G.R. No.

L-24119 August 8, 1925

FELIX MARQUEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS and THE SECRETARY-TREASURER OF THE BOARD
OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent.

M.H. de Joya for petitioner.

Acting Attorney-General Reyes for respondents.

STREET, J.:

This is an original proceeding in this court by which the petitioner, Felix Marquez, seeks to obtain a
writ of mandamus against the respondents, the Board of Medical Examiners, requiring them to admit
the petitioner to the physicians' examinations conducted, or to be conducted by the respondents in
the City of Manila. To the original complaint the respondents answered, and to the answer a
demurrer was interposed in behalf of the petitioner.

It appears that petitioner is a graduate of the Chicago Medical College, having received the degree
of M.D. from said institution on June 8, of the year 1922. No question appears to have been made by
the respondents with respect to the petitioner's qualifications of the physician's examinations in other
respects, but they have denied him admission to the examinations on the grounds that the Chicago
Medical College, where the petitioner was graduated, has been classified as a Class C medical
college by the National Medical State Board of the United States. For this reason the respondents, in
accordance with the regulations of the board now in effect, have denied the requisite standing to
said institution and excluded petitioner.

It is not denied by the respondents that prior to the adoption of the present regulations, and prior to
the date when the Chicago Medical School was classified as a Class C medical college, the Board of
Medical Examiners for the Philippine Islands had accepted diplomas of graduation from said medical
college as sufficient proof of proficiency in medical knowledge to admit a graduate to the
examinations held in these Islands; and as late as October 29, 1923, said board accepted favorably
upon the application of one Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, who was graduated from said school in the year
1921. At the time said candidate was admitted, however, the regulations denying the requisite status
to the Chicago Medical College had not been made effective, and they had been made effective by
proper authority before the present petitioner had submitted his application.

In the argument for the petitioner it is admitted that under Act No. 3111, and the regulations now in
force, the petitioner is disqualified to take the examinations; but it is pointed out that at the time he
began and even when he conducted his course in the Chicago Medical School, said institution was
still recognized as a reputable medical institution; and the question submitted is whether the
petitioner's case should be governed by the law and regulations in force at the time of his enrollment
in and graduation from the Chicago Medical School, or by those in force at the time he filed his
application for admission, on or about September 26, 1924. It is submitted for the petitioner that his
case should be governed by the law and regulations at the time of his graduation. To hold otherwise,
it is insisted, is to make the law retroactive in effect and to do irreparable damage to the petitioner,
who has pursued his work in the institution referred to in good faith, believing that said school had
the status necessary to qualify him from examination.

The position taken by the petitioner is, we think, untenable. The question whether a medical
institution is "a reputable medical school," in the sense intended by the law, is vested in the Board of
Medical Examiners, and although the action taken by them may conceivably, in isolated cases, result
in hardship, nevertheless the interests of the public require that the board should be free to exercise
its judgment and discretion without reference to the effect of the determination of the question in
particular instances. There can in the nature of things be no vested right in an existing law, which
would preclude its change or repeal. No one who has commenced preparation in a particular
institution has any inchoate right on account of that fact. If the law were otherwise upon this point, it
would be impossible for the Board of Medical Examiners to give effect to the knowledge which they
from time to time acquire as to the standing of medical schools; and an intending physician, upon
matriculating in a particular college, takes upon himself the risk of changes that may be made in the
standing of the institution by the board.

The demurrer to the answer is not well taken. The answer is therefore declared sufficient, and the
petition dismissed, with costs, So ordered.
G.R. No. L-32441 March 29, 1930

DOMINADOR GOMEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
HONORIO VENTURA, Secretary of the Interior of the Government of the Philippine Islands,
and the
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendants-appellees.

Jose Varela Calderon for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellees.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

In this cause, the plaintiff prays for judgment, as follows:

1. Annulling and setting aside the aforementioned investigation proceedings, and particularly
the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippine Islands dated March 30,
1926, forever revoking the plaintiff's license to practice medicine and surgery.

2. Ordering the defendants to restore the plaintiff to his status before the investigation and
the decision of March 30, 1926, that is, as if there had never been an investigation and an
adverse decision.

3. Ordering said defendants to issue in favor of the plaintiff a license for the practice of
medicine and surgery in the Philippine Islands, such as he had prior to the investigation and
adverse decision.

4. Granting the plaintiff any proper legal remedy. (Pages 5 and 6, bill of exemptions.)

The defendants answered with a general denial and prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

After trial the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint with costs against the
plaintiff.

Counsel for plaintiff contends that the court below erred:

1. In holding that Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila was authorized to appear
and institute administrative proceedings against Dr. Dominador Gomez before the Board of
Medical Examiners of the Philippines.

2. In not holding that Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix, of the City of Manila, had personality nor
power to institute administrative proceedings against Dr. Dominador Gomez before the
Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippines.

3. In admitting in its decision that section 9 of Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is
valid.
 4. In not holding that section 9 of Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is unconstitutional,
and therefore null and void.

5. In holding that section 9 Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is in force.

6. In not holding that section 9 Act No. 2381 has been repealed, even on the supposition that
it was valid.

7. In rendering the judgment appealed from.

8. In denying the motion for avoidance, and for a new trial, filed by appellant.

The first two assignments of error relate to the validity of the charges against the plaintiff, preferred
by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila, who, according to the plaintiff is not authorized
by law to file charges with the Board of Medical Examiners, which therefore acquired no jurisdiction
over the matter.

According to section 780 of Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3111, the procedure to be
observed in revoking a certificate of registration is the following:

Proceedings for revocation of a certificate of registration shall be begun by filing a written

charge or charges against the accused. These charges may be preferred by any person or
persons, firm or corporation, or the Board of Medical Examiners itself may direct its executive
officer to prepare said charges. Said charges shall be filed with the executive officer of the
Board of Medical Examiners and a copy thereof, together with written notice of the time and
place when they will be heared and determined, shall be served upon the accused or his
counsel, at least two weeks before the date actually fixed for said hearing. (Sec. 12, Act No.
3111.)

The law does not require that the charges be preferred by a public officer or by any specified person;
it even permits the Board of Medical Examiners itself to require its executive officer to prefer said
charges. From the wording of the law we infer that any person, including a public officer, may prefer
the charges referred to in the above-quoted provision. Wherefore, the fact that the charges were
filed by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila, does not deprive the Board of Medical
Examiners of jurisdiction to hear said charges and to take the proper action according to law.

The appellant contends in his third and fourth assignments of error that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is
null and void on the ground of unconstitutionality, since said section is foreign to the subject of said
Act, in violation of section 3 of the Jones Law prohibiting the enactment of any bill embracing more
than one subject and providing that the subject be expressed in the title of the bill.

Our opinion is that the matter contained in section 9 of Act No. 2381 is not foreign to the end
pursued in said Act, and that in view in the provision of said section it cannot be maintained that Act
No. 2381 includes more than one subject. The penalty provided in said section for the physician or
dentist who prescribes opium for a patient whose physical condition does not require the use of said
drug, is one of the means employed by the Legislature to attain the purpose of Act No. 2381, which
is, to prohibit unnecessary use of opium; it is one of the details subordinate to the purpose in view.
Such punishment is not the end contemplated in Act No. 2381, but, as we have just said, it is a
means employed to regulate the use of opium.
In passing said Act No. 2381, the Legislature merely exercised the police power expressly granted
by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1905, for the protection of the health, comfort, and general
welfare of the people of the Philippine Islands.

ID.; ID.; POWER OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO LEGISLATE UPON THE SUBJECT. —

The Philippine Legislature is expressly authorized by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1905,
to adopt legislation upon the importation and sale of opium in the Philippine Islands. The
purpose of such legislation was to protect the health, comfort, and general welfare of the
people of the Philippine Islands. Such legislation was an exercise of the police power of the
State. (United States vs. Wayne Shoup, 35 Phil., 56.)

And, as we have stated, the provisions contained in section 9 of Act No. 2381 relative to the
physicians and dentist are simply detailes and means conducive to the ultimate purpose of said Act,
which details and means need not be stated in the title of the Act for the very reason that properly
speaking, they are not foreign matter.

The general purpose of these provisions is accomplished when a law has but one general
object, which is fairly indicated by its title. To require every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishment of this general object to be provided for by a separate act
relating to that alone, would not only be unreasonable, but would actually render legislation
impossible. (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, pp. 296-297.)

The constitutional requirement is addressed to the subject, not to the details of the act. The
subject must be single; the provisions, to accomplished the object involved in that subject,
may be multifarious. . . . None of the provisions of a statute will be held unconstitutional
when they all relate, directly or indirectly, to the same subject, have natural connection, and
are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title. As very frequently expressed by the
courts, any provisions that are germane to the subject expressed in the title may properly be
included in the act. (I Sutherland on Stat. Const., par. 118.)

In order to hold that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is unconstitutional on the ground alleged by the
plaintiff, the violation of the constitutional provision must be substantial and manifest. It is not so in
the case at bar.

2. To warrant the setting aside of statutes because their subjects are not expressed in the
titles, the violation of the rule must be substantial and plain. (Posadas vs. Menzi, Decision of
the United States Supreme Court, page 388, No. 11, May 15, 1929, United States Supreme
Court Advance Opinions.)

At all events the validity of this Opium Law, Act No. 2381, has already been upheld by this court, not
only in the above cited case, United States vs. Wayne Shoup, supra, but also in the subsequent
case of United States vs. Jao Li Sing (37 Phil., 211).

Passing to the fifth and sixth assignments of error, wherein counsel for appellant contends that even
granting that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is valid, it was repealed by Act No. 2493 and later by section
780 of the Administrative Code, we note, first, that there is no express repeal of section 9 of Act No.
2381. Secondly, it cannot be held that it has been impliedly repealed, for the reason that the
provisions of section 9, Act No. 2381, are neither contrary to, nor incompatible with, the provisions of
section 780 of the Administrative Code, as amended. Upon this point, we approve and adopt the
following statements made by the trial judge:
 Counsel contends, in support of the above, that Act No. 2493 being complete, and "covering
the field" by implication repealed all laws relating to the practice of medicine, powers of the
Board of Medical Examiners and allied matters; hence, the said law, expressly providing the
causes for revocation of medical licenses, necessarily excluded all others, even though
embodied in prior enactments.

Act No. 310 provided that the Board of medical Examiners could revoke licenses for
"unprofessional conduct," without defining the term. Act No. 1761 (the Opium Law) provided
that illegaly prescribing opium should be cause for revocation of medical licenses. Clearly,
the Opium Law did not repeal Act No. 310. Act No. 2381 — also an Opium Law — in its
section 9, repeated the provision as to doctors and dentists. The repetition did not repeal Act
No. 310. Act No. 2493, section 11 (Ad. Code, sec. 780), provided that certificates of
physicians are revocable for "unprofessional conduct," without defining the phrase. In other
words, so far as revocation of licenses is concerned, Act No. 2493 is mere reenactment of
Act No. 310. The reenactment of the said portion of Act No. 310 did not repeal section 9 of
the Opium Law. If said section 9 has been repealed, it must be by Act No. 3111, which
amends Act No. 2493 (Ad. Code, sec. 780), by an addition after the words "unprofessional
conduct" of the following:

"The words "unprofessional conduct, immoral, or dishonorable conduct" as used in

this chapter shall be construed to include the following acts: (1) Procuring, aiding or
abeting a criminal abortion; (2) advertising, either in his own name or in the name of
any other person, firm, association, or corporation, in any written or printed paper, or
document, of medical business in which untruthful or improbable promises are made,
or being employed by, or in the service of any person, firm, association or corporation
so advertising, or advertising in any obscene manner derogatory to good morals; (3)
habitual intemperance or addition to the use of morphine, opium, cocaine or other
drugs having a similar effect; (4) conviction of a crime or misdemeanor involving
dishonorable conduct; and (5) willfully betraying a professional secret."

It cannot be seriously contended that aside from the five examples specified there can be no
other conduct of a physician deemed "unprofessional" conduct theretofore deemed grounds
for revocation licenses. The maxim expressio unius est exclussio alterius should be applied
only as a means of discovering legislative intent and should not be permitted to defeat the
plain indicated purpose of the Legislature. It does not apply when words are mentioned by
way of example, or to remove doubts. (See Cyc., 1122.) If, therefore, there exists,
"unprofessional conduct" not specified in the laws, with more reason does the criminal use of
opium remain a specific cause for revocation of license. (Pages 11, 12 and 13, bill of
exceptions.)

As to the seventh and eighth assignments of error, we find the judgment and appealed from correctly
rendered, and the motion of avoidance and new trial properly denied.

As the Attorney-General correctly observes, the powers vested in the Board of Medical Examiners to
suspend or revoke a physician's certificate of registration and the authority granted the Secretary of
the Interior of confirming or reversing the decision of said board of examiners, partake of a quasi-
judicial character, that is, involve the use of discretion. For this reason, the exercise thereof cannot
be reviewed by mandamus, which is the nature of this cause on its merits.

As in the case of courts and judicial officers, it is a rule of general application

that mandamus will not lie to review or control the acts of executive officers and boards of
state and federal governments in respect of matters as to which they are vested with
 discretion. In other words, they cannot be compelled to act or render a decision in any
particular way, and this is so, even though the exercise of this discretion requires the
construction and interpretation of statutes. Where public officials exercise their discretion, it
is said that their conclusions, although disputable, are impregnable to mandamus. (38 C. J.,
659-660.)

That this action is really a mandamus proceeding, appears clearly from the terms of the complaint
filed herein.

Finding no merit in the assignments of error, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER

FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172, respondents.

Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.

The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-

h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3)
successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth
time.

The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.

But first the facts.

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of
Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many
times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the
1

aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his
admission to the test.

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom
and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the
NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition
2

filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series
of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal
protection.

After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged
order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had
been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police
power. 3

We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended
4

to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence
and preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous
Court:

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and
safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health
and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized
to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical
school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in
the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation
of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the
student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the
process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission
to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of
maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic development,
are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the
NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of
applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical
education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests
in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College
Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries with far more
developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or
inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold
that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation
and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the
public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those
who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not applicable. Her
reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing about the so-
called "three-flunk rule."

We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue
raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least
initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter
cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical profession.

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is
validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary
to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.5

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject
and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the
right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated
by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and
ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a
doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link,
the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human
resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These
resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the
individual a sense of satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants
to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he
may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By
the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to
take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution
also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to
fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. 6

The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared.
Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded
medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found
wanting.

The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law
does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution.

There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other
students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly
affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more
vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable
profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not
be similarly treated.

There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and
others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection
requires is equality among equals.

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of
the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The
private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the
7

least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.

No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who
does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The
only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling
that has not excited his interest.

In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed
and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education
for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even
be a brilliant future.

We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the
farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as
merchants.

