IR2137 Foreign Policy Analysis

Foreign policy analysis
C. Alden
IR2137
2011
Undergraduate study in
Economics, Management,
Finance and the Social Sciences
This subject guide is for a 200 course offered as part of the University of London
International Programmes in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences.
This is equivalent to Level 5 within the Framework for Higher Education Qualifications in
England, Wales and Northern Ireland (FHEQ).
For more information about the University of London International Programmes
undergraduate study in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences, see:
www.londoninternational.ac.uk
This guide was prepared for the University of London International Programmes by:
Dr Chris Alden, Reader in International Relations, Department for International Relations,
London School of Economics and Political Science.
This is one of a series of subject guides published by the University. We regret that due to
pressure of work the author is unable to enter into any correspondence relating to, or arising
from, the guide. If you have any comments on this subject guide, favourable or unfavourable,
please use the form at the back of this guide.
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© University of London 2006
Reprinted with minor revisions 2011, 2015
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Contents
Contents
Introduction............................................................................................................. 1
Aims of the course.......................................................................................................... 1
Learning outcomes......................................................................................................... 1
The structure of this guide.............................................................................................. 1
How to use this guide..................................................................................................... 2
Hours of study................................................................................................................ 2
The syllabus.................................................................................................................... 2
Reading......................................................................................................................... 3
Online study resources.................................................................................................... 6
The examination............................................................................................................. 7
Chapter 1: Foreign policy analysis: an overview..................................................... 9
Essential reading............................................................................................................ 9
Recommended reading................................................................................................... 9
Further reading............................................................................................................... 9
Additional resources....................................................................................................... 9
Aims and learning objectives.......................................................................................... 9
Learning outcomes......................................................................................................... 9
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 10
Realism: the state, national interest and foreign policy................................................... 11
Behaviourism: the ‘minds of men’ and foreign policy decision making............................ 11
Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy......................................................................... 12
Pluralism: linkage politics and foreign policy.................................................................. 12
FPA and the study of International Relations................................................................. 13
A reminder of your learning outcomes........................................................................... 13
Sample examination questions...................................................................................... 13
Part 1: Decision making......................................................................................... 15
Chapter 2: Power, capability and instruments ...................................................... 17
Essential reading.......................................................................................................... 17
Recommended reading................................................................................................. 17
Further reading............................................................................................................. 17
Additional resources..................................................................................................... 17
Aims and learning objectives........................................................................................ 17
Learning outcomes....................................................................................................... 17
Introduction................................................................................................................. 18
Foreign policy and power.............................................................................................. 18
Formulating foreign policy: the national interest and the balance of power.................... 19
Instruments of foreign policy......................................................................................... 20
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 22
Chapter 3: Rational decision making.................................................................... 23
Further reading............................................................................................................. 23
i
137 Foreign policy analysis

Introduction................................................................................................................. 24
Rationality and foreign policy........................................................................................ 24
A critique of rational decision making........................................................................... 25
Reconciling rational and non-rational approaches: bounded rationality,
cybernetics and polyheuristics....................................................................................... 26
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 27
Chapter 4: Perception, cognition and personality ................................................ 29
Further reading............................................................................................................. 29
Introduction................................................................................................................. 30
The role of perception................................................................................................... 30
The role of cognition..................................................................................................... 31
The role of personality.................................................................................................. 31
The role of the group.................................................................................................... 32
Critique of the psychological approach to foreign policy decision making....................... 33
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 33
Chapter 5: Bureaucratic politics............................................................................ 35
Further reading............................................................................................................. 35
Introduction................................................................................................................. 35
Allison’s three models of foreign policy decision making................................................ 36
Bureaucratic politics and its critics................................................................................. 37
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 38
Part 2: Actors and structures................................................................................. 39
Chapter 6: Major, middle and small powers.......................................................... 41
Further reading............................................................................................................. 41
Major, middle, small and emerging powers.................................................................... 42
Major powers and the search for primacy...................................................................... 42
Middle powers and multilateralism............................................................................... 43
ii
Contents
Small states and the search for security......................................................................... 44

Emerging powers.......................................................................................................... 45
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 46
Chapter 7: The role of the external environment.................................................. 47
Further reading............................................................................................................. 47
Introduction................................................................................................................. 48
The role of the material environment: geography, natural resources,
economic development................................................................................................. 48
Problems with the material environment and foreign policy........................................... 49
The role of the international political environment: trade, security
and international law................................................................................................... 49
The external environment, determinism and foreign policy............................................. 51
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 51
Chapter 8: The role of the domestic environment................................................ 53
Further reading............................................................................................................. 53
Introduction................................................................................................................. 54
The sociological approach: state structures and regimes................................................ 54
The ‘structuralist’ approach: economic systems and social class..................................... 55
The pluralist approach: sub-state actors and interests.................................................... 56
Foreign policy decision making and the ‘two-level game’............................................... 58
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 58
Part 3: Foreign policy in the era of globalisation.................................................. 61
Chapter 9: Transnational actors and foreign policy.............................................. 63
Further reading............................................................................................................. 63
Introduction................................................................................................................. 63
Inter-governmental organisations and foreign policy...................................................... 64
Non-state actors and foreign policy............................................................................... 65
Complex interdependence and foreign policy ............................................................... 66
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 67
iii

Chapter 10: The foreign policy of states in transition........................................... 69
Further reading............................................................................................................. 69
Introduction................................................................................................................. 69
Transitional foreign policy and international recognition................................................ 70
Transitional foreign policy and domestic structure.......................................................... 70
Transitional foreign policy and charismatic leadership.................................................... 71
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 72
Chapter 11: Conclusion......................................................................................... 73
Aims and learning outcomes......................................................................................... 73
Foreign policy analysis and International Relations........................................................ 73
Appendix 1: Sample examination paper............................................................... 75
Appendix 2: Advice on answering the Sample examination paper....................... 77
Specific comments on questions.................................................................................... 77
iv
Introduction
Introduction
This subject guide provides an introduction to the field of foreign policy

analysis. Foreign policy is, to use Christopher Hill’s definition, ‘purposive
action with the view towards promoting the interests of a single political
community or state’.1 The study of foreign policy is referred to as foreign 1
Hill, C. The changing
policy analysis, and its focus is the intentions and actions of (primarily) politics of foreign
policy. (Basingstoke:
states aimed at the external world and the response of other actors (again,
Palgrave, 2003) [ISBN
primarily states) to these actions. This course is not designed to give 0333754239] p.285
you detailed exposure to the changing foreign policies of any particular
country, though of course you will have many opportunities to learn about
the foreign policies of major, middle and small powers through the reading
material. It is aimed at giving you the tools to analyse, interpret and,
ultimately, understand the dynamics of foreign policy generally so that you
might apply these to your study of the role of states in international affairs.
Aims of the course

The aims of this course are to:
• introduce you to the central concepts in foreign policy analysis
• develop your comparative skills of analysis of differing foreign policies
in practice
• promote critical engagement with the foreign policy analysis literature
and enable you to display this engagement by developing an ability to
present, substantiate and defend complex arguments.
Learning outcomes
By the end of this course, and having completed the Essential readings and
activities, you should be able to:
• identify and assess the processes involved in foreign policy decision
making
• discuss the contexts, pressures and constraints with which foreign
policy makers have to deal
• conduct comparative analysis of foreign policy without losing sense of
historical context.
The structure of this guide

This subject guide consists of 10 chapters and a concluding chapter which
provides a summary perspective on the issues covered in the course.
Chapter 1 is an overview of the field of foreign policy analysis and its
relationship to International Relations, while subsequent chapters are
grouped into three parts:
• Part 1 focuses on the decision-making process in foreign policy.
• Part 2 focuses on the actors and structures involved in foreign policy.
• Part 3 examines the role and impact of rapid globalisation on the
foreign policy process.
Following the overview on foreign policy analysis, Part 1 introduces you
to the state and the setting of foreign policy, including the role of power,
1
rationality and psychological approaches to understanding the dynamics

involved in individual and group decision making. It concludes with an
analysis of the part played by bureaucracies in shaping foreign policy.
Part 2 provides you with an introduction to the key actors in foreign
policy, namely states, and assesses their foreign policy orientation in terms
of a hierarchy of power and capability. This is followed by an examination
of the differing impacts of the external or material environment and the
domestic environment on foreign policy.
Part 3 looks at the changing international system and how the overall
rise of transnationalism, which has fostered a growth in linkages
between states, intergovernmental organisations and non-state actors,
has challenged the state’s pre-eminence in international affairs. This is
followed by an examination of the onset of democratic transitions within
many states in the contemporary era and how this has affected foreign
policy making in these states.
Finally, the conclusion summarises the main themes in the subject guide
and discusses the relationship between foreign policy analysis and
International Relations.
How to use this guide

For some courses that you study, you are directed to read your essential
textbooks after you have worked through the chapter in the guide. For this
course, the best thing to do is skim-read through the chapter in the guide
to give you an idea of what the chapter is about, then familiarise yourself
with the assigned readings in your textbooks. Then work slowly and
carefully through the chapters, and take note of the learning outcomes.
When you have finished the chapter make sure that you can ‘tick off’ all of
the points you should have covered. If you can’t, go back and read again
carefully. Recommended and Further Readings may be useful to consult as
well, both for pursuing a topic in depth and for additional clarity around a
particular idea or event.
Hours of study
If you are studying for this course over the course of a standard academic
year we would suggest that you study for no less than six hours each week
and preferably more if you are to do all the reading and thinking required
to gain higher marks. If you are taking more time to prepare for the
examination, adjust this figure. The course is equivalent to one LSE course
and full-time students study four courses in a year.
The syllabus
If taken as part of a BSc degree, 11 Introduction to international
relations must be passed before this course may be attempted.
This course examines the key concepts and schools of thought in foreign
policy analysis, concentrating particularly on the process of decision
making, the internal and external factors which influence foreign policy
decisions, the instruments available to foreign policy decision makers and
the effect of changes in the international system on foreign policy. The
course combines a discussion of these theories with their application to
selected countries in the north, the south, international organisations and
transnational actors.
2
Introduction
The principal themes to be addressed by the course are:

• the role and relevance of foreign policy in the era of globalisation
• how different theoretical approaches to foreign policy analysis shape
our understanding of foreign policy
• the role of leadership, the bureaucracy and interest groups in setting
the state’s foreign policy agenda
• what challenges face states in constructing a new foreign policy
• the scope for affecting change in the international system by non-state
actors.
Reading
The reading for this course is divided into three categories: Essential,
Recommended and Further.
You are advised to purchase or have regular access to the textbooks listed
as Essential reading. You are not required to read either the Recommended
or Further reading, but they should be considered in that order of
preference.
Essential reading
Alden, C. and A. Aran Foreign policy analysis – new approaches. (London:
Routledge, 2011) [ISBN 9780415427999].
Clarke, M. and B. White (eds) Understanding foreign policy: the foreign policy
systems approach. (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989) [ISBN 9781852781255].
Hermann, C. ‘Changing course: when governments choose to redirect foreign
policy’, International Studies Quarterly 34(1) 1990, pp.3–22.
Hill, C. The changing politics of foreign policy. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003)
[ISBN 9780333754238].
Lobell, S., N. Prisman, J. Taliaferro (eds) Neoclassical realism, the state
and foreign policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
[ISBN 9780521731928]
Neack, L., J. Hey and P. Heaney (eds) Foreign policy analysis: continuity and
change in its second generation. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice
Hall, 1995) [ISBN 9780130605757]. Alternatively, if you are having
difficulty obtaining a copy of this textbook there is a suitable alternative
by the same author:
Neack, L. The New Foreign Policy: US and Comparative Foreign Policy
in the 21st Century. (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2002)
[ISBN 9780742501478].
Smith, S., A. Hadfield and T. Dunne (eds) Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) [ISBN 9780199215294].
Webber, M. and M. Smith Foreign policy in a transformed world. (Harlow:
Prentice Hall, 2002) [ISBN 9780139087578].
Detailed reading references in this subject guide refer to the editions of the
set textbooks listed above. New editions of one or more of these textbooks
may have been published by the time you study this course. You can use
a more recent edition of any of the books; use the detailed chapter and
section headings and the index to identify relevant readings. Also check
the virtual learning environment (VLE) regularly for updated guidance on
readings.
Further and recommended reading

Please note that as long as you read the Essential reading you are then free
to read around the subject area in any text, paper or online resource. You
3
will need to support your learning by reading as widely as possible and by

thinking about how these principles apply in the real world. To help you
read extensively, you have free access to the VLE and University of London
Online Library (see below).
Other useful texts for this course include:
Alden, C. China in Africa (London: Zed 2007).
Alden, C. and M. Vieira ‘The new diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil
and India and trilateralism’, Third World Quarterly 26(7) 2005, pp.1077–096.
Allison, G. and P. Zelikow The essence of decision. (New York: Longman, 1999)
second edition [ISBN 0321013492].
Bendor, J. and T. Hammond, ‘Rethinking Allison’s models’, American Political
Science Review 86(2) 1992, pp.301–22.
Bennet, L. and D. Paletz (eds) Taken by storm: the media, public opinion and US
foreign policy in the Gulf War. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994)
[ISBN 0226042596].
Brown, C. ‘Ethics, interests and foreign policy’, in K. Smith and M. Light (eds)
Ethics and foreign policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
Byman, D. and K. Pollack, ‘Let us now praise great men: bringing the statesman
back in’, International Security 25(4) 2001, pp.107–46.
Carlnaes, W. ‘The agency-structure problem in foreign policy analysis’,
International Studies Quarterly 36, 1992, pp.245–70.
Chan, S. and W. Safran ‘Public opinion as a constraint against war:
democracies’ response to Operation Iraqi Freedom’, Foreign Policy Analysis
2(2) 2006, pp.137–56.
Cooper, A., R. Higgot and K. Nossal Relocating middle powers: Australia and
Canada in a changing world order. (Vancouver, BC: University of British
Columbia, 1993) [ISBN 0774804505].
Finnemore, M. and K. Sikkink ‘International norm dynamics and political
change’, International Organization 52(4) 1998.
Fearon, J. ‘Rationalist explanations for war’, International Organization 49(3)
1995.
Foyle, D. ‘Foreign policy analysis and globalization: public opinion, world
opinion and the individual’, International Studies Review 5(2) 2003,
pp.155–202.
Foyle, D. ‘Public opinion and foreign policy: elite beliefs as a mediating
variable’, International Studies Quarterly 41(1) 1997, pp.141–70.
Garrison, J. (ed.), ‘Foreign Policy Analysis in 20/20’, International Studies
Review June 5, pp.153–63.
Gelpi, C. ‘Democratic diversions: governmental structure and the
externalization of domestic conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(2)
1997, pp.255–82.
George, A. Bridging the gap: theory and practice in foreign policy (Washington,
DC: US Institute of Peace 1993) Chapter 1.
Gordao, P. ‘Regime change and foreign policy: Portugal, Indonesia and the self-
determination of East Timor’, Democratization 9(4) 2002, pp.142–58.
Handel, M. Weak states in the international system. (London: Frank Cass, 1990)
[ISBN 0714633852].
Hermann, M., T. Preston, B. Korany and T Shaw ‘Who leads matters: the effect
of powerful individuals’, International Studies Review 3(2) 2001, pp.83–132.
Hermann, M. ‘Explaining foreign policy behaviour using the personal
characteristics of political leaders’, International Studies Quarterly 24(7)
1980, pp.7–46.
[ISBN 0333754239].
Holsti, O. ‘Public opinion and foreign policy: the challenge to the Almond-
Lippman consensus’, International Studies Quarterly 36(4) 1992, pp.439–66.
4
Introduction
Hook, S. (ed.) Comparative foreign policy: adaptive strategies of the great and
emerging powers. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002) [ISBN 0130887897].
Hudson, V. Culture and foreign policy. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1995).
Hudson, V. ‘Foreign policy analysis: actor-specific theory and the ground of
international relations’, Foreign policy analysis 1(1) 2005, pp.1–30.
Hudson, V. and E. Singer Political psychology and foreign policy. (Boulder:
Westview 1992).
Ikenberry, J. ‘The rise of China and the future of the west’, Foreign Affairs
January/February 2008.
James, P. and E. Zhang ‘Chinese choices: a polyheuristic analysis of foreign
policy crises, 1950–1996’, Foreign Policy Analysis 1(1) 2005, pp.31–54.
Jervis, R. ‘Perception and misperception in international politics’, in J.
Ikenberry (ed.), American foreign policy: theoretical essays. (New York:
Longman, 2005), pp.462–83.
Jervis, R. Perception and misperception in international politics. (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1976) [ISBN 0691056560].
Johnston, A. ‘Is China a status quo power?’, International Security 27(4) 2003,
pp.5–56.
Josselin, D. and W. Wallace (eds) Non-state actors in world politics.
(Basingstoke: Palgrave 2001).
Kahler, M. (ed.) Liberalization and foreign policy. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997) [ISBN 0231109431] Introduction.
Keohane, R. and J. Nye, Power and interdependence. (Glenville, Ill: Scott,
Foresman 1989) second edition.
Lenin, V. Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism. Lenin Internet Archive,
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/index.htm
Light, M. ‘Foreign policy analysis’ in Light, M. and A.J.R. Groom (eds)
Contemporary international relations: a guide to theory. (London: Pinter,
1994) [ISBN 185567128X].
Mansfield, E. and J. Snyder ‘Democratic transitions, institutional strength and
war’, International Organization 56(2) 2002, pp.297–337.
Martin, L. ‘Interests, power and multilateralism’, International Organization
46(4) 1992, pp.756–92.
Mercer, J. ‘Rationality and psychology in international politics’, International
Organization 59 2005, pp.77–106.
Mintz, A. ‘How do leaders make decisions? A poliheuristic perspective’, Journal
of Conflict Resolution 48(1) 2004, pp.3–13.
Mintz, A. (ed.) Integrating cognitive and rational theories of foreign policy
making: the polyheuristic theory of decision. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003)
[ISBN 0312294093].
Morgenthau, H. Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace. (New
York: Alfred Knopf, 1950).
Nincic, M. Democracy and foreign policy. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1992) [ISBN 023107669X].
Parker, G. Geopolitics: past, present and future. (London: Pinter, 1998)
[ISBN 1855673975].
Putnam, R. ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of the two-level game’,
International Organization 42(3) 1988, pp.427–60.
Rose, G. ‘Neoclassical realism and the theories of foreign policy’, World Politics
51(1) pp.144–72.
Shain, Y. and J. Linz (eds) Between states: interim governments and democratic
transitions. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
[ISBN 0521484987].
Smith, S. ‘Allison and the Cuban missile crisis: a review of the bureaucratic
politics model for foreign policy decision making’, Millennium 9(1) 1980,
pp.21–40.
Snidal, D. ‘The game theory of international politics’, World Politics 38(1) 1985,
pp.25–57.
5
Snyder, G. ‘The security dilemma in alliance politics’, World Politics 36(4) 1984.
Snyder, J. ‘One world, rival theories’ Foreign Policy, November/December 2004,
pp.52–63.
Snyder, R., H.W. Bruck, B. Sapin and V. Hudson Foreign policy decision making
(revisited). (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002) [ISBN 1403960763].
Sprecher, C. and K. DeRouen ‘The domestic determinants of foreign policy
behaviour in Middle Eastern enduring rivals, 1948–1998’, Foreign Policy
Analysis 1(1) pp.121–42.
‘t Hart, P., E. Stern and B. Sundelius (eds) Beyond groupthink. (Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press, 1997).
Tetlock, P. and C. McGuire ‘Cognitive perspectives on foreign policy’, in J.
Ikenberry (ed.) American foreign policy: theoretical essays. (New York:
Longman, 2005), pp.462–83.
Wallace, W. and D. Josselin (eds) Non state actors in world politics.
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001) [ISBN 033396814X].
Welch, D. Painful choices: a theory of foreign policy change. (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2005).
Zakaria, F. The Post-American world (Norton, 2008).
Additional resources
Foreign policy analysis website: www.uwm.edu/~ebenc.fpa/
Online study resources

