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RULE 43
Continuation of cases
14. Argovan vs. San Miguel Corp - Radovan
15. Orosa vs. Roa - Rosario
16. St.Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC - Samson
17. National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesm - Torres
18. Abbot Laboratories Phils vs. Abbot Laboatories Employees Union - Valencia, E
19. CEU vs. CA - Alba
20. CHED vs. Mercado - Arid
21. SSC vs. CA - Bernardo
22. Deloso vs. Marapa - Bigornia
23. B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs.Alzul - Corona
24. Maniebo vs. CA - De Castro
25. Vergel de Dios vs. CA - Gaite
26. Videogram Regulatory Board vs. CA - Grande

RULE 45
1. FAT Kee computer Systems vs. ONline Networks International In - Jovero
2. Tay Chun Suy vs. CA - Lapuz
3. Producers Bank vs. Excelsa Industries - Mano
4. Union Bank of the Philippines vs. People - Marasigan
5. Steelcase Inc. vs. DEsign International Selections Inc - Montes
6. Estores vs. Supangan -Morales
7. Dalton vs. FGR Realty and Development Corp - Radovan
8. PNB vs. Perez -Rosario
9. RGM Industries Inc. vs. United Pacific Capital Corp -Samson
10. Sarona vs. NLRC -Torres
11. Sta.Maria vs. CA - Valencia,E
12. Republic vs. Ortigas -Alba
13. Altres vs. Empleo - Arid
14. Alonso vs. Cebu Country Club Inc. - Bernardo
15. Mendoza vs. CA - Bigornia
 (14) Argovan vs. San Miguel Corp
G.R. No. 188767. July 24, 2013
By: Radovan

Doctrine: The Court of Appeals is clothed with jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the Secretary of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court albeit solely on the ground that the Secretary
of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

Summary: Petitioners Sps.Argovan (Argovan and Florida) purchased beer products from SMC in the amount of P285,504.00.
Petitioners paid through a check signed by Florida and drawn against Argovan’s AsiaTrust Bank Current Account. The check
was dishonored thus SMC filed a criminal case for violation of B.P.22 and estafa against petitioners. Petitioners claimed that on,
the date when they issued the check to SMC, their joint savings account had a balance of P330, 353.17. However the bank
unlawfully garnished and debited their bank accounts when a check in the amount of P378,000.00 which was cleared by the
bank, but after a month such was declared by the bank to not have been cleared due to a material alteration. Petitioners filed a
civil case against the bank and Fatima, the issuer of the check. Petitioners argue that the civil case constitute a bar to the
prosecution of the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa filed by SMC. SMC filed a motion for
reconsideration before the Office of the Prosecutor. Thereafter SMC filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for
review challenging the Resolutions of the Office of the Prosecutor. Thereafter SMC went up to the Court of Appeals by filling a
petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether certiorari is the correct mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals? Yes, The Court of
Appeals is clothed with jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court albeit solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

Facts: Petitioner Spouses Argovan Gaditano (Argovan) and Florida Gaditano (Florida), who were engaged in the business of
buying and selling beer and softdrink products, purchased beer products from San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in the amount of
P285,504.00. on 7 April 2000. Petitioners paid through a check signed by Florida and drawn against Argovan’s AsiaTrust
Bank Current Account. The check was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. This prompted SMC to file
a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa against petitioners.

Petitioners claimed that on, the date when they issued the check to SMC, their joint savings account had a balance of
P330, 353.17. According to Petitioners a certain Fatima borrowed P30,000 from Florida. As payment for the said loan, Fatima
delivered a check payable to Florida in the amount of P378,000. Florida pointed out that the amount of the check was in excess of
the loan but she was assured by Fatima that the check was in order and the proceeds would be used for the payroll of AOWA
Electronics. Florida deposited said check to her joint AsiaTrust Savings Account which she maintained with her husband,
Argovan. The check was cleared on March 6, 2000 and petitioners’ joint savings account was subsequently credited with the
sum of P378,000.00. Florida initially paid P83,000.00 to Fatima. She then withdrew P295,000.00 from her joint savings account
and turned over the amount to Fatima. Fatima in turn paid her loan to Florida.
However on April 13,2000, Guevarra, the Bank Manager of AsiaTrust Bank, advised Florida that the check for
P378,000.00, the same check handed to her by Fatima, was not cleared due to a material alteration in the name of the payee.
Guevarra explained further that the check was allegedly drawn payable to LG Collins Electronics, and not to her, contrary
to Fatima’s representation. AsiaTrust Bank then garnished the P378,000.00 from the joint savings account of petitioners
without any court order. Consequently, the check issued by petitioners to SMC was dishonored having been drawn against
insufficient funds. Thereafter, Petitioners filed a civil action case, for specific performance and damages against AsiaTrust
Bank, Guevarra, SMC and Fatima. Petitioners assert that the issues they have raised in the civil action constitute a bar to
the prosecution of the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa. The Office of the Prosecutor
recommended that the criminal proceedings be suspended pending resolution of Civil Case No. Q-00-42386.

SMC filed a motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Prosecutor but it was denied for lack of merit. Thereafter SMC
filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review challenging the Resolutions of the Office of the Prosecutor. The
DOJ then dismissed the petition. SMC filed a motion for reconsideration, which the DOJ Secretary denied. Undaunted, SMC
went up to the Court of Appeals by filling a petition for certiorari.
CA: Granted SMC’s petition. Drew a distinction between the civil case, which is an action for specific performance, and
damages involving petitioners’ joint savings account, and the criminal case which is an action for estafa/violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 involving Argovan’s current account.

Hence this petition for review wherein Petitioners contend that SMC’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 was an improper
remedy because the DOJ’s act of sustaining the investigating prosecutor’s resolution to suspend the criminal proceedings
due to a valid prejudicial question was an error in judgment and not of jurisdiction. Petitioners further assert that
nevertheless, an error of judgment is not correctible by certiorari when SMC had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
which was to file an appeal to the Office of the President.

Issues:

1. Whether certiorari is the correct mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals? - YES

2. Whether a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings? – No.

Held:

1. YES. The Court of Appeals is clothed with jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the Secretary of the DOJ
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court albeit solely on the ground that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

In Alcaraz v. Gonzalez, we stressed that the Investigating Prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who exercises
the power of control and supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the
ruling of such prosecutor. Thus, while the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may do so only
in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave
abuse of his discretion amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction.
Also, in Tan v. Matsuura, we held that while the findings of prosecutors are reviewable by the DOJ, this does not preclude courts
from intervening and exercising our own powers of review with respect to the DOJ’s findings. In the exceptional case in which
grave abuse of discretion is committed, as when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable
cause is ignored, the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case via a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the DOJ abused its discretion when it affirmed the prosecutor’s suspension of
the criminal investigation due to the existence of an alleged prejudicial question.

2. No, the resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal investigation against them. In this case The material facts surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the criminal
investigation being conducted by the prosecutor. The prejudicial question in the civil case involves the dishonor of another check.
SMC is not privy to the nature of the alleged materially altered check leading to its dishonor and the eventual garnishment of
petitioners’ savings account. On the other hand, the issue in the preliminary investigation is whether petitioners issued a bad
check to SMC for the payment of beer products.

(15) JOSE LUIS ANGEL B. OROSA vs. ALBERTO C. ROA

By: Kaye

Doctrine: The exclusion of the DOJ from the list under Section 1 of Rule 43 is deliberate, being in consonance with
the constitutional power of control lodged in the President over executive departments, bureaus and offices.
Notably, the provision includes the Office of the President in the agencies named therein, thereby accentuating the
fact that appeals from rulings of department heads must first be taken to and resolved by that office before any
appellate recourse may be resorted to. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that if an
appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before
resort can be made to the courts.
Facts: Petitioner and respondent are both dentists. Petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit charging respondent with
the crime of libel, which stemmed from an article entitled "Truth vs. Rumors: Questions against Dr. Orosa" written
by respondent and published in the Dental Trading Post. The article delved into the possibility of an examiner in the
licensure examination where his sons were examinees, manipulating the examinations or the results thereof to
enable his children to top the same. In his complaint-affidavit, petitioner alleged that the article in question is
defamatory as it besmirched his honor and reputation as a dentist and as the topnotcher in the dental board
examinations in 1994. Respondent denied the accusation, claiming that the article constitutes a "fair and accurate
report on a matter of both public and social concern."

Pasig City Prosecutor issued a Resolution, dismissing petitioner's complaint on the ground that the
publication is a bona fide communication on matters of public concern, and made without malice.

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. Acting on the appeal, Chief State Prosecutor set aside the findings of the City
Prosecutor and directing the latter to file an Information for libel against respondent.

Respondent appealed to the Secretary of Justice. The Justice Secretary reversed the Chief State Prosecutor’s
Resolution and directed the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information earlier filed with the RTC.

Petitioner seasonably moved for a reconsideration but his motion was denied. Therefrom, petitioner went to the
CA on a petition for review under Rule 43, but was dismissed on the ground that the Prosecution Office and
the DOJ are not among the quasi-judicial agencies included in Section 1 of Rule 43 whose final orders or
resolutions are subject to review by the CA.

Issue: Is a petition for review under Rule 43 a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice
directing the prosecutor to withdraw an information in a criminal case?

Held: NO, recourse from the decision of the Secretary of Justice should be to the President, instead of the CA,
under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Rule 43 governs all appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial bodies to the CA. As may be noted,
the DOJ is not among the agencies expressly enumerated under Section 1 of Rule 43. Its absence from the list of
agencies mentioned thereunder does not, by this fact alone, already imply its exclusion from the coverage of said
Rule. This is because said Section 1 uses the phrase "among these agencies," thereby implying that the
enumeration made is not exclusive of the agencies therein listed.

There is compelling reason to believe, however, that the exclusion of the DOJ from the list is deliberate, being in
consonance with the constitutional power of control lodged in the President over executive departments, bureaus
and offices. This power of control, which even Congress cannot limit, let alone withdraw, means the power of the
Chief Executive to review, alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate, e.g., members of the Cabinet and
heads of line agencies, had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter.

The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is
available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts.
Notably, Section 1, of Rule 43 includes the Office of the President in the agencies named therein, thereby
accentuating the fact that appeals from rulings of department heads must first be taken to and resolved by that
office before any appellate recourse may be resorted to.

(16) ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME v. NLRC

G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998.
By: Apol Samson

Doctrine: All references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of
the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Facts: The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by respondent before
the NLRC. Respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home
on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was
his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for
allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT)
to the BIR. Petitioner on the other hand claims that respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita
Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin’s Funeral Home. Respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas
contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of
gratitude, respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business. The mother of Amelita
passed away, so the latter took over the management of the business. Amelita then made some changes in the
business operation and respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof.
As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.
Labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed
between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. Respondent appealed to the NLRC.
NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for
immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
NLRC in its resolution for lack of merit, hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion.

Issue: Whether or not appeals from the NLRC should be initially filed in the Supreme Court by petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65.

Held: NO! All such petitions should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on
the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

Article 302 of the Labor Code (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from
the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and
abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for. Under the present state of the law,
there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC. The present Section 223, as last amended by
Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days
from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar
days from receipt thereof by the parties.

The remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or
subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, for which said
Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-
day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the
Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional
and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65.

Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, a review of the legislative records on the
antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the
deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to
provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an
inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review.

Whatever benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its
coverage the “decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals. Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme Court are
labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and,
additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in the decisions of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees Compensation Commission to reduce
the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court.

The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court
were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper
vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word “appeal” in relation thereto and in the
instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for
certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between
them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is
within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the
assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert,
the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of
the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

The instant petition for certiorari is hereby remanded, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be forwarded, to
the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth.

(17)
National Federation of Labor v Laguesma
G.R. No. 123426. March 10, 1999.*
Roma

DOCTRINE: The remedy of an aggrieved party (from the adverse decision of the Secretary of Labor) is to timely
file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

FACTS:
A petition for certification election (CE) among the rank and file employees of Cebu Shipyard and Engineering
Work, Inc. was filed by the Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization (ANGLO-KMU). Forced-
intervenor National Federation of Labor (NFL) moved for the dismissal of the petition on grounds that petitioner has
no legal personality to file the present petition for certification election and that it failed to comply with the 25%
consent requirement. It stressed that ANGLO-KMU is not a legitimate labor organization at the time of the filing of
the petition and that it’s submission of the mandatory requirements after the freedom period would not cure the
defect of the petition. The Med-Arbiter ruled in favor of NFL and dismissed the petition. On appeal, respondent
Undersecretary Laguesma, by authority of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, set aside the Med-Arbiter’s
resolution. NFL thus filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON NFL properly resorted to a remedy of Rule 65 certiorari before the SC

HELD:
No. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for the case’s proper disposition.

In San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, the SC ruled: “It is generally understood that as to administrative
agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the
acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute.
Considering the above dictum and as affirmed by decisions of this
Court, St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC succinctly pointed out, the remedy of an aggrieved party is to timely file a
motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Considering that the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals, all such petitions should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the
hierarchy of courts. While appeal did not lie, the corrective power of this Court by a writ of certiorari was available
whenever a jurisdictional issue was raised or one of grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess
thereof.

(Re: appeals to the President)

P.D. No. 1367 eliminated appeals to the President, but gave the President the power to assume jurisdiction over
any cases which he considered national interest cases. The subsequent P.D. No. 1391, further eliminated appeals
from the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor but the President still continued to exercise his power to assume
jurisdiction over any cases which he considered national interest cases.
(Re: time to file Rule 65 petition)
Like decisions of the NLRC which under Art. 223 of the Labor Code become final after ten (10) days, decisions of
the Secretary of Labor come to the SC by way of a petition for certiorari even beyond the ten-day period provided
in the Labor Code and the implementing rules but within the reglementary period set for Rule 65 petitions under
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 (18)
Abbott Laboratories Philippines, Inc. vs. Abbott Laboratories Employees Union
GR 131374 January 26, 2000
Digest by Valencia, Emmanuelle Nicole

Doctrine:
The special civil action for certiorari should be instituted within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed.

