Aldaba v.
CA (1969)
Petition: Petition for review of a decision of the CA
Petitioners: Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba
Respondents: CA, Cesar Aldaba, et. al.
Ponencia: Zaldivar
DOCTRINE:
In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be
made in a public document. The mere expression of an intention to
donate is not a promise because a promise is an undertaking to carry
the intention into effect.
For an onerous donation to arise, the services must be rendered in
expectation that the other will pay them.
FACTS:
1. Belen Aldaba died and left two lots in Manila for disposal. Her
presumptive heirs were Estanislao Bautista (surviving husband)
and Cesar Aldaba (her brother). She was childless.
2. Dr. Vicente and Jane Aldaba (father and daughter) rendered
medical assistance to Belen. Vicente was the adviser and Jane
became her personal physician until her death.
3. They were invited by Belen to live in one of her two houses
standing on the subject lots when their house was burned during
the liberation of Manila. They accepted the offer and actually lived
in one of the houses.
4. The presumptive heirs executed a deed of extrajudicial partition of
the properties by virtue of which, the two lots were allotted to
Cesar.
5. Then, Cesar and Emmanuel (grandson of Estanislao by first
marriage) executed a deed whereby the two lots were ceded to
Emmanuel in exchange for his lot in Rizal. TCT was issued in
Emmanuel’s name.
6. Emmanuel Bautista filed an ejectment case against them.
7. Petitioners, without awaiting the result of the ejectment case, filed
a complaint in CFI alleging that they had become the owners of
the lots and that the TCT should be cancelled.
8. Both trial and appellate court dismissed the complaint.
9. Petitioners contend that what was executed was an onerous
donation for compensation of their services rendered amounting to
P53,000. Thus, it need not be executed in a public instrument.
10. A note written by Belen was also shown saying, ―Huwag kayong
umalis dyan. Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo.‖
ISSUE:
1. WoN there was a disposition of property by Belen in favor of
petitioners
PROVISIONS:
 Art 733 and Art 749 of the Civil Code
RULING + RATIO:
1. NO.
 The note written by Belen only showed mere expression of
an intention to donate. It was not a promise because a
promise is an undertaking to carry the intention into effect.
o Even admitted in their Memorandum that it was only
an indication of an intention to give.
o No evidence that such intention was effectively
carried out after the writing of the note.
 Even assuming that there was already a disposition
previous to the writing of the note, the disposition alone
would not make it a donation for a valuable consideration.
o No express agreement that Belen will pay them for
their services.
o No implied contract for payment. Jane did not expect
to be paid for her services.
o To give rise to an implied contract, services must be
rendered in expectation that the other will pay and
they have been accepted by the other party with
knowledge of that expectation.
o Fees were renounced so services were not
demandable obligations.
 Even assuming they were demandable debts, it is still not
known if this was the consideration for which Belen made
the disposition of the property.
 No explanation why from 1945 to 1955 no notarial
document was executed.
 If the services are really to be paid, they could have
initiated a claim in the intestate proceedings.
DISPOSITION: Emmanuel Bautista is the absolute owner.
 JUTIC v. CA
Petition: Petition for review
Petitioner: CONSUELO SEVILLE JUTIC, JUAN JUTIC, CELESTINO
SEVILLE, TIBURCIO SEVILLE, RAVELLO SEVILLE, SONITA SEVILLE,
LUCY SEVILLE, EPIFANIA SEVILLE, NARACY SEVILLE, EMMANUEL
SEVILLE, ORLANDO MANICAN, and PACIFICO MANICAN
Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, VICENTE SULLAN,
TRINIDAD SULLAN, TERESITA SULLAN, ULYSSES SULLAN,
ALEJANDRINO SULLAN, BUENAVENTURA SEVILLE, and ZOILO SEVILLE
Ponencia: Gutierrez, J.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
1. Respondents filed a complaint with the then CFI Tagum, Davao del
Norte against the petitioners for partition and accounting of the
properties of Arsenio Seville, alleging they are heirs of the decedent.
2. The petitioners, averred the following in their answer:
a. That the defendants are the owners of Lots 170 and 172 and
improvements thereon,
b. That defendants are the surviving heirs of Melquiades
Seville, the brother of the deceased Arsenio Seville. Arsenio
Seville died ahead.
c. That Melquiades Seville and his family have been in actual
possession, occupation and cultivation of Lots Nos. 170 and
172, since 1954 continuously and peacefully in concept of
owner, up to the time of his death, and had introduced
valuable improvements thereon. After his demise his heirs,
the defendants herein, succeeded to the occupation and
possession of the said parcel of land and improvements with
the knowledge of the plaintiffs and with the acquiescence of
Arsenio Seville during his lifetime.
d. That even during the lifetime of the deceased Arsenio Seville
it had been his desire, intention and his wish that Lots 170
and 172 shall be owned by Melquiades Seville, the father of
the herein defendants.
e. That Melquiades Seville during his lifetime had taken legal
steps to perfect titles to these parcels of land in his name."
3. Arsenio Seville owned two parcels of agricultural land (171
and 172), a residential house erected on Lot 172, rice and
corn mills and their respective paraphernalia valued at
P5,000.00, and five carabaos in the possession of the then
defendants.
4. Arsenio Seville executed an affidavit in favor of Melquiades
Seville
i. I am a widower as indicated above and that I have
no one to inherit all my properties except my
brother Melquiades Seville who appears to be
the only and rightful person upon whom I have
the most sympathy since I have no wife and
children;
ii. That it is my desire that in case I will die I will
assign all my rights, interest, share and
participation over the above- mentioned property
and that he shall succeed to me in case of my
death, however, as long as I am alive I will be the
one to possess, enjoy and benefit from the produce
of my said land and that whatever benefits it will give
me in the future I shall be the one to enjoy it;
iii. That I make this affidavit to make manifest my
intention and desire as to the way the above-
mentioned property shall be dispose of and for
whatever purpose it may serve.
5. Arsenio Seville mortgaged said properties to the PNB in
consideration of a loan. This was done with the knowledge and
acquiescence of Melquiades Seville.
6. Arsenio Seville died intestate, single, without issue, and without any
debt.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was a valid donation from Arsenio Seville to
Melquiades Seville?
PROVISIONS:
RULING + RATIO:
1. NO . The trial court was correct in stating that "a close reading
reveals that Exhibit 4 is not a donation inter vivos or mortis causa but
a mere declaration of an intention and a desire. Certainly, it is not
a concrete and formal act of giving or donating
2. There clearly was no intention to transfer ownership from
Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville at the time of the
instrument's execution. It was a mere intention or a desire on the
part of Arsenio Seville that in the event of his death at some future
time, his properties should go to Melquiades Seville.
3. It is quite apparent that Arsenio Seville was thinking of succession.
Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor
 partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and shall be
governed by the rules established in the title on succession.
4. The petitioners likewise contend that the document was a valid
donation as only donations are accepted by the donees. However,
the petitioners could not have accepted something, which by the
terms of the supposed "donation" was not given to them at the time
5. Arsenio dealt with the land and entered into transactions as its
owner. All these happened with the knowledge and acquiescence of
the supposed donee, Melquiades Seville. Contrary to the petitioners'
allegations in their brief, there was no immediate transfer of title upon
the execution of Exhibit 4.
6. Common ownership is shown by the records. Therefore, any claim of
ownership of the petitioners is not based on Exhibit 4 but on the fact
that they are heirs of Arsenio Seville together with the private
respondents.
7. It is likewise significant to note the respondents' assertion that the
signed affidavit is a forgery because Arsenio Seville was illiterate
during his lifetime. He executed documents by affixing his
thumbmark as shown in the Real Estate Mortgage.