In addition to the subject guide and the Essential reading, it is crucial that
you take advantage of the study resources that are available online for this
course, including the VLE and the Online Library.
You can access the VLE, the Online Library and your University of London
email account via the Student Portal at:
http://my.londoninternational.ac.uk
You should have received your login details for the Student Portal with
your official offer, which was emailed to the address that you gave
on your application form. You have probably already logged in to the
Student Portal in order to register! As soon as you registered, you will
automatically have been granted access to the VLE, Online Library and
your fully functional University of London email account.
If you forget your login details at any point, please click on the ‘Forgotten
your password’ link on the login page.
The VLE
The VLE, which complements this subject guide, has been designed to
enhance your learning experience, providing additional support and a
sense of community. It forms an important part of your study experience
with the University of London and you should access it regularly.
The VLE provides a range of resources for EMFSS courses:
• Self-testing activities: Doing these allows you to test your own
understanding of subject material.
• Electronic study materials: The printed materials that you receive from
the University of London are available to download, including updated
reading lists and references.
• Past examination papers and Examiners’ commentaries: These provide
advice on how each examination question might best be answered.
• A student discussion forum: This is an open space for you to discuss
interests and experiences, seek support from your peers, work
collaboratively to solve problems and discuss subject material.
6
Introduction
• Videos: There are recorded academic introductions to the subject,

interviews and debates and, for some courses, audio-visual tutorials
and conclusions.
• Recorded lectures: For some courses, where appropriate, the sessions
from previous years’ Study Weekends have been recorded and made
available.
• Study skills: Expert advice on preparing for examinations and
developing your digital literacy skills.
• Feedback forms.
Some of these resources are available for certain courses only, but we
are expanding our provision all the time and you should check the VLE
regularly for updates.
Making use of the Online Library

The Online Library contains a huge array of journal articles and other
resources to help you read widely and extensively.
To access the majority of resources via the Online Library you will either
need to use your University of London Student Portal login details, or you
will be required to register and use an Athens login:
http://tinyurl.com/ollathens
The easiest way to locate relevant content and journal articles in the
Online Library is to use the Summon search engine.
If you are having trouble finding an article listed in a reading list, try
removing any punctuation from the title, such as single quotation marks,
question marks and colons.
For further advice, please see the online help pages:
www.external.shl.lon.ac.uk/help/index.php
The examination
Important: the information and advice given in the following section
is based on the examination structure used at the time this guide
was written. Please note that subject guides may be used for several
years. Because of this we strongly advise you to check both the current
Regulations for relevant information about the examination, and the VLE
where you should be advised of any forthcoming changes. You should also
carefully check the rubric/instructions on the paper you actually sit and
follow those instructions.
This course is assessed by a three-hour unseen written exam. You must
answer four from a total of twelve questions. A sample examination
paper is provided at the end of the subject guide and there is a sample
Examiners’ commentary that shows the sorts of things Examiners are
looking for in your answers. There are also additional questions at the end
of each chapter.
In preparing for the examination you need to bear a number of things
in mind. You must attempt four questions and try and share your time
equally between them. Even if you write two excellent answers, but fail to
attempt any other questions, it will be very difficult to pass. Most students
who fail a course do so because they fail to complete the examination!
Remember that you are being asked to answer a question. The questions
are often permissive, in that they allow you to answer them from more
than one perspective – you might for example endorse or criticise an
7
argument. However, remember that you are being asked to answer a

question and not merely being invited to write all you can remember
about a particular topic. Your answer should have a clear structure – a
beginning, a middle and an end. In your introductory paragraph spell out
what you take the question to mean and outline briefly how you propose
to answer the question. The main body of the answer should demonstrate
your understanding. Where relevant, you should include illustrative
examples. Make your points clearly and concisely.
We are often asked how to refer to texts or quotations. Here are some
guidelines:
• Do not waste time on irrelevant or contextual material. A question
will rarely ask you to write all you know about the detailed events
surrounding a particular foreign policy crisis or the life and times of
a foreign policy decision maker. You can of course use background
material to illustrate a point, but make sure it is clear why this is
relevant in your answer.
• Refer to texts using author surname and short title, such as Hill,
Changing foreign policy. Do not give additional references unless they
are correct!
• You are not expected to memorise quotations, but if you have a good
memory and can do so accurately then do so. No one will be penalised
for not quoting passages from the authors discussed.
One of the skills the Examiners will be looking for is the ability to
paraphrase an argument. This ability will illustrate how well you have
understood it and your judgements about relevance and irrelevance. In
introducing an example to highlight a particular point, always make sure
your illustration is clear, well focused and relevant. Always be guided by
relevance – if you are not sure, leave it out – you have very little time and
space. Finally, your conclusion should sum up your argument and your
answer. However brief, a conclusion indicates that you have finished and
have not merely run out of time.
The Sample examination paper contains four questions. Most questions
are aimed at drawing upon a particular component of the course (e.g.
bureaucratic politics) and, therefore, can be answered without reference
to other components. At the same time, you may find it useful or relevant
to contrast one approach to foreign policy analysis with another one.
Whatever you do, it is not advisable to repeat any portion of a previous
answer in another response. And, most importantly, be sure to read the
question thoroughly.
When you begin to answer the exam paper take time to read it through
carefully. Sketch out your answer in rough notes as this will help you to
structure it. Notes will not be accepted as an answer. Give yourself time to
re-read your answer in the final minutes of the exam.
Finally, although you will not normally be penalised for poor spelling,
grammar and punctuation, you should still aim to maintain a high
standard in each.
Remember, it is important to check the VLE for:
• up-to-date information on examination and assessment arrangements
for this course
• where available, past examination papers and Examiners’ commentaries
for the course which give advice on how each question might best be
answered.
8
Chapter 1: Foreign policy analysis: an overview
Chapter 1: Foreign policy analysis: an

overview
Essential reading
Chapters 1 and 2.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) Introduction and Chapter 1.
Recommended reading
Hudson, V. ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: actor-specific theory and the ground of
international relations’, Foreign Policy Analysis 1(1) March 2005, pp.1–30.
Prentice Hall, 2000) Chapter 1.
Further reading
Carlnaes, W. ‘The agency-structure problem in Foreign Policy Analysis’,
International Studies Quarterly 36 1992, pp.245–70.
Garrison, J. (ed.), ‘Foreign Policy Analysis in 20/20’, International Studies
Review 5 June 2003, pp.153–63.
Hudson, V. Culture and foreign policy. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1995)
Chapter 1.
Neack, L. The new foreign policy: US and comparative foreign policy in the 21st
century. (Rowman and Littlefield 2002) Chapter 1 and pp.1–35.
Neack, L., J. Hey and P. Haney (eds) Foreign policy analysis: continuity and
change in its second generation. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice
Hall, 1995) Chapters 1 and 2.
Snyder, J. ‘One world, rival theories’, Foreign Policy November/December 2004,
pp.52–63.
Foreign policy analysis website: www.uwm.edu/~ebenc/fpa/
Aims and learning objectives

The aim of this chapter is to introduce you to the basic concepts and key
debates that constitute foreign policy analysis (FPA) as well as provide an
overview of the evolution of the field and its relationship to International
Relations more generally.
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter and the Essential readings, you should be able to:
• identify and apply the key concepts of FPA
• describe and evaluate the realist assumption of the centrality of the
state and national interest to FPA
• discuss the challenges that behaviourism and pluralism introduced to
traditional realist approaches to the study of foreign policy
• discuss the relationship between FPA and the discipline of
9
Introduction
Foreign policy analysis is the study of the conduct and practice of relations
between different actors, primarily states, in the international system.
Diplomacy, intelligence, trade negotiations and cultural exchanges all
form part of the substance of foreign policy analysis. At the heart of the
field is an investigation into decision making, the individual decision-
makers, processes and conditions that affect foreign policy and the
outcomes of these decisions. By virtue of this approach, foreign policy
analysis is necessarily concerned with the boundaries between the external
environment outside of the nation state and the internal or domestic
environment, with its variety of sub-national sources of influence.
FPA developed as a separate area of enquiry within the discipline of
International Relations, both because of its initially exclusive focus on the
actual conduct of interstate relations and due to its normative impulse.
While International Relations scholars understood their role to be to
interpret the broad features of the international system, FPA specialists
took as their mandate a concentration on actual state conduct and the
sources of decisions themselves. Moreover, scholars working within FPA
saw their task to be normative, that is to say, as one aimed at improving
foreign policy decision making so that states could achieve better
outcomes and, in some instances, even enhance the possibility of peaceful
relations between states.
To put this in the context of David Singer’s well-known schema of
International Relations, he says that in grappling with world politics, one
necessarily focuses on either the study of phenomena at the international
system level, the state (or national) level or the individual level. FPA has
traditionally emphasised the state and individual levels to be the key areas
for understanding the nature of the international system. At the same
time, as globalisation has transformed the international system, making
interconnectivity outside of traditional state-to-state conduct more likely,
FPA has had to expand its own outlook to account for an increasingly
diverse range of non-state actors such as global environmental activists
or multinational corporations. An underlying theme within the study
of FPA is the ‘structure–agency’ debate. Like the other branches of the
social sciences, FPA scholars are divided as to the amount of influence to
accord to structural factors (the constraints imposed by the international
system) or human agency (the role of individual choice in shaping the
international system) in analysing foreign policy decisions and decision-
making environments. FPA’s focus on the process of foreign policy
formulation, the role of decision-makers and the nature of foreign policy
choice, however, has tended to produce a stronger emphasis on agency
in its work than is found in International Relations (at least until the
advent of the ‘constructivism turn’ in the 1990s). Indeed, in many respects
as we shall see, FPA anticipates key insights and concerns found in the
constructivist tradition.
FPA shares much with other policy-oriented fields that seek to employ
scientific means to understand phenomena. Debate within FPA over
the utility of different methodological approaches, including rational
choice, human psychology and organisational studies, has encouraged
the development of a diversity of material and outlooks on foreign policy.
At the same time, there remains a significant strand of FPA that, like
diplomatic studies, owes a great debt to historical method.
10
Realism: the state, national interest and foreign policy

FPA’s starting point is the state and its interactions with other states, be
this through direct bilateral relations or through multilateral institutions
such as the United Nations. In keeping with the realist paradigm, FPA
understood the state to be a unitary actor, that is to say, one in which it is
not necessary to analyse the role of the discrete components of government
(be it the executive or the legislature) in order to assess a state’s foreign
policy. In this context, a key concept in FPA is that of the ‘national interest’.
A much disputed term, the national interest nonetheless remains a central
preoccupation of foreign policy decision-makers and a reference point for
interpreting state action. Hans Morgenthau defines national interest as
synonymous with power and, as such, both the proper object of a state’s
foreign policy and the best measure of its capacity to achieve its aims.
What constitutes national interest, how it is determined and ultimately
implemented are crucial to understanding the choices and responses pursued
by states in international affairs. Realists assert that the character of the
international system, that is to say its fundamentally anarchic nature, is the
most important guide to interpreting foreign policy. The pursuit of security
and efforts to enhance material wealth place states in competition with other
states, limiting the scope for cooperation to a series of selective, self-interested
strategies. In this setting, the centrality of power – especially manifested
as military power – is seen to be the key determinant of a state’s ability to
sustain a successful foreign policy. Geographic position, material resources and
demography are other important features in this equation as well.
Realists believe that all states’ foreign policies conform to these basic
parameters and that, above all, scholars need to investigate the influences of
the structure of the international system and the relative power of states in
order to understand the outcomes of foreign policy decisions. Calculations
of national interest are self-evident and can be rationally arrived at through
a careful analysis of material conditions of states as well as the particulars of
a given foreign policy dilemma confronting states.
Behaviourism: the ‘minds of men’ and foreign policy

decision making
The original studies of foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s were explicitly
aimed at challenging the realist assumptions that were the dominant
approach to International Relations at the time. Rather than examine the
outcomes of foreign policy decisions, behaviourists sought to understand
the process of foreign policy decision making itself. In particular, scholars
like Robert Jervis, Harold and Margaret Sprout investigated the role of the
individual decision-maker and the accompanying influences on foreign
policy choice.
This emphasis on the individual decision-maker led to a focus on
psychological and cognitive factors as explanatory sources of foreign policy
choice. For instance, Jervis asserted that the psychological disposition of
a leader, the cognitive limits imposed by the sheer volume of information
available to decision-makers and the inclination to select policy options
that were patently second-best all contributed to imperfect foreign policy
outcomes. In addition, other scholars pointed out that the decision-making
process was itself subject to the vagaries of group dynamics, while the
constraints imposed by crises introduced further distortions to foreign policy
choice. The result was a comprehensive critique of many of the key findings
on foreign policy found in the traditional realist perspective.
11
Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy

The focus on individual decision-makers, despite its insights, was seen by
some scholars to be excessively narrow. Even within states, the conflicting
outlooks and demands of foreign policy bureaucracies such as the Ministry
of Trade and the Ministry of Defence clearly influence foreign policy
decisions in ways that reflect parochial concerns first over considerations
of national interest. While the executive decision-maker was clearly a
key component of the foreign policy decision-making process, it had to
be recognised that any decisions made took place within the context of
institutions specifically charged with interpreting and implementing foreign
and security policy for the state. The role and contribution of specialised
ministries, departments and agencies – supplemented by ad hoc working
groups tasked with a particular foreign policy mandate – needed to be
accounted for in FPA.
Activity
With a group of friends compare and contrast the soft power and hard power capabilities
of the United States, China and the European Union. Does soft power ultimately depend
upon having hard power?
For Graham Allison and others, an analysis of foreign policy decision

making had to start with these bureaucracies and the various factors that
caused them to play what was, in their view, the determining role in shaping
foreign policy outcomes. This approach to understanding foreign policy
therefore emphasises the interplay between leaders, bureaucratic actors,
organisational culture and, to an extent, political actors outside of the
formal apparatus of the state. Broader than the behaviourists’ singular focus
on the individual decision-maker, advocates of the bureaucratic politics
approach to FPA began a process of investigation into sources of influence
on foreign policy beyond the state that was to culminate in a radical
rethinking of the importance of the state itself in International Relations.
Pluralism: linkage politics and foreign policy

While the previous approaches sought to understand FPA through,
respectively, recourse to the structure of the international system and
the decision-making process within states, a third approach introduced
a new means of interpreting foreign policy. Pluralists disputed the belief
that states formed the only significant actors in international politics and
asserted that, at least since the 1970s (if not earlier), increased linkages
between a variety of state, sub-state and non-state actors were eroding the
traditional primacy of the state in foreign policy. Indeed, the possibility of
multinational companies exercising de facto foreign policy through their
financial resources or non-governmental organisations through their ability
to mobilise votes was recognised as a central feature of the globalising
world. Thus for pluralists, an analysis of the influences upon foreign policy
which are derived from domestic and transnational sources – and which
were not necessarily tied to the state – is crucial to understanding foreign
policy outcomes. This environment of complex interdependency effectively
diminishes the scope of state action in foreign policy making to that of
a manager of a diversity of forces inside the domestic sphere, including
government, and outside the boundaries of the state.
Robert Putnam’s ‘two-level game’ attempts to capture the challenges
imposed by complex interdependency on foreign policy decision-makers. He
12
suggests that the decision-making process involves both a domestic arena,

where one set of rules and interests govern, as well as an international
arena, where a different set of rules and interests prevail. Balancing the
logic and demands of the two arenas, which are often in conflict, forms the
central dilemma of foreign policy making as seen by pluralists.
FPA and the study of International Relations

As can be seen from this brief overview of the field, FPA provides many
different ways of understanding the conduct and significance of state,
sub-state and non-state actors in foreign policy making. Though there is no
consensus among these approaches, each is seen to contribute to a fuller
picture of the workings of states and ultimately the international system.
Indeed, FPA illuminates much that is otherwise left obscure in the study of
International Relations. While International Relations emphasises the role
and influence of structural constraints on the international system, FPA
focuses on the inherent possibilities of human agency to affect and even
change the international system. In short, as Valerie Hudson says:
‘The single most important contribution of FPA to IR theory is to

identify the point of theoretical intersection between the primary
determinants of state behaviour: material and conceptual factors.
The point of intersection is not the state, it is human decision-
makers. If our IR theories contain no human beings, they will
erroneously paint for us a world of no change, no creativity, no
persuasion, no accountability.’ (Hudson, 2005, p.3)
In the chapters that follow, we will develop the themes introduced above,
providing further analysis and examples that illustrate the key concerns of
FPA.
Activity
Make a list of all the different approaches (realism, behaviourism, bureaucratic politics
and pluralism) to understanding the importance of the state, the individual and
international organisations to foreign policy making.
A reminder of your learning outcomes

Having completed this chapter and the Essential readings you should be
able to:
• identify and apply the key concepts of FPA
• describe and evaluate the realist assumption of the centrality of the
state and national interest to FPA
• discuss the challenges that behaviourism and pluralism introduced to
traditional realist approaches to the study of foreign policy
• discuss the relationship between FPA and the discipline of
Sample examination questions

1. What is foreign policy analysis?
2. How do different approaches in FPA contribute to our understanding
of International Relations?
13
Notes
14
Part 1: Decision making
Part 1: Decision making
15
Notes
16
Chapter 2: Power, capability and instruments
Chapter 2: Power, capability and

instruments
Essential reading
Chapter 6.
Smith, S., A. Hadfield and T. Dunne (eds) Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) Chapters 2 and 7.
Recommended reading
Clarke, M. and B. White Understanding foreign policy: the foreign policy systems
approach. (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989) Chapter 7.
Neack, L., J. Hey and P. Haney, (eds) Foreign policy analysis: continuity and
change in its second generation (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
1995) Chapter 11.
Smith, S., A. Hadfield and T. Dunne (eds) Foreign Policy: theories, actors, cases.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) Chapters 9 and 10
Further reading
Brown, C. ‘Ethics, interests and foreign policy’, in K. Smith and M. Light (eds)
Ethics and foreign policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
Hermann, M., T. Preston, B. Korany and T. Shaw, ‘Who leads matters: the effect
of powerful individuals’, International Studies Review 3(2) 2001, pp.83–132.
Lobell, S., N. Prisman, J. Taliaferro (eds) Neoclassical realism, the state and
foreign policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
Morgenthau, H. Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace
(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1950).
Rose, G. ‘Neoclassical realism and the theories of foreign policy’, World Politics
51(1) pp.144–72.