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by
directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and
evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not
because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13,
1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 144681 June 21, 2004

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC), CHAIRMAN HERMOGENES P. POBRE,

ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARMANDO PASCUAL, BOARD OF MEDICINE, CHAIRMAN
RODOLFO P. DE GUZMAN, JOSE S. RAMIREZ, JUANITO B. BILLOTE, RUBEN R.
POLICARPIO, EDGARDO T. FERNANDO and RICARDO D. FULGENCIO II, petitioners,
vs.
ARLENE V. DE GUZMAN, VIOLETA V. MENESES, CELERINA S. NAVARRO, JOSE RAMONCITO
P. NAVARRO, ARNEL V. HERRERA and GERALDINE ELIZABETH M. PAGILAGAN, ELNORA R.
RAQUENO, MARISSA A. REGODON, LAURA M. SANTOS, KARANGALAN D. SERRANO,
DANILO A. VILLAVER, MARIA ROSARIO L. LEONOR, ALICIA S. LIZANO, MARITEL M.
ECHIVERRI, BERNADETTE T. MENDOZA, FERNANDO F. MANDAPAT, ALELI A. GOLLAYAN,
ELCIN C. ARRIOLA, HERMINIGILDA E. CONEJOS, SALLY B. BUNAGAN, ROGELIO B.
ANCHETA, OSCAR H. PADUA, JR., EVELYN D. GRAJO, EVELYN S. ACOSTA, MARGARITA
BELINDA L. VICENCIO, VALENTINO P. ARBOLEDA, EVELYN O. RAMOS, ACHILLES J.
PERALTA, CORAZON M. CRUZ, LEUVINA P. CHICO, JOSEPH A. JAO, MA. LUISA S.
GUTIERREZ, LYDIA C. CHAN, OPHELIA C. HIDALGO, FERNANDO T. CRUZ, MELVIN M. USITA,
RAFAEL I. TOLENTINO, GRACE E. UY, CHERYL R. TRIGUERO, MICHAEL L. SERRANO,
FEDERICO L. CASTILLO, MELITA J. CAÑEDO, SAMUEL B. BANGOY, BERNARDITA B. SY,
GLORIA T. JULARBAL, FREDERICK D. FRANCISCO, CARLOS M. BERNARDO, JR., HUBERT
S. NAZARENO, CLARISSA B. BACLIG, DAYMINDA G. BONTUYAN, BERNADETTE H.
CABUHAT, NANCY J. CHAVEZ, MARIO D. CUARESMA, ERNESTO L. CUE, EVELYN C.
CUNDANGAN, RHONEIL R. DEVERATURDA, DERILEEN D. DORADO, SAIBZUR N. EDDING,
VIOLETA C. FELIPE, HERMINIO V. FERNANDEZ, JR., MARIA VICTORIA M. LACSAMANA,
NORMA G. LAFAVILLA, RUBY B. LANTIN, MA. ELOISA Q. MALLARI, CLARISA SJ. NICOLAS,
PERCIVAL H. PANGILINAN, ARNULFO A. SALVADOR, ROBERT B. SANCHEZ, MERLY D. STA.
ANA and YOLANDA P. UNICA, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to nullify
the Decision,1 dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283. The appellate
court affirmed the judgment2 dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530. The trial court allowed the respondents to take their
physician’s oath and to register as duly licensed physicians. Equally challenged is
the Resolution3 promulgated on August 25, 2000 of the Court of Appeals, denying petitioners’ Motion
for Reconsideration.

The facts of this case are as follows:

The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro
Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by
the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then
released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.

Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful
examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure
exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually
 and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got
100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-
Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of
95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the
performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that
strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a
record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination.

On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as physicians of
all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. 4 The PRC asked the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the February 1993
Physician Licensure Examination.

Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert
mathematician and authority in statistics, and later president of the Ateneo de Manila University, to
conduct a statistical analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the said examination.

On June 10, 1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported that a comparison of the scores in
Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne, of the Fatima College examinees with those of examinees from De La
Salle University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed that the scores of Fatima College
examinees were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. He concluded
that there must be some unusual reason creating the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must
be a cause "strong enough to eliminate the normal variations that one should expect from the
examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort, energy, etc." 5

For its part, the NBI found that "the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993]
Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the
test questions."6

On July 5, 1993, respondents Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V. Meneses, Celerina S. Navarro, Jose
Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V. Herrera, and Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan (Arlene V. De
Guzman et al., for brevity) filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 93-66530 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 52. Their petition was adopted by the other respondents as intervenors.

Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging respondents with
"immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne
examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. The case
was docketed as Adm. Case No. 1687 by the PRC.

On July 28, 1993, the RTC issued an Order in Civil Case No. 93-66530 granting the preliminary
mandatory injunction sought by the respondents. It ordered the petitioners to administer the
physician’s oath to Arlene V. De Guzman et al., and enter their names in the rolls of the PRC.

The petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to set aside the
mandatory injunctive writ, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31701.

On October 21, 1993, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 31701, with the dispositive
portion of the Decision ordaining as follows:
 WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by the lower court against petitioners is hereby nullified and set aside.

SO ORDERED.7

Arlene V. de Guzman, et al., then elevated the foregoing Decision to this Court in G.R. No. 112315.
In our Resolution dated May 23, 1994, we denied the petition for failure to show reversible error on
the part of the appellate court.

Meanwhile, on November 22, 1993, during the pendency of the instant petition, the pre-trial
conference in Civil Case No. 93-66530 was held. Then, the parties, agreed to reduce the testimonies
of their respective witnesses to sworn questions-and-answers. This was without prejudice to cross-
examination by the opposing counsel.

On December 13, 1993, petitioners’ counsel failed to appear at the trial in the mistaken belief that
the trial was set for December 15. The trial court then ruled that petitioners waived their right to
cross-examine the witnesses.

On January 27, 1994, counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion stating the reasons for
her non-appearance and praying that the cross-examination of the witnesses for the opposing
parties be reset. The trial court denied the motion for lack of notice to adverse counsel. It also denied
the Motion for Reconsideration that followed on the ground that adverse counsel was notified less
than three (3) days prior to the hearing.

Meanwhile, to prevent the PRC and the Board from proceeding with Adm. Case No. 1687, the
respondents herein moved for the issuance of a restraining order, which the lower court granted in
its Order dated April 4, 1994.

The petitioners then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 115704, to
annul the Orders of the trial court dated November 13, 1993, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994.
We referred the petition to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506.

On August 31, 1994, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 as follows:

WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining
order/preliminary injunction is GRANTED and the Orders of December 13, 1993, February 7,
1994, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994 of the RTC-Manila, Branch 52, and all further
proceedings taken by it in Special Civil Action No. 93-66530 are hereby DECLARED NULL
and VOID. The said RTC-Manila is ordered to allow petitioners’ counsel to cross-examine the
respondents’ witnesses, to allow petitioners to present their evidence in due course of trial,
and thereafter to decide the case on the merits on the basis of the evidence of the parties.
Costs against respondents.

IT IS SO ORDERED.8

The trial was then set and notices were sent to the parties.

A day before the first hearing, on September 22, 1994, the petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Manifestation and Motion praying for the partial reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, and for the outright dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. The petitioners
asked for the suspension of the proceedings.
In its Order dated September 23, 1994, the trial court granted the aforesaid motion, cancelled the
scheduled hearing dates, and reset the proceedings to October 21 and 28, 1994.

Meanwhile, on October 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the partial motion for reconsideration
in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. Thus, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review
docketed as G.R. No. 117817, entitled Professional Regulation Commission, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al.

On November 11, 1994, counsel for the petitioners failed to appear at the trial of Civil Case No. 93-
66530. Upon motion of the respondents herein, the trial court ruled that herein petitioners waived
their right to cross-examine the herein respondents. Trial was reset to November 28, 1994.

On November 25, 1994, petitioners’ counsel moved for the inhibition of the trial court judge for
alleged partiality. On November 28, 1994, the day the Motion to Inhibit was to be heard, petitioners
failed to appear. Thus, the trial court denied the Motion to Inhibit and declared Civil Case No. 93-
66530 deemed submitted for decision.

On December 19, 1994, the trial court handed down its judgment in Civil Case No. 93-66530, the
fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents to allow the petitioners and
intervenors (except those with asterisks and footnotes in pages 1 & 2 of this decision)
[sic],9 to take the physician’s oath and to register them as physicians.

It should be made clear that this decision is without prejudice to any administrative
disciplinary action which may be taken against any of the petitioners for such causes and in
the manner provided by law and consistent with the requirements of the Constitution as any
other professionals.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.10

As a result of these developments, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 118437, entitled Professional Regulation Commission v. Hon. David G.
Nitafan, praying inter alia, that (1) G.R. No. 118437 be consolidated with G.R. No. 117817; (2) the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 be nullified for its
failure to decree the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530, and in the alternative, to set aside the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530, order the trial court judge to inhibit himself, and
Civil Case No. 93-66530 be re-raffled to another branch.

On December 26, 1994, the petitioners herein filed their Notice of Appeal11 in Civil Case No. 93-
66530, thereby elevating the case to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 37283.

In our Resolution of June 7, 1995, G.R. No. 118437 was consolidated with G.R. No. 117817.

On July 9, 1998, we disposed of G.R. Nos. 117817 and 118437 in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 117817 is DISMISSED for being moot. The petition in
G.R. No. 118437 is likewise DISMISSED on the ground that there is a pending appeal before
 the Court of Appeals. Assistant Solicitor General Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang is advised to be
more circumspect in her dealings with the courts as a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with accordingly.

SO ORDERED.12

While CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 was awaiting disposition by the appellate court, Arnel V. Herrera, one
of the original petitioners in Civil Case No. 93-66530, joined by twenty-seven intervenors, to wit:
Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando
T. Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero, Joseph A. Jao,
Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri,
Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur
N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario L. Leonor-Lacandula,
Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E.
Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro,
manifested that they were no longer interested in proceeding with the case and moved for its
dismissal. A similar manifestation and motion was later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-
Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C. Rabara, Yolanda P.
Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda,
Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J.
Cañedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Grace
E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. The Court of Appeals ruled that its decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 37283 would not apply to them.

On May 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, with the following fallo, to
wit:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, We hereby AFFIRM
the same and DISMISS the instant appeal.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.13

In sustaining the trial court’s decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that the respondents complied
with all the statutory requirements for admission into the licensure examination for physicians in
February 1993. They all passed the said examination. Having fulfilled the requirements of Republic
Act No. 2382,14 they should be allowed to take their oaths as physicians and be registered in the rolls
of the PRC.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS HAVE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION FOR

MANDAMUS AGAINST PETITIONERS IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. NO. 112315 AFFIRMING THE COURT OF APPEALS’
DECISION DECLARING THAT IF EVER THERE IS SOME DOUBT AS TO THE MORAL
FITNESS OF EXAMINEES, THE ISSUANCE OF LICENSE TO PRACTICE MEDICINE IS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY GRANTED TO THE SUCCESSFUL EXAMINEES.
 II

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS COULD PROCEED DESPITE THE
PENDENCY OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1687, WHICH WAS PRECISELY LODGED
TO DETERMINE THE MORAL FITNESS OF RESPONDENTS TO BECOME DOCTORS.15

To our mind, the only issue is: Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error of law in sustaining
the judgment of the trial court that respondents are entitled to a writ of mandamus?

The petitioners submit that a writ of mandamus will not lie in this case. They point out that for a writ
of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the
thing demanded and it is the duty of the respondent to perform the act required. Thus, mandamus
may be availed of only when the duty sought to be performed is a ministerial and not a discretionary
one. The petitioners argue that the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 upholding
the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530 overlooked its own pronouncement in CA-
G.R. SP No. 31701. The Court of Appeals held in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701 that the issuance of a
license to engage in the practice of medicine becomes discretionary on the PRC if there exists some
doubt that the successful examinee has not fully met the requirements of the law. The petitioners
stress that this Court’s Resolution dated May 24, 1994 in G.R. No. 112315 held that there was no
showing "that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in rendering the questioned
judgment" in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The petitioners point out that our Resolution in G.R. No.
112315 has long become final and executory.

Respondents counter that having passed the 1993 licensure examinations for physicians, the
petitioners have the obligation to administer to them the oath as physicians and to issue their
certificates of registration as physicians pursuant to Section 2016 of Rep. Act No. 2382. The Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, found that respondents complied with all the requirements of
Rep. Act No. 2382. Furthermore, respondents were admitted by the Medical Board to the licensure
examinations and had passed the same. Hence, pursuant to Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, the
petitioners had the obligation to administer their oaths as physicians and register them.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or
the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person
requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official
station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law. 17 Section 3 of Rule 6518 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure outlines two situations when a writ of mandamus may issue, when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully (1) neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or (2) excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the other is entitled.

We shall discuss the issues successively.

1. On The Existence of a Duty of the Board of Medicine To Issue Certificates of Registration as

Physicians under Rep. Act No. 2382.

For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the officer, board, or official concerned, has
a clear legal duty, not involving discretion.19 Moreover, there must be statutory authority for the
performance of the act,20 and the performance of the duty has been refused. 21 Thus, it must be
pertinently asked now: Did petitioners have the duty to administer the Hippocratic Oath and register
respondents as physicians under the Medical Act of 1959?

As found by the Court of Appeals, on which we agree on the basis of the records:
 It bears emphasizing herein that petitioner-appellees and intervenor-appellees have fully
complied with all the statutory requirements for admission into the licensure examinations for
physicians conducted and administered by the respondent-appellants on February 12, 14, 20
and 21, 1993. Stress, too, must be made of the fact that all of them successfully passed the
same examinations.22

The crucial query now is whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that petitioners should
allow the respondents to take their oaths as physicians and register them, steps which would enable
respondents to practice the medical profession23 pursuant to Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959?

The appellate court relied on a single provision, Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, in concluding that
the petitioners had the ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and
register them as physicians. But it is a basic rule in statutory construction that each part of a statute
should be construed in connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole, not
confining construction to only one section.24 The intent or meaning of the statute should be
ascertained from the statute taken as a whole, not from an isolated part of the provision. Accordingly,
Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended should be read in conjunction with the other
provisions of the Act. Thus, to determine whether the petitioners had the ministerial obligation to
administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as physicians, recourse must be
had to the entirety of the Medical Act of 1959.

A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word
"shall" with respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners "shall sign and
issue certificates of registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of
the Board." In statutory construction the term "shall" is a word of command. It is given imperative
meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physician’s license,
the Board is obliged to administer to him his oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to
Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 2225 of the Medical Act of 1959.

However, the surrounding circumstances in this case call for serious inquiry concerning the
satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements by the respondents. The unusually high scores
in the two most difficult subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr. Nebres, the consultant of PRC on
the matter, and raised grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the tests. These doubts have
to be appropriately resolved.

Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested with the power to conduct
administrative investigations and "disapprove applications for examination or registration," pursuant
to the objectives of Rep. Act No. 2382 as outlined in Section 126 thereof. In this case, after the
investigation, the Board filed before the PRC, Adm. Case No. 1687 against the respondents to
ascertain their moral and mental fitness to practice medicine, as required by Section 9 27 of Rep. Act
No. 2382. In its Decision dated July 1, 1997, the Board ruled:

WHEREFORE, the BOARD hereby CANCELS the respondents[’] examination papers in the
Physician Licensure Examinations given in February 1993 and further DEBARS them from
taking any licensure examination for a period of ONE (1) YEAR from the date of the
promulgation of this DECISION. They may, if they so desire, apply for the scheduled
examinations for physicians after the lapse of the period imposed by the BOARD.

SO ORDERED.28

Until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents could be ascertained, according to petitioners,
the Board has discretion to hold in abeyance the administration of the Hippocratic Oath and the
issuance of the certificates to them. The writ of mandamus does not lie to compel performance of an
act which is not duly authorized.

The respondents nevertheless argue that under Section 20, the Board shall not issue a certificate of
registration only in the following instances: (1) to any candidate who has been convicted by a court
of competent jurisdiction of any criminal offense involving moral turpitude; (2) or has been found
guilty of immoral or dishonorable conduct after the investigation by the Board; or (3) has been
declared to be of unsound mind. They aver that none of these circumstances are present in their
case.

Petitioners reject respondents’ argument. We are informed that in Board Resolution No. 26, 29 dated
July 21, 1993, the Board resolved to file charges against the examinees from Fatima College of
Medicine for "immorality, dishonesty, fraud, and deceit in the Obstetrics-Gynecology and
Biochemistry examinations." It likewise sought to cancel the examination results obtained by the
examinees from the Fatima College.

Section 830 of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires to practice
medicine in the Philippines, must have "satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination."
Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may only be administered "to physicians who qualified in
the examinations." The operative word here is "satisfactorily," defined as "sufficient to meet a
condition or obligation" or "capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance." 31 Gleaned from Board
Resolution No. 26, the licensing authority apparently did not find that the respondents "satisfactorily
passed" the licensure examinations. The Board instead sought to nullify the examination results
obtained by the respondents.

