G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010 In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No.
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming
sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a
second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property.
This, despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for
injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s
vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and
was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash
the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for
the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile,
petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366,
including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because
of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC
issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner
contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s
order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to
forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his
case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants
because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a
post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been
previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence
charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such
crime are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting
petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce
calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical
injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to
file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and
private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek
relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did
not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection
afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms
of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, 8 in relation to
Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the
Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review
judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment
ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance
on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an
accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped
bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the
mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8
of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one
considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to
cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant
retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be
convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the
accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the
accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend
the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment,
petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light
of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer
arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest),
petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense"13protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the
question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than
twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who,
by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would
have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided
in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the
penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which
they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to
death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the
offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to
give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the
penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2)
a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a
generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless
imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize
"the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal
act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of
intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As
early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting
in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not
a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the
object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent
to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is
not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of
criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their
structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious
mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification
or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence,
what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce
the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13,
specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed.
Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in
proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty
for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But
instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto
mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave
felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor
to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence
bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of
crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or property. 19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for
"Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying
charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element
of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and
since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal
pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but]
simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc
promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon
rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365
are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found
expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising
from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing
of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly,
rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-
crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to
quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a
prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the
same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless
driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been
dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court,
that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution
for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court
unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in
1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported,
per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per
Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.),
People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People
v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano
v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v.
City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases
uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan,
where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property
thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries
thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: 34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical
conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority.
Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-
war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple
physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the
second prosecution was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of
jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to
rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for
"damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the
second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the
strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of
People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan,
22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal)
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation
places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva,
joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December
12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining
petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28,
1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through
reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy
exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same
consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to
property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a
vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle
arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend
in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting
jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny.
There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with
Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the
accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court
initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed
the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue
following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the
case, holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy
enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were
charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries
through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by
them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise
disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in
connection with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence
(Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and
another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by
the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose
Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case
No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending
that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just
been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted,
whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for
damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles
involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose
Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the
Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through
reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of
the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the
Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following
language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the
chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and
damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was
charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby
causing an accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that
court ῾for failure of the Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed
an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to
property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50.
Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we
affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests
of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113,
Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to
say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support
the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have
been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged
to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney
is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless
imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court. 43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz)
"for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of
double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical
Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General,
admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon
which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however,
urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or
clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the
ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case,
will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would
warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the
other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of
Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed,
stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive
and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses
and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a
procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus
excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in
lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious
crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the
mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x
x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was
crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their
consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-
offense not falling under either models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple
non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less
grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a
quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-
offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light
offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single
charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized
separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the
issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were
split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and
filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to
light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach
the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic
Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious
penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts
penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies
because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy
arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized
as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act
penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less
grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the
effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or
severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose, 52 we interpreted
paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25
pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount
fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be
an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical
injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will
do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.55

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for
conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a
quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be
crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and
imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave
severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct
or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the
concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double
lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of
jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1
culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2
make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and
May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in
intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes
Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan
under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a
necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected
the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that of Representatives.
offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
SO ORDERED.

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing
of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court
in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing G.R. No. 174504 March 21, 2011
the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a vs.
position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third division) and MANUEL G. BARCENAS, Respondents.
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which
the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
DECISION