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the student to the relationship
between foreign policy and power, the formulation of ‘national interest’
and the different means available to states to achieve their foreign policy
objectives.
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter and the Essential readings, you should be able
to:
• discuss and evaluate the key concepts of power and national interest
• assess the impact of the international system in defining the tasks of
foreign policy for states
• evaluate the utility of different foreign policy instruments in achieving
foreign policy goals.
17
Introduction
A successful foreign policy is measured in terms of a state’s ability to assert
itself and promote its interests with consistency within the international
system. Crucial to this success is an understanding of power, its sources and
an assessment of the means needed to achieve state aims. Equally important
is an ability to forge these dimensions into a coherent foreign policy
appropriate to the state in question, its particular material conditions as
well as its position within the international system. In this chapter we will
examine the relationship between foreign policy and power, the formulation
of ‘national interest’ and the different means available to states to achieve
their foreign policy objectives.
Foreign policy and power

Traditionally, foreign policy makers have assumed that it is the very nature
of the international system itself – being anarchic, that is without any
recognised central authority – which compels states to pursue a relentless
quest for security and wealth. With states in direct competition with one
another to achieve security and wealth needs, cooperation between them
is ultimately tactical and limited to a series of selective, self-interested
alliances. A ‘security dilemma’ prevails, whereby efforts by one state to
increase its sense of security through arms acquisition or other defensive
measures merely inspire other states to adopt similar strategies, and
ironically perpetuates a general sense of insecurity among all states.
In this contentious setting, the centrality of power – especially manifested
as military power – is seen to be the most important factor in determining a
state’s ability to sustain a successful foreign policy. Power is defined as the
ability of a state to cause another state to take actions which are to the first
state’s advantage and which the latter state might not otherwise pursue.
Christopher Hill suggests that there are three ways of interpreting the role
of power in foreign policy: as an end in itself, as a means to an end and
as a context within which states operate. There are two basic ways that
this can be achieved: through direct action (force or coercion) or through
indirect action (influence or persuasion). The coercion involves compelling
the target state through overt threat or outright intervention into its vital
affairs. This could include military demonstration, such as the mobilising of
troops, or actual military strikes and even invasion. It may also involve vital
economic targets, such as cutting off oil supplies or a trade embargo, which
have the effect of strangling the target state’s economy. Persuasion is more
nuanced in that it involves compelling the target state through diplomatic
means, appeals to rationality or universal principles and other sources 1
‘Hard power is the
of influence. These could include appeals to cultural affinity or historical ability to get others to
do what they otherwise
partnerships, with the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ being one of
would not do through
the most enduring. Joseph Nye characterises this ability of a state to induce threat of punishment or
others to adopt its own foreign policy preferences as ‘soft power’, while promise of reward. Soft
coercive means ‘hard power’.1 power is the ability to
get desired outcomes
The sources of a state’s power can be found primarily in its military and
because others want
economic capabilities which give it the means to exercise coercive and non- what you want.’ Nye,
coercive influence. Other factors that influence a state’s ability to pursue a J. ‘Propaganda isn’t
successful foreign policy are its geographic position, the material resources the way: soft power’,
available to it and the size of its population. The society’s level of economic International Herald
Tribune, 10 January
development and the pervasiveness of new technologies, especially as
2003.
generated through local ‘research and development’ programmes, are
additional indicators of power.
18
For neo-classical realists like Fareed Zakaria, it is the differing abilities of

leaders to mobilise these resources – be they material or human – which
explains some of the differences in the foreign policies of individual
countries. For instance, the patent inability of the Japanese government
to translate the enormous power resources of that country into equivalent
foreign policy gains on the international stage can be ascribed to the
perennial weaknesses of the leadership.
Formulating foreign policy: the national interest and the

balance of power
Classic approaches to foreign policy focus on the formulation of aims
and objectives based upon ‘national interest’. An elusive concept,
national interest is defined by the influential International Relations
scholar Hans Morgenthau as synonymous with power and, as such, both
the proper object of a state’s foreign policy and the best measure of its
capacity to achieve its aims. What constitutes national interest, how it is
determined and ultimately implemented are crucial to understanding the
foreign policy choices and responses pursued by states. For realists like
Morgenthau, the fundamentally anarchic condition of the international
system is the most important guide to decision making in foreign policy.
Classic assumptions of rationality, which are founded on the belief that
foreign policy aims (‘preferences’) of decision makers are self-evident,
further reinforce the realist view (see Chapter 3). However, other scholars
dispute the self-evident nature of national interest and see it as founded
on a narrower societal basis, such as representing the influence of strong
lobby groups or social class structures on foreign policy. According
to this interpretation, just whose interests are being elevated to the
status of ‘national interest’ and why they are adopted by the state, is a
manifestation of the struggle between segments of the power elite that
dominate society. The ability of conflicting interests within the domestic
environment to mobilise resources, be it through financial incentives or
populist claims, determines their success in construing their parochial
concerns as worthy of state action (see Chapter 8).
In this context, the ‘balance of power’ can be seen as the primary
mechanism for ordering the international system and keeping it in
equilibrium. Simply put, states act to offset an accumulation of power by
one or more states by joining up with like-minded states. This coalition
strategy is both descriptive – it reflects the historical conduct of states in
Europe – and normative – it can be taken as a foreign policy imperative
for maintaining international peace. The idea of a balance of power has
exercised considerable influence over foreign policy making though, due to
its underlying assumptions of systemic anarchy, some have suggested that
it fosters the very sense of instability which it purports to alleviate.
In spite of the problem of determining exactly the basis of national
interest, it is clear that virtually all states subscribe by necessity to
maintaining territorial integrity and economic prosperity as central
preoccupations of the government of the day in their international
dealings. Moreover, historically states have frequently used the balance of
power approach to maintaining order and stability within the international
system. What is open to dispute is whether these aims are best achieved
through the pursuit of short-term strategies based on limited provisions
for cooperation or whether states gain more through adopting long-
term strategies that emphasise cooperative institution building. Britain’s
Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, articulated the former posture in the
mid-nineteenth century when he said that England had ‘no permanent
19
friends or permanent enemies; only permanent interests’. Canada’s

Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, presented the latter position in the late
twentieth century when he declared that it was in Canada’s interests to
use its resources to promote a permanent ban on landmines through the
auspices of the United Nations.
Instruments of foreign policy

Of course, the best formulated foreign policy in the world is rendered
irrelevant without a clear sense of the tools available to politicians and
their respective utility. Traditionally, states have had recourse to diplomacy,
economic, subversion and military instruments to achieve their respective
aims. More recently, these ‘hard power’ instruments have been supplemented
by a recognition of the importance of incorporating ‘soft power’ into a
state’s repertoire. The promotion of values through governmental and non-
governmental actors is one of the ‘soft power’ tools which can help states
shape a target country’s foreign policy aims. Each of these has strengths and
weaknesses in relation to a given foreign policy problem and it is a state’s
ability to capitalise on these diverse sets of instruments that determines
whether it has a successful foreign policy or not.
Diplomacy is the prime currency of the international system and occupies
the bulk of activity between states. It consists of formal and informal
discussions aimed at resolving matters of mutual concern. These talks,
negotiations or mediation can take place at a bilateral level (between
two states) or multilateral level (involving a number of states). Usually,
officially recognised diplomats trained in the intricacies of international
protocol conduct such discussions. Alliances with like-minded states, or at
least states that share a common perception of threat, and trade relations
with preferred states are common topics in the diplomatic arena. More
often than not, however, the work of diplomats is preoccupied with the
mundane day-to-day tasks of maintaining positive relations between
states, attending to the concerns of its citizens abroad and protocol-related
issues. In those instances when one state’s behaviour causes persistent
concern or alarm, diplomatic actions – ranging from formal notes of
protest to the application of diplomatic sanctions such as the withdrawal
of official recognition of an offending government – can be utilised to
express a state’s rancour.
Contemporary diplomacy owes its formal practices and codes to the
conventions developed in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Secretive agreements tying states to the defence of one another
formed the backbone of European diplomacy up to the First World
War. In the twentieth century, the rise of democracies, the media and
international institutions such as the League of Nations and its successor,
the United Nations, has brought about a shift towards a more public form
of diplomacy. International summitry, when states’ leaders come together
to discuss high-profile foreign policy issues, has played an increasing role
from the mid-twentieth century onwards as well.
Economic instruments are used by states when standard diplomatic
practices are seen to be insufficient in achieving their aims. They include:
economic sanctions, such as imposing trade restrictions against a target
state; and military sanctions, such as imposing restrictions on trade or
manufacture of arms to a target state.
With few exceptions, sanctions are only really effective if implemented
by a collectivity of states and rigorously enforced by all of them. For this
reason, it is often said that the importance of sanctions lies more in its
20
symbolic value as a sign of displeasure with a particular state than its

actual effect upon that state.
Subversion is an instrument favoured by leaders for its purported ability
to offer a state a tactical advantage over other states. The gathering of
intelligence and its analysis by specialists trained in assessing designs and
capabilities of other states can provide insight into alternative courses of
action to be pursued by an opponent and a willingness to pursue these
actions. Less frequently – though certainly popularly associated with
espionage – is the promulgation of covert operations aimed at destabilising
an opponent in one way or another. Grey and black propaganda (the
former partially based on truth, the latter an outright fabrication) against
the target state or its leader, providing covert financial or military support
to opposition movements, and even political assassinations, all form
part of the arsenal utilised in this form of espionage. Debate within
democratic states rages as to the morality of pursuing covert operations
in times of (relative) peace, though historically these states have shown
no compunction against their use when state security was believed to be
threatened.
Values promotion is an explicitly ‘soft power’ approach to foreign
policy that is operationalised through a variety of means. Government
agencies that promote the society’s cultural values through, for example,
educational exchanges and scholarships to élites or prospective élites, are
ways of shaping the aims and choices pursued by foreign policy actors
in another country. States can also fund non-governmental actors with
an explicit values promotion agenda, such as human rights groups, trade
union support or electoral assistance. The strength of this approach is that
domestic actors within a particular target country embrace the underlying
values of another country and then this becomes the basis for foreign
policy choice that, perhaps unconsciously, conforms to the interests of the
promoter state.
Military instruments remain the ultimate expression of a state’s willingness
to pursue its foreign policy. For the renowned strategist Karl von
Clausewitz, the use of the military was ‘politics pursued by other means’.
States employ their military principally in times of crisis to defend their
interests, be they territorial, resources or citizens, or in support of foreign
policy aims such as acquiring new territory, gaining access to strategic
resources or upholding international principle. The military, in the hands
of an expert, can be a much more diversified foreign policy instrument
than is immediately apparent. For instance, it can mark the strength
of a state’s commitment to a security alliance through the presence of
permanent military bases or the sending of a naval fleet to a region in
dispute. Equally, public displays of technological prowess such as the
launching of ballistic missiles or the testing of nuclear weapons can be
important signals to potential adversaries and friends alike. With modern
military technology outside of the reach of most states, global force
projection is increasingly limited to merely a handful of states, with the
United States as the foremost military power today.
Until the end of the Cold War, the military was seen to be the most obvious
measure of a state’s power, but subsequently many International Relations
scholars have argued that economic strengths or even cultural reach are
equally significant indicators. This gave impetus to proponents of ‘soft
power’ instruments, who argued that their approach was more suited to
the changing international environment. More generally, the advent of
total warfare in the twentieth century introduced to the world conflict on
such a destructive scale that both the efficacy and the morality of the use
21
of force as an instrument of foreign policy has been called into question.

Peacekeeping forces, usually under the auspices of an international
organisation like the United Nations, are a more recent innovation of the
classic military tool and some states include a specially trained battalion
on hand for such missions.
Conclusion
As Winston Churchill famously said, ‘it is better to jaw–jaw than it is to
war–war’. Thus, despite the assumptions of anarchy and the accompanying
‘security dilemma’ facing states, the impulse towards diplomatic solutions
in foreign policy remain paramount. Calibrated use of foreign policy
instruments in the service of national interest is the most effective
means of ensuring that a state’s vital security and economic concerns are
preserved. In this context, accurately assessing the capacity and will of
other states becomes a crucial preoccupation of foreign policy makers as
they seek to formulate and implement a successful foreign policy. The
next chapter will examine in greater detail the actual process of devising a
rational foreign policy.
Activity
Choose one of the powers in East Asia (China, Japan, South Korea or the United States)
and outline the possible foreign policy instruments it can use in response to North Korea’s
determination to pursue its programme of nuclear proliferation. This activity can be done
on one’s own or with a group. For country information, see the BBC’s website under
regions in the news section of: http://news.bbc.co.uk. For information on North Korea’s
proliferation, see the International Crisis Group’s website: www.crisisgroup.org

Having completed this chapter and the Essential readings and activities,
you should now be able to:
• discuss and evaluate the key concepts of power and national interest
• assess the impact of the international system in defining the tasks of
foreign policy for states
• evaluate the utility of different foreign policy instruments in achieving
foreign policy goals.

1. What is national interest and how is it determined?
2. How do states exercise their influence over other states?
22
Chapter 3: Rational decision making
Essential reading
Chapter 6.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) Chapter 3.
Recommended reading
Mintz, A. (ed.) Intergrating cognitive and rational theories of foreign policy
making: the polyheuristic theory of decision (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003)
Snidal, D. ‘The game theory of international politics’, World Politics 38(1) 1985,
pp.25–57.
Further reading
Byman, D. and K Pollack, ‘Let us now praise great men: bringing the statesman
back in’, International Security 25(4) 2001, pp.107–46.
George, A. Bridging the gap: theory and practice in foreign policy. (Washington,
DC: US Institute of Peace 1993) Chapter 1.
James, P. and E. Zhang, ‘Chinese choices: a polyheuristic analysis of foreign
policy crises, 1950-1996’, Foreign Policy Analysis 1(1) 2005, pp.31–54.
Mercer, J. ‘Rationality and psychology in international politics’, International
Organization 59 2005, pp.77–106.
Mintz, A. ‘How do leaders make decisions? A poliheuristic perspective’, Journal
of Conflict Resolution 48(1) 2004, pp.3–13.

The aim of this chapter is to introduce you to rational decision making in
foreign policy and the accompanying critiques of this approach as well as
the efforts to reconcile rationalism with non-rational approaches.
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter and the relevant readings, you should be able
to:
• discuss and critique the key concepts of rationality in foreign policy
decision making
• discuss the difference between the operational and psychological
environment for foreign policy decision making
• discuss and evaluate attempts to reconcile rationalism with the non-
rational approaches to foreign policy decision making.
23
Introduction
Rationality and its application to foreign policy decision making is one
of the most influential approaches to understanding contemporary
international politics. Derived from public choice theory (which itself
emerged out of the fields of economics and policy sciences), rational
choice scholars have actively sought to utilise a well-established
methodology of decision making to enhance and assess foreign policy
decision making. At the same time, the use of rationalist approaches to
foreign policy has inspired considerable commentary and criticism. Indeed,
much of the work of FPA has been devoted to assessing the weaknesses of
this school of thought and its links to the assumptions underlying realism.
Rationality and foreign policy

Realists believe that all states’ foreign policies conform to basic parameters
set by the anarchic international system and that, above all, scholars need
to investigate the influences of the structure of the international system
and the relative power of states in order to understand the outcomes of
foreign policy decisions. Calculations of national interest are self-evident
and can be rationally arrived at through a careful analysis of material
conditions of states as well as the particulars of a given foreign policy
dilemma confronting states.
The classical realism formulation of balance of power provides a crude but
effective tool for analysing state action in international affairs (see Chapter
2). Rational choice theory (sometimes called public choice theory), as
applied to international affairs, sought to introduce a more rigorous,
methodologically sound approach that could use the basic laws of choice
to assess the process and outcome of foreign policy decision making. From
this perspective, the maximisation of utility by actors (in this case, states)
is the ultimate aim of foreign policy decision-makers. By maximisation
of utility, we mean a state first identifies and prioritises foreign policy
goals; it then identifies and selects from the means available to it which
fulfil its aims with the least cost. In this regard, the focus of this approach
is traditionally on policy outcomes and therefore assumes a relatively
undifferentiated decision-making body for foreign policy (a ‘unitary
actor’), rather than one composed of different decision-makers. However,
some scholars have recognised that an assessment of national interest –
defined as enhancing security and wealth maximisation (or, to use the
public choice jargon, ‘preference formation’) – is crucial to determining
policy choice. In any case, as all states reside within the same international
setting in which the conditions of anarchy tend to structure the ‘rules of
the game’ in a similar fashion for all states, coming to an interpretation of
action and reaction should not be out of reach for foreign policy analysts.
Rational decision making’s core assumptions, especially that of motivation
(self-interest) and a single decision-maker (unitary actor), can produce
some compelling explanations of the process and choices pursued in
foreign policy. This general depiction of rationality is perhaps best
captured through the application of game theory to foreign policy
decision-making. Here scholars have isolated particular dilemmas of
foreign policy and sought to frame them within a matrix of choice that
illuminates the dilemmas facing decision-makers. For game theorists, the
respective rules of different types of games frame the possibilities of choice
undertaken by the participants and the accompanying strategies employed
to achieve best possible outcomes. For instance, cooperative and non-
24
cooperative forms of the game produce strategies that range from ‘zero-
sum’ wins by one participant over the other to trade-offs that secure ‘win-
sets’, that is outcomes in which both parties are able to claim satisfactory
– if often sub-optimal – outcomes.
Thomas Schelling’s work on game theory and its application to nuclear
strategy elaborates upon the classic prisoners’ dilemma schema. Schelling
uses the format of strategic bargaining with imperfect information in a non-
cooperative game to adduce the conduct of participants facing decisions
in a nuclear arms race. His insight is to analyse how deterrence, that is the
promulgation of an arms build up and a concomitant agreement not to
mobilise (‘first strike’ in nuclear parlance), operates as an imperfect restraint
upon a state’s move towards conflict. The incremental use of strategies
of escalation to produce behaviour change in an aggressive opponent, or
‘brinkmanship’, is advocated by Schelling as a way of establishing and
maintaining the credibility of the deterrent. A ‘balance of terror’ is the
predicted foreign policy outcome in this approach and, indeed, served as the
core nuclear doctrine for the United States for a number of years.
Activity
List the costs and benefits of pursuing a weapons modernisation programme versus an
investment in improving infrastructure and social services. Then answer these questions
– on what basis would you choose one approach over the other? Which is better at
addressing the state’s security concerns and which addresses welfare concerns? Are these
long-term or short-term security and welfare concerns?
From this perspective, developing foreign policy goals and implementing

them therefore involves a relatively straightforward assessment of the
situation and other actors’ potential actions based on their status and
material endowment within the international system. Optimal outcomes,
albeit within the framework of available choices, are both the goal and
the guide for foreign policy choice. Good foreign policy is achievable
and, presumably, a realistic source for ordering the international system
through some form of balancing or trade-off mechanism.
A critique of rational decision making