Facts:
Abbott Laboratories is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and distribution of pharmaceutical drugs. On 22
February 1996, the Abbott Laboratories Employees Union (ALEU) filed an application for union registration with the Department of
Labor and Employment. ALEU claimed that it is a labor organization consisting of 30 rank and file employees in the manufacturing
unit of Abbott, and that there was no certified bargaining agent in the unit that it sought to represent (manufacturing unit).
On 28 February 1996, ALEU’s application was approved by the Bureau of Labor Relations, and a Certificate of
Registration was issued in its favor, thus making ALEU a legitimate labor organization.
On 2 April 1996, Abbott filed a petition for cancellation of ALEU’s registration. Abbott assailed the certificate since ALEU’s
application was not signed by at least 20% of the total 286 rank and file employees of the entire employer unit, and because it failed
to submit copies of its books of account.
On 21 June 1996, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations cancelled ALEU’s registrations certificate. It had
adopted the 13 June 1996 findings of the Med-Arbiter in its decision, stating that ALEU had failed to show that the rank and file
employees of the manufacturing unit were bound by a common interest to justify the formation of a bargaining unit that was separate
and distinct from those belonging to the sales and office staff units. Therefore, the bargaining unit should have been comprised of
the 286 rank and file employees of the employer unit.
On 19 August 1996, ALEU appealed the cancellation to the office of the Secretary of the DOLE. The case was referred to
the director of the BLR. On 31 March 1997, the BLR reversed the decision of the Regional Director. It cited Art. 234 of the Labor
Code, which does not require proof of the desirability of more than one bargaining unit within an employer unit; that the issue of
appropriateness cannot be raised in a cancellation proceeding; and that the one bargaining unit - one employer policy must not be
interpreted in a manner that would trample the employee’s rights to self organization and freedom of association.
On 31 March 1997, Abbott filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on 9 July 1997. Thereafter, Abbott
appealed to the Secretary of the DOLE.
On 19 September 1997, the Secretary of the DOLE wrote a letter stating that it refused to act on Abbott’s appeal because
it has no jurisdiction to review the decision of the BLR on appeals in cancellation cases emanating from the Regional Offices. It
claimed that the decision of the BLR is final and executory. The Secretary further stated that “since your office has already filed a
motion for reconsideration with the BLR, which has been denied … your recourse should have been a special civil action for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.”

Issue:
Does the Secretary of the DOLE have the power to review the decisions of the BLR rendered in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
over decisions of the Regional Director in cases involving cancellation of certificate of registration of a labor union?

Ruling / Ratio:
NO.
The appellate jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DOLE is limited only to a review of cancellation proceedings decided by
the BLR in the exercise of its exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Secretary has no jurisdiction over decisions of the BLR
rendered in the exercise of its appellate power to review the decision of the Regional Director.
In the instant case, upon the cancellation of respondent union’s registration by the Regional Office, respondent union
incorrectly appealed said decision to the Office of the Secretary. Nevertheless, this situation was immediately rectified when the
Office of the Secretary motu proprio referred the appeal to the BLR. However, upon reversal by the BLR of the decision of the
Regional Office cancelling registration, petitioner should have immediately elevated the BLR decision to the Supreme Court in a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Under Sec. 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court the special civil action for certiorari should be instituted within
a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. Abbott received the decision of the
BLR on 14 April 1997 and the order denying its motion for reconsideration of the said decision on 16 July 1997. The present petition
was only filed on 28 November 1997, after the laps of more than four months. Thus, for failure to avail of the correct remedy within
the period provided by law, the decision of the BLR has become final and executory.

(19)
CEU Faculty Union vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 165486. May 31, 2006
By: Alba, Ma. Angela
Doctrine: Decisions of the voluntary arbitrator under the Labor Code are appealable to the Court of Appeals.

The voluntary arbitrator is a government instrumentality within the contemplation of Section 9 of B.P. 129 which
provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The decisions of the voluntary arbitrator are akin to
those of the Regional Trial Court, and, therefore, should first be appealed to the Court of Appeals before being
elevated to the Supreme Court.

Facts: Petitioner filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board a preventive mediation for the recovery
of IP losses due to the university’s alleged deduction of the cost of CBA-won economic benefits from the 70% share
of the teachers and employees in the IP. Petitioner asserts that the integrated IP granted in the CBAs should not be
deducted from the personnel’s 70% share in the IP. Petitioner contends that the deduction of the IP integration
from the 70% share of tuition fee increase is illegal and contrary to the CBA, as the IP integration in the salary is
considered a CBA-won increase, hence, may not be deducted from the 70%. Petitioner hinges its contentions on
R.A. 6728, otherwise known as the “Government Assistance To Students and Teachers in Private Education Act.”
R.A. 6728 allows private schools to increase their tuition fees on the condition that 70% of the tuition fee increases
shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances an other benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel.

In his decision, Voluntary Arbitrator Mangabat upheld the position of respondent university and dismissed the case.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The appellate court
dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner used a wrong mode of appeal. It held that petitioner should
have filed an appeal under Rule 43. The Court of Appeals also denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the appellate court erred in holding that the proper remedy is an appeal via Rule 43, considering
that this involves a labor case.

Held: No, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that petitioner used a wrong remedy when it filed a special
civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Court of Appeals did not err in holding that petitioner used a wrong remedy when it filed a special civil action on
certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court held in Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees that decisions of
the voluntary arbitrator under the Labor Code are appealable to the Court of Appeals. In that case, the Court
observed that the Labor Code was silent as regards the appeals from the decisions of the voluntary arbitrator,
unlike those of the Labor Arbiter which may be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. The Court
noted, however, that the voluntary arbitrator is a government instrumentality within the contemplation of Section 9
of B.P. 129 which provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The decisions of the voluntary
arbitrator are akin to those of the Regional Trial Court, and, therefore, should first be appealed to the Court of
Appeals before being elevated to this Court. Petitioner’s argument, therefore, that the ruling in said case is
inapplicable in this case is without merit.

Moreover, a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of
law or fact which is a mistake of judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal. In addition, an independent action
for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. There was no question of jurisdiction involved in the decision of the voluntary arbitrator.
What was being questioned was merely his findings of whether the university’s practice of sourcing the integrated
IP in the CBA from the 70% share of the personnel in the IP violates the provisions of the CBA. Such is a proper
subject of an appeal.

(20)
CHED v. Mercado
G.R. No. 157877, March 10, 2006
By: ARID, Hannah Mhae G.
Doctrine: Under Rule 43, Section 4, which governs appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals,
[t]he appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or
from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioners
motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a
quo. The use of the disjunctive preposition or in the rule suggests that a petitioner has the option to file the
petition for review after notice of the assailed judgment or resolution directly, without need of a prior motion for
reconsideration, or after the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, provided such motion is duly filed in
accordance with the rule of procedure of the court or agency below. Thus, for instance, if the rule of procedure of
the court or agency a quo requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the judgment or resolution before
appeal may be taken, then failure to comply with the requisite is a ground to dismiss the appeal on the basis of
prematurity. In the case at bar, under Section 50,[1][25] Rule III of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the CSC, a party may elevate a decision of the Commission before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, without the benefit of a prior motion for reconsideration.

Facts: Through a letter-complaint Dimayuga, Dean of the College of Criminology, Republican College, accused
respondent Mercado of arrogance, abuse of power and authority, ignorance of the appropriate provisions of the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and incompetence before the CHED. Respondent Mercado is the Senior
Education Specialist of the Office of Programs and Standards of the CHED.
The complaint stemmed from the Republican Colleges application for the recognition of its Master in Criminology
Program with the CHED. As part of the standard procedure, respondent Mercado would evaluate Republican
Colleges compliance with the prescribed requirements. Respondent

Mercado allegedly acted with arrogance when she manifested that the fate of Republican Colleges application
rested on her to the extent of maligning the person of Dimayuga during the inspection conducted at the Republican
College.

The Office of Programs and Standards Director issued a Memorandum directing respondent to explain in writing
why no administrative charges should be filed against her. Respondent Mercado complied, denying the allegations
against her. Dimayuga submitted a reply.

CHED sitting en banc: rendered a decision finding respondent guilty of discourtesy in the course of official duties.
Respondent Mercado was reprimanded and warned that a similar violation in the future will warrant a more severe
punishment.

Respondent moved for the reconsideration of the September 27, 1999 CHED decision. Attached to the motion was
a resolution supposedly issued and signed by former CHED Chairman Angel C. Alcala (Alcala Resolution),
dismissing the charges against respondent Mercado on the strength of an affidavit of desistance purportedly
executed by Dimayuga.

The CHED, however, deferred the resolution of respondent Mercados motion for reconsideration when it discovered
that no record of the Alcala Resolution was on file and that there was a marked discrepancy in the signature
appearing in the affidavit of desistance of Dimayuga and the sample signature she submitted.
CHED en banc passed Resolution placing respondent under preventive suspension for a period of sixty (60) days
without pay. A hearing and investigation committee was also created for this purpose.
Respondent Mercado failed to appear before the hearing committee despite the issuance of at least three (3)
subpoenas. At the hearing,only Dimayuga appeared and testified under oath that she never signed any affidavit of
desistance and denied that it was her signature appearing on the affidavit of desistance presented by respondent
Mercado. The hearing committee received the testimonies of the CHED Records Officers, Maximina Sister and
Revelyn Brina, to the effect that the Alcala Resolution does not exist in the records.

The CHED en banc issued a resolution denying respondent Mercados motion for reconsideration and finding her
guilty of the subsequent charges, which include falsification, among others.
Respondent Mercado appealed to the CSC in which CSC denied. Respondent Mercado moved for its
reconsideration. The motion was granted.

The CHED filed a Manifestation with Motion for Clarification dated September 9, 2002 asking, among others,
whether CSC Resolution No. 02-1106 was final and executory and whether the CHED could still file a motion for
reconsideration in view of the one motion for reconsideration rule in CSC proceedings. For her part, respondent
Mercado filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of CSC Resolution.

Pending resolution of its Manifestation with Motion for Clarification and before the expiration of the
period to appeal, the CHED filed a petition for review, assailing CSC Resolution. Without delving into
the merits, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground of prematurity.

Meanwhile, with the CHEDs petition with the Court of Appeals filed and even decided already, the CSC acted on the
motion and manifestation filed by respondent Mercado and the CHED, respectively, through CSC Resolution No.
030054. In the resolution, the CSC granted respondent Mercados motion for execution and answered, belatedly
though, the queries raised in the CHEDs Manifestation with Motion for Clarification.
The CHED moved for the reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals but the appellate court denied the
motion.

Issue: W/N the appeal before the Court of Appeals suffers from prematurity.

Held: NO. The Court grants the petition. The Manifestation with Motion for Clarification filed by the
CHED does not partake of the nature of a motion for reconsideration. A reading thereof reveals that the
manifestation merely inquired into the ramifications of CSC Resolution, that is, whether the resolution
was already final and executory and whether the reinstatement of respondent Mercado was possible
considering that the position had already been filled up. The CHEDs Manifestation with Motion for
Clarification neither assailed CSC Resolution nor sought its reversal. The manifestation merely asked about the
propriety of filing another motion for reconsideration in view of the one motion for reconsideration rule in
proceedings before the CSC.

Thus, acting upon the CHEDs Manifestation with Motion for Clarification, the CSC issued CSC Resolution where it
acknowledged that available to the CHED as a recourse is the filing of a motion for reconsideration of CSC
Resolution. This indicates that the CSC did not treat the Manifestation with Motion for Clarification filed by the
CHED as a motion for reconsideration but rather as a simple request for clarification.
The Manifestation with Motion for Clarification being nothing more than an unadulterated query, the
appeal cannot be barred by litis pendentia. As a ground for dismissal, litis pendentia presupposes the
filing of two separate actions. Definitely, that is not the situation in the case at bar. From another
standpoint, the CHED can hardly be faulted for filing its petition with the Court of Appeals before the
expiration of the period to appeal since the CSC had failed to resolve its query in time. Indeed, the
CHED could have assumed that the CSCs inaction was tantamount to a negative response to its query.

The ground of litis pendentia not being in point, it follows that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
the CHEDs petition on the ground of prematurity.
There is nothing in the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the CSC that bars the filing of a
motion for clarification. However, the filing of the Manifestation with Motion for Clarification did not toll
the reglementary period for appeal of CSC Resolution. The records do not show that the CHED did file
subsequently a motion for reconsideration of the CSC resolution. Instead, the CHED elevated said resolution for
review by the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
filing of the petition for review prevented the resolution from becoming final and executory. As correctly pointed
out by the Solicitor General, had it failed to file the petition for review within the reglementary period, the CHED
would have lost its right to appeal the resolution.

As the CHED did not file a motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 02-1106, it is relevant to ask: is the
filing of a motion for reconsideration a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for review? It is
not. Under Rule 43, Section 4, which governs appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals, [t]he appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its
effectivity, or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in
accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. The use of the disjunctive preposition
or in the rule suggests that a petitioner has the option to file the petition for review after notice of the
assailed judgment or resolution directly, without need of a prior motion for reconsideration, or after
the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, provided such motion is duly filed in accordance
with the rule of procedure of the court or agency below. Thus, for instance, if the rule of procedure of
the court or agency a quo requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the judgment or
resolution before appeal may be taken, then failure to comply with the requisite is a ground to dismiss
the appeal on the basis of prematurity. In the case at bar, under Section 50 Rule III of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the CSC, a party may elevate a decision of the Commission before the Court of Appeals by
way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, without the benefit of a prior motion
for reconsideration.

(21)
Social Security Commission vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 152058. September 27, 2004
By: Bernardo, Gerard

Doctrine: Exceptions to Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: It may be disregarded (1) when there is a
violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative
action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part
of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied and assumed approval of the
latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10)
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, (12) when no administrative review is provided by law, (13) where
the rule of qualified political agency applies, and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been rendered moot.

Facts: Private respondent Jose Rago (hereafter Rago) worked as an electrician for Legend Engineering in Basak,
Pardo, Cebu City. While working on the ceiling of a building, he stepped on a weak ceiling joist. The structure gave
way and he crashed into the corridor twelve feet below.

Rago filed a claim for permanent partial disability with the Cebu City office of the Social Security System (SSS).
Later on, Rago filed several requests for the adjustment of his partial disability to total disability. This time, his
requests were denied by the Cebu City office of the SSS. The denial was based on the medical findings of the Cebu
City office that he was not totally prevented from engaging in any gainful occupation.

Undaunted, on 3 April 2000, Rago filed with the petitioner Social Security Commission (SSC) a petition for total
permanent disability benefits.

In a resolution dated 20 December 2000, the SSC denied Rago’s petition for lack of merit. The SSC ruled that he
was not entitled to permanent partial disability more than what was already granted, more so to permanent total
disability benefits since he was already granted the maximum allowable benefit for his injury.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Rago appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not filing of a motion for reconsideration in SSC is mandatory before appealing to CA.

Held: Yes, however, this case falls in one of the exceptions. ((3) when the administrative action is patently
illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction)

Section 5, Rule VI of the SSC’s 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure.

The party aggrieved by the order, resolution, award or decision of the Commission may file a motion for
reconsideration thereof within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the same. Only one motion for reconsideration shall
be allowed any party.

Section 1 of Rule VII of the SSC rules provides:

[Any order, resolution, award or decision of the Commission, in the absence of an appeal therefrom as herein
provides, shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the date of notification to the parties, and
judicial review thereof shall be permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has
exhausted his remedies before the Commission . . . .
A combined reading of Section 5 of Rule VI, quoted earlier, and Section 1 of Rule VII of the SSC’s 1997 Revised
Rules of Procedure reveals that the petitioners are correct in asserting that a motion for reconsideration is
mandatory in the sense that it is a precondition to the institution of an appeal or a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals. Stated differently, while Rago certainly had the option to file a motion for reconsideration before
the SSC, it was nevertheless mandatory that he do so if he wanted to subsequently avail of judicial remedies.

This rule is explicit in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

However, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an
ironclad rule. It may be disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is
purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is
irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President,
bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, (12) when no administrative
review is provided by law, (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and (14) when the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

Fortunately for Rago, his case falls within some of these exceptions.