2. On the Right Of The Respondents To Be Registered As Physicians

The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established by
law. If no legal right has been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of
mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right.32 There must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal
right to the thing demanded.33 It is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a
privilege or franchise granted by the government. 34

It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right 35 of every citizen to select a profession or
course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements.36 But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so
regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education,
order, safety, and general welfare of the people. 37 Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned
professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a
prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the
field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance among those who would practice medicine. In a previous case, it may be recalled, this
Court has ordered the Board of Medical Examiners to annul both its resolution and certificate
authorizing a Spanish subject, with the degree of Licentiate in Medicine and Surgery from the
University of Barcelona, Spain, to practice medicine in the Philippines, without first passing the
examination required by the Philippine Medical Act.38 In another case worth noting, we upheld the
power of the State to upgrade the selection of applicants into medical schools through admission
tests.39

It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit
of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or
oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the
authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such
conditions may not, however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring
the license.40 Under the view that the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or
refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that
vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful
business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of
said officials in the exercise of their power. 41

In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided for in Rep. Act No. 2382, as
amended, which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the
qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope and conduct of the examinations,
the grounds for denying the issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking a license that has been
issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that
he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing
authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the privilege
will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if
denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been
satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without
thwarting the legislative will.

3. On the Ripeness of the Petition for Mandamus

Lastly, the petitioners herein contend that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the petition
for mandamus below for being premature. They argue that the administrative remedies had not been
exhausted. The records show that this is not the first time that petitioners have sought the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 93-66530. This issue was raised in G.R. No. 115704, which petition we referred to
the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. On motion for
reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, the appellate court denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground that the prayers for the nullification of the order of the trial court and the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 93-66530 were inconsistent reliefs. In G.R. No. 118437, the petitioners sought to nullify the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 insofar as it did not order the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 93-66530. In our consolidated decision, dated July 9, 1998, in G.R. Nos. 117817 &
118437, this Court speaking through Justice Bellosillo opined that:

Indeed, the issue as to whether the Court of Appeals erred in not ordering the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 93-66530 sought to be resolved in the instant petition has been rendered
meaningless by an event taking place prior to the filing of this petition and denial thereof
should follow as a logical consequence.42 There is no longer any justiciable controversy so
that any declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. 43 It should be recalled that
in its decision of 19 December 1994 the trial court granted the writ of mandamus prayed for
by private respondents, which decision was received by petitioners on 20 December 1994.
Three (3) days after, or on 23 December 1994, petitioners filed the instant petition. By then,
the remedy available to them was to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals, which they
in fact did, by filing a notice of appeal on 26 December 1994. 44

The petitioners have shown no cogent reason for us to reverse the aforecited ruling. Nor will their
reliance upon the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies in the instant case advance
their cause any.

Section 2645 of the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the administrative and judicial remedies that
respondents herein can avail to question Resolution No. 26 of the Board of Medicine, namely: (a)
appeal the unfavorable judgment to the PRC; (b) should the PRC ruling still be unfavorable, to
elevate the matter on appeal to the Office of the President; and (c) should they still be unsatisfied, to
ask for a review of the case or to bring the case to court viaa special civil action of certiorari. Thus,
as a rule, mandamus will not lie when administrative remedies are still available. 46 However, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where, as in this case, a pure
question of law is raised.47 On this issue, no reversible error may, thus, be laid at the door of the
appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, when it refused to dismiss Civil Case No. 93-66530.

As we earlier pointed out, herein respondents Arnel V. Herrera, Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia C.
Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon, Ma.
Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero, Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S.
Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C.
Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-
Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario Leonor-Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-
Palma, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio,
Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro manifested to the Court of Appeals during
the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, that they were no longer interested in proceeding with the
case and moved for its dismissal insofar as they were concerned. A similar manifestation and motion
were later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla,
Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C. Rabarra, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B.
Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan,
Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J. Cañedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L.
Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita.
Following these manifestations and motions, the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 decreed
that its ruling would not apply to them. Thus, inasmuch as the instant case is a petition for review of
the appellate court’s ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, a decision which is inapplicable to the
aforementioned respondents will similarly not apply to them.

As to Achilles J. Peralta, Evelyn O. Ramos, Sally B. Bunagan, Rogelio B. Ancheta, Oscar H. Padua,
Jr., Evelyn D. Grajo, Valentino P. Arboleda, Carlos M. Bernardo, Jr., Mario D. Cuaresma, Violeta C.
Felipe, Percival H. Pangilinan, Corazon M. Cruz and Samuel B. Bangoy, herein decision shall not
apply pursuant to the Orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530, dropping their names from
the suit.

Consequently, this Decision is binding only on the remaining respondents, namely: Arlene V. de
Guzman, Celerina S. Navarro, Rafael I. Tolentino, Bernardita B. Sy, Gloria T. Jularbal, Hubert S.
Nazareno, Nancy J. Chavez, Ernesto L. Cue, Herminio V. Fernandez, Jr., Maria Victoria M.
Lacsamana and Merly D. Sta. Ana, as well as the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, (1) the assailed decision dated May
16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, which affirmed the judgment dated
December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530,
ordering petitioners to administer the physician’s oath to herein respondents as well as the resolution
dated August 25, 2000, of the appellate court, denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (2) the writ of mandamus, issued in Civil Case No. 93-66530, and
affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166097 July 14, 2008

BOARD OF MEDICINE, DR. RAUL FLORES (now DR. JOSE S. RAMIREZ), in his capacity as
Chairman of the Board, PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, through its Chairman,
HERMOGENES POBRE (now DR. ALCESTIS M. GUIANG), Petitioners,
vs.
YASUYUKI OTA, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 849452 dated November 16, 2004 which affirmed the Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Manila, dated October 19, 2003. 4

The facts are as follows:

Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national, married to a Filipina, who has continuously
resided in the Philippines for more than 10 years. He graduated from Bicol Christian College of
Medicine on April 21, 1991 with a degree of Doctor of Medicine. 5 After successfully completing a
one-year post graduate internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, he filed an
application to take the medical board examinations in order to obtain a medical license. He was
required by the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) to submit an affidavit of undertaking,
stating among others that should he successfully pass the same, he would not practice medicine
until he submits proof that reciprocity exists between Japan and the Philippines in admitting
foreigners into the practice of medicine.6

Respondent submitted a duly notarized English translation of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan
duly authenticated by the Consul General of the Philippine Embassy to Japan, Jesus I. Yabes; 7 thus,
he was allowed to take the Medical Board Examinations in August 1992, which he subsequently
passed.8

In spite of all these, the Board of Medicine (Board) of the PRC, in a letter dated March 8, 1993,
denied respondent's request for a license to

practice medicine in the Philippines on the ground that the Board "believes that no genuine
reciprocity can be found in the law of Japan as there is no Filipino or foreigner who can possibly
practice there."9

Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against the Board before the RTC of
Manila on June 24, 1993, which petition was amended on February 14, 1994 to implead the PRC
through its Chairman.10

In his petition before the RTC, respondent alleged that the Board and the PRC, in refusing to issue
in his favor a Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice medicine, had acted arbitrarily, in
clear contravention of the provision of Section 20 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2382 (The Medical Act
of 1959), depriving him of his legitimate right to practice his profession in the Philippines to his great
damage and prejudice.11
On October 19, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision finding that respondent had adequately proved
that the medical laws of Japan allow foreigners like Filipinos to be granted license and be admitted
into the practice of medicine under the principle of reciprocity; and that the Board had a ministerial
duty of issuing the Certificate of Registration and license to respondent, as it was shown that he had
substantially complied with the requirements under the law. 12 The RTC then ordered the Board to
issue in favor of respondent the corresponding Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice
medicine in the Philippines.13

The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the case to the CA, stating that while respondent
submitted documents showing that foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in Japan, it was not
shown that the conditions for the practice of medicine there are practical and attainable by a foreign
applicant, hence, reciprocity was not established; also, the power of the PRC and the Board to
regulate and control the practice of medicine is discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not
compellable by a writ of mandamus.14

The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.15

Hence, herein petition raising the following issue:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING

THAT RESPONDENT HAD ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY IN THE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN.16

Petitioners claim that: respondent has not established by competent and conclusive evidence that
reciprocity in the practice of medicine exists between the Philippines and Japan. While documents
state that foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in Japan, they do not similarly show that the
conditions for the practice of medicine in said country are practical and attainable by a foreign
applicant. There is no reciprocity in this case, as the requirements to practice medicine in Japan are
practically impossible for a Filipino to comply with. There are also ambiguities in the Medical
Practitioners Law of Japan, which were not clarified by respondent, i.e., what are the provisions of
the School Educations Laws, what are the criteria of the Minister of Health and Welfare of Japan in
determining whether the academic and technical capability of foreign medical graduates are the
same or better than graduates of medical schools in Japan, and who can actually qualify to take the
preparatory test for the National Medical Examination. Consul General Yabes also stated that there
had not been a single Filipino who was issued a license to practice medicine by the Japanese
Government. The publication showing that there were foreigners practicing medicine in Japan, which
respondent presented before the Court, also did not specifically show that Filipinos were among
those listed as practicing said profession.17 Furthermore, under Professional Regulation Commission
v. De Guzman,18the power of the PRC and the Board to regulate and control the practice of medicine
includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine,
which power is discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ of mandamus.19

Petitioners pray that the CA Decision dated November 16, 2004 be reversed and set aside, that a
new one be rendered reinstating the Board Order dated March 8, 1993 which disallows respondent
to practice medicine in the Philippines, and that respondent's petition before the trial court be
dismissed for lack of merit.20

In his Comment, respondent argues that: Articles 2 and 11 of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan
and Section 9 of the Philippine Medical Act of 1959 show that reciprocity exists between the
Philippines and Japan concerning the practice of medicine. Said laws clearly state that both
countries allow foreigners to practice medicine in their respective jurisdictions as long as the
applicant meets the educational requirements, training or residency in hospitals and pass the
licensure examination given by either country. Consul General Yabes in his letter dated January 28,
1992 stated that "the Japanese Government allows a foreigner to practice medicine in Japan after
complying with the local requirements." The fact that there is no reported Filipino who has
successfully penetrated the medical practice in Japan does not mean that there is no reciprocity
between the two countries, since it does not follow that no Filipino will ever be granted a medical
license by the Japanese Government. It is not the essence of reciprocity that before a citizen of one
of the contracting countries can demand its application, it is necessary that the interested citizen’s
country has previously granted the same privilege to the citizens of the other contracting
country.21 Respondent further argues that Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 22 indicates the
mandatory character of the statute and an imperative obligation on the part of the Board inconsistent
with the idea of discretion. Thus, a foreigner, just like a Filipino citizen, who successfully passes the
examination and has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications, is entitled as a matter of
right to the issuance of a certificate of registration or a physician’s license, which right is enforceable
by mandamus.23

Petitioners filed a Reply24 and both parties filed their respective memoranda 25 reiterating their
arguments. 1avvphi1

The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.

There is no question that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the
government.26 It is a right that is earned through years of education and training, and which requires
that one must first secure a license from the state through professional board examinations. 27

Indeed,

[T]he regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and
control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board
examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly,
the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements – i.e., the completion of prescribed
courses in a recognized medical school – for admission to the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state." 28

It must be stressed however that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an
occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive
manner. A political body which regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to
both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. As the legislature cannot
validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will
generally strike down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a
license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite
rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power. 29

R.A. No. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959 states in Section 9 thereof that:

Section 9. Candidates for Board Examinations.- Candidates for Board examinations shall have the
following qualifications:

1. He shall be a citizen of the Philippines or a citizen of any foreign country who has submitted
competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs,
showing that his country’s existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine under
the same rules and regulations governing citizens thereof;

xxxx

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 223 30 also provides in Section (j) thereof that:

j) The [Professional Regulation] Commission may, upon the recommendation of the Board
concerned, approve the registration of and authorize the issuance of a certificate of registration with
or without examination to a foreigner who is registered under the laws of his country: Provided, That
the requirement for the registration or licensing in said foreign state or country are substantially the
same as those required and contemplated by the laws of the Philippines and that the laws of such
foreign state or country allow the citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession on the same
basis and grant the same privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign state or country:
Provided, finally, That the applicant shall submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence,
confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's existing laws permit
citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession under the rules and regulations governing
citizens thereof. The Commission is also hereby authorized to prescribe additional requirements or
grant certain privileges to foreigners seeking registration in the Philippines if the same privileges are
granted to or some additional requirements are required of citizens of the Philippines in acquiring the
same certificates in his country;

xxxx

As required by the said laws, respondent submitted a copy of the Medical Practitioners Law of
Japan, duly authenticated by the Consul General of the Embassy of the Philippines in Japan, which
provides in Articles 2 and 11, thus:

Article 2. Anyone who wants to be medical practitioner must pass the national examination for
medical practitioner and get license from the Minister of Health and Welfare.

xxxx

Article 11. No one can take the National Medical Examination except persons who conform to one of
the following items:

1. Persons who finished regular medical courses at a university based on the School
Education Laws (December 26, 1947) and graduated from said university.

2. Persons who passed the preparatory test for the National Medical Examination and
practiced clinics and public sanitation more than one year after passing the said test.

3. Persons who graduated from a foreign medical school or acquired medical practitioner
license in a foreign country, and also are recognized to have the same or more academic
ability and techniques as persons stated in item 1 and item 2 of this article. 31

Petitioners argue that while the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan allows foreigners to practice
medicine therein, said document does not show that conditions for the practice of medicine in said
country are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant; and since the requirements are practically
impossible for a Filipino to comply with, there is no reciprocity between the two countries, hence,
respondent may not be granted license to practice medicine in the Philippines.
The Court does not agree.

R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be candidates for the medical board examinations, merely
requires a foreign citizen to submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), showing that his country’s existing laws permit citizens of
the Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules and regulations governing citizens thereof.

Section (j) of P.D. No. 223 also defines the extent of PRC's power to grant licenses, i.e., it may, upon
recommendation of the board, approve the registration and authorize the issuance of a certificate of
registration with or without examination to a foreigner who is registered under the laws of his country,
provided the following conditions are met: (1) that the requirement for the registration or licensing in
said foreign state or country are substantially the same as those required and contemplated by the
laws of the Philippines; (2) that the laws of such foreign state or country allow the citizens of the
Philippines to practice the profession on the same basis and grant the same privileges as the subject
or citizens of such foreign state or country; and (3) that the applicant shall submit competent and
conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the DFA, showing that his country's existing laws
permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession under the rules and regulations governing
citizens thereof.

The said provision further states that the PRC is authorized to prescribe additional requirements or
grant certain privileges to foreigners seeking registration in the Philippines if the same privileges are
granted to or some additional requirements are required of citizens of the Philippines in acquiring the
same certificates in his country.

Nowhere in said statutes is it stated that the foreign applicant must show that the conditions for the
practice of medicine in said country are practical and attainable by Filipinos. Neither is it stated that it
must first be proven that a Filipino has been granted license and allowed to practice his profession in
said country before a foreign applicant may be given license to practice in the Philippines. Indeed,
the phrase used in both R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223 is that:

[T]he applicant shall submit] competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the
Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's existing laws permit citizens of the
Philippines to practice the profession [of medicine] under the [same] rules and regulations governing
citizens thereof. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a Filipino to get license and practice therein.
Requiring respondent to prove first that a Filipino has already been granted license and is actually
practicing therein unduly expands the requirements provided for under R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No.
223.

While it is true that respondent failed to give details as to the conditions stated in the Medical
Practitioners Law of Japan -- i.e., the provisions of the School Educations Laws, the criteria of the
Minister of Health and Welfare of Japan in determining whether the academic and technical
capability of foreign medical graduates are the same as or better than that of graduates of medical
schools in Japan, and who can actually qualify to take the preparatory test for the National Medical
Examination – respondent, however, presented proof that foreigners are actually practicing in Japan
and that Filipinos are not precluded from getting a license to practice there.