Harold and Margaret Sprout introduced one of the most defining critiques
of the rational approach to foreign policy. They examined the environment
within which foreign policy decisions are taken, distinguishing between
the ‘operational environment’ – which they posited as objective reality –
and the ‘psychological environment’ – which they held to be subjective
and under the influence of a myriad of perceptual biases and cognitive
stimuli. Foreign policy decision-makers take decisions on the basis of
their psychological environment, relying upon perceptions as a guide,
rather than any cold weighing of objective facts. The Sprouts believed that
the accompanying gap between the ‘operational environment’ and the
‘psychological environment’ within which decision-makers act introduced
significant distortions to foreign policy making with important implications
for foreign policy as a whole. Richard Snyder and his colleagues took this
further and pointed out that it is a misnomer to ascribe decision making to
the autonomous unitary entity known as the state. In their view, the ‘black
box of foreign policy decision making’ needed to be opened up so that one
could both recognise the actual complexity underlying decisions (which
included individual biases and bureaucratic processes) and to develop a
better analysis of foreign policy itself.
25
For these critics of rationality, foreign policy decision-makers do not act in

a purely rational manner that conforms to the core assumptions of realism
and public choice theory. At best, foreign policy decision-makers could
be said to operate within the framework of the information available to
them and make decisions on that limited basis. Moreover, decision-makers
are also subject to other influences such as their perceptions, pre-existing
beliefs or prejudices and cognitive limitations on handling information
which introduce further distortions to the process. Much of the substance
of this latter critique against rationality as a source for foreign policy
decision making was made by the behaviourists in their work on individual
decision-makers and is covered in Chapter 4. Critics of rationality believe
that attempts at rational foreign policy decision making are misguided and
even potentially dangerous for states.
Reconciling rational and non-rational approaches:

bounded rationality, cybernetics and polyheuristics
Efforts to rehabilitate rationality as a source for foreign policy decision
making resulted in a number of innovative approaches that attempted to
incorporate the insights and criticisms levelled against it. Herbert Simon’s
work (though he himself is not an International Relations scholar but
rather an economist) suggests that while decision-makers cannot achieve
pure rationality, they nonetheless conduct themselves along the lines
of ‘procedural’ rationality when faced with a particular policy dilemma.
Foreign policy makers therefore operate within the framework of what
Simon calls ‘bounded rationality’; that is, they act rationally within the
context of partial information and other limitations placed on decisions.
John Steinbruner, responding to the general critique on rationality, the
problem of group decision making (see Chapter 4) and the issues raised by
the bureaucratic politics model (see Chapter 5), introduced what he called
a cybernetic processing approach to foreign policy. He posits that there are
three paradigms of decision making – analytical (or rational), cybernetic
and cognitive – and that the integration of the latter two paradigms more
accurately captures the actual process of decision making and the foibles
of individual and group actors.
More recently, Alex Mintz has proposed another way of reconciling
the critique against rationality in foreign policy decision making while
maintaining much of the substance of rational choice approaches. Called
the ‘polyheuristic method’, Mintz declares that foreign policy decisions are
best understood as a two-stage process. The first step is one in which the
non-rational elements govern decision making, in particular considerations
of what is politically possible by the leader of the state. Once courses
of action which are not politically palatable or attainable, such as the
surrendering of sovereign territory in response to a foreign ultimatum,
are discarded, the second step of decision making occurs. In this latter
stage, policy options are introduced and selected in a rational manner that
conforms to the rules of public choice theory, namely that foreign policy
decisions are driven primarily by a search for the maximisation of utility
within a particular framework. The strength of Mintz’s approach is that it
attempts to account for the variants in outcome through the integration of
the impact of cognition and other non-rational factors.
26
Conclusion
What is clear from the previous analysis is that a purely rational account
of foreign policy decision making cannot hold up against the various
criticisms, be they psychological or empirical in content. At the same
time, the durability of rationality as a means of analysing foreign policy
continues and, in part, reflects the willingness of FPA scholars to accept the
basic tenets of criticism but their reluctance to abandon the methodology
of public choice.
It should be pointed out that the influence of rationality is more
widespread than in the realm of FPA theory debates alone. Rational
analyses of foreign policy underlie much of our ordinary interpretation of
international events, and we are making assumptions about the unitary
nature of decision-makers when we talk about, for example, ‘French
foreign policy’ without accounting for different influences on decision
making within governments. Thus, while the criticisms of rationality
remain both powerful and valid, its assumptions still play an important
part in much of our day-to-day understanding of foreign policy. In the
next chapter we will delve more deeply into one of the main critiques of
rationality, which is the impact of the psychological assessment of foreign
policy on our understanding of FPA.
Activity
With a group of friends, debate the question of whether foreign policy decisions are the
product of rationality or are fundamentally irrational.

Having completed this chapter, the Essential readings and activities, you
should now be able to:
• discuss and critique the key concepts of rationality in foreign policy
decision making
• discuss the difference between the operational and psychological
environment for foreign policy decision making
• discuss and evaluate attempts to reconcile rationalism with the non-
rational approaches to foreign policy decision making.

1. What is a rationalist approach to foreign policy decision making and
how does it differ from other approaches?
2. Can foreign policy ever be considered rational?
27
Notes
28
Chapter 4: Perception, cognition and personality
Chapter 4: Perception, cognition and

personality
Essential reading
Routledge, 2011) pp.14–30.
Chapter 5.
Recommended reading
Jervis, R. ‘Perception and misperception in international politics’, in J.
Ikenberry (ed.) American foreign policy: theoretical essays. (New York:
Longman, 2005) pp.462–83.
Hall, 1995) Chapter 4 or Neack, L. The New Foreign Policy: US and
Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century. (Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers Inc., 2002) pp.55–66.
Further reading
Hudson, V. and E. Singer, Political psychology and foreign policy. (Boulder:
Westview, 1992).
Jervis, R. Perception and misperception in international politics. (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1976).
‘t Hart, P., E. Stern and B. Sundelius (eds) Beyond groupthink. (Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press, 1997).
Tetlock, P. and C. McGuire, ‘Cognitive perspectives on foreign policy’, in
J. Ikenberry (ed.) American foreign policy: theoretical essays. (New York:
Longman, 2005) pp.462–83.

The aim of this chapter is to introduce you to the role of perception,
cognition, personality and groups in shaping foreign policy decision
making.
29
Learning outcomes
to:
• discuss the key concepts of perception, cognition and personality and
evaluate their influence on foreign policy
• outline the problems associated with foreign policy decision making in
group settings
• discuss and evaluate the impact that the psychological approach has
on rational accounts of foreign policy.
Introduction
Foreign policy is the product of human agency, that is to say, individuals in
a leadership position identifying foreign policy issues, making judgments
about them and then acting upon that information. It is this fundamental
insight – the product of the critique of rationality in decision making –
that initiated a concentrated study of the impact of individual psychology
on foreign policy. Underlying this approach was the recognition that
individual leaders of states exercised a seminal influence over the foreign
policy process by dint of their experience, outlook and limitations, and
were therefore worthy of special attention. Among the diversity of
psychological factors said to play a role in shaping foreign policy are
the influence of individual perceptions, human cognition, a leader’s
personality and the dynamics of group decision making.
For proponents of the psychological approach, foreign policy decision-
makers operate in a highly complex world and their decisions carry
with them significant risks. These include linguistic–cultural barriers,
stereotypes and high volume of, yet incomplete, information. Hence
through processes of perception and cognition, decision-makers develop
images, subjective assessments of the larger operational context, that when
taken together constitute the ‘definition of the situation’. These definitions
are always a distortion of reality, as the purpose of perception is to simplify
and order the external environment. Policy makers can therefore never
be completely rational in applying the maximisation of utility approach to
decisions.
The role of perception

In dividing the setting of foreign policy decision making between the
‘operational’ and ‘psychological’ environments, Harold and Margaret
Sprout, among the first scholars to address FPA concerns, opened up
the possibility of FPA scholars investigating the interior life of the mind
of individual foreign policy makers. Robert Jervis produced one of the
most influential studies in this area on the role of ‘misperception’ on
foreign policy decisions, which he says stems from the fact that leaders
make foreign policy based upon their perceptions rather than the actual
‘operational environment’. For Kenneth Boulding, this suggests that foreign
policy decisions are largely the product of ‘images’ which individual
leaders have of other countries or leaders and, therefore, are based upon
stereotypes, biases and other subjective sources that interfere with their
ability to conduct rational foreign policy. Both scholars see leadership
as bringing its particular experience and outlook, perhaps shaped by
individual and societal prejudices or media imagery, to the foreign policy
process and thus introducing distortions to ‘definitions of the situation’.
30
The role of cognition

Another dimension of the psychological approach that affects foreign
policy is cognition. Cognition, the process by which humans select and
process information from the world around them, introduces important
problems to the decision-making process. Indeed, the limits that cognition
– when coupled with the role of perception – introduces to a rational
account of foreign policy are such that it is difficult to describe these
decisions as anything but the product of an incomplete (and therefore
unsatisfactory) process.
According to Alexander George, an eminent diplomatic historian, the
international environment is filtered by decision-makers through their
own ‘operational code’, that is, a set of rules and perceptions that have
previously been established within their minds and which are used to
assess new situations and develop policy responses to them. Robert
Axelrod, an international relations scholar, suggests that this process
leads to the development of a ‘cognitive map’ that combines perception,
prejudice and an understanding of ‘historical lessons’, and applies these
to the task of decision making. Moreover, his research findings suggest
that foreign policy makers tend towards those policy choices that involve
the fewest trade-offs, not necessarily the ‘best’ or ‘optimal’ policies that
rational choice theorists would have us believe, but the ones that involve
taking the path of least resistance. Indeed, some have characterised this
sub-optimal decision making as ‘satisficing’, that is the decision-maker’s
impulse to choose a policy option that addresses the immediate pressures
and concerns rather than weighing the merits of a given policy.
Building upon these insights, other behaviourist scholars in FPA have
highlighted the distortions on rational foreign policy imposed by the
search for cognitive consistency by individual leaders. The academician,
Leon Festinger’s concept of ‘cognitive dissonance’, that is, the effort
by which a decision-maker deliberately excludes new or contradictory
information, in order to maintain his existing image or cognitive map, is
one example of this. Jervis’ investigation into ‘cognitive consistency’ points
out that foreign policy makers habitually screen out disruptive effects
by finding a logical way of incorporating it into the rationale behind a
given foreign policy choice. Rosati’s work on ‘schema theory’, however,
suggests that these accounts of cognitive consistency are too rigid.
Cognitive theorists assumes that individual decision-makers are fixated
on maintaining a well-integrated belief system and this is both resistant
to change as well as serving as a singular source for foreign policy choice.
Schema theory posits a much more fragmented depiction of beliefs, which
are said to be better understood as isolated repositories of knowledge,
allowing for the inconsistency that characterises their application to
foreign policy decision-making. The role of learning in foreign policy,
including the impulse to use history as a source for decision-making, is an
expression of this dynamic process.
The role of personality

In addition to perception and cognition, FPA scholars have sought to
assess the impact of a leader’s personality on foreign policy. They note that
different leaders bring their own biases to office and – this is most evident
in the removal of one leader and the installation of another – can exercise
dramatically different influences over their country’s foreign policy. For
example, Anthony Eden’s harkening back to Britain’s imperialist past was
a major factor in his ill-advised intervention into Suez in 1956, while John
31
Kennedy’s inexperience and youth caused him to respond aggressively to

the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962. Psychological profiling of
leaders, analysing the origins of their patterns of behaviour as a clue to their
possible actions, became a priority activity. All of these individualistic and
deeply personal elements are said to affect leadership and ultimately foreign
policy outcomes.
In their study of personality, Irving Janis and Leon Mann introduced a
‘motivational’ model of foreign policy decision making that emphasised the
fact that leaders are emotional beings seeking to resolve internal decisional
conflict. The role of emotions is most pronounced in a crisis and at this point
stress intervenes, causing a lack of ability to abstract and tolerate ambiguity,
as well as an increased tendency towards aggressive behaviour. ‘Tunnel
vision’, a fixation on single solutions to the exclusion of all others, may
also ensue. According to some scholars, those leaders who are more highly
motivated by the pursuit of power have a propensity for confrontational
foreign policy, while those inclined towards greater inter-personal trust
display more conciliatory forms of foreign policy.
The role of the group

The same human psychological and cognitive limitations which challenge
the rational actor model of decision making apply to groups as well. Group
decision-making structures, which are put into place in order to broaden the
information base and provide alternative sources of analysis and experience
– in other words, to combat some of the perceptual misconceptions that
arise in individual decision making – themselves introduce a new set of
problems. Janis’s investigation of foreign policy making by groups concluded
that they suffer from ‘group think’, that is to say individuals tend to seek
to maintain consensus when operating in a group even at the expense of
promoting their own particular (and possibly more sensible) perspective
on an issue under discussion. Through this process, the objectively best (or
‘optimal’) decision to a given foreign policy dilemma can become diluted
or even abandoned as individuals strive to come up with a common group
position on how to address a specific foreign policy challenge.
Considerable scholarship has been devoted to ameliorating the worst effects
of ‘group think’. George proposed a number of measures, including the
imposition of a ‘devil’s advocate’ to question pending decisions, to combat
this tendency, but the fact remains that under circumstances in which time
is an issue, such as is the case in foreign policy crises, the impulse towards
seeking consensus for sub-optimal policy positions is strong. Other scholars
have sought to go ‘beyond groupthink’ and re-examine the phenomenon
in light of new data and insights. Stern and Sundelius, for instance, have
suggested that a key case examined by Janis, that of the Bay of Pigs fiasco,
were better explained by ‘new group syndrome’ and an absence of assertive
leadership than by the pathologies associated with ‘groupthink’.
Activity
Read the outline of President Obama’s daily schedule reproduced by MSNBC. List the
constraints he faces as a decision-maker and consider the impact that these have on the
foreign policy decisions he has to take.
32
Critique of the psychological approach to foreign policy

decision making
The psychological approach is in many respects a devastating one for
proponents of rationality in foreign policy. Nevertheless, its limitations as
an interpretive tool in FPA have become evident to many working in the
discipline. Jervis, for one, ultimately seeks to downplay the significance of
psychological factors in foreign policy by stressing the importance of the
operational environment as determinative of foreign policy independent of
the psychological environment. He says foreign policy cannot be usefully
explained if one doesn’t take into account several levels of analysis in
addition to the individual level (where considerations of perception,
cognition and personality do matter), namely bureaucratic constraints,
domestic influences and the external environment. Moreover, images,
perceptions and ideology are not the products of individuals but rather
emerge out of society (they are ‘socially constructed’), and therefore it
is not especially relevant to focus on individuals alone. In this respect, it
would be more meaningful to focus on the social context within which
they operate.
The importance of personality in foreign policy is discounted by some
scholars as well. Steve Smith’s study of the Iran hostage crisis suggests that
personality is not as significant as the actual role assumed by individuals
holding a position of authority. Others point out the difficulty of measuring
the degree of input psychological factors have on foreign policy outcomes
– can one really ascribe the decision by Charles De Gaulle to pull France
out of Algeria to formative events in his childhood, and if so, why was this
any more important than the social, economic and security reasons for
taking action? All in all, personality – as well as perception and cognition –
can usefully explain aspects of the process of choice in foreign policy but it
cannot serve as its sole or overarching explanatory source.
Conclusion
Psychological approaches in FPA provide a window into decision making
that enrich our understanding of the myriad of possible influences
on the foreign policy choices made by leaders. At the same time, the
relationship between the decision-maker, the state and the structure of
the international system is a complex one and the utility of such concepts
as misperception in explaining different types of foreign policy depends,
it can be argued, as much on the characteristics of the state, the issue
being addressed and the type of policy being formulated as on the
leader’s cognitive constraints. All foreign policy decisions are the product
of the foreign policy institutions within which decisions are taken. In
the next chapter we will take up the examination of the impact of these
organisations upon the foreign policy process.
Activity
Identify the personality characteristics of important world leaders (for example, Winston
Churchill, George W Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev, Charles de Gaulle and Nelson Mandela)
that have influenced their choice and conduct of their country’s foreign policies.
33

• discuss the key concepts of perception, cognition and personality and
evaluate their influence on foreign policy
• outline the problems associated with foreign policy decision making in
group settings
• discuss and evaluate the impact that the psychological approach has
on rational accounts of foreign policy.

1. Explain how one of the following influences foreign policy: perception,
cognition or personality.
2. Is group decision making in foreign policy better than individual
decision making?
34
Chapter 5: Bureaucratic politics
Essential reading
Chapter 4.
Recommended reading
Neack, L., J. Hey and P. Haney, (eds) Foreign policy analysis: continuity and
Hall, 1995) Chapter 6.
Further reading
Allison, G. and P. Zelikow The essence of decision. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1999).
Bendor, J. and T. Hammond ‘Rethinking Allison’s models’, American Political
Science Review 86(2) 1992, pp.301–22.
Smith, S., ‘Allison and the Cuban missile crisis: a review of bureaucratic politics
model for foreign policy decision making’, Millennium 9(1) 1980, pp.21–40.

The aim of this chapter is to introduce you to the concept of bureaucratic
politics and its influence upon the foreign policy decision-making process.
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter and the relevant readings, you should be able
to:
• discuss the key concepts of bureaucratic politics
• discuss and compare Allison’s three models of foreign policy decision
making
• discuss the impact of bureaucracies on democratic foreign policy
making
• discuss the critiques levelled against bureaucratic politics.
Introduction
Understanding the role of bureaucracies in shaping the foreign policy of
states is an important dimension of FPA. Scholars like Graham Allison
and Morton Halperin, despite sharing a desire to open up the ‘black box’
of foreign policy decision making with fellow behaviourists working in
35
International Relations, were nonetheless highly critical of their emphasis

on individual decision makers. They felt that this approach did not recognise
the seminal influence of the institutions of foreign policy making, that is,
the ministries of foreign affairs, defence and trade, which contribute to
the formulation and implementation of a state’s foreign policy. For these
academicians, an analysis of foreign policy decision making necessarily
begins with foreign policy bureaucracies and the various factors that cause
them to play a central role in the foreign policy process.
The ‘bureaucratic politics’ approach to understanding foreign policy
therefore emphasises the interplay between leaders, bureaucratic actors,
organisational culture and, to an extent, political actors outside the formal
apparatus of the state. It has been characterised as ‘middle-level theory’
because it places the analytical focus on the state and its institutions of
decision making, rather than on the individual or the international system
as a whole. In so doing, the bureaucratic politics approach set the stage
for a broader consideration of influences on foreign policy that eventually
included the role of interest groups, constitutional structures, societal values
and even culture.
Allison’s three models of foreign policy decision making

Allison’s influence on studies of bureaucracies and foreign policy is
undisputed and it is based upon his classic book, The essence of decision.
He takes a single case study – that of the Cuban missile crisis of October
1962 – and examines the decision-making process of the Kennedy
administration through three different theoretical lenses or ‘models’. In so
doing, he attempts to test the validity of established positions on the nature
of foreign policy decision making as well as introduce some new insights
into that process.
The first theoretical approach that Allison employs is called the ‘rational
actor model’. It conforms broadly to the rational decision-making
approach outlined in Chapter 3 (see page 23). Specifically, the rational
actor model posits that a state’s foreign policy decision making is conducted
in terms of a rational calculation of self-interest that takes into account
all relevant factors. It is based upon a number of assumptions about the
nature of decision makers and the environment within which they operate,
in particular, that there is one unitary actor making foreign policy and
that decisions taken reflect near-perfect information. Allison, like his
behaviourist predecessors, disputes these presumptions when they are seen
against the complexity of the experience of the Kennedy administration.
The second theoretical approach utilised by Allison to interpret the Cuban
missile crisis is the ‘organisational process model’. It envisages
what he calls a ‘feudalist structure’ of decision making, that is, one in
which different institutions within the government (such as the Ministry
of Defence or the Ministry of Trade) operate internally in a hierarchical
manner that is based upon set routines (‘standard operating procedures’)
that form the backbone of all decisions on foreign policy issues. Between
different ministries, however, there is relatively little communication or
cross-fertilisation of ideas, and policy within these institutions is the product
first and foremost of organisational needs. In this account, foreign policy
making bodies are seen as autonomous and unable to develop a policy
stance that is outside of their narrow set of institutional interests. Though
more in keeping with actual events in October 1962, Allison finds that this
approach does not fully capture the decision-making dynamics that took
place.
36
Finally, Allison introduces the ‘bureaucratic politics model’ which,

he believes, provides the most cogent explanation for the decision-
making process that took place during the Cuban missile crisis. Drawing
on some of the insights of organisational theory, the bureaucratic politics
model posits that foreign policy bureaucracies – again, the principal ones
being the ministries of foreign affairs, defence and trade – are in fact in
outright competition as they vie for access to the head of state and for
resources from the central government. Bureaucratic actors who are able
to articulate positions effectively and have privileged relations with the
head of state are seen to be most likely to win contests for shaping foreign
policy, irrespective of the merits or content of the policy they promote.
The leader, in this instance the President, is consigned to a position of
relative equality with other non-elected officials and derives most of his
importance from his status as the final source of decision rather than
any contribution he might make to the content of national foreign policy
formulation. In this regard, the insertion of considerations of party politics
into the policy-making process by the executive introduces a further
dimension of non-rationality into the foreign policy calculus.
Bureaucratic politics and its critics