DISPOSITION: The order appealed from is affirmed. Petition Dismissed.

 HOWARD v PADILLA

Petition: Petition for Review

Petitioner: Marie Howard
Respondent: Constancia Padilla and Court of Appeals
Ponente: Bautista, J.

(Disclaimer: Case is only two paragraphs)

DOCTRINE:

Donations must conform to the formalities set by law; otherwise

it is null and void.

FACTS:

Marie Howard is the widow of the donor, and the property in dispute is
a donation from the conjugal property.

The CA ruled that the donation was inter vivos, not mortis causa, and
as such is valid and irrevocable, though it likewise declares that it is
valid in so far only as the share of the donor of the property donated is
concerned because it cannot prejudice the share of Marie Howard.

ISSUES:

Is the donation mortis causa or inter vivos?

RULING + RATIO:

The donation is mortis causa or one to take effect after death. Not
having been executed with the formalities of the law regarding wills,
the same is null and void and without effect.

DISPOSITION:

CA decision is reversed.
 PUIG v. PEÑAFLORIDA (1966)
Plaintiffs-Appellants: Angeles Ubalde Puig, et al.,
Defendants-appellants: Estela Magbanua Peñaflorida
Ponencia: Reyes, J. B. L., J.
DOCTRINE: Void donations mortis causa – The reservation in the deed of
donation by the donor of the right to dispose of the property during her
lifetime does not indicate that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime,
but that the donor merely reserves the power to destroy the donation at any
time, and that it meant that the transfer is not binding on the grantor until her
death made it impossible to channel the property elsewhere.
pass any interest to the grantee, except from and after the death
of the grantor.
 The power reserved by the donor, has no restriction. The power
reserved was a power to destroy the donation at any time, and that it
meant that the transfer is not binding on the grantor until her death.
 Liberality is testamentary in nature, and must appear with the
solemnities required of last wills and testaments in order to be legally
valid.
DISPOSITION: Motion denied.

FACTS: (not much facts in this case. This is a resolution on motion to

reconsider)
1. A deed was executed by the grantor, Carmen Ubalde Vda. De
Parcon, in favor of the defendant Doña Estela Magbanua.
2. The deed contained the following provisions:
a. Reservation by the donor of the right to dispose of the
property during her lifetime.
b. She also expressly and consistently declared her
conveyance to be one of donation mortis causa
c. Forbade the registration of the deed until after her death.
d. Contained a paragraph where it states that, ―if at the date of
her death, the donor had not transferred, sold, or conveyed
one-half of lot 58 of the Pototan Cadastre to other persons or
entities, the donee would be bound to pay to Carmen
Ubalde, the amount of P600. This payment shall be made on
the date the donee took possession of the lot.
3. Defendants-appellants Estela Magbanua Penaflorida, et al insist that
the reservation by the donor of the right to dispose of the property
during her lifetime in the deed indicates that title had passed to the
donee in her lifetime, otherwise, such reservation would be
superfluous.

ISSUES:
Whether the donation is a donation mortis causa or a donation inter vivos;

RULING + RATIO: Donation mortis causa

 Court took into consideration NOT ONLY of the fact that there
was a reservation of the right to dispose of the property BUT
ALSO the fact that the deceased consistently declared her
conveyance to be one of donation mortis causa. Moreover,
registration was made forbidden until after the decedent‟s
death. Given these, it shows that the conveyance was not
intended to produce any definitive effect, nor is there intent to
 SICAD VS. CA (1998)
Petitioners: SPOUSES ERNESTO and EVELYN SICAD, petitioner,
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, CATALINO VALDERRAMA, JUDY CRISTINA
M. VALDERRAMA and JESUS ANTONIO VALDERRAMA, respondents.
Ponente: Narvasa
Doctrine: A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from
the donee that right to dispose during the donor’s lifetime is in truth one
mortis causa.
FACTS:
1. The main issue in this case revolves around a deed of donation
executed by the late Aurora Virto Vda. De Montinola of Iloilo City.
The deed was entitled ―DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS‖.
a. The deed was executed by Montinola on December 11,
1979. The donees were her grandchildren, Catalino
Valderrama, Judy Cristina M. Valderrama and Jesus Antonio
Valderrama (private respondents)
b. The subject matter is Lot 3231 of Panay, Capiz covered by a
TCT in her name.
c. The deed also contained signatures of the donees in
acknowledgment of their acceptance.
d. The deed contained a provision stating that the Donees
shall not sell or encumber the properties donated within
10 years after her death.
2. Montinola’s secretary, Gloria Salvilla presented the deed for
recording in the Property Registry and Registry of Deeds to cancel
the TCT under Donor’s name, and issue a TCT in the name of the
donees on February 7, 1980. However, Montinola retained the
owner‟s duplicate copy of the new title as well as the property
itself.
3. On March 12, 1987, Montinola drew up a deed of revocation of
donation and annotated the adverse claim on the TCT of the
donees.
4. 3 years later, on July 10, 1990, she transferred the property to the
spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad (Petitioners)
5. Then 1 month later, on August 24, 1990, she filed a petition with the
RTC of Roxas City to cancel the TCT under donees’ name, and
reinstatement of her previous TCT.
a. Her theory was that the donation to her 3 grandchildren
was one MORTIS CAUSA and thus had to follow the
formalities of a will, and since it did not, donation was void.
6. The donees opposed the petition. They averred that the donation
in their favor was one inter vivos and complied with the
requirements of Article 729, and thus valid.
7. RTC judged the donation as Inter Vivos, dismissing Montinola’s
petition for lack of merit. Matter of revocation was not passed upon.
8. Montinola elevated the case to CA but she died while appeal was
pending on March 10, 1993.
9. After she died, the spouses Sicad filed a ―Manifestation and Motion‖
dated March 31, 1993. They alleged that they had become owners of
the property due to a deed of definite sale executed by Montinola in
their favor on May 25, 1992, confirmed by an affidavit. They also
wanted to be substituted as appellants and prosecute the case in
their own behalf.
10. Montinola’s legal heirs (Ofelia M. de Leon, Estela M. Jaen and
Teresita M. Valderama) declared that they wanted to withdraw from
the case, but was opposed by Montinola’s counsel.
11. CA issued a resolution substituting the legal heirs and the spouses
Sicad to replace the late Montinola and denied their withdrawal.
12. CA affirmed RTC decision.
.
ISSUE:
2. WoN the donation was Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa
PROVISIONS:
Art. 728 and 729 of the CC:
RULING + RATIO:
2. It was a Donation MORTIS CAUSA.
a. The real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by its language and
the intention of the parties.
b. When the right to dispose and the right to enjoy the product,
and possession remain with the Donor, it is Mortis Causa.
These rights remained with the donor because of her express
provision in the deed of donation prohibiting disposition until 10
years after her death.
c. The power to dispose is the most essential attribute of ownership,
and in this case, it is reserved to the Donor.
d. A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds
from the donee that right to dispose during the donor‟s
lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa
―the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the
donor is still alive.‖
e. Nothing of consequence was truly transferred to the donees. They
did not get the right to dispose, they did not get possession, did not
acquire the right to the fruits, or any right of dominion over the
property. They were simply ―paper owners‖
Petitioner also argued that the donation is Inter Vivos because it was
founded on love and affection. SC said this was wrong because such is not a
characteristic of a Donation Inter Vivos, and because a Donation mortis
Causa could also be done for the same reasons.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