Respondent presented before the trial court a Japanese Government publication, Physician-Dentist-
Pharmaceutist Survey, showing that there are a number of foreign physicians practicing medicine in
Japan.32 He also presented a letter dated January 28, 1992 from Consul General Yabes, 33 which
states:
Sir:

With reference to your letter dated 12 January 1993, concerning your request for a Certificate of
Confirmation for the purpose of establishing a reciprocity with Japan in the practice of medical
profession relative to the case of Mr. Yasuyuki Ota, a Japanese national, the Embassy wishes to
inform you that inquiries from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health and
Welfare as well as Bureau of Immigration yielded the following information:

1. They are not aware of a Filipino physician who was granted a license by the Japanese
Government to practice medicine in Japan;

2. However, the Japanese Government allows a foreigner to practice medicine in Japan after
complying with the local requirements such as holding a valid visa for the purpose of taking
the medical board exam, checking the applicant's qualifications to take the examination,
taking the national board examination in Japanese and filing an application for the issuance
of the medical license.

Accordingly, the Embassy is not aware of a single Filipino physician who was issued by the
Japanese Government a license to practice medicine, because it is extremely difficult to pass the
medical board examination in the Japanese language. Filipino doctors here are only allowed to work
in Japanese hospitals as trainees under the supervision of a Japanese doctor. On certain occasions,
they are allowed to show their medical skills during seminars for demonstration purposes only.
(Emphasis supplied)

Very truly yours,

Jesus I. Yabes
Minister Counsellor &
Consul General

From said letter, one can see that the Japanese Government allows foreigners to practice medicine
therein provided that the local requirements are complied with, and that it is not the impossibility or
the prohibition against Filipinos that would account for the absence of Filipino physicians holding
licenses and practicing medicine in Japan, but the difficulty of passing the board examination in the
Japanese language. Granting that there is still no Filipino who has been given license to practice
medicine in Japan, it does not mean that no Filipino will ever be able to be given one.

Petitioners next argue that as held in De Guzman, its power to issue licenses is discretionary, hence,
not compellable by mandamus.

The Court finds that the factual circumstances of De Guzman are different from those of the case at
bar; hence, the principle applied therein should be viewed differently in this case. In De Guzman,
there were doubts about the integrity and validity of the test results of the examinees from a
particular school which garnered unusually high scores in the two most difficult subjects. Said doubts
called for serious inquiry concerning the applicants’ satisfactory compliance with the Board
requirements.34 And as there was no definite showing that the requirements and conditions to be
granted license to practice medicine had been satisfactorily met, the Court held that the writ
of mandamus may not be granted to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will. 35
Indeed, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. It must also appear that he has fully complied
with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority. 36

In De Guzman itself, the Court explained that:

A careful reading of Section 2037 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word
"shall" with respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners [PRC] "shall
sign and issue certificates of registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the
requirements of the Board." In statutory construction the term "shall" is a word of command. It is
given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his
physician's license, the Board is obliged to administer to him his oath and register him as a
physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 22 of the Medical Act of 1959. 38

In this case, there is no doubt as to the competence and qualifications of respondent. He finished his
medical degree from Bicol Christian College of Medicine. He completed a one-year post graduate
internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, a government hospital. Then he
passed the Medical Board Examinations which was given on August 8, 1992 with a general average
of 81.83, with scores higher than 80 in 9 of the 12 subjects.

In fine, the only matter being questioned by petitioners is the alleged failure of respondent to prove
that there is reciprocity between the laws of Japan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners into
the practice of medicine. Respondent has satisfactorily complied with the said requirement and the
CA has not committed any reversible error in rendering its Decision dated November 16, 2004 and
Resolution dated October 19, 2003.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-15079 January 31, 1962

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GUILLERMO I. VENTURA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Claro M. Recto for defendant-appellant.

BENGZON, C.J.:

Statement. —This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal finding
Guillermo I. Ventura guilty of illegal practice of medicine under Section 770 in connection with
Section 2678 of the Revised Administrative Code, and sentencing him, this being his second
offense, to pay a fine in the sum of P500.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay costs.

Appellant, the accused, was charged with the above offense in an information which alleged that in
February, 1955, he did, .

"willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and for compensation and reward, practice medicine in
the said City (Pasay) by treating and applying electrical appliances to patients for the
purpose of curing them with their ailments, diseases, pains, and physical defects from which
they are suffering and by holding out himself to the public by means of signs,
advertisements, and other means, to be a Doctor of Medicine."

Facts. — lower court found, as facts, the following:

"... in the year 1949, the accused herein, Guillermo I. Ventura, was convicted by the court of
first instance of Rizal of a 'similar offense' or illegal practice of medicine in the municipality of
Pasay, now Pasay City and sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00 under the same legal
provisions, or Section 770 in connection with Section 2678 of the Revised Administrative
Code.

"... by reason of certain complaints the National Bureau of Investigation had received from
the President of the Philippine Federation of Private Medical Practitioners and from the
Chairman of the Board of Medical Examiners, the National Bureau of Investigation on
December 16, 1955, sent its morgue attendant Jose Natayan to the clinic of the accused at
No. 2454 M. de la Cruz Street, Pasay City. Natayan was at that time suffering from pains in
his back and he asked the accused to see his sickness. The accused attended to Natayan;
wrote something on a piece of paper; and then he told him that he (Natayan) 'was sick of
lumbago'. Thereupon, the accused asked Natayan to pay P5.00 and then asked him to pay
the amount to a lady employee in the clinic which Natayan did. At the request of the accused,
Natayan, then went around the other side of the clinic where he was given an enema of hot
water by a male attendant. Then Natayan was asked to lie down on a table where his back
was exposed to a big bulb for around fifteen minutes and afterwards to a red colored bulb for
another ten minutes. Thereafter Natayan went back to the accused, who told him to come
back to his clinic for six consecutive days. After that Natayan went back on the same day or
December 16, 1955 to his office in the National Bureau of Investigation.
 The following day, Natayan returned to the clinic of the accused with the National Bureau of
Investigation raiding party composed of two agents, two attorneys and one photographer.
After he was dropped by the National Bureau of Investigation agents about seven meters
away from the clinic of the accused, Natayan proceeded to the office of the accused, who
then and there told him that another treatment would be applied to him and that he would
pay P3.00. After paying this amount and while Natayan was lying on a table about to be
given treatment the National Bureau of Investigation agents raided the place.

The accused herein, Guillermo I. Ventura, is not a duly registered masseur or a physician
qualified to practice medicine.

Issues. —Appellant seeks a reversal here of aforementioned judgment of conviction on the grounds:
(1) that the offense charged in the information had already prescribed; (2) that the laws involved are
unconstitutional and void; (3) that granting that the said laws are valid, the accused should not have
been prosecuted thereunder because he was not engaged in the practice of medicine; (4) that
Congress, in passing House Bills Nos. 2405 and 357 recognized and believed in the efficacy of the
drugless systems of healing and although said bills were vetoed by the President of the Philippines
and thereby did not become regular statutes, they may be considered as concurrent resolutions
formally establishing the drugless system of healing as a separate and distinct profession, not
covered by Section 770 of the Medical Law; (5) that the complainants and the Government are
estopped from prosecuting the accused under Section 770 because they were the ones who
induced him to practice drugless healing after his conviction in 1949; and (6) that the accused has
an implied license to practice drugless healing from the people of the Philippines and the Chairman
of the Medical Board of Examiners.

Discussion. — Appellant, testifying on his behalf admitted that for the past 35 years, he had been
practicing as a naturopathic physician, "treating human ailments without the use of drugs and
medicines" and employing in his practice "electricity, water and hand" without a license to practice
medicine; that during this time he had treated 500,000 patients, more or less about 90% of whom
were healed, and that he had studied drugless healing in the American University, Chicago, Illinois
for about four years.

Invoking prescription, he argues that in view of the fact that he had begun the alleged practice of
medicine thirty five years ago without the required license, the crime charged in the information had
already prescribed.1

The records reveal that the accused began practicing his method of drugless healing 35 years ago.
This practice was first discovered by the authorities in 1949. He was prosecuted and convicted
therefor the same year. Sometime after he again set up a clinic. He had a lucrative clientele and
nobody bothered him. 1äwphï1.ñët

However, at about February, 1955, the President of the Philippine Federation of Private Medical
Practitioners, complained to the National Bureau of Investigation that appellant was advertising
himself as capable of treating human ailments without drugs. Upon investigation, appellant was
found to be without certificate of registration to practice such profession either from the Board of
Medical Examiners or from the Committee of Examiners of Masseurs. So, this prosecution started in
1956. It is clear that the four-year period of prescription of the offense charged should be computed
from February, 1955 when the National Bureau of Investigation discovered appellant's alleged illegal
practice of Medicine.

Appellant also questions the constitutionality of Section 770 in relation to Section 775 of the Revised
Administrative Code. It is appellant's theory that to require, of any person whose business is merely
to stimulate by mechanical means the nerves of the body, many years of study in medical schools,
taking up obstetrics, general surgery, gynecology, bacteriology and many other sciences, is
curtailment of the exercise of one's calling, a violation of the constitutional principle that all men have
the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and are entitled to the equal protection of the
law. It is furthermore theorized that inasmuch as drugless healing is not taught in any of the medical
schools prescribed, how could the members of the Medical Board of Examiners pass on the
competence of these drugless healers? .

This same contention was presented to and settled by this Court in the case of People vs.
Buenviaje who was convicted of illegal practice of medicine for practicing chiropractor. 2 It held:

There is very little force in this argument. The subjects in which an examination is required
relate to matters of which a thorough knowledge seems necessary for the proper diagnosis
of diseases of the human body and it is within the police power of the State to require that
persons who devote themselves to the curing of human ills should possess such knowledge.

In the instant case, we must again uphold these immutable concepts of the police power of the
State. Under this power, the State may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or
tend to secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequences of
ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud. As one means to this end, it has been
the practice of different States, from time immemorial to exact in any pursuit, profession or trade, a
certain degree of skill and learning upon which the community may confidently rely, their possession
being generally ascertained in an examination of parties by competent persons, or inferred from a
certificate to them in the form of a diploma or license from an institution established for instruction on
the subjects, scientific or otherwise, with which such pursuits have to deal. 3

Appellant claims that his act of stimulating the affected nerves of the patients without use of any drug
or medicine is not practice of medicine; that "practice of medicine" is confined only to the systems
taught by the medical schools, namely, the regular, the homeopathic and the eclectic schools or
systems.

Section 770 of the Revised Administrative Code in no uncertain terms covers appellant's acts. The
statutory definition as to what acts constitute illegal practice of medicine its provided in said Section
770 includes the acts and practices performed by appellant, By his own statements, he admitted to
have continuously diagnosed and treated more or less 500,000 instances of different kinds of human
ailments and to have prescribed remedies therefor.

As regards the contention that there are at least two concurrent resolutions declaring formally that
Congress has recognized the drugless methods of healing, we need not elaborate further than to
say that not until such recognition is actually embodied in a statute, shall we extend consideration of
such method.

Appellant pleads that the lower court erred in not holding that the complainants and the government
are estopped from prosecuting him because they were the ones who induced him to practice
drugless healing after his conviction in 1949. He tried to show that medical practitioners, members of
Congress, provincial governors, city mayors and municipal board members wrote to him requesting
his help for persons suffering from all kinds of ailments; that municipal ordinances and resolutions
were also passed authorizing him not only to practice his method of healing but also to put up clinics
in some of municipalities; that he was even extended free transportation facilities to work in the
Central Luzon Sanitarium in Tala, Caloocan, Rizal.
Above plea cannot be sustained by this Court. The doctrine of estoppel does not apply to the
government.4 It is never stopped by mistakes or errors on the part of its agents, even assuming
without conceding that said municipalities had encouraged appellant's practice. We cannot allow the
bargaining away of public health and safety for the semblance of benefit to a few government
officials, people or even municipalities.

Similarly, there is no such thing as implied license to practice drugless healing by the mere fact that
the Chairman of the Board of Medical Examiners had permitted appellant to serve free in the Central
Luzon Sanitarium in Tala, Caloocan, Rizal, or that countless people persisted in engaging his
services. For one thing, these people might have contracted his services on the mistaken notion that
he was duly licensed to practice his profession; for another, a repetition of illegal acts can never
make them legal.

As additional argument, appellant urges acquittal under the new Medical Act of 1959 5 wherein the
practice of physiotherapy is recognized as a distinct science. He claims coverage of said law on the
ground that he practices physiotherapy by massage through physical devices and upon the
recommendation of duly registered physicians.

The above argument has no merit because there is strong evidence to the effect that appellant alone
diagnoses his patients' ailments and applies the remedies therefor 6 without written order or
prescription by a registered physician.

Judgment. — Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all parts and respects.
Costs against appellant.
G.R. No. 88259 August 10, 1989

THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION and the HON. LOURDES R. QUISUMBING, in her
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and Chairman,
Board of Medical Education, petitioners,
vs.
HON. DANIEL P. ALFONSO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, Fourth
Judicial Region, Antipolo, Rizal, and the PHILIPPINE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF
MEDICINE FOUNDATION, INC., respondents.

Carpio, Villaraza & Cruz for private respondent.

Anatolio S. Tuazon, Jr. for intervenors.

NARVASA, J.:

Petitioners, the Board of Medical Education, the government agency which supervises and regulates
the country's medical colleges, and Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, as Chairperson of the Board, pray for a writ of certiorari to nullify and
set aside the order issued by respondent Judge Daniel P. Alfonso, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo,
Rizal, in Civil Case No. 1385 restraining the enforcement of petitioner Quisumbing's order of closure
of the respondent Philippine Muslim-Christian College of Medicine Foundation, Inc. (hereafter simply
the College).lâwphî1.ñèt

The, College, a private educational institution, was founded in 1981 for the avowed purpose of
producing physicians who will "emancipate Muslim citizens from age-old attitudes on health." The,
unstable peace and order situation in Mindanao led to the establishment of the College in Antipolo,
Rizal, which granted it a temporary permit to operate in the municipality, instead of in Zamboanga
City where the school was first proposed to be located. It has since adopted Antipolo as its
permanent site and changed its name to the Rizal College of Medicine.

In 1985, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the Board of Medical
Education (BME) authorized the Commission on Medical Education to conduct a study of all medical
schools in the Philippines. The, report of the Commission showed that the College fell very much
short of the minimum standards set for medical schools. The, team of inspectors, composed of
1

Doctors Florentino Herrera, Jr., Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Horacio Estrada, Jose V. Silao, Jr. and
Andres L. Reyes, recommended the closure of the school upon the following findings, to wit:
2

(a) the College was not fulfilling the purpose for which it had been created because
of its inappropriate location and the absence in its curriculum of subjects relating to
Muslim culture and welfare;

(b) its lack of university affiliation hindered its students from obtaining a "balanced
humanistic and scientific" education;

(c) it did not have its philosophy base hospital for the training of its students in the
major clinical disciplines, as required by the DECS;
 (d) more than 60% of the college faculty did not teach in the College full-time,
resulting in shortened and irregular class hours, subject overloading, and in general,
poor quality teaching.

The, school disputed these findings as biased and discriminatory. At its request, the Board of
Medical Education, in May, 1987, sent another team of doctors for a re-evaluation of the College.
3

After inspection, the team confirmed the previous findings and recommended the phase-out of the
school. 4

The, first two reports were verified on June 23, 1987 by a third team of inspectors. A year
5

thereafter, the College failed another test what was in effect the fourth evaluation of its fitness to
continue as a medical school conducted on March 4 and 5, 1988 by a team from the Board of
Medical Education determining the eligibility of medical schools for government recognition. The,
College was adjudged "inadequate" in all aspects of the survey, to wit, college, curriculum, facilities,
teaching hospital, and studentry. The, inspectors, Doctors Nilo Rosas, Macario Tan and Elena Ines
6

Cuyegkeng, accordingly recommended denial of government; recognition.

