R. No. 163494. August 3, 2016
Facts:
1) Tan Tiac Chiong filed a complaint for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the petitioner who issued to the former
23 post-dated checks which were eventually dishonoured by the drawee-bank.
2) The petitioner plead for his acquittal by contending, among others, that she failed to receive any notice of
dishonor on the subject checks, which rendered absent the element of knowledge of insufficient funds.
3) The prosecution attempted to prove the petitioner's receipt of a notice of dishonor by referring to a demand
letter, along with a registry receipt showing that the letter was sent by registered mail, and the registry return
card showing its receipt by a certain Rolando Villanueva.
Issue: Whether the prosecution successfully proved the element of petitioner’s knowledge of insufficiency of funds.
Ruling: NO. "To be liable for violation of B.P. [Blg.] 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the
making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment."

Although a notice of dishonor is not an indispensable requirement in a prosecution for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as it
is not an element of the offense, evidence that a notice of dishonor has been sent to and received by the accused is
actually sought as a means to prove the second element. Jurisprudence is replete with cases that underscore the value
of a notice of dishonor in B.P. Blg. 22 cases, and how the absence of sufficient proof of receipt thereof can be fatal
in the prosecution's case.

In Yu Oh v. CA, the Court explained that since the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to
establish, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 created a prima facie presumption of such knowledge xxx. Based on this section,
the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only after it is
proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to
pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as
provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or
drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no
way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period. xxx. Indeed, this requirement [on proof of receipt of notice of
dishonor] cannot be taken lightly because Section 2 provides for an opportunity for the drawer to effect full
payment of the amount appearing on the check, within five banking days from notice of dishonor. The absence
of said notice therefore deprives an accused of an opportunity to preclude criminal prosecution. In other
words, procedural due process demands that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner.

Similarly, in the instant case, the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the actual receipt by the petitioner of the
demand letter sent by Tan. No witness testified to authenticate the registry return card and the signature appearing
thereon. The return card provides that the letter was received by one Rolando Villanueva, without even further proof
that the said person was the petitioner's duly authorized agent for the purpose of receiving the correspondence.

Clearly, the prosecution failed to establish the presence of all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The petitioner
is acquitted from the 23 counts of the offense charged. The failure of the prosecution to prove the receipt by the
petitioner of the requisite written notice of dishonor and that she was given at least five banking days within which
to settle her account constitutes sufficient ground for her acquittal.