CV No. 33202 dated June 30, 1995 as well as the Resolution denying reconsideration
thereof and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Special Case No. 3311 are
SET ASIDE. The Deed of Donation Inter Vivos (Exh. ―A‖) executed by Aurora Virto
Vda. De Montinola on December 11, 1979 in favor of Catalino M. Valderrama, Judy
Cristina M. Valderrama and Jesus Antonio M. Valderrama is declared null and void.
The Register of Deed of Roxas City is directed to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-16622, revive and reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16105.
 David v. Sison
Petitioner: GONZALO D. DAVID
Respondent: CARLOS SISON
Ponencia: Perfecto, J.
DOCTRINE: When the most essential elements of ownership —
the right to dispose of the donated properties and the right to
enjoy the products, profits, possession — remain with the donor
during his/her lifetime, and would accrue to the donees only after
the donor‟s death then the donation is a donation mortis causa.
FACTS:
1. Margarita David executed a will in favor of her grandnieces
Narcisa de la Fuente de Teodoro and Priscila de la Fuente de
Sison (respondent’s wife).
2. Margarita adopted Narcisa and Priscila making them her
adopted children.
3. Margarita executed a deed of donation in favor of her newly
adopted children, donating to them the same properties that
were to be given to them in the will.
4. All the necessary taxes and fees were paid upon the death of
Margarita.
5. When Margarita David signed the deed of donation she was
already irretrievably ill. In fact, she died less than 6 months
after she signed the deed of donation.
6. The deed of donation had the ff terms:
a. Margarita has reserved to herself the usufruct of all the
donated properties during her lifetime
b. That the donated properties could not be alienated by
the donees without the knowledge and consent of the
donor, Margarita.
7. Petitioner David filed this petition claiming 5% of the estate as
attorney’s fees amounting to P81,375.36. Whereas
respondent Sison is claiming that only Php 3,000 is the
reasonable amount for atty’s fees.
a. David is claiming that he is entitled to 5% of the estate
and this includes the properties given to Narcisa and
Priscila because the donation was a donation mortis
causa1
b. While Sison claims that the properties are not included
because they were given in a donation inter vivos
ISSUE: WoN donation is inter vivos or mortis causa
RULING + RATIO: The donation was a donation mortis causa
because the terms of the deed of donation show that it could not
have taken effect before the death of Margarita David.
 According to the terms of the deed, the most essential
elements of ownership — the right to dispose and the
right to enjoy the products, profits, possession —
remained with Margarita David during her lifetime, and
would accrue to the donees only after Margarita David's
death.
o All rents, proceeds, fruits, of the donated properties
shall remain for the exclusive benefit and disposal of
the donor, Margartia, during her lifetime
o Without the knowledge consent of the donor, the
donated properties could not be disposed of, thus
making the donees mere paper owners of the
properties which, for all practical purposes, remained
the properties of Margarita.
*Thus, Sison and other heirs are to pay David attorney’s fees from the
estate of Margarita. The SC held P10,000 as sufficient amount for
attorney’s fees.
1
If kasama yung donated properties mas malaki yung estate ni Margarita and thus mas malaki
rin yung makukuha niya as attorney’s fee (5% of total estate). So heirs are claiming na hindi
kasama ang properties since already donated inter vivos (nung buhay pa si Margarita) so mas
maliit ang ibabayad na atty fee.
 Maglasang v Cabatingan (1969)
Petition: petition for review on certiorari
Petitioners: MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN
and MERLY S. CABATINGAN,
Respondents: THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely,
LUZ M. BOQUIA, PERLA M. ABELLA, ESTRELLA M. CAÑETE,
LOURDES M. YUSON, and JULIA L. MAYOL, HEIRS OF
GENOVIVA C. NATIVIDAD namely, OSCAR C. NATIVIDAD, OLGA
NATIVIDAD, ODETTE NATIVIDAD, OPHELIA NATIVIDAD,
RICHARD NATIVIDAD, RAYMUND NATIVIDAD, RICHIE
NATIVIDAD, SONIA NATIVIDAD and ENCARNACION
CABATINGAN VDA. DE TRINIDAD, ALFREDO CABATINGAN and
JESUSA C. NAVADA,
Ponencia: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
DOCTRINE: In donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is
not transferred to the done while the donor is still alive
FACTS:
On February 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her
brother Nicolas Cabatingan a ―Deed of Conditional Donation Inter
Vivos for House and Lot‖
Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by
Conchita Cabatingan, on January 1995, bestowing upon:
(a) Petitioner Estrela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land
(b) Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion of land
(c) Merly S. Cabatingan, a portion of land.
All above donations contained the similar provisions to wit:
“That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR
for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR does hereby, by these presents,
transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-
described property, together with the buildings and all improvements
existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE
should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
automatically rescinded and of no further force and
effect; x x x”[3] (Emphasis Ours)
On May 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.
Upon learning the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents
(Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan) filed an action for Annulement And/Or
Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations and Accounting, seeking
the annulment of the said four (4) deeds and donations executed.
Heirs allege, inter alia, that petitioners fraudulently caused the
donations and that the documents are void for failing to comply with
the formalities of wills and testaments, considering that the donations
were mortis causa.
ISSUE: WoN the donations were mortis causa
PROVISIONS:
RULING + RATIO: YES
In donation mortis causa, ―the right of disposition is not transferred to
the done while the donor is still alive‖. In determining whether a
donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be
taken into account:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the
death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing,
that the transferor should retain the same ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided
for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive
the transferee
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is
confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear
provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to
Cabatingan’s death. The phrase ―to become effective upon the death
of the DONOR‖ admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan
did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners
during her lifetime.