Accordingly, the Board of Medical Education recommended to the DECS the closure of the College,
effective the end of the school year 1988-1989. The, College however succeeded in having the
Board form yet another team to review the previous findings. Doctors Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Alberto
Romualdez, Artemio Ordinaria Joven Cuanang and Nilo L. Rosas conducted their inspection on
June 18, 1988. Their findings: although there had been a "major effort to improve the physical plant
for classroom instructions and the library, serious deficiencies remain(ed) in the areas of clinical
facilities and library operations;" "faculty continue(d) to be quite inadequate with no prospects for
satisfactory growth and development;" "student profile ... (was) below par from the point of view of
credentials (NMAT and transfer records) as well as level knowledge and preparedness at various
stages of medical education," and "the most serious deficiency ... (was) the almost total lack of
serious development efforts in academic medicine — i.e., seeming lack of philosophy of teaching, no
serious effort to study curricula, almost non-existent innovative approaches." Again, the
recommendation was to close the College with provisions for the dispersal of its students to other
medical schools. 7

In her letter of June 23, 1988, Secretary Quisumbing informed the Chairman of the College's Board
of Trustees, Mr. Victor Sumulong, of the decision of the Board of Medical Education to close the
College. Mr. Sumulong instead proposed a gradual phase-out starting the school year 1989-1990 in
order not to dislocate the students and staff and to minimize financial loss. The, Board
8

subsequently allowed the College to continue its operations but only until May, 1989, after which it
was to be closed, this decision being "final and unappealable." The, College was, however, assured
of assistance in the relocation of its students and in its rehabilitation as an institution for health-
related and paramedical courses. 9

The, College appealed the decision to the Office of the President, imputing grave abuse of discretion
to the Secretary. On February 16, 1989, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., finding "no
10

reason to disturb" the contested decision, affirmed it.11

On March 2, 1989, the College went to court. It filed Civil Case No. 1385 in the court of respondent
Judge Daniel P. Alfonso against Secretary Quisumbing in her capacity as Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports, questioning the decision as illegal, oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory and
applied for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain its implementation.

The, writ issued as prayed for by order of the respondent Judge dated May 10, 1989. His Honor
12

ruled that the inspection of June 18, 1988 was the principal basis of the closure order, and on such
basis sustained the claim of the College that the inspection was done in an "arbitrary and haphazard
manner" by a team of inspectors who had already prejudged the school. Judge Alfonso held that
there was no evidence supporting the findings in the report of June 18, 1988, and declared that his
philosophy ocular inspection of the College disclosed that the deficiencies mentioned in the report
were non-existent, and that on the contrary, the laboratory and library areas were "big enough," and
in the operations of the proposed base hospital were going on smoothly at the time of the ocular
inspection."

The, school thereupon promptly advertised in major newspaper dailies for enrollees in all levels of
the medical college and in its pre-board review classes. 13

Hence the present petition, assailing the order of injunction dated May 10, 1989 as having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion, and praying for a restraining order against its enforcement as
well as for the dismissal of the action instituted in the court a quo. The, Court on June 1, 1989
ordered the respondent College to desist from advertising and admitting students, and the
respondent judge to refrain from enforcing his injunction order.

The, College in its Comment would justify its entitlement to the questioned injunction on the ground
that the closure order against which it was directed was issued without factual basis and in violation
of the right of the College to due process of law, and that it violates MECS Order No. 5 (Series of
1986) to the effect that the penalty of closure cannot be imposed earlier than three (3) years from the
last evaluation, which in this instance was made, on June 18, 1988.

Resort to the Courts to obtain a reversal of the determination by the Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports that the College is unfit to continue its operations is in this case clearly unavailing. There
is, to begin with, no law authorizing an appeal from decisions or orders of the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports to this Court or any other Court. It is not the function of this Court or
any other Court to review the decisions and orders of the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an
educational institution meets the norms and standards required for permission to operate and to
continue operating as such. On this question, no Court has the power or prerogative to substitute its
opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any Court would have the
competence to do so.

The, only authority reposed in the Courts in the matter is the determination of whether or not the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports has acted within the scope of powers granted him by law
and the Constitution. As long as it appears that he has done so, any decision rendered by him
should not and will not be subject to review and reversal by any court.

Of course, if it should be made, to appear to the Court that those powers were in a case exercised
so whimsically, capriciously, oppressively, despotically or arbitrarily as to call for peremptory
correction — or stated otherwise, that the Secretary had acted with grave abuse of discretion, or had
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, or
excluded another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled — it
becomes the Court's duty to rectify such action through the extraordinary remedies of certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus, whichever may properly apply. Yet even in these extreme instances,
where a Court finds that there has been abuse of powers by the Secretary and consequently nullifies
and/or forbids such an abuse of power, or compliance whatever is needful to keep its exercise within
bounds, the Court, absent any compelling reason to do otherwise, should still leave to the Secretary
the ultimate determination of the issue of the satisfy action or fulfillment by an educational institution
of the standards set down for its legitimate operation, as to which it should not ordinarily substitute
its over judgment for that of said office.
In any case, the recorded facts quite clearly fail to support the College's claim of grave abuse of
discretion containing the order of closure, and on the contrary convincingly show the challenged
decision to be correct. From 1985, no less than five (5) surveys were conducted of respondent
institution to determine its compliance with the minimum standards established for a medical college.
The, first survey, that undertaken by the Commission on Medical Education, disclosed such various
and significant deficiencies in the school as to constrain the inspectors to recommend its closure.
Four (4) other surveys were thereafter made by as many different committees or teams, at the
school's instance or otherwise, all of which basically confirmed the results of that first survey.
Moreover, the findings of all five (5) surveys were affirmed by the Office of the President. Indeed, the
petitioner, through the Chairman of its Board of Trustees, to all intents and purposes accepted the
validity of the findings of those five (5) survey groups when it proposed, in 1988, a gradual phase-out
of the school starting in 1989. The, respondent College knew that the recommendation for its closure
was made, as early as 1986, that recommendation was reiterated and reaffirmed four (4) times
thereafter until it was finally approved and acted upon by the Secretary, whose action was confirmed
by the Office of the President. Said respondent was given notice in June 1988, that in consequence
of all these, the time for its definite closure had been unalterably set at May, 1989, a notice which
was accompanied by assurances of assistance in the relocation of its students before June, 1989
and in its rehabilitation as a school for other courses. After having resorted to the whole range of
administrative remedies available to it, without success, it sought to obtain from the respondent
Court the relief it could not obtain from those sources, and what can only be described as a
deliberate attempt to frustrate and obstruct implementation of the decision for its closure as of June,
1989 openly solicited, by newspaper advertisements or otherwise, enrollment of new and old
students.

Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
exercises the power to enjoin compliance with the requirements laid down for medical schools and to
mete out sanctions where he finds that violations thereof have been committed, it was a grave abuse
of discretion for the respondent judge to issue the questioned injunction and thereby thwart official
action, in the premises correctly taken, allowing the College to operate without the requisite
government permit. A single ocular inspection, done after the College had been pre-warned thereof,
did not, in the circumstances, warrant only the findings of more qualified inspectors about the true
state of the College, its faculty, facilities, operations, etc. The, members of the evaluating team came
from the different sectors in the fields of education and medicine, and their judgment in this
14

particular area is certainly better than that of the respondent Judge whose sole and only visit to the
school could hardly have given him much more to go on than a brief look at the physical plant and
facilities and into the conduct of the classes and other school activities. Respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in substituting his judgment for theirs. It is well-settled doctrine that courts of
justice should not generally interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions; that
courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative
departments of the government; involving the exercise of judgment and findings of facts, because by
reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, the latter
are in a better position to pass judgment on such matters andn their findings of facts in that regard
are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts. There are, to be sure, exceptions to
15

this general rule but none of them obtains in this case.

The, claim of denial of due process likewise holds no water, as the record clearly shows that the
College was given every opportunity to so improve itself as to come up to requirements, but
remained sadly sub-standard after the inspections conducted by the evaluating teams. It had, in fact,
admitted its failure to have up to the desired standards when it proposed its gradual phase-out in its
letter dated June 27, 1988 to Secretary Quisumbing. It was also precisely because of its complaints
of bias and prejudice that the Board of Medical Education dispatched new teams to survey and re-
evaluate its performance. It had even gone all the way up to the Office of the President to seek a
reversal of the order of closure. There is thus no reason for it to complain of a lack of opportunity to
be heard and to explain its side as well as to seek reconsideration of the ruling complained of.

There is also no merit in respondent College's argument that the closure violated NMCS ORDER
No. 5, Series of 1986, because it was sought to be effected before the lapse of the three-year period
therein snowed, which in this case is sought to be counted from June 18, 1988, or the date of the
last evaluation. The, provision referred to reads:

The following sanction shall be applied against any medical school, for failure to
comply with the specific requirements of the essentials, viz.:

xxx

c. Withdrawal or cancellation of the school's government; authority to operate, for

failure to fully comply with the prescribed requirements after three (3) years from the
last evaluation conducted on the school.

It must at once be obvious from a reading of the provision, paragraph c, that the situation therein
contemplated — where a school is found to have failed to "fully comply with the prescribed
requirements," i.e., has not complied with some requirements and has failed to do so within three (3)
years from the last evaluation is quite distinct from that obtaining in the case at bar — where
respondent school was found to have deficiencies so serious as to warrant its immediate closure.
Said paragraph c should not be construed to prohibit absolutely the withdrawal or cancellation of
government; authority to operate until after three (3) years from the last evaluation conducted on the
school; or, stated otherwise, it does not unexceptionally prescribe a three-year waiting period before
authority to operate may be withdrawn. Rather, it should be read as giving the Secretary of
Education the discretion, depending on the seriousness of the discovered deficiencies, to afford an
educational institution which has failed to comply with some requirement or other, time not
exceeding three (3) years to correct the deficiencies before applying the sanction of withdrawal or
cancellation of the government; authority to operate. The, circumstances in the case at bar are far
from nominal and, to repeat, are different from those obviously envisioned by the paragraph in
question. There had never been a recommendation that the College be granted an opportunity to
comply with certain requirements. From the outset, the proposal had been that it be forthwith closed,
its discovered deficiencies as a medical college being of so serious a character as to be
irremediable. The, other four (4) surveys were conducted, not to determine if in the course of time
the petitioner school had already fully complied with all the prescribed requisites, but rather, whether
or not the original recommendation for its closure was correct and should be sustained. And, as
already mentioned, the subsequent surveys, over a period of more than three (3) years, served but
to confirm the validity of that initial proposal for its closure. Under these circumstances, therefore,
even if it be assumed that the provision, paragraph c, applied to petitioner school, it must be held
that there has been substantial compliance therewith.

Having thus disposed of the issues raised by the facts of the case, the Court sees no useful purpose
to be served by remanding the case to the Trial Court for further proceedings. The, only acceptable
reason for such a remand would be so that the Trial Court may determine whether or not the
petitioners' first have acted within the scope of their powers or grossly abused them, a matter that
this Court has already passed upon here. Such a remand cannot be justified on the theory that the
Trial Court will make its philosophy independent determination of whether or not respondent medical
institution has complied with the minimum standards laid down for its continued operation, since, as
here ruled, it has not that power.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted and the temporary restraining
order issued by the Court is made, permanent. The, questioned writ of preliminary injunction dated
May 10, 1989 is set aside and respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 1385.
G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987

TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in

their behalf and in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges during the
school year 1987-88 and future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled tile
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT).petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the
BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT
(CEM), respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-
1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents,
and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of
1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition
for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for
taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future.
After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition
on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this Court to set aside the
Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of
1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:

Section 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and
regulation of medical education (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the
supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines.
(Underscoring supplied)

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which is composed of (a) the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, as Chairman; (b)
the Secretary of Health or his duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or
his duly authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly authorized
representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the College
of Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine
Medical Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges, as
members. The functions of the Board of Medical Education specified in Section 5 of the statute
include the following:

(a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine;

(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical facilities of colleges of
medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus,
instruments, appliances, laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating and
delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and others, used for didactic and practical
instruction in accordance with modern trends;

(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum qualifications of teaching
personnel, including student-teachers ratio;

(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum leading to the degree of
Doctor of Medicine;

(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical curriculum in a medical school

that has exceptional faculty and instrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum may
prescribe admission and graduation requirements other than those prescribed in this Act;
Provided, That only exceptional students shall be enrolled in the experimental curriculum;

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a
register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of
twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical
Education;

(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments of the hospitals for
training which comply with the minimum specific physical facilities as provided in
subparagraph (b) hereof; and

(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the
proper implementation of the foregoing functions. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:

Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not been
convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude
and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a
certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical
Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the
college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit
any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance
requirements that may be deemed admissible.

xxx xxx x x x (Emphasis supplied)

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and
dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into
medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to
state that:

2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the

selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve
the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants,
based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical
Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT
rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called
for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of
elegibility for admission into the medical colleges.

3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education, each medical college may
give other tests for applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate of eligibility
for admission that will yield information on other aspects of the applicant's personality to
complement the information derived from the NMAT.

xxx xxx xxx

8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or
admitted for enrollment as first year student in any medical college, beginning the school
year, 1986-87, without the required NMAT qualification as called for under this
Order. (Underscoring supplied)

Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted NMATs for
entrance to medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April
1987, respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the school
year 1987.1988. 1avvphi1

Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to
enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute and
administrative order. We regard this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs
documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the petitioner
assailing a statute or administrative order has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough
to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a
clear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the
statute or order assailed.

1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their
assertion, violated by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as follows:

(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect of human rights. "

(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and
shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It
shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs."
 (c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and technology,
arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and
to promote total human liberation and development. "

(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible
to all. "

(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."

Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the
government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken
to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the administrative order they assail
collide with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words,
discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is heavy enough where the
constitutional provision invoked is relatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in
behavioral or operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where the
constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article II is cast, in language
descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and therefore
highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their case, even a prima facie case, and
we are not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation impugned as
unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional provisions pointed to by the petitioners.

Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more petitioners have
failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On
the contrary we may note-in anticipation of discussion infra — that the statute and the regulation
which petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the level of
professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one
must one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute
literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education "
accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but
rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements. "

2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No.
2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of
legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the
Board of Medical Education. The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both
flows from the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers
among the three great departments of government, must be applied with circumspection in respect
1

of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical
as medical education and the practice of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel
stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service
Commission: 2

One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers
and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegate potestas non potest
delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E.
Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in
principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of
modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits of the principle of
 "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but in practically all
modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939].
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and
toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 3

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an
administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract.
As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta — 4

The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection
is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law,
clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang
v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.5

We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical
Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same
Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with
the requirements of the non-delegation principle.

3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair,
unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again,
petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and
"unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary
requirement when added on top of the admission requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical
Act of 1959, and other admission requirements established by internal regulations of the various
medical schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to relate to utility and wisdom
or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of power or
authority: this Court has neither commission or competence to pass upon questions of the
desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative regulation. Those questions must be
address to the political departments of the government not to the courts.

There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and administrative
provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police
power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable
power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote an the important interests and needs —
in a word, the public order — of the general community. An important component of that public order
6

is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can
deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.7

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation
between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the
one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand.
This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of
medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine
8

includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is
also well recognized. thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to
practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized
as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
9
educational requirements — i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical
school — for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise
of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely
10

related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier,
articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical
quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student
body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required
degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain,
and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely
known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means
for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools"
and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today
of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the
Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably in other countries with far more
11

developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the
petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably
related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is
useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of the
MECS Order which provides that

the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every-year by the Board of Medical 11 Education after consultation with the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. (Emphasis supplied)

infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking
admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score
than that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders
the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The force of this argument is more apparent than real.
Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining
during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such
factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding
year; the number of places available in medical schools during the current year; the average score
attained during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so
forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances
from year to year, may wen result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order
No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the
measure of flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change.

We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition
for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court
denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22945 March 3, 1925

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOVITA V. BUENVIAJE, defendant-appellant.

