<NAME HERE> 2 – EXEC PROPERTY LAW

1. The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions,

alleging that the whole parcel of land is public property of the
Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or
through any title of egresion (1. f. ant. Exit from somewhere)from the
State.

Ans. Yes, the statute of limitations did not run against the government.
The government is still the absolute owner of the land. Further, Mateo’s
possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require
the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It
was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except
insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it
has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.

2. Respondent appellate court found petitioner to have abandoned its

mining claim over the said tract of land and, on the other hand,
adjudged private respondent to be the owner thereof by virtue of his
having possessed the same under a bona fide claim of ownership for at
least thirty (30) years prior to the filing of his land registration
application in 1965.

Ans. Petitioner failed to sufficiently show compliance with actual annual

work requirement on its mining claims but also the credible are the
transcribed observations of the trial commissioner that nowhere on the
subject land could be found tangible works or improvements of an
extent that would have existed had petitioner really complied with the
annual work requirement from 1931 when it allegedly first located said
mining claims. In fact, no mining infrastructure or equipment of any sort
can be found on the area. Understandable thus is the action of the
Director of Lands not to further appeal from respondent courts decision,
Director of Lands eventually conceding the subject land to be
registrable, considering petitioners non-performance of mining works
thereon, private respondents adverse possession of the subject land
more than thirty (30) years and its use thereof for as many years solely
for agricultural purposes.

3. The trial court held that petitioner failed to comply with the conditions
of the donation and declared it null and void. The court a quo further
directed petitioner to execute a deed of the reconveyance of the
property in favor of the heirs of the donor, namely, private respondents
herein.

Ans. Yes, the ruling of the Court is correct. Records are clear and facts
are undisputed that since the deed of donation up to the filing of the
case, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as donee.
Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time.
Hence, it is only just to declare the subject donation ineffective and, for
all purposes, revoked. Therefore the petitioner as donee should now
return the donated property to the heirs of the donor by means of
reconveyance.
4. Respondents, in their answer, allege that "petitioner was not and is not
entitled as a matter of right to a patent to the 'Nob Fraction' claim
because the Constitution provides that 'natural resources, with the
exception of public agriculture land, shall not be alienated’.

Ans. NO. A constitution provision must be presumed to have been

framed in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws. When
the Constitution became effective on November 15, 1935, the location
of the mining claim under consideration was already perfected prior
thereto. A valid location of a mining claim has already segregated the
area from the public domain. They became lands that could not be
granted to any other person By such location and perfection, the land
located is segregated from the public domain even as against the
Government.
5. Petitioner maintains that the sub-terrain portion where the underground
tunnels were constructed does not belong to respondents because, even
conceding the fact that respondents owned the property, their right to
the subsoil of the same does not extend beyond what is necessary to
enable them to obtain all the utility and convenience that such property
can normally give.

Ans. The Court held that the sub-terrain portion of the property belongs
to respondents. In this case, respondents still had a legal interest in the
sub-terrain portion insofar as they could have excavated the same for
the construction of the deep well. The fact that they could not was that
the tunnels interfered with respondents’ enjoyment of their property and
deprived them of its full use and enjoyment.
6. Did the registration of the sale after the annotation of the notice of lis
pendens obliterate the effects of delivery and possession in good faith
which admittedly had occurred prior to SLDCs knowledge of the
transaction in favor of Babasanta?

Ans. NO. From the time of execution of the first deed up to the moment
of transfer and delivery of possession of the lands to SLDC, it had acted
in good faith and the subsequent annotation of lis pendens has no effect
at all on the consummated sale between SLDC and the Spouses Lu.
Given the opportunity of the right of SLDC to the claim of Babasanta,
the annotation of thenotice of lis pendens cannot help Babasanta’s
position a bit andit is irrelevant to the good or bad faith characterization
of SLDC as a purchaser.
7. Union Motor Corporation maintains that the respondent spouses are not
entitled to a return of the downpayment for the reason that there was
a delivery of the subject motor vehicle. According to the petitioner, there
was a constructive delivery of the vehicle when respondent Bernal
signed the registration certificate of the subject vehicle.

Ans. No, there was no delivery, physical or constructive, of the vehicle,

thus, Bernal did not come into possession of the vehicle that was
supposed to be delivered to them by Union Motor. The registration
certificate, receipt and sales invoice that they signed as a part of the
 processing and for the approval of their application to buy the vehicle
and without such signed documents, no sale, much less delivery, of the
vehicle could be made. The documents were not therefore an
acknowledgement of the physical acquisition of the vehicle but merely
a requirement of UMC so that the vehicle would be delivered to them.
The receipt and the invoice, the signing of the registration certificate
was qualified by the fact that it was a requirement for the sale to be
approved. It is necessary that the act of delivery, actual or constructive,
should be coupled with the intention of the delivering the thing and
without such intention, there is no delivery.