For a donation mortis causa to be valid, it must conform with the

following requisites‖

ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be

subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator’s name written by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each
and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper
part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the
will is written , and the fact that the testator signed the will and every
page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under
his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses,
and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it

shall be interpreted to them. (n)

ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by

the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required
to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of
Court. (n)

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Digest Author: Billy Alcid
Heirs of Bonsato v. CA (1954)
Petitioner: HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO
Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA, ET AL.,
Ponencia: REYES, J.B.L., J.
DOCTRINE: Characteristics of documents in a Deed of Donation Mortis
Causa:
- Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive
- That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed
- That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
FACTS:
4. Respondents Utea and heirs of Domingo Bonsato filed a case before
the CFI of Pangasinan for the annulment of the Deeds of Donations
executed by Domingo in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and
nephew Felipe Bonsato (petitioners herein) plus damages.
5. Respondents alleged that:
a. Domingo had been induced and deceived into signing two
notarial deeds of donations in favor of his brother and of his
nephew transferring to them several parcels of land situated
in Pangasinan.
b. Donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the
requisite formalities.
6. Petitioners answered averring that:
a. Donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in
consideration of past services rendered by them to the late
Domingo
b. Deed was executed freely without the use of force and
violence, misrepresentation or intimidation
7. CFI ruled in favor of petitioners finding that the Deeds were of
donation inter vivos (meaning the requisite formalities need not be
complied with). CA reversed the decision of the CFI ruling that the
donation was in fact a donation mortis causa hence ruling that the
donations were void for failing to comply with the requisite
formalities.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the donation was a donation inter vivos or donation mortis
causa
2. WON the donation was null and void.
PROVISION: Article 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be
valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate
public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the
lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be
notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments. (633)
RULING + RATIO:
1. Donation Inter Vivos (During lifetime)
 Characteristics of documents in a Deed of Donation Mortis
Causa
o Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the
death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same
thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full
or naked) and control of the property while alive
o That before his death, the transfer should be revocable
by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may
be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power
in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed
o That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.
 None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of
donation. The donor only reserved for himself, during his
lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or produce which
would be unnecessary if the ownership remained with the
donor.
 There was the absence of stipulation that the donor could
revoke the donations. In fact the donation was declared to
irrevocable which was incompatible with donations mortis causa.
Revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a
testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of
revocation
 Deed contained the phrase: "that after the death of the donor the
aforesaid donation shall become effective." Such should be
construed such that after the donor's death, the donation will
take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the
donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances
(reservation of donor on his share of the fruits)
2. No
 Since the deed was a donation inter vivos, the CA erred in ruling
that the Deeds were void due to lack of requisite formalities.
Being donations inter vivos, the solemnities required for them
 were those prescribed by Article 633 of the Old Civil Code (Art.
749 in New Civil Code).

DISPOSITION: Donation was not null and void hence it cannot be annulled.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of
First Instance is revived and given effect. Costs against respondents.
Digest Author: Bugsy Mangaser
REYES v. MOSQUEDA (1990)
Petitioner: Ruperto Reyes and Reynaldo San Juan; Pedro Dalusong (GR no L-
45394); Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil
Respondent: Hon. Lorenzo Mosqueda and Ursula Pascual; Hon. Intermediate
Appellate Court, Benjamin Reyes and Oscar Reyes
Ponencia: Gutierrez, Jr., J.
DOCTRINE:
1.) Title given to a deed of donation is not the determinative factor,
which makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa."
2.) It is the body of the document of donation and the statements
contained therein that should be considered in ascertaining the
intention of the donor.
3.) Whether a donation if inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the
nature of the disposition made.
FACTS:
8. 1969: DR. EMILIO PASCUAL executed a donation inter vivos over
Lot 24 in favor of OFELIA PARUNGAO, a minor with her mother,
Rosario Duncil, accepting the gift and donation in her behalf.
9. 1972: DR. PASCUAL died intestate and was survived by his sister,
URSULA PASUCAL and the children of his late sisters, Maria, Ines
and Josefa.
10. February 1976: URSULA filed a motion to exclude some properties
from the inventory of DR. PASCUAL's estate and to have the titles
delivered to her. According to her, in 1966, DR. PASCUAL executed
a DONATION MORTIS CAUSA in her favor. This included the
disputed property, Lot 24.
a. "That the said donor, Dr. Emilio D. Pasucla, for and in consideration
of the love and affection which he has and bears unto said donee,
as also for the personal services rendered... does hereby by these
presents voluntarily give, grant, and donate mortis causa, unto the
said donee... all my rights, title and interest, in and to the following
parcels of land with all the improvements thereon..."
11. September 1976: URSULA executed a deed of absolute sale over
Lot 24 in favor of BENJAMIN, OSCAR, JOSE and EMMANUEL (all
surnamed REYES)
12. December 1976: PARUNGAO reached the age of majority and tried
to have the donation registered. She found out that the certificate of
title was missing. This prompted her to file a petition for
reconstitution. It was granted and she was able to register the deed
of donation. A TCT was issued in her name.
13. 1978: BENJAMIN filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the
TCT in favor of PARUNGAO.
14. TC and CA declared the PARUNGAO's TCT null and void.
ISSUES:
 WoN the probate court has jurisdiction to exclude the properties
donated to URSULA
 WoN the DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is actually a Donation
Inter Vivos
PROVISION:
RULING + RATIO:
YES.
 The provisional character of the exclusion of the contested properties
in the inventory is within the jurisdiction of the probate court.
 Probate court may pass upon judgment whether or not a property
should be included in the inventory but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.
YES.
 The subject deed of donation was titled "Donation Mortis Cause."
However, it is a settled rule that the title given to a deed of donation
is not the determinative factor, which makes the donation "inter
vivos" or "mortis causa." It is the body of the document of
donation and the statements contained therein that should be
considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor.
 If a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by
the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. Whether a donation is
inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the
disposition made. If donor intends to transfer the ownership upon
execution of the donation, then it is inter vivos. It is mortis causa if it
is made to take effect after death.
 The so-call DONATION MORTIS CAUSE is really a DONATION
INTER VIVOS. The transfer of ownership was immediate and
independent of the death of the donor. The provisions as regards
the reservation of properties of the donor's subsistence in relation to
the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of
the donor to give naked ownership of the properties to the donee
immediately after the execution of the deed of donation.
DISPOSITION: Appeal made by petitioners REYES, DALUSONG,
PARUNGAO and DUNCIL, DENIED.
 Digest Author: George Filasol  What was the need for the reservation if the donor
GESTOPA v. COURT OF APPEALS (2000) and the spouse remained owners of the properties?
Petitioner: Sps. Argipino Gestopa and Isbael Silario Gestopa o The donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance
Respondent: Court of Appeals and Mercedes Danlag y Pilapil in accordance with his standing in society
Ponencia: Quisimbing, J. o Donee accepted the donation

