G.R. No. 147039. January 27, 2006. * be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.
The
DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE COMPANIES,
petitioner, vs.RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC.,
respondent.
Same; Evidence; The burden of proof refers to the duty of the
insured to show that the loss or damage is covered by the policy; The
burden of proof still rests upon petitioner to prove that the damage
or loss was caused by an excepted risk in order to escape any
liability under the contract.—The “burden of proof” contemplated
by the aforesaid provision actually refers to the “burden of
evidence” (burden of going forward). As applied in this case, it
refers to the duty of the insured to show that the loss or damage is
covered by the policy. The foregoing clause notwithstanding, the
burden of proof still rests upon petitioner to prove that the damage
or loss was caused by an excepted risk in order to escape any
liability under the contract.
Same; Same; Once respondent makes out a prima facie case in
its favor, the duty or burden of evidence shifts to petitioner to
controvert respondent’s prima facie case.—It is sufficient for private
respondent to prove the fact of damage or loss. Once respondent
makes out a prima facie case in its favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to petitioner to controvert respondent’s prima
facie case. In this case, since petitioner alleged an excepted risk,
then the burden of evidence shifted to petitioner to prove such
exception. It is only when petitioner has sufficiently proven that
the damage or loss was caused by an excepted risk does the burden
of evidence shift back to respondent who is then under a duty of
producing evidence to show why such excepted risk does not
release petitioner from any liability. Unfortunately for petitioner, it
failed to discharge its primordial burden of proving that the
damage or loss was caused by an excepted risk.
Same; Witnesses; Hearsay Evidence Rule; A witness may not
testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he
was told or read or heard the same; Such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned.—A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows
of his personal knowledge, which means those facts which are
derived from his perception. A witness may not testify as to what
he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or
heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not
hearsay rule is based upon serious concerns about the
trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence inasmuch as
such evidence are not given under oath or solemn affirmation and,
more importantly, have not been subjected to cross-examination by
opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and
articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose
reliability on which the worth of the out-of-court statement
depends.
Same; Same; Same; Res Gestae; Requisites before the rule in
res gestae to apply.—Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay
rule, refers to those exclamations and statements made by either
the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The rule in res
gestae applies when the declarant himself did not testify and
provided that the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant
complies with the following requisites: (1) that the principal act,
the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were
made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence
in question and its immediate attending circumstances.
Same; Evidence; Admissibility of evidence depends on its
relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade.—Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with its
weight and sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence depends on its
relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade. Even assuming that the declaration of the bystanders
that it was the members of the CPP/NPA who caused the fire may
be admitted as evidence, it does not follow that such declarations
are sufficient proof. These declarations should be calibrated vis-à-
vis the other evidence on record.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
1
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The assailed decision originated from Civil Case No. 90-
602 filed by Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (respondent)
against DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies
(petitioner) and Provident Insurance Corporation (Provident)
for recovery of insurance benefits. Respondent owns several
broadcasting stations all over the country. Provident covered
respondent’s transmitter equipment and generating set for
the amount of P13,550,000.00 under Fire Insurance Policy
No. 30354, while petitioner covered respondent’s transmitter,
furniture, fixture and other transmitter facilities for the
amount of P5,883,650.00 under Fire Insurance Policy No. F-
66860.
In the evening of July 27, 1988, respondent’s radio station
located in SSS Building, Bacolod City, was razed by fire
causing damage in the amount of P1,044,040.00. Respondent
sought recovery under the two insurance policies but the
claims were denied on the ground that the cause of loss was
an excepted risk excluded under condition no. 6 (c) and (d), to
wit:
1. 6.This insurance does not cover any loss or damage
occasioned by or through or in consequence, directly
or indirectly, of any of the following consequences,
namely:
1. (c)War, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities, or
warlike operations (whether war be declared or not),
civil war.
1. (d)Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising,
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, military or usurped
power.3
The insurance companies maintained that the evidence
showed that the fire was caused by members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army
(CPP/NPA); and consequently, denied the claims. Hence,
respondent was constrained to file Civil Case No. 90-602
against petitioner and Provident.
After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati, Branch 138,
rendered a decision in favor of respondent. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
“IN VIEW THEREOF, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff.
Defendant Provident Insurance Corporation is directed to pay
plaintiff the amount of P450,000.00 representing the value of the
destroyed property insured under its Fire Insurance Policy plus
12% legal interest from March 2, 1990 the date of the filing of the
Complaint. Defendant DBP Pool Accredited Insurance Companies
is likewise ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of P602,600.00
representing the value of the destroyed property under its Fire
Insurance Policy plus 12% legal interest from March 2, 1990.
SO ORDERED.” 4
Both insurance companies appealed from the trial court’s
decision but the CA affirmed the decision, with the
modification that the applicable interest rate was reduced to
6% per annum. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioner DBP which was denied by the CA per its
Resolution dated January 30, 2001. 5
Hence, herein petition by DBP Pool of Accredited
Insurance Companies, with the following assignment of
6
errors:
Assignment of Errors
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
HELD THAT THERE WERE NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
SHOWING THAT THE APPROXIMATELY TENTY [sic] (20)
ARMED MEN WHO CUSED [sic] THE FIRE AT RESPONDENT’S
RMN PROPERTY AT BACOLOD CITY WERE MEMBERS OF
THE CPP-NPA.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
ADJUDGED THAT RESPONDENT RMN CANNOT BEHELD [sic]
FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR INSTITUTING
THE PRESENT ACTION AGAINST THE PETITIONER UNDER
2
ARTICLES 21, 2208, 2229 AND 2232 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES. 7 members of the CPP/NPA. The said documents simply stated that
Petitioner assails the factual finding of both the trial court
and the CA that its evidence failed to support its allegation
that the loss was caused by an excepted risk, i.e., members of
the CPP/NPA caused the fire. In upholding respondent’s
claim for indemnity, the trial court found that:
“The only evidence which the Court can consider to determine if
the fire was due to the intentional act committed by the members
of the New People’s Army (NPA), are the testimony [sic] of
witnesses Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres and SPO3 Leonardo Rochar who
were admittedly not present when the fire occurred. Their
testimony [sic] was [sic] limited to the fact that an investigation
was conducted and in the course of the investigation they were
informed by bystanders that “heavily armed men entered the
transmitter house, poured gasoline in (sic) it and then lighted it.
After that, they went out shouting “Mabuhay ang NPA” (TSN, p.
12., August 2, 1995). The persons whom they investigated and
actually saw the burning of the station were not presented as
witnesses. The documentary evidence particularly Exhibits “5” and
“5-C” do not satisfactorily prove that the author of the burning
were members of the NPA. Exhibit “5-B” which is a letter released
by the NPA merely mentions some dissatisfaction with the
activities of some people in the media in Bacolod. There was no
mention there of any threat on media facilities.”
8
The CA went over the evidence on record and sustained the
findings of the trial court, to wit:
...
“To recapitulate, defendants-appellants presented the follow-ing
to support its claim, to wit: police blotter of the burning of DYHB,
certification of the Negros Occidental Integrated National Police,
Bacolod City regarding the incident, letter of alleged NPA members
Celso Magsilang claiming responsibility for the burning of DYHB,
fire investigation report dated July 29, 1988, and the testimonies of
Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres and SFO III Leonardo Rochas. We
examined carefully the report on the police blotter of the burning of
DYHB, the certification issued by the Integrated National Police of
Bacolod City and the fire investigation report prepared by SFO III
Rochas and there We found that none of them categorically stated
that the twenty (20) armed men which burned DYHB were
the said armed men were ‘believed’ to be or ‘suspected’ of being
members of the said group. Even SFO III Rochas admitted that he
was not sure that the said armed men were members of the CPP-
NPA, thus:
...
In fact the only person who seems to be so sure that that the
CPP-NPA had a hand in the burning of DYHB was Lt. Col. Nicolas
Torres. However, though We found him to be persuasive in his
testimony regarding how he came to arrive at his opinion, We
cannot nevertheless admit his testimony as conclusive proof that
the CPP-NPA was really involved in the incident considering that
he admitted that he did not personally see the armed men even as
he tried to pursue them. Note that when Lt. Col. Torres was
presented as witness, he was presented as an ordinary witness
only and not an ex-pert witness. Hence, his opinion on the identity
or membership of the armed men with the CPP-NPA is not
admissible in evidence.
Anent the letter of a certain Celso Magsilang, who claims to be
a member of NPA-NIROC, being an admission of person which is
not a party to the present action, is likewise inadmissible in
evidence under Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The
reason being that an admission is competent only when the
declarant, or someone identified in legal interest with him, is a
party to the action.”
9
The Court will not disturb these factual findings absent
compelling or exceptional reasons. It should be stressed that
a review by certiorariunder Rule 45 is a matter of discretion.
Under this mode of review, the jurisdiction of the Court is
limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact.10
Moreover, when supported by substantial evidence,
findings of fact of the trial court as affirmed by the CA are
conclusive and binding on the parties, which this Court will
11
not review unless there are exceptional circumstances. There
are no exceptional circumstances in this case that would have
impelled the Court to depart from the factual findings of both
the trial court and the CA.
3
 Both the trial court and the CA were correct in ruling that
petitioner failed to prove that the loss was caused by an
excepted risk.
Petitioner argues that private respondent is responsible
for proving that the cause of the damage/loss is covered by
the insurance policy, as stipulated in the insurance policy, to
wit:
...
“Any loss or damage happening during the existence of
abnormal conditions (whether physical or otherwise) which are
occasioned by or through in consequence directly or indirectly, of
any of the said occurrences shall be deemed to be loss or damage
which is not covered by the insurance, except to the extent that the
Insured shall prove that such loss or damage happened
independently of the existence of such abnormal conditions.
In any action, suit or other proceeding where the Companies allege
that by reason of the provisions of this condition any loss or
damage is not covered by this insurance, the burden of proving that
such loss or damage is covered shall be upon the Insured.”12
An insurance contract, being a contract of adhesion, should
be so interpreted as to carry out the purpose for which the
parties entered into the contract which is to insure against
risks of loss or damage to the goods. Limitations of liability
should be regarded with extreme jealousy and must be
construed in such a way as to preclude the insurer from
noncompliance with its obligations. 13
The “burden of proof” contemplated by the aforesaid
provision actually refers to the “burden of evidence” (burden
of going forward). As applied in this case, it refers to the
14
duty of the insured to show that the loss or damage is covered
by the policy. The foregoing clause notwithstanding, the
burden of proof still rests upon petitioner to prove that the
damage or loss was caused by an excepted risk in order to
escape any liability under the contract.
Burden of proof is the duty of any party to present
evidence to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law, which is preponderance of evidence
in civil cases. The party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who
asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to
obtain a favorable judgment. For the plaintiff, the burden of
proof never parts. For the defendant, an affirmative defense
15
is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the
plaintiff’s cause of action, but one which, if established, will
be a good defense—i.e. an “avoidance” of the claim. 16
Particularly, in insurance cases, where a risk is excepted
by the terms of a policy which insures against other perils or
hazards, loss from such a risk constitutes a defense which the
insurer may urge, since it has not assumed that risk, and
from this it follows that an insurer seeking to defeat a
claim because of an exception or limitation in the
policy has the burden of proving that the loss comes
within the purview of the exception or limitation set
up. If a proof is made of a loss apparently within a contract of
insurance, the burden is upon the insurer to prove that the
loss arose from a cause of loss which is excepted or for which
it is not liable, or from a cause which limits its liability.
17
Consequently, it is sufficient for private respondent to
prove the fact of damage or loss. Once respondent makes out
a prima facie case in its favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to petitioner to controvert respondent’s prima
facie case. In this case, since petitioner alleged an excepted
18
risk, then the burden of evidence shifted to petitioner to
prove such exception. It is only when petitioner has
sufficiently proven that the damage or loss was caused by an
excepted risk does the burden of evidence shift back to
respondent who is then under a duty of producing evidence to
show why such excepted risk does not release petitioner from
any liability. Unfortunately for petitioner, it failed to
discharge its primordial burden of proving that the damage
or loss was caused by an excepted risk.
Petitioner however, insists that the evidence on record
established the identity of the author of the damage. It
argues that the trial court and the CA erred in not
4
appreciating the reports of witnesses Lt. Col Torres and SFO
II Rochar that the bystanders they interviewed claimed that
the perpetrators were members of the CPP/NPA as an
exception to the hearsay rule as part of res gestae.
A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of
his personal knowledge, which means those facts which are
derived from his perception. A witness may not testify as to
19
what he merely learned from others either because he was
told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what
he has learned. The hearsay rule is based upon serious
concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay
evidence inasmuch as such evidence are not given under oath
or solemn affirmation and, more importantly, have not been
subjected to cross-examination by opposing counsel to test the
perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-
court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which the
worth of the out-of-court statement depends. 20
Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to
those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement
of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The
rule in res gestae applies when the declarant himself did not
testify and provided that the testimony of the witness who
heard the declarant complies with the following requisites:
(1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and
(3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances. 21
The Court is not convinced to accept the declarations as
part of res gestae. While it may concede that these statements
were made by the bystanders during a startling occurrence, it
cannot be said however, that these utterances were
made spontaneously by the bystanders and before they
had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood. Both
SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres received the bystanders’
statements while they were making their investigations
during and after the fire. It is reasonable to assume that
when these statements were noted down, the bystanders
already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk
to one another and exchange information, not to mention
theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in
disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take place.
It cannot therefore be ascertained whether these utterances
were the products of truth. That the utterances may be mere
idle talk is not remote.
At best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col.
Torres that these statements were made may be considered
as independently relevant statements gathered in the course
of their investigation, and are admissible not as to the
veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been thus
uttered.22
Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with its weight and sufficiency. Admissibility of
23
evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the
weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and
its tendency to convince and persuade. Even assuming that
24
the declaration of the bystanders that it was the members of
the CPP/NPA who caused the fire may be admitted as
evidence, it does not follow that such declarations are
sufficient proof. These declarations should be calibrated vis-à-
visthe other evidence on record. And the trial court aptly
noted that there is a need for additional convincing
proof, viz.:
“The Court finds the foregoing to be insufficient to establish that
the cause of the fire was the intentional burning of the radio
facilities by the rebels or an act of insurrection, rebellion or
usurped power. Evidence that persons who burned the radio
facilities shouted “Mabuhay ang NPA” does not furnish logical
5
conclusion that they are member [sic] of the NPA or that their act
was an act of rebellion or insurrection. Additional convincing proof
need be submitted. Defendants failed to discharge their
responsibility to present adequate proof that the loss was due to a
risk excluded.”
25
Petition dismissed, judgment and resolution affirmed in
toto.
Note.—The fundamental rule is that upon him who
alleges rests the burden of proof. (People vs. Villar, 322 SCRA
393 [2000])

While the documentary evidence presented by petitioner, i.e.,

(1) the police blotter; (2) the certification from the Bacolod ——o0o——
Police Station; and (3) the Fire Investigation Report may be
considered exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in
official records, nevertheless, as noted by the CA, none of
these documents categorically stated that the perpetrators
were members of the CPP/NPA. Rather, it was stated in the
26

police blotter that: “a group of persons accompanied by one (1)

woman all believed to be CPP/NPA … more or less 20
persons suspected to be CPP/NPA,” while the certification
27

from the Bacolod Police station stated that “… some 20 or

more armed men believed to be members of the New People’s
Army NPA,” and the fire investigation report concluded that
28

“(I)t is therefore believed by this Investigating Team that

the cause of the fire is intentional, and the armed
men suspected to be members of the CPP/NPA where (sic)
the ones responsible …” All these documents show that
29

indeed, the “suspected” executor of the fire were believed to

be members of the CPP/NPA. But suspicion alone is not
sufficient, preponderance of evidence being the quantum of
proof.
All told, the Court finds no reason to grant the present
petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated November 16, 2000 and Resolution
dated January 30, 2001 rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 56351
are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-
Santiago and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., No Part.

6
 G.R. No. 162704. November 19, 2004. * Lot 4-B-2-B was later recorded in the names of the
MEMORIA G. ENCINAS and ADOLFO A. BALBOA,
petitioners, vs. NATIONAL BOOKSTORE, INC., respondent.
Evidence; Preponderance of Evidence; Defined; In civil cases,
the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence.—In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. “Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the
evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.”
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis,
means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Felix B. Lerio for petitioners.
Regalado, Manahan & Regalado for respondent.
TINGA, J.:
Two certificates of title in the names of two different persons
cover one and the same piece of land. The question in this
case is who is the rightful owner of the property.
The land in question is located at the corner of Epifanio De
los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and Aurora Boulevard, Quezon
City. It was originally part of a larger piece of land
designated as Lot No. 4-B-2-B of the subdivision plan Psd-
20172, being a portion of Lot 4-B-2 of Plan SWO-16797, per
1
original survey for Valentin Afable, et al. dated March 3,
1944. Lot No. 4-B-2-A of said plan was in the name of
Valentin Afable, while Lot No. 4-B-2-B of the same plan was
in the name of Eugenio Evangelista. Lot 4-B-2-B had an area
of 8,371 square meters. 2
Heirs of one Simeon Evangelista under Transfer Certificate
3
of Title (TCT) No. T-219636, issued on June 22, 1976. The 4
title indicated that the land was originally registered under
Act No. 496 on October 3, 1927, in the registration book of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, Vol. T-51, Page 218, pursuant to
Decree No. 917, G.L.R.O. Record No. 197. 5
On December 4, 1978, the Heirs of Simeon Evangelista
executed a deed of sale with mortgage of Lot 4-B-2-B in favor
of the spouses Nereo and Gloria Paculdo, resulting in the
cancellation of TCT No. 219636 and the issuance of TCT No.
251175 in the names of the Paculdo spouses, with the
6
mortgage lien annotated thereon. For failure of the Paculdo
spouses to pay their obligation under the mortgage contract,
the mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and the land sold
at public auction to the Heirs of Simeon Evangelista. On
August 7, 1981, on the basis of the Sheriff’s Certificate of
Sale executed in favor of the Heirs, TCT No. 251175 of the
7
Paculdo spouses was cancelled and TCT No. 279654 was 8
issued in the name of the Heirs of Simeon Evangelista.
9
In 1982, an unsegregated portion measuring 906 square
meters of Lot 4-B-2-B was expropriated by the Government
for the widening of Aurora Boulevard. The unsegregated
portion was designated as Lot 4-B-2-B-1. The remaining
portion of 7,465 square meters was designated as Lot 4-B-2-
B-2, the subject land. On May 23, 1983, the Heirs of Simeon
Evangelista sold the subject land, to respondent National
Bookstore Inc. through a Deed of Sale with Real Estate
Mortgage. Respondent took possession of the subject land,
10
declared the same for taxation purposes and was issued TCT
11
No. 300861 covering the subject land.
12
In 1994, petitioner Memoria G. Encinas, through her
attorney-in-fact and herein co-petitioner Adolfo Balboa, filed
a Petition for the administrative reconstitution of her title,
13
TCT No. 179854, which was supposedly burned in the fire
that razed the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 11,
1988. To support her petition, she presented a copy of her Tax
7
Declaration No. B-040-01639 for the year 1985 allegedly
14
covering the subject property and a certification from the
15
Acting Chief of the Revenue Collection Office of the Quezon
City Treasurer stating that the real property taxes on the
said property have been paid up to 1994 under Tax
Declaration No. 1639. On October 20, 1994, the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
after investigation and verification that the titles to be
reconstituted do not overlap other properties, issued an
order reconstituting several transfer certificates of title,
16
including petitioner Encina’s TCT No. 179854. Pursuant to
the order, the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City issued TCT
No. RT-103022 in petitioner Encinas’ name on November 9,
17
1994.
Petitioner offered the property covered by the
reconstituted title for sale to Alfredo C. Ramos, the president
of respondent. It was then that respondent discovered that its
TCT No. 300861 and petitioner’s TCT No. RT-103022 referred
to the same property, Lot No. 4-B-2-B-2.
On July 17, 1997, after conducting an investigation on
titles alleged to have been illegally reconstituted, the LRA
Reconstitution Officer issued a Supplemental Order dated
July 17, 1997 and an Order dated June 8, 1999 which set
aside the previous order of reconstitution dated October 20,
1994, and in particular, directed the exclusion of the
reconstitution of the original of TCT No. T-179854.18
On February 28, 1996, respondent as plaintiff filed an
action for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 215, alleging that it was the true and
lawful owner of Lot 4-B-2-B-2 as evidenced by its TCT No.
300861. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-96-
26716.
Petitioner Encinas as defendant denied respondent’s
allegations and stubbornly claimed that she was the real and
absolute owner in fee simple of the subject property and
neither she nor her predecessor-in-interest ever sold the
property to anybody. She relied on the legality and regularity
of the reconstitution of her title to the subject property. 19
On June 21, 1999, the RTC decided in favor of respondent.
The trial court declared that while a reconstituted title has
a prima facie appearance of legality, the reconstitution of said
title is subject to the proviso that no other certificate of title
covering the same parcel of land exists in the records of the
registry. A certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, if
found or recovered, prevails over the reconstituted title.
In Civil Case No. Q-96-26716, the original transfer certificate
of title covering the property, TCT No. 300861 in respondent’s
name, is on file with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City
and is one of the titles which were not burned in the fire of
June 1988. The owner’s duplicate copy of the title is intact
and in respondent’s possession. Furthermore, respondent was
able to show how it acquired the property from its immediate
predecessors and was able to account for the previous major
transactions involving the subject property until ownership
thereof was transferred to respondent.
Petitioner Encinas, on the other hand, failed to present
any evidence to show how she acquired ownership of the
property. She merely alleged that she was the owner in fee
simple. To support her claim of ownership, she presented a
tax declaration covering the property. But it was shown that
said tax declaration was tampered with and apparently
falsified. Petitioner Encinas relied mainly on the presumption
of validity of her reconstituted title. However, as the trial
court noted, the LRA Administrator eventually issued the
Supplemental Order of July 17, 1997 and Order of June 8,
1999 excluding petitioner Encinas’ title from the
reconstitution order. To the trial court, not only was
respondent able to prove its ownership of the subject property
with preponderant evidence, but the case had already become
moot and academic by virtue of the LRA’s cancellation of
petitioner Encina’s reconstituted title. Hence, it upheld
respondent’s title to the subject property and ordered the
cancellation of petitioner Encina’s reconstituted title.20
8
 Petitioners promptly moved for reconsideration. On
November 10, 1999, the trial court granted the same and set
aside its earlier Decision. In a complete reversal of its
21
previous ruling, the trial court upheld the validity of
petitioner Encina’s title. According to the trial court,
petitioner Encinas’ title, TCT No. 179854, was registered and
issued on August 25, 1972 which should have served as
constructive notice to respondent whose title, TCT No.
300861, was issued only on June 6, 1983. The trial court also
pointed out that there is a manifest defect in respondent’s
title as to its origin: respondent’s title is a derivative of an
original certificate of title issued pursuant to Decree No. 917,
GLRO Record No. 197; however, said GLRO Record No. 197
referred to a piece of land located in Bataan, not Quezon City.
Respondent’s title referred to a piece of land in Bataan and
not the subject property. Hence, in the Orderdated November
10, 1999, the RTC nullified respondent’s title, and declared
petitioner Encina’s reconstituted title valid.
Respondent appealed the RTC Order of November 10,
1999 to the Court of Appeals. On October 27, 2003, the Court
of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC Order and
reinstated the RTC Decision of June 21, 1999. The appellate
22
court found that the antecedents leading to respondent’s
acquisition of the property were clearly shown in the records
and even annotated in its TCT No. 300861. On the other
hand, petitioner Encinas failed to describe the circumstances
of her ownership or possession of the land and to identify her
predecessor-in-interest or the manner by which she acquired
the property. Petitioners again raised the argument that the
erroneous entry of the GLRO record number in respondent’s
title is a fatal defect which proves the title’s invalid source.
However, the appellate court concluded that based on the
testimony of petitioners’ own witnesses, the variance was
23
merely a typographical or clerical error. The same witnesses
testified that in cases of such clerical errors, it is the
technical description which controls. The technical
description in respondent’s title described the subject
property, Lot 4-B-2-B-2, located in Quezon City.
On the other hand, the technical description in petitioner
Encinas’ title refers to a different parcel of land. Her title
describes a parcel of land which is a portion of Lot 2-E-2 of
plan SWO-16797, certainly not the subject property.
The Court of Appeals also observed that respondent was
able to present tax declarations and real property tax bill
receipts in its name and in the name of its immediate
predecessor, the Evangelista clan. While petitioners also
presented a tax declaration and certification from the
Revenue Collection Office of Quezon City, upon closer
scrutiny, said documents showed that petitioners had
declared Lot 4-B-2-B-1 for taxation purposes, and not Lot 4-
B-2-B-2, the property subject of this case. It should be
24
remembered that Lot 4-B-2-B-1 refers to the portion which
was expropriated by the government.
Petitioners timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
25
the appellate court’s decision but this was denied on March
12, 2004. Hence, they filed this Petition for Review on
26
Certiorari, alleging that the Court of Appeals “committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in upholding the validity of [respondent’s]
purported TCT No. 300861 notwithstanding the abundance of
competent evidence demonstrating positively that said title is
spurious and fake.” Petitioners insist that the variance in the
entries in respondent’s TCT No. 300186 and GLRO Record
No. 197 is not a mere typographical or clerical error, but
instead an indication of the fraudulent nature of respondent’s
title.
Petitioners submit that respondent’s evidence failed to
show that it proved its ownership of the subject property. In
particular, petitioners take issue with the Court of Appeals’
alleged disregard of its evidence which allegedly
demonstrates that respondent’s title to the subject property is
fake and spurious. Petitioners harp on the supposed
incongruity between the entries in the GLRO Record
9
Numbers in respondent’s and petitioner’s respective titles to
the property.
Respondent, in its Comment, seeks to have
the Petition dismissed on the ground that it raises only
questions of fact which this Court cannot entertain via a
petition for certiorari.
27
Indeed, this Court has held that factual findings of the
trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal. However, there are several exceptions to the rule,
namely: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment
of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record.28
This case falls under one of the exceptions, as the factual
conclusions of the trial court and the appellate court are in
conflict with each other. Hence, although the petition raises
questions of fact since it entails a review of the evidence at
hand, it may be entertained by this Court.
The issue before this Court is whether petitioners were
able to discharge their burden of proving the superiority of
their title over the title of respondent. The Court of Appeals
upheld the initial Decision of the RTC and found the
quantum of evidence presented by petitioners insufficient. A
review of the evidence reveals no compelling reason to
reverse the appellate court’s ruling.
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
“Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value
of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of
the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.”
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which
is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.
29
Respondent as plaintiff was able to overcome the burden of
proof and prove by preponderant evidence that it has a
superior right and title to the subject property. In contrast,
petitioners as defendants seem to rely only on the alleged
weakness of respondent’s evidence, without asserting any
proof other than her reconstituted title to the subject
property.
From the evidence, respondent derived its title from the
title of its vendor, the Heirs of Simeon Evangelista, via a
deed of sale. The Heirs obtained their title from their
predecessor-in-interest Simeon Evangelista. Prior to the
transfer of the title to respondent, the Heirs had sold the
subject property to the Paculdo spouses in whose names
another title was issued. However, the Heirs were able to
reclaim the property upon the failure of the Paculdo spouses
to pay their mortgage obligation on the property. All these
transactions involving the property are well-
documented. From the time respondent obtained the
30
property, it protected its interest therein by fencing off the
property and designating security guards around its
perimeter. Respondent also exercised its obligation as owner
31
by paying real property taxes on the property it had acquired,
evidenced by tax declarations issued in its name by the
Quezon City Assessor’s Office.32
10
 In contrast, petitioner Encinas asserts her right to the
subject property via a reconstituted title, also presented in
evidence. However, other than the allegation in
her Answer to respondent’s Complaint (for quieting of title)
that she is the owner in fee simple of the subject property,
petitioner Encinas failed to disclose before any of the judicial
levels how she was able to acquire title to the property. The
trial court had intimated during the hearings that to get to
the truth of the matter, it is important to trace the origins or
source of the titles of the properties. Counsel for petitioners
33
had manifested time and again that petitioner Encinas
herself, who was then in Detroit, Michigan, would be
presented to testify on the acquisition of the property, but the
34
hearings terminated without petitioner Encinas ever making
an appearance. Neither was her co-petitioner and attorney-
in-fact Adolfo A. Balboa able to shed light on the matter, as
he clearly had no knowledge of the circumstances of
petitioner Encinas’ acquisition of the property.35
Petitioners also cannot rely on Tax Declaration No. B-040-
01639 allegedly issued in petitioner Encinas’ name, since a
tax declaration with the same number was also issued in the
name of respondent. Indeed, according to petitioner’s witness,
Dante M. Veloria, Assistant City Assessor of Quezon City,
there are many cases of duplication of tax declaration
numbers in their office, and such duplication does not
necessarily mean that the duplicate tax declaration is
spurious. The Assessor’s Office rectifies the duplication by
adjusting the tax declaration number and annotating the
correction at the back of the tax declaration and notifying the
persons concerned. The same witness noted that trouble
arises when such duplications are not corrected, as in this
case.
Instead of presenting evidence to prove the superiority of
petitioner Encinas’ title, petitioners rely only on the apparent
weakness of respondent’s title, that is, the alleged fatal defect
in GLRO Record No. 197 perpetuated in the titles of
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest.
Petitioners cite Lorenzana Food Corporation v. Court of
Appeals in arguing that these errors cannot simply be
36
qualified as mere typographical errors. However, the facts of
the cited case differ from the case at bar, and the ruling
thereon cannot be blindly applied to this case.
The Lorenzana case involved a large tract of land
traversed by a railroad and divided into two parcels
designated as Lots 1 and 2, both parcels covered by a
reconstituted title Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
(1020) RO-9. A separate OCT for Lot 1, OCT No. (1898) RO-
58 was issued, while Lot 2 remained covered by OCT No.
(1020) RO-9. Lots 1 and 2 were subsequently subdivided and
titles to the resulting parcels of land were issued. However,
the TCTs covering the subdivided parcels of Lot 1, while
correctly indicating OCT No. (1898) RO-58 of Lot 1 as its
source, contained the technical description lifted from the
OCT No. (1020) RO-9 covering Lot 2. Subsequent
transactions of the subdivided parcels of land of Lot 1
resulted in the issuance of TCTs containing the incorrect
technical description as well as the inaccurate description of
the location of the properties. The controversy arose when
Lorenzana, et al., learned that the same parcels were being
claimed by therein respondent B.E. San Diego, Incorporated,
based on titles registered in the latter’s name. The trial court
found for respondent B.E. San Diego, as its titles were “not
blemished by any defect and were regularly issued.” The trial
court also considered in respondent B.E. San Diego’s favor its
open, adverse and continuous possession of the disputed land
since 1966 and its consistent payment of taxes thereon. This
Court upheld the ruling of the trial court. The defects
appearing on the titles of Lorenzana, et al. relating to the
lots’ mother title, technical descriptions and locations—
judicially admitted by Lorenzana, et al.—were too glaring
that they could not be dismissed as clerical and harmless in
character. The discrepancies in Lorenzana, et al.’s titles
11
cannot be upheld against the unblemished titles of B.E. San ——o0o——
Diego.
_______________
The same cannot be said of the alleged defect in
respondent’s title in the case at bar. In Lorenzana, the Supra, see note 18.
37