Francisco and Lualhati and Ariston Rivera for appellant.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

OSTRAND, J.:

The defendant is accused of the violation of the Medical Act, the information alleging "that on or
about the first day of June, 1923, and for some time prior to said date, the said accused without
having obtained from the Board of Medical Examiners the corresponding certificate of registration for
the practice of medicine in the Philippine Islands, voluntarily, illegally and criminally and for
compensation, practiced medicine in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, assisting, treating and
manipulating the head and body of Regino Noble for the purpose of curing him of the ailments,
diseases, pains and physical defects from which he pretended to suffer, and advertising and offering
her services as a physician, by means of cards which she distributed and by letterheads and signs
which she exposed on the door of her office, situated at No. 712 Calle Asuncion, and in newspapers
which are published and circulated in the City of Manila, in which cards, letterheads, signs and
advertising she added and prefixed to her name the letters `Dra.,' which is the abbreviation of the
word `doctor,' for the purpose of causing the public to believe that she, the said defendant, had
received the corresponding title of doctor."

To this information the defendant demurred in the court below on the grounds: (1) That it stated more
than one offense, and (2) that it was not drawn in accordance with the form prescribed by law. The
demurrer was overruled and the defendant pleaded not guilty.

At the trial of the case the defendant made the following admissions: "That on the first of June, 1923,
she had no certificate from the Board of Medical Examiners authorizing her to practice medicine in
the Philippine Islands; that on that day she treated and manipulated the head and body of Regino
Noble in order to cure him of ailments from which he pretended to suffer, the treatment consisting in
a `thrust' by means of the application of the hand to the spinal column; that she for such treatment
received and collected from said Regino Noble the sum of P1; that the said treatment took place in
her office situated at No. 712 Calle Asuncion, District of Binondo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands;
that she on or about the first day of June, 1923, and for some time prior to that date, advertised
herself as a `doctor of chiropractic,' in said City of Manila, said advertisement appearing upon her
business cards and in the newspaper `El Debate,' in its issue of April 29, 1923, edited and published
in Manila and in which cards and newspaper advertisement the defendant prefixed the abbreviation
`Dra.' to her name; that she was graduated a doctor in chiropractic on the 13th day of August, 1919,
as evidenced by a certificate marked Exhibit I and issued by the American University School of
Chiropractic of Chicago, Illinois."

Upon this admission and some other evidence to the same effect, the trial court found the defendant
guilty as charged in the information and, in accordance with section 2678 of the Administrative Code,
sentenced her to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs. From this judgment the defendant appeals to this court and presents four assignments of
error.
I. In the first assignment of error counsel contends that the demurrer to the information should have
been sustained on the ground that said information charged more than one offense. The Medical
Law is contained in sections 758 to 783 of the Administrative Code and it is argued that inasmuch as
some of the illegal acts with which the defendant is charged are prohibited by section 770 of the
Code and others by section 783, the defendant is in reality accused of two separate and distinct
offenses, namely, illegal practice of medicine and illegally representing oneself as a doctor.

We cannot accept this view. It may be noted that the Medical Law itself, as it appears in the
Administrative Code, does not declare any of the therein prohibited acts penal offenses. The penal
provisions relating thereto are contained in section 2678 of the Code, which reads as follows:

SEC. 2678. Violation of Medical Law. — A person violating any provision of the Medical Law
shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than three hundred pesos or by
imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The offense here penalized is "violation of the Medical Law." The statute makes no distinction
between illegal practice of medicine and illegally advertising oneself as a doctor. Both are in violation
of the Medical Law and carry the same penalty. They are merely different ways or means of
committing the same offense and both of these means are closely related to each other and usually
employed together.

In these circumstances and where, as alleged in the information in the present case, the various
violations have taken place simultaneously, we do not think it was the intention of the legislator that
each single act should be regarded as a separate offense and separate informations presented for
each. The language of this court in the case of United States vs. Poh Chi (20 Phil., 140), in regard to
the Opium Law, is opposite to the present case.

It is true that the Commission has provided a certain punishment for the possession of a pipe
used in the smoking of opium, for the smoking of opium, as well as a punishment for the
illegal possession of opium, but it is not believed that it was the intention of the legislature to
have separate complaints filed against a person who was found in the illegal possession of
opium and a pipe at the same time. If that were true then every person who was found to be
smoking opium could be charged in three different complaints: First, with the illegal
possession of the pipe; second, the illegal possession of the opium; and third, for smoking
the opium. Certainly the legislature did not intend any such consequences.

In the case of United States vs. Douglass (2 Phil., 461), the court said:

It is not objectionable, when a single offense may be committed by the use of different
means, to charge, in the alternative, the various means by which the crime may have been
committed. (U.S. vs. Potter, 27 Fed. Cases, 604; Bishop's New Criminal Procedure, sec.
434.)

The same rule was followed in the case of United States vs. Dorr (2 Phil., 332); United States vs.
Tolentino (5 Phil., 682); and United States vs. Gustilo (19 Phil., 208) and is in harmony with the
views of the courts in other jurisdictions. That the various means of committing the offense is
described in more than one section of the statute does not necessarily effect the general principle
involved; the subdivision of a statute into section is merely a matter of convenience and while it
sometimes may be of some aid in ascertaining the legislative intent, it is, of course, not conclusive
thereof.
II. Under the second assignment of error the appellant argues in substance that chiropractic has
nothing to do with medicine and that the practice of that profession can therefore not be regarded as
practice of medicine. There is no merit whatever in this contention. Assuming without conceding that
chiropractic does not fall within the term "practice of medicine" in its ordinary acceptation, we have
the statutory definition contained in section 770 of the Administrative Code and which clearly
includes the manipulations employed in chiropractic. The statutory definition necessarily prevails
over the ordinary one.

Under the same assignment of error the defendant also argues that the examination prescribed by
section 776 of the Administrative Code for admission to the practice of medicine, embraces subjects
which have no connection with chiropractic and that to require chiropractors to take that examination
is unreasonable and, in effect amounts to prohibition of the practice of their profession and therefore
violates the constitutional principle that all men have the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness and are entitled to the equal protection of the law.

There is very little force in this argument. The subjects in which an examination is required by
section 778 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3111, relate to matters of which a
thorough knowledge seems necessary for the proper diagnosis of diseases of the human body and it
is within the police power of the State to require that persons who devote themselves to the curing of
human ills should possess such knowledge. (State vs. Edmunds, 127 Iowa, 333; 69 L.R.A., 504;
Underwood vs. Scott, 43 Kan., 714; People vs. Blue Mountain Joe, 129 Ill., 370; State vs. Mylod, 20
R. I., 632; 41 L.R.A., 428; Stewart vs. Raab, 55 Minn., 20; Matthei vs. Wooley, 69 Ill. App., 654;
State vs. Buswell, 40 Neb., 158; 24 L.R.A., 68; O'Connor vs. State, 46 Neb., 157; U. S. vs. Gomez
Jesus, 31 Phil., 218.)

III. The third assignment of error is closely related to the foregoing. The appellant contends that the
prohibition in section 783 against the unauthorized use of the title "doctor" must be understood to
refer to "Doctor of Medicine" and has no application to doctors of chiropractic. Under different
circumstances that might possibly be so, but where, as here, chiropractic is by statute made a form
of the practice of medicine, it necessarily follows that a person holding himself out as a doctor of
chiropractic in legal effect represents himself as a doctor of medicine.

IV. In her fourth assignment of error the appellant attacks the constitutionality of Act No. 3111,
amending section 770 of the Administrative Code, on the ground that the subject of the Act is not
sufficiently expressed in its title and that it embraces more than one subject. There is no merit in this
contention. The title of Act No. 3111 reads as follows:

An Act to amend sections seven hundred and fifty-nine, seven hundred and sixty, seven
hundred and sixty-one, seven hundred and sixty-two, seven hundred and sixty-five, seven
hundred and sixty-seven, seven hundred and seventy, seven hundred and seventy-four,
seven hundred and seventy-five, seven hundred and seventy-six, seven hundred and
seventy-eight, seven hundred and eighty, seven hundred and eighty-two, seven hundred and
eighty-three, and twenty-six hundred and seventy-eight of Act Numbered Twenty-seven
hundred and eleven, known as the Administrative Code, increasing the number of the
members of the Board of Medical Examiners, conferring upon the same certain additional
powers and responsibilities and for other purposes.

All of the sections enumerated in the title quoted relate to the same general subject, namely, defining
and regulating the practice of medicine, and section 770 is expressly mentioned as one of the
sections amended.
This is sufficient. Under constitutional provisions similar to ours the general rule is that a title which
declares the amendatory statute to be an act to amend a designated section or the like of a specified
Code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory Act need not be further stated. (Ross vs.
Aguirre, 191 U.S., 60; Udell vs. Citizens Street R. Co., 152 Ind., 507; McGuire vs. Chicago, etc., R.
Co., 131 Iowa, 340; Lankford vs. County Commissioners of Somerset County, 73 Md., 105; Tabor vs.
State, 34 Tex. Crim., 631; Com. vs. Brown, 91 Va., 762.) For a full and authoritative discussion of this
subject, see Note to Lewis vs. Dunne, 55 L.R.A., 833. See also Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Municipality of Binalonan and Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia (32 Phil., 634)
and Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad (p. 385, ante).

We find no error in the judgment appealed from and the same is therefore affirmed, with the costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. Nos. 78813-14 November 8, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FARHAD HATANI y ABOLHASSAN, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Nestor I. Madlansacay, counsel de parte for accused-appellant.

Nasser A. Marohomsalic, collaborating counsel for accused-appellant.

QUIASON, J.:

This is an appeal from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City, convicting
appellant in Criminal Cases No. Q-11867 and No. Q-11868.

The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11867 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Farhad Hatani y
Abolhassan, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal practice of medicine in
violation of R.A. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959 (Secs. 8, 10)
penalized by Section 28 thereof with "a fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor
more than ten thousand pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, or
by imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five years, or by both such
fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court; and considering the
circumstances of the case and the ignominy caused by him to his two teen-aged,
female, then unmarried victims, this Court exercising its discretion granted under said
Section 28 of the law, hereby SENTENCES said accused FARHAD HATANI Y
ABOLHASSAN to pay a fine of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency AND to suffer imprisonment of five (5) years; and
to pay the costs.

This Court further recommends that after service of his sentence the accused be
deported as undesirable alien (Rollo, p. 35).

The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11868 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, FARHAD HATANI
y ABOLHASSAN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby SENTENCES said accused
to suffer life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the complainant,
Precila Borja, in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and to pay costs
(Rollo, p. 41).

The information in Criminal Case No. Q-11867 charged appellant with illegal practice of medicine, in
violation of R.A. No. 2382, otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959, committed as follows:
 That on or about the 6th day of July, 1979, in Quezon City, Philippines the above
named accused, knowing fully well that he has not satisfactorily passed the
corresponding Board Examination, neither is he a holder of a valid Certificate of
Registration duly issued by the Board of Medical Examiners, as in fact he does not
even appear to have taken or completed the course leading to a medical degree, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for compensation, fee and salary,
paid to him directly, physically examined Priscila (sic) Borja Y Loquero and Wilma
Borja Y Loquero, diagnosed, treated and administer injections on the persons of
Prescila (sic) Borja Y Loquero and Wilma Borja Y Loquero, in Violation of Section 10,
in relation to Section 28, Republic Act No. 2382 (Records, Vol. I, p. 1).

The information in Criminal Case No. Q-11868, charged appellant with Rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of July, 1979, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, with lewd designs, and while she was deprived of reason or
unconscious after having been drugged or administered medicine, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the
undersigned PRECILA BORJA Y LOQUERO without her consent and against her
will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code (Records, Vol. II, p. 1).

It appears that in the morning of July 6, 1979, Agustina Borja visited her comadre, Maura Fontreras,
and requested malunggay leaves as medication for her 16-year old daughter, Precila, who had high
fever and loose bowel movement. Upon learning that Precila was sick, Marita, Maura's daughter,
introduced Agustina to her husband, appellant herein, whom she said was a medical doctor. Marita
suggested that her husband treat Precila and Agustina agreed.

Appellant and Marita went to the Borja residence, where he examined Precila. He gave her tablets to
take and administered two injections (to her), one in the morning and the second at noon. After each
injection, Precila would feel dizzy and fall asleep.

It was appellant's diagnosis that Precila was a drug addict and required further observation and
treatment. Appellant offered to attend to Precila at his house and again, Agustina agreed in the belief
that her daughter was a drug addict.

In the evening of the same day, Precila was fetched by appellant and Marita and was brought to
appellant's house. Again, Precila was given an injection which caused her to sleep. When she
awoke, she realized that she was naked and her entire body was in pain. Appellant was seated on
the bed and was fondling her private parts. Shocked, Precila called for her mother and tried to get
up. Appellant, however, punched her on the chest and forced her to lie down. He pressed a pillow on
her face and injected her again, causing her to fall asleep.

When Precila awoke the second time, she found appellant in bed with her. He was naked and
fondling her private parts. The pain all over her body lingered. When Precila touched her private
parts, she saw blood stains on her hand. She tried to stand up but she was too weak. Appellant gave
her another injection rendering her unconscious.

The following morning, Agustina went to fetch Precila. Upon reaching the Fontreras' residence, she
went straight to the bedroom, where, to her great dismay, she found Precila and appellant both
asleep and naked. She hurriedly dressed up Precila and brought her home.
When Precila woke up, she noticed she was already home and her mother was crying. Precila
remained dizzy, with throbbing pains all over her body. When talked to, she was incoherent.

That evening, Precila's oldest sister, Josefina, a nurse by profession, came home and saw Precila
looking very weak. Her mother, who was crying narrated what she had witnessed that morning. She
also told Josefina that appellant was in the other bedroom, treating another sister, Wilma whom he
also diagnosed as a drug addict. Josefina immediately proceeded to the bedroom and saw appellant
about to inject Wilma.

Josefina saw the open bag of appellant, which contained empty capsules of dalmane and empty
vials of valium. She inquired on the need of the injection and appellant replied that a second shot of
plain distilled water was required to cure Wilma of her drug addiction. Josefina told appellant to stop
but he persisted. Only upon threat that she would call the police did appellant stop. Appellant and his
wife then left the Borja residence.

The following day, Agustina and Josefina brought Precila and Wilma to the Philippine Constabulary
Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, where Josefina and Wilma gave their statements
(Exhs. "D" and "F"). Precila was physically examined by a doctor, whose medical report stated that
Precila's hymen and "deep, healing lacerations" and that "subject is in non-virgin state physically"
(Exh. A). Several needle puncture marks were also found on Precila's arms and buttocks.

A physical examination was likewise done on Wilma, which showed that she too had a needle
puncture, as shown in the Medico-Legal Report (Exh. "L").

Acting on the complaint filed before the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), a surveillance of
appellant's residence was conducted. Subsequently, a search warrant was secured from Judge Jose
P. Castro of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. Armed with the warrant, CANU agents raided
appellant's residence on July 15, 1979.

Assorted drugs, such as dalmane, valium and mogadon, as well as prescription pads in the name of
Dr. Jesus Yap (Exhs. "H" "H-4") and other medical instruments, such as a "thermometer, a
"hygomonometer (sic), stethoscope, syringes and needles, were seized.

The Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. "I") on the prescription slips showed that these were
written by the appellant himself. The report on the chemistry examination of the seized tablets and
capsules (Exhs. "J" "J-1") confirmed the presence of mogadon, dalmane and valium.

After the preliminary investigation, separate informations for rape and violation of R.A. No. 2382
were filed. Appellant pleaded not guilty to both crimes.

The defense's version is that in the evening of July 6, 1976, Agustina and Precila Borja visited the
mother-in-law of the appellant, Maura Fontreras. In the course of the conversation, Agustina asked
Marita if she could help Precila. Marita obliged and agreed to take care of Precila for the night and
allow her to sleep in her bedroom.

Precila and Marita chatted the whole night. Accordingly, Precila confessed that she was not really
sick. She merely related her personal problems, involving her parents. She also admitted her vice,
such as drinking, smoking and taking drugs.

Their talk lasted until the wee hours of the morning and during their conversation, appellant would
occasionally enter the room but he never joined their discussion.
Precila and Marita shared the same bed. Appellant; who was wearing only his pajama pants, slept
on the floor at the opposite end of the room.

The following morning Agustina arrived and Marita related some of Precila's problems. Nothing
untoward happened that day and Agustina headed for home while Precila and Marita followed later.