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x
x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the
same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second
jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under
Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of
constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state
resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The dismissal order arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and
cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is
reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
This is a Petition for Certiorari which seeks to nullify the Sandiganbayan’s July 26, 2006
Resolution1 which granted private respondent’s demurrer to evidence.
Factual Antecedents
On May 21, 2004, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 89 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 14452 before the Sandiganbayan. The Information reads —
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo
City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused MANUEL G. BARCENAS, a high-ranking public officer, being a Vice-
Mayor of Toledo City, and committing the offense in relation to office, having obtained cash
advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE PESOS (₱61,765.00), Philippine Currency, which he received
by reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period
required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of ₱61,765.00, Philippine Currency, despite
demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount. 3
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 27990 and raffled to the Third Division. On
October 20, 2004, private respondent was arraigned for which he pleaded not guilty. The
prosecution presented its lone witness, Manolo Tulibao Villad, Commission on Audit (COA)
State Auditor. Thereafter, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
On April 20, 2006, private respondent filed a motion4 for leave to file demurrer to evidence. On
June 16, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution5 granting the motion. On June 30, 2006,
private respondent filed his demurrer6to evidence.
Sandiganbayan’s Ruling
On July 26 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Resolution, viz:
WE find the demurrer to evidence well taken.
The testimony of the prosecution’s lone witness City Auditor Manolo Tulibao confirming his
Report (Exhibit "D") that the accused had indeed liquidated his cash advances did not help the
prosecution but rather weakened its cause of action against the accused. At the time this case
was filed in Court, the accused had already liquidated his cash advances subject matter hereof
in the total amount of ₱61,765.00. Hence, We find the element of damages wanting in this case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted and this case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED.7
Issue
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in giving due course to and eventually granting the demurrer to evidence.8
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner contends that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the offense
defined and penalized under Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445: (1) the private respondent, an
accountable officer, received cash advances in the total amount of ₱120,000.00 to defray the
expenses of the Public Assistance Committee and Committee on Police Matters covering the
period January-March 1993, (2) the purpose of the cash advance has been served, (3) the
private respondent settled his cash advances only in March 1996, (4) the city auditor sent a
demand letter to the private respondent to settle the cash advance within 72 hours from receipt
thereof, and (5) the private respondent received said letter on December 22, 1995 but failed to
liquidate the same within the aforestated period.
Although it concedes that the private respondent eventually settled the subject cash advances
sometime in March 1996, petitioner theorizes that damage is not one of the elements of the
offense charged. Hence, the settlement of the cash advance would not exonerate the private
respondent but only mitigate his criminal liability. Otherwise, the purpose of the law would be
rendered futile since accountable officers can easily make cash advances and liquidate the
same beyond the period prescribed by law without being penalized for doing so.
Finally, petitioner argues that double jeopardy does not lie in this case because the order of
dismissal was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Private Respondent’s Arguments
Private respondent counters that the grant of a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to an acquittal
from which the prosecution cannot appeal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
Further, assuming that the Sandiganbayan erroneously granted the demurrer, this would, at
most, constitute an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction. Thus, certiorari does not lie
to correct the grant of the demurrer to evidence by the Sandiganbayan.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
An order of dismissal arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence has the effect of an
acquittal unless the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer9 is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order
may not be appealed because this would place the accused in double jeopardy. 10 Although the
dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.11 For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham thus
rendering the assailed judgment void.12 The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate
that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice.13
In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer to evidence on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove that the government suffered any damage from private respondent’s
non-liquidation of the subject cash advance because it was later shown, as admitted by the
prosecution’s witness, that private respondent liquidated the same albeit belatedly.
Sections 89 and 128 of P.D. No. 1445 provide—
SECTION 89. Limitations on Cash Advance. — No cash advance shall be given unless for a
legally authorized specific purpose. A cash advance shall be reported on and liquidated as soon
as the purpose for which it was given has been served. No additional cash advance shall be
allowed to any official or employee unless the previous cash advance given to him is first settled
or a proper accounting thereof is made.
SECTION 128. Penal Provision. — Any violation of the provisions of Sections 67, 68, 89, 106,
and 108 of this Code or any regulation issued by the Commission [on Audit] implementing these
sections, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos or by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) months, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, COA Circular No. 90-33114 or the "Rules and Regulations on the Granting,
Utilization and Liquidation of Cash Advances" which implemented Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445
pertinently provided–
5. LIQUIDATION OF CASH ADVANCES
5.1 The AO (Accountable Officer) shall liquidate his cash advance as follows:
5.1.1 Salaries, Wages, etc. - within 5 days after each 15 day/ end of the month pay period.
5.1.2 Petty Operating Expenses and Field Operating Expenses - within 20 days after the end of
the year; subject to replenishment during the year.
5.1.3 Foreign Travel - within 60 days after return to the Philippines.
Failure of the AO to liquidate his cash advance within the prescribed period shall constitute a
valid cause for the withholding of his salary.
xxxx
5.7 When a cash advance is no longer needed or has not been used for a period of two (2)
months, it must be returned to or deposited immediately with the collecting officer.
5.8 All cash advances shall be fully liquidated at the end of each year. Except for petty cash
fund, the AO shall refund any unexpended balance to the Cashier/Collecting Officer who will
issue the necessary official receipt.
xxxx
9. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COA AUDITOR
xxxx
9.6 Upon failure of the AO to liquidate his cash advance within one month for AOs within the
station and three months for AOs outside the station from date of grant of the cash advance, the
Auditor shall issue a letter demanding liquidation or explanation for non-liquidation.
9.7 If 30 days have elapsed after the demand letter is served and no liquidation or explanation is
received, or the explanation received is not satisfactory, the Auditor shall advise the head of the
agency to cause or order the withholding of the payment of any money due the AO. The amount
withheld shall be applied to his (AO's) accountability. The AO shall likewise be held criminally
liable for failure to settle his accounts.15 (Emphasis supplied.)
As can be seen, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, actual damage to the
government arising from the non-liquidation of the cash advance is not an essential element of
the offense punished under the second sentence of Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 as
implemented by COA Circular No. 90-331. Instead, the mere failure to timely liquidate the cash
advance is the gravamen of the offense. Verily, the law seeks to compel the accountable officer,
by penal provision, to promptly render an account of the funds which he has received by reason
of his office.16
Nonetheless, even if the Sandiganbayan proceeded from an erroneous interpretation of the law
and its implementing rules, the error committed was an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
Petitioner failed to establish that the dismissal order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion
such as the denial of the prosecution’s right to due process or the conduct of a sham trial. In
fine, the error committed by the Sandiganbayan is of such a nature that can no longer be
rectified on appeal by the prosecution because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. 17
In United States v. Kilayko,18 the accused was charged with a violation under Section 12 of the
Chattel Mortgage Law19 which prohibited the mortgagor from selling the mortgaged property
without the consent of the mortgagee while the debt secured remained outstanding. The
accused was arraigned for which he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, he moved to dismiss the
Information. After the prosecution and defense entered into a stipulation of facts, the trial court
dismissed the case. On appeal by the prosecution to this Court, we acknowledged that the trial
court erred in interpreting Section 12 when it ruled that the subsequent payment of the secured
debt extinguished the accused’s criminal liability arising from the unlawful sale of the mortgaged
property. Nonetheless, we ruled that the judgment dismissing the Information, although based
upon an erroneous interpretation of the law, was in effect a judgment on the merits from which
no appeal lay on the part of the prosecution as it would place the accused in double
jeopardy.201avvphi1
In another case, People v. City Court of Silay,21 after the prosecution had presented its evidence
and rested its case, the accused filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence. The trial
court granted the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal by the prosecution to this Court, we
were of the view that the dismissal order was erroneous and resulted to a miscarriage of justice.
However, we ruled that such error cannot be corrected because double jeopardy had already set
in:
In the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the charge against them was
one on the merits of the case which is to be distinguished from other dismissals at the instance
of the accused. All the elements of double jeopardy are here present, to wit: (1) a valid
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged, (2) a
court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) an unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the
prosecution had rested its case, amounting to the acquittal of the accused. The dismissal being
one on the merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea of double jeopardy cannot be
invoked.
It is clear to Us that the dismissal of the criminal case against the private respondents was
erroneous.
As correctly stated in the Comment of the Acting Solicitor General, the accused were not
charged with substitution of genuine "tarjetas" with false ones. The basis for the accusation was
that the accused entered false statements as to the weight of the sugar cane loaded in certain
cane cars in "tarjetas" which were submitted to the laboratory section of the company. The act of
making a false entry in the "tarjetas" is undoubtedly an act of falsification of a private document,
the accused having made untruthful statements in a narration of facts which they were under
obligation to accomplish as part of their duties - Ernesto de la Paz, as overseer of Hda.
Malisbog, and the other accused as scalers of the offended party, the Hawaiian-Philippine
Company, thereby causing damage to the latter.
However erroneous the order of respondent Court is, and although a miscarriage of justice
resulted from said order, to paraphrase Justice Alex Reyes in People vs. Nieto, 103 Phil. 1133,
such error cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy. 22
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 157472 September 28, 2007
SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L.
ESCUETA, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by SSGT. Jose M.
Pacoy1 (petitioner) seeking to annul and set aside the Orders dated October 25, 20022 and
December 18, 20023 issued by Presiding Judge Afable E. Cajigal (respondent judge) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac in Criminal Case No. 02-42.
On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner committed
as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer
2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita
multiple gunshot wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous death.
With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank. 4
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial conference and
trial on October 8, 2002.5
However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another
Order,6 likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend
the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in
the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.
Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word
"Homicide" and instead wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in the opening paragraph of
the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original
Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the victim’s name from "Escuita"
to "Escueta."7
On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to be re-
arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter
would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been terminated
without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter
his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of
not guilty.8
On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings
Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion9 on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioner
alleged that in the Information for Homicide, he was validly indicted and arraigned before a
competent court, and the case was terminated without his express consent; that when the case
for Homicide was terminated without his express consent, the subsequent filing of the
Information for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy.
In an Order10 dated October 25, 2002,11 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. He
ruled that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double jeopardy and
cannot be sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant in the
former prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the
Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or amended before trial commenced and did not
terminate the same; that the Information for Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so
no valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the allegation of aggravating
circumstance of "disregard of rank," the crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to
Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and
partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard
of the provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent, which constitutes a ground to quash the
information for murder; and that to try him again for the same offense constitutes double
jeopardy. Petitioner stated that contrary to respondent judge's conclusion that disregard of rank
qualifies the killing to Murder, it is a generic aggravating circumstance which only serves to
affect the imposition of the period of the penalty. Petitioner also argued that the amendment
and/or correction ordered by the respondent judge was substantial; and under Section 14, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done, since petitioner had
already been arraigned and he would be placed in double jeopardy.
In his Order dated December 18, 2002,12 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and
granted the Motion for Reconsideration, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is hereby DENIED while the Motion
for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
Unless ordered otherwise by the Highest Court, the presiding judge shall continue hearing this mandated an amendment of the Information as provided under Section 14, Rule 110 of the
case. Further, the Order dated October 25, 2002 is reconsidered and the original information Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; and that amendments do not entail dismissal or
charging the crime of homicide stands.13 termination of the previous case.

In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that "disregard of rank" is merely a generic
mitigating14 circumstance which should not elevate the classification of the crime of homicide to
murder.
On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari on the following grounds:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND
EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE AMENDMENT OF THE
INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.
Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the victim, filed his Comment alleging that no
grave abuse of discretion was committed by the respondent judge when he denied petitioner's
Motion to Quash the Amended Information, as petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy; that
the proceedings under the first Information for homicide has not yet commenced, and the case
was not dismissed or terminated when the Information was amended.
In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the amendment of the charge of Homicide to
Murder after his arraignment would place him in double jeopardy, considering that said
amendment was without his express consent; and that such amendment was tantamount to a
termination of the charge of Homicide.

The parties filed their respective Memoranda.