erroneous entries were too numerous and evident, and 307

involved significant portions of the titles. On the other hand, © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
the claimed flaw in respondent’s title and the title of its
predecessors-in-interest is GLRO Record No. 197, which
petitioners assert should be GLRO Record No. 917. It is
obvious that such a defect involves only an interchanging of
numbers. It is certainly believable that such variance in the
copying of entries could be merely a typographical or clerical
error. Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals pointed out,
petitioners’ own witnesses explained that the inconsistency in
the entries in the GLRO record number could be due to
clerical error, and in such case, the technical description in
the title should prevail over the record number.
It must be noted, too, that the original of respondent’s title
still exists and is with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
it was not one of the titles that were destroyed by the fire.
Petitioner Encinas’ title, on the other hand, is a reconstituted
title, which was later withdrawn by the same office which
issued it, pursuant to the Supplemental Order dated July 17,
1997 and Order dated June 8, 1999. 37

Respondent has established by preponderant evidence that

it is the rightful owner of the subject property. Petitioners
have not.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
DENIED, no reversible error on the part of the Court of
Appeals having been adduced. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo,
Sr.and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,concur.
Petition denied.
Note.—Factual findings of the trial court are binding on
the Supreme Court, especially if the Court of Appeals affirms
such findings. (Montecillo vs. Reynes, 385 SCRA 244 [2002])

12
 Same; Res Gestae; In a general way, res gestae includes the
G.R. No. 158362. April 4, 2011.* circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- fact and serve to illustrate its character and which are so
appellee, vs. GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR. @ “BERTING”, spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude
GILBERTO VILLARICO, JR., JERRY RAMENTOS, and the idea of deliberation and fabrication.—The term res gestae refers
to “those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a
RICKY VILLARICO, accused-appellants.
particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; The first duty of the prosecution
of such act.” In a general way, res gestae includes the
is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal,
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main
for, even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can
fact and serve to illustrate its character and which are so
be no conviction without proof of the identity of the criminal beyond
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude
reasonable doubt.—The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove
the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res
the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for, even if the
gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by
commission of the crime can be established, there can be no
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
conviction without proof of the identity of the criminal beyond
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of
reasonable doubt. In that regard, an identification that does not
the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements
preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any
were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
evidentiary force. The intervention of any mistake or the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
appearance of any weakness in the identification simply means
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
that the accused’s constitutional right of presumption of innocence
Same; Same; Test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the
until the contrary is proved is not overcome, thereby warranting an
res gestae; Requisites of Res Gestae.—The test of admissibility of
acquittal, even if doubt may cloud his innocence. Indeed, the
evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration,
presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to every
or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the
individual is forever of primary importance, and every conviction
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part
for crime must rest on the strength of the evidence of the State, not
of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly
on the weakness of the defense.
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
Evidence; Witnesses; The familiarity of the witness with the
A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res
assailant erased any doubt that the witness could have erred.—The
gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
close relationship of Remedios and Francisco with the victim as
rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act,
well as their familiarity with the accused who were their neighbors
the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were
assured the certainty of their identification as Haide’s assailants.
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c)
In Marturillas v. People, the Court observed that the familiarity of
the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
the witness with the assailant erased any doubt that the witness
immediately attending circumstances.
could have erred; and noted that a witness related to the victim
had a natural tendency to remember the faces of the person
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
involved in the attack on the victim, because relatives, more than The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
anybody else, would be concerned with seeking justice for the Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
victim and bringing the malefactor before the law. Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellants.
BERSAMIN, J.:
_______________

13
 The identification of the accused as the person responsible
for the imputed crime is the primary duty of the State in
every criminal prosecution. Such identification, to be positive,
need not always be by direct evidence from an eyewitness, for
reliable circumstantial evidence can equally confirm it as to
overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the
accused.
On appeal by the accused is the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) promulgated on June 6, 2003,1 finding Gilberto
Villarico, Sr., Gilberto Villarico, Jr., Jerry Ramentos,2 and
Ricky Villarico guilty of murder for the killing of Haide
Cagatan, and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on
each of them, thereby modifying the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, in Tangub City that had
pronounced them guilty of homicide aggravated by dwelling.3
With treachery having attended the killing, we affirm the
CA but correct the civil liability to accord with pertinent law
and jurisprudence.
Antecedents
On October 7, 1999, an information for murder was filed in
the Regional Trial Court in Misamis Occidental (RTC)
against all the accused,4 the accusatory portion of which
reads:
“That on or about August 8, 1999, at about 7:50 o’clock in the
morning at Barangay Bolinsong, Municipality of Bonifacio,
Province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill, armed with a short firearms (sic), did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously suddenly and treacherously shoot
HAIDE CAGATAN at the back penetrating through the neck which
cause(d) the instant death of said victim and that he had no chance
to avoid or defend himself from the attack.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
All the accused pleaded not guilty at their December 15,
1999 arraignment.
Version of the Prosecution
At around 7:50 p.m. on August 8, 1999, Haide was busy
preparing dinner in the kitchen of his family’s residence in
Bolinsong, Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental. The kitchen,
located at the rear of the residence, had a wall whose upper
portion was made of three-feet high bamboo slats (sa-sa) and
whose lower portion was also made of bamboo slats arranged
like a chessboard with four-inch gaps in between. At that
time, Haide’s sister-in-law Remedios Cagatan was attending
to her child who was answering the call of nature near the
toilet. From where she was, Remedios saw all the accused as
they stood at the rear of the kitchen aiming their firearms at
the door—Ricky Villarico was at the left side, and Gilberto,
Jr. stood behind him, while Gilberto, Sr. was at the right side,
with Ramentos behind him. When Gilberto, Jr. noticed
Remedios, he pointed his gun at her, prompting Remedios to
drop to the ground and to shout to Lolita Cagatan, her
mother-in-law and Haide’s mother: Nay, Nay tawo
Nay (Mother, mother, there are people outside, mother). At
that instant, Remedios heard three gunshots.5
Francisco Cagatan, the father of Haide, also heard the
gunshots just as he was coming out of the toilet, making him
instinctively jump into a hole, from where he was able to see
and recognize Gilberto, Sr., Gilberto, Jr. and Ricky who were
then standing by the kitchen door. They were aiming their
guns upward, and soon after left together with Ramentos.6
Lolita also heard the gunshots while she was in
the sala. She recalled that Haide then came towards her from
the kitchen, asking for help and saying: Tabang kay gipusil
ko ni Berting (I was shot by Berting).7At that, she and
Remedios brought the wounded Haide to Clinica Ozarraga,
where he was treated for gunshot wounds on his left scapular
region (back of left shoulder) and right elbow. He succumbed
shortly thereafter due to hypovolemic shock or massive loss of
blood.8
14
 Version of the Defense
The accused denied the accusations and each proffered an
alibi.
Gilberto, Sr. claimed that he was sleeping in his home
with a fever when he heard a gunshot. He insisted that he
learned that Haide had been shot only in the next
morning.9 His denial and alibi were corroborated by his wife
Carmelita10 and his daughter Jersel.11
Gilberto, Jr. testified that on the day of the incident, he
went to Liloan, Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental at around 5:00
p.m. to visit his girlfriend together with Charlie Bacus and
Randy Hernan. They stayed there until 9:00 p.m. Thereafter,
they proceeded to Tiaman to attend the wake for one Helen
Oligario Cuizon, and were there for an hour. They then
returned to Bolinsong and spent the night in the house of
Randy. It was only in the morning that Randy’s father
informed them that Haide had been shot.12
Ricky declared that he stayed throughout the whole
evening of August 8, 1999 in the house of his aunt
Flordeliza.13 Myrna Hernan, a neighbor of Flordeliza,
corroborated his testimony.14
Ramentos alleged that he was drinking tuba with others at
the store owned by Cinderella Bacus at the time of the
shooting; and that he went home at around 9:00 p.m. after
his group was done drinking. He did not recall hearing any
gunshots while drinking and came to know of the shooting
only from a certain Anecito Duyag on the following morning.
To discredit the testimony about Haide being able to
identify his assailants, the Defense presented Peter Ponggos,
who narrated that he had been on board a motorcycle (habal-
habal) when Lolita and Remedios asked for his help; and that
he then aided Lolita and Remedios in bringing Haide to the
hospital. According to Peter, he asked Haide who had shot
him, but Haide replied that there had been only one assailant
whom he did not recognize.15
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC convicted the four accused of homicide
aggravated by dwelling, disposing:16
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds all the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide,
with one aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences each one of them to
a penalty of imprisonment ranging from 6 years and 1 day, as its
minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, as its maximum, to
suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law, to pay jointly
and solidarily, the heirs of the victim P50,000.00, as civil liability
and to pay the costs.
Let all the accused be credited of the time that they were placed
in jail under preventive imprisonment, applying the provisions of
Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED.”
The RTC accorded faith to the positive identification of the
accused by the Prosecution’s witnesses, and disbelieved their
denial and alibis due to their failure to show the physical
improbability for them to be at the crime scene, for the
distances between the crime scene and the places where the
accused allegedly were at the time of the commission of the
crime were shown to range from only 100 to 700 meters.17The
RTC found, however, that the Prosecution was not able to
prove treachery because:
“x x x The medical report of “gunshot wound left scapular
region” which the doctor interpreted to be at the back of the left
shoulder is not sufficient to prove treachery, it being susceptible to
2 different interpretations: one: that victim had his back towards
his assailants, and two: that he was actually facing them but he
turned around for cover upon seeing the armed “group of Berting”.
The Court is inclined to believe the second interpretation because
the victim was able to see and identify his assailants. Two
prosecution witnesses testified that the victim identified to them
who shot him.”18
Ruling of the CA
15
 On intermediate review, the CA modified the RTC’s
decision, holding instead that murder was established beyond
reasonable doubt because the killing was attended by
treachery, viz.:19
“WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby
MODIFIED. Pursuant to Section 13, paragraph 2 of Rule 124
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, We render JUDGMENT
without entering it, as follows:
1. We find all accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
MURDER. Each accused is hereby SENTENCED TO
SUFFER the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. The Division Clerk of Court is hereby directed to
CERTIFY and ELEVATE the entire records of this case
to the Supreme Court for review.
SO ORDERED.”20
Citing People v. Valdez,21the CA explained that the
attendance of treachery did not depend on the position of the
victim at the time of the attack, for the essence of treachery
was in the element of surprise the assailants purposely
adopted to ensure that the victim would not be able to defend
himself. Considering that the accused had purposely
positioned themselves at night outside the door to the kitchen
from where they could see Haide, who was then busy
preparing dinner, through the holes of the kitchen wall, the
CA concluded that Haide was thus left unaware of the
impending assault against him.
Issues
In this recourse, the accused raise the following errors:
I not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF MURDER DESPITE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE IDENTITY OF THE
ASSAILANT AS WELL AS ACCUSED-APPELLANTS’ GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONSIDERING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY.
The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses failed
to positively identify them as the persons who had actually
shot Haide; that treachery was not attendant because there
was no proof showing that they had consciously and
deliberately adopted the mode of attacking the victim; and
that assuming that they committed the killing, they could
only be convicted of homicide.
The decisive queries are, therefore, the following:
(a) Should an identification, to be positive, have to be
made by a witness who actually saw the assailants?
(b) Was treachery attendant in the killing of Haide as to
qualify the crime as murder?
Ruling
We affirm the finding of guilt for the crime of murder, but
modify the civil liability.
1.
Positive identification refers to
proof of identity of the assailant
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime
but to prove the identity of the criminal, for, even if the
commission of the crime can be established, there can be no
conviction without proof of the identity of the criminal beyond
reasonable doubt.22 In that regard, an identification that does
accorded any evidentiary force.23 The intervention of any
mistake or the appearance of any weakness in the
identification simply means that the accused’s constitutional
right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved
is not overcome, thereby warranting an acquittal,24even if
16
doubt may cloud his innocence.25 Indeed, the presumption of
innocence constitutionally guaranteed to every individual is
forever of primary importance, and every conviction for crime
must rest on the strength of the evidence of the State, not on
the weakness of the defense.26
The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses did
not actually see who had shot Haide; hence, their
identification as the malefactors was not positively and
credibly made.
We cannot uphold the contention of the accused.
The established circumstances unerringly show that the
four accused were the perpetrators of the fatal shooting of
Haide. Their identification as his assailants by Remedios and
Francisco was definitely positive and beyond reasonable
doubt. Specifically, Remedios saw all the four accused near
the door to the kitchen immediately beforethe shots were
fired and recognized who they were. She even supplied the
detail that Gilberto, Jr. had trained his firearm towards her
once he had noticed her presence at the crime scene. On his
part, Francisco attested to seeing the accused near the door
to the kitchen holding their firearms right after he heard the
gunshots, and also recognized them.
The collective recollections of both Remedios and Francisco
about seeing the four accused standing near the door to the
kitchen immediately before and afterthe shooting of Haide
inside the kitchen were categorical enough, and warranted no
other logical inference than that the four accused were the
persons who had just shot Haide. Indeed, neither Remedios
nor Francisco needed to have actually seen who of the
accused had fired at Haide, for it was enough that they
testified that the four armed accused: (a) had strategically
positioned themselves by the kitchen door prior to the
shooting of Haide; (b) had still been in the same
positions after the gunshots were fired; and (c) had
continuously aimed their firearms at the kitchen door even as
they were leaving the crime scene.
The close relationship of Remedios and Francisco with the
victim as well as their familiarity with the accused who were
their neighbors assured the certainty of their identification as
Haide’s assailants. In Marturillas v. People,27 the Court
observed that the familiarity of the witness with the
assailant erased any doubt that the witness could have erred;
and noted that a witness related to the victim had a natural
tendency to remember the faces of the person involved in the
attack on the victim, because relatives, more than anybody
else, would be concerned with seeking justice for the victim
and bringing the malefactor before the law.28
Moreover, the following portions of Lolita’s testimony show
that Haide himself recognized and identified his assailants,
to wit:
Atty. Fernandez:
Q. And where were you at that time when he was shot?
A. In the sala.
Q. Could you possibly tell the Honorable Court what actually took place when
your son was shot?
A. He came from the kitchen at that time when I heard gunreports, he
said “Nay” help me because I was shot by Berting.29
xxx
Atty. Anonat:
Q. And that affidavit was executed by you at the Bonifacio Police Station?
A. Yes.
xx
Q. And you affirm to the truth of what you have stated in this affidavit?
A. Yes.
Q. On question No. 7 you were asked in this manner—“Giunsa man nimo
pagkasayod nga sila maoy responsible sa kamatayon sa imong
anak? How do you know that they were responsible (for) the death
of your son? And your answer is this “Tungod kay ang biktima
nakasulti pa man sa wala pa siya namatay ug ang iyang pulong
mao nga TABANG NAY KAY GIPUSIL KO NILA NI BERTING ug
nasayod ako nga sila gumikan sa akong mga testigos.” which
translated into English—Because the victim was able to talk before
he died and the words which he told me help me Nay I am shot by
the group of Berting and I know this because of my witnesses.30
xxx
The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just
been shot by the group of Berting—uttered in the immediate
aftermath of the shooting where he was the victim—was a true
part of the res gestae. The statement was admissible against
17
the accused as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides: immediately attending circumstances.35
“Section 42. Part of the res gestae.—Statements made by a We find that the requisites concurred herein. Firstly, the
person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately principal act—the shooting of Haide—was a startling
prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances occurrence. Secondly, his statement to his mother about
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, being shot by the group of Berting was made beforeHaide had
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
time to contrive or to devise considering that it was
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res
uttered immediately afterthe shooting. And, thirdly, the
gestae.” (36 a)
statement directly concerned the startling occurrence itself
The term res gestae refers to “those circumstances which
and its attending circumstance (that is, the identities of the
are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and
assailants). Verily, the statement was reliable as part of
which are admissible when illustrative of such act.”31 In a
the res gestae for being uttered in spontaneity and only in
general way, res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and
reaction to the startling occurrence.
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to
In the face of the positive identification of all the four
illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and
accused, it did not matter whether only one or two of them
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of
had actually fired the fatal shots. Their actions indicated that
deliberation and fabrication.32 The rule on res
a conspiracy existed among them. Indeed, a conspiracy exists
gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.36 Direct
immediately before, during, or immediately after the
proof of a previous agreement among the accused to commit
commission of the crime when the circumstances are such
the crime is not necessary,37for conspiracy may be inferred
that the statements were made as a spontaneousreaction or
from the conduct of the accused at the time of their
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and
commission of the crime that evinces a common
there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and
understanding among them on perpetrating the
to fabricate a false statement.33
crime.38 Thus, the concerted acts of the four manifested their
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
agreement to kill Haide, resulting in each of them being
gestae is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
guilty of the crime regardless of whether he actually fired at
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
the victim or not. It is axiomatic that once conspiracy is
event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part of the
established, the act of one is the act of all;39and that all the
principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly
conspirators are then liable as co-principals.40
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
But did not the fact that the name Berting without any
testimony.34 A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as
surname being too generic open the identification of the
part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an
accused as the assailants to disquieting doubt about their
exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites
complicity?
concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
We hold that there was no need for a surname to be
occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the
attached to the nickname Berting in order to insulate the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the
identification by Haide from challenge. The victim’s res