DOCTRINE: Acceptance clause

Acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Donations
mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by
the donees during the donor’s lifetime.
FACTS:
15. Sps. Diego and Catalina Danlag were owners of 6 parcels of land.
a. They executed 3 deeds of donation mortis causa in favor of
Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil over 4 out of the 6 parcels of land.
16. Subsequently, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife, executed a
deed of donation inter vivos covering the all the 6 parcels of land,
again in favor of Mercedes.
a. This contained 2 conditions:
Limitation on the right to sell i. That the Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the
implied ownership has passed
to donee. The donor's right to
fruits of the land during their lifetime, and
give consent was merly ii. That the donee cannot sell or dispose of the land
intended to protect his
usufructuary rights
during the lifetime of the said spouses, without their
prior consent ad approval.
17. Notwithstanding the said donation, the spouses Danlag sold parcels
3 and 4 to spouses Gestopa.
18. Thereafter, the Danlags executed a deed of revocation recovering
the 6 parcels of land subject of the deed of donation inter vivos.
19. Mercedes filed a petition for quieting of title against the Gestopas
and Danlags.
ISSUES:
 Whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa
PROVISION:
RULING + RATIO:
DONATION INTER VIVOS.
Determining the character of donation
 In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed’s provisions
must be read together.
o The granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties
out of love and affection – a mark of a donation inter vivos
o The reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor
intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties
 Acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos.
o Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not
required to be accepted by the donees during the donor’s
lifetime.
Condition on need of consent of donor to dispose property
 The donor’s right to give consent was merely intended to protect his
usufructuary interests.
 A limitation on the right to sell during the donor’s lifetime implied that
ownership has passed to the donees and donations was effective
during the donor’s lifetime.
Prior donation mortis causa
 The Danlag spouses were aware of the difference between the two
donations.
o If they did not intend to donate inter vivos, they would not
again donate the 4 lots already donated mortis causa.
Revocation
 A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on
account of officiousness, failure by the done to comply with the
charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude.
o The donor-spouses did not invoke any of these reasons in
the deed of revocation.
 The donors stated that Mercedes prohibited them from gathering
coconut trees but nothing on the record showed such fact.
DISPOSITION: Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
 DEL ROSARIO V. FERRER (2010)
Petitioner: Jarabini Del Rosario
Respondent: Asuncion Ferrer, substituted by her heirs Vicente, Pilar, Angelito,
Felixberto, all surnamed Ferrer, and Miguela Ferrer Alteza
Ponencia: Abad, J.
DOCTRINE: The express ―irrevocability‖ of the donation is the distinctive
standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos.
upon their death, such reservation, in the context of an irrevocable
donation, simply means that the donors parted with their naked title,
but maintaining beneficial ownership of the property while they lived.
 Also, the acceptance signed by the donees also indicates that
the donation is inter vivos since acceptance is a requirement
only for such kind of donations.
o Donations mortis causa need not be accepted by the done
during the donor’s lifetime.

FACTS:
20. Spouses Gonzales executed a document entitled ―Donation Mortis
Causa,‖ covering a house and lot in Pandacan, Manila, in favor of
their 2 children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter,
Petitioner Jarabini,
21. The deed provided that the donation shall be ―irrevocable and shall
be respected by the surviving spouse.‖
a. The named donees signified their acceptance on the face of
the document.
22. A few months after the donor wife died, the donor husband executed
a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in the subject
property to their daughter Asuncion.
23. Jarabini filed a petition for the probate of the deed of donation mortis
causa.
24. This was opposed by Asuncion invoking his father’s assignment of
his rights in the property to her.
ISSUES:
WON the donation was a donation mortis causa
 Since the donation is inter vivos, the donee became the absolute
owner of the property donated, and thus, the father‟s subsequent
assignment of rights in the property to Asuncion is void, for by
then, he had no more rights to assign.
Note: Characteristics of donation mortis causa
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of
the transferor; or that the transferor should retain the ownership (full
or naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
DISPOSITION: Petition granted

PROVISION:

RULING + RATIO:
NO

 Although the document was entitled ―donation mortis causa,‖ it was,

by its terms, a donation inter vivos.
 The express “irrevocability” of the donation is the distinctive
standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos.
o Since in this case, the donors stated that the donation shall
be ―irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving
spouse”, then the donation was in reality a donation inter
vivos.