The implications of the bureaucratic politics model have been both
profound and, in certain respects, troubling for scholars. For many, the iron
grip which the ‘faceless bureaucrats’ apparently have over a state’s foreign
policy – as opposed to elected politicians (who seemed relatively powerless
by some accounts) – called into question the matter of democratic control
of foreign policy. Moreover, the fact that decisions ultimately taken owe as
much to the political skills of bureaucrats as to any objective assessment of
their worth raises concerns over the formulation of national interest.
As influential as the bureaucratic politics approach has been in FPA,
it nonetheless inspired considerable criticism. One criticism levelled
against Allison in particular was that the bureaucratic politics model and
the organisational process model overlapped in a number of ways. For
instance, it isn’t clear how autonomous institutions pursuing particular
interests is significantly distinctive from bureaucratic competition
identified within the bureaucratic politics model. Indeed, Allison himself
eventually admitted the similarities between the two models were greater
than their differences and went on to merge them in later accounts.
Another criticism is that the anonymity and singularity of roles assigned
to bureaucrats by scholars is too limiting. Bureaucrats may be obliged to
respond to administrative pressure from above and react in terms of pre-
established routines, but they remain complex individuals with identities
and outlooks that extend beyond the vision of the anonymity of the
‘organisation man’ portrayed by proponents of the bureaucratic politics.
Far from promoting institutional interests alone, bureaucrats can (and do)
act in ways that may be at odds with their institutions for reasons as varied
as personal expediency or patriotism. Arguing from a different angle,
some critics have pointed out that the bureaucratic politics model ignores
the fact that a classic prerogative of the executive is to appoint like-
minded individuals to key administrative positions. Under this scenario,
bureaucratic conformity, echoing the insights of the behaviourists rather
than conflict, is the mostly likely scenario.
Finally, the elevation of the US experience of foreign policy decision
making to that of FPA theory was seen by many scholars as deeply
problematic. With the bulk of the world’s states being found outside
37
of the highly specialised setting of industrialised Western countries, it is

presumptuous to assume that they all function in a similar way to the US
model of decision making. Indeed, given the diversity of everything, from
administrative capacity to social cultural factors, there is much scope for
investigating and deriving more truly general principles on the impact of
bureaucracy on foreign policy than has been attempted by Allison and
Halperin.
Conclusion
Bureaucratic politics has made a solid contribution to our understanding
of foreign policy making. Some studies have sought to use the bureaucratic
politics model as a starting point for a more thorough investigation into
the effect that institutions as actors have on policy making. Others have
extended the original research through studies of new foreign policy crises
in a variety of different settings. Here the work of Steve Smith, who looked
at the Iran hostage crisis under the Carter administration, and that of Yakob
Vertzenberger, who examined the influence of bureaucratic politics on Indian
foreign policy, stand out. And some scholars have taken the substance of the
critique and developed a more nuanced analysis of individual foreign policy
actors and their social environment through the exploration of role theory.
More generally, advocates of the bureaucratic politics approach to FPA began
a process of investigation into sources of influence on foreign policy beyond
the state that was to culminate in a rethinking of the centrality of the state
in world politics. Subsequently, the importance of inter-governmental
organisations and non-state actors such as multinational corporations and
advocacy groups became recognised as significantly influential over foreign
policy.
Activity
Read the US Senate’s report on Iraq and weapons of mass destruction and discuss with
your colleagues as to whether, as the report suggests, cognitive factors like ‘group think’
were to blame for poor decision making or whether it was in fact due to bureaucratic
politics. See the conclusions of the Report by the Select Committee on Intelligence, US
Senate: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5403731/

Having completed this chapter and the Essential readings and activities, you
• discuss the key concepts of bureaucratic politics
• discuss and compare Allison’s three models of foreign policy decision
making
• discuss the impact of bureaucracies on democratic foreign policy making
• discuss the critiques levelled against bureaucratic politics.

1. What is bureaucratic politics and how does it impact upon foreign
policy?
2. Compare and contrast Allison’s models of foreign policy decision
making.
38
Part 2: Actors and structures
Part 2: Actors and structures
39
Notes
40
Chapter 6: Major, middle and small powers
Chapter 6: Major, middle and small

powers
Essential reading
Webber, M. and M. Smith Foreign policy in a transformed world. (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2000) Chapters 1 and 2.
Recommended reading
Alden, C. and M. Vieira ‘The new diplomacy of the south: South Africa, Brazil
and India and trilateralism’, Third World Quarterly 26(7) 2005, pp.1077–
96.
Further reading
Alden, C. China in Africa. (London: Zed, 2007).
Cooper, A., R. Higgot, K. Nossal Relocating middle powers: Australia and Canada
in a changing world order. (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia
1993).
Handel, M. Weak states in the international system. (London: Frank Cass, 1990).
Ikenberry, J. ‘The rise of China and the future of the west’, Foreign Affairs
January/February 2008.
Neack, L. The new foreign policy: US and comparative foreign policy in the 21st
century. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2002) pp.123–83.
Zakaria, F. The Post-American world (Norton 2008).

The aim of this chapter is to introduce you to the foreign policies of major,
middle and small powers. In particular, it will focus on the distinctions
between these three types of powers and the role of structure and agency
in shaping their respective foreign policies.
41
Learning outcomes
to:
• identify and contrast the three basic types of power in foreign policy
• describe their particular characteristics and evaluate how these impact
upon their foreign-policy approach
• outline the differences between the four types of powers.
Major, middle, small and emerging powers

Most analysts of foreign policy accept that there is a rough hierarchy
of states within the international system whose status is founded on a
recognised calculus of power and prestige. Though difficult to quantify
with exact certainty, nonetheless FPA scholars have divided states between
major powers, middle powers and small or weak states. More
recently the rise of developing countries with robust economics and
growing political (and military) prowess has introduced a new type of
power, the emerging power. Underlying each of these categories is an
acknowledgement that they represent a different capacity for independent
action within the international system, producing distinctive strategies that
inform their foreign policy and engendering a diversity of relationships
between states and international organisations.
Major powers and the search for primacy

At the top of the international hierarchy are major powers, those states
with sufficient military and economic capacity to act with some measure
of independence in the international system. The United States, with its
preponderance of military force (15 times greater in size than its nearest
rival) as well as having the world’s largest economy, currently occupies an
undisputed status as the only superpower. This puts it in a unique position
both in terms of its ability to influence the international system and its
responsibilities to maintain systemic stability. Bilateral and multilateral
avenues for foreign policy are readily available to major powers,
especially as they tend to dominate diplomatic processes and international
organisations through their ability to craft rules and institutions through
use of their superior means. The attractive pull of ‘soft power’ (see Chapter
2) is also a factor in sustaining a major power’s status as first among
equals in the international system.
The study of the rise and fall of major powers inspired scholars like
Charles Kindleberger to introduce the concept of ‘hegemony’ as a way of
capturing the unique standing of these states. Hegemonic states are those
which have been able to use their superior attributes, be they material,
technological or in the realm of social organisation, to attain a position of
dominance relative to other states in the international system. According
to Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, hegemonic states pursue foreign
policies that are concerned with the construction and maintenance of an
international system such that it continues to serve their national interests
(‘hegemonic stability’). This includes the use of financial means to ensure
that the national currency becomes the international pillar of the world
economic system (as was the case with the British pound during the
nineteenth century and the American dollar in the twentieth century).
Another example is the promotion of rule-making international institutions
which uphold the basic interests and values of the hegemon, for example
42
the American support for liberal trade through its promotion of the Bretton
Woods institutions (the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and
now the World Trade Organisation).
Earlier periods in world history have been characterised not by a unipolar
system dominated by a single hegemonic power as is the situation today,
but by bipolar (the Cold War) and multi-polar (nineteenth-century
Europe) systems in which rival states compete for standing in the world.
Major states, or would-be hegemons, utilise coalition-building strategies
to enhance their position and further their interests in pursuit of primacy.
Balance of power politics drives the foreign policy choices and actions of
major states under these circumstances (see Chapter 2).
Though blessed with superior resources and means, major states do not
operate without constraints. Indeed, in many respects the expectation of
leaders and their populations as to the ability of major states to secure
their interests without serious cost can lead to foreign policy mishaps.
The failure of the US to halt the communist takeover of China in 1949
and, two decades later, to drive out the communist forces in Vietnam –
despite America’s overwhelming superiority in all categories of power –
inspired serious domestic political crises. Coalitions of states opposed to
the hegemon arise which exploit foreign policy crises and challenge the
prevailing international order. International law, the underlying principle
of which is the sovereign equality of states, systematically attempts to
rein in the unilateralist instincts of major states which are not deemed
acceptable to the international community. Even international institutions,
though created originally by major powers to further their interests in the
international system, are said by scholars of ‘principle-agent theory’ to
develop some measure of autonomy from their progenitors.
Middle powers and multilateralism

Middle powers, by virtue of their standing as clearly smaller than the
major powers but having greater capability than small states, occupy a
critical place within the international system. Though the scholarly debate
over which criteria are most appropriate to measure ‘middlepowerdom’
(different readings of the importance of material attributes producing
very different assessments), a sensible approach is to follow Andrew
Cooper, Richard Higgot and Kim Nossal, who focus on the foreign policy
conduct of these states. From their perspective, only states with the
means and the desire to act as middle powers warrant inclusion in this
category. Middle powers’ foreign policy manifests itself in three ways: as
a ‘catalyst’ to promote global issues, a ‘facilitator’ to build coalitions and
a ‘manager’ acting within their region to promote and/or enforce norms
and institutional rules. Because of constraints on their resources, middle
powers pursue ‘niche diplomacy’, that is to say, selective involvement
in specific issue areas that reflect their broader national interests.
Their foreign policy is invariably multilateralist (some cynics would
say by necessity rather than choice) and they see themselves as ‘bridge
builders’ between opposing factions within the international community;
for example, the former Soviet Union and the United States or the
industrialised north and impoverished south.
Canada and Australia are often upheld as classic examples of middle
powers. Their foreign policies are oriented towards supporting multilateral
institutions to find solutions to international problems and they expend
considerable financial and political capital in pursuit of this aim. The
same could be said of Norway, which has leveraged its oil resources to
43
pursue a targeted foreign policy that supports mediation of selective global

problems, from the Oslo Accords in the Middle East to the negotiations in
Sri Lanka.
As noted above, there are a number of difficulties with the existing
definitions of middle powers. For instance, the self-ascribed status as
‘international good citizens’ and ‘bridge builders’, from the perspective
of critics, disguises the fundamentally supportive role that middle
powers have in upholding the established international system. Their
prominent representation in international institutions like the United
Nations or the International Monetary Fund reflects their willingness to
use multilateralism to ensure that the prevailing international order is
maintained. Another problem is situating emerging regional powers like
Brazil and India, which were once characterised as middle powers but
whose economic and military status already exceed that of the likes of
Canada and Australia. Behaviour-based assessments of the foreign policy
of these states, when coupled to Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver’s work on
regional security complexes, suggest that the best way to understand them
is as aspirant regional hegemons.
Small states and the search for security

Though this is an analytically unsatisfactory way to characterise them,
small and weak states constitute ‘everyone else’; that is, recognised
sovereign states that are not major or middle powers. Small states are
distinguished primarily by their physical size, small population and the
accompanying constraints that these have on participating in international
affairs at a global level. Generally speaking, their foreign policy orientation
is tailored to the region within which they are based and where their voice
may have greater effect. A further category of small state is the ‘micro
state’, these being principally island nations in the Pacific like Fiji, and
remnants of European feudalism, like San Marino. Weak states are not
necessarily small; indeed, they could be large territorially or in terms of
population but are unable to exercise effective authority over either of
these, usually due to internal conflict related to challenges of legitimacy
or administrative ineptitude. For example, the Sudan and the Congo are
both greater in size than Western Europe and have substantial populations
but, due to their history of conflict, exploitation and poor governance, they
are weak states with little to no impact in international affairs (beyond the
problems they pose as conflict zones).
In terms of the foreign policy of small and weak states, the constraints on
choice – based on their limited means – inevitably obliges these states to
seek out alliance partners and coalitions of other states. Multilateralism
forms a crucial part of their foreign policy orientation as international
institutions provide both opportunities for coalition building and a
platform for articulating and projecting their interests in ways that they
might otherwise not be able to do.
Like middle powers, categorising just what constitutes a ‘small or weak
state’ is problematic and has a bearing on one’s understanding of the
range of possibilities and constraints on small and weak states. To begin
with, smallness in itself does not denote the level of power, and it would
be a mistake to conflate size with lack of capacity or influence in the
international system. For instance, Singapore in geographic and population
terms is a minor state, and yet it has been able to play an important
role both within its region and, albeit selectively, in international affairs.
Equally, weakness is a condition that is dependent upon the measures
44
of power one chooses to use and presumably can change, rendering the
utility of this category subject to constant review. For instance, until the
1990s, China was seen to be a militarily significant power within its
region with a strong centralised administration, but one which hosted an
economy that was smaller than Switzerland’s. Should it have been called
a weak state? The limitations of these efforts at categorisation are, in this
case, self-evident.
Emerging powers
‘Emerging powers’ is a label coined to describe a new group of states
which has through a combination of economic prowess, diplomatic
acumen and military might managed to move away from developing
country status to challenge the dominance of mainly Western powers.
Their ability to operate and profit from the neo-liberal trading system,
using their relatively low cost factor advantages to gain market share in
both the industrial economies and developing world, has proved to be
a successful formula for achieving nationalist development aims while
providing substantial improvements in the economic livelihood of their
citizens.
Emerging powers have increasingly sought to translate their economic
standing into foreign policy gains on the global stage, a process that has
been accelerated by the global financial crisis of 2008. For instance, they
have brought pressure to bear on international institutions, in particular
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to broaden their
representation to include a larger stake for emerging powers while, for
India and Brazil, getting a permanent seat on the UN Security Council
is a key priority as well. The suggestion that power transitions from one
hegemonic order to a new one have historically been accompanied by
conflict has caused countries like China to launch a diplomatic campaign
designed to assure traditional powers that its drive for primacy would be a
peaceful one.
One of the most interesting aspect of the foreign policy conduct and
impact of emerging powers is their role in regions such as Africa which, at
least until recently, had been overwhelmingly dominated by Europe and
the United States. China, India and Brazil have at various times openly
declared their economic interests in gaining access to African resources
and (to a lesser degree) markets; all have used a combination of public
and private sector means to achieve these aims. At the same time, as
developing countries themselves, all three have felt compelled to use at
least the rhetoric of South solidarity – and arguably its substance – in
justifying their accelerating economic presence in Africa. And finally,
though these emerging powers have provided long-standing (if relatively
small) development assistance to Africa over the years, they have so
far shunned some key features of OECD official overseas development
practices in applying what they prefer to characterise as forms of South-
South cooperation.
Activity
With a group of friends, debate whether emerging powers are revisionists or reformers of
the international system. What are the implications of these approaches for the prevailing
norms and the functioning of contemporary international institutions?
45
Conclusion
The difficulty in establishing criteria for all but the most powerful states
does indeed call into question the power hierarchy approach to assessing
state capacity. Nonetheless, the three basic types used to classify states
in accordance with their attributes and status provides us with a rough
guide to expected foreign policy orientation. Concurrently, it highlights
the constraints on action imposed by international institutions and
international law, themselves more often the instruments of the weak
rather than strong states. In the next section we will delve further into the
influence of the external environment upon states and their foreign policy.
Activity
Outline the differing strategies and responses that major, middle, small and weak powers
have to Iran’s bid to develop nuclear weapons. The United States (major power); India
(middle power); Uzbekistan (small power) and Afghanistan (weak power). For country
information, see the BBC’s website under regions in the news section of: http://news.bbc.
co.uk. For information on Iran’s nuclear proliferation, see the International Crisis Group’s
website: www.crisisgroup.org

Having completed this chapter and Essential readings and activities, you
• identify and contrast the three basic types of power in foreign policy
• describe their particular characteristics and evaluate how these impact
upon their foreign-policy approach
• outline the differences between the four types of powers.

1. What are the capacities and limitations on foreign policy action by
major powers?
2. Compare and contrast the coalition-building strategies of major
powers, middle powers and small states.
46
Chapter 7: The role of the external environment
Chapter 7: The role of the external

environment
Essential reading
Chapter 7.
foreign policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) Chapters 1
and 8.
Recommended reading
Neack, L., J. Hey and P. Haney (eds) Foreign Policy Analysis: continuity and
Smith, S., A. Hadfield and T. Dunne (eds) Foreign Policy: theories, actors, cases
Further reading
Johnston, A. ‘Is China a status quo power?’, International Security 27(4) 2003,
pp.5–56.
Martin, L. ‘Interests, power and multilateralism’, International Organization
46(4) 1992, pp.756–92.
Parker, G. Geopolitics: past, present and future. (London: Pinter 1998).
Smith, S., A. Hadfield and T. Dunne (eds) Foreign Policy: theories, actors, cases
Prentice Hall, 2000) Chapter 1.