18
gestae statement was only one of the competent and reliable
pieces of identification evidence. As already shown, the
accused were competently incriminated also by Remedios and
Francisco in a manner that warranted the logical inference
that they, and no others, were the assailants. Also, that
Berting was the natural nickname for a person whose given
name was Gilberto, like herein accused Gilberto, Sr. and
Gilberto, Jr., was a matter of common knowledge in the
Philippines. In fine, the pieces of identification evidence,
including Haide’s res gestaestatement, collaborated to render
their identification unassailable.
Relevantly, the Court has distinguished two types of
positive identification inPeople v. Gallarde,41 namely: (a) that
by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very
commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial
evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the
victim immediately before or after the crime. The Court said:
“x x x Positive identification pertains essentially to proof
of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to
the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types
of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or
accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an
eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This
constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances
where, although a witness may not have actually seen the
very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to
positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator
of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or
one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately
before and right after the commission of the crime. This is
the second type of positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other
pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only
fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the
author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual
eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively
identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then
nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness,
because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction
until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a
proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct
evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of
guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to
prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence,
then felons would go free and the community would be denied
proper protection.”42
To conclude, the identification of a malefactor, to be
positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require
direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction
will be possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses.
Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally
confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally
presumed innocence of the accused.
Faced with their positive identification, the four accused
had to establish convincing defenses. They opted to rely on
denial and their respective alibis, however, but both the RTC
and the CA rightly rejected such defenses.
The rejection was warranted. Long judicial experience
instructs that their denial and alibis, being too easy to invent,
could not overcome their positive identification by credible
Prosecution witnesses whose motives for the identification
were not shown to be ill or vile. Truly, a positive
identification that is categorical, consistent, and devoid of any
showing of ill or vile motive on the part of the Prosecution
witnesses always prevails over alibi and denial that are in
the nature of negative and self-serving evidence.43 To be
accepted, the denial and alibi must be substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence establishing not only that the
accused did not take part in the commission of the imputed
criminal act but also that it was physically impossible for the
accused to be at or near the place of the commission of the act
at or about the time of its commission. In addition, their
proffered alibis were really unworthy of credit because only
19
the accused themselves and their relatives and other
intimates substantiated them.44
2.
The essence of treachery is in the mode of attack,
not in the relative position of the victim
and the assailant
The RTC ruled out the attendance of treachery due to its
persuasion that the victim must have been facing his
assailants at the time of the assault and was thus not taken
by surprise. The CA differed from the RTC, however, and
stressed that regardless of the position of the victim, the
essence of treachery was the element of surprise that the
assailants purposely adopted to ensure that the victim was
not able to defend himself.45
We uphold the ruling of the CA.
There is treachery when: (a) at the time of the attack, the
victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.46 The
essence of treachery lies in the suddenness of the attack that
leaves the victim unable to defend himself, thereby ensuring
the commission of the offense.47 It is the suddenness of the
attack coupled with the inability of the victim to defend
himself or to retaliate that brings about treachery;
consequently, treachery may still be appreciated even if the
victim was facing the assailant.48
Here, the elements of treachery were present. His
assailants gunned Haide down while he was preoccupied in
the kitchen of his own abode with getting dinner ready for the
household. He was absolutely unaware of the imminent
deadly assault from outside the kitchen, and was for that
reason in no position to defend himself or to repel his
assailants.
The argument of the accused that the Prosecution did not
show that they had consciously and deliberately adopted the
manner of killing Haide had no substance, for the testimonies
of Remedios and Francisco disclose the contrary.
Remedios’ testimony about seeing the four accused taking
positions near the door to the kitchen immediately preceding
the shooting of Haide was as follows:
Atty. Fernandez:
xxx
Q. Were you present when the late Haide Cagatan was shot?
A. Yes, I was present.
Q. Could you possibly tell the Court in what particular place you were when
the alleged incident took place?
A. I was in the ground floor.
Q. What were you doing there?
A. I attended my child (to) answer(ing) the call of his (sic) nature.
Q. Now, could you possibly describe before this Honorable Court, Mrs. Cagatan,
the exact event that took place when the alleged shooting incident took
place in your presence?
A. At that time, I attended my child (to) answer(ing) the call of (his)
nature and after doing that when I was about to stand up to go up
I saw the Villarico’s was (sic) at the back of the kitchen.
Q. At the time you saw them was (sic) any one of them saw you
likewise?
A. There was.
Q. Who was he?
A. Gilberto Villarico, Jr.
Q. At that precise time when you saw them and one of them saw you,
what did Villarico, Jr. do?
A. He aimed his gun to me.65
VOL. 647, APRIL 4, 2011 65
People vs. Villarico, Sr.
Q. Could you possibly demonstrate that to the Court?
A. (Witness demonstrated by squatting position)
Q. Now at that precise moment when you saw Villarico, Jr. on a
squatting position pointing his gun at you, what was the exact
action that you did?
A. When he aimed his gun to me I immediately dropped to the ground.
xxx
Q. Since you were personally present could you still remember
Mrs. Cagatan how many gun burst you head at that precise
moment when you dropped to the ground because Villarico Jr. was
aiming his gun at you. How many gun burst did you hear?
A. Three gunbursts.
20
 Q. Let us go back to the time when Villarico, Jr. pointed his gun to
you. Do you still remember what were the other accused doing or
where were they at that time?
A. I can remember.
Q. Please tell the Honorable Court.
A. Gilberto Villarico, Sr. was on the right side; Ricky Villarico was on
the left side and behind Gilberto Villarico, Sr. was Jerry
Ramientos and behind Ricky Villarico is (sic) Gilberto Villarico Jr.
Q. What were Ricky and Gilberto Villarico, Jr. doing at the time?
A. They were also dropping themselves on the ground and aimed their
guns.
Q. To what particular object that they were aiming their guns?
A. To the door of our kitchen.
Q. How about Ramientos, where was he at that time when you saw the
accused pointing their guns towards the door of your kitchen?66
A. Ramientos was standing behind Gilberto Villarico Sr.49
Likewise, Francisco saw the four accused in the same
positions that Remedios had seen them moments prior to the
shooting. He claimed that they were aiming their firearms at
the kitchen and continued aiming their firearms even as they
were leaving the crime scene, viz.:
Atty. Fernandez:
xxx
Q. Now you said that you saw all of the accused at the time when your late son
Haide Cagatan was murdered in the evening of August 8. Could you
possibly explain to this Honorable Court at the very first time what did you
see?
A. After I came from the toilet I was proceeding to the kitchen because Haide
was preparing food and he was calling for dinner. When Haide Cagatan
was calling for dinner and at the time I was proceeding to the door of the
kitchen, when I was near the door I heard the gun shots.
Q. At the time when you heard gunshots, what did you do?
A. I laid down flat on the ground while my head is (sic) looking up and
there I saw the 3 Villaricos bringing a revolver. They came from
aiming their guns towards upstairs and they are about to
withdraw from that place together with Jerry Ramientos.
xxx
Q. Now, since you said that you saw the accused Villaricos, could you
possibly tell the Court, what were their responsible position(s) in
relation to the door of the kitchen?
A. They were in shooting position as they aimed upward and they
were bringing revolver aiming upstairs.
Q. In relation to the door of the kitchen, could you possibly tell
the Court what were their responsible position at that time when
you saw them?
A. The four of them were situated in front of the kitchen door.
Villarico Jr. and Villarico Sr. were facing each other while Ricky
Villarico and Jerry Ramientos were also facing each other.50
The testimonies of Remedios and Francisco on how and
where the four accused had deliberately and strategically
positioned themselves could not but reveal their deliberate
design to thereby ensure the accomplishment of their design
to kill Haide without any possibility of his escape or of any
retaliation from him. Aptly did the CA observe:
“A perusal of the information shows that treachery was properly
alleged to qualify the killing of Heide [sic] Cagatan to murder. The
prosecution was likewise able to prove treachery through the
element of surprise rendering the victim unable to defend himself.
In this case, the evidence shows that the victim, who was in the
kitchen preparing dinner, could be seen from the outside through
the holes of the wall. The witnesses consistently described the
kitchen’s wall as three feet high bamboo splits (sa-sa), accented
with bamboo splits woven to look like a chessboard with 4-inch
holes in between. The accused-appellants, likewise, positioned
themselves outside the kitchen door at night where the victim
could not see them. When the accused-appellants shot him, he was
caught unaware.”51
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on
June 6, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 24711, finding GILBERTO
VILLARICO, SR., GILBERTO VILLARICO, JR., JERRY
RAMENTOS, and RICKY VILLARICO guilty of murder and
sentencing each of them to suffer reclusion perpetua, subject
to the modification that they are held jointly and solidarily
liable to pay to the heirs of the late Haide Cagatan death
indemnity of P75,000.00, moral damages of P75,000.00, and
exemplary damages of P30,000.00.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
21
 No. L-26195. January 31, 1974. * This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. DOMINADOR MEJIA, Nicknamed Domingo,
defendant-appellant.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Conspiracy need not be proved by
direct evidence.—The existence of a conspiracy among the four
accused is amply borne by the evidence. True it is that there is no
direct evidence of an agreement among them, but the
environmental circumstances compel the conclusion that they did
conspire to wreak vengeance upon the members of their rival gang,
in general, and upon the deceased, in particular, who was known
not only as a member of the said rival gang but also as the one who
had previously fired upon the mother and brother of Garcia and at
Capili and his group.
Same; Same; Same.—That the appellant Mejia did not
participate in the shooting of the victim de la Cruz does not make
him any less a conspirator, because it has been proved that he
acted in concert with his co-accused. He posted himself at a
vantage point, as did his co-accused, as they prepared and waited
for the moment to strike; he fired at Pi to just before Capili shot de
la Cruz; and he fled together with his co-accused from the scene of
the crime immediately upon its commission.
Same; Same; Same.—Conspiracy can seldom be proved except
by circumstancial evidence. The conduct of the appellant before,
during and after the commission of the crime demonstrates that he
was part of the conspiracy, the degree of his participation being of
no consequence.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Barcelona, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor
General Isidro C. Borromeoand Solicitor Adolfo J. Diazfor
plaintiff-appellee.
Francisco R. Achacoso (Counsel de oficio) for defendant-
appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
Instance of Manila in its criminal case 72744, finding the
accused Dominador Mejia, Rolando Echalar, Ricardo Garcia
and Fidel Capili guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing
the first three named accused to life imprisonment and the
last named accused, by reason of his minority, to a lighter
penalty. Echalar, Garcia and Capili later withdrew their
appeals, leaving Dominador Mejia as the sole appellant.
1
The appellant Mejia, thru counsel de oficio, seeks a
reversal of the judgment and a consequent declaration of his
innocence on the ground of reasonable doubt, stressing his
alleged non-participation in the conspiracy that resulted in
the killing of Victoriano de la Cruz, the victim named in the
indictment upon which the appellant and his co-accused were
convicted.
Death came to Victoriano de la Cruz shortly after 6:00
o’clock in the morning of September 28, 1963 as he was
crossing G. Perfecto street in Tondo, Manila, from his house
on Malong street, toward a public toilet nearby. He was felled
by a .38 caliber bullet which lacerated his diaphragm, liver
and its blood vessels and bile duct, vena cava and abdominal
aorta. The fatal shot was fired by Fidel Capili who with his
co-accused Rolando Echalar, was beside a bakery, about
fifteen meters away. Echalar also fired at Victoriano but
missed.
The aforesaid place had been the scene of several
gunfights between two rival gangs known as the “Kalaspac
Group,” to which the deceased de la Cruz belonged, and the
“Dagupan Hunters Group.” to which Capili and Garcia
belonged. Two weeks before de la Cruz met his death, he had
taken potshots at the mother and brother of Garcia.
At about 3:00 o’clock in the morning of September 28,
1963, the deceased de la Cruz again shot at the group of
Capili. To even up the score, Capili’s group hunted him the
rest of the night; their quest and vendetta culminated in the
killing of de la Cruz at the time and spot above-indicated.
22
 The factual details inculpating the appellant Mejia were
established mainly by the testimony of eyewitnesses.
Prosecution witness Aurelia de la Cruz was inside her
house at 1549 G. Perfecto street in Tondo, Manila, that early
morning of September 28, 1963 when she heard a shout,
“Pasok, mga ulol!” She instinctively looked out of the window
and espied the four accused, with firearms, at the corner of G,
Perfecto and Linampas streets. Eehalar and Capili stood
close to the bakery, while the appellant Mejia and Ricardo
Garcia were near the “talipapa;” the distance between the
bakery and the “talipapa” was but the width of Linampas
street. A certain Pito (Agapito) was about to cross G. Perfecto
street when the appellant Mejia fired at him but missed. Pito
remarked, “Bakit ninyo ako babarilin, hindi naman ako ang
kalaban ninyo,” as he retreated to the “looban” or interior
dwellings. When de la Cruz appeared and walked toward the
public toilet, Eehalar said to Capili, “Iyan ang isa, tirahin mo
na.” Eehalar and Capili fired simultaneously at Victoriano,
who thereupon fell. Witness Aurelia de la Cruz screamed.
The four accused forthwith fled. Shortly thereafter, the
brother of Victoriano de la Cruz arrived and brought him to
the North General Hospital, where he was pronounced dead
on arrival.
Julia Alagao testified that she was then at the store of
her comadre, Bianang, not far from where the four accused
were before the shooting. She noted that Victoriano de la
Cruz was unarmed. As de la Cruz walked toward the toilet,-
he was shot by Capili. She saw de la Cruz fall. Then the four
accused fled. The existence of a conspiracy among the four
accused is amply borne by the evidence. True it is that there
is no direct evidence of an agreement among them, but the
environmental circumstances compel the conclusion that they
did conspire to wreak vengeance upon the members of their
rival gang, in general, and upon the deceased, in particular,
who was known not only as a member of the said rival gang
but also as the one who had previously fired upon the mother
and brother of Garcia and at Capili and his group. The
remark of Rolando Echalar, “Pasok, mga ulol,” was a
command to his companions to hide; the remark was
intended not for Capili alone, as shown by the use of the
plural word “mga,” nor was the command intended to exclude
the appellant Mejia because he and Garcia were together
near the “talipapa.” Even the plea of Pito was addressed to no
one in particular in the group of four accused. The second
remark of Rolando, “Iyan ang isa, tirahin mo na,”
demonstrates the unity of purpose of the four accused, as the
remark indicated that they finally had an intended quarry —
one whom they believed belonged to the enemy camp. That
the appellant Mejia did not participate in the shooting of the
victim de la Cruz does not make him any less a conspirator,
because it has been proved that he acted in concert with his
co-accused. He posted himself at a vantage point, as did his
co-accused, as they prepared and waited for the moment to
strike; he fired at Pito just before Capili shot de la Cruz; and
he fled tog-ether with his co-accused from the scene of the
crime immediately upon its commission.
Conspiracy can seldom be proved except by circumstantial
evidence. The conduct of the appellant before, during and
2
after the commission of the crime demonstrates that he was
part of the conspiracy, the degree of his participation being of
3
no consequence. 4
Mejia’s defense of alibi — that from June, 1963 until
December 12, 1964 he was in Malasiqui, Pangasinan, helping
his uncle plant rice, while the crime was committed on
September 28, 1963 — was not pursued in the present
appeal. Even so, it must be stated that his defense is feeble in
the face of the positive declarations of the prosecution
witnesses Aurelia de la Cruz and Julia Alagao that he was
with his co-accused at the time and place of the commission of
the crime. It may be conceded that he did spend some time in
5
Malasique, Pangasinan, but he did so, after the commission
of the crime, as a fugitive from justice. While there, he
received a telegram informing him of the death of his brother
in Manila, and, to pay his last respects, he came to Manila,
23
arriving at past midnight on December 13, 1964. Padilla, A., Criminal Law-Revised Penal Code, 3 vols.,
Unfortunately for him, while he was in front of the Sta. 1971-72 Editions.
Monica chapel at Jose Basa and Dagupan streets, Binondo,
where the remains of his brother lay, he was nabbed by the —————
police.
We hold that the crime was committed in pursuance of a
proven conspiracy, and that the appellant’s direct
involvement in the said conspiracy was established beyond a
reasonable doubt.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo, insofar as the
appellant Dominador Mejia is concerned, is affirmed. Costs
against the said appellant.
Makalintal,
C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma,
JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.—Conspiracy arises from the very instant the
plotters agree to commit the felony and pursue it (People vs.
Indie, 10 SCRA 130) and implies concert of design and not
participation in every detail of execution (People vs.
Mojica, 10 SCRA 515).
A vicarious declaration of a conspirator made after the
termination of the conspiracy may be admissible against his
co-defendants (People vs. Paz,11 SCRA 667). In robbery and
kidnapping, the co-conspirators are also liable for killing of
the victim even if done without the knowledge of one of the
accused (People vs. Rogel, 4 SCRA 807; People vs. Atencio,22
SCRA 88).

LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE

See SCRA Quick Index-Digest,volume one, page 570 on

Criminal Law; and page 369 on Conspiracy.
Aquino, R.C., The Revised Penal Code, 2 vols., 1961
Edition.
Feria, L.R., and Gregorio, A.L., Comments on the Revised
Penal Code, 2 vols., 1957 59 Editions.