8. It is alleged that the donation made by Petrona Reyes is void because

she donated on February 28, 1914, a future property, such as the share
in the business of the deceased Osorio, which was adjudicated to her on
May 10, 1915, and because in 1914 she did not have the right to all or
part of the share which her deceased husband had in the shipping
business of Ynchausti & Co.

Ans. The contention is correct. The donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes
in favor of the plaintiff was of no value and effect. The donation made
by Da. Petrona Reyes is void because she donated on February 28,
1914, a future property, such as the share in the business of the
deceased Osorio, which was adjudicated to her on May 10, 1915, and
because in 1914 she did not have the right at all or part of the share
which her deceased husband had in the shipping business of Ynchausti
Steamship Co. The Court ruled that future inheritance cannot be an
object of donation but present or accrued inheritance may be.
9. The trial court further held that, under Article 764 of the New Civil Code,
actions to revoke a donation on the ground of non-compliance with any
of the conditions of the donation shall prescribe in four years counted
from such non-compliance. In the instant case, the four-year period for
filing the complaint for revocation commenced on April 9, 1976 and
expired on April 9, 1980. Since the complaint was brought on September
23, 1980 or more than five (5) months beyond the prescriptive period,
it was already barred by prescription.

Ans. It is true that under Article 764 of the NCC, actions for the
revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the
non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. However, the Court’s
opinion says that the said article does not apply to onerous donations in
view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous
donations are governed by the rules on contracts.

10. The Trial Court rejected vda de tupas’s claim on the ground that Article
900 relied upon by plaintiff is not applicable because the properties which
were disposed of by way of donation one year before the death of
Epifanio Tupas were no longer part of his hereditary estate at the time
of his death on August 20, 1978 and that Tupas Foundation, Inc. being
a stranger and not a compulsory heir, the donation inter vivos made in
its favor was not subject to collation under Art. 1061, C.C
 Ans. The Trial Court is in error on all counts and must be reversed. A
person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations,
one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than he can give
by will. If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can
give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the
extent of such excess, though without prejudice to its taking effect in
the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing
donated.
11. The private respondent rigorously argues that the seven parcels of
coconut land worth P10,297.50 are subject to collation, conformably to
Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062,
claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited
such collation and the donation was not officious.

Ans. No, the contention is wrong. There is nothing in the above

provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties.
The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the
subject matter from the collation required under Article 1061. Moreover,
anything less than such expressed prohibition will not suffice under the
clear language of Article 1062.
12. Distinguish contract to sell from a contract of sale.

Ans. A Contract of Sale is a type of contract whereby one party (seller)

either transfers the ownership of goods or agrees to transfer it for
money to the other party (buyer). A contract of sale can be a sale or an
agreement to sell. In a contract of sale, when there is an actual sale of
goods, it is known as Sale whereas if there is an intention to sell the
goods at a certain time in future or some conditions are satisfied, it is
called an Contract to sell.
13. Distinguish an option clause or an option contract from a contract of a
right of first refusal.

Ans. Option Contract is a contract granting a privilege in one person,

for which he has paid a consideration, which gives him the right to buy
certain merchandise, at any time within the agreed period, at a fixed
price while Right of First Refusal is a right of first priority all things
and conditions being equal; there should be identity of the terms and
conditions to be offered to the optionee and all other prospective buyers,
with optionee to enjoy the right of first priority.

14. The plaintiff, George L. Parks, alleging that the conditions of the
donation had not been complied with and invoking the sale of this parcel
of land made by Concepcion Cirer and James Hill in his favor, brought
this action against the Province of Tarlac, the municipality of Tarlac,
Concepcion Cirer and James Hill and prayed that he be declared the
absolute owner entitled to the possession of this parcel, that the transfer
of the same by the municipality of Tarlac to the Province of Tarlac be
 annulled, and the transfer certificate issued to the Province of Tarlac
cancelled.