Petitioners SSS and SSC have consistently shown their obstinacy in their stand to deny Rago’s request to convert
his permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. The SSC’s reliance on the SSS recommendations,
which did not consider other evidence of the illness’ progression and its disregard of long-standing
jurisprudence, made for the patent nullity of the SSC decision. The error was made more blatant when, in
the SSC’s clarificatory order, it classified the disability based on the amount of contributions Rago had paid.
To give the SSC another chance to rectify its error in accordance with the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies would inevitably result in the same inflexible stance in defense of its error.

Issue outside of procedure: Whether or not Rago’s disability is partial or total.

It is permanent total.

The SSS had granted Rago sickness benefit for 120 days and, thereafter, permanent partial disability for 38
months. Such grant is an apparent recognition by the SSS that his injury is permanent and total as we have
pronounced in several cases. This is in conformity with Section 2 (b), Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation which defines a disability to be total and permanent if, as a result of the injury or sickness, the
employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, and Section 1, b
(1) of Rule XI of the same Amended Rules which provides that a temporary total disability lasting continuously for
more than 120 days, shall be considered permanent.

(22)
Deloso vs. Marapao, G.R. No. 144244, November 11, 2005
By: Donna Bigornia
Doctrine: As can clearly be seen from the foregoing provision, in resolving appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies such as the DARAB, the appellate court has the discretion to give due course to the petition.

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the province of
Agusan del Norte against respondents praying that the latter be enjoined from interfering with her tenurial rights,
and that an order be issued fixing the sharing of the net produce of the landholding between the parties and
directing respondents to account for the November 1994 harvest.
The case was referred to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Butuan City for the purpose of
determining, among others, whether petitioner is indeed a tenant of the subject landholding. The MARO found
Alberto Temple to be the tenant of the landholding. The PARAD, however, reversed the finding of the MARO and
declared that petitioner is a tenant of the landholding. On appeal, the DARAB affirmed the findings of the PARAD
and ruled that the requisites of agricultural tenancy are present. The decision of DARAB was reversed by the Court
of Appeals. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the petition filed before the Court of Appeals was deficient in form and substance as it did
not contain a statement of facts, issues, and the grounds relied upon for the review. The petition also allegedly
failed to point out the findings of the DARAB which are not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court
allegedly violated Sec. 10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as it failed to first give due course to the petition before
proceeding to resolve the same. In so doing, the Court of Appeals allegedly denied her due process. Finally,
petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the DARAB which is allegedly supported
by substantial evidence.

Issue:
a. Whether or not the Court of Appeals violated Section 10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court for failing to
give due course to the petition before proceeding to resolve the same.
b. Whether or not petitioner is a tenant.

Ruling: No.

a. An examination of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals reveals that while it does not contain a separate
section on statement of facts, the facts of the case are, in fact, integrated in the petition particularly in the
discussion/argument portion. Moreover, the decision of the DARAB which contains the facts of the case was
attached to the petition and was even quoted by the appellate court. The petition also sufficiently discusses the
errors committed by the DARAB in its assailed decision.

There was, therefore, substantial compliance with Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It is settled that liberal
construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or
error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a
reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. After all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial justice.

With regard to the alleged failure of the Court of Appeals to first give due course to the petition, Sec. 10, Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 10. Due course.—If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or documents as may be required
or allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of the period for the filing thereof, and on the basis of
the petition or the records the Court of Appeals finds prima facie that the court or agency concerned has committed
errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final order or resolution
sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings of
fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of
Appeals.

As can clearly be seen from the foregoing provision, in resolving appeals from quasi-judicial agencies such as the
DARAB, the appellate court has the discretion to give due course to the petition. It is also within the Court of
Appeals’ discretion to have the original records of the proceedings under review transmitted to it.

Petitioner’s contention that the appellate court deprived her of the opportunity to elevate the records by deciding
the case without first giving the petition due course is, therefore, utterly unmeritorious. The records of the Court of
Appeals show that the court decided the case on the basis of the pleadings filed by the parties, such as the
petition, motion to dismiss, comment, reply and rejoinder, including the documents attached thereto. The
pleadings and annexes, which replicate approximately the entire records of the DARAB, undoubtedly provided
adequate basis for the resolution of the case.
b. In order to establish a tenancy relationship, the following essential requisites must concur: (1) that the parties
are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant
or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee.

In this case, three requisites are absent, namely: (1) consent on the part of respondents for petitioner to become a
tenant of the landholding; (2) personal cultivation; and (3) sharing in the produce of the farm.

(23)
B.E. San Diego, Inc. v. Alzul
G.R. No. 169501, June 8, 2007
By: Joen Corona
Doctrine:

Facts: Respondent bought a 4 subdivision of lots from the Petitioner. It was to be paid in installments. The
transaction was executed in a Contract to Sell. Upon payment of downpayment, Respondent immediately took
possession of the property and constructed fenced thereon.

Respondent signed a "Conditional Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights" which assigned to a certain Wilson P.
Yu her rights under the Contract to Sell. Yu, however, failed to pay her obligation under the Conditional Deed.

On August 25, 1980, [respondent] commenced an action for rescission of the conditional deed of assignment
against Yu before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. Subsequently, on September 30, 1985, [respondent]
caused the annotation of notices of lis pendens on the titles covering the subject lots. The rescission was granted.

Petitioner notified the respondent that the contract to sell was rescinded due to Yu’s default. Petitioner then sold
the land to spouses Ventura who were surprised to see the annotation on the title. Spouses Ventura filed for
quieting of title. RTC ruled in favor of the spouses but the SC reversed and held that the spouses’ title are void.

The Supreme Court gave the Respondent 30 days to pay his remaining balance. Respondent tendered payment but
the petitioner refused to accept. Petitioner alleged that Yu failed to pay the amortization hence, the contract was
long legally rescinded.

Respondent filed for an action for consignation and specific performance against petitioner before the HLURB.
HLURB dismissed the petition. CA reversed and ruled in favor of the respondent.

B.E. San Diego assailed the sufficiency of the respondent’s petition to the CA due to lack of essential and relevant
pleadings filed with HLURB and the Office of the President.

Issue: Whether or not the petition should have been dismissed for failure to comply with Sec 6. Rule 43 (Failure to
attach certified true copy of material portions).

Ruling: No.
SEC. 6. Contents of the petition.—The petition for review shall x x x (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together
with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers.

The above proviso explicitly requires the following to be appended to a petition: 1) clearly legible duplicate original
or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from; 2) certified true copies of
such material portions of the record referred to in the petition; and 3) other supporting papers.

Effect of failure to comply with requirements.—The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of
the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal thereof.
Material is defined as "important; more or less necessary; having influence or effect; going to the merits; having to
do with matter, as distinguished from form." Thus, material portions of the records are those parts of the records
that are relevant and directly bear on the issues and arguments raised and discussed in the petition.

Only plain and clear copies of the material portions of the records are required under Sec. 3 of Rule 43. This finding
is buttressed by our ruling in Cadayona v. CA, where it was held that only judgments or final orders of the lower
courts are needed to be certified true copies or duplicate originals.

Sec. 7 of Rule 43 does not prescribe outright rejection of the petition if it is not accompanied by the required
documents but simply gives the discretion to the CA to determine whether such breach constitutes a "sufficient
ground" for dismissal. Apparently, petitioner was not able to convince the CA that the alleged missing attachments
deprived said court of the full opportunity and facility in examining and resolving the petition. It has not been
satisfactorily shown that the pleadings filed by petitioner with the quasi-judicial agencies have material bearing or
importance to the CA petition. Such pleadings could have been attached to the comment of respondent and hence,
no prejudice would be suffered. Thus, the CA did not exercise its discretion in an arbitrary or oppressive manner by
giving due course to the petition.

PANDAGDAG: These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

(24) Maniebo vs CA
By: De Castro

DOCTRINE: The rule clearly requires the petition for review to be accompanied by “a clearly legible duplicate
original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from together with
certified true copies of such material portions of the record refined to therein and other supporting papers.”

FACTS: Mayor of Puerto Galera issued a promotional permanent appointment to the petitioner as Cashier III in the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer because she appeared to possess the qualifications for the position, including the
Career Service (Professional) Eligibility appearing in line 18 of her Personal Data Sheet showing her to have passed
with a rating of 74.01% the Career Service (Professional) examination. However, upon verification against the
Masterlist of Eligibles, it was discovered that she failed to obtain a passing rating in the exam. CSC Regional Office
held a preliminary investigation and find that a prima facie case of falsification existed against the petitioner. She
was charged with possession of spurious report of rating, falsification, grave misconduct and dishonesty. The case
was set for hearing because CSCRO was unsatisfied with the answer filed by petitioner. In her direct testimony, the
petitioner denied knowledge of the falsified nature of her Career Service (Professional) eligibility rating. She
asserted that the rating had come from the CSC through the mails. She insisted that she did not on any occasion
approach any personnel of the CSC, or anybody else connected with the CSC in order to procure the passing grade
of 74.01%. CSCRO rendered decision finding her guilty. Petitioner appealed to the CSC, which affirmed the
decision. Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied by CSC. Then she appealed with the CA. It dismissed
the appeal due to petitioner’s failure to accompany it with the requisite certified true copies of the material portions
of the record. (i.e., the preliminary investigation and charge for possession of spurious report of rating, the answer,
the decision dated December 16, 1999 of Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV, Civil Service
Commission Resolution No. 02-0433 dated March 20, 2002, and other supporting papers and the evidences
submitted) Petitioner filed a MR, which her counsel undertook to submit required certified true copies of the
material portions within 10 days from October 23, 2002. She explained in her motion that her counsel had
failed to submit the required certified copies, due to her failure to turn over said copies to her counsel
because of the distance between her home in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro and the office of her
counsel in Fairview, Quezon City. But the CA denied the motion. She even filed 2nd MR but was likewise denied.
Then case was brought before SC via petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the court of appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the petitioner's petition for review for
failure to attach certified copy of the annexes
HELD: No, the CA did not commit any error, least of all a reversible one. Its dismissal was founded on the correct
application of the applicable rule. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court expressly lists down the
pleadings and other matters that a petition for review should contain.

“Section 6. Contents of the petition.—The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case,
without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the
facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together
with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; and
(d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The
petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein.”

The rule clearly requires the petition for review to be accompanied by “a clearly legible duplicate original or a
certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true
copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers.” The requirement is
intended to immediately enable the CA to determine whether to give due course to the appeal or not by having all
the material necessary to make such determination before it. This is because an appeal under Rule 43 is a
discretionary mode of appeal, which the CA may either dismiss if it finds the petition to be patently without merit,
or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration; or may process by requiring the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to
dismiss, within 10 days from notice.

The petitioner was not entitled to a liberal construction of the rules of procedure. Although her petition cited
decisions of the Court declaring that only the copies of the decisions or final orders assailed on appeal needed to be
certified, it is acknowledged even in the cited decisions of the Court that there should at least be a substantial
compliance with the rules. She should not forget that her petition for review in the CA was essentially assailing not
only CSC Resolution 02-1028 (denying her motion for reconsideration) but also CSC Resolution No. 02-0433 (the
very decision of the CSC finding her guilty of possession of the spurious report of rating, falsification, grave
misconduct, and dishonesty, and imposing the penalty of dismissal from the service). With respect to the other
supporting documents of the petition as set forth in Section 6, Rule 43, their legible copies should have
been attached to the petition or to the motion for reconsideration filed against the resolution dismissing the
petition. However, she did not even substantially comply with the requirement. Also, the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration did not allege the date when she had received a copy of the resolution. Her omission to
allege did not escape the attention of the CA, which cited it in the resolution dated January 8, 2003 as a ground for
denying the motion for reconsideration. That detail was necessary to determine the timeliness of the filing of the
motion for reconsideration. The petitioner next filed a second motion for reconsideration after the issuance
of the resolution dated January 8, 2003. The CA regarded her doing so as a blatant contravention of the Rules of
Court.
(25)Vergel de Dios vs. CA

Vergel De Dios vs CA
GR 127623, June 19, 1997
By: Rhio

Doctrine: The Court of Appeals acts hastily when it concludes that a party is going to file a petition for certiorari
instead of a petition for review solely on the basis of such party’s allegation that he was going to file a petition for
certiorari—the appellate court should reserve judgment on the matter until it shall have actually received the
petition. The very fact that a party seeks an extension of time should alert the court to the possibility that what
said party intends to file is a petition for review.

Facts: Petitioner, Vergel de Dios filed ejectment suits against private respondents Valentin Sarmiento and
Reynaldo (Regino) Venturina. Originally brought in RTC Malolos, Bulacan, the cases were eventually referred to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and there docketed as DARAB Case Nos. 248 and 283,
on the ground that they involve primarily agrarian disputes.

In DARAB Case No. 248, petitioner alleged that he was the owner of a two-hectare farm in Barangay Calawitan,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan under agricultural lease to private respondent Valentino Sarmiento; that sometime in 1988,
respondent Sarmiento abandoned the landholding by selling his rights thereto to respondent Reynaldo Venturina;
and that Sarmiento did not pay rentals, while Venturina refused to surrender the landholding to petitioner. In
DARAB Case No. 283, petitioner claimed that Venturina had been cultivating an area of 3.75 hectares without his
knowledge and consent and without paying any rent. The land was formerly under leasehold to one Jose Salonga
who, before his death, had allegedly sold his rights to private respondent Reynaldo Venturina without petitioners
consent.

Provincial Adjudicator: Declared the agricultural leasehold relationship between petitioner and respondent
Sarmiento extinguished and accordingly ordered respondent Venturina to vacate the landholding in question and to
turn over its possession to petitioner. The Provincial Adjudicator gave credence to petitioners claim that Sarmiento
had abandoned the landholding by selling his tenancy rights to Venturina based on petitioners evidence.

DARAB: On appeal, the DARAB reversed on the ground that petitioners evidence, on which the Provincial
Adjudicator had relied for his decision, was, with respect to petitioners affidavit, self-serving, and, with regard to
the affidavits of his witnesses, too good to be true. The DARAB also disregarded as hearsay Manuel Villanueva’s
affidavit, stating among others that the sale of Sarmiento’s tenancy rights was known to the residents of the
barangay. Neither the barangay captain nor the chairperson of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC)
was presented to attest to this fact. The DARAB instead gave weight to the declaration of Pio Sarmiento that his
father Valentin had tilled the land since 1972 but that because of old age had to relinquish its cultivation to Pio
Sarmiento, not to Reynaldo Venturina, and that they had paid all the yearly rentals except for 1 year when there
was a devastating typhoon.

With regard to Venturina, the DARAB found him to be the lawful tenant of the 3.75 hectare lot formerly cultivated
by Jose Salonga on the basis of a DAR certification issued on April 27, 1993 which stated that Venturina had been
in actual cultivation of the 3.75 hectare lot owned by petitioner since 1984; the testimony of Josefina Venturina
Bravo, administrator of the Victorias Ricemill, that the rentals consisting of 60 cavans per year had been deposited
by Venturina with the ricemill since 1984 and that all the rentals up to 1988 had been withdrawn by petitioner; the
declaration of Melencia Toledo, a palay trader, that from 1989 up to 1992, Venturina had been depositing lease
rentals for petitioner which were all withdrawn by petitioner; and the receipts for 60 cavans of palay each for 1992
and 1993 signed by petitioner on December 9, 1993 and December 16, 1993, respectively. The DARAB held that
while at the outset, petitioner may have been the unwilling lessor, his non-action, considering his own witnesses
declaration that Venturinas cultivation of the subject landholding was well-known in the community, and his
acceptance of the rentals constituted acquiescence on his part.