 When the donors reserved the ―right, ownership, possession, and

administration of the property‖ and made the donation operative
 VILLANUEVA v. BRANOCO
Petitioner: GONZALO VILLANUEVA
Respondent: SPOUSES FROILAN AND LEONILA BRANOCO
Ponencia: Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE:
Rodrigo‟s acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift
in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance
by the recipient.
The designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the
deed to the effect that the donation is „to take effect at the death of the
donor‟ are not controlling criteria but are to be construed together with
the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the
transferor." Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are resolved
to favor inter vivos transfers "to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership
of the property subject of the deed."
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Villanueva, represented by his heirs, sued respondents
Spouses Branoco in RTC Biliran to recover a 3,492 square-meter
parcel of land and collect damages. Villanueva claimed ownership
over the Property through purchase in July 1971 from Vere, who, in
turn, bought the Property from Rodrigo (donor) in August 1970.
Villanueva declared the property in his name for tax purposes soon
after acquiring it.
2. In their Answer, Spouses Branoco similarly claimed ownership over
the Property through purchase in July 1983 from Rodriguez (donee
and Rodrigo’s niece) to whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May
1965.
3. The trial court ruled for petitioner, declared him owner of the
Property, and ordered respondents to surrender possession to
petitioner, and to pay damages, the value of the Property’s produce
since 1982 until petitioner’s repossession and the costs. The trial
court rejected respondents’ claim of ownership after treating the
Deed as a donation mortis causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled
by selling the Property to Vere in 1970. Thus, by the time Rodriguez
sold the Property to respondents in 1983, she had no title to transfer.
4. CA reversed TC’s ruling.
5. Petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the trial court’s ruling.
Alternatively, petitioner claims ownership over the Property through
acquisitive prescription, having allegedly occupied it for more than 10
years
ISSUE:
1. WoN the contract between Rodrigo and Rodriguez was a donation or
a devise (If donation, respondents hold superior title, having bought the
Property from Rodriguez. If devise, petitioner prevails, having obtained title
from Rodrigo under a deed of sale the execution of which impliedly revoked
the earlier devise to Rodriguez.)
RULING + RATIO:
1. The naked title passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez under a
perfected donation
 Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me,
the Property will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be
inherited by the heirs of Rodriguez," signaling the
irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate,
waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was
perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s
acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected in the Deed,
took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo‟s
acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift
in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need
acceptance by the recipient.
 What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the
beneficial title to the Property. When the donor used the
words, upon which the appellants base their contention that
the gift in question is a donation mortis causa, that the gift
"does not pass title during my lifetime; but when I die,
she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned
parcels", the donor meant nothing else than that she
reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of said
two parcels of land until her death, at which time the
donee would be able to dispose of them freely. Indeed, if
Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it
was unnecessary for her to reserve partial usufructuary
right over it.
 The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death,
such as the donor’s love and affection to the donee and the
services the latter rendered, while also true of devises,
nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of inter
vivos transfers."
 It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick
stipulations from the Deed tending to serve his cause (e.g.
"the ownership shall be vested on Rodriguez upon my
demise" and "devise"). Dispositions bearing contradictory
 stipulations are interpreted wholistically, to give effect to the
donor’s intent. (See doctrine)
 PETITONERS ACQUIRED NO TITLE OVER THE
PROPERTY.
Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having
successively acquired the Property through sale, neither
was a good faith possessor. Rodriguez already occupied
and possessed the Property "in the concept of an owner"
("como tag-iya"31) since 21 May 1962, nearly three years
before Rodrigo’s donation in 3 May 1965 and seven years
before Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo. In short,
when Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo in 1970,
Rodriguez was in possession of the Property, a fact that
prevented Vere from being a buyer in good faith. Lacking
good faith possession, petitioner’s only other recourse to
maintain his claim of ownership by prescription is to show
open, continuous and adverse possession of the Property for
30 years. Undeniably, petitioner is unable to meet this
requirement.
 ON THE CONTENTION THAT Rodriguez only registered the
property in 1982: the contemporaneous acts of Rodrigo and
Rodriguez, the latter, already in possession of the Property
since 1962 as Rodrigo admitted, obtained naked title over it
upon the Deed’s execution in 1965. Neither registration nor
tax payment is required to perfect donations.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
 Quijada v. Court of Appeals
Petition: Quieting of title, recover of possession and ownership
Petitioner: Alfonso Quijada, et al.
Respondent: Court of Appeals, Regalado Mondejar, et al.
Ponente: Martinez, J.
DOCTRINE:
So long as the resolutory condition subsists and is capable of
fulfillment, the donation remains effective and the donee continues to
be the owner subject only to the rights of the donor or his successors-
in-interest under the deed of donation.
FACTS:
1. Trinidad and her siblings inherited a two-hectare parcel of land
in San Agustin, Talacogon, Agusan del Sur. In 1956, they
executed a conditional deed of donation in favor of the
Municipality of Talacogon. The condition was the parcel of
land shall be used solely as part of the high school campus to
be constructed.
2. However, Trinidad remained in possession of the land despite
the donation.
3. In 1962, she sold one hectare of such land to Regalado
Mondejar through an oral sale.
4. The proposed provincial high school failed to materialize and
the Sanggunian reverted the donated lands back to the
donors.
5. Mondejar sold portion of lands to Goloran, Asis, Ras, et al.
6. In 1988, the children of Trinidad then filed an action against all
of the vendees including Mondejar alleging that their mother
never sold the land to Mondejar. They claim that the land
belonged to the Municipality of Talacogon at the time of the
purported sale.
7. Mondejar, et al. claim that it was validly sold to Mondejar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Trinidad was able to validly sell the portion of land to
Mondejar, et al.
PROVISION:
RATIO + RULING:
No. She no longer had the right to dispose due to the deed of
donation she and her siblings executed in favor of the municipality.
The donation made by Trinidad and her siblings was subject to the
condition that the donated property shall be "used solely and
exclusively as a part of the campus of the proposed Provincial High
School in Talacogon and should the proposed Provincial High School
be discontinued or if the same shall be opened but for some reason or
another, the same may in the future be closed" the donated property
shall automatically revert to the donor.
When the Municipality's acceptance of the donation was made known
to the donor, the Municipality became the new owner of the land
notwithstanding the condition imposed by the donee. The donation is
perfected once the acceptance by the donee is made known to the
donor. Ownership is immediately transferred to the Municipality and
that ownership will only revert to the donor if the resolutory condition
is not fulfilled.
In this case, that resolutory condition is the construction of the school.
When a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter
would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed is a
resolutory one. Thus, at the time of the sales made by Trinidad, she
could not have sold the lots since she had earlier transferred
ownership thereof by virtue of the deed of donation.
So long as the resolutory condition subsists and is capable of
fulfillment, the donation remains effective and the donee continues to
be the owner subject only to the rights of the donor or his successors-
in-interest under the deed of donation.