At past midnight of July 15, 1979, a raid was conducted by CANU agents in the house of the
appellant under the supervision of C1C Agustin Timbol, Jr. The raid was made upon Josefina's
complaint for illegal possession of drugs.

Appellant and his wife were driven out of their bedroom, while three-men remained. Later, appellant
was called to join them in the bedroom and he was shocked to see assorted drugs scattered around.
Appellant denied owning them. Photographs were taken of him with the drugs. A barangay official
was called to attest to the list of the confiscated drugs. Appellant, however, refused to sign the said
list.

C1C Timbol offered to fur the case in exchange of money. Instead of acceding, appellant demanded
to see the search warrant. C1C Timbol failed to show a warrant on the pretext that they were military
men without need of any identification or search warrant. Appellant, his wife and brother-in-law were
forced to join C1C Timbol for questioning in Camp Crame. Upon boarding the van, appellant saw
Josefina aboard kissing C1C Timbol and both exchanged victory signs.

The trial court rendered two separate decisions and convicted the appellant of both crimes. In finding
appellant guilty of illegal purchase of medicine, considerable weight was given to the prosecution's
exhibits.

The Professional Regulation Commission certified that appellant is not among the list of registered
physicians nor among those with special permit to practice medicine in a limited scope (Exh. "K").

Appellant failed to refute the Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. "I") released by the PC Crime
Laboratory showing that the signature of Dr. Jesus D. Yap (Exhs. "H" — "H-4") prescribing medicine
belonged to him. The pictures also taken during the raid (Exhs. "G" - "G-8'" undeniably reveal
several medical equipment used by practicing physicians.

Notwithstanding the trial court's finding that there was no direct evidence of rape, it concluded that
circumstantial evidence indicate that rape was consummated by appellant considering the following:

1. The medico-legal examination of victim Precila, taken on July 8, 1979 at 10:25 in

the morning or less than 48 hours from the evening of July 6, 1979 found "hymen
with deep, healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9 o'clock position"; thus indicating that the
lacerations were recent as they are in the process of healing; (Exh. "A-1")

2. The above undeniable findings of the expert confirms the statement of the victim, a
young girl of 16 or 17 years of age, that when she held private parts which were
painful then, she noticed blood. (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 4-5).

The fresh laceration of the hymen further confirms the carnal assault. (People vs. Ocampo, L-47335,
Aug. 13, 1986)
 3. In the two short waking moments of the victim she noticed she was naked and
beside her on the same bed was the accused, also naked. (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984,
pp. 3-5)

4. The accused, then 21 years of age was in the prime of youth, and the unconscious
girl beside him was just 16 or 17 years of age, thus in the full bloom of womanhood.
The sexual excitement on the part of the accused was therefore exceedingly great.

5. When the mother, Agustina, came into the room of the accused that early morning
of July 7, 1979 she saw her daughter and the accused on the same bed and both
naked. (tsn., Rogato, Jan. 27, 1981, p. 9)

6. The medico-legal found several needle puncture marks on the arms and buttocks
of Precila (Exh. "A"); thus confirming Precila's testimony that she had been injected
by the accused, rendering her unconscious (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 4-5; tsn.,
Nenita, May 21, 1984, pp. 3-6; also pp. 29-30).

7. The medico-legal found the victim "in non-virgin state physically." (Exh; "A-i")

8. At the time of the medico-legal examination, i.e. morning of July 8, 1979, the victim
was found to be "incoherent." (Exh. A) — after effect of the injections or drugs.

9. At the time of the incident (July 6, 1979) the Borjas and Frontreras (sic) were
"comadres" and neighbors. There is no enmity between and among them.

10. Between accused and Marita on one hand, and the victim, her mother, and
sisters, on the other hand, there was no misunderstanding before the incident. There
is absolutely absence of any ulterior motive for the teen-aged victim or her family to
file the serious charge of rape which would expose her to embarrassment of
examination of her private parts and public trial (Rollo, pp. 38-39).

In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

Appellant faults complainant for recounting her ordeal only after four years when she took the
witness stand. This argument is misleading. The record shows that the day after the rape, Josefina
and Wilma Borja, accompanied by their mother, Agustina, issued their statements at Camp Crame.
Agustina gave her statement twice on separate days. Precila did not give any statement due to her
weak condition but it cannot be denied that she was instead physically examined. Suffice it to say,
the Medico Legal Report (Exh. "A") indicates swellings and lacerations and concludes that Precila
was no longer a virgin. Although the records fail to show any sworn statement by Precila, such is not
fatal where the sworn affidavits of her mother, her two sisters and the medico-legal report are
sufficient to show probable cause of rape (People v. Yambao, 193 SGRA 571 [1991]).

Precila was either dizzy or unconscious at the time she was sexually abused. We find her testimony
consistent and credible. While her testimony is limited to the times when she would gain her
consciousness, it is not unlikely that such traumatic incidents would still be engraved on her mind
even four years after.

Appellant's assertion that Precila failed to inform her family of his misdeeds is explainable. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Precila was still dizzy and incoherent as a
consequence of the injections administered by appellant. In fact, when Precila was physically
examined by the doctor the day after, she was still sleepy and groggy (TSN, March 31, 1980, pp. 7-
8).

Appellant also finds it strange that considering the acts allegedly committed by him against Precila,
the medico-legal report fails to specify any injuries on the body of Precila. Appellant need not inflict
heavy blows on Precila for the simple reason that she was under sedation. The absence of the
injuries does not negate the commission of rape (People v. Torrevillas, 203 SCRA 576 [1991];
People v. Arenas, 198 172 [1991]) for rape may be committed after rendering a woman unconscious
(Art. 335, Revised Penal Code; People v. Gerones, 193 SCRA 263 [1991]).

Appellant alleges that Precila was no longer a virgin on that fateful day and that her bleeding was
actually the start of her menstrual cycle. It is settled jurisprudence that virginity is not an essential
element of rape (People v. Corro, 197 SCRA 121 [1991]; People v. Banayo, 195 SCRA 543 [1991]).
To claim that Precila's menstrual cycle began on that day is highly speculative.

Appellant claims that the sworn statements of the Borjas (Exhs. "D", "E" and "F") were antedated
and were prepared after the illegal search was conducted in his residence. He also cites some
inconsistencies in said statements. We find the claim to be devoid of merit. It is only now on appeal
that appellant disputes the execution of these affidavits. When they were presented and offered as
evidence, appellant failed to raise such objections and to refute them.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses merely refer to minor
details, which cannot destroy their credibility (People v. Doctolero, 193 SCRA 632 [1991]). This is
also true where statements made while on the witness stand are claimed to be inconsistent with the
affidavit, which are generally incomplete (People v. Lagota, 194 SCRA 92 [1991]; People v.
Avanzado, 158 SCRA 427 [1988]).

With regard to the second assignment of error, appellant insists that his conviction arose from
insufficient evidence and his failure to prove his innocence.

Indeed, the circumstantial evidence established at the trial are more than sufficient to prove the guilt
of appellant. The Medico-Legal Report on Precila, taken within 48 hours from the commission of
rape confirmed that her hymen had "deep, healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9 o'clock position" and
Precila was "in non-virgin state physically" (Exh. "A"). Furthermore, the report confirms that Precila
had at least six needle puncture marks and swellings, which confirm that appellant had injected her
several times.

On the two occasions that Precila woke up, she positively stated that appellant was with her on the
bed and that they were both naked. She also tried to free herself on both attempts from accused,
but, he made her unconscious through injections (TSN, February 9, 1984, pp. 3-5). This is
corroborated by the testimony of Agustina, who saw her daughter and accused together naked on
bed (TSN, January 27, 1981, p. 9). These unbroken chain of events leads one to a fair and
reasonable conclusion that accused actually raped Precila.

As held in People v. Yambao, supra, credence is given to the findings of the trial court where the
rape victim's testimony is buttressed by the corroborative testimony of the mother and the medico-
legal report, as well as the report of the police investigator.

It must also be borne in mind that at the time of the commission of the crime, Precila was just sixteen
years old. No young lady at the prime of her youth would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her intimate parts and later bare herself to the disgrace brought to her honor in a
public trial unless she was motivated solely by a desire to have the culprit apprehended and brought
to justice (People v. Patilan, 197 SCRA 354 [1991]; People v. Yambao, 193 SCRA 571 [1991]).

Appellant claims that his right to be presumed innocent was violated. He cites the trial court's
decision holding that it. —

. . . finds that with these circumstantial evidences (sic) pieced together the
prosecution has proved the crime of rape, and the burden shifted on the defense to
show the contrary (Rollo, p. 40).

Appellant was afforded a fair trial and in fact he availed of surrebuttal evidence. The statement of the
trial court, as correctly argued by the Solicitor General, implies that the circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to support appellant's conviction unless the defense is able to provide evidence to the
contrary.

With respect to his conviction of illegal practice of medicine, appellant presented inconsistent claims.
On one hand, he claims that the drugs and other paraphernalia were planted by the raiding team;
while on the other hand, he claims that these were seized without any warrant.

If indeed the evidence were all planted, how can appellant explain his handwriting on the
prescription pads in the name of Dr. Jesus Yap? A perusal of the photographs showing accused
during the raid, fails to indicate any protestation by him. In fact, the other photographs (Exhs. "G-l",
"G-2", "G-4" — "G-8") do not bear any sign of disorder, in contrast to appellant's testimony that his
room was made into a mess during the raid.

The records fail to disclose a copy of a search warrant. However, the prosecution was able to
present its return (Exh. "ZZ") and we are satisfied that indeed a lawful search warrant was obtained.
Besides, the judge who granted the search warrant was the same judge who initially heard both
criminal cases. It can therefore be presumed, that the search was made with a search warrant and
absent of any showing that it was procured maliciously, the items seized are admissible in evidence
(People v. Umali, 193 SCRA 493 [1991]).

The evidence is overwhelming that appellant actually treated and diagnosed Precila and Wilma
Borja. The positive testimony of Agustina, Precila, Wilma and Josefina Borja; the medico-legal
reports (Exhs. "A", "A-7", "C", "L" and "L-1") which attest to the needle marks; the Handwriting
Identification Report (Exh. I); the photographs (Exhs. "G-l — "G-8") showing assorted drugs and
medical equipment in appellant's room; and the chemistry reports (Exhs. "J" — "J-1") prove that
appellant was engaged in the practice of medicine. And as to his allegation that there was no proof
of payment, the law specifically punishes said act whether or not done for a fee.

Appellant claims that Precila admitted in her cross-examination that she was in school the whole day
of July 6, 1979 and it was therefore impossible for him to have treated and diagnosed her on that
date. An accurate reading of the transcript, however, will show that Precila's testimony was in
response to a question regarding her school schedule for that day.

Finally, appellant claims that the ponente of both decisions was not the trial judge, ergo said judge
was thus deprived of the opportunity to assess the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

Admittedly, the ponente's participation was limited to the resolution of the cases. The fact that the
judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment, and for that reason the
latter did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but
merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the judgment erroneous (People v. Ramos,
Jr., 203 SCRA 237 [1991]; People v. Villamayor, 199 SCRA 472 [1991]), especially where the
evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion.

WHEREFORE, the judgments appealed from are AFFIRMED in toto. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 89095 & 89555 November 6, 1989

SIXTO P. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner,

vs.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SPOUSES SHOJI YAMADA and MICHIYO
YAMADA and SPOUSES TOMOTADA ENATSU and EDITA ENATSU, respondents.

Salma Pir T. Rasul, Rosalinda L. Santos and A.E. Dacanay for petitioner.

Gonzales, Batiller Law Offices for respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres and Evangelista for Spouses Tomotada and Edita Enatsu.

Lino M. Patajo for Spouses Shoji and Michiyo Yamada.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

In his petition for certiorari, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the en banc resolution dated
1

February 14, 1989 of the Securities and Exchange Commission in SEC EB Case No. 191 and the
concurring opinions thereto (Annexes F, G, and H, pp. 39-62, Rollo), as well as its orders dated June
27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (Annexes M and 0, pp. 83-86, Rollo) directing the corporate secretary of
the United Doctors Medical Center, Inc. (hereafter "UDMC") to call a special meeting of the
stockholders to elect the officers and directors in the implementation of the SEC's
aforementioned en banc resolution of February 14, 1989, which the Court of Appeals affirmed in its
decision dated June 8, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 17435, entitled "Sixto Crisostomo, petitioner vs.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Spouses Dr. Shoji Yamada and Michiyo Yamada, and
Spouses Dr. Tomotada Enatsu and Edita Enatsu, respondents." On August 1, 1989, the Court of
Appeals denied Crisostomo's motion for reconsideration of its decision. On August 24, 1989, he filed
a petition for review of said decision in this Court (G.R. No. 89555) which was originally assigned to
the Third Division, but was later consolidated with G.R. No. 89095.

At first blush, the petitions sound like a patriotic defense of the Constitution, but, at bottom they are
only an artful scheme to defraud a group of foreign investors who had been persuaded by the
officers of UDMC to invest P57 million to save the corporation (its assets as well as those of the
Crisostomo's) from imminent foreclosure by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to which
UDMC was indebted in the sum of P55 million. It is the kind of operation that sullies our collective
image as a people and sets back our government's heroic efforts to attract foreign investments to
our country.

The antecedent facts, culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Sixto Crisostomo, Felipe Crisostomo (deceased), Veronica Palanca, Juanito

Crisostomo, Carlos Crisostomo, Ricardo Alfonso, Regino Crisostomo and Ernesto
Crisostomo (known as the Crisostomo group) were the original stockholders of the
United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) which was organized in 1968 with an
authorized capital stock of P1,000,000 (later increased to P15,000,000 in 1972).
They owned approximately 40% of UDMC's outstanding capital stock, while the 60%
majority belonged to the members of the United Medical Staff Association (UMSA),
numbering approximately 150 doctors and medical personnel of UDMC.

Despite their minority status, the Crisostomo group has managed UDMC from its
inception, with Juanito Crisostomo as president, Ricardo Alfonso, Sr. as chairman of
the board, Carlos Crisostomo as corporate secretary and Sixto Crisostomo as
director and legal counsel.

In 1988, UDMC defaulted in paying its loan obligation of approximately P55 million to
the DBP. In the last quarter of 1987, UDMC's assets (principally its hospital) and
those of the Crisostomos which had been given as collateral to the DBP, faced
foreclosure by the Asset Privatization' rust (APT), which had taken over UDMC's loan
obligation to the DBP.

To stave off the threatened foreclosure, UDMC, through its principal officers, Ricardo
Alfonso and Juanito Crisostomo, persuaded the Yamadas and Enatsu (Shoji Yamada
and Tomotada Enatsu are Japanese doctors) to invest fresh capital in UDMC. The
wife of Tomotada Enatsu, Edita Enatsu, is a Filipina. They invested approximately
P57 million in UDMC.

The investment was effected by means of: (1) a Stock Purchase Agreement; and (2)
an Amended Memorandum of Agreement whereby the group subscribed
to 82.09% of the outstanding shares of UDMC.

Both transactions were duly authorized by the board of directors and stockholders of
UDMC. They were submitted to, scrutinized by, and, finally, approved by the Board of
Investments, the Central Bank of the Philippines, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The elaborate governmental approval process was done openly and
with full knowledge of all concerned, including Sixto Crisostomo, the corporate legal
counsel. Upon the completion of the governmental approval process, shares of
stock, duly signed by UDMC's authorized officers, were issued to the Yamadas and
Enatsus.

This capital infusion not only saved the assets of the UDMC (especially the hospital)
from foreclosure but also freed the Crisostomos from their individual and solidary
liabilities as sureties for the DBP loan.

As it had been agreed in the Amended Memorandum of Agreement between UDMC

and the Japanese group that upon the latter's acquisition of the controlling interest in
UDMC, the corporation would be reorganized, a special stockholders' meeting and
board of directors' meeting were scheduled to be held on August 20, 1988.