DARAB: Dismissed the complaints for lack of evidence, ordered the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of San
Ildefonso, Bulacan to place the property under formal leasehold in favor of Valentin Sarmiento’s son Pio by reason
of Valentin’s advanced age and to prepare and execute a leasehold contract over the 3.75 hectares between
petitioner and Venturina.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the board in a resolution received by
petitioner on July 31, 1996. On August 9, 1996, petitioner moved for an extension of 15 days, until August 24,
1996, within which to file a petition for certiorari in the CA. On August 23, 1996, he filed his petition, denominated
as one for review by way of appeal by certiorari.

CA: In its resolution, however, the CA denied the motion for extension (1) on the ground that the petition for
certiorari which petitioner intended to file was not the proper remedy and (2) for violation of Circular No. 28-91,
because the certification against forum shopping was executed not by petitioner himself but by petitioners counsel.
In another resolution dated September 18, 1996, the appellate court dismissed petitioner’s petition for having been
filed late. Unknown to the Court of Appeals, petitioner had filed on September 13, 1996 a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution dated August 30, 1996 denying his motion for extension. The motion was denied
on November 15, 1996 along with the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of August 30, 1996. Hence this
petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion for extension on the
grounds that the petition which petitioner intended to file is not the proper remedy and for violating Circular No.
28-91. He points out that the petition he actually filed on August 23, 1996 satisfies the requirements for a petition
for review under Circular No. 1-95, par. 6.

Held: Yes. CA was rather hasty in concluding that petitioner was going to file a petition for certiorari solely on the
basis of petitioners allegation that he was going to file a petition for certiorari. It should have reserved judgment on
the matter until it had actually received the petition especially considering that petitioner’s motion for extension
was filed well within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review. The very fact that petitioner sought an
extension of time should have alerted the CA to the possibility that what petitioner really intended to file was a
petition for review. As it turned out, what petitioner actually filed was a petition for review which complies with all
the requirements for such a petition under Circular No. 1-95, par. 6, to wit: a statement of the full names of the
parties to the case, a statement of the material dates to show that it was filed on time, a statement of the nature
of the action (one for review by way of appeal by certiorari), and a summary of the proceedings before the
Provincial Adjudicator and the DARAB. Under the heading Discussion, the petition contains an analysis of the
evidence, while attached to the petition are certified true copies of the assailed decision and resolution of the
DARAB and a properly executed certification against forum shopping.

The DARAB is made a respondent, a feature of a petition for certiorari, but this fact should have been treated
merely as innocuous and should not have been allowed to detract from the true consideration of the petition as a
petition for review.

The CA moreover committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the requirement of Circular No. 28-91 for a
certification against forum shopping to petitioner’s motion for extension. Under this circular, such certification is
required in every petition filed with the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. Obviously, a motion for extension is
not the petition spoken of in this provision. While such certification may be attached to a motion for extension and,
in such a case, may be considered as compliance with the rules even if none is attached to the petition
subsequently filed, the reverse does not follow. Petitioner’s failure to have a properly executed certification against
forum shopping attached to his motion for extension is not fatal, considering that the proper certification was later
attached to his petition at the time of its filing.

(26) Videogram Regulatory Board vs. CA

(26)
Videogram Regulatory Board vs.
G.R. No. 106564. November 28, 1996
BY: Grande, Jonicocel
Doctrine: There are certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable, like those setting the periods for
perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for review, for it is doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a
statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that right must comply with the statute or rules.
Facts:
Upon application made by officers of petitioner Videogram Regulatory Board, the MTC, issued Search Warrant
against private respondent Edward L. Unite for violation of Section 6 of P.D., the law creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board and penalizing illegal reproductions of videograms.
Private respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Recover Seized Articles.

MTC: denied said Motion to Quash.

RTC: declared as null and void the said search warrant issued by the MTC.

Thereafter, petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time of Thirty (30) days
from May 20, 1992 or until June 19, 1992 within which to file a petition for review.
However, in its Resolution dated May 27, 1992, respondent Court granted the petitioner a non-extendible period of
fifteen (15) days only, counted from May 20, 1992 or until June 4, 1992, within which to file the petition for review.
The OSG allegedly received a copy of said Resolution on June 8, 1992, or four days after the lapse of the granted
extension.
The OSG filed a Motion to Admit, alleging that it was physically impossible to comply with the deadline of June 4,
1992 since it received a copy of the resolution only on June 8, 1992.
CA: RESOLVED to DENY the Motion To Admit.

Issue: WON CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issued the order giving petitioner a fifteen
day inextendible period to file petition for review was received by petitioner when the fifteen day
period had already expired.

HELD: NO.

There are certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable, like those setting the periods for perfecting an
appeal or filing a petition for review, for it is doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a statutory right and
one who seeks to avail of that right must comply with the statute or rules. The rules, particularly the requirements
for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law, must be strictly followed as they are
considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business.
Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and
executory. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.
These periods are carefully guarded and lawyers are well-advised to keep track of their applications. After all, a
denial of a petition for being time-barred is a decision on the merits.
In the case of Lacsamana vs. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court had
already put a stop to and set a policy on overly long extensions of time. The Court said:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision, an extension of only fifteen days for filling
a petition for review may be granted by the Court of Appeals, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.
The motion for extension of time must be filed and the corresponding docket fee paid within the
reglementary period of appeal.
Here, the Solicitor General could not feign ignorance. He knew or ought to have known that, pursuant to the above
rule, his motion for extension of time of thirty (30) days could be granted for only fifteen (15) days. There simply was no basis
for assuming that the requested 30-day extension would be granted.

LACK OF NOTICE
The court have consistently held that allowance or denial of a motion for extension of time is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court, and such discretion vested in the courts must be exercised wisely and prudently, and
never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice.
But, once granted, the extension of time starts from the end of the original reglementary period. It begins to run
whether or not the movant/grantee has knowledge of such action of the granting court. Notice in this instance is
unimportant as, in the first place, lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension or postponement
would be granted. It behooves them to follow up on their motions, for the mere filing of the same is not enough.
They must check with the division clerks of court for the action on their motions, considering that time may run out
on them as it did in this case.
The OSG persists in pressing that the Court to take judicial notice of its very heavy caseload, which in its
estimation constitutes sufficient justification for the delay. However, it cannot be gainsaid that, with ordinary
diligence and foresight, the Solicitor General and his staff could have readily found a way to comply with the
deadline.

Appeal For Liberality

Petitioner insists that the challenged Resolutions must be overturned, in light of the fact that petitioner is tasked
with regulating the video industry pursuant to P.D. 1987, and that its petition is meritorious, being highly
impressed with public interest in view of the unfair competition against the local movie industry posed by rampant
film piracy, as well as the erosion of the viewing publics moral fiber due to unclassified and unreviewed videotapes
of films with pornographic and violent sequences.[21] Petitioner thus prays that we apply a liberal interpretation of
the rules to its petition.
The court rejects such argument. While the court recognize the laudable role and difficult task of petitioner, they do
not make the case exceptionally meritorious as to warrant the liberal application of the rules. The reasoning
employed is untenable. The issue that petitioner tried to bring before respondent Court was the propriety of the
quashal of the search warrant. It has nothing to do with petitioners purpose and task because these do not show
how the RTC erred in quashing the aforementioned search warrant.
And, while the court understands the OSGs predicament, its oft-repeated excuse of being saddled with a huge
caseload, which is resorted to almost everytime it applies for extensions of time for appeal and filing of
comments/replies/briefs, has already lost its flavor, if not gone stale entirely. Certainly, by this time the OSG must
have already developed a system for keeping track of all its deadlines and monitoring the progress of work being
done on the cases it is handling. After all, government service really entails hard work and perennial, unceasing
pressure to meet deadlines. Most assuredly, this is not a ground for the liberal interpretation of the rules. Only in
exceptionally meritorious cases should the rules be relaxed. Such has not been shown to be the situation in this
case.
RULE 45

1. FAT Kee computer Systems vs. ONline Networks International In - Jovero

2. Tay Chun Suy vs. CA - Lapuz
3. Producers Bank vs. Excelsa Industries - Mano
4. Union Bank of the Philippines vs. People - Marasigan
5. Steelcase Inc. vs. Design International Selections Inc - Montes
6. Estores vs. Supangan -Morales
7. Dalton vs. FGR Realty and Development Corp - Radovan
8. PNB vs. Perez -Rosario
9. RGM Industries Inc. vs. United Pacific Capital Corp -Samson
10. Sarona vs. NLRC -Torres
11. Sta.Maria vs. CA - Valencia,E
12. Republic vs. Ortigas -Alba
13. Altres vs. Empleo - Arid
14. Alonso vs. Cebu Country Club Inc. - Bernardo
15. Mendoza vs. CA - Bigornia
 (01)
FAT KEE COMPUTER SYSTEMS v. ONLINE NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL
G.R. No. 171238, Feb. 2, 2011
By: Jovero, John Tristram V.

Doctrine: Non-attachment of the relevant portions of the TSN does not render the petition for review on certiorari
defective.

Facts: ONLINE filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against FAT KEE. ONLINE alleged that sometime in November
1997, it sold computer printers to FAT KEE. Despite repeated demands, FAT KEE failed to pay its obligations to
ONLINE without any valid reason. As FAT KEE still ignored the demand, ONLINE instituted the instant case.

FAT KEE contests the argument of ONLINE that the instant petition is fatally defective for the failure of the former
to attach the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the RTC proceedings. FAT KEE counters that there is no
need to annex the said TSN given that ONLINE does not dispute the accuracy of the quoted portions of the
transcripts and the petition does not request for a reevaluation of the evidence of the parties. Assuming arguendo
that the TSN should have been attached to the petition, FAT KEE begs for the relaxation of the rules so as not to
frustrate the ends of substantive justice.

FAT KEE also rejects the contention of ONLINE that the petition raises only factual issues, which are not proper in a
petition for review on certiorari.

Issues:

I. Does the non-attachment of the TSN make the petition fatally defective?
II. Can an appeal by certiorari raise only factual issues?

Held:

I. No. Non-attachment of the relevant portions of the TSN does not render the petition of FAT KEE fatally defective.

such a requirement was not meant to be an ironclad rule such that the failure to follow the same would merit the
outright dismissal of the petition. In accordance with Section 7 of Rule 45, "the Supreme Court may require or
allow the filing of such pleadings, briefs, memoranda or documents as it may deem necessary within such periods
and under such conditions as it may consider appropriate." More importantly, Section 8 of Rule 45 declares that
"[i]f the petition is given due course, the Supreme Court may require the elevation of the complete record of the
case or specified parts thereof within fifteen (15) days from notice." Given that the TSN of the proceedings before
the RTC forms part of the records of the instant case, the failure of FAT KEE to attach the relevant portions of the
TSN was already cured by the subsequent elevation of the case records to this Court. This pronouncement is
likewise in keeping with the doctrine that procedural rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding.

II. As to the substantive issues raised in the instant petition, the Court finds that, indeed, questions of fact are
being invoked by FAT KEE. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them.

Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court dictates that a petition for review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of
law, which must be distinctly set forth." This rule is, however, subject to exceptions, one of which is when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the RTC are conflicting. Said exception applies to the instant case.

(2)
Tay Chun Suy vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 93640 | January 7, 1994.
by: Lapuz, Jesus Jr. Ros
Doctrine: Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court
need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing Court as they cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.

PETITIONER: Tan Chun Suy

RESPONDENT: Development Bank of the Philippines

Facts: On 9 May 1978, Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc. (SCLC), obtained a loan of P18,514,357.56 from private
respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). As security for the loan, SCLC mortgaged some of its
properties, among which was a vessel, MV Sta. Clara I. Upon SCLC’s failure to pay the loan, the mortgage was
foreclosed. On 18 August 1982, the Clerk of Court and Provincial Sheriff Ex-Officio of Sultan Kudarat, Aurelio M.
Rendon, conducted an auction sale and sold the vessel to DBP for P3,600,000.00. He thereafter issued a certificate
of sale dated 18 August 1982 in favor of DBP. However, DBP did not register with the Philippine Coast Guard the
mortgage; neither the foreclosure nor the auction sale.

In December 1983, DBP and Sta. Clara Housing Industries, Inc. (SCHI), entered into a Lease/Purchase Agreement
which provided that DBP should lease some of the former properties of SCLC, including MV Sta. Clara I, to the
latter and transfer actual ownership over these properties upon completion by the lessee of tG.R. No. 106564.
November 28, 1996
BY: Grande, Jonicocel

Doctrine: There are certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable, like those setting the periods for
perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for review, for it is doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a
statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that right must comply with the statute or rules.
Facts:
Upon application made by officers of petitioner Videogram Regulatory Board, the MTC, issued Search Warrant
against private respondent Edward L. Unite for violation of Section 6 of P.D., the law creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board and penalizing illegal reproductions of videograms.
Private respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Recover Seized Articles.

MTC: denied said Motion to Quash.

RTC: declared as null and void the said search warrant issued by the MTC.

Thereafter, petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time of Thirty (30) days
from May 20, 1992 or until June 19, 1992 within which to file a petition for review.
However, in its Resolution dated May 27, 1992, respondent Court granted the petitioner a non-extendible period of
fifteen (15) days only, counted from May 20, 1992 or until June 4, 1992, within which to file the petition for review.
The OSG allegedly received a copy of said Resolution on June 8, 1992, or four days after the lapse of the granted
extension.
The OSG filed a Motion to Admit, alleging that it was physically impossible to comply with the deadline of June 4,
1992 since it received a copy of the resolution only on June 8, 1992.
CA: RESOLVED to DENY the Motion To Admit.

Issue: WON CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issued the order giving petitioner a fifteen day
inextendible period to file petition for review was received by petitioner when the fifteen day period had already
expired.

HELD: NO.