24
 G.R. Nos. 82223-24.November 13, 1992. * crime. Corollarily, conviction of the accused should not be made to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. MANUEL MATRIMONIO Y PADILLA, accused-
appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; Evidence; A teenage unmarried lass
would not ordinarily file a rape complaint against anybody much
less her own father if it were not true.—A teenage unmarried lass
would not ordinarily file a rape complaint against anybody, much
less her own father, if it were not true. Besides, the records are
bereft of any evil motive which would have moved Rowena to
charge her father with rape.
Same; Same; Same; Principles adhered to by the Court in
evaluating the evidence in cases of rape.—In evaluating the
evidence in cases of rape, this Court has consistently adhered to
the following principles: a) an accusation of rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; b) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where only two (2) persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized
with extreme caution; and c) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Same; Same;Same; A finding of guilt must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt or that degree of proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind.—This adherence is consistent with the
constitutional guaranty enjoyed by an accused that he is presumed
innocent until proven guilty. A finding of guilt must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it should not be based on a
mere accusation for an accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, synonymous with guilt.
Same; Same; Same; Conviction of the accused should not be
made to rest on the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant
unless the latter’s story is impeccable and rings true throughout or
bears the stamp of absolute truth and candor.—In most rape cases,
however, the culpability of the offender invariably hinges on the
story of the complainant since the crime of rape is not normally
committed in the presence of witnesses. This Court is therefore
duty bound to carefully scrutinize and closely examine the
complainant’s testimony that the accused indeed committed the
rest on the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant unless the
latter’s story is impeccable and rings true throughout, or bears the
stamp of absolute truth and candor.
Same; Same; Same; Credibility of witnesses; Trial court’s
finding concerning the credibility of witnesses carry great weight
and respect and will be sustained by the appellate court unless
certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which if
considered might affect the result.—Conclusions as to the
credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie heavily on the sound
judgment of the trial court. Accordingly, in the appreciation of the
evidence, the appellate court accords due deference to the trial
court’s views on who should be given credence since the latter is in
a better position to decide the question of the credibility of
witnesses, having seen and heard these witnesses and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during trial. The trial
court’s findings concerning the credibility of witnesses carry great
weight and respect and will be sustained by the appellate court
unless certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked
which, if considered, might affect the result.
Same; Same; Same; Intimidation is addressed to the mind of
the victim and is therefore subjective.—Intimidation is addressed to
the mind of the victim and is, therefore, subjective. It must be
viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the
time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast
rule. We have said before that the workings of the human mind
when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable and people
react differently. In such a given situation, some may shout; some
may faint; and some may be shocked into insensibility; while
others may openly welcome the intrusion. The test for its
sufficiency under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is whether
it produces a reasonable fear in the victim that if she resists or
does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, that which the
latter threatened to do would happen to her, or those dear to her—
in this case, her mother, sister and brothers. Where such degree of
intimidation exists, and the victim is cowed into submission as a
result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be
extremely unreasonable to expect the victim to resist with all her
might and strength.
25
APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Br. 45.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
DAVIDE, JR.,J.:
Rowena Matrimonio, a girl of fourteen (14) years in December
of 1985, was unlike many of the youths of her age in our
country. She was the first to be born into a common-law
relationship between a man and a woman who did not think
of legalizing their union despite the succeeding births of four
(4) more children. She was no stranger to poverty; both her
father and mother were itinerant vendorse of sweepstakes
tickets and she of children’s toys. As if these adverse
circumstances were not enough, she underwent, at such a
tender and innocent age, a most painful, terrifying and
horrifying experience the memory of which will forever haunt
her. She was sexually molested—not once but twice—by her
own natural father, the herein appellant, in their own home
in Sampaloc, Manila. The first assault occurred on 27
December 1985. As a consequence of this most unnatural and
revolting act, she became pregnant. The second took place on
5 April 1986. On both occasions, she had no choice but yield
her body and honor because he had threatened to kill her, her
mother and her siblings. It was only after the second incident
that she decided to reveal his bestial deeds.
On 25 June 1986, Rowena, accompanied by her maternal
uncle, proceeded to the General Assignment Section (GAS) of
the Western Police District (WPD) of Manila to report her
painful ordeal. She was investigated and thereafter made to
execute a sworn statement. On that date, upon the advice of
1
P/ Capt. Harrison Tolosa of the GAS, she submitted to a
physical and genital examination which was conducted by Dr.
Marcial Ceñido, Medico-Legal Officer of the WPD Medico-
Legal Section; the latter issued a written report indicating
therein the following findings and opinion:
xxx
1. “1.Breasts are hemispherical in shape, engorged, and with
dark brown prominent nipples and areolae;
2. 2.Abdomen is enlarged, with fundus of the uterus two (2)
fingers breadth above the umbilicus, fetal head at
hypogastrium and positive for fetal heart beats;
3. 3.Hymen is circular in shape, thin and with a deep old
healed laceration at 6 o’clock position and gaping;
4. 4.Introitus vagina admits two (2) examining fingers with
moderate resistance;
5. 5.External cervical os is round and normal in consistency;
and
6. 6.Last menstrual period—November 26, 1985 for one (1)
week.
OPINION:
The above findings is (sic) consistent with uterine pregnancy on
or about the 7th month of gestation.” 2
Also on that date, on the basis of Rowena’s sworn statement
and Dr. Ceñido’s findings, the police arrested and booked the
appellant. 3
On 26 June 1986, after an ex-parte investigation, Rowena
signed two (2) complaints for rape. Duly subscribed and
sworn to by her before Assistant Fiscal Macairog L. De Vega
who appropriately certified the same, the complaints were
filed on that date with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila and docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-46285 and
Criminal Case No. 86-46286. The first complaint reads:
“The undersigned complainant accuses MANUEL MATRIMONIO y
PADILLA of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
That on or about December 27, 1985, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, being the father of the undersigned complainant, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with abuse of
confidence, by means of threats and intimidation, and taking advantage
of undersigned’s youth and weakness, have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned, a minor, 14 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
4
26
while the second provides as follows:
“The undersigned complainant accuses MANUEL MATRIMONIO y
PADILLA of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
That on or about April 5, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being the father of the undersigned complainant, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with abuse of confidence, by
means of threats and intimidation, and taking advantage of undersigned’s
youth and weakness, have carnal knowledge of the undersigned, a minor,
14 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.” 5
Both cases were originally raffled off to Branches 45 and 47,
respectively, of the court a quo.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment
on 17 July 1986 in Criminal Case No. 86-46286 (Branch
47). He entered the same plea at his arraignment on 4
6
August 1986 in Criminal Case No. 86-46285 (Branch
45). Trial in the latter commenced on 25 August 1986.
7 8
Appellant moved for a consolidation of Criminal Case No.
86-46286 in Branch 47 with Criminal Case No. 86-46285 in
Branch 45, which was granted, subject to the conformity of
the Presiding Judge of Branch 45, in the Order of 9
September 1986. The latter did not object to the
9
consolidation. As a result, the two (2) cases were jointly tried
in Branch 45.
The prosecution presented as its witnesses the victim,
Rowena Matrimonio, policeman Cresencio S. Martin and
Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Marcial Ceñido for its evidence in
chief, and recalled Rowena and Yolanda Infante, her mother,
as its witnesses on rebuttal. The defense presented the
accused as its sole witness.
In a Decision dated 5 October 1987 but promulgated on 28
10
October 1987, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code in both criminal cases, and sentenced
him:
“x x x to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the
first rape on December 27, 1985 and the same penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA for the second rape on April 5, 1986.” 11
A day after the promulgation, accused-appellant filed a
Notice of Appeal wherein he manifested his intention to
appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, in
12
view of the penalty imposed, the trial court forwarded to this
Court the records of both cases. This Court accepted the
appeal in the Resolution of 13 April 1987.13
The version of the prosecution, as developed by its
evidence and upon which the judgment of conviction is based,
is as follows:
Rowena, the eldest in a brood of five (5) siblings—four (4)
brothers and a sister—born out of the common-law
relationship between the appellant and Yolanda Infante,
lived with her family in the second storey of a house in
Gerardo St., Balicbalic, Sampaloc, Manila on and prior to 27
December 1985. In that month, she was a mere fourteen (14)
year old first year high school student.
At 11:00 o’clock in the evening of that date, while sleeping
beside her brother Eduardo and their “ampon”Marites Garcia
in their sala, she suddenly noticed her father, the appellant
herein, sitting beside her. When she asked him why he was
there, he told her not to shout or else he would kill her. She
14
believed this because “x x x kung gumulpi po siya sa
nakababata kong kapatid ay parang papatayin niya.” He 15
then held her left arm, pressed his knee on her right arm and
covered her mouth with his left hand; thereupon, he removed
her panty. At that time, he was only wearing his briefs. He
then positioned himself on top of her. She attempted to resist
but “tinatakot po niya ako na papatayin niya ang apat (4)
kong kapatid at aking nanay kung hindi ko
ibibigay.” So, “[P]inagbigyan ko na po dahil sa maliliit pa po
ang aking mga kapatid at ang nanay ko rin po na siyang
naghahapbuhay sa amin.” He then forced his private organ
16
into her private organ. He succeeded in raping her—
“Ginahasa po ako ng tatay ko.” Asked to explain what that
27
means, she answered: “Hinalay po niya
ako.” Notwithstanding the fact that she suffered pain in her
17
private organ until the following morning, she did not reveal
her ordeal to anyone because the appellant warned her not to;
he said that if she did, he would kill her four (4) brothers, her
sister and her mother. It was this assault which caused her
18
pregnancy. 19
On 5 April 1986, at about 8:00 o’clock in the morning,
while alone in the sala of their house after having served
breakfast to her two (2) brothers and a sister at the kitchen
located in the ground floor, Rowena was sexually assaulted
again by the appellant. As in the first assault, she gave in
because of fear; he told her that if she would say anything to
anybody, he would kill her brothers, sister and mother. He
placed himself on top of her, inserted his private organ into
hers, kissed her and fondled her breasts. At that time, her
mother had already left to sell her wares. Eduardo had gone
to school while the brothers and sister she had fed were
playing downstairs. Afraid that the appellant would sexually
20
molest her again, she left on 6 April 1986 for her
grandfather’s residence in Sapang Palay, Bulacan where she
stayed until 1 June 1986. On 2 June 1986, the appellant,
21
Rowena and her mother, Yolanda, met at a restaurant in
Quiapo, Manila. The appellant then suggested, and Yolanda
agreed, that Rowena be taken to the house of a friend in
Dasmariñas, Cavite to “hide” her there because she was
already seven (7) months into her pregnancy. On their way
22
to Dasmariñas, Cavite, she confided everything to her
mother. The latter then told her brother, Manuel Infante, and
Rowena’s uncle about what happened. Both convinced
Rowena to file the case against the appellant. Consequently,
on 25 June 1986, Rowena accompanied by her uncle Manuel,
went to the General Assignment Section (GAS) of the
Western Police District of Manila to report the sexual
assaults. 23
On 11 September 1986, Rowena gave birth to a male child
at the Jose Fabella Hospital; this child was given by
Rowena’s mother, Yolanda, to a person who brought him to
Canada. 24
Upon the other hand, appellant admitted having had
sexual intercourse with Rowena but denied that he forced or
coerced her into giving in to his advances for the truth of the
matter is that without Yolanda’s knowledge, he and Rowena
lived as husband and wife for about one (1) year and fifteen
(15) days. The relationship started in 27 December 1985
when he and Yolanda quarreled, because the latter came
home drunk, and Rowena offered herself to him. Yolanda
discovered the relationship when Rowena was in the seventh
month of her pregnancy; both parents thus agreed to take
Rowena to Cavite to hide such pregnancy. However, Rowena
first stayed in Sapang Palay for about four (4) months during
which time she and the appellant allegedly met every
Saturday in Pateros Street in Quiapo to watch movies. The
appellant claims that he continued having sexual intercourse
with Rowena after the 27 December 1985 incident. These
alleged trysts would usually take place in a motel at the
corner of Avenida and Bangbang streets in Manila; there
were times that they would sleep over in the said motel. 25
On cross-examination, appellant admitted that Yolanda is
only his common-law wife and revealed for the first time that
he is legally married to a certain Leticia Soriano who is still
alive. He thus considers Yolanda as “my second wife.” He also
claimed for the first time that the complainant, Rowena, is
not really his daughter because when he started living with
Yolanda, the latter was already seven (7) months pregnant
with Rowena. 26
On rebuttal, Rowena vigorously denied the appellant’s
assertions and declared that she had never lived as the
latter’s wife; he is her father; she did not offer herself to him
because of such fact; she yielded to him only because of the
threats he employed; she did not meet him on Saturdays; and
she has not gone to any motel and does not even know how
one looks like.27
28
 Yolanda also took the witness stand to refute the claim of
the appellant that Rowena is not his daughter. 28
Confronted with the foregoing diametrically opposed
versions, the trial court found no difficulty in giving full faith
and credit to the story of Rowena and in discrediting that of
the appellant. The following is its exposition:
“The evidence of the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused raped his own daughter, Rowena, on December
27, 1985 and April 5, 1986, intimidating her in both instances to
submit to his evil desire—the circumstances of the second rape,
being almost identical to those of the first rape.
Rowena was fourteen (14) years old and a first year high school
student when she was deflowered on December 27, 1985 x x x. She
was (sic) the eldest of the five (5) children of the accused and
Yolanda Infante x x x. When she saw her father seated beside her
at about ‘11:00 o’clock in the evening’ of December 27, 1985 x x x
she ‘did not think about anything bad’ but when he threatened to
kill her if she will shout, she believed that he will do what he
threatened, ‘kasi kung gumulpi po siya sa nakababata kong
kapatid ay parang papatayin niya’ x x x. Rowena’s awareness of his
cruelty shocked her more when he told her that he will kill her
mother and her brothers and sisters (sic) ‘kung hindi ko ibibigay’ x
x x.
It is thus, without hesitation that the Court finds that there was
intimidation sufficient to overcome the will of Rowena to resist the
assault upon her honor. Assuredly, the force and intimidation
employed should be appreciated in relation to her youth and her
fear of her assailant, her own father. So it has been held that ‘the
force or violence necessary in rape is naturally a relative term,
depending on the age, size and strength of the parties and their
relation to each other’.
Manuel Matrimonio is her own father—and since birth had
exercised strong moral and physical influence and control over her.
A young daughter’s regard for her father naturally intervened in
such a revolting and dastardly occurrence.
In the words of the Supreme Court in PEOPLE vs. OYDOC, 125
SCRA 250, 256:
‘One should not expect a fourteen-year old girl to act like an adult or
mature and experienced woman who would know what to do under such
difficult circumstances and who would have the courage and intelligence
to disregard a threat on her life and the members of her family and
complain immediately that she had been forcibly deflowered. It is not
uncommon for young girls to conceal for sometime the assaults on their
virtue because of the rapists’ threat on their lives, more so when the
rapist is the child’s own stepfather, living with her’.
The Court is, therefore, persuaded to view Rowena’s failure to
promptly disclose to her mother ‘the details of her defoliation’ (sic)
in the ‘light of the mental shock and trauma that must have
overwhelmed her’ as stressed by the Supreme Court in PEOPLE
vs. SANTOS, 94 SCRA 277, cited in People vs. Oydoc, supra, p.
257.
The Court finds the testimony of the accused that ‘Rowena
offered herself’ to him when he and Rowena’s mother quarreled on
December 27, 1985, a blatant lie and the irrefutable proof of the
beast in him, of his shameless lust for the human flesh, be it of his
own flesh and blood.
Rowena belied the same in this wise: ‘that is not true, sir. Why
should I offer myself to him when I know that he is my father?’
(August 7, 1987, t.s.n., p. 3).
In those few and simple words, Rowena proved her regard for
her father—and her contempt of (sic) what he did to her.
Rowena appeared to the Court as one who has not overcome the
trauma of her misfortune—and would rather keep to herself the
ignominy of her sad experience. In fact, the records will show that
she (sic) first took the witness stand, the Court had to reset the
reception of her testimony as she was too reluctant to talk and
that, when she decided to testify, she cried in open Court—
obviously ‘still possessed of the traditional and proverbial modesty
of the Filipina’ who would not have filed this complaint against her
own father and ‘suffered the torment, if not ignominy, of having to
testify in a court of justice about the wrong done to her’ by her own
father, if in truth she was not really raped.
Rowena gave her story to the Court and ‘she gave it under the
solemnity of an oath under the gaze of a public trial.’ She
submitted her private organ to medical examination. She
unraveled the sordid details of her own perdition. Certainly,
nothing could be more humiliating and painful to a young girl as
Rowena. ‘It was the truth of her story that gave her the courage
and boldness fearlessly to face interrogation, and medical
29
examination, both effective means of verifying the truth of her
serious accusation’ (People vs. Clarin, 108 SCRA 680, 692).”
29
In his Appellant’s Brief filed on 23 August 1988, appellant
contends that in convicting him, the court a quo erred:
“I
X X X IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
II
X X X IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME
CHARGED UNDER CRIM. CASE NO. 86-46225 (sic) AND CRIM.
CASE NO. 86-46486 (sic), DESPITE THE APPARENT CONSENT
GIVEN BY THE COMPLAINANT IN BOTH INSTANCES.
III
X X X IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.” 30
In support thereof, appellant insists that the sexual
intercourse that occurred on 27 December 1985 was with the
consent of Rowena who was rather passive, if not submissive
to his sexual advances. Considering that she shared the same
room with her brother, adopted sister and mother who were
all asleep, it was highly improbable that her brother and
sister, who were lying beside her, were not awakened by her
supposed struggle when the accused stayed on top of her for
thirty (30) minutes. Moreover, her permissiveness provided
the appellant with enough confidence to consummate the act
despite the fact that the room was well-lit; what he was doing
could have been easily seen by the other occupants therein
had any one of them awakened.
He also alleges that if there was any threat employed by
him, the same was not sufficient to prevent the complainant
from resisting since he was unarmed. He contends that based
on the complainant’s own testimony regarding her attitude
towards her father immediately after the 27 December 1985
incident, the threat, if any, had already ceased to exist. When
she left home on 10 April 1986 to stay with her grandparents
in Sapang Palay, she had all the chances to reveal the matter
to them but she opted to remain silent. That it took the
complainant five (5) months from the 27th of December
before lodging the complaints against the appellant casts
much doubt on the veracity of her story.
Appellant further claims that the testimony of the
complainant as to when the alleged rapes were revealed to
her mother is inconsistent with the testimony given by the
mother herself. He faults the victim’s mother for not taking
any steps to protect her daughter despite knowledge of the
victim’s pregnancy three (3) weeks before 5 April 1986.
As to the second rape committed on 5 April 1986, appellant
claims that there was no sufficient resistance put up by the
complainant. He maintains that “there must be physical
struggle taking her power to the utmost.” Hence, he claims
31
that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the element
of force and intimidation.
In the Appellee’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General
rejects all the contentions of the appellant and prays for the
affirmancein toto of the appealed decision. It maintains that
the decisive fact in this case is the appellant’s admission of
having had sexual intercourse with Rowena, and considers
his story in support thereof as “seemingly ridiculous, comical
and humorous.” It avers that at the time of the commission
32
of the offense, the appellant, being the complainant’s father,
still had moral ascendancy and influence over her; hence, it
was not necessary for her to have put up a determined
resistance against his molestations. A teenage unmarried
lass would not ordinarily file a rape complaint against
anybody, much less her own father, if it were not true.
Besides, the records are bereft of any evil motive which would
have moved Rowena to charge her father with rape.
30
 In evaluating the evidence in cases of rape, this Court has
consistently adhered to the following principles: a) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to
prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove; b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape where only two (2) persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and c) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 33
This adherence is consistent with the constitutional
guaranty enjoyed by an accused that he is presumed innocent
until proven guilty. A finding of guilt must be proven beyond
34
reasonable doubt, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it should not be based
35
on a mere accusation for an accusation is not, according to
the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. 36
In most rape cases, however, the culpability of the offender
invariably hinges on the story of the complainant since the
37
crime of rape is not normally committed in the presence of
witnesses. This Court is therefore duty bound to carefully
scrutinize and closely examine the complainant’s testimony
that the accused indeed committed the crime. Corollarily,
conviction of the accused should not be made to rest on the
uncorroborated testimony of the complainant unless the
latter’s story is impeccable and rings true throughout, or
bears the stamp of absolute truth and candor. 38
Conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases
lie heavily on the sound judgment of the trial
court. Accordingly, in the appreciation of the evidence, the
39
appellate court accords due deference to the trial court’s
views on who should be given credence since the latter is in a
40
better position to decide the question of the credibility of
witnesses, having seen and heard these witnesses and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during
trial. The trial court’s findings concerning the credibility of
41
witnesses carry great weight and respect and will be 42
sustained by the appellate court unless certain facts of
substance and value have been overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result.
43
After carefully examining the records and sifting through
the evidence, We find no compelling reason to disturb the
findings of the trial court.
The assigned errors present only one crucial issue:
whether appellant committed the crime of rape in Criminal
Case No. 86-46285 and in Criminal Case No. 86-46286. He
contends that he did not because Rowena consented to the
sexual acts alleged therein. The trial court found otherwise
and ruled that the latter yielded because of intimidation. It
further declared that the acts were committed against her
will.
The pertinent portion of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code reads as follows:
“ART.335.When and how rape is committed.—Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1.By using force or intimidation.”
xxx
We sustain the trial court for the prosecution’s evidence
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant
intimidated Rowena into consummating the sexual acts with
him on 27 December 1985 and 5 April 1986. He conveniently
availed of two (2) forms of intimidation: threats and his
overpowering moral influence. With respect to the first
incident, he craftily threatened her during the initial stage by
telling her not to shout or else she would be killed; he also
threatened the lives of her mother, sister and brothers to
force her to yield her honor and privacy when he was already
on top of her. To an innocent girl who was then barely
fourteen (14) years old, the threat engendered in her a well-
grounded fear that if she dared resist or frustrate the bestial
desires of the appellant, she, her siblings and her mother
would be killed. Intimidation is addressed to the mind of the
victim and is, therefore, subjective. It must be viewed in the
31
light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of
the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast
rule. We have said before that the workings of the human
mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable
and people react differently. In such a given situation, some
may shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked into
insensibility; while others may openly welcome the
intrusion. The test for its sufficiency under Article 335 of the
44
Revised Penal Code is whether it produces a reasonable fear
in the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the bestial
demands of the accused, that which the latter threatened to
do would happen to her, or those dear to her—in this case,
her mother, sister and brothers. Where such degree of
intimidation exists, and the victim is cowed into submission
as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it
would be extremely unreasonable to expect the victim to
resist with all her might and strength. And even if some
degree of resistance would nevertheless be futile, offering
none at all cannot amount to consent to the sexual assault.
For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or
intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of
such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary
that the force or initmidation be sufficient to consummate the
purpose which the accused had in mind. This is especially
45
true in the case of a young, innocent and immature girl like
Rowena, who could not have been expected to act with
equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel; or to act
46
like an adult or mature and experienced woman who would
know what to do under the circumstances; or to have the
courage and intelligence to disregard the threat. 47
As if these threats were not enough, appellant took full
advantage of his moral ascendancy and influence over his
daughter who loves and respects him as a father. Even after
being belatedly disowned by him during his last few minutes
at the witness box on cross-examination, Rowena remained
steadfast in her claim that he is her father. That sudden,
surprising and shocking disclaimer—which was also
vehemently denied by Rowena’s mother, Yolanda—reflected
either the heaviness of his conscience now troubled by the
evil he had done to his daughter and which he perhaps felt
could be lessened by a rejection of the father-daughter
relationship, or the total degeneration of an aberrant mind.
In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter,
the former’s moral ascendancy and influence over the latter
substitutes for violence or intimidation. That ascendancy or
48
influence necessarily flows from the father’s parental
authority, which the Constitution and the laws recognize,
support and enhance, as well as from the children’s duty to
obey and observe reverence and respect towards their
parents. Such reverence and respect are deeply ingrained in
the minds of Filipino children and are recognized by
law. Abuse of both by a father can subjugate his daughter’s
49
will, thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants.
We have applied the foregoing principle in the case of a
sexual assault of a stepdaughter by her stepfather, and of a
50
goddaughter by a godfather in the sacrament of
confirmation. 51
Then too, as early as 1901, in United States vs.
Ramos, this Court already ruled that “[w]hen a woman
52
testifies that she has been raped she says, in effect, that all
that is necessary to constitute the commission of this crime
has been committed.” If this rule, already deeply embedded in
our jurisprudence, applies to any man committing the crime
of rape, then a victim’s testimony would be entitled to greater
weight when the accusing words are said against a close
relative, as in the case of a father by a daughter, son-in-law
53
by a mother-in-law or an uncle by a niece. In the instant
54 55
case, We could hardly believe that Rowena would fabricate a
story of defloration and charge her father with two (2) counts
of rape unless these were true. At her tender age, she needed
the company, care and support of a father and mother. She
certainly realized that by her accusations, her father would
be deprived of his liberty and thrown into prison to serve a
long sentence. She was also aware that by testifying, she
32
made public a painful and humiliating secret which others
would have simply kept to themselves forever, jeopardized
her chances of marriage or foreclosed the possibility of a
blissful married life as her husband may not fully
56
understand the excruciatingly painful experience which
would haunt her. She further realized too well that her
denunciations against her own father would only bring down
on her and her family shame and humiliation. These 57
considerations are enough to strengthen Our conviction that
Rowena was telling the truth and was not inspired by any
other motive than to obtain justice for the grievous wrong
58
committed against her, to have the same punished, to have
the full force of the law take its course against her father and,
hopefully, even if it would seem impossible, to reform the
latter. It was not vindictiveness which moved her to file the
cases against the appellant. Then again, it is equally settled
that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit
that she had been ravished and abused unless it is the
truth. Appellant
59 has not shown that Rowena,
notwithstanding her illegitimate status, for which she is
entirely blameless as she did not choose who her parents
should be, and the social and economic environment in which
she was reared, has lost the innate decency and modesty of a
Filipina.
That she reported the sexual assaults six (6) months after
the first intercourse does not weaken her case. Delay in
reporting a rape case committed by a father against his
daughter due to threats is justified.60
The version of the appellant that he and his daughter
Rowena were living together as husband and wife since 27
December 1985 in their own house with her mother, that
Rowena freely gave her consent to the sexual assaults and
that they even had Saturday sessions in a Manila motel to
consummate their mutual passions, is simply incredible and
improbable. It is an affront to Filipino values and an assault
on the intelligence; it offends sensibilities. The story could
only be concocted by a morally corrupt and mentally
depraved sex maniac. Such is the appellant who committed
the most dastardly, if not diabolical, act any man could
commit: the rape of his own daughter—his own flesh and
blood. What this Court said, through Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, in People vs. Ramos, is worth repeating:
61
“Rape is a nauseating crime that deserves the condemnation of all
decent persons who recognize that a woman’s cherished chastity is
hers alone to surrender of her own free will. Whoever violates that
will descends to the level of the odious beast. The act becomes
doubly repulsive where the outrage is perpetrated on one’s own
flesh and blood for the culprit is reduced to lower than the lowly
animal. The latter yields only to biological impulses and is
unfettered by social inhibitions when it mates with its own kin, but
the man who rapes his own daughter violates not only her purity
and her trust but also the mores of his society which he has
scornfully defied. By inflicting his animal greed on her in a
disgusting coercion of incestuous lust, he forfeits all respect as a
human being and is justly spurned by all, not least of all by the
fruit of his own loins whose progeny he has forever stained with his
shameful and shameless lechery.”
He has forsaken that which is the highest and noblest in his
human nature and thus deserves no place in society. It is
hoped that others who had suffered the same fate as Rowena
would be inspired by her courage to expose the evil deeds
unworthy fathers may have committed. This world would
surely be different without these beasts.
The affirmance of the appellant’s convictions in the two (2)
cases subject of this appeal is inevitable. He should, however,
be condemned to pay moral and exemplary damages which
the trial court failed to impose. Of course, since the appellant
was only a vendor of sweepstakes tickets and has been in
prison since 25 June 1986, it would be impossible for him to
satisfy any award for damages. Nevertheless, it must be
imposed for the circumstances in these cases warrant the
award of moral damages under Article 2219(3) in relation to
Article 2217 of the Civil Code. We hereby fix the award at
P50,000.00 in each of the two (2) appealed cases. As for
exemplary damages, provided for under Article 2229 of the
33
same Code, We hereby set the same at P25,000.00 in each of © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
the said cases. Exemplary damages are herein imposed to
deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant
sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters.
Also, We find that the trial court should have appreciated
against the appellant the alternative circumstance
of relationship provided for in Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code considering that the offended party is a descendant of
the appellant. Even if not alleged in the informations, it was
duly proven without objection on the part of the appellant. In
crimes against chastity, such as rape, relationship is
aggravating.62

However, it would not affect the penalty in each of the two (2)
cases herein involved—reclusion perpetua—because it is an
indivisible penalty which must, under Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code, be applied regardless of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the crime.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of Branch 45 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 86-
46285 and Criminal Case No. 86-46286 is hereby AFFIRMED
subject to the modification above indicated. As modified,
moral and exemplary damages, in the amounts of P50,000.00
and P25,000.00, respectively, are awarded to the offended
party, ROWENA I. MATRIMONIO, in each of the said cases.
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Bidin, Romeroand Melo,
JJ., concur.
Decision affirmed with modification.
Note.—Rape is a nauseating crime especially when the
same is committed by a father on his own daughter (People
vs. Rosell,181 SCRA 679).

——o0o——

34
 G.R. No. 118770. December 6, 1996. * took place must have taken its toll on the accuracy of the witness'
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. GEORGE GONDORA, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Witnesses; The rule is that witnesses
are to be weighed, not numbered—it has never been uncommon to
reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single
witness.—Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
rendering a judgment of conviction based on the biased and
uncorroborated testimony of witness Edma Malinao. We find the
contention bereft of merit. The rule is to accord much weight to the
impressions of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe
the witnesses directly and to test their credibility by their
demeanor on the stand. Although the judgment of conviction was
primarily based on the testimony of Edma Malinao, we do not find
any reversible error committed by the lower court in arriving at its
findings. The rule is that witnesses are to be weighed, not
numbered. It has never been uncommon to reach a conclusion of
guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness.
Same; Same; Same; Inconsistency on minor details has no
bearing on the credibility of witnesses.—Concretely, appellant
points to certain alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Edma
Malinao. Appellant alleges that in one of her sworn statements,
Edma Malinao mentioned that the victim was suddenly and
immediately stabbed by two men (at pagtapat sa amin ay walang
sabi-sabing bigla na lang sinaksak si Tony),while in another
affidavit, she stated that one of the assailants boxed the victim
first before the latter was stabbed by them simultaneously (At
sinuntok noong isang lalaki ang aking asawa at siya ay bumagsak.
Pagbangon ng aking asawa ay pinagsasaksak siya ng dalawang
lalaki sa bahagi ng katawan ng aking asawa). The inconsistency
refers to minor details and has no bearing on the credibility of the
witness. It is rather immaterial to dwell exhaustively on whether
the victim was boxed first when the cause of the death of the victim
is the multiple stab wounds inflicted on his person. On this point,
Edma Malinao consistently testified and remained unwavering in
her stand that appellant and Totoy Killer, repeatedly stabbed the
victim to death. A certain latitude must be given to whatever minor
mistake the witness might have said about the actual
confrontation. For apart from the shock and the numbing effect of
the whole incident, the rapidity with which the sequence of events
account
Same; Same; Same; Affidavits; Affidavits are generally
subordinated in importance to open court declarations because the
former are often executed when affiant's mental faculties are not in
such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full
the incident which has transpired.—The above alleged
inconsistencies pointed out by appellant were all contained in the
three (3) affidavits executed by Edma Malinao in connection with
the filing of the case. The contradictions, if any, may be explained
by the fact that an affidavit can not disclose the whole facts, and
oftentimes and without design, incorrectly describe, without the
deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences narrated. Being
taken ex parte, an affidavit is almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes
from the want of suggestions and inquiries. It has thus been held
that affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open
court declarations because the former are often executed when an
affiant's mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a
fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has
transpired. Further, affidavits are not complete reproductions of
what the declarant has in mind because they are generally
prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs
them after the same have been read to her.
Same; Same; Same; Murder; It is not to be lightly supposed
that relatives of the deceased would callously violate their
conscience to avenge the death of dear one by blaming it on persons
whom they believe to be innocent thereof—relationship per se does
not give rise to a presumption of ulterior motive, nor does it ipso
facto impair the credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness.—
Moreover, Edma Malinao is the common-law wife of the deceased
and her relationship, as such, adds to the weight of her testimony
since she would then be interested in seeing the real killers
brought to justice rather than falsely implicating innocent persons.
This Court has held that it is not to be lightly supposed that
relatives of the deceased would callously violate their conscience to
avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on persons whom they
believe to be innocent thereof. Relationship per se does not give rise
to a presumption of ulterior motive, nor does it ipso facto impair
the credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness. It has been
35
correctly observed that the natural interest of witnesses who are
relatives of the victims in securing the conviction of the guilty
would deter them from implicating persons other than the culprits,
for, otherwise, the latter would gain immunity. In the absence of
ill-motive on the part of the witness, and none was shown,
relationship between her and the victim does not undermine her
credibility and so [her] testimony is entitled to full faith and
credence.
Same; Same; Same; An obvious contradiction in the stories
given by a defense witness and the accused casts doubt on the
latter's credibility.—Appellant likewise assigns as error, the fact
that the court did not give credit to the testimony of defense
witness Rowena Olanday. It is worthy of note that nothing in said
testimony would exculpate appellant from the charge. The same
merely consists of failure to identify the assailants probably for
failure of memory or fear for her own safety. Nevertheless, on
material points, we cannot say that the testimony of Olanday
favors herein appellant. On the contrary, an obvious contradiction
in the stories given by Olanday and that by appellant casts doubt
on the latter's credibility. While Rowena Olanday testified that two
malefactors aided each other in the commission of the offense,
appellant's testimony is to the effect that Totoy Killer was the lone
assailant.
Same; Same; Same; Denials; Denials, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence
which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.—On the other hand, the testimony of
appellant consists merely of denials without any other evidence to
sustain his claim and defense. We have consistently ruled that
denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative selfserving evidence which deserve no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between
the positive declarations of the prosecution witness and negative
statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence,
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Br. 109.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Virgilio G. Saldajenocounsel de oficio for
accusedappellant.
FRANCISCO, J.:
This is a case of murder.
Appellant George Gondora alias "Bogie" alias "George
Gongora," together with "Totoy" and "Onio" were charged
1
with the crime of murder in an information which reads as
follows;
"The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accused GEORGE
GONDORA Y MINA, JOHN DOE of TOTOY and PETER DOE of
ONIO, the true names and real identities of the last two accused
are still unknown of the crime of MURDER committed as follows:
"That on or about the 19th of May, 1992, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation and treachery, suddenly attack and assault and
repeatedly stab one Antonio Malinao, Jr. on the vital parts of the
latter's body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which caused his death.
"Contrary to law."
2
"Totoy" and "Onio" remain at large. Upon arraignment,
appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. After trial, the
3
lower court convicted the appellant of the crime of murder
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P50,000.00. 4
The facts, as summarized in the People's Brief, and which
we adopt are as follows:
"In the morning of May 19, 1992, at about 9:30 a.m., Antonio
Malinao and his common-law wife Edma Malinao went to Villa
Barbara, Tramo Street, Pasay City to collect a loan from a certain
36
"Junior." However, they were not able to collect said loan, and were
merely asked to return the next day (TSN, August 6,1992, pp. 6-7).
"While on their way home passing via an alley suggested by
Junior, two (2) persons, one known as "Bogie," herein appellant
and another known as "Totoy Killer," suddenly appeared from
nowhere. The latter boxed Antonio Malinao, and when he fell
down, appellant repeatedly stabbed him. Simultaneously, Totoy
Killer stabbed Antonio (TSN, Ibid., p. 7).
"Edma Malinao pleaded for mercy and tried to embrace the
[assailants], but was instead pushed and kicked aside. Thereafter,
the two (2) [assailants] ran towards opposite directions and
escaped (TSN, Id., pp. 2-3). "With the help of a tricycle driver,
Edma Malinao brought Antonio to the Manila Sanitarium.
Thereat, Dr. Prudencio Sta. Lucia, Jr. found the victim with a
"The 11th wound is a 3 cm. wound located on the subcoastal margin on
the posterior back of the chest on the right.
"The 12th wound is 3 cm. in width located on the posterioir lumbar
area.
"The 13th wound is a 2.5 cm. wound located on the posterior forearm.
"The 14th wound is 2 cm. located on the medial aspect of the forearm.
"The 15th wound is 3 cm. located on the posterior aspect of the forearm.
"The 16th wound is 2.5 cm. located on the anterior aspect of the
superior alia spine.
"The 17th wound is 3 cm. located on the left wrist.
"The 18th wound is 3 cm. located on the right forearm.
"The 19th wound is 1.5 cm. located on the right side of the neck; and
"The 20th wound is 3 cm. located on the dermal aspect of the right arm
(tsn, p. 1 Barrientos, July 17, 1992)
(Exhibits "A," "B" to "S-8"). (TSN, July 17, 1992, pp. 6-7)." 5