However, on the eve of the meetings, i.e., on August 19, 1988, Sixto Crisostomo,
supposedly acting for himself, filed SEC Case No. 3420 against Juanito Crisostomo,
Ricardo Alfonso, Shoji Yamada, Michiyo Yamada, Tomotada Enatsu and Edita
Enatsu, praying, among other things, (1) to stop the holding of the stockholder's and
board of directors' meetings; (2) to disqualify the Japanese investors from holding a
controlling interest in UDMC and from being elected directors or officers of UDMC;
and (3) to annul the Memorandum of Agreement and Stock Purchase Agreement
because they allegedly did not express the true agreement of the parties (pp. 194-
203, Rollo).
Two weeks later, on September 2, 1988, Crisostomo filed Civil Case No. 88-1823 in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, where he also sought a preliminary
injunction and the Identical reliefs prayed for by him in SEC Case No. 3420 (pp. 317-
335, Rollo). It was dismissed by the trial court for lack of jurisdiction and is pending
appeal in the Court of Appeals where it is docketed as CA-G.R. No. 20285-CV.

On September 13, 1988, the hearing officer, Antonio Esteves, granted the application
for a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents —

... from holding the special meeting of the stockholders and of the
Board of Directors of United Doctors Medical Center, [Inc.] (UDMC)
scheduled on August 20, 1988 or any subsequent meetings; from
adopting resolutions to elect new directors and appoint new officers;
from approving resolutions directly or indirectly affecting the
operations, organizational structure, and financial condition of the
corporation, ... and from disbursing funds of the said corporation
except those ordinary day-to-day expenses pending the final
termination of this case. (p. 30, Rollo.)

The private respondents' motion for reconsideration of this order was denied by the
hearing officer on November 16, 1988. In the same order, he created a management
committee to administer UDMC (pp. 32-35, Rollo).

The respondents appealed by certiorari to the SEC en banc. On February 14,1989,

Commissioner Jose C. Laureta, with whom Commissioners Rosario N. Lopez and
Gonzalo T. Santos separately concurred, set aside the preliminary injunction issued
by Esteves and the management committee which he created. The dispositive part of
the decision reads:

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED and
the Commission en banc ORDERS:

1. That the questioned orders of the hearing officer in SEC Case No.
3420 of September 13, 1988 and November 16, 1988, be
immediately vacated;

2. That a special stockholders' meeting of UDMC be held for the

purpose of allowing the stockholders of record of the corporation to
elect a new board of directors, which special meeting is hereby
directed to be scheduled within 10 days from receipt of a copy of this
resolution by the incumbent corporate secretary or acting corporate
secretary of UDMC, and to this end, that such officer be, as he
hereby is, directed: (a) to issue a call for such special meeting and
serve notice thereof on all stockholders of record of the corporation,
in accordance with section 6 of article VII of UDMC's by-laws; and (b)
to submit to the Commission, through the Commission Secretary, a
written report of his compliance with this particular order of the
Commission, not later than 5 days prior to the scheduled date of the
proposed UDMC special stockholders' meeting;

3. That upon the election of a new board of directors of UDMC, that

such board be, as it hereby is, enjoined to meet as promptly as
 possible for the purpose of electing a new set of officers of the
corporation in order to ensure its proper management;

4. That the hearing officer be, as he hereby is, directed to continue

with the proceedings of SEC Case No. 3420, and to do so with all
deliberate speed, for the purpose of resolving the alleged violation of
certain rights of Sixto Crisostomo, as a stockholder of UDMC
particularly, his right to inspect the corporate books and records of
UDMC, his preemptive right to subscribe to the P60 million increase
in the authorized capital of UDMC, and his appraisal rights; and

5. That the board of directors and officers of UDMC be, as they

hereby are, ordered to submit to the Commission, through the
Chairman, a written report as to its plans as regards its nursing
school, such report to be submitted at least one month prior to the
commencement of the school year 1989-1990.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 49-50, Rollo.)

Sixto Crisostomo sought a review of the SEC's en banc resolution in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
SP No. 17435).

On June 8, 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition and lifted the temporary restraining
order that it had issued against the SEC's resolution (Annex K, pp. 65-81, Rollo). Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration (pp. 418-434, Rollo). The Court of Appeals required the private
respondents to comment but it denied the petitioner's motion to reinstate the writ of preliminary
injunction (Annex L, p. 82, Rollo),

On motion of the private respondents (Annex K, p. 413, Rollo), the SEC en banc issued an order on
June 27, 1989 directing the secretary of UDMC to call a special stockholders' meeting to elect a new
board of directors and officers of the corporation (Annex F). Petitioner asked the SEC to recall that
order on account of his pending motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals. The motion was
opposed by the private respondents. On July 21, 1989, the SEC denied petitioner's motion (p. 86,
Rollo). Whereupon, he filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for preliminary
injunction alleging that the SEC en banc abused its discretion:

1. in setting aside Esteves' orders

2. in allowing the Japanese group to have control of UDMC for it will result in
culpable violation of Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals or
corporations qualified to acquire or hold land of the public domain, meaning
corporations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizens
(Sec. 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution); and

3. in allowing the Japanese investors to own more than 40% of the capital stock of
UDMC (which operates a nursing and midwifery school) in violation of Section 4 (2)
Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution which provides that educational institutions ...
shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens.
The public and private respondents, in their comments on the petition, asked that the petition be
dismissed and that the petitioner be cited for contempt for forum-shopping.

We find no merit in the petition. The first allegation that the SEC en banc erred in reversing the
orders of the hearing officer, Esteves, is the same ground raised by the petitioner in CA-G.R. No. SP
17435. The issue is frivolous for the authority of the SEC en banc to review, revise, reverse, or affirm
orders of its hearing officers is too elementary to warrant any debate.

Equally unmeritorious are the second and third grounds of the petition — that the P57 million
investment of the Japanese group in UDMC violates the constitutional provisions restricting the
transfer or conveyance of private lands (Art. XIII, Sec. 7, 1987 Constitution) and the ownership of
educational institutions (Art. XVI, Sec. 14[a], 1987 Constitution), to citizens of the Philippines or
corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens. While 82% of UDMC's
capital stock is indeed subscribed by the Japanese group, only 30% (equivalent to 171,721 shares
or P17,172.00) is owned by the Japanese citizens, namely, the Yamada spouses and Tomotada
Enatsu. 52% is owned by Edita Enatsu, who is a Filipino. Accordingly, in its application for
approval/registration of the foreign equity investments of these investors, UDMC declared that 70%
of its capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens, including Edita Enatsu. That application was
approved by the Central Bank on August 3, 1988 (p. 249, Rollo,).

The investments in UDMC of Doctors Yamada and Enatsu do not violate the Constitutional
prohibition against foreigners practising a profession in the Philippines (Section 14, Article XII, 1987
Constitution) for they do not practice their profession (medicine) in the Philippines, neither have they
applied for a license to do so. They only own shares of stock in a corporation that operates a
hospital. No law limits the sale of hospital shares of stock to doctors only. The ownership of such
shares does not amount to engaging (illegally,) in the practice of medicine, or, nursing. If it were
otherwise, the petitioner's stockholding in UDMC would also be illegal.

The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (directing the secretary of UDMC to call a
stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not premature, despite the petitioner's then pending motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The lifting by the Court of Appeals of its writ
of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. SP No. 17435 cleared the way for the implementation by the
SEC's en banc resolution in SEC EB Case No. 191. The SEC need not wait for the Court of Appeals
to resolve the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a
preliminary injunction is immediately executory. It "shall not be stayed after its rendition and before
an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal." (Sec. 4, Rule 39, Rules of Court; Marcelo
Steel Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 89 [1973]; Aguilar vs. Tan, 31 SCRA 205 [1970]; Sitia
Teco vs. Ventura, 1 Phil. 497 [1902]; Watson & Co., Ltd. vs. M. Enriquez, I Phil. 480 [1902]).

We now address the public and private respondents' separate motions to dismiss the petition and to
cite Crisostomo and his counsel for contempt of court for forum-shopping. The records show that
Crisostomo had two actions pending in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP 17435 and CA-G.R.
No. 20285 CV) when he filed the petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 89095) in this Court on July 27,
1989. The case docketed as CA-G.R. No. 20285-CV, is his appeal from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, dismissing his complaint for annulment of the Memorandum of Agreement and
the Stock Purchase Agreement between UDMC and the Japanese investors. CA-G.R. No. SP 17435
is his petition for certiorari to review the SEC's en banc resolution upholding those transactions and
ordering the holding of a stockholders meeting to elect the directors of the UDMC, and of a board of
directors meeting to elect the officers.
Notwithstanding the pendency of those two cases in the Court of Appeals, Crisostomo filed this
petition for certiorari 1 and prohibition on July 27, 1989 where he raises the same issues that he
raised in the Court of Appeals.

The prayer of his petition in CA-G.R. No. SP 17435 reads thus:

3) After hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered:

a) Annulling and setting aside the questioned rulings of the

respondent COMMISSION for having been issued with grave abuse
2

of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

b) Making permanent the preliminary injunction issued in this case

against the respondents. (p. 241, Rollo.)

In his petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 89095), he also prays that —

1. Upon the filing of this petition, a temporary restraining order issue enjoining
respondents, their representatives or agents from implementing or executing the
SEC opinions (Annexes "F", "G" and "H") and its June 27 and July 21,1989 orders
(Annexes "M" and "O") until further orders from the Honorable Court.

xxx xxx xxx

3. After notice, this petition be given due course and a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued for the same purpose and effect upon such terms and conditions the
Honorable Court may impose; and thereafter, judgment be rendered granting the writ
prayed for and annulling and setting aside the said opinions rendered by the SEC in
their stead, affirming the orders of the Hearing Officer (Annexes "A" and "B"). (pp. 27-
28, Rollo.)

Additionally, in his petition for review (G.R. No. 89555) he prays this Court to giant "all the reliefs"
prayed for by him in CA-G.R. SP No. 17435. Here is a clear case of forum-shopping.

There is forum-shopping whenever as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a

party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The
principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in
connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative
proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes
and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court
ruling. This is specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit
was brought, has no jurisdiction. (Villanueva vs. Adre, G.R. No. 8063, April 27, 1989.)
(p. 303, Rollo)

Forum-shopping is prohibited by the Interim Rules of Court for it trifles with the courts and abuses
their processes (E. Razon, Inc. vs. Phil. Port Authority, 101 SCRA 450). Section 17 of the Interim
Rules of Courts provides:

17. Petitions for writs of certiorari, etc., — No petition for certiorari, mandamus,
prohibition, habeas corpus or quo warranto may be filed in the Intermediate Appellate
Court if another similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Supreme
 Court. Nor may such petition be filed in the Supreme Court if a similar petition has
been filed or is still pending in the Intermediate Appellate Court, unless it be to review
the action taken by the Intermediate Appellate Court on the petition filed with it. A
violation of this rule shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for the
summary dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate
action against the counsel or party concerned. (Interim Rules of Court.)

Forum-shopping makes the petitioner subject to disciplinary action and renders his petitions in this
Court and in the Court of Appeals dismissible (E. Razon, Inc. vs. Philippine Port Authority, et al., G.R.
No. 75197, Resolution dated July 31, 1986; Buan vs. Lopez, Jr., 145 SCRA 34, 38-39; Collado vs.
Hernando, L-43886, May 30, 1988). For this reason, if not for their lack of merit, the petitions should
be, as they are hereby, dismissed.

WHEREFORE, these petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. The temporary restraining order which
this Court issued on August 7, 1989 in G.R. No. 89095 is hereby lifted. The Court of Appeals is
ordered to immediately dismiss CA-G.R. CV No. 20285. The petitioner and his counsel are censured
for engaging in forum-shopping. The petitioner is further ordered to pay double costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14160 June 30, 1960

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ANUNCIACION VDA. DE GOLEZ, defendant-appellee.

Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for appellant.
Aniceto V. Zezobrado for appellee.

REYES, J. B. L., J.:

On October 2, 1957, the provincial fiscal of Negros Occidental filed an information in the Court of
First Instance of that province charging Anunciacion Vda. de Golez with the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence, as follows:

That on or about the period comprised from December 12, 1956 to December 24, 1956, in
the municipality of San Carlos, province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, without being duly licensed to
practice medicine and with reckless negligence and without taking due precaution, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniosly diagnose, prescribe, and treat one Susana Tam,
who had been suffering for sometime with bodily ailment, knowing fully well that she is
incompetent and not possessing the necessary technical or scientific knowledge or skill, and
as a consequence of such negligence and carelessness and lack of medical skill, said
Susana Tam died thereafter.

The accused pleaded not guilty to the information.

When the case was called for trial, the assistant fiscal made a manifestation that the accused had
also been charged with the crime of illegal practice of medicine before another sala of the same
court. In view of this manifestation, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the information for being
fatally defective, without prejudice to the filing of the proper information against the same accused.
The grounds given for the dismissal were the following:

In view of the foregoing manifestation of the Fiscal, the Court finds that the information is
fatally defective and, therefore, should be dismissed under Par. (a), Sec. 2 of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court inasmuch as the facts charged do not constitute the offense of homicide thru
reckless imprudence because illegal practice of medicine is malicious per se, and when the
accused practiced medicine without academical preparation and without a license to do so,
then she is per se committing a criminal act for which the criminal intent is presumed.
Although the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence can be committed by a duly
licensed physician when in the practice of his profession he fails to exercise due care and
diligence from which the criminal act arises, this crime cannot be imputed to a person who
has no authority to practice this profession, which act is malicious per se. The crime
described in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code results from the performance of a lawful
act which was done without exercising the care and diligence that is required by the
circumstances, and not from the performance of an unlawful act which is the subject of the
information in this case because a quack doctor who practices medicine does so against the
law, and, therefore, his act is necessarily malicious and criminal.
From the above order, the provincial fiscal appealed to this Court, and, through the Solicitor General,
urges that the court below erred in dismissing the information for being fatally defective because the
facts charged therein allegedly do not constitute the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence.

We agree with appellant that the order of dismissal is erroneous, in that the crime of illegal practice
of medicine is a statutory offense wherein criminal intent is taken for granted, so that a person may
be convicted thereof irrespective of his intention and in spite of his having acted in good faith and
without malice; i.e., even if he was not motivated by an evil desire to injure or hurt another, but by an
honest desire to cure or alleviate the pain of a patient. In fact, as defined by Section 2678 of the
Revised Administrative Code (the law then in force), the offense consists in the mere act of
practicing medicine in violation of the Medical Law, even if no injury to another, much less death,
results from such malpractice. When, therefore, the patient dies, the illegal practitioner should be
equally responsible for the death of his patient, an offense independent of and distinct from the
illegal practice of medicine.

The allegations in the information in this case that the accused acted with reckless negligence in
diagnosing, prescribing for, and treating the deceased Susana Tam, knowing that she did not
possess the necessary technical knowledge or skill to do so, thus causing her death, sufficiently
charge the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, since ordinary diligence counsels one
not to tamper with human life by trying to treat a sick man when he knows that he does not have the
special skill, knowledge, and competence to attempt such treatment and cure, and may
consequently reasonably foresee harm or injury to the latter, said accused was found guilty and
convicted by this Court of physical injuries through imprudence under the old Penal Code (U. S. vs.
Feliciano Divino, 12 Phil., 175).

However, in view of the error of the lower court in dismissing the information, we cannot sustain this
appeal for the reason that it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The present information
being valid and sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, the dismissal thereof by the
court after the accused had pleaded not guilty to the charge and without his consent constitutes
jeopardy as to bar further proceedings upon the case (U. S vs. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil., 67;
People vs. Hernandez, 94 Phil., 49; 49 Off. Gaz. No. 12, 5342; People vs. Ferrer, 100 Phil., 124; 55
Off. Gaz. [4] 620). The failure of the accused to file a brief and raise the question of double jeopardy
in this appeal does not mean that section 2, Rule 118, providing that the People can not appeal if the
defendant would be placed in double jeopardy would no longer apply (People vs. Bao, 106 Phil.,
243; 56 Off. Gaz. [51] 7768).

The unfortunate result in this case could have been avoided if the trial court had proceeded more
deliberately, without allowing its judgment to be influenced by preconceived notions or undue haste
in dispatching cases.

The appeal is, therefore, dismissed, with costs de oficio.