There are certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable, like those setting the periods for perfecting an
appeal or filing a petition for review, for it is doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a statutory right and
one who seeks to avail of that right must comply with the statute or rules. The rules, particularly the requirements
for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law, must be strictly followed as they are
considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business.
Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and
executory. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.
These periods are carefully guarded and lawyers are well-advised to keep track of their applications. After all, a
denial of a petition for being time-barred is a decision on the merits.
In the case of Lacsamana vs. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court had
already put a stop to and set a policy on overly long extensions of time. The Court said:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision, an extension of only fifteen days for filling a petition
for review may be granted by the Court of Appeals, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.
The motion for extension of time must be filed and the corresponding docket fee paid within the reglementary
period of appeal.
Here, the Solicitor General could not feign ignorance. He knew or ought to have known that, pursuant to the above
rule, his motion for extension of time of thirty (30) days could be granted for only fifteen (15) days. There simply
was no basis for assuming that the requested 30-day extension would be granted.
LACK OF NOTICE
The court have consistently held that allowance or denial of a motion for extension of time is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court, and such discretion vested in the courts must be exercised wisely and prudently, and
never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice.
But, once granted, the extension of time starts from the end of the original reglementary period. It begins to run
whether or not the movant/grantee has knowledge of such action of the granting court. Notice in this instance is
unimportant as, in the first place, lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension or postponement
would be granted. It behooves them to follow up on their motions, for the mere filing of the same is not enough.
They must check with the division clerks of court for the action on their motions, considering that time may run out
on them as it did in this case.
The OSG persists in pressing that the Court to take judicial notice of its very heavy caseload, which in its
estimation constitutes sufficient justification for the delay. However, it cannot be gainsaid that, with ordinary
diligence and foresight, the Solicitor General and his staff could have readily found a way to comply with the
deadline.
Appeal For Liberality

Petitioner insists that the challenged Resolutions must be overturned, in light of the fact that petitioner is tasked
with regulating the video industry pursuant to P.D. 1987, and that its petition is meritorious, being highly
impressed with public interest in view of the unfair competition against the local movie industry posed by rampant
film piracy, as well as the erosion of the viewing publics moral fiber due to unclassified and unreviewed videotapes
of films with pornographic and violent sequences.[21] Petitioner thus prays that we apply a liberal interpretation of
the rules to its petition.
The court rejects such argument. While the court recognize the laudable role and difficult task of petitioner, they do
not make the case exceptionally meritorious as to warrant the liberal application of the rules. The reasoning
employed is untenable. The issue that petitioner tried to bring before respondent Court was the propriety of the
quashal of the search warrant. It has nothing to do with petitioners purpose and task because these do not show
how the RTC erred in quashing the aforementioned search warrant.
And, while the court understands the OSGs predicament, its oft-repeated excuse of being saddled with a huge
caseload, which is resorted to almost everytime it applies for extensions of time for appeal and filing of
comments/replies/briefs, has already lost its flavor, if not gone stale entirely. Certainly, by this time the OSG must
have already developed a system for keeping track of all its deadlines and monitoring the progress of work being
done on the cases it is handling. After all, government service really entails hard work and perennial, unceasing
pressure to meet deadlines. Most assuredly, this is not a ground for the liberal interpretation of the rules. Only in
exceptionally meritorious cases should the rules be relaxed. Such has not been shown to be the situation in this
case.
he stipulated lease/purchase payment.

On 10 July 1986, Petitioner caused the levy and attachment of the same vessel, MV Sta. Clara I, in order to satisfy
a judgment in favor of Petitioner against Sta. Clara Lumber. At the time of the levy, the coastwise license of the
vessel was in the name of Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc.
On the scheduled date of the execution sale, Atty. Necitas Kintanar, counsel for SCHI, verbally informed Deputy
Sheriff Manases M. Reyes, Jr., who was to conduct the sale, that MV Sta. Clara I was no longer owned by SCLC but
by DBP pursuant to a prior extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Despite such information, Sheriff Reyes, Jr., proceeded
with the sale and awarded the vessel to petitioner for P317,000.00.
Meanwhile, on 23 July 1986, MV Sta. Clara I was again levied upon and attached by Deputy Sheriffs Alfonso M.
Zamora by virtue of a writ of attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court, Br. XI, Cebu City, in Civil Case No.
CEB-5162, “Philippine Trigon Shipyard Shipping Corp. v. Sta. Clara Housing Industries, Inc., et al.” On 24 July
1986, the same court issued an order appointing Philippine Trigon Shipyard Shipping Corporation as depository of
the attached vessel with authority to operate the vessel temporarily. MV Sta. Clara I was then taken from the port
of Davao City to Cebu City.

Upon being informed of the execution sale to petitioner, DBP filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court, Br.
XVII, Davao City, for annulment of the execution sale, recovery of possession, damages and attorney’s fees with
prayer for restraining order and preliminary injunction.

Both the RTC and CA issued a decision which, among other matters, declared that DBP was the lawful owner of MV
Sta. Clara I and that the public auction sale was null and void. Hence, this petition REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
UNDER RULE 45 by the petitioner.

PERTINENT TO OUR TOPIC: Please take note that the petition with the SC of Tan Chun Suy now includes a
contention wherein he alleges that he came to know about the acquisition by DBP only upon its filing of the
complaint for annulment of the execution sale and that he never admitted that he knew of DBP’s prior acquisition
at the time of execution in his favor. (AN ARGUMENT THAT WAS NOT RAISED WITH BOTH RTC and CA)

Issue: Whether an argument NOT raised with the lower courts may still be entertained upon petition with the
Supreme Court on certiorari?

Held: NO.
Petitioner never challenged and raised the argument on appeal to the Court of Appeals. He is, therefore, estopped
from denying knowledge of the prior claim of DBP to the vessel in the light of his judicial admission. Hence, he
cannot be allowed to ventilate it now in this proceeding. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a
reviewing Court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Well-entrenched is the rule that factual
findings of the trial court, as well as those of the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great weight and respect. This
rule finds application in the case at bar.

The evidence on record fully supports the findings of the lower courts. PETITION DENIED.
 Producers Bank v. Excelsa
G.R. No. 173820, April 16, 2012
By: Mano, Razna I.

Doctrine: It is a procedural blunder to file a separate petition for certiorari when two cases were consolidated and
a joint decision was rendered because the cases lost their identities; and a petition for certiorari is not the proper
remedy to assail a decision granting the issuance of a writ of possession.

Respondent obtained a loan from petitioner secured by a real estate mortgage. When respondent presented for
negotiation to petitioner drafts drawn under the letter of credit and the corresponding export documents in
consideration for its drawings, petitioner purchased the drafts and export documents by paying respondent the
peso equivalent of the drawings. Petitioner demanded from respondent the payment of the peso equivalent of said
export documents together with its due and unpaid loans. For failure of respondent to heed the demand, petitioner
moved for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. At the public auction, petitioner emerged as
the highest bidder. For failure of respondent to redeem the properties, the titles were consolidated in favor of
petitioner and new certificates of title were issued in its name.

Respondent instituted an action for the annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure with prayer for preliminary injunction
and damages (foreclosure case) against petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Marikina before the RTC.
Petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession (writ of possession case) before the same
court. The RTC thereafter ordered the consolidation of the two cases. The RTC rendered a decision upholding the
validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure and ordering the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of petitioner.

Aggrieved, respondent availed of two modes of appeal. Respondent appealed the foreclosure case via ordinary
appeal to the CA. Respondent likewise filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as
to the writ of possession case also before the CA. In both cases, respondent assailed the Decision of the RTC
which is actually a joint decision on the two consolidated cases subject of the separate actions. CA (First Division)
rendered a decision in the foreclosure case reversing and setting aside the RTC decision thereby declaring the
foreclosure of mortgage invalid and annulling the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of petitioner. CA
(Tenth Division) also rendered the assailed decision in the writ of possession case annulling the issuance of the
writ of possession in favor of petitioner.

Whether the Petition for Certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the writ of possession case.

NO. Respondent herein committed a procedural blunder when it filed a separate petition for certiorari before the
CA, because when the two cases were consolidated and a joint decision was rendered, the cases lost their
identities; and a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail a decision granting the issuance of a writ
of possession.

In this case, there was a joint hearing and the RTC eventually rendered a Joint Decision disposing of the cases both
as to the validity of the foreclosure (foreclosure case) and the propriety of the issuance of a writ of possession
(writ of possession case). This being so, the two cases ceased to be separate and the parties are left with a
single remedy to elevate the issues to the appellate court. This is bolstered by the fact that when the appeal in the
foreclosure case was disposed of by the CA (First Division) by reversing the RTC decision, the appellate court not
only declared the foreclosure of mortgage invalid but likewise annulled the issuance of the writ of possession.

Assuming that respondent could still treat the original cases separately and could avail of separate remedies, the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was incorrectly availed of to assail the issuance of the writ of possession.

A special civil action for certiorari could be availed of only if a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases that the remedy of a party
from the trial courts order granting the issuance of a writ of possession is to file a petition to set aside the sale and
cancel the writ of possession, and the aggrieved party may then appeal from the order denying or granting said
petition. When a writ of possession had already been issued as in this case, the proper remedy is an appeal and not
a petition for certiorari. To be sure, the trial courts order granting the writ of possession is final. The soundness of
the order granting the writ of possession is a matter of judgment, with respect to which the remedy of the party
aggrieved is ordinary appeal. As respondent availed of the wrong remedy, the appellate court erred in not
dismissing outright the petition for certiorari.

When respondent received the unfavorable decision of the RTC, it appealed the decision to the CA assailing the
validity of the foreclosure. The CA (First Division) reversed and set aside the RTC decision, declared the foreclosure
invalid, and annulled the issuance of the writ of possession. When it rendered the assailed decision, the CA (Tenth
Division) addressed the issues raised by respondent which were the very same issues raised by it in its appeal. In
short, the assailed decision was a mere reiteration of the findings and conclusions of the CA (First Division). This
emphasizes the error committed by the CA (Tenth Division) in rendering the assailed decision.

The Court settles once and for all the validity of the foreclosure and the propriety of the issuance of the writ of
possession.
 (4) Union Bank of the Philippines
GR No. 192565, February 28, 2012
By: Mariz

Doctrine: Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of improper venue,
the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Facts: (Rule 45 petition)

Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false
narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping.

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City.
Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly,
she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate
against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding
involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction
over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati City also
ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. The MeTC-Makati City
subsequently denied Tomas motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be Makati City, where
the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was
presented to the trial court.

Held: MeTC-Makati City

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In
determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it,
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis
ours]

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which states:

Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its
allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the
jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the
offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

Information Charging Perjury

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the requirement for a Certificate
against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a statement under oath in
the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the
complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required to execute a statement under oath before
a duly commissioned notary public or any competent person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has
not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if
there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or
she should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall
report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading
has been filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is
the truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies
in different fora.

In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for making a false Certificate
against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:

(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer
oath.

(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
(emphasis ours)

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of improper venue, the
allegations in the complaint and information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently
support a finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-
Makati City.

The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum Shopping was
alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth elements,
requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently
alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati City.

We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have been
committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the Information:

[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer
for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the
Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in
another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making a willful
and deliberate assertion of falsehood. (underscoring ours)

Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false declarations
in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the
material statements she subscribed and sworn to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-
Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
 (5)
Steelcase, Inc. V. Design International Selections, Inc.
G.R. No. 171995. April 18, 2012
By: Maria Francesca Montes

DOCTRINE: Foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license may still sue before the
Philippine courts a Filipino or a Philippine entity that had derived benefit from their contractual arrangement
because the latter is considered to be estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after it had
acknowledged the said corporation by entering into a contract with it.

FACTS:
Steelcase is a foreign corporation registered in Michigan, USA which is engaged in office furniture manufacturing.
DISI is a domestic corporation engaged in furniture distribution. In 1986 or 1987, both orally entered in dealership
agreement. Steelcase granted DISI the right to market, sell, distribute, install and service its products to end-user
customers within the PH. In 1999, Steelcase filed a complaint for sum of money against DISI allegedly for unpaid
account of USD 600,000. DISI alleged that complaint failed to state cause of action and sought for 1) TRO and writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin Steelcase from selling its products in PH except through DISI; 2) dismissal of
complaint; and 3) payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages. DISI highlighted that Steelcase does not
have legal capacity to sue in the PH due to its lack of license to do so, hence, complaint should be dismissed.

On March 3, 1999, Steelcase filed its Motion to Admit Amended Complaint which was granted, however, it still filed
another Motion to Admit Second Amended Complaint on March 13. On November 15, RTC granted the TRO prayed
by DISI and set aside order admitting the Amended Complaint. RTC ruled that in requiring DISI to meet Dealer
Performance Expectation and in terminating the dealership agreement with DISI, Steelcase revealed that it
participated in the operations of DISI. Hence, Steelcase was considered “doing business” in PH as contemplated by
RA 7042 or the Foreign Investments Act of 1991, and since it did not have the license to do business in the
country, it was barred from seeking redress from PH courts.

Steelcase moved for MR but RTC denied. It elevated to the CA by way of appeal but CA affirmed RTC. Steelcase
filed MR but CA denied.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Steelcase is doing business in PH without a license.
2. Whether DISI is estopped from challenging Steelcase’s legal capacity to sue.

HELD:
Court ruled in favor of Steelcase, admitted the Second Amended Complaint and remanded case to RTC for
appropriate action.
1. No. IRR of RA 7042 qualified “doing business” under Rule I, Section 1(f)(3) where it states that “the
following acts shall not be deemed “doing business” in the Philippines: xxx (3) appointing a representative
or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in the representative’s or distributor’s
own name and account. xxx” DISI was independent contractor, distributing various products of Steelcase
and of other companies, acting in its own name and for its own account.
2. Yes. DISI is estopped from questioning Steelcase’s existence and capacity to sue as it acknowledged its
entity when it entered into Dealership Agreement with it and even benefiting from it.

(6) ESTORES v SUPANGAN

G.R. No. 175139, April 16, 2012
By: MORALES, EDILYN T.

Doctrine
Interest may be imposed even in the absence of stipulation in the contract. Article 2210 of the Civil Code expressly
provides that “[i]nterest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of
contract.” In this case, there is no question that petitioner is legally obligated to return the P3.5 million because
of her failure to fulfill the obligation under the Conditional Deed of Sale, despite demand. Petitioner enjoyed the
use of the money from the time it was given to her until now. Thus, she is already in default of her obligation
from the date of demand.

Facts

Petitioner Hermojina Estores and respondent-spouses Arturo and Laura Supangan entered into a Conditional Deed
of Sale whereby petitioner offered to sell, and respondent-spouses offered to buy, a parcel of land at Naic, Cavite
for the sum of P4.7 million.

After almost seven years from the time of the execution of the contract and notwithstanding payment of P3.5
million on the part of respondent-spouses, petitioner still failed to comply with her obligation as expressly provided
in the contract. Hence, in a letter, respondent-spouses demanded the return of the amount of P3.5 million within
15 days from receipt of the letter. In reply, petitioner acknowledged receipt of the P3.5 million and promised to
return the same within 120 days. Respondent-spouses were amenable to the proposal provided an interest of 12%
compounded annually shall be imposed on the P3.5 million.

When petitioner still failed to return the amount despite demand, respondent-spouses were constrained to file a
Complaint for sum of money before the RTC of Malabon against herein petitioner as well as Roberto U. Arias (Arias)
who allegedly acted as petitioner’s agent.

Despite several postponements, petitioner and Arias failed to appear hence they were deemed to have waived the
presentation of their evidence. Consequently, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

RTC rendered its Decision finding respondent-spouses entitled to interest but only at the rate of 6% per annum and
not 12% as prayed by them. It also found respondent-spouses entitled to attorneys fees as they were compelled to
litigate to protect their interest.

Aggrieved, petitioner and Arias filed their notice of appeal. The CA noted that the only issue submitted for its
resolution is whether it is proper to impose interest for an obligation that does not involve a loan or forbearance of
money in the absence of stipulation of the parties.