The aim of this chapter is to introduce you to the role played by the
external environment in shaping a state’s foreign policy.
Learning outcomes
to:
• discuss and evaluate the influence of the external environment on
foreign policy
• describe and evaluate the role of material factors and international
political factors in foreign policy formulation
• discuss the problems with determinism and choice in foreign policy.
47
Introduction
The external environment has long held a prominent place in studies of
foreign policy, primarily because it conforms closely to the realist position
in International Relations. For realists, who believe that the structure of
the international system holds the key to understanding foreign policy
orientation and outcome, the importance of the material and political
aspects of the external environment cannot be underestimated. Other
scholars who differ on this, nonetheless acknowledge the importance of
material resources, geographic position, international law and norms on
foreign policy. The influence of FPA and constructivism on realist thinking
has generated a new scholarly approach, neo-classical realism, which
seeks to integrate insights ranging from the impact of perception to the
role leadership on foreign policy. Traditionally, the external environment
is divided into two spheres: the material environment within which states
operate and the political environment of the international system. Each of
these introduces constraints and even limitations on a state’s foreign policy.
The role of the material environment: geography,

natural resources, economic development
Reflecting upon the surge in European nationalism and aggressive
foreign policies that accompanied this phenomenon, nineteenth-century
geographers developed a range of theories which linked the physical
position and character of the nation-state to the formulation of national
behaviour and with that its foreign policy. Their musings gave rise to the
classical geo-strategists and their theories of world domination, works
such as Harold Mackinder’s ‘heartland’ thesis (which famously declared
that ‘he who controls the heartland – i.e. Eastern Europe – controls
the world island’)1 and Alfred Mahan’s assessment of centrality of sea
power, which were influential in military planning of the major powers.
From this perspective, topography and terrain were key determinants of
foreign policy; for example, Britain as an island was destined to become
a maritime power, while the American foreign policy of isolationism grew
out of the physical fact of separateness from continental Europe (and Asia)
by two vast oceans.
Tied to a state’s geographic position as a source of influence over foreign
policy is its resource endowment which includes the degree of access it
has to the vital needs of society (food, water, energy) and its dependency
on trade to obtain these requirements. The national population is also a
critical resource, with a large population viewed as a positive indication
of the strength of a state, both in terms of its economic productivity and
ability to marshal an effective military. This was given foreign policy
expression, rather infamously, in Nazi Germany’s rationale (‘Lebensraum’
or living room) for its expansion into Eastern Europe, while Mao promoted
population growth as a panacea for China’s military and economic
shortcomings after 1949. A further influence of the external environment
upon a state’s foreign policy is its level of economic development and
its capacity to use this to enhance its foreign policy instruments (see
Chapter 2). In particular, a country’s balance of payments status, its trade
dependency, the need for capital and level of technical skills sourced from
abroad are all critical factors. In this context, Imperial Japan’s drive into
Manchuria and Southeast Asia was as much a quest for vital economic
resources needed to maintain its own development as a desire to dislodge
European colonialism.
48
The result was that foreign policy makers in the late nineteenth and
most of the twentieth centuries construed these maxims on nationalism,
geographic position and self-sufficiency as guiding notions for foreign
policy formulation. Moreover, the failure to account for these factors or
to misread them clearly had serious penalties for major powers as well as
smaller states. An example of this was John Kennedy’s declaration that his
government would ‘pay any price and bear any burden’ in its containment
of communism, a foreign policy posture built upon a sense of unlimited
American resources. The financial burden of sustaining American
intervention in the Vietnam War, coupled to its political ramifications
at home, brought about a serious foreign policy crisis and accusations
of ‘imperial overstretch’ (much like the impact of the Anglo-Boer war in
Britain in an earlier century).
Problems with the material environment and foreign

policy
Much of what is said about the relationship between the material
environment and foreign policy, such as the link between maritime
prowess, interests and geographic position, is common sense. However,
the tendency of geo-strategists has been to conflate a source of influence
rooted in physical attributes of a state’s territorial position and its requisite
economic and security concerns with an outright deterministic approach
to foreign policy. This has been compounded by the use of geo-strategic
principles as a justification for aggressive foreign policies of conquest in
the past. Generally speaking, geography is seen today not as a determinant
of foreign policy but rather one important factor that facilitates or impedes
action. Moreover, as technology has developed in the last 50 years, the
patent ability of humans to transcend geography and develop substitutes
for natural resources has rendered aspects of these material constraints
less relevant for states. For example, delivery systems for major weapons
like Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and satellite technology
have meant that no region is immune from attack by the major powers.
Equally, changing notions of power have also played a role in revising
the importance of territorial acquisition as a source and expression of a
state’s wealth and security. In this regard, one cannot overestimate the
significance of the liberal principles that have shaped global trade policy,
eliminating much of the once-mandatory drive for self-sufficiency by
states. Nevertheless, the external environment still holds important clues
to a state’s capacity and outlook in international affairs, especially in a
world where resources are becoming scarcer.
The role of the international political environment:

trade, security and international law
The international political environment exercises another form of
influence over a state’s foreign policy. As noted earlier, the international
system, being anarchic, lacks overt responsible governance. As a
consequence, states respond to a growing collection of tacit rules and
restraints which are the product of power politics, multilateral governance
and international law and norms. These factors impinge upon the
formulation and implementation of a given state’s foreign policy, setting
parameters which oblige conformity increasingly through incentives or
prohibitive costs. The impact of the international political environment
on foreign policy is manifested in three areas: the economic sphere, the
security sphere and the realm of international law and norms.
49
The international economic sphere has a particularly pronounced,

if sometimes unrecognised in FPA, impact on the conduct of states.
Historically, states have had to modify behaviour in order to participate
in international commercial activities as well as the accompanying
communication network. For example, shared use or understanding of
the conversion of monetary values and weights, not to mention common
standards in transport, have involved surrendering some of the sovereign
prerogatives to collective decision-making bodies. Adherence to basic
rules of international economic institutions, in particular the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) imposes additional constraints on action for states.
In this instance, the near-universal membership of the WTO has meant
that signatory states are obliged to accept negotiated parity of access to
domestic markets and abide by WTO rules on intellectual property laws.
The European Union’s efforts to introduce trade barriers to, for example,
low-cost Chinese imports have had to be withdrawn (even before they
went to arbitration) because officials knew they were contravening WTO
agreements. In a more general sense, the international economic sphere’s
shift to a liberalisation of restrictions on the movement of capital has
had a tremendous impact on a state’s ability to raise foreign investment
for its development, as this can be contingent upon external assessments
of the conditions of market openness and transparency in the country
(see Chapter 9). Thus, in both cases, foreign policy makers often have to
discard strictly nationalist economic policies as untenable due to existing
agreements or an emerging consensus on what constitutes a liberal
environment of foreign investment.
The international security sphere is best characterised as the
strategic habitat in which a state operates. The network of alliances in a
particular region, formed as a check on adversarial states or to reinforce
action in keeping with the aims of like-minded states, exercises a critical
role in shaping foreign policy choice. For example, the presence of US
troops on the soil of South Korea – the product of a security alliance
– has acted as a restraint on unfettered action by an aggressive North
Korea. Treaty agreements and the consensus decision-making rules of
some regional organisations can reduce foreign policy choice, stifle
public dialogue and even recourse to independent actions by individual
states as has been seen with the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) on the issue of military rule in Burma/Myanmar. The choice of
foreign policy instruments to address a particular dilemma can be heavily
influenced by the international security sphere. Covert American funding
for the rebel Unita movement in Angola and the Contras in Nicaragua
was pursued in part (there were domestic restrictions as well) because of
concerns that Washington would incur diplomatic costs from its allies and
other states in Africa and Central America.
Finally, the realm of international law and norms imposes constraints
on state action and facilitates the pursuit of certain kinds of action,
namely diplomacy and negotiation over that of war. The International
Court of Justice as the recognised arbitrator on international law and
states in dispute with one another can take the matter to the Court for
arbitration. A range of international treaty agreements, first amongst them
the responsibilities imposed upon members of the United Nations and
subsidiary agreements like the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948),
have obliged states to uphold the decisions and institutions themselves.
Though clearly not always effective, nonetheless, international laws,
rules and norms are almost without exception factored into a state’s
50
foreign policy decision-making process and thus impact upon the policies
ultimately selected. Changing international norms on sovereignty in
the post-Cold War era have played a crucial part in the international
interventions in the name of humanitarianism in Iraq and Africa, bringing
with it the corrosion of one of the sacred principles of the international
system, namely that of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states.
The introduction of international criminal tribunals into domestic
jurisdiction of particular states over crimes against humanity, as has been
the case in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, has (presumably) had an
effect on the conduct of dictators and would-be violators of human rights.
Finally, international norms against use of nuclear weapons have, so far,
stayed the hand of the declared and undeclared nuclear powers while the
Non-Proliferation Treaty has served as a device (albeit, an unsatisfactory
one) for socialising aspirant nuclear powers.
The external environment, determinism and foreign

policy
In the end, the external environment is best understood as a general
framework that affects policy or as a pattern which positively shapes
policy within certain constraints, but it would be overstating to say it
actually determines foreign policy. According to Harold and Margaret
Sprout, a foreign policy maker is not a free agent, nor is his or her conduct
completely determined by external structures. They propose the term
‘environmental probablism’ as a way to understand the relationship
between external environment and foreign policy, that is to say that the
external environment makes certain outcomes more likely. Tied to this
is what they call ‘cognitive behaviourism’, the fact that decision makers
have greater freedom of choice in foreign policy to the extent that they
can recognise that they have choices. Thus one could say that the fixation,
for example, with pursuing time-bound foreign policy objectives such
as Russia’s historical efforts to capture territory for a ‘warm water port’
or Franco-German rivalry in Europe, need not be external sources of
foreign policy. Or, as Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe has shown, the various
international legal obligations and normative restrictions on state conduct
can be successfully ignored without incurring personal cost. Modification,
if not outright abandonment, of a particular foreign policy shibboleth is
always a possibility from this perspective.
Conclusion
Material conditions and the international political structures around
economy, security and law have a demonstrable impact upon a state’s
foreign policy. How foreign policy makers assess the needs of state and
choose to implement policies which take into account these external
factors remains subject to cognitive factors. In the next chapter, we will
explore the role and impact of the other key dimension of foreign policy
decision making, namely the domestic environment.
Activity
With a group of friends, discuss the influence of geography, natural resources, population
and development status in shaping the foreign policy of Singapore and the United States.
For country information, see the BBC’s website under regions in the news section of:
http://news.bbc.co.uk
51

• discuss and evaluate the influence of the external environment on
foreign policy
• describe and evaluate the role of material factors and international
political factors in foreign policy formulation
• discuss the problems with determinism and choice in foreign policy.

1. How important is the external environment to shaping a state’s foreign
policy?
2. Discuss the influence of ONE of the following on a state’s foreign
policy: the global trade system, the regional security system or
international law and norms.
52
Chapter 8: The role of the domestic environment
Chapter 8: The role of the domestic

environment
Essential reading
Hill, C. The changing politics of foreign policy. (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2003)
Chapters 8 and 9.
change in its second generation. (Harlow: Prentice Hall, 1995) Chapter 8 or
Neack, L. The New Foreign Policy: US and Comparative Foreign Policy in the
21st Century. (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2002) pp.75–122.
Recommended reading
Clarke, M. and B. White (eds) Understanding foreign policy: the foreign policy
systems approach. (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989) Chapter 4.
foreign policy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) Chapters 5
and 6
Putnam, R. ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of the two-level game’,
International Organization 42(3) 1988, pp.427–60.
Further reading
Chan, S. and W. Safran ‘Public opinion as a constraint against war:
democracies’ response to Operation Iraqi Freedom’, Foreign Policy Analysis
2(2) 2006, pp.137–56.
Bennet, L. and D. Paletz (eds) Taken by storm: the media, public opinion and US
foreign policy in the Gulf War. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
Foyle, D. ‘Public opinion and foreign policy: elite beliefs as a mediating
variable’, International Studies Quarterly 41(1) 1997, pp.141–70.
Gelpi, C. ‘Democratic diversions: governmental structure and the
externalization of domestic conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(2)
1997, pp.255–82.
Holsti, O. ‘Public opinion and foreign policy: the challenge to the Almond-
Lippman consensus’, International Studies Quarterly 36(4) 1992, pp.439–
66.
Nincic, M. Democracy and foreign policy. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1992).
Sprecher, C. and K. DeRouen ‘The domestic determinants of foreign policy
behaviour in Middle Eastern enduring rivals, 1948–1998’, Foreign Policy
Analysis 1(1) pp.121–42.
53

The aim of this chapter is to introduce you to the different approaches
to understanding the role and impact of the domestic environment on a
state’s foreign policy.
Learning outcomes
to:
• discuss the three approaches to interpreting the impact of the domestic
environment upon foreign policy
• describe and evaluate the importance of domestic structure and
regimes to the making of foreign policy
• describe and evaluate the role of the domestic economic system in the
foreign policy process
• discuss the role of interest groups and the media in shaping public
opinion on foreign policy.
Introduction
The old adage ‘politics stops at the water’s edge’ captures the sense in
which, traditionally, foreign policy was seen to be an area around which
domestic political factionalism is sublimated to the interests of national
security. The study of foreign policy, as noted in earlier chapters, in
addition to recognising the problems inherent in defining the ‘national
interest’, inspired a closer examination of the sources of decision making
and the nature of the process itself. Domestic influences, be they lobbyists,
the media, class factors or constitutional restrictions, are clearly significant
and in some cases central to the making of a state’s foreign policy.
There are three basic approaches to understanding the impact of domestic
factors upon a state’s foreign policy. One approach sees the principal
source of domestic influence in the actual structural form (i.e. institutions
and regimes) of states themselves. A second approach sees foreign policy
making as being driven by the nature of the economic system within states
and concurrently in the hands of a small élite that has traditionally acted
in terms of its perception of national interest. A third account sees foreign
policy as the product of a competitive pluralist environment as expressed
by interest group politics. We will focus on these three accounts in this
chapter as well as the accompanying critiques.
The sociological approach: state structures and regimes

For many FPA scholars, the most significant source of foreign policy is
found in the nature and structure of the state itself. According to Thomas
Risse-Kappen (1991), the importance of structure of state resides in the
fact that it is the crucial site of foreign policy decision making and, as
mediated through constitutional arrangements, the area where state and
society ‘negotiate’ the country’s international relations. Here, within the
particular constitutional framework of each state, domestic institutions
and interest groups operate, devising coalition-building strategies that
ultimately demonstrate the effectiveness of domestic influences over
foreign policy. Rules of political participation also influence formal
politics and the conduct of political parties when it comes to international
issues. Traditionally, the executive is accorded the right to formulate and
54
implement foreign policy, either by dint of the constitution or through

convention, with the legislature and other institutions having only limited
powers of judicial review and control over the budget. The number of
points of access between societal groups and decision makers determines
the degree to which a state’s foreign policy is the product of public input.
For example, France with its few access points to the executive is ‘state-
dominated’, as the public has only a limited role in foreign policy, while
the US with multiple access points to the executive is ‘society-dominated’,
and the public has more opportunities to influence foreign policy.
Another aspect of domestic structure which influences foreign policy is
that of political regime type. Authoritarian regimes, lacking an electoral
mandate from their population, have historically used foreign issues as a
distraction from domestic difficulties. George Kennan’s ‘X telegram’1 and 1
George Kennan, a
subsequent articulation of America’s ‘containment policy’ of the Soviet US diplomat based
in Moscow during
Union was predicated on this form of analysis of the roots of Soviet
the 1940s, wrote an
foreign policy. From this perspective, democratic (or ‘pluralist’) regimes anonymous telegram to
should pursue fewer foreign policy ‘adventures’ that are out of step with the US state department
their public’s interests. However, some research has shown that access critising the prevailing
to information or other bureaucratic obstacles in an authoritarian state approach towards the
may be as much of an impediment to public involvement in foreign policy Soviet Union that was
founded on the wartime
decision making in a democratic one, reducing the differences on foreign
alliance that formed the
policy between the two regime types. basis for a shift in US
Within the context of regime-oriented considerations of the domestic foreign policy
origins of foreign policy is the ‘democratic peace debate’. It is derived
from Kant’s ‘perpetual peace’ theory in which he constructs a model of an
international order that only ‘republican’ states are allowed to join.
Michael Doyle, an international relations scholar, transformed ‘republican’
to ‘liberal’ and notes that statistical analyses bear out the point that
stable constitutional liberal democracies do not engage in war with one
another. The rationale behind this is twofold. First, a ‘cultural-normative’
interpretation suggests that stable democracies resolve conflict through
negotiation and bargaining and, therefore, favour these same approaches
in foreign policy, especially towards other democratic regimes. However,
when dealing with non-democratic regimes, democratic leaders put
aside inhibitions against conflict. Concurrently, a ‘structural-institutional’
interpretation suggests that democratic regimes, founded on a system of
checks and balances which effectively slow down decision making while
encouraging public consent on foreign policy decisions leading to war, acts
as a deterrent to war between democracies.
The ‘structuralist’ approach: economic systems and

social class
For structuralists writing in the Marxist tradition, we find the roots of
foreign policy and, more particularly, the drive for exploitative policies
like imperialism and colonialism, in the nature of the capitalist economic
system. According to Karl Marx, though the state is nothing more than a
committee representing bourgeoisie interests, it performs a function in
ordering the interests of capital in relation to labour and markets. Vladimir
Lenin took this notion further, proclaiming that:
‘(It is) the drive for markets due to over-production and
saturation of domestic markets, as well as a constant need
for resources that causes capitalist countries to engage in
competition with one another. The result is the “last stage of
capitalism”, an effort to export the modes of production
55
and accompanying class contradictions inherent at home to

unexploited regions of the world, to the non-industrialised
world.’ (Lenin, 1916)2 2
Lenin, V. ‘Imperialism,
the highest stage of
A centre-periphery relationship, based upon economic exploitation of non- capitalism’, Lenin
and semi-industrialised states of the ‘Third World’ (or ‘South’), produces Internet Archive, http://
a foreign policy oriented towards maintaining this relationship on the www.marxists.org/
part of the industrialised core with the countries of the periphery. Others, archive/lenin/index.htm
such as Robert Cox and Hein Marais, critical theorists, have suggested that
there is a transnational capitalist class in developing countries that shares
the norms and values derived from the interests of the leading capitalist
countries and which are fostered by leading international institutions like
the World Bank. These local élites actively subvert local considerations in
favour of capitalist interests and, in so doing, perpetuate the exploitative
relations of economic dominance. So, for example, the foreign policy
orientation towards Western interests in matters like trade liberalisation by
otherwise impoverished states, whose domestic industries and agricultural
sector suffer from open market access, can be explained.
Finally, there is a strand of class and élite theories of foreign policy that
describes foreign policy as being conducted by and for the élite within
society. Nineteenth-century English observer, John Bright, noted that
the social origins of the diplomatic corps were essentially drawn from a
country’s élite, and he proposed that ‘foreign policy is a gigantic system of
outdoor relief for the aristocracy’. In the mid-twentieth century, American
political scientist C. Wright Mills identified a ‘power élite’ composed of
corporate leaders, politicians and military commanders as the driving
force behind foreign (and national) policy. The ability of these groups
to construe their parochial concerns as ‘national interest’, and therefore
be adopted as a state’s foreign policy, is tied to their capacity to mobilise
society through ideogolical and economic appeals.
The pluralist approach: sub-state actors and interests

Perhaps the most widely acknowledged approach to assessing the role and
impact of domestic factors on foreign policy is that of pluralism, which
takes the myriad of sub-state actors and their efforts to exert influence
over state institutions and decision-making processes. The focus of the
pluralist approach is electoral democracies and the role of sub-state and
non-state actors. Principal among these are interest groups, public opinion
and the media, in shaping foreign policy choices taken by decision makers.
Interest groups are distinguished by their source of support as well as
nature of issue. Generally speaking, they offer either political mobilisation
for electoral support or financial mobilisation for electoral support (or
both) to governments and political parties in exchange for their backing
of foreign policy positions. A key variable in this exchange is the degree to
which interest groups are able to mobilise and present their positions as
collective ones. Interest groups vary but can roughly be divided into lobby
groups, single-issue movements, constituency-based groups (such as ethnic
minority voters) and special interest-based groups (such as representatives
of a particular industry). Though somewhat neglected in pluralist studies
of foreign policy, the role of political parties as aggregates of localised
interests is also an important element in this process, with politician
or parties acting as ‘issue setters’ or ‘issue followers’ depending upon
circumstances. Here the insights of domestic structure (see above) and
how different political systems configure political participation is critical.
56
Public opinion is a broad term that constitutes the mass, attentive

public and various interest groups and lobbies. Public opinion can be said
to be a ‘background constraint’ on foreign policy in the form of setting
parameters on the decision and the approach to be adopted. The classical
view of public opinion holds that it has no role or influence over foreign
policy and that it is largely indifferent and ignorant of foreign policy
issues. Christopher Hill, in his study of British public opinion on foreign
policy, echoes this sentiment when he characterises public opinion as ‘the
Loch Ness monster’, something often spoken of but never seen. Rosenau
disputes this position and sees public opinion in pyramidal terms with
the top level being the élite (constituting the government, the legislature
and the media); the second being the attentive public (intellectuals and
business); and the third being the rest of the public (who are indifferent).
Others, like Risse-Kappen, hold that only a section of public opinion,
perhaps 5–20 per cent, is interested and attentive to foreign policy. The
key determinant of this public concern seems to be ‘issue saliency’; that
is, the idea that public interest is issue-dependent. Routine issues of
diplomacy do not penetrate the normal array of public concerns, but
economic and trade issues as well as matters of war and peace do arouse
interest.
The media plays a crucial, if controversial, role in the foreign policy
process as the information bridge between the public, the state and
international events. The media’s influence on foreign policy can be seen
from three basic perspectives: as an agenda setter (an example being
William Randolph Hearst, an American media mogul who promoted war
through his newspapers); as a ‘clearing house’ for information (essentially
a neutral provider of news for the public); and as a propaganda tool for
governments. More recently, FPA scholarship has debated the ‘CNN effect’,
the degree to which the media spotlight on a given matter can actually
force a state to take action, through research into government responses
to portrayals of humanitarian crises. Noam Chomsky characterised the
process of opinion formation in democracies as ‘manufactured consent’
whereby the state and media élites shape citizens’ outlook to conform
to their particular interests so as to win support for pursuit of foreign
policy. Following on from this insight, scholarly studies have gone on to
suggest that only when élite opinion within a state is itself divided over a
particular foreign policy issue do the media actually exert influence over
public opinion. By this account, the British media and public’s outcry over
the Blair government’s participation in the Iraq War reflected first and
foremost divisions within the foreign policy establishment over this policy.
Having an input into the media is a priority of democratic states seeking
to win over the public for a particular course of action. Following the
Vietnam War, efforts were made by the American government to influence
the media, which was seen to have been an independent actor capable of
undermining its foreign policy objectives. This included the introduction
of new approaches to managing media (daily briefings, controlled leaks,
spin and ‘embedded journalists’ who are placed within military units to
report on combat). State-funded media, like the British Broadcasting
Corporation, present a somewhat different set of problems for a
democratic state as they raise the issue of balance between independence
and control of the media agenda. Another source of information on
international affairs is non-state actors whose mandate is to shape public
opinion on foreign policy issues. These include ‘think tanks’ such as the
nearly 300 strategic studies centres worldwide, philanthropic foundations
such as the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and semi-state actors such as
57
political party foundations like Germany’s Friedrich Ebert Foundation and

the US National Endowment for Democracy. Multinational corporations
use their funding of non-state actors to support perspectives that
correspond with their interests. Advocacy groups like environmentalists
or human rights activists try to mobilise public support (and in so doing
influence government action) through media campaigns designed to
raise awareness of their issues and concerns (see Chapter 9). Finally, the
so-called ‘new media’, that is the world wide web, has provided non-state
actors, as well as individuals through ‘blog’ sites, nearly infinite platforms
for connecting individuals and sources of information. However, the
accompanying fragmentation of national media into narrow interest-based
constituencies which are market or interest driven and its implications for
opinion formation has yet to be adequately explored.
Foreign policy decision making and the ‘two-level game’