DISPOSITION:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the

Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Digest Author: Alyssa Rodriguez
Laguzo v CA (1998)
Petitioner: Tito Lagazo
Respondent: CA and Alfredo Cabanlit
Ponencia: Panganiban, J.
DOCTRINE: The donation following the theory of cognition is perfected
only upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance.
FACTS:
1. The Monserrat Estate is a public land owened by the City of Manila
and distributed for sale to bona fide tenants under its land-for the-
landless program.
2. Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother to Lagazo,
was awarded a portion of the estate wherein she built a house.
3. The parties hinge their title claims on the following assertions:
According to Lagazo, before leaving for Canada, Catalina executed
an SPA in favor of Espanol (her son-in-law) for the purpose of
executing necessary documents for the final adjudication of her claim
as an awardee of the lot.  Espanol failed in his duties and so Catalina
revoked the SPA and awarded another one in the same tenor to him
(Lagazo).  Subsequently Catalina executed in a Canada a Deed on
Donation over the lot in favor of himself (Lagazo).
According to Cabanlit, Catalina executed a Deed of Absolute Sale and a
Deed of Assignment over the subject lot in favor of Espanol. 
Subsequently, Espanol executed a Deed of Assignment in his (Cabanlit’s)
favor.
4. TC ruled in favor of Lagazo  CA reversed citing the fact of
Lagazo’s non-acceptance of the donation Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
W/N Lagazo’s acceptance/non-acceptance is material
PROVISION:
Art. 734. The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee. (623)
Art. 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and of
the donee. (n)
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be
made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the
value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate
public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the
lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be
notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments. (633)
RULING + RATIO: Yes for this case involves a purported donation.
Lagazo claims that the donation made by Catalina in favor of him was
onerous since in reality he paid for the installments in arrears and for the
remaining balance of the lot in question. As such, being an onerous donation,
his acceptance may be express or implied.
The SC rules that the donation was simple, not onerous. The payment of the
purchase price was a burden not imposed by the donor to the donee. It is
clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner
as the donee. The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation.
The payments made by Lagazo are voluntary.
This being a simple donation the donation could only be perfected upon the
donee’s acceptance and upon the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee. The donation following the theory of cognition is
perfected only upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance.
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable.
Lagazo, therefore, cannot be considered the lawful owner of the subject
property. This does not necessarily mean, however, that Cabanlit is
automatically the rightful owner. In resolving respondent Cabanlit’s claim of
ownership, the examination of the genuineness of the documents upon which
Cabanlit asserts his right is necessary, especially in light of Laguzo’s
allegations of forgery. However, the respective assignors (Catalina or
Espanol) in both documents are not parties to the instant case.
DISPOSITION: Petition is denied.
 Felix Danguilan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Apolonia Melad
(assisted by her husband, Jose Tagacay)
G.R. No. L-69970, November 28, 1988
Petition: for certiorari on appeal of (lower court not indicated)
Petitioner: Felix Danguilan (defendant in trial case)
Respondents: IAC, Apolonia Melad (plaintiff in trial case)
Ponencia: Cruz
Doctrine:
 There can be no doubt that the donation in question was made for a
valuable consideration… therefore, in order to determine whether or
not said donation is valid and effective it should be sufficient to
demonstrate that, as a contract, it embraces the conditions the law
requires and is valid and effective, although not recorded in a public
instrument (Manalo v De Mesa)
 tl;dr: ONEROUS DONATIONS (“for valuable consideration”) DO
NOT NEED TO BE IN A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT. PRIVATE WILL
SUFFICE/IT JUST HAS TO BE A VALID CONTRACT.
Facts
 Melad filed a case for recovery of possession of a farm lot and
residential lot against Danguilan (possessor).
o Melad’s claim: Domingo Melad (she claims to be his
illegitimate daughter) sold them to her for PhP80 (Deed of
Sale dated Dec. 4 ’43). Danguilan asked her if he could stay
and cultivate the land, and she agreed, on the condition that
he deliver part of the harvest to her, moving out in ’46.
Deliveries stopped, so she filed the case. Story corroborated
by her mom.
o Felix’s claim: he is the husband of Domingo Melad’s
niece/ward. He stayed with his dad and mom-in-law on the
subject properties. Domingo via private instrument the farm
(in ’41) and the residential lot (in ’43), with the condition that
Felix take care of dad-in-law Domingo and bury him on his
death (in ’45). Story corroborated by 3 witnesses.
 Trial court: for Felix based on possession; Melad’s evidences
―unpersuasive and unconvincing‖, contrary to ownership
 Appellate: IAC found the deeds of donation of real estate void for not
being public instruments
ISSUE(S)
 W/N the Deeds of Donation were invalid for being through private
instruments
Provision(s):
 CC Art. 749 (1): In order that the donation of an immovable may be
valid, it must be in a public instrument…
Ruling + Ratio: Irrelevant if in public instrument or not. IT WAS AN
ONEROUS DONATION; Art. 749 DOES NOT APPLY.
 Consideration of donation: take care of Domingo, and upon his
death, bury him.
o Onerous donation: where consideration = value of donation.
o SC believed that upon donation, and due to Domingo’s old
age, Felix had been tilling the land on his own + taking care
of Domingo—that’s a fair (onerous) exchange as any.
o Melad counters: there’s no equivalence between value of
land and Felix’s services. NO EVIDENCE OFFERED though.
o Therefore, per Manalo v. De Mesa, because the donation
is onerous, Art. 749’s public instrument requirement
DOES NOT APPLY. It can be in a private instrument (see
Doctrine). It just needs to be a valid contract.
 (in case he asks!) Melad’s ―Deed of Sale‖ was appreciated by the
IAC as ―preponderance of evidence‖, but the SC found that VERY
shallow, and criticized the IAC for giving her evidences credence.
o First: it’s weird that, at the date of the Deed of Sale, Melad
was THREE YEARS OLD, and the property paid for by her
mom. Why not sell the land to her mom then?
o Plus, she had been going by Apolonia YEDAN (her mom’s
maiden name), not Melad.
o And then the averment that the sale was simulated and
prepared after Domingo’s death.
o And even another averment that even after the sale, Melad
held Domingo to be the true owner, which was why she
never took possession of the lot until much later.
 In any case, even if both Melad’s and Felix’s claims were weak
(weird circumstances surrounding Deed of Sale, donation of real
 property via private instrument), one more doctrine tips this in Felix’s
favor: Santos & Espinosa v. Estejada. “If the claim of both the
plaintiff and the defendant are weak, judgment must be for the
defendant, for the latter being in possession is presumed to be
the owner, and cannot be obliged to show or prove a better
right.”
Disposition