On May 12, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the ruling of the RTC finding the imposition of
6% interest proper. However, the same shall start to run only from September 27, 2000 when respondent-spouses
formally demanded the return of their money and not from October 1993 when the contract was executed as held
by the RTC. The CA also modified the RTC’s ruling as regards the liability of Arias. It held that Arias could not be
held solidarily liable with petitioner because he merely acted as agent of the latter. Moreover, there was no
showing that he expressly bound himself to be personally liable or that he exceeded the limits of his authority.
More importantly, there was even no showing that Arias was authorized to act as agent of petitioner. Anent the
award of attorneys fees, the CA found the award by the trial court (P50,000.00 plus 20% of the recoverable
amount) excessive and thus reduced the same to P100,000.00.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied in the August 31, 2006 Resolution of the CA.

Petitioner’s arguments- Petitioner insists that she is not bound to pay interest on the P3.5 million because the
Conditional Deed of Sale only provided for the return of the downpayment in case of failure to comply with her
obligations. Petitioner also argues that the award of attorney’s fees in favor of the respondent-spouses is
unwarranted because it cannot be said that the latter won over the former since the CA even sustained her
contention that the imposition of 12% interest compounded annually is totally uncalled for.

Respondent-spouses’ arguments- Respondent-spouses aver that it is only fair that interest be imposed on the
amount they paid considering that petitioner failed to return the amount upon demand and had been using the
P3.5 million for her benefit. Moreover, it is undisputed that petitioner failed to perform her obligations to relocate
the house outside the perimeter of the subject property and to complete the necessary documents. As regards the
attorney’s fees, they claim that they are entitled to the same because they were forced to litigate when petitioner
unjustly withheld the amount. Besides, the amount awarded by the CA is even smaller compared to the filing fees
they paid.

Issue

Whether the imposition of interest and attorney’s fees is proper

Held

YES.

The Court sustains the ruling of both the RTC and the CA that it is proper to impose interest notwithstanding the
absence of stipulation in the contract. Article 2210 of the Civil Code expressly provides that [i]nterest may, in the
discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract. In this case, there is no question
that petitioner is legally obligated to return the P3.5 million because of her failure to fulfill the obligation under the
Conditional Deed of Sale, despite demand. She has in fact admitted that the conditions were not fulfilled and that
she was willing to return the full amount of P3.5 million but has not actually done so. Petitioner enjoyed the use of
the money from the time it was given to her until now. Thus, she is already in default of her obligation from the
date of demand, i.e., on September 27, 2000.
Anent the interest rate, the general rule is that the applicable rate of interest shall be computed in accordance with
the stipulation of the parties. Absent any stipulation, the applicable rate of interest shall be 12% per annum when
the obligation arises out of a loan or a forbearance of money, goods or credits. In other cases, it shall be six
percent (6%). In this case, the parties did not stipulate as to the applicable rate of interest. The only question
remaining therefore is whether the 6% as provided under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, or 12% under Central
Bank Circular No. 416, is due.

The contract involved in this case is admittedly not a loan but a Conditional Deed of Sale. However, the contract
provides that the seller (petitioner) must return the payment made by the buyer (respondent-spouses) if the
conditions are not fulfilled. There is no question that they have in fact, not been fulfilled as the seller (petitioner)
has admitted this. Notwithstanding demand by the buyer (respondent-spouses), the seller (petitioner) has failed to
return the money and should be considered in default from the time that demand was made on September 27,
2000.

Petitioners unwarranted withholding of the money which rightfully pertains to respondent-spouses amounts to
forbearance of money which can be considered as an involuntary loan. Thus, the applicable rate of interest is 12%
per annum.

Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the Court finds respondent-spouses entitled to recover
attorney’s fees. There is no doubt that they were forced to litigate to protect their interest, i.e., to recover their
money. However, we find the amount of P50,000.00 more appropriate in line with the policy enunciated in Article
2208 of the Civil Code that the award of attorneys fees must always be reasonable.

(7)Dalton vs. FGR Realty and Development Corporation

G.R. No. 172577. January 19, 2011.
By: Radovan

Dalton vs. FGR Realty and Development Corporation

G.R. No. 172577. January 19, 2011

Doctrine: Factual findings of the lower courts are binding on the Court. Exceptions.—The factual findings of the lower courts are binding on the
Court. The exceptions to this rule are (1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on speculation; (3) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions
of the parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8)
when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. Dalton did not show that any of these circumstances is present.
Facts: Flora R. Dayrit (Dayrit) owned a 1,811-square meter parcel of land in Cebu City. Petitioner Soledad Dalton (Dalton) and Sasam, et al.
leased portions of the property. In June 1985, Dayrit sold the property to respondent FGR Realty and Development Corporation (FGR). In August
1985, Dayrit and FGR stopped accepting rental payments because they wanted to terminate the lease agreements with Dalton and Sasam, et al. In
a complaint, Dalton and Sasam, et al. consigned the rental payments with the RTC. They failed to notify Dayrit and FGR about the consignation.
Dayrit and FGR withdrew the rental payments. In their motions, Dayrit and FGR reserved the right to question the validity of the consignation.
Dayrit, FGR and Sasam, et al. entered into compromise agreements. In the compromise agreements, they agreed to abandon all claims against
each other. Dalton did not enter into a compromise agreement with Dayrit and FGR.

RTC: Dismissed the complaint and ordered Dalton to vacate the property.
CA: Affirmed RTC Decision.

Hence, this petition. Dalton claims that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that she failed to pay rent.

Issue: Whether the claim of Dalton is reviewable?

Held: NO. Whether Dalton failed to pay rent is a question of fact. It is not reviewable.
The factual findings of the lower courts are binding on the Court. The exceptions to this rule are:
(1) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(2) When the findings are grounded on speculation;
(3) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(4) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the factual findings are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties;
(7) When the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(8) When the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and
(9) When the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.

Dalton did not show that any of these circumstances is present.

(8) PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. SPS. ANGELITO PEREZ and JOCELYN PEREZ
By: Kaye

Doctrine: Nevertheless, even with the existence of the remedy of appeal, this Court has, in certain cases, allowed
a writ of certiorari where the order complained of is a patent nullity.

Facts: Spouses Perez obtained a revolving credit line from PNB’s branch in Cauayan City, Isabela. The credit line
was secured by several chattel and real estate. Spouses Perez defaulted on their financial obligations, prompting
PNB to institute extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings over the aforementioned securities. The sheriff instituted a
Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale for the mortgaged properties by public auction.

Spouses Perez filed a Complaint with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary Mandatory Injunctive Writ and a
Temporary Restraining Order. Spouses Perez and their counsel failed to appear at the hearing of the application so
the prayer for injunctive relief was denied. They likewise failed to appear at the pre-trial conference. Hence, the
trial court dismissed the case. Spouses Perez then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was subsequently
denied. After this, Spouses Perez filed a Notice of Appeal which was denied at first, but was subsequently granted.

Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court. The trial court issued an Order setting the case for
hearing on March 8, 2006. PNB, however, failed to receive a copy of the aforementioned order and was,
thus, unable to attend the hearing on March 8, 2006. Questionably, on said date, the trial court issued
an Order allowing Spouses Perez to adduce evidence and considered the hearing as a pre-trial
conference. PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order. The trial court decided in favor of Spouses
Perez.

PNB again filed a Motion for Reconsideration but due to certain reasons, the counsel for PNB failed to send a copy
of the said motion to the trial court. As a result, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration for having
been filed outside the reglementary period and concluded that the Decision already became final and executory by
operation of law.

PNB filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment/Order of Execution with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, alleging that the failure to file the Motion for Reconsideration was due to mistake and/or
excusable negligence. Afterwards, the trial court issued an Order denying the prayer for preliminary injunction.
Also, the trial court issued an Order annulling the certificates of title issued to PNB covering the properties subject
of the case and directed the Register of Deeds of Isabela to issue new certificates of title in the names of Spouses
Perez.

PNB filed a Petition for Certiorari (with Prayer for the Issuance of an Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of
Preliminary Injunction) before the CA, which granted the prayer for a TRO. Despite the issuance of the TRO,
Spouses Perez were able to garnish Php 2,676,140.70 from PNB’s account with Equitable PCI Bank on the same
date the TRO was issued.

In view of this development, PNB filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari seeking additional reliefs for the return
or reinstatement of the garnished amount and/or the appointment of a receiver over the said funds to administer
and preserve the same pending the final disposition of the case.

CA: Granted the petition of PNB. It ruled that the sending of a notice of pre-trial is mandatory and that the Order
dated March 8, 2006 issued by the trial court cannot be considered as such. Therefore, the CA held that all orders
issued subsequent to the said order are, likewise, null and void. The Decision of the CA, however, failed to address
PNB’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction and the return/reinstatement of the Php
2,676,140.70. Hence, PNB and Spouses Perez filed their separate petitions with this Court assailing both the
decision and the resolution of the CA.

In their petition, Spouses Perez argue that the filing of a petition for certiorari by PNB before the CA was improper
for two reasons: (a) a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal; and (b) there were other pending
petitions for relief from judgment and a motion for reconsideration with the lower court.

Issue: Whether a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy in this case.

Held: YES.

The essential requisites for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a
board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. v. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the Court discussed
the differences between "excess of jurisdiction", "without jurisdiction" and "grave abuse of discretion", to wit:

Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though within the
general power of a tribunal, board or officer, is not authorized and invalid with respect to the particular
proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of
it are wanting.

Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause
or causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to
exercise authority.

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

In Agulto v. Tecson, the SC ruled that an order by the trial court allowing a party to present his evidence ex-parte
without due notice of pre-trial to the other party constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Here, the trial court failed to
issue a proper notice of pre-trial to PNB. Thus, it committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the Order
dated March 8, 2006 allowing Spouses Perez to present their evidence ex-parte. Considering that the trial court’s
action in issuing such order constituted grave abuse of its discretion, PNB availed of the proper remedy when it
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

Nevertheless, even with the existence of the remedy of appeal, this Court has, in certain cases, allowed a writ of
certiorari where the order complained of is a patent nullity. In the instant case, the lack of notice of pre-trial
rendered all subsequent proceedings null and void. Hence, the CA was correct in not dismissing the petition for
certiorari.

Moreover, it is a basic tenet that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original and independent action. It is
not a part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of. Neither does
it "interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary periods involved in the
proceedings, unless an application for a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to the appellate court is
granted." Evidently, the argument that the petition for certiorari is precluded by the motion for reconsideration and
the petition for relief from judgment filed before the trial court is untenable.

(9) RGM INDUSTRIES, INC. v. UNITED PACIFIC CAPITAL CORPORATION

G.R. No. 194781. June 27, 2012.
By: Apol Samson

Doctrine: Oft-repeated is the rule that petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court may be brought
only on questions of law, not on questions of fact.

Facts: At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The respondent is a
domestic corporation engaged in the business of lending and financing, it granted a thirty million peso short-term
credit facility in favor of the petitioner. The loan amount was sourced from individual funders on the basis of a
direct-match facility for which a series of promissory notes were issued by the petitioner for the payment of the
loan. The petitioner failed to satisfy the said promissory notes as they fell due and the loan had to be assumed in
full by the respondent which thereby stepped into the shoes of the individual funders. Consequently, the petitioner
issued in favor of the respondent a consolidated promissory note in the principal amount of P27,852,075.98 for a
term of fourteen (14) days and maturing on April 28, 1998. The stipulated interest on the consolidated promissory
note was 32% per annum. In case of default, a penalty charge was imposed in an amount equivalent to 8% per
month of the outstanding amount due and unpaid computed from the date of default. The petitioner failed to
satisfy the consolidated promissory note, the principal balance of which as of April 28, 1998 was P27,668,167.87.
Respondent thus sent demand letters to the petitioner but the latter failed to pay and instead asked for
restructuring of the loan. The respondent declined the request and filed the herein complaint for collection of sum
of money against the petitioner. The petitioner asserted that the respondent unilaterally imposed the increased
interest rates in violation of the principle of mutuality of contracts. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment but modified the interest rates and penalty charges imposed. The CA
held that the interest rates levied by the respondent were excessive and unconscionable hence, must be reduced to
12% per annum. The CA likewise lowered the penalty charges to 2% per month. Its motion for reconsideration of
the foregoing issuance having been denied, the petitioner interposed the present petition arguing that the modified
interest rates and penalty charges decreed by the CA are still exorbitant and that the CA failed to appreciate the
partial payments already made when it upheld the amount of P27,668,167.87 as petitioner's outstanding balance.

Issue: Whether or not petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court may be brought only on questions
of law, not on questions of fact.

Held: YES! The issue on partial payments and their application to the outstanding balance involves a calibration of
the evidence presented, hence, factual in nature and not reviewable in the petition at bar. Oft-repeated is the rule
that petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court may be brought only on questions of law, not on
questions of fact. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the courts a quo, in concluding the outstanding balance of
the petitioner, have both carefully considered and appreciated the evidence of partial payments adduced. As found
by the CA, the payments made by the petitioner before the complaint was filed were duly deducted from the
outstanding balance; while the payments made during the pendency of the case were applied to the due and
outstanding penalty charges.

We affirm the interest rate decreed by the CA, stipulated interest rates are illegal if they are unconscionable and
courts are allowed to temper interest rates when necessary. In exercising this vested power to determine what is
iniquitous and unconscionable, the Court must consider the circumstances of each case. What may be iniquitous
and unconscionable in one case, may be just in another.

We cannot uphold the petitioner's invocation of our ruling in DBP v. Court of Appeals, wherein the interest rate
imposed was reduced to 10% per annum. The overriding circumstance prompting such pronouncement was the
regular payments made by the borrower. Evidently, such fact is wanting in the case at bar, hence, the petitioner
cannot demand for a similar interest rate. The circumstances attendant herein are similar to those in Trade &
Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Roblett Industrial Construction Corporation wherein we
levied the legal interest rate of 12% per annum. However, pursuant to Bank of the Philippine Islands, Inc. v. Yu,
we deem it proper to further reduce the penalty charge decreed by the CA from 2% per month to 1% per month or
12% per annum in view of the following factors: (1) respondent has already received P7,504,522.27 in penalty
charges, and (2) the loan extended to respondent was a short-term credit facility. The penalty charge is reduced to
1% per month or 12% per annum; and the attorney's fees is reduced to 1% of the total unpaid obligation.

(10)
Sarona v NLRC
G.R. No. 185280. January 18, 2012.
Roma

DOCTRINE: A Rule 45 Petition should be confined to questions of law. Nevertheless, this Court has the power to
resolve a question of fact, such as whether a corporation is a mere alter ego of another entity or whether the
corporate fiction was invoked for fraudulent or malevolent ends, if the findings in assailed decision is not supported
by the evidence on record or based on a misapprehension of facts.

FACTS:
Sarona was a security guard of Spectre. He was later made to sign a resignation letter to terminate his services
therein and to sign an application for employment for respondent Royale Security Agency. He was made to work
for some of its clients but later was told by the GM of Spectre that he will not anymore be given assignments. He
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and LA Gutierrez ruled ruled that he was illegally dismissed. However, the LA
refused to apply the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil as alleged by Sarona. The LA reasoned that the mere
fact that Spectre and Royale has the same officers and use the same office cannot justify the doctrine’s application,
since Spectre is a sole proprietorship. The LA said that the claim of Sarona should be against the estate of its sole
owner, since he already died.