dilated pupil, 0/0 blood pressure and 0/0 cardiac rate. Said doctor Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction via this appeal on
pronounced Antonio dead (TSN, July 17, 1992, pp.5-6; August 6, the following assignment of errors:
1992, p.3).
"Dr. Sta. Lucia thereafter examined the deceased and found 1. "I.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED ON (SIC)
twenty (20) different stab wounds all over the different parts of the CONVICTING THE ACCUSED SOLELY ON THE
body of the victim, namely: UNCORROBORATED AND BIASED TESTIMONY
"First Stab Wound—was located on the right chest along the interior
OF WITNESS EDMA MALINAO, THE COMMON-
auxilliary (sic) line wichi is about 1.5 cm. in width and located also along
the fifth rib. LAW WIFE OF VICTIM ANTONIO MALINAO, JR.;
"The Second Stab Wound—is located on the anterior portion of the 2. "II.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT TAKING
arm ehich is about 1 cm. in iwdth. INTO CONSIDERATION THE TESTIMONY OF
"TheThird Stab Wound—is located on the prominal portion of the WITNESS [ROWENA] OLANDAY; 6

forearm which is 2 cm. in width.

3. "III.THE SAID COURT ALSO DID NOT TAKE INTO
"The Fourth Stab Wound—is located on the anterior chest or along the
8th rib about 2 cm. CONSIDERATION THE TESTIMONY OF
"The Fifth Stab Wound—is located on the subcontrol area of the right ACCUSED GEORGE GONGORA;
anterior chest about 1 cm. in width. 4. "IV.THE TRIAL COURT ACTED IN A HOSTILE AND
"The Sixth Stab Wound—is located on the left parasternal line at the UNJUST ATTITUDE AGAINST THE ACCUSED,
left or third intercentral space about 2.5 cm. in width.
THEREBY DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHT OF
"The 7th Wound is located on the posterior auxilliary (sic) area on the
right side and about 1.5 cm. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE." 7

"The 8th wound is located at the mastoid left on the right side about 2
cm. in width.
"The 9th wound [is located this] is a triangular wound or altrasion
located at the right shoulder.
"The 10th wound is about 2.5 cm. located on the 11th rib on the
posterior back on the right.
The issue raised in the foregoing assignment of errors
ultimately boils down to a question of the factual finding and
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses by the trial
court. Hence, we shall discuss them together.

37
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in rendering a
judgment of conviction based on the biased and
uncorroborated testimony of witness Edma Malinao. We find
the contention bereft of merit. The rule is to accord much
weight to the impressions of the trial judge, who had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses directly and to test their
credibility by their demeanor on the stand. Although the
8 misplaced as there is no inconsistency at all, but rather, an
judgment of conviction was primarily based on the testimony
of Edma Malinao, we do not find any reversible error
committed by the lower court in arriving at its findings. The
rule is that witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. It
has never been uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on
the basis of the testimony of a single witness. 10
Concretely, appellant points to certain alleged
inconsistencies in the testimony of Edma Malinao. Appellant
alleges that in one of her sworn statements, Edma Malinao
mentioned that the victim was suddenly and immediately
stabbed by two men (at pagtapat sa amin ay walang sabi-
sabing bigla na lang sinaksak si Tony), while in another
11
affidavit, she stated that one of the assailants boxed the
victim first before the latter was stabbed by them
simultaneously (At sinuntok noong isang lalaki ang aking
asawa at siya ay bumagsak. Pagbangon ng aking asawa ay
pinagsasaksak siya ng dalawang lalaki sa bahagi ng
katawan ng aking asawa). The inconsistency refers to minor
12
details and has no bearing on the credibility of the witness. It
is rather immaterial to dwell exhaustively on whether the
victim was boxed first when the cause of the death of the
victim is the multiple stab wounds inflicted on his person. On
this point, Edma Malinao consistently testified and remained
unwavering in her stand that appellant and Totoy Killer,
repeatedly stabbed the victim to death. A certain latitude
must be given to whatever minor mistake the witness might
have said about the actual confrontation. For apart from the
shock and the numbing effect of the whole incident, the
rapidity with which the sequence of events took place must
have taken its toll on the accuracy of the witness' account.
13
Appellant likewise makes issue of the fact that in Edma
Malinao's third affidavit, she mentioned that the motive for
14
the commission of the crime was the alleged quarrel between
one "Onio" and the victim, when no such declaration was
made in the previous affidavits. Again, appellant's claim is
not worthy of credit. For one, the imputed inconsistency is
omission which relates to the apparent motive for the killing.
Such motive is inconsequential in view of the positive
identification of the perpetrators of the crime. Moreover, we
9 attribute the omission to state the motive of the crime to the
apparent reluctance of witness Edma Malinao to divulge the
illegal dealings of her common-law husband. We note that the
deceased was into the business of dealing illegal drugs and
the same must have been the cause of his death.
The above alleged inconsistencies pointed out by appellant
were all contained in the three (3) affidavits executed by
Edma Malinao in connection with the filing of the case. The
contradictions, if any, may be explained by the fact that an
affidavit can not disclose the whole facts, ;and oftentimes and
without design, incorrectly describe, without the deponent
detecting it, some of the occurrences narrated. Being taken ex
parte, an affidavit is almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and
sometimes from the want of suggestions and inquiries. It has
15
thus been held that affidavits are generally subordinated in
importance to open court declarations because the former are
often executed when an affiant's mental faculties are not in
such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating
in full the incident which has transpired. Further, affidavits
are not complete reproductions of what the declarant has in
mind because they are generally prepared by the
administering officer and the affiant simply signs them after
the same have been read to her. 16
We have thus gone beyond the affidavits and reviewed the
witness' account as reflected in the transcript of stenographic
notes and a reading of the same would bear out that the trial
38
court correctly assessed the credibility of witness Edma Q: What was your reaction while your husband was being
Malinao. She testified as follows: continuously stabbed by Totoy Killer and Boogie?
"Q: Where were you at that time your husband was stabbed? A: I was trying to embrace each one of them as I was pleading to
A: I was together with my husband. stop it, "tama na."
Q: How many person (sic) actually stabbed your husband? Q: While you were pleading and begging from Totoy Killerand
A: They were two, sir. Boogie to stop from further stabbing your husband, did these
Q: How far were you at the time when your husband being (sic) two people hear your advice?
stabbed by these two male individuals? A: No. They did not listen to me instead they kicked me.
A: I was beside him, one foot away. (Witness pointing to his (sic) left knee with black scar.)
Q: Were was (sic) these two persons going to, as testify (sic) a Q: Who actually kicked you at that time?
while ago stabbed your husband? A: I did not notice who kicked me.
A: They just suddenly came from our sides. xxx xxx x x x"
17

xxx xxx xxx Moreover, Edma Malinao is the common-law wife of the
Q: After these two male individual (sic) appeared nowhere deceased and her relationship, as such, adds to the weight of
before you, what was the initial happening afterwards? her testimony since she would then be interested in seeing
A: The other one boxed my husband and he fell down. the real killers brought to justice rather than falsely
Q: Who boxed your husband? implicating innocent persons. This Court has held that it is
18

A: The person who suddenly appeared in front of us.
Q: You mentioned awhile ago that you knew their names
because they were gambling mates in sakla of your hus-
band, tell the Court what are the names of these two male
not to be lightly supposed that relatives of the deceased
would callously violate their conscience to avenge the death of
a dear one by blaming it on persons whom they believe to be
innocent thereof. Relationship per se does not give rise to a
19

individuals? presumption of ulterior motive, nor does it ipso facto impair

A: Totoy Killer and Boogie. the credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness. It has
Q: This Totoy Killer is the one who appeared before you? been correctly observed that the natural interest of witnesses
A: Totoy Killer was the one who boxed my husband and who who are relatives of the victims in securing the conviction of
was in front of us. the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other
than the culprits, for, otherwise, the latter would gain
immunity. In the absence of ill-motive on the part of the
20

witness, and none was shown, relationship between her and

Q: And what happened to your husband after it (sic) was boxed by
the victim does not undermine her credibility and so [her] 21
Totoy Killer?
testimony is entitled to full faith and credence. 22
A: My husband fell flat on his back face up and at the same time
Appellant likewise assigns as error, the fact that the court
stabbed by Boogie.
did not give credit to the testimony of defense witness
Q: Who stabbed your husband?
Rowena Olanday. It is worthy of note that nothing in said
A: Totoy Killer boxed my husband while Boogie simultaneously
testimony would exculpate appellant from the charge. The
stabbed by husband.
same merely consists of failure to identify the assailants
xxx xxx xxx
probably for failure of memory or fear for her own safety.

39
Nevertheless, on material points, we cannot say that the A: No. They were merely passing
testimony of Olanday favors herein appellant. On the by.
contrary, an obvious contradiction in the stories given by Q: When he was boxed by the
Olanday and that by appellant casts doubt on the latter's person following them, what
credibility. While Rowena Olanday testified that two happened next?
malefactors aided each other in the commission of the A: The other one handed the other
offense, appellant's testimony is to the effect that Totoy
23 a knife and this person
Killer was the lone assailant. repeatedly stabbed the victim.
Our finding is that, on substantial points, Rowena Q: This victim, did you know him?
Olanday's narration of events jibes with the story as told by A: No. I do not know those
Edma Malinao. Both of them testified that there were two persons, they just passed there.
assailants who came from different directions; that one of the Q: After he was stabbed by that
assailants boxed the victim as the other one proceeded into person, what happened next?
stabbing him; that Edma Malinao shouted for help and A: The woman shouted asking for
pleaded with the assailants for mercy, and; that after the help.
stabbing incident, the two assailants fled toward opposite xxx xxx xxx
directions. Rowena Olanday testified as follows: Q: At the scene of the incident,
"Q: What happened next if you was (sic) there other people?
recall? A: After the said victim was
A: We were about to go out of an repeatedly stabbed by (sic)
alley when I met two male seven times, the person who
individuals. stabbed the victim and his
Q: What happened next if any companion fled afterwards.
when you met two male They went out of their way.
individual (sic)? They went on their opposite
_A: I was following two persons a direction."
24

male and a female when Rowena Olanday's testimony, we observe, does not help
suddenly two male individuals appellant's cause. The same merely consists of narrating the
met them and boxed somebody. factual circumstances of the case, which as we already noted,
Q: You mentioned boxed corroborates the narration of Edma Malinao. Rowena
somebody, who boxed who? Olanday's failure to identify the assailant is not enough basis
A: One of the two male individual to render a judgment of acquittal. The mere fact that her
(sic) boxed the victim. testimony was offered by the defense does not mean that the
Q: The two individual (sic) a male same tilts the scale in favor of appellant. Rowena Olanday's
and a female you were failure to reveal the identity of the assailants is not
following, do you know their equivalent to a negative identification. Rowena Olanday
identity? simply said she cannot recall the assailants. She never said

40
that the appellant is not one of them. Moreover, the identity Notes.—Contradictions and discrepancies between the
of the assailants have been sufficiently established by the testimony of a witness and his statements in an affidavit do
testimony of Edma Malinao. not necessarily discredit him 7. unless the omission in the
On the other hand, the testimony of appellant consists merely affidavit refers to a very important detail of the incident that
of denials without any other evidence to sustain his claim and one relating as an eyewitness would not be expected to fail to
defense. We have consistently ruled that denials, if mention, or, the narration in the sworn statement
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are substantially contradicts the testimony in court. (People vs.
negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law Español, 256 SCRA 137 [1996])
and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the Allegations in an affidavit not testified upon in the trial
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative are mere hearsay evidence and have no substantial evidential
matters. As between the positive declarations of the value. (Osias vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 101 [1996])
prosecution witness and negative statements of the accused,
the former deserves more credence. 25 ——o0o——
Finally, accused-appellant contends that the judge acted in
a hostile and unjust manner tantamount to depriving him of © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
his right to be presumed innocent. We are not persuaded. The
records reveal nothing irregular, hostile or unjust in the
manner the trial court judge conducted the trial.
Accusedappellant was afforded the opportunity to cross
examine the prosecution witnesses and present evidence on
his behalf. It has thus been held that:
Judges are not mere referees like those of a boxing bout, only to
watch and decide the results of the game; they should have as
much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious
presentation of evidence, calling the attention of counsel to points
at issue that are overlooked, directing them to ask questions that
would elicit the facts on the issues involved; clarifying ambiguous
remarks by witness, etc.
A judge may properly intervene in the trial of a case to promote
expedition and unnecessary waste of time or to clear up some
obscurity.
26

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the lower

court is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Davide,
Jr., Meloand Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed in toto.

41
 G.R. No. 113785. September 14, 1995. * appellants that Salvacion would falsely accuse them of a very grave
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELY
CABILES (at large), accused. RUDY ESPARRAGUERRA and
ROGELIO ESPARRAGUERRA, accused-appellants.
Evidence; Witnesses; Findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses should not be disturbed because the latter is
in a better position to decide the question, having observed the
deportment of the witnesses and their manner of testifying during
the trial.—Accused-appellants’ argument hinges on the credibility
of Salvacion Almoguera as an eyewitness. It is settled that the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses should not
be disturbed because the latter is in a better position to decide the
question, having observed the deportment of the witnesses and
their manner of testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of
value have been plainly overlooked which, if considered, might
affect the outcome of the case.
Same; Same; Absent any compelling reason to overturn the
trial court’s findings, the same must be respected.—Indeed, the trial
court’s assessment on whose story should be believed goes beyond
what the witnesses declare at the trial—a privilege which the
appellate court does not usually enjoy. Absent any compelling
reason to overturn the trial court’s findings, the same must be
respected. We adhere to this rule, especially since the court a
quo observed that Salvacion testified in a forthright and direct
manner. Moreover, she mentioned the minutiae of the incident,
indicating her sincerity and truthfulness in the narration of events.
Same; Same; Criminal Law; Robbery with Homicide; The
probative value of a witness’ testimony is not diminished by her
failure to report the incident to the authorities that same evening
where what she did after the killing of her mother was an act of self-
preservation.—The probative value of Salvacion’s testimony is not
diminished by her failure to report the incident to the authorities
that tragic evening. What she did after the killing of her mother
was an act of self-preservation. At that time, she believed that
accused-appellants had followed her.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court is not convinced that the
daughter of the victim would falsely accuse the appellants of a very
grave offense as she would be more interested in securing the
conviction of the guilty, deterring her from implicating persons
other than the culprits.—We are not convinced by accused-
offense such as the case at bar. Considering her relationship with
the victim, she would be more interested in securing the conviction
of the guilty, and that would deter her from implicating persons
other than the culprits, otherwise, the latter would go free.
Same; Same; Same; Alibi; Alibi becomes weaker in the face of
the positive identification of an accused by an eyewitness with no
improper motive to falsely testify.—Accused-appellants’ defense of
alibi is not worthy of belief. We have repeatedly ruled that alibi is a
weak defense as it is easy to concoct and fabricate. It becomes
weaker in the face of the positive identification of an accused by an
eyewitness with no improper motive to falsely testify.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not sufficient for an accused to
allege that he was elsewhere at the time of its commission of the
crime—he must also present clear and convincing proof that it is
physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis while the
crime was in progress.—More. It is not sufficient for an accused to
allege that he was away from the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission. He must also present clear and convincing proof
that it is physically impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis while the crime was in progress. That physical
impossibility is not present in this case.
Same; Same; Same; Motive; The prosecution need not prove
motive on the part of the accused when they have been positively
identified.—Jurisprudence tells us that the prosecution need not
prove motive on the part of the accused when they have been
positively identified as the perpetrators of the crime.
Same; Same; Same; Robbery with Homicide; Elements.—In
robbery with homicide cases, the prosecution need only to prove
these elements: (a) the taking of personal property with violence or
intimidation against persons; (b) that the property taken belongs to
another; (c) the taking be done with animo lucrandi ; and (d) on the
occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide (used in its
generic sense) was committed. These elements had been
established by the prosecution when Salvacion testified in open
court that accused-appellants, acting in unison, demanded money
from her mother, forcibly took the same against her will and then
hacked her to death.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Insult
or disregard of rank, age or sex; The aggravating circumstance of
42
disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his
rank, age or sex may be taken into account only in crimes against
persons or honor—Robbery with Homicide is primarily a crime
against property and not against persons.—Well settled is the rule
that the aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed
with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of his rank, age or sex, may be taken into account only in
crimes against persons or honor, when in the commission of the
crime, there is some insult or disrespect shown to rank, age or sex.
It is not proper to consider this aggravating circumstance in crimes
against property. Robbery with homicide is primarily a crime
against property and not against persons. Homicide is a mere
incident of the robbery, the latter being the main purpose and
object of the criminal. It is thus erroneous to take this aggravating
circumstance into account in robbery with homicide.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Uninhabited Place; Words
and Phrases; The term uninhabited place refers not to the distance
of the nearest house to the locus criminis—the more important
consideration is whether the place of commission affords a
reasonable possibility for the victim to receive some help.—As
regards the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place
(despoblado), we have ruled that the term uninhabited place refers
not to the distance of the nearest house to the locus criminis. The
more important consideration is whether the place of commission
affords a reasonable possibility for the victim to receive some help.
Further, before it could be appreciated against the accused, it must
be established that solitude was purposely sought or taken
advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. We find that
this circumstance was not satisfactorily proven in this case.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Jacinto, Masbate, Br. 50.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney’s Officefor accused-appellants.
PUNO, J.:
Rudy Esparraguerra, Rogelio Esparraguerra and Ely Cabiles
were charged with Robbery with Homicide before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch L, of San Jacinto, Masbate. The
1
Information against them, dated October 1, 1991, reads:
2
“That on or about July 27, 1991, in the evening thereof,
at Barangay Sowa, Municipality of San Fernando, Province of
Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused confederating together and mutually
helping one another with intent of (sic) gain, violence and
intimidation upon person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously demand money from one Violeta Angustia y Mitra,
box and then hogtied her, with intent to kill, hack (her) with a bolo
hitting her neck, thereby inflicting wound which directly caused
her instantaneous death, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and rob away cash (in the) amount of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos, belonging to Violeta Angustia y Mitra, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter in the amount aforementioned.
“That apart from the aforementioned aggravating
circumstances, the following also concurrently attended in the
commission of the crime; that the crime was committed in an
uninhabited place; that it was committed with insult or in
disregard on account of her sex.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Only accused Rudy and Rogelio Esparraguerra were arrested.
They entered a plea of “not guilty” and underwent trial. Ely
3
Cabiles, on the other hand, remains at large.
The victim, Violeta Angustia, was a fish vendor. At the
time of the incident, she was a resident of sitioSowa in San
Fernando, Masbate. Her house is about 200 meters away
from the poblacion proper of barangaySowa. Accused Ely
Cabiles and Rogelio Esparraguerra (both accused reside
in barangay Sowa) were her barriomates. The other accused,
Rudy Esparraguerra, younger brother of Rogelio, resides
in barangay Talisay (also in San Fernando, Masbate), which
is about four (4) kilometers away from Violeta’s house
in sitio Sowa.
In essence, the prosecution tried to establish the following
4
facts:
43
On July 27, 1991, Violeta visited her daughter, Salvacion
Almoguera, at the latter’s house in Buenavista, San
Fernando, Masbate. Violeta borrowed P1,000.00 cash from
her daughter who readily gave the money to her. That same
day, Violeta was to return to her house in sitioSowa. At that
time, she was allegedly tipsy. Concerned with her mother’s
safety, Salvacion decided to accompany her mother
to sitioSowa. 5 Capisnon, a resident of barangay Sowa.
Salvacion and Violeta left Buenavista at about 5:00 p.m.
and trekked the trail leading towards Sowa. Along the way,
they had to occasionally stop because Violeta was getting
weak. Soon after, it became dark. It was, however, a moonlit
6 to barangay Sowa. Reynaldo was on his way home after
night.
The two women passed the poblacion proper
of barangaySowa at approximately 7:30 p.m. Suddenly,
accused-appellants Rogelio and Rudy Esparraguerra and
their uncle and co-accused Ely Cabiles, appeared from
nowhere and blocked the trail leading to sitio Sowa.
Salvacion, who was only a few meters behind her mother,
recognized the three (3) men. She knew all of them since
childhood. 7 was told by his neighbors that a dead body was recovered
Rogelio demanded money from Violeta saying, “Give me
the money.” Violeta refused. Her response infuriated Rogelio.
He forcibly took the money from Violeta and boxed her
shoulders. She lurched. Thereafter, Ely Cabiles approached
Violeta and twisted her arms towards her back. While she
was in that defenseless position, Rudy drew a bolo and
hacked Violeta, hitting her neck (just below the chin) in the
process. 8
Salvacion was shocked by what transpired. Initially, she
thought that the accused were only joking. During the
hacking incident, she stood motionless at a distance of about
two (2) meters behind her mother and about five (5) meters
away from Rudy. Upon seeing the tragic fate of her mother,
she came to her senses and ran back to her house in
Buenavista. She immedi-
ately informed her husband of the incident. For fear that the
three (3) men would harm her, Salvacion and her husband
locked the doors and windows of their house.9
The news about the death of Violeta spread
in barangaySowa in the early morning of July 28, 1991. Soon
after, people started to gather at the crime scene. Among
those who came to view the victim’s body was Reynaldo
Apparently, that fateful evening, at around 6:00 p.m.,
Reynaldo Capisnon encountered Ely Cabiles and the
Esparraguerra brothers along the trail leading
working in his farm some 150 meters away from the crime
scene. At that time, Reynaldo was carrying a bolo which he
used in clearing his farm. For no apparent reason, Rogelio
grabbed Reynaldo’s bolo and attempted to hack him.
Fortunately, Reynaldo managed to escape. He immediately
went home. He did not inform his wife or the authorities of
the incident.
10
The following day (July 28), at around 7:00 a.m., Reynaldo
within the vicinity of barangay Sowa. Thereafter, Reynaldo
and his neighbors proceeded to the crime scene. When they
arrived, there was a crowd at the scene. Reynaldo viewed the
victim’s body. He also saw Salvacion Almoguera. She was
holding a bolo stained with blood. Reynaldo immediately
recognized the bolo as his because he himself made its handle
and put a distinguishing mark thereon. He asked Salvacion
to give it to him for safekeeping. She agreed.
11
The victim’s body was examined by Dr. Jesus Camposano,
Rural Health Physician of Ticao District Hospital, in
Masbate, on July 28, 1991. His postmortem examination
revealed that the victim sustained, among others, contusion
on her left shoulder and a 10-centimeter hacking wound on
her neck which caused her death. Accused-appellants
12
proffered the defense of denial and alibi. They claimed they
44
were in their respective houses during the commission of the
crime.
Rogelio Esparraguerra averred that he worked in the farm
of Hilario Barruga from 7:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. of July 27,
1991. Thereafter, he went home and rested. He and his
family had supper at 7:00 p.m. Rogelio claimed he did not see
his younger brother Rudy nor his uncle Ely that evening.
Rogelio and his wife slept at around 9:00 p.m.
The following day, at about 7:00 a.m., Rogelio again
worked at Hilario’s farm. Allegedly, Hilario hired him to work
in his farm from July 24, 1991, to July 28, 1991.
Rosevita Esparraguerra, wife of Rogelio, corroborated her
husband’s testimony. She claimed, further, that she learned
of Violeta’s death from her neighbors at around 8:00 a.m. of
July 28, 1991. She and her neighbors went to the crime scene
which was only about a kilometer from their house. According
to Rosevita, she wanted to see Violeta’s body because her
father and Violeta were cousins. Rosevita denied having seen
Salvacion Almoguera and Reynaldo Capisnon at the crime
scene. However, she admitted that she stayed thereat only for
a brief moment. She went home thereafter. She admitted
that, prior to the incident, they never had any
misunderstanding with the victim and her family.
For his part, Rudy Esparraguerra alleged that, during the
hacking incident on July 27, 1991, he stayed home with his
wife, Milagros, who was then four (4) months pregnant.
Allegedly, she had a miscarriage that night.
Rudy alleged that, on July 27, 1991, at around 3:00 p.m.,
Milagros felt pain in her stomach. An hour later, she started
to bleed. The bleeding became more profuse at 6:00 p.m. She
then asked Rudy to fetch a hilot (comadrona). He left at once
and returned home with the hilot, Adelina Baldeo, at around
6:30 p.m. Adelina attended to the needs of Milagros but failed
to save the fetus.
That same evening, Rudy sought the help of spouses
Felixberto Bartolay and Socorro Cabiles whose house is about
ten (10) meters away from his house. Socorro is Rudy’s
mother, while Felixberto is his stepfather. Felixberto and
Socorro went to Rudy’s house at about 7:00 p.m. While
Adelina was attending to Milagros, Rudy, Felixberto and
Socorro drank liquor. Adelina went home at 10:00 p.m.
Felixberto and Socorro left an hour later.
Milagros Esparraguerra and Felixberto Bartolay
corroborated Rudy’s testimony.
To destroy the alibi put up by accused-appellants, the
prosecution presented the testimonies of Hilario Barruga and
Adelina Baldeo.
Hilario Barruga denied that Rogelio worked for him from
July 24, 1991, until July 28, 1991. According to Hilario,
Rogelio worked for him on July 14 and 15, 1991. Hilario
allegedly encircled said calendar dates to help him remember
the dates when he started planting his crops.
For her part, Adelina Baldeo confirmed that Milagros had
a miscarriage sometime in July, 1991. However, she averred
that the miscarriage happened on July 5, 1991, not July 27,
1991. In support of her allegation, Adelina submitted a
notebook containing the information relative to the child
births she had attended to. Her testimony was corroborated
by Imelda Almoguera, the supervising midwife of Adelina
Baldeo.
After trial, accused-appellants were found guilty as
charged by the court a quo . They were sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Violeta
Angustia, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. 13
Hence, the appeal. Accused-appellants contend that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
Salvacion Almoguera positively identified accused-
appellants as the culprits. She testified as follows:
14
“PROSECUTOR RAPSING:
“Q At about 5:00 (P.M.) of July 27,
1991, do you remember where
45
 you were? “Q And what did your mother do
Yes, sir. upon the demand of Rogelio
“A with your mother’s money?
“Q Where were you? “A She refused to give the money.
“A I was walking with my late “Q And what happened after that?
mother. “A Rogelio boxed my mother twice
xxx xxx xxx on both her shoulder.
“Q Where were you walking? “Q What happened next?
“A Going to Sitio Sowa. “A She was out balanced.
xxx xxx xxx “Q You mean, your mother,
“Q Of San Fernando, Masbate? Violeta?
“A Yes, sir. “A Yes, sir.
“Q You said you were walking with “Q And what happened after?
your mother, who is your mother “A Ely approached my mother and
please? held her two hands behind her
“A Violeta Mitra Angustia. back.
“Q While walking with your “Q What happened?
mother, do you remember of any “A Rudy pulled out his boloand
incident that took place? hacked my mother on her neck.
“A Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx “Q After your mother (was) hacked
“A While I and my mother were by Rudy Esparraguerra, what
walking, and upon arrival happened next?
at BarangaySowa, San “A Upon seeing that my mother was
Fernando, Masbate, all of a hacked by Rudy, I ran
sudden, this Rogelio, Rudy and towards our house.
Ely Cabiles appeared. “COURT:
“Q You mean Ely Cabiles, Rudy Do you remember what part of
Esparraguerra and Rogelio his body was hacked?
Esparraguerra, the accused in “A On the neck.
this case? “Q On the left or right?
“A Yes, sir. “A (Witness pointing to her upper
“Q And what happened thereafter? throat below the chin).
“A One of the accused, Rogelio xxx xxx xxx
Esparraguerra, demanded the “Q You said, Mrs. Witness, that
money of my mother saying. after your mother Violeta was
“Give me the money.” hacked at the neck by Rudy