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND
VIOLATED THE LAW IN DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION
FOR MURDER. Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is highly improper, for it violates the
established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. However, the judicial
hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.16 A strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND
is not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but
EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN ORDERING THE
legal questions.17
REINSTATEMENT OF THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE WHICH WAS
ALREADY TERMINATED.15
In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the proper legal
interpretation of the provisions on amendment and substitution of information under the Rules of
Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the charge of Homicide, the
Court. It also involves the issue of double jeopardy, one of the fundamental rights of the citizens
public respondent ordered the amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder because
under the Constitution which protects the accused not against the peril of second punishment
of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," which is in violation of
but against being tried for the same offense. These important legal questions and in order to
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; that the public respondent’s
prevent further delay in the trial of the case warrant our relaxation of the policy of strict
ruling that "disregard of rank" is a qualifying aggravating circumstance which qualified the killing
observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.
of 2Lt. Escueta to murder is erroneous since, under paragraph 3, Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code, disregard of rank is only a generic aggravating circumstance which serves to affect the
penalty to be imposed upon the accused and does not qualify the offense into a more serious The Court’s Ruling
crime; that even assuming that disregard of rank is a qualifying aggravating circumstance, such
is a substantial amendment which is not allowed after petitioner has entered his plea.
The petition is not meritorious.

Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
denied the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder, considering that the original Information
discretion in amending the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the
for Homicide filed against him was terminated without his express consent; thus, prosecuting
charge in the Information for Homicide. The argument of petitioner --
him for the same offense would place him in double jeopardy.

Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already terminated without his
Petitioner further argues that although the respondent judge granted his Motion for
express consent, he cannot anymore be charged and arraigned for Murder which involve the
Reconsideration, he did not in fact grant the motion, since petitioner's prayer was for the
same offense. The petitioner argued that the termination of the information for Homicide without
respondent judge to grant the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder on the ground of
his express consent is equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to charge him again, this time for
double jeopardy; that his Motion for Reconsideration did not seek the reinstatement of the
Murder, is tantamount to placing the petitioner in Double Jeopardy.18
Information for Homicide upon the dismissal of the Information for Murder, as he would again be
placed in double jeopardy; thus, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
reinstating the Homicide case. is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or substitution
under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to wit --
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's Order reinstating the
Information to Homicide after initially motu proprio ordering its amendment to Murder renders SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or
herein petition moot and academic; that petitioner failed to establish the fourth element of double in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the
jeopardy, i.e., the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it
or otherwise terminated without his consent; that petitioner confuses amendment with can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
substitution of Information; that the respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002
xxx
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused
would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail
for their appearance at the trial.
with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When it becomes
manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense
necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to
detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense
and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.
First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under Section 14, Rule
110. For this purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag19 is instructive, viz:
The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the
second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be
made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution
necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court,
but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information
has to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information,
another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the
new information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original
information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea
has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original
information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the
other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a
different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original
charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of
Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the
rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the
information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is
distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one
offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is
exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration
of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first
information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information,
constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in
another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.20
In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a
formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in Teehankee.
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only
change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the
Information, with the crossing out of word "Homicide" and its replacement by the word "Murder."
There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information for
Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide,
as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta
without any qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and
preamble from "Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal. 21
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the
accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of
the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally
stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the
accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information.22 Since the facts
alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the
original Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the
case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that "disrespect on account of rank" qualified
the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance, 23 we do not find
that he committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information
after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment
made was only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner.
Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the
charge from Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide. Petitioner's
claim that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his Motion to
Quash the Amended Information for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy is not meritorious.
Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:
xxxx
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense
and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.
Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy
may prosper, to wit: Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged is
wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a crime with
which he was not charged in the information even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been
dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new information charging the proper offense.
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
Section 14 does not apply to a second information, which involves the same offense or an
express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In this
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. 28
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely
Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy
ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. To
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second
repeat, it was the same original information that was amended by merely crossing out the word
jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.24
"Homicide" and writing the word "Murder," instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of
the homicide case.
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in
accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
ordering that the original Information for Homicide stands after realizing that disregard of rank
his express consent.25
does not qualify the killing to Murder. That ruling was again a violation of his right against double
jeopardy, as he will be prosecuted anew for a charge of Homicide, which has already been
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case that terminated earlier.
bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the
frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. 26

A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge granted
Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for homicide
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy exists, but on his
without his express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.
realization that "disregard of rank" is a generic aggravating circumstance which does not qualify
the killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating the original
Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or unconditional Information for Homicide. The requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have
dismissal which terminates the case.27 And for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy attached prior to the second is not present, considering that petitioner was neither convicted nor
clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.1âwphi1 acquitted; nor was the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.29
The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to correct
and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a new Information WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed
charging the proper offense as contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 by respondent Judge.
of the Rules of Court -- which, for convenience, we quote again --
SO ORDERED.
If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall
not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.

and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:

SEC. 19.- When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense - When it becomes
manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper G.R. No. 167526 July 26, 2010
offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
DANTE TAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the June 14, 2004 Resolution2 and February 24, 2005 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 83433.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On December 21, 2000, two Informations for violation of Rule 36 (a)-1,4 in relation to Sections
32 (a)-15 and 566 of the Revised Securities Act, were filed by petitioner People of the Philippines
against respondent Dante Tan in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 153. They
were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832.
The Information7 in Criminal Case No. 119831 reads:
That on December 10, 1998, or thereabout, in the City of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being the beneficial
owner of 84,030,000 Best World Resources Corporation shares, a registered security sold
pursuant to Sections 4 and 8 of the Revised Securities Act, which beneficial ownership
constitutes 18.6% of the outstanding shares of the company, way above the 10% required by
law to be reported, and covered by Certificate Nos. DT-UK 55485704 and DT-UR 55485776, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and with the Philippine Stock Exchange a sworn statement of the amount of all
BWRC shares of which he is the beneficial owner, within ten (10) days after he became such
beneficial owner, in violation of the Revised Securities Act and/or the rules and regulations
prescribed and pursuant thereto.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The Information9 in Criminal Case No. 119832 reads:
That on June 18, 1999, or thereabout, in the City of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being the beneficial owner of
75,000,000 Best World Resources Corporation shares, a registered security which has been
sold pursuant to Sections 4 and 8 of the Revised Securities Act, which beneficial ownership
constitutes 18.6% of the outstanding shares of the company, way above the 10% required by
law to be reported, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to file with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and with the Philippine Stock Exchange a sworn
statement of the amount of all BWRC shares of which he is the beneficial owner, within ten (10)
days after he became such beneficial owner, in violation of the Revised Securities Act and/or the
rules and regulations prescribed pursuant thereto.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
After arraignment, respondent pleaded not guilty11 to both charges and the trial ensued.
On November 24, 2003, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence,12 consisting of Exhibits "A"
to "E" with sub-exhibits, Exhibits "K-1," "K-10" and "K-11," "Q," "R," "S," "T" and "W" with sub-
exhibits, and Exhibit "X."
On December 11, 2003, the RTC issued an Order13 admitting Exhibits "A," "B," "W" and "X," but
denied admission of all the other exhibits on the grounds stated therein.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC in an
Order14 dated January 27, 2004.
In the meantime, on December 18, 2003, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer to Evidence15 and to admit the attached Demurrer to Evidence.
On January 29, 2004, the RTC issued another Order16 granting respondents’ Motion for Leave to
File the Demurrer and forthwith admitted respondent’s attached Demurrer. The RTC also
ordered petitioner to file an opposition.
On February 18, 2004, petitioner filed its Opposition17 to the Demurrer to Evidence. Respondent
then filed a Reply.18
On March 16, 2004, the RTC issued an Order19 granting respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the Demurrer to Evidence filed by accused Dante Tan to be meritorious,
the same is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.20
On April 12, 2004,21 petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari22 before the CA assailing the
December 11, 2003, January 27, 2004, and March 16, 2004 Orders of the RTC.
On June 14, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution denying the petition, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the context of all the foregoing considerations, it would be futile to take further
action on the herein petition, which is therefore DISMISSED outright for evident want of merit.
SO ORDERED.23
In denying the petition, the CA ruled that the dismissal of a criminal action by the grant of a
Demurrer to Evidence is one on the merits and operates as an acquittal, for which reason, the
prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.24
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the CA
in a Resolution dated February 24, 2005.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the lone assignment of error, to wit:
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN PRECLUDING THE PEOPLE FROM
PROSECUTING ITS CASES AGAINST DANTE TAN.25
The petition has no merit.
Notwithstanding the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner contends that
the CA erred in applying the rules on double jeopardy. Specifically, petitioner argues that double
jeopardy does not apply in cases decided by the trial court without jurisdiction and in violations of
petitioner’s right to due process.26
In People v. Sandiganbayan,27 this Court explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer
to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution
had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits,tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be
appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one
of acquittal, the case ends there.28
The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been
arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.29
These elements are present here: (1) the Informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and
119832 against respondent were sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the
RTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832; (3) respondent was
arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty; and (4) the RTC dismissed Criminal Cases Nos.
119831 and 119832 on a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence which
amounts to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had.
30
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., this
Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted
with grave abuse of discretion, thus:
x x x The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham.
However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in
such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused
its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. 31
After an extensive review of previous Court decisions relevant to herein petition, this Court finds
that the abovementioned exception is inapplicable to the factual milieu herein. This Court finds
that the RTC did not abuse its discretion in the manner it conducted the proceedings of the trial,
as well as its grant of respondent’s demurrer to evidence.
Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 32
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan,33 this Court ruled that the prosecution was denied due process of
law when the trial was but a mock trial, to wit:
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as
we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered
respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire
proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as
innocent of all the respondents-accused.34
In addition, in People v. Bocar,35 this Court ruled that there is no double jeopardy when the
prosecution was not allowed to complete its presentation of evidence by the trial court, to wit:
It is evident from the brief transcript of the proceedings held on July 7, 1967 that the parties were
not placed under oath before they answered the queries of the respondent Judge (pp. 11-17,
rec.). Verily, no evidence in law had as yet been entered into the records of the case before
respondent Court. Respondent Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary,
whimsical and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion which this Court cannot permit.
Moreover, it is clear from the same transcript that the prosecution never had a chance to
introduce and offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of Court (pp. 11-17, rec.).
Verily, the prosecution was denied due process.
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right
to due process is thereby violated. x x x36
Likewise, in People v. Judge Albano,37 this Court held that there is no double jeopardy when the
trial court preemptively dismissed the case, thus:
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it practically held that the prosecution failed to
establish the culpability of the accused in a proceeding which does not even require the
prosecution to do so. It acted with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction,
when it preemptively dismissed the cases and, as a consequence thereof, deprived the
prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby violating its fundamental right to
due process." With this violation, its Orders, dated 28 October 1976 and 20 December 1976, are
therefore null and void. Likewise, for being null and void, said orders cannot constitute a proper
basis for a claim of double jeopardy.38
In Saldana v. Court of Appeals,39 this Court ruled that the prosecution’s right to due process is
violated when the trial court aborted its right to complete its presentation of evidence, thus:
The order of the Court of Appeals reinstating the criminal case for further hearing by the trial
court does not violate the rule on double jeopardy. One of the elements of double jeopardy is a
competent court. The trial court in this case was ousted from its jurisdiction when it violated the
right of the prosecution to due process by aborting its right to complete the presentation of its
evidence. Hence, the first jeopardy had not been terminated. The remand of the case for further
hearing or trial is merely a continuation of the first jeopardy. It does not expose the accused to a
second jeopardy. x x x40
Thus, the question to be resolved, given the factual molding of herein petition, is "did the RTC
violate petitioner’s right to due process?" On this note, this Court rules that petitioner was given
more than ample opportunity to present its case as gleaned from the factual antecedents which
led to the grant of respondent’s demurrer.
On September 18, 2001, petitioner completed its presentation of evidence and, on the day after,
filed its formal offer of evidence. On January 21, 2002, respondent filed an opposition to
petitioner’s formal offer. Instead of filing a reply as directed by the RTC, petitioner filed a "Motion
to Withdraw Prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence and to Re-open Presentation of
Evidence."41 Said motion was granted by the RTC and petitioner thus continued its presentation
of evidence.
On January 28, 2003, petitioner ended its presentation of additional witnesses and was then
ordered by the RTC to formally offer its exhibits. On February 26, 2003, petitioner filed a request
for marking of certain documents and motion to admit attached formal offer of evidence. 42 The
motion was initially denied by the RTC, but on motion for reconsideration the same was granted
by the RTC. The RTC, thus, ordered petitioner to file anew its formal offer of evidence. Finally,
on November 24, 2003, petitioner filed its Formal Offer of Evidence. 43
After respondent filed its Demurer to Evidence, the RTC, in an Order dated January 29, 2004,
directed petitioner to file its opposition thereto. On February 18, 2004, petitioner filed its
Opposition44 to the demurrer.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the RTC never prevented petitioner from presenting its
case. Unlike in Bocar and Saldana where the prosecution was prevented from completing its
presentation of evidence, petitioner was given the opportunity to present its case, formally offer
its evidence and oppose respondent’s demurrer. It even bears to point out that the RTC even