The inherent complexity of interpreting the process of foreign policy
formulation and choice inspired Robert Putnam to develop a model which
helps us to understand the different (and sometimes rival) dynamics
involved in foreign policy decision making. According to him, decision
makers have to operate within two competing frameworks with different
rules and operational logics – one being the external environment which
is anarchic and the other being the domestic environment which operates
under recognised rules – as they seek to achieve a ‘win-set’ (a policy
that satisfies all requisite interests). The weighing of options, the classic
‘guns versus butter’ (security versus wealth creation) in coming to a
decision on a specific foreign policy matter, is made more challenging by
these different sets of rules governing the two environments. Putnam’s
influential approach is framed within the game theory paradigm and it
captures the dynamic between two levels and attempts by decision makers
to address local constituencies and external forces at the same time.
Conclusion
The various approaches presented above – the first a sociological
rendering, the second a classical structuralist account, and the last drawn
from the work of neo-realists and rationalists – form the key elements of
the ‘conversation’ about the importance, role and influence of the domestic
environment in foreign policy. Furthermore, through the application of
Putnam’s ‘two-level game’, we can see how decision makers manage
competing pressures and concerns as they work towards developing their
state’s foreign policy. As has been demonstrated, the domestic environment
is a crucial and constraining factor in foreign policy, placing limits on what
is possible in a country’s foreign policy. At the same time, it is clear that
contemporary foreign policy is not just focused on the externalisation of
domestic politics but part of a complex interchange across the domestic–
foreign frontier of states. We will pick up this latter theme on how the
changing international system has, through the rise of transnational actors,
impacted upon foreign policy in the next chapter.
Activity
Make a list of the reasons why democracies don’t go to war with one another
(‘democratic peace theory’). Then consider the theory in light of the arguments made by a
proponent of the idea, US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice (www.state.gov/secretary/
rm/2005/57888.htm) and a critic, Atul Bharadwaj (www.mafhoum.com/press3/112S21_
files/AN-APR0402-9.htm). Who makes the better argument, in your opinion? Why?
58

• discuss the three approaches to interpreting the impact of the domestic
environment upon foreign policy
• describe and evaluate the importance of domestic structure and
regimes to the making of foreign policy
• describe and evaluate the role of the domestic economic system in the
foreign policy process
• discuss the role of interest groups and the media in shaping public
opinion on foreign policy.

1. Do democratic regimes have significantly different foreign policies
from those of authoritarian regimes?
2. Describe the role of ONE of the following on the foreign policy
process: interest groups, public opinion or the media.
59
Notes
60
Part 3: Foreign policy in the era of globalisation
Part 3: Foreign policy in the era of

globalisation
61
Notes
62
Chapter 9: Transnational actors and foreign policy
Chapter 9: Transnational actors and

foreign policy
Essential reading
Hill, C. The changing politics of foreign policy. (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2003)
Chapter 6.
Hall, 1995) Chapter 14 or Neack, L. The New Foreign Policy: US and
Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century. (Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers Inc., 2002) pp.185–205.
Recommended reading
Finnemore, M. and K. Sikkink ‘International norm dynamics and political
change’, International Organization 52(4) 1998.
Further reading
Foyle, D. ‘Foreign policy analysis and globalization: public opinion, world
opinion and the individual’, International Studies Review 5(2) 2003,
pp.155–202.
Josselin, D. and W. Wallace (eds) Non-state actors in world politics.
(Basingstoke: Palgrave 2001).
Keohane, R. and J. Nye Power and interdependence. (Glenville, Ill: Scott,
Foresman, 1989) second edition.

The aim of this chapter is to introduce you to the relationship between
transnational actors, the state and foreign policy.
Learning outcomes
to:
• evaluate the significance of transnational actors in the shaping of a
state’s foreign policy
• describe the process through which inter-governmental organisations
and non-state actors exercise influence over foreign policy
• assess the impact of transnationalism on the role of the state in foreign
policy.
Introduction
The ‘globalisation’ of the world economy and, increasingly, the extension
of international rules and norms, have had a significant impact on
63
states. This phenomenon has inspired the emergence of a new form

of international conduct, one which James Rosenau calls ‘linkage
politics’, that involves both a diffusion of state power and the rise of
inter-governmental organisations and non-state actors. In this context,
states are no longer seen as the sole providers of ideas and influence in
the international system, but rather as working in tandem with inter-
governmental organisations and non-state actors to address global issues.
Moreover, domestic politics within states is increasingly influenced by
ideas and actors outside of the traditional sphere of local politics (Peter
Gourevitch’s ‘second image reversed’). Against this background of
international change, a key question facing FPA scholars is to determine
the degree to which transnationalism challenges the role of the state in
international affairs or merely serves as a new instrument for reinforcing
its status.
Inter-governmental organisations and foreign policy

As noted in Chapter 7, inter-governmental organisations (also referred
to more specifically as international institutions) are created by states to
facilitate commerce and communication, provide for peace and security
through collective action and to distribute governing capabilities among
member states. Their presence ameliorates conflict between states and, in
so doing, induces a measure of stability in the otherwise anarchic system.
International institutions are seen by realists to remain the instruments of
states while other scholars have emphasised the degree to which they are
able to establish a measure of autonomy.
This debate over the rationale behind state participation in inter-
governmental organisations and the effect that it has on state and
international organisational interests is central to our understanding
of the relationship between states, their foreign policy aims and the
influence of international institutions over these aims. State engagement
with international institutions is predicated on the desire to participate
in global multilateral institutions, despite the obvious surrendering of
some state prerogatives. Though some International Relations scholars
have focused on the short-term interests which drive state engagement,
others have emphasised the longer term gains for participating states. Bob
Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek, international relations scholars, believe
that such long-term participation by states ‘offers tools of influence to the
(international) organisation because it allows for policy proposals that are
closer to the organisation’s interests than to the state’s.’
In this setting, the capacity of states to exercise influence over the
international agenda is under several important constraints. For example,
the institutional rules and procedures introduce barriers to direct action
and require consultation as well as consensus among member states as
a precursor to policy formulation. Norms like the sovereign equality of
states, though deliberately violated in the structuring of the Permanent
Five in the UN Security Council as well as the system of weighted voting
in the IMF, nonetheless introduce checks on major power influence in
international institutions at the same time that they amplify middle
and small power roles. Foreign policy making under these conditions
becomes deeply enmeshed in coalition-building strategies which, echoing
the insights of group decision making within states, tends to produce
sub-optimal policies from the perspective of all participants. However,
proponents would argue, the emergent system of ‘global governance’
lays the foundation for a stable, rules-based international order that will
ultimately transcend the anarchy of the past.
64
Non-state actors and foreign policy

Non-state actors, broadly construed, are all categories of political
actors involved in international affairs which are neither states nor
representative of state-created bodies or intergovernmental organisations.
They vary in classification from large multinational corporations like
Exxon, with a global presence and huge financial resources at hand, to
small environmental lobby groups like Greenpeace with a global media
presence and representative offices around the world. More recently, the
recognition that globalisation has been accompanied by a rise in criminal
transnational actors like Al Qaeda has further expanded this category.
Christopher Hill makes the following distinction between different non-
state actors (or transnational actors, as he prefers to call them): territorial,
using or seeking a territorial base; ideological/cultural, promoting ideas
across boundaries; and economic, whose primary focus is wealth creation.
They relate to states in basically three ways, through bargaining and
negotiation, as competitors, and in the form of transcending relations. An
example of the first kind of relationship is an environmental NGO which
hopes to influence government policy using different forms of persuasion
that is routinised through regular interaction between the two entities. An
example of the second kind of relationship is that of a human rights group
that challenges a state’s treatment of its citizens and may even provoke a
hostile response from the state apparatus. Finally, an example of the third
is that of actors such as churches who do not necessarily even use the state
as a reference point, either to influence or compete against, in the pursuit
of their transnational activitities like missionary work (Christopher Hill,
The changing politics of foreign policy, pp.193–205).
Historically, the impact of non-state actors on foreign policy was first
seen in the nineteenth century over the abolition of the slave trade, when
primarily churches and church-affiliated organisations in England led by
William Wilberforce made common cause with like-minded individuals
across the British Empire, North America and elsewhere. Trade unions
promoted solidarity and labour rights among industrialised countries and,
in the twentieth century, in the developing world. Political movements
lobbied for civil rights in the colonial territories during the twentieth
century and, in some instances, embarked on campaigns of political
violence against states. More recently, the triumph of democratic liberalism
that accompanied the end of the Cold War, laid the basis for a proliferation
of non-state actors who use new communication technologies such as the
internet to promote their interests and concerns.
Central to the discussion of how contemporary non-state actors, and in
particular advocacy groups, influence foreign policy is the place of ‘norms’.
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, international relations scholars,
propose a schema for understanding how non-state actors are able to
influence foreign policy by focusing on the role of ‘norm entrepreneurs’.
Norm entrepreneurs attempt to introduce new ideas that are linked to
existing norms and hold out the possibility of greater effectiveness and
acceptance by state actors. The diffusion of norms follows a pattern (or
‘life cycle’) characterised by norm emergence, a ‘tipping point’, norm
cascade and ultimately norm internalisation by state actors. The tipping
point or threshold is especially important as it is the moment when a
sufficient number of states as well as influential states have accepted the
norm, thus paving the way for general acceptance by all states in the
international system. Conflicts between international and domestic norms
do occur and are influenced by international trends which can act to
discredit one constellation of norms, thus allowing another to replace it.
65
For example, in Southern Africa, the discrediting of racial narratives which

informed settler colonialism played a crucial role in undermining support
for settler oligarchies both internationally and domestically, as did the
collapse of communism in paving the way for transitions to democracy.
The motivation for acceptance of new norms by state actors is important
to consider as well. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, governing élites
respond to norms when their legitimacy is threatened, when prominent
states abide by a particular norm, for the intrinsic (usually universalistic)
qualities of the norm, and when the new norms can claim ties to existing
norms. The centrality of local norm entrepreneurs to the process of
extending the reach of international – indeed, Western – norms to non-
Western polities such as those in southern Africa introduces a level of local
agency that holds implications for acceptance of these ‘outside’ norms.
Amitaya Acharya notes that socio-cultural factors such as belief systems
influence the degree to which resistance, adaptation and adoption, or
replacement strategies are employed by local actors in Southeast Asia.
Complex interdependence and foreign policy

Against this backdrop of growing global interdependence, Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye sought to understand how these changes in
turn affect the dynamics of foreign policy decision making. For them, the
web of interconnections between state, sub-state and non-state actors
produces a foreign policy process characterised by a multiplicity of
actors, channels and inputs which produce new agendas and outcomes.
In particular, they felt that the globalising world elevated the status of
international organisations because of their recognised role as the key site
of cooperation and coalition building for states. Keohane and Nye suggest
that the process of foreign policy formulation under conditions of complex
interdependency is influenced by the following factors:
• The goals of actors: these vary from issue to issue for states, and
multiple channels of contact between governments (e.g. ministry-to-
ministry) make goals difficult to define. Transnational actors pursue
their own goals.
• Instruments of state policy: power resources specific to issue
areas are most relevant and state actors’ attempts to manipulate
interdependence to promote national agendas, using where they can
international organisations and transnational actors as alternative
instruments of foreign policy.
• Agenda formation: the policy agenda is affected by changes
in the distribution of power resources within issue areas, the
status of international regimes, changes in the importance of
transnational actors, linkages to other issues and politicisation due to
interdependence.
• Roles of international organisations: these bodies ultimately set the
international agenda, induce coalition formation among state actors
and act as arenas for political action for states (but especially for weak
states).
In this account, the centrality of the state is diluted by the international
organisation and, to a degree, other transnational actors, but it remains
a key player in the process. At the same time, this model of the foreign
policy process does not address defining issues such as the matter of
institutional autonomy of international organisations from states nor the
different distributions in state power (major, middle and small/weak) and
how this affects their aims, input and outcome.
66
Rosenau’s ‘linkage politics’, which describes the process by which the

classic division between state and international is being eroded, is further
realised through ‘linkage actors’. These include governments as negotiators,
international organisations as agenda setters, international courts
penetrating domestic legal systems, transgovernmental coalitions which act
collectively when states are unable or unwilling to, and NGOs and epistemic
communities. According to Karen Mingst, these linkage actors adopt one of
four strategies to influence foreign policy. These are:
• a power approach targeting top decision makers
• a technocratic approach using knowledge of the procedural mechanisms
of the international system to gain influence
• a coalition-building approach which utilises domestic actors to create
consensus that ultimately forms part of a transnational coalition; and
• grassroots mobilisation targeting the public of different states to
generate support for their foreign policy aim.
Conclusion
The rise of transnational actors as increasingly important players in
world politics reflects the dramatic changes experienced by a globalising
international system in the last few decades. From the perspective of
FPA, the challenge is to determine how significant this phenomenon is
when faced with the methodological difficulties in ascribing causality to
the lobbying efforts of non-state actors in actually influencing the foreign
policy choices of states or the problem of assessing institutional autonomy
of international institutions from states. Ultimately, an analysis of the
significance of transnational actors is dependent on an appraisal of state
power and the relationship of each state to these new entities. In the next
chapter, we will pick up the theme of change in the international system
and its impact on foreign policy by examining how regime change in states
themselves affects their foreign policy.
Activity
Each of the following transnational actors have been actively sought to influence states
and use international organisations in pursuit of their particular issues. Describe how they
have sought to influence states to change their foreign policies in their particular area of
concern and obstacles they face. (a) Greenpeace and whaling; and (b) multinational oil
companies and human rights in the Niger delta. For country information, see the BBC’s
website under regions in the news section of: http://news.bbc.co.uk. For information
on Greenpeace and whaling, see www.greenpeace.org and the International Whaling
Commission, www.iwcoffice.org. For information on Nigeria, see the International Crisis
Group’s website: www.crisisgroup.org and CorpWatch: www.corpwatch.org/article.
php?id=18

Having completed this chapter and the Essential readings and activities, you
• evaluate the significance of transnational actors in the shaping of a
state’s foreign policy
• describe the process through which inter-governmental organisations
and non-state actors exercise influence over foreign policy
• assess the impact of transnationalism on the role of the state in foreign
policy.
67

1. What are the challenges to states posed by globalisation and how can
foreign policy decision makers best respond?
2. What is the impact of either inter-governmental organisations or
advocacy groups on the foreign policy process and how important is it?
68
Chapter 10: The foreign policy of states in transition
Chapter 10: The foreign policy of states

in transition
Essential reading
Gordao, P. ‘Regime change and foreign policy: Portugal, Indonesia and the self-
determination of East Timor’, Democratization 9(4) 2002, pp.142–58.
Hermann, C. ‘Changing course: when governments choose to redirect foreign
policy’, International Studies Quarterly 34(1) 1990, pp.3–22.
Recommended reading
Kahler, M. (ed.) Liberalization and foreign policy. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1995).
Further reading
Shain, Y. and J. Linz (eds) Between states: interim governments and democratic
transitions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
Smith, S., A. Hadfield and T. Dunne (eds) Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the dynamics of foreign policy
formulation and implementation in the context of states in transition.
Learning outcomes
to:
• discuss the key foreign policy challenges facing transitional states
• discuss the significance of international recognition for transitional
states
• discuss the relationship between regime type and leadership in
shaping the foreign policy of transitional states.
Introduction
Studying the foreign policy of transitional states allows one to examine
the influence of change and uncertainty on the policy choices and
implementation strategies of regimes in flux. Transitions are defined as
‘an interval between one political regime and another’, triggered by a
69
dissolution of one regime based on a particular set of political actors,

practices and institutions and ending in its replacement with another
regime based on a new set of political actors, practices and institutions.
The focus of scholarship in this area has been on transitions from
authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes and, indeed, has a strong
normative bias in favour of electoral democracy. Unlike political authorities
in an established state, transitional governments occupy an ambivalent
position between that of non-state actors and state actors. This status
conditions their outlook and preferences as well as their performance in
the foreign policy sphere. Three aspects of the foreign policy of transitional
states, namely the centrality of international recognition as an ambition,
the role of domestic structure as an arbitrator of policy choice and the
importance of charismatic leadership in generating successful outcomes,
make up the core of this phenomenon.
Transitional foreign policy and international recognition

For governments in transitional states, achieving international recognition
is the sine qua non of their long quest for power. Crucial to winning
recognition is a ‘sponsor’ (inevitably a state or coalition of states) within
multilateral institutions, and an ability to cast the aspirant governing
authorities as conforming to cosmopolitan ideals. International institutions
are gatekeepers of sovereign recognition and use established rules and
procedures to grant or withhold legitimacy. In the context of the United
Nations, the Security Council ultimately has the final word on recognition
though the procedures reflect the outlook of the General Assembly as
well. The willingness of a coalition of states to use resources to create the
UN’s Special Committee on Apartheid and the UN Institute for Namibia,
to grant observer status to a variety of liberation movements and,
concurrently, to disallow authoritarian governments representative status
in either the UN or its agencies are all examples of this process at work.
Individual states also use their own resources, be they diplomatic – by
making formal representation of non-state actor interests in multilateral
settings – or material – by providing the financial and physical support
necessary which allows cash-strapped movements and new governments
the means of carrying on their search for recognition and legitimacy.
Aspirant political entities such as liberation and opposition movements
have a strong element of opportunism in their engagement with
sponsor states, something readily seen in the post-Cold War summary
abandonment of Marxist-Leninism for neo-liberalism by many apparently
committed adherents. Despite this, there is clearly a process of
socialisation that occurs in the context of extended informal engagement
and achieving formal recognition within international organisations.
International institutions and non-governmental organisations (as well as
other non-state actors such as political foundations) play a critical role in
this training and broader socialisation process.
Transitional foreign policy and domestic structure