46
 Esparraguerra, you ran away, court’s findings, the same must be respected. We adhere to
where did you go? this rule, especially since the court a quo observed that
“A To our house at Buenavista. Salvacion testified in a forthright and direct
“Q Upon reaching your house, what manner. Moreover, she mentioned the minutiae of the
16

did you do? incident, indicating her sincerity and truthfulness in the
“A I and my husband closed the narration of events. 17

door and the windows of our The probative value of Salvacion’s testimony is not
house. diminished by her failure to report the incident to the
xxx xxx xxx authorities that tragic evening. What she did after the killing
“Q And what happened to your of her mother was an act of self-preservation. At that time,
mother after that? she believed that accused-appellants had followed her. She
“A She died.” testified thus: 18

Accused-appellants, however, find the prosecution’s version of “PROSECUTOR RAPSING:

the crime at bar incredible. They aver that Salvacion’s (continuing)
allegation—that she was with her mother during the hacking “Q You testified, Mrs. Witness, that
incident—does not inspire belief because it would be unwise upon seeing Rudy hack the neck
for them, as the alleged assailants, to leave her unharmed if, of your mother, you ran away
indeed, she had witnessed the incident. Further, accused- and upon reaching your home,
appellants fault Salvacion for her failure to report the crime you and your husband closed the
to the authorities or seek help from her neighbors that same windows and the doors of your
evening. Accused-appellants, therefore, insist that Salvacion house, why, Mrs. Witness?
was not around at the time of the incident. “(SALVACION):
We are not persuaded. “A Because I thought that they were
Accused-appellants’ argument hinges on the credibility of following me.
Salvacion Almoguera as an eyewitness. It is settled that the COURT:
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses “Q More or less what time was that?
should not be disturbed because the latter is in a better “(WITNESS):
position to decide the question, having observed the “A More or less 8:30 o’clock (sic)
deportment of the witnesses and their manner of testifying in the evening.”
during the trial, unless certain facts of value have been On cross-examination, she further testified as follows:
19

plainly overlooked which, if considered, might affect the “ATTY. BAILON:

outcome of the case. 15 “Q So we are now certain that the
place of Buenavista is very
Indeed, the trial court’s assessment on whose story should much farther from the house of
be believed goes beyond what the witnesses declare at the your mother to the place of the
trial—a privilege which the appellate court does not usually incident.
enjoy. Absent any compelling reason to overturn the trial “(SALVACION):

47
“A Yes, sir. that it is physically impossible for him to be at the locus
“Q And you told us that when you criminis while the crime was in progress. That physical
saw the accused hack your impossibility is not present in this case. The records show
22

mother, you ran to your house at that Rogelio’s residence is about a kilometer away from the
Buenavista. crime scene. On the other hand, Rudy’s house
23

“Q Yes, sir. in barangay Talisay is about four (4) kilometers away from
“Q Why did you run to your house the house of the victim in sitioSowa. As a fish vendor, Rudy
24

at Buenavista which is very far, peddled fish not only in Talisay but also in the other
rather than (go to) the house of nearby barangays of San Fernando, Masbate, such as
your mother which is very near? Buenavista and Sowa. Thus, it was not physically impossible
25

“A Because they were guarding the for both accused-appellants to be at the crime scene and
place. commit the crime on July 27, 1991.
“Q Who were guarding the place? Accused-appellants also argue that, as per the testimony of
“A The three accused, Rudy, Salvacion Almoguera, the main motive of the assailants was
Rogelio and Ely. to rob the victim. Thus, they suggest that whoever killed the
“Court: victim must have had previous knowledge that the victim
“Q How did you know that? was carrying cash at the time of the incident. In their case, no
“A Because the dogs were barking. such evidence was adduced against them.
“Q Aside from that, why did you Jurisprudence tells us that the prosecution need not prove
know that they were barking? motive on the part of the accused when they have been
“A Because I was afraid that I might positively identified as the perpetrators of the crime. In 26

be killed by them and I don’t robbery with homicide cases, the prosecution need only to
want to be killed.” prove these elements: (a) the taking of personal property
27

We are not convinced by accused-appellants that Salvacion with violence or intimidation against persons; (b) that the
would falsely accuse them of a very grave offense such as the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done
case at bar. Considering her relationship with the victim she with animo lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery
28

would be more interested in securing the conviction of the
guilty, and that would deter her from implicating persons
other than the culprits, otherwise, the latter would go free.
20
Accused-appellants’ defense of alibi is not worthy of belief.
We have repeatedly ruled that alibi is a weak defense as it is
easy to concoct and fabricate. It becomes weaker in the face of
the positive identification of an accused by an eyewitness
with no improper motive to falsely testify.21
More. It is not sufficient for an accused to allege that he
was away from the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. He must also present clear and convincing proof
or by reason thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) was
committed. These elements had been established by the
prosecution when Salvacion testified in open court that
accused-appellants, acting in unison, demanded money from
her mother, forcibly took the same against her will and then
hacked her to death.
We now come to the allegation in the information that the
aggravating circumstances of disregard of sex and
uninhabited place attended the commission of the crime.
Well settled is the rule that the aggravating circumstance
that the crime was committed with insult or in disregard of

48
the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age
or sex, may be taken into account only in crimes against
29
persons or honor, when in the commission of the crime, there
is some insult or disrespect shown to rank, age or sex. It is
not proper to consider this aggravating circumstance in
crimes against property. Robbery with homicide is primarily
a crime against property and not against persons. Homicide
is a mere incident of the robbery, the latter being the main
purpose and object of the criminal. It is thus erroneous to
take this aggravating circumstance into account in robbery
with homicide. 30
Note.—When homicide is committed as a consequence or
on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals
of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
although they did not actually take part in the homicide.
(People vs. Cobre, 239 SCRA 159 [1994])
——o0o——
_______________
33 cf. Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Parenthetically, even if the

As regards the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited
place (despoblado), we have ruled that the term uninhabited
place refers not to the distance of the nearest house to
the locus criminis. The more important consideration is
whether the place of commission affords a reasonable
possibility for the victim to receive some help. Further, before
31
alleged aggravating circumstances had been established, the imposable
penalty is still reclusion perpetuabecause death penalty cannot be imposed
under Section 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
222
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it could be appreciated against the accused, it must be

established that solitude was purposely sought or taken
advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. We 32

find that this circumstance was not satisfactorily proven in

this case.
Robbery with homicide is punishable by two (2) indivisible
penalties, reclusion perpetua to death. Since the alleged
aggravating circumstances were not duly established, we
agree with the court a quo that the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed against accused-appellants. 33

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the assailed decision of the Regional

Trial Court (Branch L) of San Jacinto, Masbate, in Criminal
Case 453, finding accused-appellants ROGELIO
ESPARRAGUERRA AND RUDY ESPARRAGUERRA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery With
Homicide, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.,
Chairman), Regalado, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ. , concur.
Judgment affirmed.