allowed petitioner to withdraw its formal offer of evidence after having initially rested its case and
then continue its presentation by introducing additional witnesses. Thus, no grave abuse can be
attributed to the RTC as petitioner’s right to due process was not violated. Even Galman finds no
application to the case at bar as clearly such trial cannot be considered a sham based on the
abovementioned considerations.
Petitioner argues that the RTC displayed resolute bias when it chose to grant respondent’s
demurrer to evidence notwithstanding that it had filed a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance the
Resolution of Accused Dante Tan’s Demurrer to Evidence and The Prosecution’s Opposition
Thereto."45 Petitioner contends that instead of acting on the motion, the RTC peremptorily
granted respondent’s demurrer to evidence which prevented petitioner from its intention to file a
petition for certiorari to question the December 11, 2003 and January 27, 2004 Orders of the
RTC.
While it would have been ideal for the RTC to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to
evidence, nowhere in the rules, however, is it mandated to do so. Furthermore, even if this Court
were to consider the same as an error on the part of the RTC, the same would merely constitute
an error of procedure or of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction as persistently argued by
petitioner. Errors or irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a
plea of antrefois acquit.46 We are bound by the dictum that whatever error may have been
committed effecting the dismissal of the case cannot now be corrected because of the timely
plea of double jeopardy.47 To reiterate, the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is
when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction which cannot be attributed to the RTC simply because it chose not to hold in
abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence. Consequently, petitioner’s attempt to put in
issue the December 11, 2003 and January 27, 2004 Orders of the RTC which denied admission
of certain documentary exhibits in evidence must fail. As correctly manifested by the CA, the
said Orders have already been overtaken by the March 16, 2004 Order, which already granted
respondent’s demurrer to evidence. Hence, this Court would be violating the rules on double
jeopardy if the twin orders were to be reviewed after a finding that the CA did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer to evidence.
Lastly, even if this Court were to review the action taken by the RTC in granting the demurrer to
evidence, no grave abuse can be attributed to it as it appears that the 29-page Order granting
the demurrer was arrived at after due consideration of the merits thereto. As correctly observed
by the CA, the RTC extensively discussed its position on the various issues brought to
contention by petitioner. One of the main reasons for the RTC’s decision to grant the demurrer
was the absence of evidence to prove the classes of shares that the Best World Resources
Corporation stocks were divided into, whether there are preferred shares as well as common
shares, or even which type of shares respondent had acquired, thus:
To secure conviction for the violations of RSA Secs. 32 (a-1) and 36 (a), it is necessary to prove
the following: (1) the BW Resources Corporation ("BW") has equity securities registered under
the Revised Securities Act; [2] that the equity securities of BW Resources Corporation are
divided into classes, and that these classes are registered pursuant to the Revised Securities
Act; (3) the number of shares of BW Resources Corporation (authorized the number of shares of
BW Resources (authorized capital stock) and the total number of shares per class of stock; (4)
the number of shares of a particular class of BW stock acquired by the accused; (5) the fact of
the exact date, the accused [becomes] the beneficial owner of ten (10%) percent of a particular
class of BW shares; and (6) the fact, the accused failed to disclose his ten (10%) percent
ownership within ten days from becoming such owner.
It is very clear from the evidence formally offered, that the foregoing facts were not proven or
established. These cases were for Violations of RSA Rule 32 (a)-1 and Section 56 of Revised
Securities Act, however, it is very surprising that the prosecution never presented in evidence
the Article of Incorporation of BW Resources Corporation. This document is very vital and is the
key to everything, including the conviction of the accused. Without the Article of Incorporation,
the Court has no way of knowing the capitalization authorized capital stock of the BW Resources
Corporation, the classes of shares into which its stock is divided and the exact holdings of Dante
Tan in the said corporation. Its not being a prosecution’s evidence renders impossible the
determination of the ten (10%) percent beneficial ownership of accused Dante Tan, as there is
no focal point to base the computation of his holdings, and the exact date of his becoming an
owner of ten (10%) percent.48
There is no showing that the conclusions made by the RTC on the sufficiency of the evidence of
the prosecution at the time the prosecution rested its case, is manifestly mistaken. Assuming,
however, that there is an error of judgment on the denial of admission of certain exhibits of the
prosecution and the appreciation of the prosecution’s case, there is to this Court’s mind, no
capricious exercise of judgment that would overcome the defense of double jeopardy.
Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription
against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and
safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. 49 While
petitioner insists that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, this Court finds that none
can be attributed to the RTC. Consequently, the CA did not err when it affirmed the assailed
Orders of the RTC.
On a final note, this Court is aware of this Court’s Third Division Decision dated April 21, 2009
entitled Dante Tan v. People of the Philippines50 wherein respondent argued that his right to a
speedy trial was violated by the prosecution. This Court denied the petition and ruled for the
remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. It must be pointed out that said decision
involves Criminal Case No. 119830,51 which is distinct and separate from Criminal Case No.
119831 and Criminal Case No. 119832 which are the subject matter of herein petition. Thus, the
resolution of the case at bar is without prejudice to the proceedings that are being conducted in
Criminal Case No. 119830 at whatever stage it may be.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The June 14, 2004 Resolution and
February 24, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 83433 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149453 October 7, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUÑO,
STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY
CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners,
vs.
PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are the following motions of the respondent, to wit: (a) Omnibus Motion;1 (b)
Motion for Reconsideration;2 (c) Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration;3 (d) Motion To Set
for Oral Arguments.4
The Omnibus Motion
The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 29, 2003 Resolution of this Court which
granted the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The respondent thereafter prays to allow
Associate Justices Renato C. Corona, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Conchita C. Morales, Romeo
J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna to voluntary inhibit themselves or, absent their consent, rule
that such inhibition is in order and to recuse them from further deliberating, discussing or, in any
manner, participating in the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement to
Motion for Reconsideration. The respondent points out that the aforenamed members of the
Court were appointed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after the February 19, 2002 oral
arguments and after the case at bar was submitted for the decision of the Court. He asserts that
although A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC5 specifically provides that it applies only to the divisions of the
Court, it should likewise apply to this case, in light of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of this Court
which set aside its Resolution dated May 28, 2002, apart from the constitutional issues raised by
the respondent in his motion for reconsideration and its supplement. As such, according to the
respondent, the instant case should be unloaded by Justice Callejo, Sr. and re-raffled to any
other member of the Court.
The Court resolves to deny the respondent’s motion for lack of merit.
The records show that as early as May 24, 2002, the respondent filed an urgent motion for the
recusation of Justices Renato C. Corona and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez for the reason that they
were appointed to the Court after the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and did not participate
in the integral portions of the proceedings. Justices Corona and Austria-Martinez refused to
inhibit themselves and decided to participate in the deliberation on the petition. 6 On March 18,
2003, the respondent filed a motion with the Court for the recusation of Justice Romeo J.
Callejo, Sr. on account of his voluntary inhibition when the case was pending before the Court of
Appeals.
On March 25, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the respondent’s Motion dated March
18, 2003. The respondent thereafter filed his motion for reconsideration of the April 1, 2003
Resolution of the Court in which he prayed, inter alia, for the inhibition of Justice Callejo, Sr.
under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC and that the case be re-raffled to another member of the Court who
had actually participated in the deliberation and the rendition of its May 28, 2002 Resolution. The
respondent likewise sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna,
again for the reason that they were appointed to the Court after the oral arguments on February
19, 2002 and after the case had already been submitted for decision.
On April 29, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the aforesaid motions of the
respondent.7 The Court ruled that A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC is applicable only to cases assigned to
the divisions of the Court:
The respondent’s reliance on Supreme Court Circular No. 99-8-09 is misplaced. As admitted by
the respondent, the said circular is applicable only to motions for reconsideration in cases
assigned to the Divisions of the Court. For cases assigned to the Court En Banc, the policy of
the Court had always been and still is, if the ponente is no longer with the Court, his replacement
will act upon the motion for reconsideration of a party and participate in the deliberations thereof.
This is the reason why Justice Callejo, Sr. who had replaced retired Justice De Leon, prepared
the draft of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court.8
The Court also ruled that there was no need for its newest members to inhibit themselves from
participating in the deliberation of the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration:
Although Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna were
not yet members of the Court during the February 18, 20029 oral arguments before the Court,
nonetheless they were not disqualified to participate in the deliberations on the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the May 28, 2002 Resolution of the Court or of the instant motion
for reconsideration. Neither is Justice Callejo, Sr. disqualified to prepare the resolution of the
Court on the motion for reconsideration of the respondent. When the Court deliberated on
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
and Adolfo S. Azcuna were already members of the Court.
It bears stressing that transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the February 18, 2002
hearing and oral arguments of the parties are parts of the records of this case. Said transcripts