Ans. The condition to erect a school within six months is not a condition
precedent. The characteristic of a condition precedent is that the
acquisition of the right is not effected while said condition is not complied
with or is not deemed complied with. Nothing is acquired and there is
only an expectancy of a right. When a condition is imposed, the
compliance of which cannot be effected except when the right is deemed
acquired, such condition cannot be a condition precedent. In the present
case the condition that a public school be erected and a public park be
made of the donated land could not be complied with except after giving
effect to the donation.

15. The trial court in deciding these six cases, held that the donations to the
six plaintiffs made by the deceased Father Braulio Pineda are donations
inter vivos, and therefore, not subject to the inheritance tax, and ordered
the defendants to return to each of the plaintiffs the sums paid by the
latter.

Ans.

16. The appellants dwelling on the words of the fourth paragraph of the deed
of gift just quoted, "does not pass title during my lifetime; but when I
die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels,"
contend that the gift in question is a donation mortis causa, and, the
requisites and conditions indispensable for a will, according to article 620
of the Civil Code, being lacking is null and void.

Ans.

17. In her answer Emilia claimed title to said properties by reason of the
donation and submitted a copy of the deed of donation. After trial, the
lower court found that the donation was one mortis causa and because
it was not executed in the manner required by the law on wills, it was
declared null and void; the properties therein included were all declared
part of the estate of the deceased Manuela Concepcion subject to
distribution among the heirs in the proportion of 1/11 for each as
declared by the court in special proceedings No. 491; defendant Emilia
Concepcion was ordered to deliver to each of the plaintiffs their
respective shares of the products of the land for the agricultural year
1947-48 and those to be obtained thereafter in the proportion of 1/11 to
each heir.

Ans. The donation here was accepted by Emilia; said acceptance is

embodied in the deed of donation, and both donor and donee signed
below said acceptance conclusively showing that the donor was aware
of said acceptance. The deed and acceptance was by agreement of both
recorded or registered. Everything was complete. Only donations inter
vivos need be accepted. the fact that they not only be agreed to the
acceptance but regarded said acceptance necessary argues for their
 understanding and intention that the donation was inter vivos. We find
that the donation in question is inter vivos and not mortis causa, and
that it is valid because the requisites of the law about the execution of
wills do not apply to it. The decision appealed from is hereby reversed
with costs.

18. Where the acceptance of a donation was made in a separate instrument

but not formally communicated to the donor, may the donation be
nonetheless considered complete, valid and subsisting?

Ans.
19. On July 8, 1948, the Philippine Trust Company, judicial administrator of
the intestate estate, and the legal heirs Manuel Genato, Felisa Genato de
Lorenzo and Juan Genato filed the complaint in the case at bar to recover
from the other two legal heirs, Florentino Genato and Francisco G.
Genato, the 530 shares of stock in order that they may be included in
the inventory of the intestate estate of their deceased mother and in due
course distributed among all the surviving children of the decedent. In
their answer, the defendant Florentino Genato and Francisco G. Genato
alleged that they had acquired the ownership of the 530 shares by simple
donation from their mother.

Ans. The contention of Florentino and Francisco Genato is unmeritorious.

Assuming, ad arguendo, that the late Simona Vda. de Genato gave the
Certificates of Stock to Florentino with instructions to transfer the same to him
and his brother, this act did not constitute a valid manual donation in law for
lack of proper acceptance. Incontestably, one of the two donees was not
present at the delivery, and there is no showing that he, Francisco Genato,
had authorized his brother, Florentino to accept for both of them. As pointed
out by Manresa in his Commentaries to the Civil Code of 1889, the delivery by
the donor and the acceptance by donee must be simultaneous, and the
acceptance by a person other than the true donee must be authorized by a
proper power of attorney set forth in a public document. None has been
claimed to exist in this case and since by appellants' own version, the donation
intended was a joint one to both donees, one could not accept independently
of his co-donee, for there is no accretion among donees unless expressly so
provided (Art. 637) or unless they be husband and wife.

20. The trial court ruled in favor of the Seraspis, stating that they had
acquired the property through a sale and acquisitive prescription.
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that
the action of the Seraspis was barred by the statute of limitations. Hence,
this petition filed by Quirico Seraspi.

Ans. The petition filed by Quirico Seraspi shall prosper. What is involved
in the present case is extinctive prescription, whereby the applicable law
is Art. 1141 of the Civil Code which provides that real actions over
immovables prescribe after thirty years. Since the action for recovery of
possession and ownership was filed by petitioners only on April 12, 1987,
thirteen (13) years after their predecessor-in-interest had been allegedly
deprived of the possession of the property by private respondent, it was
held that the action had not yet prescribed in accordance to Art 1141 of
the Civil Code.