49
 G.R. No. 110107. January 26, 1995. * against the presumption of good faith for a prosecution witness to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. DOLORES LORENZO Y CORSINO, accused-
appellant
Evidence; Witnesses; When the issue is the witnesses’
credibility, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings
of the trial court.—The pith of the assigned errors and the focus of
the appellant’s arguments is the issue of the witnesses’ credibility.
It is a wellentrenched rule that when such is the issue, appellate
courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court
considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless
certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. The trial court has
the singular opportunity to observe and consider certain potent
aids in understanding and weighing the testimony of witnesses,
such as the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice of the
witnesses while they are on the witness stand. As these are not
incorporated into the record, the appellate court cannot avail of
them and must therefore rely on the good judgment of the trial
court. The appellant has not convinced us that the trial court
plainly overlooked proved facts or circumstances which, if
considered, may affect the result of this case. We thus accept its
assessment of the evidence as correct and consider it binding, there
being no showing that it was reached arbitrarily. Our own
evaluation thereof yields no cause for the application of the
exception to the settled rule.
Same; Same; Motive; Absence of evidence as to an improper
motive strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that none existed
and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.—lf there
was any bias, it should have been, logically, in favor of the
appellant because of esprit de corps. Eclipse did not allow that
sentiment to compromise his official and public duty as a peace
officer. It is settled that the absence of evidence as to an improper
motive strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that none existed
and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit, for,
indeed, if an accused had nothing to do with the crime, it would be
against the natural order of events and of human nature and
falsely testify against the accused.
Same; Same; Extrajudicial Confessions; Under Sec. 3, Rule
133 of the Rules of Court, what must be corroborated is the
extrajudicial confession and not the testimony of the person to
whom the confession is made, and the corroborative evidence
required is that of the corpus delicti.—Nor is there merit to the
claim that Isabelo Liban’s testimony must corroborate Eclipse’s
testimony or the confession of the appellant since without such
corroboration Eclipse’s testimony would have no probative value.
This theory could only be a product of a misunderstanding of
Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides: “SEC.
3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction.—
An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be
sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of
corpus delicti.” Note that what must be corroborated is
the extrajudicial confession and not the testimony of the person to
whom the confession is made, and the corroborative evidence
required is not the testimony of another person who heard the
confession but the evidence of corpus delicti.
Same; Same; In determining the value and credibility of
evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered.—Exceptwhen
expressly required by law, the testimony of a single person, if
credible and positive and if it satisfies the court as to the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. In
determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to
be weighed, not numbered.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Corpus Delicti,
“Explained.—As to the corroborative evidence of corpus delicti, the
appellant herself does not question its presence because she knows
that it has been overwhelmingly established in this case. Corpus
delicti is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has
been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the charred
remains of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, it means
the substantial fact that a crime was committed. It is made up of
two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved, for example
a man has died or a building has been burned, and (b) that some
person is criminally responsible for the act.
Same; Same; Elements of Corpus Delicti; Sec. 3, Rule 133 does
not mean that every element of the crime must be clearly established
50
by independent confession apart from the confession—it means
merely that there should be some evidence tending to show the
commission of the crime apart from the confession.—Section 3, Rule
133 of the Rules of Court does not mean that every element of the
crime charged must be clearly established by independent evidence
apart from the confession. It means merely that there should be
some evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart
from the confession. Otherwise, the utility of the confession as a
species of proof would vanish if it were necessary, in addition to the
confession, to adduce other evidence sufficient to justify conviction
independently of such confession. Otherwise stated, the other
evidence need not, independently of the confession, establish
the corpus delictibeyond a reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility
of witnesses, as they may even tend to strengthen rather than
weaken their credibility.—Since the corroboration of Isabelo Liban’s
testimony was unnecessary, we need not discuss its intrinsic
merits, more especially on its alleged inconsistencies vis-a-visthe
testimony of Eclipse which inconsistencies we, nevertheless, find to
be on minor matters. Minor inconsistencies do not affect the
credibility of witnesses; on the contrary, they may even tend to
strengthen rather than weaken their credibility because they erase
any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.
Same; Same; The presumption that “evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced” does not apply when the
testimony of the witness not produced would only be corroborative,
or when the said witness is available to the defense.—The claim of
suppression of evidence has no merit. The testimony of the other
policeman whom Eclipse requested to get a vehicle could only be
corroborative in some respects but not of the fact of the surrender
of the blood-stained bolo and fan knife and of the appellant’s telling
Eclipse that she killed her husband since it was not explicitly
shown that he was with Eclipse at the precise time of the
surrender. The prosecutor and the defense counsel asked no
further questions of Eclipse to elicit more on the presence of the
other policeman. In any event, even if the latter were present, his
testimony would only be corroborative. Furthermore, it has never
been shown that the said policeman was not available to the
defense. The presumption laid down in Section 3(e), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court that “evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced” does not apply when the testimony of the
witness not produced would only be
627
VOL. 240, JANUARY 26, 6
1995 27
People vs. Lorenzo
corroborative, or when the said witness is available to the
defense because then the evidence would have the same weight
against one party as against the other.
Same; Same; Parricide; “Admissions” and “Confessions,”
Distinguished.—We do not, however, agree with the trial court’s
characterization of the appellant’s declaration that she killed her
husband as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. It
is clear from Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
that there is a distinction between an admissionand a confession.
These sections read as follows: “SEC. 26. Admission of a party.—
The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may
be given in evidence against him. * * * SEC. 33. Confession.—
Thedeclaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be
given in evidence against him.” In a confession, there is an
acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in criminal
cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly
involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the
criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged.
Same; Same; Same; An admissible confession or admission
which has been duly proved shifts to the accused the burden of
evidence to disprove, by strong evidence, that he made the
admission, or admitting it, that he is not guilty of the crime.—
Nevertheless, whether it was a confession or an admission, it was
admissible against the appellant and, having been duly proved,
together with the other facts and circumstances, the burden of the
evidence was shifted to the appellant to disprove, by strong
evidence, that she made the admission or, admitting it, to prove
that she was not guilty of killing her husband. As earlier shown,
the trial court characterized her story as “palpably a put-up
scenario .... [A] story which runs against the grain of ordinary
reality, controverts logic and assails common sense.” The five
reasons enumerated by it to support this conclusion are founded on
or are inferred from facts duly established by the prosecution or are
51
otherwise solidly based on common experience, logic, and common
sense.
Same; Same; Same; The testimony of the accused is not
credible where he has adopted an attitude of indifference relative to
the crime he is accused of and where he failed to inform the police
authorities and the fiscal during the investigation that it was not he
but somebody else who committed the crime.—The appellant’s
failure to assert, at any part of the entire event, from the time she
went with Eclipse to the police station up to the time she was
committed to jail and even thereafter until she took the witness
stand, that it was not she who killed her husband only serves to
reinforce and strengthen this Court’s respect for the trial court’s
finding that her story that “it was not she but Robert Santos who
did her husband in,” is “shot.” We find it incredible that a peace
officer and a wife of the victim would not forthwith denounce or
reveal the identity of the assailant if it were true that it was not
she who killed her husband, This Court has held that the
testimony of the accused is not credible where he has adopted an
attitude of indifference relative to the crime he is accused of and
where he failed to inform the police authorities and the fiscal
during the investigation that it was not he but somebody else who
committed the murder.
Same; Same; Same; Circumstantial Evidence; An accused
could be convicted based on circumstantial evidence where the
circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused to the
exclusion of all others as the guilty person.—Evengranting for the
sake of argument that the appellant only surrendered a blood-
stained bolo and a fan knife but did not admit that she killed her
husband, we find in this case several circumstances whose
concordant combination and cumulative effect point to the
appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty party. These
circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion that points to the appellant, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The requirements then
of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court on the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence to convict the appellant are present,
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Br. 5.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Martinez & Consigna for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
For having allegedly killed her husband on 30 July 1990,
accused-appellant Dolores Lorenzo y Corsino, a policewoman,
was charged with the crime of parricide in an
information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
1
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, on 30 March 1992. The information
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2060–92-TUG and raffled
to Branch 5. The accusatory portion thereof reads as follows:
“That on or about July 30, 1990, in the Municipality of Tuguegarao,
Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, P01 Dolores C. Lorenzo, armed with a bolo
and a fan knife, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and
with treachery did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack and chop one, Agapito
Lorenzo, her own husband, inflicting upon him several injuries on
the different parts of his body which caused his death.
That in the commission of the offense, the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty was present.”
After due trial, the trial court promulgated on 24 February
1993 its judgment finding the appellant guilty of the crime of
2
parricide and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00.
At the trial, the prosecution presented barangay captain
Isabelo Liban and SPO1 Jose Eclipse as its witnesses. The
defense presented the appellant herself and Romeo Racheta.
The ver‘sions of both the prosecution and the defense are
summarized by the trial court as follows:
“The prosecution’s evidence tells the following story: Agapito
Lorenzo and accused Dolores Lorenzo were spouses residing in
Looban, Barangay 12, Balzain, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Among their
neighbors are Barangay Captain Isabelo Liban, Romeo Racheta
and Robert Santos.
52
 In the evening of July 30, 1990, SPO1 Jose Eclipse of the
Tuguegarao PNP Station was in Balzain, Tuguegarao, Cagayan
because that was his post for the night. At about a little past 10:00
o’clock that evening, a tricycle driver went to Policeman Eclipse
and reported to him a stabbing incident in said Barangay 12,
Policeman Eclipse rushed to the reported crime scene. On his
way, he met PO1 Dolores Lorenzo, a policewoman of his own
Station who immediately surrendered to him a blood-stained bolo
and a fan knife and told him, ‘I killed my husband.’
The two proceeded to where the victim was. In front of the store
of Barangay Captain Isabelo Liban, Policeman Eclipse saw Agapito
sprawled on the ground with blood all over his body,
Policeman Eclipse called for Barangay Captain Liban to come
out of his house. In the presence and within the hearing of said
barangay official, Policewoman Lorenzo again said, ‘I’m
surrendering because I killed my husband.’
Policeman Eclipse ordered somebody to get a tricycle to bring
the lifeless body of Agapito Lorenzo to a funeral parlor while he
and Policewoman Lorenzo went to the Tuguegarao PNP Station.
Policeman Eclipse turned over Policewoman Lorenzo together
with.the bolo and knife to the Desk Officer, SPO3 Urbano Aquino.
Eclipse then orally made his report to the Desk Officer which was
noted down in the Police Blotter.
The defense painted another picture of the incident. Its theory
is that it was not Policewoman Lorenzo but a certain Robert Santos
who killed Agapito. Here is defense’s version of the incident.
In the afternoon of July 30, 1990, Agapito Lorenzo and his
neighbor Robert Santos were in the former’s house passing the
time over a bottle of beer grande. When Policewoman Lorenzo
arrived home from work, Agapito, in the presence of Robert Santos,
met her with the following intemperate questions: ‘Your mother’s
cunt, why do you arrive only now? Where did you come from?’ To
avoid further scandal, Policewoman Lorenzo just kept quiet, went
to change her clothes and proceeded to the kitchen to prepare
supper. Finding nothing to cook, she asked permission from her
husband to go to market,
Policewoman Lorenzo went to market and then immediately
went back home to cook what she bought. While cooking in the
kitchen, she heard a heated exchange of words between Robert
Santos and her husband in the sala of their house pertaining to
some bullets and a hand grenade which the latter gave Robert
Santos.
Policewoman Lorenzo went to the sala to pacify the quarreling
men only to meet Robert Santos running out of the house with a
bolo and being chased by Agapito Lorenzo who was holding a knife
in his hand and whose clothes were splattered with blood, When
Agapito overtook Robert, a struggle for the possession of the bolo
ensued between the two men.
While wrestling, Agapito dropped his knife. Policewoman
Lorenzo picked it up and tried to stab Robert with it but she was so
overwhelmed by nervousness that she collapsed into
unconsciousness. Seconds later on, she regained consciousness and
found herself beside her dying husband.
Policewoman Lorenzo stood and picked up the knife and bolo. It
was at this precise time when Policeman Eclipse arrived at the
scene of the incident,
Policewoman Lorenzo gave the knife and bolo to Policeman
Eclipse. The policeman invited her to go with him to the
Tuguegarao PNP Station. She obliged. When the two arrived at the
police station, Policeman Eclipse, in the presence of Policewoman
Lorenzo, reported to the Desk Officer that the latter killed her
husband. Since the policewoman had not yet fully recovered her
composure, she did not say anything.” 3
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses. It found nothing on record which
showed that their impartiality had been vitiated or
compromised or that they had any motive to falsely impute
upon the appellant the commission of the crime. It further
declared that when the appellant surrendered the knife and
bolo to SPO1 Eclipse and volunteered the information that
she killed her husband, she made an extrajudicial confession
and nothing more was needed to prove her culpability. The 4
trial court held that the confession was admissible for it was
not made in violation of paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution. The appellant was neither under police
5
custody nor under investigation in connection with. the
killing of her husband.
53
 The trial court rejected the story of the defense and
characterized it as “palpably a put-up scenario . . . . [A] story
which runs against the grain of ordinary reality, controverts
logic and assails common sense.” 6
“First, accused Policewoman Lorenzo testified that it is not true
that she confessed to Policeman Eclipse in the presence of
Barangay Captain Liban that she killed her husband. If her denial
is true, why did she not correct or even protest when Policeman
Eclipse reported to the Desk Officer that she confessed having
killed her husband? Why did she not even try to correct the entry
in the police blotter containing said inculpatory report? On the
contrary, by some inexplicable quirk, she even let the cat out when
she presented in evidence Exhibit “1.”
Second, accused put forth the theory of her defense: it was not
she but Robert Santos who did her husband in. This theory is shot.
If this is true, why did she not tell it to Policeman Eclipse and
Barangay Captain Liban at the scene of the crime? Why did she
withhold such a very vital information when she was brought to
the Tuguegarao PNP Station shortly after the incident? But the
biggest ‘why’ is: Why did not the accused, wife of the slain man and
policewoman at that, file a criminal case against Robert Santos?
The accused’s explanation was: she was still uncomposed when
she turned over the knife and bolo to Policeman Eclipse and even
when she was in the police station. She did not also file a case
against Robert Santos because she found herself the suspect and
later on the accused.
These reasons do not cut ice. They are for the birds. No one with
an ordinary intelligence would buy such reasons.
Third, the accused never filed a counter-affidavit during the
preliminary investigation of this case. Not that a counter-affidavit
is obligatory but that it afforded the accused the best opportunity
to explain her innocence and to identify the ‘real killer’ of her
husband. Why did she not grab this chance—as normal people in
the same situation—would have done?
Fourth, accused version is simply implausible. According to
Policewoman Lorenzo, when she saw her husband Agapito chasing
Robert out of the house, Agapito’s clothes were already bloodied.
Since there is no proof at all that Robert ever sustained any wound,
the implication is that Agapito was already hacked and stabbed by
Robert inside the former’s house.
It is therefore, difficult to believe that Agapito who already
sustained several wounds could chase Robert—and even harder to
imagine that he wrestled with Robert for the possession of the
latter’s bolo. But why, it may be asked, should Agapito still try to
divest Robert of his bolo when he (Agapito) was holding a knife
which he could have easily used against the latter during the
alleged clinching between the two?
Finally, it is very unnatural for ‘assailant’ Robert to have left
his bolo before running away from the scene of the crime. This is a
concoction to provide an explanation for the possession of the
accused of a knife and a bolo.
Fifth, the version of accused and her witness Romeo Racheta
are even at variance at a very vital point. Thus, Policewoman
Lorenzo said that when Agapito was able to overtake Robert in
front of the store of Barangay Captain Liban, the two struggled for
the possession of the bolo of Robert. Witness Racheta however said
that when Agapito chased Robert, he caught up with him when he
was already cornered. When Robert could no longer run anywhere
else, he turned around, faced Agapito and hacked and stabbed him
many times. Such inconsistency in the version of the two defense
witnesses cannot but heighten one’s conviction that the defense
theory is a conjured one.”
7
The appellant appealed from the judgment to this Court and
in her brief contends that the trial court rt erred in:
8
1. “I.. . .. GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES
OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ISABELO LIBAN
AND SPO1 JOSE ECLIPSE.
2. II.. . . NOT HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.” 9
She discusses these jointly and, in support thereof, she
asseverates that the testimonies of Liban and Eclipse are
inconsistent on material points, for while Liban declared in
court and stated in his sworn statement that he (Liban) came
out of his house and heard the appellant confess to Eclipse
that she killed her husband, Eclipse testified that Liban did
54
not come out of his house. One of them, she continues, did not
tell the truth and argues that a testimony on Liban’s
presence was necessary to corroborate Eclipse’s testimony on
her alleged confession, which would be devoid of any
evidentiary value without corroboration.
She pleads that this Court discredit both Liban and
Eclipse because the testimony of Liban was improbable while
that of Eclipse “was not so firm and resolute as to what was
actually allegedly told to him by the accused.” At one time,
while testifying, he declared that the appellant told him that
she “accidentally injured her husband,” but on another, he
testified that the appellant told him that she “killed her
husband.” Also, as shown in the entry in the police
10
blotter, Eclipse was reported to have disclosed that the
11
appellant “voluntarily surrendered and asked him to bring
her to the police station because she allegedly killed her
husband named Agapito Lorenzo, Jr. together with Robert
Santos who first stabbed him”; yet, in his testimony in court
he pinned down only the appellant and mentioned nothing
about Santos. Furthermore, she charges the prosecution with
suppression of evidence in not presenting as a witness
another police officer who Eclipse said accompanied him to
the scene of the crime and who used a vehicle which they rode
in going to the police station.
12
Meeting squarely the ratiocinations of the trial court in
describing the story of the defense as a “probably put-up
scenario,” the appellant asserts that’ it was error for the trial
court to hold her failure to correct the entry in the police
blotter against her since there is nothing in the records which
clearly shows that she heard Eclipse making the report to the
desk officer and that she saw the entry. The appellant also
contends that the trial court erred when it made capital of
her alleged failure to file a criminal complaint against Robert
Santos since it was the police’s duty to arrest. and prosecute
Robert Santos, Eclipse having known of Robert Santos’
killing of her husband. Besides, she was in detention all
throughout and suffering from trauma. She avers that the
trial court erred when it held against her the failure to file
her counter-affidavit, since that was not obligatory and her
nonfiling was in accord with her constitutional right to
remain silent. Finally, she contends that the conclusions
drawn by the trial court in its evaluation of her testimony
and that of her witnesses are mere speculations.
The appellee agrees with the findings of fact and
conclusions of the trial court and prays that the challenged
decision be affirmed.
The pith of the assigned errors and the focus of the
appellant’s arguments is the issue of the witnesses’
credibility. It is a wellentrenched rule that when such is the
issue, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings
of the trial court considering that the latter is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of value have
been plainly overlooked which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case. The trial court has the singular
13
opportunity to observe and consider certain potent aids in
understanding and weighing the testimony of witnesses, such
as the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice of the
witnesses while they are on the witness stand. As these are
not incorporated into the record, the appellate court cannot
avail of them and must therefore rely on the good judgment of
the trial court. The appellant has not convinced us that the
14
trial court plainly overlooked proved facts or circumstances
which, if considered, may affect the result of this case. We
thus accept its assessment of the evidence as correct and
consider it binding, there being no showing that it was
reached arbitrarily. Our own evaluation thereof yields no
15
cause for the application of the exception to the settled rule.
We agree with the trial court that prosecution witness
SPO1 Jose Eclipse told the truth when he declared under
oath that the appellant surrendered to him a blood-stained
bolo and a fan knife and told him that she killed her husband.
Eclipse happened to be on his way to the scene of the
55
stabbing incident which was reported to him by a tricycle
driver while he was in the performance of his official duty at
his assigned post in Barangay Balzain, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. Eclipse and the appellant both belonged to the
same police unit, the PNP at the Tuguegarao station. There
is nothing in the records, and more specifically in the cross-
examination of Eclipse and the direct examination of the
appellant, which suggests, even remotely, that Eclipse had
any improper motive to implicate a fellow police officer in the
commission of a serious crime or the slightest bias against
the appellant which would blemish his objectivity and
truthfulness. If there was any bias, it should have been,
logically, in favor of the appellant because of esprit de
corps. Eclipse did not allow that sentiment to compromise his
official and public duty as a peace officer. lt is settled that the
absence of evidence ‘as to an improper motive strongly tends
to sustain the conclusion that none existed and that the
testimony is worthy of full faith and credit, for, indeed, if an
accused had nothing to do with the crime, it would be against
the natural order of events and of human nature and against
the presumption of good faith for a prosecution witness to
falsely testify against the accused. 16
The appellant’s emphasis on the inconsistency in the
testimony of Eclipse as to what she actually told him, i.e.,
that she “injured” her husband or “killed” him, is misplaced;
the latter word was used when the court asked him for the
precise term used by the appellant. 17
Nor is there merit to the claim that Isabelo Liban’s
testimony must corroborate Eclipse’s testimony or the
confession of the appellant since without such corroboration
Eclipse’s testimony would have no probative value. This
theory could only be a product of a misunderstanding of
Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides:
“SEC. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for
conviction.—An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall
not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti.”
Note that what must be corroborated is the extrajudicial
confession and not the testimony of the person to whom the
confession is made, and the corroborative evidence required is
not the testimony of another person who heard the confession
but the evidence of corpus delicti.Except when expressly
required by law, the testimony of a single person, if credible
18
and positive and if it satisfies the court as to the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. In19
determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses
are to be weighed, not numbered. 20
As to the corroborative evidence of corpus delicti, the
appellant herself does not question its presence because she
knows that it has been overwhelmingly established in this
case. Corpus delicti is the body (material substance) upon
which a crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a
murdered man or the charred remains of a house burned
down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact
that a crime was committed. lt is made up of two elements:
(a) that a certain result has been proved, for example a man
has died or a building has been burned, and (b) that some
person is criminally responsible for the act. Section 3, Rule
133 of the Rules of Court does not mean that every element of
the crime charged must be clearly established by independent
evidence apart from the confession. It means merely that
there should be some evidence tending to show the
commission of the crime apart from the confession.
Otherwise, the utility of the confession as a species of proof
would vanish if it were necessary, in addition to the
confession, to adduce other evidence sufficient to justify
conviction independently of such confession. Otherwise
stated, the other evidence need not, independently of the
confession, establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable
doubt.21
Since the corroboration of Isabelo Liban’s testimony was
unnecessary, we need not discuss its intrinsic merits, more
especially on its alleged inconsistencies vis-a-vis the
testimony of Eclipse which inconsistencies we, nevertheless,
56
find to be on minor matters. Minor inconsistencies do not
affect the credibility of witnesses; on the contrary, they may
even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility
because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 22
The claim of suppression of evidence has no merit. The
testimony of the other policeman whom Eclipse requested to
get a vehicle could only be corroborative in some respects but
not of the fact of the surrender of the blood-stained bolo and
fan knife and of the appellant’s telling Eclipse that she killed
her husband since it was not explicitly shown that he was
with Eclipse at the precise time of the surrender. The
prosecutor and the defense counsel asked no further
questions of Eclipse to elicit more on the presence of the other
policeman. In any event, even if the latter were present, his
testimony would only be corroborative. Furthermore, it has
never been shown that the said policeman was not available
to the defense. The presumption laid down in Section 3(e),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that “evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced” does not apply
when the testimony of the witness not produced would only
be corroborative, or when the said witness is available to the
defense because then the evidence would have the same
weight against one party as against the other. 23
We do not, however, agree with the trial court’s
characterization of the appellant’s declaration that she killed
her husband as an extrajudicial confession. It is only
an admission. It is clear from Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court that there is a distinction between
an admission and a confession. These sections read as
follows:
“SEC. 26. Admission of a party.—The act, declaration or omission
of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him.
***
SEC. 33. Confession.—Thedeclaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against
him.”
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt.
Admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements
of fact by the accused which. do not directly involve an
acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal
intent to commit the offense with which he is
charged. Wharton defines confessionas follows:
24 25
“A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in
a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an
admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts
pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of
other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is
something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of
some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize
a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of
guilt.”
Underhill distinguishes a confession from an admission as
26
follows:
“A confession is defined as an acknowledgment of guilt of the crime
charged or of the facts which constitute the crime; but it is an
admission and not a confession if the facts acknowledged raise an
inference of guilt only when considered with other facts.”
While Wigmore says:27
“A confession is an acknowledgment in express words, by the
accused in a criminal case, of the truth of the guilty fact charged or
of some essential part of it.”
28
Nevertheless, whether it was a confession or an admission, it
was admissible against the appellant and, having been duly
proved, together with the other facts and circumstances, the
burden of the evidence was shifted to the appellant to
disprove, by strong evidence, that she made the admission or,
admitting it, to prove that she was not guilty of killing her
husband. As earlier shown, the trial court characterized her
story as “palpably a putup scenario .... [A] story which runs
against the grain of ordinary reality, controverts logic and
assails common sense.”
57
The five reasons enumerated by it-to support this conclusion officer you meant to say that you
are founded on or are inferred from facts duly established by heard him telling the police
the prosecution or are otherwise solidly based on common officer that you killed your
experience, logic, and common sense. husband Agapito Lorenzo, Jr.
The trial court had stated that if indeed the appellant together with Robert Santos who
never confessed to Eclipse that she killed her husband, she first stabbed him, is that not so?
should have protested when Eclipse reported to the desk A Yes, sir.
officer that she had confessed to the killing of her husband or Court: ,
she should have attempted to correct the entry in the police Proceed,
blotter containing this inculpatory report. The appellant Pros. Sagucio:
demonstrated her penchant for falsehood when, in order to Q You heard this and you did not
refute this statement, she asserted in her brief that nothing make any comment?
in the record clearly shows that she heard Eclipse making the A Yes, sir, but because at that time I
report and that she read the entry in the police blotter. She was not in my right
conveniently forgot that on crossexamination she admitted senses because I was then shocked at that time.” 29

having heard Eclipse making the report but claiming that she The appellant’s failure to assert, at any part of the entire
did not protest because she was not in her right senses and event, from the time she went with Eclipse to the police
was in a state of shock at the time. Thus: station up to the time she was committed to jail and even
“Prosecutor Sagucio: thereafter until she took the witness stand, that it was not
Q Did the desk officer ever talk to she who killed her husband only serves to reinforce and
you? strengthen this Court’s respect for the trial court’s finding
A No, sir. that her story that “it was not she but Robert Santos who did
Q So it was only PFC Eclipse who her husband in,” is “shot.” We find it incredible that a peace
talked to the desk officer? officer and a wife of the victim would not forthwith denounce
A Yes, sir. or reveal the identity of the assailant if it were true that it
Q Within your hearing and you was not she who killed her husband. This Court has-held that
heard PFC Eclipse talked to the the testimony of the accused is not credible where he has
desk officer? adopted an attitude of indifference relative to the crime he is
A Yes, sir. accused of and where he failed to inform the police
Q And what did PFC Eclipse report authorities and the fiscal during the investigation that it was
to the desk officer? not he but somebody else who committed the murder. 30

A The one that is appearing in the Even granting for the sake of argument that the appellant
excerpt of the police blotter, sir. only surrendered a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife but did
xxx not admit that she killed her husband, we find in this case
Court: several circumstances whose concordant combination and
Q When you said that you heard cumulative effect point to the appellant, to the exclusion of
31

Pat. Eclipse reported to the desk

58
all others, as the guilty party. These circumstances are the
following:
1. 1.A tricycle driver reported to Eclipse a stabbing
incident and the latter immediately proceeded to
where it took place;
2. 2.Eclipse met the appellant who had with her a blood-
stained bolo and a fan knife;
3. 3.The appellant surrendered to Eclipse the blood-
stained bolo and the fan knife;
4. 4.The appellant’s husband lay dead nearby with nine
chop wounds, thirteen stab wounds, and nine incised
wounds on different parts of his body, with abrasions
and multiple contusions as well; 32
5. 5.Eclipse accompanied the appellant to the police
station and, in her presence, the former reported to
the desk officer that she surrendered to him and told
him that she had killed her husband; the desk officer
then entered this report in the police blotter;
1. 6.Although the appellant heard the report, she did not
protest to Eclipse or except to the report; and ,
2. 7.The appellant never asked the police authorities to
investigate Robert Santos for his complicity in the
killing of her husband; despite the unhampered
opportunities ‘for her to denounce Santos as the
alleged killer of her husband, she implicated Santos
only when she testified on 21 January 1993, or after
33
the lapse of nearly two and onehalf years after the
incident.
These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the
appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
The requirements then of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of
34
Court on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to convict
the appellant are present.35
To be appreciated in the appellant’s favor, however, is the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The penalty
for parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion perpetua to death, which are both indivisible
penalties. In the light of the mitigating circumstance, the
proper penalty which should be imposed upon the appellant
should be reclusion perpetua,pursuant to Rule 3, Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code.
The challenged decision is then in accordance with the
facts and the applicable laws.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of Branch 5 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in Criminal
Case No. 2060–92-TUG is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan
, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed. :
Note.—Mere relationship to the victim need not
automatically tarnish the testimony of the witness. (People
vs. Uy, 206 SCRA 270[1992])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
59
 G.R. No. 111888. November 8, 1994. * the testimony of a witness on the point may be entitled to great
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. JOSERIEL RIGODON Y RESTON and EFREN
TORREJANO Y APARICIO, accused, JOSERIEL RIGODON
Y RESTON, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; Elements
necessary for a charge of illegal sale of marijuana.—This Court has
held that the elements necessary for a charge of illegal sale of
marijuana are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefore.
Same; Same; Same; It is indispensable that the identity of the
marijuana which constitutes the corpus delicti must be established
before the court.—Not all the evidence required for proving the
crime charged were presented by the prosecution. It is
indispensable that the identity of the marijuana which constitutes
the corpus delicti must be established before the court.
Same; Same; Same; Indispensable in every prosecution for
illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is the submission of
proof that the sale of the illicit drug took place between the poseur-
buyer and the seller thereof, and the presentation further of the
marijuana, the corpus delicti, as evidence in court.—During the
trial, the sticks of marijuana were never presented as evidence to
prove that appellant indeed sold the same during the entrapment
operation. It is an entrenched rule in our jurisprudence that
indispensable in every prosecution for illegal sale of marijuana, a
prohibited drug, is the submission of proof that the sale of the illicit
drug took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof,
and the presentation further of the marijuana, the corpus
delicti, as evidence in court.
Same; Same; Same; A chemical analysis is not
indispensable requisite to establish whether a certain substance
offered in evidence is a prohibited drug or not.—True, a chemical
analysis is not an indispensable requisite to establish whether a
certain substance offered in evidence is a prohibited drug or not,
the reason being that the ability to recognize these drugs can be
acquired without a knowledge of chemistry to such an extent that
weight.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption that official duty is regularly
performed cannot prevail over the constitutional presumption of
innocence accorded to an accused especially so where there is no
sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction.—This Court sustains
the rule that police officers in buy-bust operations are entitled to
the presumption of having acted pursuant to official duty (People v.
Cruz, 215 SCRA 339 [1992]). However, this presumption that
official duty is regularly performed cannot prevail over the
constitutional presumption of innocence accorded to an accused
(People v. Taruc, 157 SCRA 178 [1988]) especially so where there is
no sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. It is a settled rule
that an accused is entitled to the constitutional presumption of
innocence which may be overcome only with proof beyond
reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the offense charged.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
Br. 2.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor-General for plaintiff-appellee.
Jacinto S. Bautista for accused-appellant.
BIDIN, J.:
Appellant Joseriel Rigodon y Reston and accused Efren
Torrejano y Aparicio were charged with violation of Section 4,
Article 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act
6425, as amended) before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
Branch II, allegedly committed as follows:
“That on or about the 31st day of July, 1992, in the municipality of
an
Clarin, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
have in their possession and control 15 sticks of handrolled
marijuana cigarettes and thereafter did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, push, deal, dispense, deliver and
60
give away 5 sticks thereof for a consideration to a poseur-buyer; to
the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.
“Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Sec. 4, Art. 2 in
relation to Sec. 2(a), par. 1, Art. 1 of R.A. No. 6425 otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.” (Rollo, p.
4).
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.
The trial court’s findings were reproduced in the Appellee’s
Brief as follows:
“PO3 Abundio Vistal, witness for the prosecution, declared that on
March 23, 1992 he was assigned by the Station Commander of the
NARCOM Detachment, as Intelligence Section of the Jagna Police
Station. His duties were to conduct surveillance and follow-ups,
buybust operation and effect arrest (pp. 3-5, tsn, Oct. 21, 1992).
“That in the month of July 1992 he was in his office of the
NARCOTIC Command, Tagbilaran City. He conducted surveillance
at Clarin, Bohol as ordered by the Detachment Commander
Ranulfo Villamor. They received from the then Confidential Agents
PO3 Hercules Chatto and Fulgencio Claro reports that
transactions of marijuana were rampant. The corresponding
surveillance was conducted which yielded positive result. They
reported the matter to the Detachment Commander (pp.6-
7, supra).
“That in the afternoon of July 30, 1992 there was a report that a
drug pusher was selling marijuana. They decided to conduct a buy-
bust operation. The Detachment Commander PO4 Ranulfo
Villamor, assembled them and formed a team which was composed
of PO3 Hercules Chatto, PO3 Fulgencio Claro and himself (pp. 8-
9, supra).
“They went and arrived at Tubigon and proceeded to Clarin
between 6:30 to 7:30 o’clock in the evening of July 31, 1992 (p. 5,
tsn, Oct. 23, 1992) where they met their confidential agent. He
approached a person near a building shop and told him that he
would buy five pieces of marijuana for P30.00 (pp. 11-13, tsn, Oct.
21, 1992). His companion (sic) served as a back-up. He was able to
buy from Joseriel Rigodon and Efren Torrejano. It was the accused
Joseriel Rigodon who handed to him the five sticks of marijuana for
which he paid P30.00 Philippine currency consisting of two ten-
peso bills and two five-peso bills (p. 14, supra). He then examined
the five sticks of marijuana and smelled them and found the same
to be marijuana (p. 15, supra). At this juncture he signaled to his
companions by taking off his Piercing (sic) cap. His companions
immediately effected the arrest of the two accused Joseriel Rigodon
and Efren Torrejano and recovered the money he paid. The bills
paid were initialed by their Detachment Commander (pp. 15-
17, supra). There were ten more marijuana sticks taken from the
accused Joseriel Rigodon. The two accused were brought to Clarin
(pp. 18-19, supra).
“The prosecution offered in evidence the following exhibits, to
wit:
“Exh. A & Marked money of two
A1, ten-peso bills
B & Another marked
B1, money of two five-
peso bills
C, Complaint (pp. 2-3,
tsn, Nov. 5, 1992).”
(Rollo,
pp. 42-44)
On the other hand, appellant Rigodon’s and accused
Torrejano’s versions of the events which led to their arrest
were summarized by the trial court as follows:
“Joseriel Rigodon, one of the accused in the instant case, declared
that at 7:00 o’clock in the morning of January 31, 1992 he was at
the store of Norma Torrejano located at Poblacion Centro, Clarin,
Bohol, located along the national highway to buy gillet (sic) blade
because somebody came to him to have a haircut. He was not able
to buy for the owner of the store was busy. While waiting for the
storekeeper there was an unusual incident. Somebody approached
and asked him if he knew Dondong Aleman which he answered in
the affirmative. As requested he went to the house of Dondong
Aleman. It turned out that the person who requested him to go to
the house of Dondong Aleman was Patrolman Vistal.
“Upon his return from the house of Dondong Aleman,
Patrolman Vistal requested to accompany him which he consented.
They then rode in a jeep. He did not know the person during the
ride in the jeep. The person at his side was SPO4 Villamor. There
were many persons at the back of the jeep. Upon reaching the
61
house of Dondong they disembarked from the jeep. He accompanied
them to the house of Dondong Aleman. While at the house of
Dondong he saw Villamor and Dondong talking. Then they left.
Upon arrival at Tubigon they were made to go to the police
headquarters. In the police headquarters, his companions were
Efren, Villamor, Vistal and Claro. From Tubigon they rode in a
passenger bus for Tagbilaran together with Efren, Claro and
Vistal. At the office of the NARCOM they were escorted by Vistal.
“Efren Torrejano, accused in the instant case, declared that in
the morning of July 31, 1992 he was at Poblacion Centro, Clarin,
Bohol. That his house is located below the public market of Clarin.
He is a carpentry helper. On July 31, 1992 he had a work. Before
he went to work he went to the store of Norma Torrejano to buy
cigarettes. He was then bringing a paleta, an instrument used in
mixing cement and sand. He was held and required by Mr. Claro to
ride in a jeep with several policemen from Tubigon. He complained
but was told not to ask questions. The jeep stopped at the house of
Dondong Aleman. The accused Joseriel Rigodon and Villamor
alighted from the jeep. They went to the municipal building of
Clarin. From Clarin they were brought to Tubigon, then to
Tagbilaran. He told his mother that he was maltreated.
“The defense offered in evidence the following exhibits, to wit:
“Exh. 1, Complaint
1-A & Portion on Exhibit 1
1-D,
1 B & Withdrawn” (Rollo,
1-C, pp. 15- 16)
The defense also presented Cecilio Bayal who testified that
he was constructing a new house and accused Torrejano was
one of the carpenters; said construction began in 1991 and
ended on July 31, 1992 (Rollo, p. 15).
After assessing the evidence adduced at the trial, the trial
court found appellant Joseriel Rigodon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs (Rollo, p. 18). Torrejano, on
the other hand was acquitted. The dispositive portion of said
decision reads as follows:
“PREMISES CONSIDERED, the court finds the accused Joseriel
Rigodon guilty of the crime of Violation of Sec. 4, Art. 2 of Republic
Act No. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment
of Reclusion Perpetua and a fine in the amount of P20,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency (Par. 3 of
Art. 35 Revised Penal Code) with the accessories of the law and to
pay the costs.
“The sticks of marijuana cigarettes which are the subject matter
of the instant case are hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government.
“It appearing that the accused Joseriel Rigodon has undergone
preventive imprisonment, he is entitled to the full term of his
preventive imprisonment to be deducted from his term of sentence
if he has executed a waiver, otherwise, he will only be entitled to
4/5 of the time of his preventive imprisonment to be deducted from
the term of his sentence if he has not executed a waiver.
“The accused Efren Torrejano is hereby acquitted of the crime
as charged, with costs de oficio.
“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 18)
In assailing the trial court’s decision, appellant assigns the
following errors allegedly committed by the court a quo:
1. “1.The Honorable Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol, Branch Two (2) erred in overlooking the
principle of conspiracy where the guilt of one is the
guilt of all; and the acquittal of one in the conspiracy
is also the acquittal of the other.
2. “2.The Honorable Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol, Branch Two (2) erred in convicting Joseriel
Rigodon despite the fact that there is no evidence
against him. That he should have been acquitted like
co-accused Efren Torrejano, because the role played
by Joseriel Rigodon was actually for the pointing out
of the dwelling and person of the big time supplier of
marijuana in Bohol. That his conviction is an irony.
62
 3. “3.That the Honorable Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol, Branch Two (2) erred in convicting
Joseriel Rigodon despite the fact that the prosecution
completely failed to present the alleged 15 sticks of
marijuana, completely failed to present any
laboratory analysis,
1. completely failed to present their named chemist.
What was presented was only the complaint and the
two (2) ten peso bills and two (2) five peso bills
claimed as marked which can easily be produced by
anybody.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 1 -2)
On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted, in lieu of
brief, a Manifestation and Motion praying for the acquittal of
appellant.
The Court agrees.
This Court has held that the elements necessary for a
charge of illegal sale of marijuana are: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore
(People v. Esguerra, 221 SCRA 261 [1993]; People v.
Rumeral, 200 SCRA 194 [1991]).
Not all the evidence required for proving the crime
charged were presented by the prosecution. It is
indispensable that the identity of the marijuana which
constitutes the corpus delicti must be established before the
court (People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743[1993]).
During the trial, the sticks of marijuana were never
presented as evidence to prove that appellant indeed sold the
same during the entrapment operation. It is an entrenched
rule in our jurisprudence that indispensable in every
prosecution for illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is
the submission of proof that the sale of the illicit drug took
place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof, and
the presentation further of the marijuana, the corpus
delicti, as evidence in court (People v. Pacleb, 217 SCRA
92 [1993]; People v. Labarias, 217 SCRA 483 [1993]).
As elucidated in the case of People v. Gesmundo (supra):
“On the issue of non-delivery of the seized marijuana to the court,
the trial court held that it takes ‘judicial notice of the usual
practice of the San Pablo City police force of retaining possession of
confiscated specimens suspected of being marijuana by
immediately forwarding them to the NBI or to an NBI accredited
physician for preliminary examination before filing a case with the
city prosecutor’s office. The mere tolerance by the trial court of such
a practice does not make it right. Clearly, such practice violates the
mandatory requirements of the law and defeats the very purpose for
which they were enacted. Speculations as to the probability of
tampering with the evidence cannot then be avoided.’” (Italics
supplied)
The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt despite the fact that the sticks of marijuana allegedly
bought and found in appellant’s possession were never
presented before it. The court a quo merely relied on the
uneducated opinion of PO3 Abundio Vistal that what he
recovered from appellant were indeed sticks of marijuana.
True, a chemical analysis is not an indispensable requisite
to establish whether a certain substance offered in evidence
is a prohibited drug or not, the reason being that the ability
to recognize these drugs can be acquired without a knowledge
of chemistry to such an extent that the testimony of a witness
on the point may be entitled to great weight (People v.
Enrique, Jr., 204 SCRA 674 [1991]).
In this case, the apprehending officer’s declaration that
what he examined and smelled was indeed marijuana is
incompetent and inadmissible in evidence. In People v.
Enrique (supra), the police officer involved therein conducted
an immediate field testing called “Narcotest Disposakit 9” in
his office to make sure that the evidence obtained from the
accused was indeed marijuana. This kind of test was declared
judicially admissible owing to the fact that said officer
63
underwent special training for the purpose and whose initial of innocence which may be overcome only with proof beyond
finding was confirmed by the PC crime laboratory. reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the offense charged
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, the (People v. Colcol, Jr., 219 SCRA 107 [1993]). Absent
apprehending officer’s alleged ability to recognize a the corpus delicti and its examination as a proof of its being a
prohibited drug in the case at bar was not the product of any prohibited merchandise, the conviction of appellant has no
training or experience as a narcotics agent. On the contrary, leg to stand on.
it was based merely on the alleged briefing given by the WHEREFORE, appellant Joseriel Rigodon is hereby
detachment commander. ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt and is
PO Vistal testified as follows: ordered immediately released from detention unless he is
“Court: Why do you say that they are being held for some other legal cause or ground.
marijuana? SO ORDERED.
“A Because I smelled them your Romero, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
honor. Feliciano (Chairman), J., On leave.
“Q Now, what was the smell? Appellant acquitted.
“A When I smelled it, the smell was Note.—In prosecutions for illegal sale of marijuana, what
the same as marijuana. is material is the proof that the selling transaction transpired
“Q Did you conduct a seminar coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
regarding the identification of evidence. (People vs. Mariano, 191 SCRA 136 [1990])
marijuana?
“A I have not attended a seminar. ——o0o——
“Q What is the basis of this
conclusion that the 5 sticks of
marijuana were in fact and in
truth marijuana?
“A Because we were briefed before
by our detachment com-
mander.” (Rollo, pp. 46-47)