are available to the parties or to any member of the Court. Likewise, Attys. Rene A.V. Saguisag
and Felix Carao, Jr. may not yet have been the counsel of the respondent on February 18, 2002
but by reading the said transcripts and the records of this case they are informed of what
transpired during the hearing and oral arguments of the parties.10
It is thus clear that the grounds cited by the respondent in his omnibus motion had already been
passed upon and resolved by this Court. The respondent did not make any new substantial
arguments in his motion to warrant a reconsideration of the aforesaid resolutions.
Besides, the respondent sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S.
Azcuna only after they had already concurred in the Court’s Resolution dated April 1, 2003.
Case law has it that a motion for disqualification must be denied when filed after a member of
the Court has already given an opinion on the merits of the case, the rationale being that a
litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court, only to raise an objection
of this sort after a decision has been rendered.11
The Motion to Set the Case for Oral Arguments
The Court denies the motion of the respondent. The parties have already extensively discussed
the issues involved in the case. The respondent’s motion for reconsideration consists of no less
than a hundred pages, excluding the supplement to his motion for reconsideration and his reply
to the petitioners’ comment on his motion. There is no longer a need to set the instant case for
oral arguments.
The Issue as to the Application of the Time-bar under Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure – Whether Prospective or Retroactive
The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court and
thereafter reinstate its Resolution of May 28, 2002.
He asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice in
applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (RRCP)
should be applied prospectively and retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the
basis of its being favorable to the accused. He asserts that case law on the retroactive
application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch of
criminal law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new
provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. It
is primarily a check on the State to prosecute criminal cases diligently and continuously, lest it
loses its right to prosecute the accused anew. The respondent argues that since Section 8 is
indubitably a rule of procedure, there can be no other conclusion: the rule should have
retroactive application, absent any provision therein that it should be applied prospectively.
Accordingly, prospective application thereof would in effect give the petitioners more than two
years from March 29, 1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the
respondent’s right to due process and equal protection of the law.
The respondent asserts that Section 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the
accused. In this case, the State had been given more than sufficient opportunity to prosecute the
respondent anew after the March 29, 1999 dismissal of the cases by then Judge Wenceslao
Agnir, Jr. and even before the RRCP took effect on December 1, 2000. According to the
respondent, the petitioners filed the Informations with the RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-101112 beyond the two-year bar, in violation of his right to a speedy trial, and that
such filing was designed to derail his bid for the Senate.
In their comment on the respondent’s motions, the petitioners assert that the prospective
application of Section 8 is in keeping with Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides in part that the rules of procedure which the Court may promulgate shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantial rights. While Section 8 secures the rights of the
accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public
justice. If such right to public justice is taken away, then Section 8 can no longer be said to be a
procedural rule. According to the petitioners, if a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would
work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application. They contend that the
right of the accused to a speedy trial or disposition of the criminal cases applies only to
outstanding and pending cases and not to cases already dismissed. The petitioners assert that
the "refiling of the cases" under Section 8 should be taken to mean as the filing of the criminal
complaint with the appropriate office for the purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation,
and not the actual filing of the criminal complaint or information in court for trial. Furthermore,
according to the petitioners, the offended parties must be given notices of the motion for
provisional dismissal of the cases under Section 8 since the provision so expressly states. Thus,
if the requisite notices to the heirs of the deceased would be taken into consideration, the two-
year period had not yet even commenced to run.
In his consolidated reply to the comment of the petitioners, the respondent asserts that the State
is proscribed from refiling a criminal case if it can be shown that the delay resulted in a violation
of the right of the accused to due process. In this case, there was an inordinate delay in the
revival of the cases, considering that the witnesses in the criminal cases for the State in March
1999 are the same witnesses in 2001. The State had reasonable opportunity to refile the cases
before the two-year bar but failed to do so because of negligence; and perhaps institutional
indolence. Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the respondent posits that the revival of the
cases contemplated in Section 8 refers to the filing of the Informations or complaints in court for
trial. The operational act then is the refiling of the Informations with the RTC, which was done
only on June 6, 2001, clearly beyond the two-year bar.
The Court finds the respondent’s contentions to be without merit.
First. The Court approved the RRCP pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5,
paragraph 5 of the Constitution which reads:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it is favorable to the
accused. It must be noted that the new rule was approved by the Court not only to reinforce the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case. The time-bar under the
new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the
criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.
The Court emphasized in its assailed resolution that:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or
two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of
the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first
impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the
accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the
State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the
accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the
State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the
offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the
period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. 12
In criminal litigations concerning constitutional issue claims, the Court, in the interest of justice,
may make the rule prospective where the exigencies of the situation make the rule prospective.
The retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a rule is not automatically determined by the provision of
the Constitution on which the dictate is based. Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has
its own distinct functions, its own background or precedent, and its own impact on the
administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with
the dictate involved.13
Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in operation as a statute. 14 To paraphrase
the United States Supreme Court per Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the Court in defining the limits
of adherence may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of
relating forward.15
The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of
the Constitution. This constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it the power, inter alia,
to determine whether to give the said rules prospective or retroactive effect. Moreover, under
Rule 144 of the Rules of Court, the Court may not apply the rules to actions pending before it if
in its opinion their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event, the
former procedure shall apply.16
The absence of a provision in Section 8 giving it prospective application only does not proscribe
the prospective application thereof; nor does it imply that the Court intended the new rule to be
given retroactive and prospective effect. If the statutory purpose is clear, the provisions of the
law should be construed as is conducive to fairness and justice, and in harmony with the general
spirit and policy of the rule. It should be construed so as not to defeat but to carry out such end
or purpose.17 A statute derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is approved. To construe it
in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law. 18 In Cometa
v. Court of Appeals,19 this Court ruled that "the spirit rather than the letter of the statute
determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or
intent."20 While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have
the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to the "letter that
killeth" but to the "spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the lawmaker’s will."21
In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied
prospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would
defeat the very purpose for which it was intended, namely, to give the State a period of two
years from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of the
accused. It would be a denial of the State’s right to due process and a travesty of justice for the
Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the present case as the respondent insists,
considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March
29, 1999 before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. A retroactive application of the
time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to the
victims of crimes and their heirs.
Consider this scenario: the trial court (RTC) provisionally dismissed a criminal case with the
express consent of the accused in 1997. The prosecution had the right to revive the case within
the prescriptive period, under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On December
1, 2000, the time-bar rule under Section 8 took effect, the prosecution was unable to revive the
criminal case before then.
If the time-bar fixed in Section 8 were to be applied retroactively, this would mean that the State
would be barred from reviving the case for failure to comply with the said time-bar, which was
yet to be approved by the Court three years after the provisional dismissal of the criminal case.
In contrast, if the same case was dismissed provisionally in December 2000, the State had the
right to revive the same within the time-bar. In fine, to so hold would imply that the State was
presumed to foresee and anticipate that three years after 1997, the Court would approve and
amend the RRCP. The State would thus be sanctioned for its failure to comply with a rule yet to
be approved by the Court. It must be stressed that the institution and prosecution of criminal
cases are governed by existing rules and not by rules yet to exist. It would be the apex of
injustice to hold that Section 8 had a platonic or ideal existence before it was approved by the
Court. The past cannot be erased by a capricious retroactive application of the new rule.
In holding that the petitioners had until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the criminal
cases provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999, this Court explained, thus:
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year
period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of
the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the
intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally
dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule
took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State
would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these
criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other
hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1,
2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the
intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid
absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 199922 should be excluded in the computation of
the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State
could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State
waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not
reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule.1a\^/phi1.net As the United States
Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People, 351 US 12 (1956):
We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law and,
therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights …
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It
should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar
therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an "injustice of
hardship" to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal
laws in particular.23
Further quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter’s opinion in Griffin v. People,24 he said, "it is much more
conducive to law’s self-respect to recognize candidly the considerations that give prospective
content to a new pronouncement of law. That this is consonant with the spirit of our law and
justified by those considerations of reason which should dominate the law has been luminously
expounded by Mr. Justice Cardozo shortly before he came here and in an opinion which he
wrote for the Court."
Parenthetically, the respondent himself admitted in his motion for reconsideration that Judge
Agnir, Jr. could not have been expected to comply with the notice requirement under the new
rule when it yet had to exist:
99. Respondent submits that the records are still in the same state of inadequacy and
incompletion. This however is not strange considering that Section 8, Rule 117 had not existed
on March 29, 1999, when the criminal cases were dismissed, and then Judge Agnir did not have
its text to guide his actions. How could the good judge have complied with the mandate of
Section 8, Rule 117 when it yet had to exist?25
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that extent,
procedural laws are retroactive.26 Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 had long
been dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. When
the petitioners filed the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 on June 6,
2001, Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 and Q-99-81689 had long since been terminated. The
two-year bar in the new rule should not be reckoned from the March 29, 1999 dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 but from December 1, 2000 when the new rule
took effect. While it is true that the Court applied Section 8 of Rule 11027 of the RRCP
retroactively, it did so only to cases still pending with this Court and not to cases already
terminated with finality.
The records show that after the requisite preliminary investigation conducted by the petitioners in
accordance with existing rules, eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112 were filed with the RTC on June 6, 2001, very well within the time-bar therefor. The
respondent cannot argue that his right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases
as enshrined in the Constitution had been violated.28
The respondent’s plaint that he was being singled out by the prospective application of the new
rule simply because before the Court issued its April 1, 2003 Resolution, he announced his
candidacy for the presidency of the Republic for the 2004 elections has no factual basis
whatsoever.29 The bare and irrefutable fact is that it was in this case where the issue of the
retroactive/prospective application of the new rule was first raised before the Court. The ruling of
the Court in its April 1, 2003 Resolution and its ruling today would be the same, regardless of
who the party or parties involved are, whether a senator of the Republic or an ordinary citizen.
The respondent’s contention that the prospective application of the new rule would deny him due
process and would violate the equal protection of laws is barren of merit. It proceeds from an
erroneous assumption that the new rule was approved by the Court solely for his benefit, in
derogation of the right of the State to due process. The new rule was approved by the Court to
enhance the right of due process of both the State and the accused. The State is entitled to due
process in criminal cases as much as the accused.
Due process has never been and perhaps can never be precisely defined.1a\^/phi1.net It is not
a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. The
phrase expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness, a requisite whose meaning can be
as opaque as its importance is lofty.30 In determining what fundamental fairness consists of in a
particular situation, relevant precedents must be considered and the interests that are at stake;
private interests, as well as the interests of the government must be assessed. In this case, in
holding that the new rule has prospective and not retroactive application, the Court took into
consideration not only the interests of the respondent but all other accused, whatever their
station in life may be. The interest of the State in the speedy, impartial and inexpensive
disposition of criminal cases was likewise considered.
The Respondent Failed to Comply with the Essential Prerequisites of Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
The respondent argues that the issue involved in the Court of Appeals is entirely different from
the issue involved in the present recourse; hence, any admissions he made in the court below
are not judicial admissions in this case. He asserts that the issue involved in the CA was
whether or not he was placed in double jeopardy when he was charged with murder in Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 despite the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
to Q-99-81689; whereas the issue in this Court is whether the prosecution of Criminal Cases
Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 was barred by Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP. The respondent
avers that the proceedings in the appellate court are different from those in this Court.
The respondent posits that this Court erred in giving considerable weight to the admissions he
made in his pleadings and during the proceedings in the CA. He stresses that judicial
admissions may only be used against a party if such admissions are (a) made in the course of
the proceedings in the same case; and (b) made regarding a relevant fact, pursuant to Section
4, Rule 129 and Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence. He contends that contrary to the
ruling of the Court, when he filed his motion for the judicial determination of probable cause in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, he thereby prayed for the dismissal of the said
cases. His motion carried with it, at the very least, the prayer for the dismissal of the criminal
cases. Absent a finding of probable cause, Judge Agnir, Jr. had no recourse but to dismiss the
criminal cases. Moreover, the respondent avers that his motion included the general prayer "for
such other reliefs as may be equitable in the premises." The respondent also points out that the
public prosecutor agreed to the averments in his motion as the latter did not even file any motion
for the reconsideration of Judge Agnir, Jr.’s order dismissing the cases.
The respondent further contends that the Court is not a trier of facts. It has no means to
ascertain or verify as true the contrasting claims of the parties on the factual issues, a function
best left to the trial court as the trier of facts. He posits that there is a need for the case to be
remanded to the RTC to enable him to present evidence on whether or not Judge Agnir, Jr.
complied with the notice requirements of Section 8. Echoing the May 28, 2002 ruling of this
Court, the respondent contends that it is not fair to expect the element of notice under Section 8
to be litigated before Judge Agnir, Jr., for the said rule was not yet in existence at the time he
filed his motion for a determination of probable cause.
The respondent avers that the requirement for notices to the offended parties under Section 8 is
a formal and not an essential requisite. In criminal cases, the offended party is the State and the
role of the private complainant is limited to the determination of the civil liability of the accused.
According to the respondent, notice to the prosecution provides sufficient safeguard for the
private complainant to recover on the civil liability of the accused based on the delicts; after all,
the prosecution of the offense is under the control and direction of the public prosecutor.
The contentions of the respondent have no merit.
First. The issue posed by the respondent in the CA and in this Court are the same. To recall, in
Civil Case No. 01-100933,31 the respondent32 sought injunctive relief from the RTC of Manila on
his claim that in conducting a preliminary investigation in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112, the petitioners thereby placed him in double jeopardy under Section 7, Rule 117 of the
RRCP.33 When the RTC denied his plea for injunctive relief, the respondent filed his petition for
certiorari in the CA, again invoking his right against double jeopardy, praying that:
13. Inasmuch as the case subject of the "preliminary investigation" was dismissed for the
reasons mentioned, there currently exists no complaint upon which a valid investigation can be
had in light of the clear provisions of Rule 110 which requires the existence of a "sworn written
statement charging a person with an offense" as basis for the commencement of a preliminary
investigation under Rule 112.1awphi1.nét
For petitioner, the investigation covers exactly the same offenses over which he had been duly
arraigned and a plea validly entered before the Sandiganbayan (in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047
to 57) before its remand to the QC RTC. Hence, to proceed therewith on similar charges will put
him in jeopardy of being twice punished therefor (Article III, §21, Constitution).34
The respondent (petitioner therein) contended that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 by Judge Agnir, Jr. amounted to a judgment of acquittal; hence, he could
no longer be charged and prosecuted anew for the same offense without violating his right
against double jeopardy. However, the respondent filed a second amended petition wherein he
invoked for the first time Section 8 of Rule 117 of the RRCP:
(e) the new criminal cases for Murder filed by respondents against petitioner and the other They are two different claims.
accused on June 6, 2001 (docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112) and
pending before respondent Judge Yadao (Annex B) is dismissible on its face as they involve
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
exactly the same accused, facts, and offenses which had previously been dismissed by the QC
RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 on March 29, 1999, hence, can no longer be
revived two (2) years after such dismissal in accordance with the clear provisions of Section 8, That is what I am trying to rule out so that we do not have to discuss it.
Rule 117.35
ATTY. FORTUN:
Indeed, the CA granted the respondent’s petition based on Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP. In
this case, the respondent invoked the same rule and the Constitution. Thus, during the oral
Very well, Your Honor.
arguments in this Court, the respondent, through counsel, admitted that he was indeed invoking
Section 8 anew and the provisions of the Constitution on double jeopardy:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
You are not invoking double jeopardy?
You are saying that Sen. Lacson can no longer be prosecuted forever for that crime,
for the killing of the 11 in 1995? ATTY. FORTUN:

ATTY. FORTUN: As I mentioned we are saying that the effects of a permanent dismissal vest the
effects (interrupted)
That is my submission, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
No, I am not talking of the effects, I am asking about the application, you are not
Let us see your reason for it? asking the Court to apply the doctrine of double jeopardy to prevent a prosecution of
Mr. Lacson?

ATTY. FORTUN:36
ATTY. FORTUN:

First, are you saying that double jeopardy applies or not?

Because the element of double jeopardy cannot apply 8, 117.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:37
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

Allow me to qualify the effects of double jeopardy occur with permanent dismissal that
is my submission. So, the answer is yes?

ATTY. FORTUN:38 ATTY. FORTUN:

No, Your Honor, we were saying that precisely a permanent dismissal vests the rights
No, no, I am not talking of the effects, I am talking of the doctrine, you are not invoking
the doctrine of double jeopardy? of double jeopardy upon the accused who invokes it.

ATTY. FORTUN: JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

Your Honor, double jeopardy does not apply Section 8, 117 they are (interrupted) What you are saying is the effects, I am not asking about the effects, I will ask that
later.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
ATTY. FORTUN:

That is right.
They are two different (interrupted)

ATTY. FORTUN:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: ATTY. FORTUN:

Later, I am asking about doctrines. Since you are not invoking the doctrine of double Yes, Your Honor.39
jeopardy you are resting your case win or lose, sink or sail on the application of 8,117?
Second. The respondent’s answers to the questions of Madame Justice Josefina
ATTY. FORTUN: Salonga during the hearing in the CA where he admitted, through counsel, that he
gave no express conformity to the dismissal of the cases by Judge Agnir, Jr., were in
relation to Section 8 of Rule 117 and not to Section 7 of Rule 117 on double jeopardy,
On the constitutional right of the accused under Section 16 of Article 3 which is
thus:
speedy disposition of cases which implemented 8,817, that is our arguments in this
bar.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Do we get it from you that it is your stand that this is applicable to the case at bar?
Are you not resting on 8,117?
ATTY. FORTUN:
ATTY. FORTUN:
It is my submission, that it is, Your Honor. In addition, of course, to my proposition that
Mr. Lacson is covered by the rule on double jeopardy as well, because he had already
That and the constitutional provision, Your Honor.
been arraigned before the Sandiganbayan prior to the case being remanded to the
RTC.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
So, you are resting on 8,117?
You are referring to those cases which were dismissed by the RTC of Quezon City.
ATTY. FORTUN:
ATTY. FORTUN:
Not exclusive, Your Honor.
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And the Constitution?
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?
ATTY. FORTUN:
ATTY. FORTUN:
The Constitution which gave life to 8,117.
It was in that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset was simply
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: a judicial determination of probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge
Agnir, [Jr.] upon the presentation by the parties of their witnesses, particularly those
who had withdrawn their affidavits, made one further conclusion that not only was this
To speedy disposition? case lacking in probable cause for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but
also it did not justify proceeding to trial.
ATTY. FORTUN:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Yes, Your Honor.
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: dismissed except [if] it is with the express conformity of the accused.

Can a Court, let us see your theory then – your theory rest on two provisions: first, the ATTY. FORTUN:
Rules of Court 8,117 and Second, the Constitution on speedy disposition?
That is correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE GUERRERO:

JUSTICE SALONGA: Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial
determination of probable cause?
And with notice to the offended party.
ATTY. FORTUN:
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause
what should the Court do?
Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?

ATTY. FORTUN:
ATTY. FORTUN:

That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we asked. In
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any statement
fact, I have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer before the
which would normally be required by the Court on pre-trial or on other matters,
Court, it said: "Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial determination of
including other provisional dismissal. My very limited practice in criminal courts, Your
probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted, and
Honor, had taught me that a judge must be very careful on this matter of provisional
for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present private
dismissal. In fact, they ask the accused to come forward, and the judge himself or
complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2)
herself explains the implications of a provisional dismissal. 40
the warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the
meantime until resolution of this incident."
The respondent, through counsel, even admitted that despite his plea for equitable
relief in his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause in the RTC, he did not
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
agree to a provisional dismissal of the cases. The respondent insisted that the only
relief he prayed for before Judge Agnir, Jr. was that warrants for his arrest be withheld
pending a finding of probable cause. He asserted that the judge did not even require There is no general prayer for any further relief?
him to agree to a provisional dismissal of the cases:
ATTY. FORTUN:
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
You were present during the proceedings?
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
ATTY. FORTUN:
Don’t you surmise Judge Agnir, [Jr.] now a member of this Court, precisely addressed
Yes, Your Honor. your prayer for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the
net effect of a situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without
dismissing the case?
JUSTICE ROSARIO:

ATTY. FORTUN:
You represented the petitioner in this case?

Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is plain is
ATTY. FORTUN:
we did not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any
assent to the provisional dismissal.
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good Judge
Agnir, [Jr.] who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal
of the case.
 If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal, did you not file any motion for
reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir, [Jr.] that the case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had already
been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I was concerned. So, the
dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not
take any further step in addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter further
because it probably could prejudice the interest of my client.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Continue.41
In his memorandum, in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the respondent
declared in no uncertain terms that:
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan without
jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the QC RTC. Upon raffle, the case
was assigned to Branch 91. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for his arrest not be issued.
He did not move for the dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSG’s claim. 42
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.
A judicial admission is a formal statement made either by a party or his or her attorney, in the
course of judicial proceeding which removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. It is a
voluntary concession of fact by a party or a party’s attorney during such judicial proceedings,
including admissions in pleadings made by a party.43 It may occur at any point during the
litigation process. An admission in open court is a judicial admission. 44 A judicial admission binds
the client even if made by his counsel.45 As declared by this Court:
... [I]n fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of attorney of record, who is,
for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made ... for the
purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, ... they bind the client, whether made during, or
even after the trial."46
When the respondent admitted that he did not move for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
99-81679 to Q-99-81689 in his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause, and that he
did not give his express consent to the provisional dismissal of the said cases, he in fact
admitted that one of the essential requisites of Section 8, Rule 117 was absent.
The respondent’s contention that his admissions made in his pleadings and during the hearing in
the CA cannot be used in the present case as they were made in the course of a different
proceeding does not hold water. It should be borne in mind that the proceedings before the
Court was by way of an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, from the
proceedings in the CA; as such, the present recourse is but a mere continuation of the
proceedings in the appellate court. This is not a new trial, but a review of proceedings which
commenced from the trial court, which later passed through the CA. The respondent is bound by
the judicial admissions he made in the CA, and such admissions so hold him in the proceedings
before this Court. As categorically stated in Habecker v. Clark Equipment Company:47
... [J]udicial admissions on issues of fact, including those made by counsel on behalf of a client
during a trial, are binding "for the purpose of the case ... including appeals."
While it may be true that the trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal case if it finds no
probable cause, absent the express consent of the accused to such provisional dismissal, the
latter cannot thereafter invoke Section 8 to bar a revival thereof. Neither may the accused do so
simply because the public prosecutor did not object to a motion of the accused for a judicial
determination of probable cause or file a motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal
of the case. Even a cursory reading of the respondent’s motion for a judicial determination of
probable cause will show that it contained no allegation that there was no probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant for the respondent’s arrest as a prayer for the dismissal of the cases. The
respondent was only asking the court to determine whether or not there was probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and in the meantime, to hold in abeyance the issuance of
the said warrant. Case law has it that a prayer for equitable relief is of no avail, unless the
petition states facts which will authorize the court to grant such relief.48 A court cannot set itself in
motion, nor has it power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their
pleadings. Anything that is resolved or decided beyond them is coram non judice and void. 49
Third. There is no need for the Court to remand the instant case to the trial court to enable the
respondent to adduce post facto evidence that the requisite notices under Section 8 had been
complied with by Judge Agnir, Jr. The Court has thoroughly examined the voluminous records
from the Sandiganbayan and the RTC50 and found no proof that the requisite notices were even
served on all the heirs of the victims. The respondent himself admitted that, as held by this
Court, in its May 28, 2002 Resolution, "Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have complied with the
mandate under Section 8 because said rule had yet to exist."51
One final matter. The records show that Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were
assigned, through the customary raffle of cases, to Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City, the
same branch which dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 99-81679 to 99-81689.52 In the April 1, 2003
Resolution of the Court, the Presiding Judge of Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City was
directed to try and decide Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with reasonable
dispatch. The Court notes, however, that in Administrative Order No. 104-96, it designated six
branches of the RTC of Quezon City53 as special courts, exclusively to try and decide heinous
crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659. Since the accused in the said cases are charged with murder,
which under Rep. Act No. 7659, is classified as a heinous crime, the above cases should be
consolidated and re-raffled by the Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City to a branch
thereof designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Panfilo M. Lacson’s Omnibus Motion and
Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED. The respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration
and its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102
to 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE the same with dispatch to one of the branches of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous
crimes.
SO ORDERED.