The focus of scholastic enquiries into the foreign policy of transitional
states has been on the relationship between regime type and foreign policy
choice. Samuel Huntington proposes a typology of regimes, specifically,
transformation (incumbent caretaker) led from above; replacement
(revolutionary provisional) where the ancien regime is ousted altogether
and a revolutionary government takes its place, albeit with an explicit
mandate to usher in democratic change; and transplacement
70
Chapter 10: The foreign policy of states in transition
(power-sharing interim government). He suggests that each of these

transitional governments are faced with a dilemma regarding the previous
authoritarian government’s foreign policy centred around how and when
to demonstrate change, continuity and to retain or build legitimacy. The
critical factor is the constituency that the transitional government is
beholden to in defining and addressing foreign policy preferences.
Building upon this work, Alison Stanger puts the focus more explicitly
on regime type as the key determinant in understanding foreign policy
choice by transitional governments. She says that the character of each of
the three regime types described by Huntington provides the underlying
motivation for their foreign policy. Paulo Gorjao looks to domestic
structure and, in particular, the role of corporate entities (or institutional
representations of collective interests) like the military or the Catholic
Church as well as the role of charismatic individuals to shape selection
and promote their respective interests on given foreign policy issues. He
believes that in turbulent times of transition these entities are better able
to articulate and influence decision makers who might otherwise lack the
requisite information or the sense of certainty needed to make difficult
decisions.
Examining transitional states and foreign policy through the rubric of
domestic structures tells us which foreign policy issue a certain regime
type will take up as a function of constituencies, both international and
domestic.
Transitional foreign policy and charismatic leadership

The character of political leadership of a transitional state is crucial
in mobilising support for it, both internationally and domestically, as
well as shaping perceptions of the transition. This individual in many
respects symbolises the anti-authoritarian struggle for the international
and domestic constituency and has an opportunity – and sometimes
a commensurate ability – to articulate the foreign policy aims of the
transitional state. For example, Cory Aquino, wife of the assassinated
Filipino opposition leader with no political experience of her own, was
seen by virtue of familial association to be the symbol of oppositional
politics in the Philippines and the key figure around which the domestic
and international forces coalesced during the transition. Leaders, again
by dint of their standing and recognition accorded to them as individuals
who embody cosmopolitan values, can shape and promote aims that
reflect their interpretation of national priorities. Of equal importance is
the capacity of leaders as coalition builders domestically and interlocutors
between local politics and the international community. Charismatic
leaders who are able to negotiate across these two settings, against a
backdrop of the uncertainty and change that comes with transitions, are
more likely to be able to succeed in achieving their government’s foreign
policy goals.
Examining transitional states and foreign policy through the rubric of
individual leadership provides us with a means of understanding the
selection and promotion of specific foreign policy issues by transitional
governments. Furthermore, it is suggestive of the importance of
perception in moulding international institutional responsiveness to
transitional states’ agendas. The role of contingency and human agency is
more readily apparent than seen in the previous two dimensions outlined
above.
71
Conclusion
The impact of change on states themselves, a topic traditionally neglected
in FPA, demonstrates that under these circumstances foreign policy is
beholden to a number of factors. The constant among all such states
is the search for international legitimacy, while the contingent nature
of transitional regime type and the character of leadership introduce
variables to the process of foreign policy formulation for transitional
states. Examining this phenomenon reasserts the role and specificity of
agency in the actions of states as well as the significance of domestic and
systemic structures to influencing choice, thus contributing to our broader
understanding of foreign policy.
Activity
Take the following countries – Czechoslovakia and South Africa – and describe how
their transitions to democracy altered their foreign policy. For country information, see
BBC’s website under regions in the news section of: http://news.bbc.co.uk, South African
government’s foreign affairs website: www.dfa.gov.za and the Czech Republic’s foreign
affairs website: www.mzv.cz/www-o/mzv/default.asp?/idj=2&amb=1

Having completed this chapter, the Essential readings and activities, you
• discuss the key foreign policy challenges facing transitional states
• discuss the significance of international recognition for transitional
states
• discuss the relationship between regime type and leadership in
shaping the foreign policy of transitional states.

1. What impact does the search for international recognition have on
transitional states?
2. Which is more important in determining the foreign policy of a
transitional state: the nature of the transition regime or the role of
leadership?
72
Chaper 11: Conclusion
Chapter 11: Conclusion
Aims and learning outcomes

The aim of this chapter is to review some of the key themes and issues
raised in this subject guide. It will provide a summary of the development
of FPA, the impact of the changing international system upon foreign
policy and conclude with an analysis of the relationship of FPA to
It seeks to address the following questions:
• Are states still the key actors in the international system?
• Does transnationalism really challenge central assumptions about
foreign policy?
• What impact does this have on the relationship between FPA and the
discipline of International Relations?
Foreign policy analysis and International Relations

As we have seen, the development of FPA is intertwined with the
evolution of International Relations as a whole. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine doing any serious study of world politics which omits a careful
consideration of the role of states and foreign policy.
FPA itself has gone through many changes and challenges in its 60 years
of existence as a sub-field within International Relations. In the 1960s the
study of foreign policy was seen as a progressive academic exercise aiming
at the formulation of a general theory of foreign policy. Behaviourist
scholars looked closely at the role of the individual in foreign policy
decision making and found that the prevailing realist and rationalist
assumptions about foreign policy were insufficient. Bureaucratic theories
of foreign policy further challenged these assumptions through their
analysis of the role of sub-state decision units in decision making.
The attack on state-centric theories of International Relations and the
growth of ideas of complex interdependence in the 1970s, however,
resulted in FPA becoming increasingly marginalised by mainstream
scholars working in the discipline. The rise of studies in transnational
relations and the continuing erosion of state sovereignty from that point
onwards led to a theoretical impasse and even an identity crisis in FPA.
The academic frenzy over the impact of globalisation on the state led to
exaggerated claims of the state’s demise, claims which hold only modest
currency today as the state reasserts its authority in world politics. Though
clearly affected by the changes in the international system (and in turn
giving effect to these changes), the state remains the key site of political
action on international matters, and foreign policy is at the heart of that
process.
Thus, in spite of the critique of FPA that took hold some years ago, foreign
policy retains its central place in the discipline of International Relations as
well as in the public eye through the exercise of diplomacy, sanctions and
military action. This is the case because, on the one hand, the recognition
of growing links heightens the importance of foreign policy for the public
as the key legitimate representative of the political communities. Second,
as Margot Light says, virtually all scholars agree that the state is still ‘first
amongst equals’, that is to say that it still plays a seminal role in the
73
international system, whether by virtue of the monopoly on force

(realists), its internationally recognised and codified responsibilities under
international law (liberal internationalists) or as the object to be
influenced by NGOs and interest groups (transnationalists). In the end,
Christopher Hill makes the case for FPA’s continuing relevance most
succinctly:
‘All central notions of modern politics are implicated in the
conduct of foreign policy, and it is always a mistake to regard
the latter as some specialised form of conduct, sealed away
from the rest of public life. Civil society, the state and the values
which they serve are shapers of foreign policy and may be
shaped by it in turn.’ (Hill, 2003, p.283)
Our study of states and their foreign policies, how decisions are made,
who makes them, and for what purpose, is therefore crucial to any
broader understanding of the international system. Without it, the stage
of international politics is a lifeless one, without actors and devoid of
characters and with little meaning beyond the props and scenery.
74
Appendix 1: Sample examination paper
Appendix 1: Sample examination paper
Important note: This Sample examination paper reflects the

examination and assessment arrangements for this course in
the academic year 2010−2011. The format and structure of the
examination may have changed since the publication of this subject
guide. You can find the most recent examination papers on the VLE
where all changes to the format of the examination are posted.
Time allowed: three hours

Candidates should answer FOUR of the following TWELVE questions. All
questions carry equal marks.
1. ‘Domestic policy can only defeat us; foreign policy can kill us’ (John
F. Kennedy). Does this mean that foreign policy is the first priority for
most heads of government?
2. Do you agree that decision makers base their foreign policy on what
they think the world is like, rather than on what it is really like?
3. Does effective diplomacy require force to back it up?
4. ‘Means determine ends far more often than ends determine means.’
Discuss in relation to foreign policy.
5. To what extent is a country’s foreign policy determined by its
geographical situation?
6. How do the activities of transnational organisations affect the
sovereign foreign policies of individual states?
7. Discuss the role of either pressure groups or public opinion in the
making of foreign policy in democratic states.
8. Does democracy provide a remedy for the conduct of states in an
anarchical system?
9. ‘Rationalism is still the most cogent explanation of an opponent’s
foreign policy.’ Discuss.
10. ‘Bureaucratic politics is the best explanation for Britain’s conduct in
the run up to the second Iraq war.’ Discuss.
11. Is diplomacy more relevant for weak states than strong states?
12. What foreign policy challenges do transitional states face and how do
they address them?
75
Notes
76
Appendix 2: Advice on answering the Sample examination paper
Appendix 2: Advice on answering the

Sample examination paper
Above all, Examiners are looking for an understanding of the question, a

familiarity with the literature, an ability (where appropriate) to illustrate
a point with reference to an example, and the ability to write clearly
and to focus on the question as set. Students are likely to gain marks by
being critical of a question, by pointing to ambiguities in a question, or by
criticising assumptions that lie behind it.
A good command of written English is therefore an advantage. Presenting
pre-prepared model answers is likely to be a risky strategy as they are
likely to lack a strong focus on the precise form of the question set.
The better answers are also likely to demonstrate a grasp of relevant
theories and the ability to use empirical evidence in support of arguments
deployed.
Specific comments on questions

Question 1
Here you are asked to give a view about the relative importance of foreign
policy to state survival as compared to the arena of domestic politics for
leaders. Implicit in this question are realist assumptions about the nature
of the international system. A further dimension of the question suggests
that external politics are of paramount importance to states and guide
foreign policy choices, contradicting a body of work in FPA that believes
foreign policy decisions are first and foremost the product of domestic
forces. Finally, the question is posed in the context of leaders, so it would
be appropriate to consider the role of personality in developing a response.
A good answer would argue that foreign policy is the product of a ‘two-
level game’ whereby external and domestic factors are brought into
consideration by leaders in coming to a particular decision. It would also
note that there is an inherent tension between the two arenas of choice
and that the leaders and issues in question determine the avenues of
choice on the basis of their personal characteristics and their ‘assessment
of the situation’. An excellent answer might refer to Mintz’s work on an
attempt to model decision making in this dual context.
Question 2
Here you are asked to consider the basis upon which foreign policy is
made and, in particular, the role of perception in shaping decision makers’
analysis of a situation and, ultimately, the outcomes they choose. The FPA
literature on psychology should be employed here with specific reference
to Jervis’s work on perception. The constraints that cognition imposes on
information gathering and processing would also need to be highlighted as
well as the impact of the environment of decision making.
A good answer would argue that decision makers are limited by a
combination of psychological and cognitive factors, citing as relevant
the key scholars and ideas in this area, as well as illustrating these with
succinctly written examples. An excellent answer would analyse the
implications that this holds for rational decision making.
77
Question 3
In this case, you are asked to consider the link between one instrument of
foreign policy, that is diplomacy, and another, the use of the military, and
whether diplomatic tools are effective only in relation to a state’s capacity
to use force. Implicit in this question is a realist interpretation of foreign
policy and that states are most likely to respond to the possibility of
compellance rather than strictly legal or moral appeals.
A good answer would argue that the diplomatic tool is most effective
when the possibility of force is available, but that there are instances when
diplomacy can act without direct reference to power politics. Moreover,
an answer that recognises the theoretical assumptions in the question and
incorporates the distinction between ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ would
be seen as particularly appropriate.
Question 4
This question asks that you consider the relationship between motivation
in foreign policy choice, and whether it is the particular aims of a state or
its capacity to carry out particular action that is most important in shaping
its foreign policy. As in question 3, the underlying theoretical assumption
here is a realist framework.
A good answer would consider the hierarchy of power and how
this influences the debate over ends and means in formulating and
implementing foreign policy. An excellent answer would take this
comparative approach further by pointing out the possibilities and
constraints on action imposed by the international system as a whole,
irrespective of capacity.
Question 5
In this case, you are being asked to consider the role of the material
environment in shaping a state’s foreign policy. Factors such as a country’s
geo-strategic position, relations with neighbouring states, access to
trade networks, resources and demography should be given attention
in developing this response. The theoretical literature on geopolitics
addresses the concerns contained within this question.
A good answer would make reference to the theoretical literature on
geopolitics, citing as appropriate key ideas that have informed our
understanding of the relationship between the material environment
and foreign policy. The matter of geographic determinism should be
mentioned in this context, as should technology and how it has challenged
classic geopolitical assumptions. An excellent answer would contrast
the geopolitical approach with that of the impact of globalisation as to
whether the material environment is still relevant to our understanding of
foreign policy.
Question 6
Here, you are asked to consider the impact of the phenomenon known as
transnationalism on foreign policy. Moreover, it requires you to consider
what transnationalism is, what activities in particular are important to a
state’s foreign policy and how (in what way) these activities influence a
state’s foreign policy.
A good answer would demonstrate knowledge of the literature on
transnationalism and foreign policy and, concurrently, be able to cite
specific examples of how and under what circumstances non-state actors
or MNCs are able to influence foreign policy practices and choices of
78
Appendix 2: Advice on answering the Sample examination paper
states. An excellent answer would consider whether the state is in fact,

as transnationalism would have us believe, diminishing in power relative
to these new actors, or whether it is demonstrating its ability to adapt to
the changing international environment and, if so, explain how this is the
case.
Question 7
This question asks that you consider the role and impact of domestic
factors on the formulation of foreign policy. It is cast in the pluralist
theoretical framework, focusing as it does on interest groups and public
opinion within democracies. It also implies an understanding of the
relationship between public opinion, the media and government.
A good answer to this question would demonstrate knowledge of the
theoretical literature on domestic influences on foreign policy, focusing
on the three approaches to understanding this relationship including
state-society and regime types as well as the relationship between public
opinion, the media and foreign policy decision making. An excellent
answer would consider whether pluralist influences are found exclusively
in democracies, and if not, how these elements affect foreign policy in
non-democratic settings.
Question 8
In this case, the question asks you to consider the democratic peace
theory and its applicability to the international system. Knowledge of the
theoretical literature on democratic peace, including the critiques of that
theory, would necessarily form a part of your response.
A good answer would, as noted above, demonstrate that you know the
literature on democratic peace theory and would include appropriate
examples to illustrate your points. An ability to recognise the shortcomings
as well as the empirical strengths of democratic peace theory would
be important to a good response. An excellent answer would consider
alternative explanations based on other theoretical approaches (like
realism) for the apparent phenomenon of state behaviour among
democracies.
Question 9
Here, you are asked to consider whether rationalism provides a good guide
to understanding the formulation of foreign policy. Clearly, knowledge of
the basics of rational or public choice theory as applied to foreign policy
is important. Moreover, the question implies a defence of rationalism and
consequently you should be able to present the criticisms levelled against
this approach as well.
A good answer would demonstrate knowledge of rationalism and the
problems with it as well as either defending its explanatory power in
the foreign policy arena or offering up a criticism of it. The ability to
introduce and explain concepts like ‘bounded rationality’ would be seen as
important to producing a good answer. An excellent answer would include
a discussion of refinements to rationalism such as Mintz and Steinbruner.
Question 10
This question asks you to consider the role of bureaucratic politics in
shaping foreign policy decision making. Furthermore, it asks that you
frame that response in terms of Britain’s foreign policy process towards
the recent intervention into Iraq. As a consequence, you will need to
79
have knowledge both of the theoretical literature and some empirical

information on this particular foreign policy act.
A good answer would be able to demonstrate knowledge of Allison’s
models for foreign policy decision making as well as an informed
application of these to the British decision to invade Iraq. An excellent
answer would be able to apply the critiques of the Bureaucratic Politics
Model to the example.
Question 11
Though on the surface this question appears to be about instruments of
foreign policy, in fact to answer it you will need to have an understanding
of power hierarchies among states in the international system as well. The
relationship between ends and means is also a feature of this question,
with the obvious point that weak states have no recourse but to diplomacy
in the absence of sufficient means (such as military) to act.
A good answer would distinguish between weak and strong states,
calling upon the literature on power hierarchies within the state-based
international system, and then discuss how this influences both the foreign
policy ambitions of a state and the selection of instruments to achieve
foreign policy goals. An excellent answer would consider the role of
alliances and international institutions in enhancing or constraining weak
and strong states’ foreign policy.
Question 12
In this case, you would need to be familiar with the theoretical literature
on transitional states and foreign policy, including the relationship
between different regime types and differing conditions in which choices
are made.
A good answer would present the competing theories on transitional
states and foreign policy, linking regime type to foreign policy outlook and
choice. Moreover, it would be helpful to make reference to examples that
illustrate distinguishing features of these regime types and foreign policy.
An excellent answer would critically analyse the explanatory power of the
competing theories.
80

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Foreign policy analysis

University of London International Programmes

Published by: University of London

Aims and learning objectives........................................................................................ 23

Small states and the search for security......................................................................... 44

A reminder of your learning outcomes........................................................................... 67

This subject guide provides an introduction to the field of foreign policy

Aims of the course

The structure of this guide

rationality and psychological approaches to understanding the dynamics

How to use this guide

The principal themes to be addressed by the course are:

Further and recommended reading

will need to support your learning by reading as widely as possible and by

Online study resources

• Videos: There are recorded academic introductions to the subject,

Making use of the Online Library

argument. However, remember that you are being asked to answer a

Chapter 1: Foreign policy analysis: an

Aims and learning objectives

Realism: the state, national interest and foreign policy

Behaviourism: the ‘minds of men’ and foreign policy

Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy

For Graham Allison and others, an analysis of foreign policy decision

Pluralism: linkage politics and foreign policy

suggests that the decision-making process involves both a domestic arena,

FPA and the study of International Relations

‘The single most important contribution of FPA to IR theory is to

A reminder of your learning outcomes

Sample examination questions

Part 1: Decision making

Chapter 2: Power, capability and

Aims and learning objectives

Foreign policy and power

For neo-classical realists like Fareed Zakaria, it is the differing abilities of

Formulating foreign policy: the national interest and the

friends or permanent enemies; only permanent interests’. Canada’s

Instruments of foreign policy

symbolic value as a sign of displeasure with a particular state than its

of force as an instrument of foreign policy has been called into question.

A reminder of your learning outcomes

Sample examination questions

Chapter 3: Rational decision making

Aims and learning objectives

Rationality and foreign policy

From this perspective, developing foreign policy goals and implementing

A critique of rational decision making

For these critics of rationality, foreign policy decision-makers do not act in

Reconciling rational and non-rational approaches:

A reminder of your learning outcomes

Sample examination questions

Chapter 4: Perception, cognition and

Aims and learning objectives

The role of perception

The role of cognition

The role of personality

Kennedy’s inexperience and youth caused him to respond aggressively to

The role of the group

Critique of the psychological approach to foreign policy

A reminder of your learning outcomes

Sample examination questions

Chapter 5: Bureaucratic politics

Aims and learning objectives

International Relations, were nonetheless highly critical of their emphasis

Time allowed: three hours