 IAC decision SET ASIDE

 Trial court decision REINSTATED
 Costs against Melad
Digest Author: Dompor
Republic vs Guzman (2000)
Petition: Review on certiorari of decision of the CA
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: David Guzman, Lolita G. Abela, Register of Deeds of Bulacan
(Meycauayan Branch)
Ponencia: Bellosillo
DOCTRINE:
If acceptance is made through a public instrument separate from the deed of
donation, the notice of acceptance must be noted in both public instruments
in order for the donation to be valid
FACTS:
11. Simeon Guzman was a naturalized American citizen. His wife Helen is
an American citizen and his son David Rey is a natural-born American
citizen
12. Simeon died, leaving to Helen and David an estate covering parcels of
land in Bulacan
13. Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and adjudicating all the property
belonging to Simeon’s estate
a. This was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds
b. Taxes due were paid through their Attys.-In-Fact Juan Austria
and Lolita Abela
c. Lands were registered in Helen and David‟s names in
undivided equal shares
14. Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed, assigning, transferring, and
conveying to David her undivided ½ interest on the land
a. Helen executed a Deed of Quotation confirming the earlier
deed as well as modifying it to encompass all her property in the
Philippines
15. David executed an SPA, acknowledging that he became the owner of the
lands subject of the Quitclaim Deed and empowering Lolita Abela to sell
the lots
16. Upon instruction of Helen, Lolita paid donor’s taxes to facilitate the
registry of the lands in the name of David
17. A certain Atty. Batongbacal wrote the Office of the Solicitor General,
showing that David’s ownership of the ½ of Simeon’s estate was
defective
18. Thus, the Government filed before the RTC a petition for Escheat praying
that the ½ interest be forfeited in its favor
19. Trial court dismissed the petition holding that the 2 deeds of quitclaim
executed by Helen had no legal force and effect
a. Thus, ownership remained with her
20. This was brought to the CA, but they too dismissed the appeal
ISSUES:
3. W/N the lands subject of the quitclaim deeds should be forfeited to
the Government in light of its having no legal force and effect
PROVISION:
 Article 749
RULING + RATIO:
3. NO
- There are 3 elements of a donation
o Reduction of the patrimony of the donor
o Increase in the patrimony of the done
o Intent to do an act of liberality
- In donations of immovable property, there is a further
requirement
o Donation is to be made in a public document, and the
acceptance should be made in the same document or in
a separate public document
o Where the acceptance is made in a separate document,
donor should be notified in an authentic form, noted in
both instruments
- Helen’s intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David
was not sufficiently established
o Helen merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, titles,
and interest, and not a donation
o She was aware that donation was not possible because
the arrangement in this case is illegal
o She reasoned that if she really wanted to donate, she
would sell to David and give the proceeds back to him
o In Helen’s mind was the preservation of the lands within
the bloodline of Simeon over and above the benefit that
would accrue to David
 - Furthermore, the 2 deeds of quitclaim, though public in nature,
lack the essential element of acceptance in the proper form
o The SPA executed by David merely acknowledged that
David owns the property and that he authorizes Lolita to
sell the same
o There is no intimation that David acquired the land by
virtue of Helen’s possible donation
- If an acceptance is made in a separate public instrument, it must
be noted not only in the document containing the acceptance but
also in the deed of Donation
o The two deeds and the SPA do not contain the
purported acceptance
o There was no other instrument evidencing such
acceptance and notice to the donor in an authentic
manner
o Because this was not done, the donation is void
- The inexistence of a donation does not render the repudiation
made by Helen in favor of David valid
o Because there was already an acceptance of the
inheritance via the Extrajudicial Settlement, the law on
succession provides that the same cannot be repudiated
unless the acceptance was through vitiated consent or
an unknown will
- Lastly, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto convert
the land into res nullius
o It having no effect, the land merely reverts back to
original ownership
o Helen, though an American citizen, is qualified to own
via the rules on hereditary succession

DISPOSITION: Decision of CA affirmed.

 Cagaoan vs. Cagaoan (1983) Art. 1473 of the Civil Code awards the first registrant with
ownership if the registration is made with good faith. If there be
Petition: Petition for Review of the Decision of the Court no registration, ownership is awarded to the one who first takes
Petitioner: EUGENIO CAGAOAN possession in good faith and in the absence of both registration
Respondent: FELIX CAGAOAN and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE and possession, one who presents the oldest title shall be the
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN owner, provided further that there is good faith.
Ponencia: Ostrand. J.:
In the present case, it cannot be said the Felix registered the
land with good faith. Evidence (which was not described in the
DOCTRINE: case) shows that Felix had full notice of Eugenio’s adverse claim
In settling disputes regarding multiple donations of a single real on the land. That being the case, Felix registration cannot be
property to two different persons, the rules on double sales considered in deciding who the owner is. Thus, since there is no
shall apply. registration in good faith, possession in good faith shall be the
FACTS: determining factor. Since Eugenio was the first to take
possession in good faith, he should be awarded with ownership.
1) Petitioner, Eugenio Cagaoan, and Respondent, Felix Cagaoan, are
siblings. DISPOSITION: Petition is granted. The judgment appealed from is
2) In 1915, Gregorio Cagaoan, the father of the parties mentioned therefore reversed.
above, executed a deed of gift in favor of Felix and indicating
thereon, 4 parcels of land.
3) In 1918, Gregorio executed a deed of gift in favor of Eugenio. This
deed gave Eugenio ownership of the fourth lot previously donated to
Felix.
4) Both brothers immediately took possession of their respective lots. It
was shown however, that Felix never took possession of parcel no.
4.
5) Gregorio was never able to register the land under his name due to
discrepancies in the descriptions found on the deed and that on the
certificate of ownership. Felix, on the other hand, was able to register
all lots under his name.
6) Eugenio sought to cancel the registration on the ground that Felix
employed fraudulent means in obtaining the donation of parcel no. 4.
7) The lower court dismissed the case.

ISSUES:
a) W/N Eugenio has a better right to the land even though his borther,
Felix, registered the same first.

RULING + RATIO:
a) Yes.
The court ruled that in finding for petitioner, the fraud
imputed is irrelevant. The reason why Eugenio should be
awarded is because of the application on the rules of double
sale.