This Court sustains the rule that police officers in buy-bust

operations are entitled to the presumption of having acted
pursuant to official duty (People v. Cruz, 215 SCRA
339 [1992]). However, this presumption that official duty is
regularly performed cannot prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence accorded to an accused (People v.
Taruc, 157 SCRA 178 [1988]) especially so where there is no
sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. It is a settled rule
that an accused is entitled to the constitutional presumption

64
 G.R. No. 126480. August 10, 2001. * writing of a particular person, any other writing of that person may
MARIA TIN @ MARIA TY @ MARIA DY,
petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Appeals; Evidence; It is not the function of the Supreme Court
to weigh the evidence on factual issues all over again.—Essentially,
in our view, petitioner raises issues of fact by assailing the
credibility of witnesses. As a general rule, this Court in a petition
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court will review only errors of law.
It is not the function of this Court to weigh the evidence on factual
issues all over again. However, there are certain exceptions to this
rule, one of which is when the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts. In this case, the decisions of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals are allegedly based on
misapprehensions of vital facts, making their review necessary.
Evidence; Witnesses; Hearsay Rule; A private certification is
hearsay where the person who issued the same was never presented
as a witness, and the same is true of letters.—A careful review of
the records, however, reveals that, first, it was erroneous for the
Court of Appeals to consider in evidence the letter which a certain
Aurora Jose sent to Fiscal Jumino. Aurora Jose was never,
presented to testify on the veracity of said letter, much less its
contents. A private certification is hearsay where the person who
issued the same was never presented as a witness. The same is
true of letters. They are hearsay evidence. Here, Aurora Jose’s
alleged letter is obviously hearsay. While hearsay evidence may be
admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse party’s
counsel, it is nonetheless without probative value.
Same; Handwritings; When a private writing is claimed on the
one hand and denied upon the other to be the writing of a particular
person, any other writings of that person may be admitted in
evidence for the purpose of comparison with the writing in
dispute.—The signature appearing in the receipt, Exhibit “A”,
apparently differs from the specimen signatures provided by
petitioner Maria Tin in open court. But it has striking and obvious
similarities to Mia Chan’s specimen signatures. The differences
and similarities are so obvious to the eye. They could not be
casually disregarded. Expert handwriting analysis is probably
useful here, but it is not indispensable. As said in People vs.
Pagpaguitan, 315 SCRA 226 (1999): When a writing in issue is
claimed on the one hand and denied upon the other to be the
be admitted in evidence for the purpose of comparison with the
writing in dispute. It is also recognized that a comparison of
writing is a rational method of investigation; similarities and
dissimilarities thus disclosed have probative value in the search for
truth. Thus, it has been held that, where a comparison is
permissible, it may be made by the court, with or without the aid of
expert witnesses. The court may, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, order a party to write or sign his signature as a basis for
comparison. For, the handwriting of a person is characteristic of
the person himself. Once admitted, the genuineness of other
offered writings alleged to be the work of the same writer becomes
a question for the trier of fact who may, but need not, be assisted in
this task by experts.
Same; An exhibit which was not properly identified or
introduced as evidence at the trial but was marked as an exhibit
upon mere manifestation of counsel is deemed inadmissible in
evidence.—Exhibit “M-2” which the Court of Appeals considered
proof that petitioner was in possession of the jewelry, deserves
serious scrutiny. Said exhibit was not properly identified or
introduced as evidence at the trial. It was marked as an exhibit
upon mere manifestation of counsel. It was not touched upon
during the testimony of the private complainant nor listed in the
list of exhibits for the prosecution, hence deemed inadmissible in
evidence.
Same; Witnesses; While non-presentation of certain witnesses is
not a valid defense nor does it work against the prosecution’s cause,
this holds true only if the evidence of the prosecution is sufficiently
strong to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused;
When the sole testimony of the complainant is met by an equally
credible evidence of the defense, then the prosecution must present
credible corroborative witnesses to buttress its case.—Petitioner
claims that the loan was for a three-month period only. But private
complainant averred that it was extended under a so-called “white-
paper” system, or a loan with an indefinite term. Petitioner
presented her daughter-in-law, Mia Chan, to establish that the
loan was only for a three-month period. Private complainant did
not present evidence to substantiate her claim, other than her self-
serving testimony. Private complainant relied on the
acknowledgment receipt allegedly signed by petitioner in the
65
presence of two witnesses. However, the prosecution did not The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
present Aurora Jose, who allegedly witnessed the transaction. Nor Benitez, Parlade, Africa, Herrera, Parlade & Panga
did it present Mrs. Dava and Mrs. Zuñiga who allegedly Law Offices for petitioner.
accompanied Dr. Santiago when the latter tried to redeem her E.C. Tutaan & Associates Law Office for private
jewelries. While non-presentation of certain witnesses is not a valid
respondent.
defense nor does it work against the prosecution’s cause, this holds
true only if the evidence of the prosecution is sufficiently strong to
QUISUMBING, J.:
overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused. If the
prosecution evidence is not strong, then it becomes mandatory for
This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals
the prosecution to present evidence which can help further its case,
dated July 24, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional
or explain why such evidence is not presented. When the sole
testimony of the complainant is met by an equally credible Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, dated May 5, 1993, finding
evidence of the defense, then the prosecution must present credible the accused (now petitioner) Maria Tin @ “Maria Ty” @
corroborative witnesses to buttress its case. Its failure to present “Maria Dy” guilty of estafa and sentencing her to suffer
corroborative witnesses, without any explanation why they were imprisonment of six years and one day of prision mayor as
not produced, weakens the testimony of the witness who named minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporalas maximum and
those corroborating witnesses in her testimony. In this case, the to pay the private complainant, Dr. Francisca M. Santiago,
prosecution’s failure to present the corroberative witnesses, the amount of P280,000.00 plus 12 percent interest per
without any explanation for their non-appearance, makes private annum from the filing of the information and P40,000.00 as
complainant’s testimony weak. attorney’s fees.
Same; Burden of Proof; Equipoise Rule; Under the equipoise
rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is
Petitioner was charged in an Information which reads:
doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having
That, on or about February 8, 1980, in the City of Manila,
the burden of proof loses.—Faced with two conflicting versions, we
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
are guided by the equipoise rule. Under this rule, where the
unlawfully and feloniously defraud one FRANCISCA M.
evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on
SANTIAGO in the following manner, to wit: the accused received
which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the
in trust from said Francisca M. Santiago several pieces of jewelry
burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if the
with an estimated value of more than P220,000.00 as collateral to
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
the loan in the amount of P220,000.00 which the latter obtained
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
from the accused, under the express obligation of returning the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the
said pieces of jewelry to said Francisca M. Santiago immediately
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not
upon demand for redemption, but the said accused once in
suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum
possession of the said pieces of jewelry far from complying with her
of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found
aforesaid obligation, failed and refused, and still fails and refuses
lacking. And in this case, the petitioner must be declared innocent
to do so despite repeated demands made upon her to that effect and
and set free.
with intent to defraud the said accused denied having received the
said pieces of jewelry to the damage and prejudice of the said
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court
Francisca M. Santiago.
of Appeals.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

66
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. introduced them to one another and it was Mia Chan who
At the trial, private complainant Dr. Francisca Santiago signed the acknowledgment receipt and who actually received
testified that on February 8, 1980, she and Aurora Jose went the pieces of jewelry. 10

to Mady’s Pawnshop owned by petitioner to pawn some pieces Mia Chan, for her part, corroborated the testimony of
of jewelry. She initially asked for P250,000.00 but petitioner petitioner, her mother-in-law. She stated that she was the
offered only P220,000.00, P200,000.00 first and then the one who extended the loan to Dr. Santiago and that she
P20,000.00 a week later. A list of the jewelries was merely asked petitioner to appraise the pieces of jewelry for
typewritten by a helper of the petitioner. This list was signed her. She also requested petitioner to collect payments from
by petitioner as evidence of her receipt of the said Dr. Santiago. According to Mia Chan, the loan was for a
jewelries. Dr. Santiago also averred that from 1980 to 1982,
2 three-month term with 14 percent interest per annum. She
she made 19 payments of various amounts totaling stated she signed the receipt upon request of Dr. Santiago. 11

P95,600.00. She said that the loan was under a “white-paper”

3 On May 5, 1993, the trial court rendered at decision
system where there is no maturity/expiration date and where finding petitioner guilty. The dispositive portion of the said
the jewelry can be redeemed anytime provided the interests decision reads:
were paid. 4 From the foregoing, the court finds MARIA TIN, alias MARIA
On February 1, 1984, Dr. Santiago said, she went to the TY or MARIA DY, the accused, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
pawnshop with a certain Mrs. Dava and a Mrs. Zuñiga to of the crime of ESTAFA. Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an
redeem her jewelry. She brought with her the amount of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
P450,000.00 to settle her loan. However, petitioner told her
Accused is hereby ordered to pay Dr. Francisoa M. Santiago the
that the jewelries were already sold. This prompted Dr.
5
amount of P280,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from the filing
Santiago to consult Atty. German Abaya Sipin, who wrote to of the Information and P40,000.00 as Attorney’s Fees.
Maria Tin asking her to allow Dr. Santiago to redeem the
6
Dr. Francisca M. Santiago is required to pay the docket fees of
pieces of jewelry. On March 2, 1984, petitioner replied the civil aspect of this case.
through her counsel, Atty. Marcelo T. Dy, confirming that Dr. SO ORDERED. 12

Santiago has an unsettled obligation of P220,000.00 and Petitioner appealed with the Court of Appeals which affirmed
demanding payment. The letter also stated that no jewelries the trial court’s decision. Her Motion for Reconsideration was
were received as collateral for the loan. In a handwritten
7
denied.
letter dated March 7, 1984, Dr. Santiago pleaded for the Hence, this petition. Petitioner avers that the appellate
redemption of her jewelries. Maria Tin, also in a handwritten
8
court erred in:
letter dated March 16, 1984, replied that she merely acted as
guarantor of the loan and since she was made to pay the loan 1. I.. . . NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION’S
she now was demanding payment therefor. In said letter, Tin
9
EVIDENCE IS FULL OF LOOPHOLES AND SELF-
narrated the circumstances behind the loan, and alleged that CONTRADICTIONS, APART FROM BEING
it was another person who gave the loan and received the INHERENTLY INCREDIBLE, AND HENCE
jewelry as collateral. GROSSLY INSUFFICIENT FOR CONVICTION.
Petitioner testified that the real parties to the loan were
Dr. Santiago and her daughter-in-law, Mia Chan. She merely

67
 2. II.. . . RELYING ON WHAT IT PERCEIVED TO BE
WEAKNESSES OF THE DEFENSE RATHER ON
THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION’S CASE.
3. III.. . . NOT UPHOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S
CONTENTION (A) THAT SANTIAGO LIED WHEN
SHE SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY WHEN SHE
ARRIVED AT MADY’S PAWNSHOP THAT SHE
CAME TO KNOW FROM WHOM SHE WAS GOING
TO OBTAIN A LOAN AND THAT IT WAS
SANTIAGO WHO TYPED AND PREPARED EXH.
“A” AND (B) THAT DRA. SANTIAGO HERSELF
PREPARED EXH. “A” AND WROTE THE NAME
“MARIA TIN” AS THE LENDER.
Essentially, in our view, petitioner raises issues of fact by
assailing the credibility of witnesses. As a general rule, this
Court in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court will
review only errors of law. It is not the function of this Court
to weigh the evidence on factual issues all over
again. However, there are certain exceptions to this rule, one
13
of which is when the judgment is based on misapprehension
of facts. In this case, the decisions of both the trial court and
14
the Court of Appeals are allegedly based on
misapprehensions of vital facts, making their review
necessary.
A conviction in this case for estafa depends on three facts:
(1) that accused was the one who extended the loan; (2) that
accused was the one who received the pieces of jewelry as
collateral for the loan she extended; and (3) that the loan was
for an indefinite term. These factual circumstances must
relate directly to the elements of the crime of estafa with
abuse of confidence under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised
Penal Code. 15
Both trial and appellate courts held that it was petitioner
who extended the loan and who actually received the
jewelries from Dr. Santiago. Their conclusion stemmed from
the following circumstances:
1. (1)In a letter she wrote to Fiscal Jumino, one Aurora
Jose who had allegedly introduced Dr. Santiago to
Maria Tin and who was present when the transaction
took place, corroborated Dr. Santiago’s testimony;
_ (2)The signature of appellant [petitioner] appears on the
document acknowledging receipt of the pieces of jewelry;
16
1. (3)Receipts evidencing payments made by Dr. Santiago
and which appeared to be signed by the petitioner
were not denied by the latter;
2. (4)Petitioner did not deny that she sent a note (Exh.
“M-2”) to Dr. Santiago reminding her to update her
payments, or else she would auction the pieces of
jewelry.
A careful review of the records, however, reveals that, first, it
was erroneous for the Court of Appeals to consider in
evidence the letter which a certain Aurora Jose sent to Fiscal
Jumino. Aurora Jose was never presented to testify on the
17
veracity of said letter, much less its contents. A private
certification is hearsay where the person who issued the
same was never presented as a witness. The same is true of
18
letters. They are hearsay evidence. Here, Aurora Jose’s
alleged letter is obviously hearsay. While hearsay evidence
may be admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse
party’s counsel, it is nonetheless without probative value. 19
Second, the signature appearing in the receipt, Exhibit
“A”, apparently differs from the specimen signatures provided
by petitioner Maria Tin in open court. But it has striking
20
and obvious similarities to Mia Chan’s specimen
signatures. The differences and similarities are so obvious to
21
the eye. They could not be casually disregarded. Expert
handwriting analysis is probably useful here, but it is not
indispensable. As said in People vs. Pagpaguitan, 315 SCRA
22
226 (1999):
68
When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and denied
upon the other to be the writing of a particular person, any other
writing of that person may be admitted in evidence for the purpose
of comparison with the writing in dispute. It is also recognized that
a comparison of writing is a rational method of investigation;
similarities and dissimilarities thus disclosed have probative value
in the search for truth. Thus, it has been held that, where a
comparison is permissible, it may be made by the court, with or
without the aid of expert witnesses. The court may, in the exercise
of its sound discretion, order a party to write or sign his signature
as a basis for comparison. For, the handwriting of a person is
characteristic of the person himself. Once admitted, the
genuineness of other offered writings alleged to be the work of the
same writer becomes a question for the trier of fact who may, but
need not, be assisted in this task by experts.
23
In the present case, the prosecution bears the burden of
proving that the signature in Exhibit “A” was the petitioner’s,
not Mia Chan’s. This the prosecution did not do.
Third, petitioner did not deny that she received payments
and made demands for payment from private complainant.
They do not show, however, that she was the one who
weighty consideration and could not be ignored. That
admission is one against self-interest, amounting to an
incriminatory statement, which the witness could not have
volunteered if not the truth.
Petitioner claims that the loan was for a three-month
period only. But private complainant averred that it was
extended under a so-called “white-paper” system, or a loan
with an indefinite term. Petitioner presented her daughter-
in-law, Mia Chan, to establish that the loan was only for a
three-month period. Private complainant did not present
evidence to substantiate her claim, other than her self-
serving testimony. Private complainant relied on the
acknowledgment receipt allegedly signed by petitioner in the
presence of two witnesses. However, the prosecution did not
present Aurora Jose, who allegedly witnessed the
transaction. Nor did it present Mrs. Dava and Mrs. Zuñiga
who allegedly accompanied Dr. Santiago when the latter tried
to redeem her jewelries. While non-presentation of certain
witnesses is not a valid defense nor does it work against the
prosecution’s cause, this holds true only if the evidence of the
29

extended the loan and accepted the jewelries. Note that even
Mia Chan received certain payments from Dr. Santiago, as
shown by Exhibits “8”, “8-A”, “10” and “10-A.” A certain
“Viring” also received payment from Dr. Santiago. These
instances only prove that a person who received payments
from another is not necessarily the person who extended the
loan.
Fourth, Exhibit “M-2” which the Court of Appeals
25
considered proof that petitioner was in possession of the
jewelry, deserves serious scrutiny. Said exhibit was not
properly identified or introduced as evidence at the trial. It
was marked as an exhibit upon mere manifestation of
prosecution is sufficiently strong to overcome the
presumption of innocence of the accused. If the prosecution
evidence is not strong, then it becomes mandatory for the
24
prosecution to present evidence which can help further its
case, or explain why such evidence is not presented. When
the sole testimony of the complainant is met by an equally
credible evidence of the defense, then the prosecution must
present credible corroborative witnesses to buttress its case.
Its failure to present corroborative witnesses, without any
explanation why they were not produced, weakens the
testimony of the witness who named those corroborating
witnesses in her testimony. In this case, the prosecution’s
30

counsel. It was not touched upon during the testimony of the

26
private complainant nor listed in the list of exhibits for the
prosecution, hence deemed inadmissible in evidence.
27 28
Fifth, Mia Chan’s admission, that she was the one who
extended the loan and received the jewelries, deserves
failure to present the corroborative witnesses, without any
explanation for their non-appearance, makes private
complainant’s testimony weak.
Further, since it was private complainant who asserted
that the loan was for an indefinite term under the so-called

69
“white-paper system” of the pawnshop, she had the burden of comparing handwriting. (People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA
proving that fact as true. In this she failed, and her failure 676 [1995])
undermines the case for the prosecution.
——o0o——
Faced with two conflicting versions, we are guided by the
equipoise rule. Under this rule, where the evidence on an © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof
loses. The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory
31

facts and circumstances are capable of two or more

explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then
the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and
does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the
32

needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime

charged is found lacking. And in this case, the petitioner
must be declared innocent and set free.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14818, affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court in Crim. Case No. 88-64598, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Tin is
ACQUITTED of the charge against her under Article 315 (1)
(b) of the Revised Penal Code, for lack of evidence sufficient
to sustain a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside, petitioner acquitted.
Notes.—The authenticity of a handwriting may be proven
by its comparison made by the witness or the court with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. (Eugenio vs. Court of Appeals,239
SCRA 207 [1994])
Resort to questioned document examiners, more familiarly
called handwriting experts, is not mandatory, and while
probably useful, they are not indispensable in examining or

70