The respondents appealed LA Gutierrez’s decision to the NLRC, claiming that the finding of illegal dismissal was
attended with grave abuse of discretion. This appeal was, however,
dismissed by the NLRC. The petitioner, on the other hand, did not appeal LA Gutierrez’s decision but opted to raise
the validity of LA Gutierrez’s adverse findings with respect to piercing Royale’s corporate personality and
computation of his separation pay in his
Reply to the respondents’ Memorandum of Appeal. (Sarona wants the doctrine to apply so the separation pay will
be computed to include his services in Spectre). However, as the filing of an appeal is the prescribed remedy and
no aspect of the decision can be overturned by a mere reply, the NLRC dismissed the petitioner’s efforts to reverse
LA Gutierrez’s disposition of these issues. Effectively, the petitioner had already waived his right to question LA
Gutierrez’s Decision when he failed to file an appeal within the reglementary period.

Sarona then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to the CA, which recognized the petition. The CA said that
errors not assigned on appeal may be reviewed as technicalities should not serve as bar to the full adjudication of
cases. However, the CA refused as well to apply the doctrine of corporate veil. Sarona filed this instant Petition for
Review under Rule 45.

ISSUE: WON the SC may review questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition for review
HELD: The question of whether one corporation is merely an alter ego of another is purely one of fact. So is the
question of whether a corporation is a paper company, a sham or subterfuge. As a general rule, this Court is not a
trier of facts and a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must exclusively raise
questions of law. Nevertheless, this Court will not hesitate to deviate from what are clearly procedural guidelines
and disturb and strike down the findings of the CA and those of the labor tribunals if there is a showing that they
are unsupported by the evidence on record or there was a patent misappreciation of facts.

Evidence abound showing that Royale is a mere continuation or successor of Sceptre and fraudulent objectives are
behind Royale’s incorporation and the petitioner’s subsequent employment therein. The management and operation
of Spectre and Royale was under the control of one person: Aida. She took over as soon as the license to operate
was transferred to Royale. The manner by which the petitioner was made to resign from Sceptre and how he
became an employee of Royale suggest the perverted use of the legal fiction of the separate corporate personality.
It is undisputed that the petitioner tendered his resignation and that he applied at Royale at the instance of Spectre
and on the impression it created that these were necessary for his continued employment. That the petitioner was
made to resign from Sceptre and apply with Royale only to be unceremoniously terminated shortly thereafter leads
to the ineluctable conclusion that there was intent to violate the petitioner’s rights as an employee, particularly his
right to security of tenure. For the piercing doctrine to apply, it is of no consequence if Sceptre is a sole
proprietorship because it is the act of hiding behind the separate and distinct personalities of juridical entities to
perpetuate fraud, commit illegal acts, evade one’s obligations that the equitable piercing doctrine was formulated
to address and prevent.
 (11)
Spouses Sta. Maria vs. Court of Appeals and Spouses Fajardo
GR 127549 January 28, 1998
Digest by Valencia, Emmanuelle Nicole

Doctrine:
Rule is settled that the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law.
Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive, except in certain instances (see “Notes” at the end
of the digest for the enumeration).

Facts:
Spouses Fajardo are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Paco, Obando, Bulacan, Lot No. 124.
They acquired the lot under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 6 February 1992, executed by the vendors, Pedro
Sanchez, et. al.
Lot No. 124 is surrounded by:
Northeast portion - Lot 1 (a fishpond);
Southeast portion - Lot 126 (owned by Florentino Cruz);
Southwest portion - Lots 6-a and 6-b (owned by Spouses Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria,
respectively); and
Northwest portion - Lot 122 (owned by Jacinto family).
On 17 February 1992, Spouses Fajardo filed a complaint against Spouses Sta. Maria or Florcerfida Sta.
Maria for the establishment of an easement of right of way. Spouses Fajardo claimed that their lot, Lot 124, is
surrounded by properties belonging to other persons, including those of the Sta. Marias; since Spouses Fajardo
have no adequate outlet to the provincial road, an easement of right of way passing through either of the
alternative parties’ properties, which are directly abutting the provincial road, would be Spouses Fajardo’s only
convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the said road. It was also claimed that the predecessors in
interest of the Spouses Fajardo had been passing through these properties in their ingress and egress from Lot
124, and that the mother of the Sta. Marias had promised Spouses Fajardo’s predecessors in interest to grant an
easement of right of way, since there was no access to the road from Lot 124. Spouses Fajardo claimed that the
Sta. Marias did not grant them an easement, despite request and referral of the dispute to barangay officials.
The Sta. Marias filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that the lower court lacked jurisdiction, since the
Fajardos had failed to refer the matter to the barangay lupon.
On 18 May 1992, the lower court denied the motion on the premise of substantial compliance. On 25 May
1992, the Sta. Marias filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. On 24
June 1992, the lower court denied the notice of appeal for lack of merit. The Sta. Marias filed a petition for review
on certiorari of the 18 May order.
On 8 July 1992, the third division of the Supreme Court denied the petition for failure to comply with the
requirements. On 20 July 1992, the motion for reconsideration was denied with finality.
The Sta. Marias then filed their answer in the lower court, where they alleged that granting an easement
in favour of Spouses Fajardo would cause them great damage and inconvenience, and that there is another access
route from Lot 124 to the main road, through the property of Florentino Cruz, which also abutted the main road,
and was being offered for sale.
The trial court ordered an ocular inspection, and found that there was no other way through which the
Spouses Fajardo could establish a right of way in order to reach the provincial road, other than directly traversing
the land of the Sta. Marias. It also found that there were no significant structures that would be affected, there
was sufficient vacant space between the houses, and that the property would provide the shortest route from Lot
124 to the provincial road. Consequently, on 30 June 1994, the prayer for easement was granted.
The Sta. Marias appealed to the Court of Appeals, which agreed with the trial court. On 18 December
1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issues:
(1) Can the Supreme Court resolve questions of fact in a case brought before it from the Court of Appeals via
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court?

(2) Was the decision in granting the easement of right of way correct?

Ruling / Ratio:
(1) NO.
Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive, except in certain instances. (Please see “notes”
section below for the enumeration).
A perusal of the pleadings of the assailed decision yields no ground for the application of any of the
exceptions.

(2) YES.
The findings of fact of both courts satisfied the requirements for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory
servitude of right of way:
1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.);
and
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest
(Art. 650).
Among the three (3) possible servient estates, it is clear that the Sta. Marias’ property would afford the
shortest distance from Spouses Fajardo’s property to the provincial road. Moreover, it is the least prejudicial since
as found by the lower court.

Notes:
Findings of fact in cases brought before the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals via R45 are conclusive,
except:
1. when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
2. when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
3. when there is grave abuse of discretion;
4. when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. when the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
7. when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
8. when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
9. when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent; and
10. when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.

(12)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DPWH v. ORTIGAS AND COMPANY
 By: Valencia, Mary Clydeen L.

DOCTRINE: An appeal by notice of appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals is proper if the appellant raises questions of fact or both questions of fact and
questions of law; while an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely questions of law
must, in all cases, be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

F: Respondent, Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, is the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 5-B-2 with
an area of 70,278 square meters in Pasig City. Upon the request of the DPWH, respondent Ortigas caused the
segregation of its property into five lots and reserved one portion for road widening for the C-5 flyover project. It
designated Lot 5-B-2-A, a 1,445-square-meter portion of its property, for the road widening of Ortigas Avenue.

The C-5-Ortigas Avenue flyover was completed in 1999, utilizing only 396 square meters of the 1,445-square-
meter allotment for the project. Consequently, respondent Ortigas further subdivided Lot 5-B-2-A into two lots: Lot
5-B-2-A-1, which was the portion actually used for road widening and Lot 5-B-2-A-2, which was the unutilized
portion of Lot 5-B-2-A.

On 14 February 2001, respondent Ortigas filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for authority to sell to the
government Lot 5-B-2-A-1. Respondent Ortigas alleged that the DPWH requested the conveyance of the property
for road widening purposes. On 11 June 2001, the RTC issued an order authorizing the sale of Lot 5-B-2-A-1 to
petitioner Republic of the Philippines. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the same was denied.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a notice of appeal, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the
ground that an order or judgment denying a motion for reconsideration is not appealable. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, but the same was denied on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
noted that even if the order denying the motion for reconsideration was appealable, the appeal was still dismissible
for lack of jurisdiction, because petitioner Republic of the Philippines raised only a question of law.

I: Did the Office of the Solicitor General commit a fatal mistake when it brought by way of appeal the denial of its
motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals?

H: YES. Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals taken from the Regional Trial Court to the
Court of Appeals raising only pure questions of law are not reviewable by the Court of Appeals. In which case, the
appeal shall not be transferred to the appropriate court. It shall be dismissed outright. Thus, an appeal by notice of
appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeals is proper if the appellant raises questions of fact or both questions of fact and questions of law; while an
appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely questions of law must, in all cases, be taken to
the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

There is a question of law when the appellant raises an issue as to what law shall be applied on a given set of facts.
Questions of law do "not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented." Its resolution
rests solely on the application of a law given the circumstances. There is a question of fact when the court is
required to examine the truth or falsity of the facts presented. A question of fact "invites a review of the evidence."

The sole issue raised by petitioner Republic of the Philippines to the Court of Appeals is whether respondent
Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to it only by donation, in accordance with Section 50 of PD 1529. This
question involves the interpretation and application of the provision. It does not require the Court of Appeals to
examine the truth or falsity of the facts presented. Neither does it invite a review of the evidence. The issue raised
before the Court of Appeals was, therefore, a question purely of law. The proper mode of appeal is through a
petition for review under Rule 45. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal on this ground.

Nevertheless, Rule 41, Section 1(a) of the Rules of Court, which provides that "[n]o appeal may be taken from [a]n
order denying a x x x motion for reconsideration," is based on the implied premise in the same section that the
judgment or order does not completely dispose of the case.

Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders. A motion for reconsideration may
be considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if "it puts an end to a particular matter," leaving the court with
nothing else to do but to execute the decision. Thus, an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration
of an order of dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself." It is an appeal from
a final decision or order.

The RTC order denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ motion for reconsideration of the decision granting
respondent Ortigas the authority to sell its property to the government was not an interlocutory order, because it
completely disposed of a particular matter. An appeal from it would not cause delay in the administration of justice.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, was properly dismissed because the
former used the wrong mode of appeal.

In any event, the Supreme Court resolved the substantive issue on whether respondent Ortigas may not sell and
may only donate its property to the government in accordance with Section 50 of PD 1529.

Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 does not apply in a case that is the proper subject of an expropriation
proceeding. Thus, respondent Ortigas may sell its property to the government. It must be compensated, because
its property was taken and utilized for public road purposes.

(13)
Altres v. Empleo
G.R. No. 180986. December 10, 2008
By: Alba, Ma. Angela

Doctrine: When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is
a question of law.

Facts: Sometime in July 2003, the city government of Iligan City publicly announced the existence of the vacant
career positions in the city government. Mayor Quijano issued appointments to petitioners. Petitioners and other
applicants submitted their applications for the different positions. Toward the end of his term or on May 27, June 1,
and June 24, 2004, Mayor Quijano issued appointments to petitioners.

The Sangguniang Panglungsod then issued two resolutions. The first was addressed to the CSC suspension of
action on the processing of appointments to all vacant positions in the plantilla of the city government until the
enactment of a new budget while the second was directed the officers of the City Human Resource Management
Office to hold in abeyance the transmission of all appointments signed or to be signed by the incumbent mayor in
order to ascertain whether these had been hurriedly prepared or carefully considered and whether the matters of
promotion and/or qualifications had been properly addressed in view of the Sanggunian’s stated policy against
“midnight appointments.”

Respondent city accountant Empleo did not thus issue a certification as to availability of funds for the payment of
salaries and wages of petitioners, as required by a CSC Memorandum Circular, and the other respondents did not
sign petitioners’ position description forms pursuant to the two resolutions.

The CSC Field Office disapproved the appointments issued to petitioners invariably due to lack of certification of
availability of funds. On appeal, the CSC Regional Office dismissed the appeal, explaining that its function in
approving appointments is only ministerial, hence, if an appointment lacks a requirement prescribed by the civil
service law, rules and regulations, it would disapprove it without delving into the reasons why the requirement was
not complied with.

Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC against respondent Empleo or his successor in office for him
to issue a certification of availability of funds for the payment of the salaries and wages of petitioners, and for his
co-respondents or their successors in office to sign the position description forms. The RTC denied petitioners’
petition for mandamus, holding that, while it is the ministerial duty of the city accountant to certify as to the
availability of budgetary allotment to which expenses and obligations may properly be charged under Sec.
474(b)(4) the Local Government Code, the city accountant cannot be compelled to issue a certification as to
availability of funds for the payment of salaries and wages of petitioners as this ministerial function pertains to the
city treasurer pursuant to Sec. 344 of the same Code.Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence,
the present petition for review on certiorari.
Respondents argue that petitioners raise questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari
as the same must raise only questions of law. They entertain doubt on whether petitioners seek the payment of
their salaries, and assert that the question of whether the city accountant can be compelled to issue a certification
of availability of funds under the circumstances herein obtaining is a factual issue.

(Just in case itanong din ni sir…

The lone issue in the present petition is whether it is Sec. 474(b) (4) or Sec. 344 of the Local Government Code
which applies to the requirement of certification of availability of funds. Respondents assail as defective the
verification and certification against forum shopping attached to the petition as it bears the signature of only 11 out
of the 59 petitioners, and no competent evidence of identity was presented by the signing petitioners. In the
present case, the signing of the verification by only 11 out of the 59 petitioners already sufficiently assures the
Court that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation; that the pleading is filed in good faith; and that the signatories are unquestionably real parties-in-
interest who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
petition.

With respect to petitioners’ certification against forum shopping, the failure of the other petitioners to sign as they
could no longer be contacted or are no longer interested in pursuing the case need not merit the outright dismissal
of the petition without defeating the administration of justice. The non-signing petitioners are, however, dropped
as parties to the case.)

Issue: Whether the issue raised by petitioners involves a question of fact, which is not proper in a Rule 45 petition
for review on certiorari.

Held: No. The issue raised by petitioner involves a pure question of law and thus, Rule 45 is the proper remedy.

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a
certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevance of specific surrounding
circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. When
there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of
law.

In the case at bar, the issue posed for resolution does not call for the reevaluation of the probative value of the
evidence presented, but rather the determination of which of the provisions of the Local Government Code applies
to the Civil Service Memorandum Circular requiring a certificate of availability of funds relative to the approval of
petitioners’ appointments.

(14)
Alonso v. Cebu Counrty Club Inc.
G.R. No. 139876, January 31, 2002
By: Arid, Hannah Mhae G.

Doctrine: In an appeal via certiorari, petitioners may raise only questions of law, which shall be distinctly set
forth. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the
review of errors of law and not to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again, as its findings of facts are deemed
final and conclusive.

In this appeal, petitioners raise five (5) issues, all of which involve questions of fact that have been resolved by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals in favor of the Cebu Country Club, Inc.
Facts: The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto that of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Cebu City, declaring that the title to the contested Lot No. 727, Banilad Friar Lands
Estate, Cebu City, was validly re-constituted in the name of the Cebu Country Club, Inc. and ordering petitioners to
pay attorney’s fees of P400,000.00, and litigation expenses of P51,000.00, and costs.

Petitioner Francisco M. Alonso, who died pendente lite and substituted by his legal heirs, a lawyer by profession,
the only son and sole heir of the late Tomas N. Alonso and Asuncion Medalle, who died on June 16, 1962 and
August 18, 1963, respectively. Cebu Country Club, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine Laws the purpose of which is to cater to the recreation and leisure of its members.

Sometime in 1992, petitioner discovered documents and records — Friar Lands Sale Certificate
Register/Installment Record Certificate No. 734, Sales Certificate No. 734 and Assignment of Sales Certificate —
showing that his father acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government of the
Philippine Islands in or about the year 1911 in accordance with the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120). The documents
show that one Leoncio Alburo, the original vendee of Lot No. 727, assigned his sales certificate to petitioner’s
father on December 18, 1911, who completed the required installment payments thereon under Act No. 1120 and
was consequently issued Patent No. 14353 on March 24, 1926. On March 27, 1926, the Director of Lands, acting
for and in behalf of the government, executed a final deed of sale in favor of petitioner’s father Tomas N. Alonso. It
appears, however, that the deed was not registered with the Register of Deeds because of lack of technical
requirements, among them the approval of the deed of sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
as required by law.

Upon investigation of the status of the land, petitioner found out from the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Cebu
City that title to Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate had been "administratively reconstituted from the
owner’s duplicate" on July 26, 1948 under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-1310 (T-11351) in the name of
United Service Country Club, Inc., predecessor of Cebu Country Club, Inc. On March 8, 1960, upon order of the
Court of First Instance, the name of the registered owner in TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11531) was changed to Cebu
Country Club, Inc. Moreover, the TCT provides that the reconstituted title was a transfer from TCT No. 1021.

In the firm belief that petitioner’s father is still the rightful owner of Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate
since there are no records showing that he ever sold or conveyed the disputed property to anyone, on July 7,
1992, petitioner made a formal demand upon Cebu Country Club, Inc. to restore to him the ownership and
possession of said lot within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. Cebu Country Club, Inc., however, denied
petitioner’s claim and refused to deliver possession to him.

Left with no other recourse, on September 25, 1992, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, a
complaint for declaration of nullity and non-existence of deed/title, cancellation of certificates of title and recovery
of property against defendant Cebu Country Club, Inc. He alleged that the Cebu Country Club, Inc. fraudulently
and illegally managed to secure in its name the administrative reconstitution of TCT No. RT-13 10 (T-11351)
despite the absence of any transaction of specific land dealing that would show how Lot No. 727 had come to pass
to Cebu Country Club, Inc.; that TCT No. 11351 which is the source title of TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351) does not
pertain to Lot No. 727; that the reconstituted title which was issued on July 26, 1948, did not contain the technical
description of the registered land which was inserted only on March 8, 1960, twenty-eight (28) years after the
issuance of TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351), hence, Cebu Country Club, Inc.’s title is null and void. Petitioner thus
prayed for the cancellation of TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351) and the issuance of another title in his name as the sole
heir of Tomas Alonso, for Cebu Country Club, Inc. to deliver possession of the property to petitioner, and render an
accounting of the fruits and income of the land. Petitioner likewise prayed for the sum of P100, 000.00 by way of
attorney’s fees plus P500.00 per hearing as appearance fee, and P10, 000.00 as reasonable litigation expenses.

On November 5, 1992, Cebu Country Club, Inc. filed with the trial court its answer with counterclaim. It alleged
that petitioner had no cause of action against Cebu Country Club, Inc. since the same had prescribed and was
barred by laches, Cebu Country Club, Inc. having been in possession of the land since 1935 until the present in the
concept of an owner, openly, publicly, peacefully, exclusively, adversely, continuously, paying regularly the real
estate taxes thereon; that Cebu Country Club, Inc. acquired the lot in good faith and for value; that it caused the
administrative reconstitution of Lot No. 727 in 1948 from the owner’s duplicate, the original of TCT No. 11351
having been lost or destroyed during the war, pursuant to Republic Act No. 26, its implementing Circular, GLRO
Circular No. 178 and Circular No. 6 of the General Land Registration Office; that unlike Cebu Country Club, Inc.,
petitioner’s father never had any registered title under the Land Registration Act No. 496 nor did he pay the
necessary taxes on Lot No. 727 during his lifetime; that petitioner’s father knew that the United Service Country
Club, Inc., predecessor of Cebu Country Club, Inc. was occupying Lot No. 727 as owner; that petitioner’s father
never reconstituted his alleged title to Lot No. 727 but did so over Lot No. 810 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, a
lot adjacent to the disputed property, in 1946; that petitioner himself lived in Cebu City, a few kilometers away
from the land in litigation; that petitioner’s father or petitioner himself, both of whom are lawyers and the former a
congressman as well, for more than sixty (60) years, never made any demand on Cebu Country Club, Inc. for the
recovery of the property knowing fully well that said land was owned and utilized by Cebu Country Club, Inc. as its
main golf course. By way of counterclaim, Cebu Country Club, Inc. prayed for the award of attorney’s fees in the
amount of P900,000.00 and litigation expenses of P100,000.00, moral damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary
damages of P2,000,000.00.

Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff: declaring the contested property
or Lot 727 as legally belonging to the defendant; directing the plaintiff to pay attorney'’ fee of P400, 000.00; and
litigation expenses of P51, 000.00; and finally, with costs against the plaintiff.

After proceedings on appeal, on March 31, 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.

On April 30, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration; however, on October 2, 1997, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: 1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351).
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining respondent’s claim of ownership over Lot No. 727;
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the present action is barred by prescription and/or by laches;
4. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the doctrine of stare decisis;
5. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s award for damages in the form of attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses.

Held: 1. Reconstitution was based on the owner’s duplicate of the title, hence, there was no need for the covering
deed of sale or other modes of conveyance. Cebu Country Club, Inc. was admittedly in possession of the land since
long before the Second World War, or since 1931. In fact, the original title (TCT No. 11351) was issued to the
United Service Country Club, Inc. on November 19, 1931 as a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1021.
More importantly, Cebu Country Club, Inc. paid the realty taxes on the land even before the war, and tax
declarations covering the property showed the number of the TCT of the land. Cebu Country Club, Inc. produced
receipts showing real estate tax payments since 1949. On the other hand, petitioner failed to produce a single
receipt of real estate tax payment ever made by his father since the sales patent was issued to his father on March
24, 1926. Worse, admittedly petitioner could not show any torrens title ever issued to Tomas N. Alonso, because,
as said, the deed of sale executed on March 27, 1926 by the Director of Lands was not approved by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and could not be registered. "Under the law, it is the act of registration of the
deed of conveyance that serves as the operative act to convey the land registered under the Torrens system. The
act of registration creates constructive notice to the whole world of the fact of such conveyance." On this point,
petitioner alleges that Cebu Country Club, Inc. obtained its title by fraud in connivance with personnel of the
Register of Deeds in 1941 or in 1948, when the title was administratively reconstituted. Imputations of fraud must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner failed to adduce evidence of fraud. In an action for re-
conveyance based on fraud, he who charges fraud must prove such fraud in obtaining a title. "In this jurisdiction,
fraud is never presumed." The strongest suspicion cannot sway judgment or overcome the presumption of
regularity. "The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass."
Worse, the imputation of fraud was so tardily brought, some forty-four (44) years or sixty-one (61) years after its
supposed occurrence, that is, from the administrative reconstitution of title on July 26, 1948, or from the issuance
of the original title on November 19, 1931, that verification is rendered extremely difficult, if not impossible,
especially due to the supervening event of the second world war during which practically all public records were
lost or destroyed, or no longer available.

Petitioners next question the lack of technical description inscribed in the reconstituted title in Cebu Country Club,
Inc.’s name. This is not a bar to reconstitution of the title nor will it affect the validity of the reconstituted title. A
registered owner is given two (2) years to file a plan of such land with the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office. The two-year period is directory, not jurisdictional. In other words, the failure to submit the technical
description within two (2) years would not invalidate the title. At most, the failure to file such technical description
within the two-year period would bar a transfer of the title to a third party in a voluntary transaction.
2. Admittedly, neither petitioners nor their predecessor had any title to the land in question. The most that
petitioners could claim was that the Director of Lands issued a sales patent in the name of Tomas N. Alonso. The
sales patent, however, and even the corresponding deed of sale were not registered with the Register of Deeds and
no title was ever issued in the name of the latter. This is because there were basic requirements not complied with,
the most important of which was that the deed of sale executed by the Director of Lands was not approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence, the deed of sale was void. "Approval by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale." Moreover, Cebu Country Club, Inc. was in
possession of the land since 1931, and had been paying the real estate taxes thereon based on tax declarations in
its name with the title number indicated thereon. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes
are strong evidence of ownership. This Court has ruled that although tax declarations or realty tax payments are
not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for
no one in his right mind will be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.

Notwithstanding this fatal defect, the Court of Appeals ruled that "there was substantial compliance with the
requirement of Act No. 1120 to validly convey title to said lot to Tomas N. Alonso."

On this point, the Court of Appeals erred.

Under Act No. 1120, which governs the administration and disposition of friar lands, the purchase by an actual and
bona fide settler or occupant of any portion of friar land shall be "agreed upon between the purchaser and the
Director of Lands, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (mutatis
mutandis)."

In his Memorandum filed on May 25, 2001, the Solicitor General submitted to this Court certified copies of Sale
Certificate No. 734, in favor of Leoncio Alburo, and Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 734, in favor of Tomas N.
Alonso. Conspicuously, both instruments do not bear the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
the Interior. They also do not bear the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Only recently, in Jesus P. Liao v. Court of Appeals, the Court has ruled categorically that approval by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce of the sale of friar lands is indispensable for its validity, hence, the absence of such
approval made the sale null and void ab-initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such
sale or assignment. Consequently, petitioner Francisco’s father did not have any registerable title to the land in
question. Having none, he could not transmit anything to his sole heir, petitioner Francisco Alonso or the latter’s
heirs.

Consequently, we rule that neither Tomas N. Alonso nor his son Francisco M. Alonso or the latter’s heirs are the
lawful owners of Lot No. 727 in dispute. Neither has the respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc. been able to establish
a clear title over the contested estate. The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate
certificate of title in its original form and condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land
covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not
vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.

3. An action for re-conveyance is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another’s name, but then the action must be filed within ten years from the issuance of
the title since such issuance operates as a constructive notice." In addition, the action is barred by laches because
of the long delay before the filing of the case. Petitioner Francisco’s action in the court below was basically one of
re-conveyance. It was filed on September 25, 1992, sixty-one (61) years after the title was issued on November
19, 1931, and forty-four (44) years after its reconstitution on July 26, 1948.

4. Petitioners assert that as the Court of Appeals annulled Cebu Country Club, Inc.’s title in the Cabrera-Ingles
case, so too must the title in this case be declared void. In the first place, there is no identity of parties; secondly,
neither the titles to nor the parcels of land involved are the same. Consequently, the doctrine of res-judicata does
not apply. Momentarily casting aside the doctrine of res-judicata, there is an important moiety in the Cabrera-
Ingles case. There, the Director of Lands, after the administrative reconstitution of the title, issued a directive to
the Register of Deeds to register the lot in question in favor of Graciano Ingles. This superseded the administrative
reconstitution, rendering allegations of fraud irrelevant. Here, the Director of Lands did not issue a directive to
register the land in favor of Tomas N. Alonso. And worse, the sales patent and corresponding deed of sale executed
in 1926 are now stale.

5. An award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is proper under the circumstances provided for in Article
2208 of the Civil Code, one of which is when the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered and when the civil action or proceeding is clearly unfounded and where
defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. However, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals and
that of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, Branch 08. IN LIEU THEREOF, we DISMISS the complaint and
counterclaim of the parties in Civil Case No. CEB 12926 of the trial court. We declare that Lot No. 727 D-2 of the
Banilad Friar Lands Estate covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. 251, 232, and 253 legally belongs to the
Government of the Philippines.

(15)
Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 116216. June 20, 1997
By: Bernardo, Gerard

Doctrine: That an entry of judgment was effected by the Court of Appeals indicates that there was no valid service
upon the public respondent of the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. This is consistent with
the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties by public officers and offices.

Facts: Natalia Mendoza and her husband signed a promissory note dated July 10, 1978, for US$35,000.00 in favor
of Thomas and Nena Asuncion. The promissory note contains that the Mendozas will pay the Asuncions the amount
of $456.00 each month starting on April, 1978 and 120 consecutive months, thereafter. On April 1988, the entire
balance of principal and accrued interest then remaining unpaid shall be due and payable. Should default be made
in the payment of the interest and principal when due, the entire balance of principal and interest then remaining
unpaid shall become immediately due at the option of the holder of this note.

In 1982, the Mendozas defaulted.

The Asuncions filed a case for collection. After due trial, the trial court rendered its decision dated November 12,
1985, dismissing the case for lack of cause of action.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC, holding that the acceleration clause gave private respondents the right to
collect the full amount of the promissory note.

The Mendozas filed a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. One of the contention of
the The Asuncions is that the petition cannot be given due course at all considering that the decision
sought to be reviewed is already final, Respondent Court of Appeals having made an ‘Entry of
Judgment’ in C.A. G.R. No. CV-18016.

Issue: Whether or not the Mendozas may file for a petition for review on certiorari.

Held: No.

Not disputed or denied by petitioner is the fact that there was no valid service upon Respondent Court of Appeals
of the motion for extension of time to file the present petition. Although the motion for extension carried a
registry receipt purportedly sent to Respondent Court of Appeals, the affidavit of service attached
thereto did not state whether the service was effected by personal delivery, ordinary or registered
mail. That an entry of judgment was effected by the Court of Appeals, on the other hand, indicates that
there was no valid service upon the public respondent of the motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review and that, consequently, the CA Decision has become final.
This is consistent with the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties by public officers and offices. For
this reason alone, the dismissal of this petition is already in order.

Issue outside of procedure: Whether or not the Asuncions may invoke the acceleration clause.

Yes. Petitioner contends that upon default of the payment, she can invoke the second statement in the promissory
note which makes the obligation’s maturity date on April 1988.

The second statement provides for the discretionary exercise of leniency by private respondents. However, a
definite deadline is fixed—April 1988—when all obligations then unpaid shall become due and payable. The third
statement is solely for the benefit of the private respondents if ever they choose to accelerate the total amount of
the obligations upon default in the payment of any of the installments. In short, the creditors are given by the
promissory note two options in case of default by the debtor: one, to wait for April 1988 before collecting the
unpaid installments; and two, to invoke the acceleration clause and collect the entire balance immediately without
waiting for April 1988.