United Provinces Electric Supply Co. Ltd. Allahabad Vs. T. N.

Chatterjee
[1972] INSC 73 (13 March 1972)
GROVER, A.N.

GROVER, A.N.

SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) RAY, A.N.

PALEKAR, D.G.

BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH

CITATION: 1972 AIR 1201 1972 SCR (3) 754 1972 SCC (2) 54

CITATOR INFO :

F 1972 SC1626 (8) F 1973 SC2650 (6)

ACT:

Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, s. 4 and Schedule items 8, 9 and 11C and U.P.
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1946--Model Standing Orders, para 13--Applicability of
Standing Order, re : age of retirement to employees in service before the certifying of Standing Orders--
Framing of Standing Order regarding retirement before amendment, of Schedule--Certifying Officer, if
could certify the standing order as fair or reasonable before amendment of s. 4--High Court deciding
question and remanding--When operates as res judicata.

HEADNOTE:

In accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Employment (standing Orders) Act, 1946, and the U.P.

Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1946, the appellant substituted draft standing defining
the conditions of employment of its employees and they were certified bythe Certifying Officer in 1951.
Clause 32 of the Standing Orders provided that an employee who has served 30 years or who has reached
the age of 55 years will be retired, but, exemption from this may be granted by the company in special
case. In 1959, notices were served on the respondentworkmen that they were retired by reason of their
having attained the age of superannuation as per cl. 32. The workmen contended that the clause was not
binding or enforceable as far as they were concerned, because, they had entered the service of the
appellant prior to the certification of the Standing Orders and there was no condition that they would be
liable to retirement after attaining any prescribed age or any fixed period of service, and that they were
entitled to continue in service as long as they were physically. fit. The industrial dispute was referred to
the Industrial Tribunal and the Tribunal held in favour of the appellant. The respondents filed a writ
petition in the High Court They also applied in 1960, under s' 10(2) of the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946, for amendment and notification of cl. 32 claiming fixation of retirement age at 60. The
Certifying Officer modified the clause and fixed the age of retirement at 58, but the appellate authority
refixed it at 55.
The High Court, in the writ petition, on the basis of the decision or this Court in Guest Keen Williams Pvt.
Ltd., [1960] 1 S.C.R. 348 her that Cl. 32 was not applicable to the employees and directed the Tribunal to
rehear the case.

The Tribunal thereafter held that the respondent. workmen were wrongfully and unjustifiably retired.

In appeal to this Court,

HELD : (1) It was not intended by the Legislature that different sets of conditions should apply to
employees depending on whether workman was employed before the Standing Orders were certified by
after, as that would defeat the object of the legislation. The objection and 755 scheme of the Act is that
the employers must define precisely the conditions of employment of all the employees and have them
certified by the Certifying Officer. The right given to be workmen to express their views, to raise
objections, to appeal to the appellate authority and to ask for modification of the Standing Orders under
s. 10 of the Act, show that every possible safeguard has provided in the interests of the workmen.
Moreover, the individual items in the Schedule to the Act show that there cannot be different conditions
for different employees depending upon the point of time when they came to be employed, for that would
result in a great deal of heart burning between the employees inter se. [762 F-H; 763 A-D] Salem Erode
Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Its Workers; [1966] 2 S.C.R. 498, and Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd., v. Sri
Alladin & Ors. [1970] 1 S.C.R. 808, followed.

(2) The decision in Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd. that the Industrial Tribunal had to consider not only the
propriety, reasonableness and fairness of a Standing Order but that it had also to deal with the question
as to whether a particular Standing Order could be made applicable to employees who had already been
employed without any limit as to age of retirement was delivered under the unlamented s. 4 of the Act,
under which the Certifying Officer or the appellate authority could not go into the reasonableness or
fairness of the Standing Orders. But after the amendment of the section in 1956, the Certifying Officer
and the appellate authority are bound to examine the question of fairness of the standing orders, and
therefore, there can be no justification now for not giving effect to the principle of uniformity of conditions
of service which is clearly contemplated by the provisions of the Act. [763 D-F] (3) But cl. 32 of the Standing
Orders as certified in 1951 was not valid and could not be binding on the respondents, because, there was
then 'no item in the Schedule to the Act covering cases of superannuation or ret retirement, with respect
to which Standing Orders could be made. [766 E-F, GH] Item 8 and 9 of the Schedule deal with the
termination of employment and notice thereof, and suspension or dismissal for misconduct. The language
of item 8 shows that it does not cover the case of superannuation, which does not depend on )any notice
and which covers an event which is automatic and which must be given effect to without any volition on
the Part of the employer or workmen. If termination is to be read in a wide sense as meaning 'employment
coming to an end' there was no necessity to have item 3, because, dismissal would then be covered by
termination. From the paragraph 13 of the Model Standing Orders contained in the Schedule to Rules it
is apparent that item 8 is confined to termination of employment by notice in writing and 'does not refer
to superannuation or retirement. It was only in 959 that item 11(C) was introduced in the Schedule
enabling the framing of Standing Orders in relation to the age of retirement and superannuation. [765 F-
H; 766 A-C] Saroj Kumar v. Orissa State Electricity Board, A.I.R. 1970 Orissa, 126, approved.

Management of the Windu' v. Secretary Hindu Office & National Press Employees Union, A.I.R. 1961 Mad.
107, disapproved.
(4) No assistance can be derived by the use of the word 'retirement' in para, 16 of the Model Standing
Orders, because, it may well refer to 756 retirement under the terms of the contract of employment
entered into between the employer and the employees. [765 AB, E] (5) Since before the amendment of s.
4 the Certifying Officer and the appellate auhority were debarred from adjudicating upon, the fairness or
reasonableness of the Standing Orders, the Certifying Officer at that time, could not certify any Standing
Order on the ground that it was reasonable or fair. Therefore, in 1951, when the Standing Orders were
certified, cl. 32 could not have been framed because there was no item in the Schedule relating to
superannuation and the Certifying Officer could not certify it on the ground it was fair and reasonable
because he bad no power to do so. [766 D-F] (6) The Certifying Officer, however, when be modified cl. 32
and fixed the retirement age at 58 (after s. 4 was amended) could have validly certified such clause as
modified by him.

This Court could also give an appropriate direction with regard to fixing the age of superannuation. In the
circumstances of this case the age of superannuation should be 58 years. Therefore, the concerned
workman should be deemed to have continued in service of the appellant till they had attained the age
of 58 years. [767 A-C, G-H] (7) The order of the High Court in the writ petition did not finally terminate the
proceedings at all. The proceedings were terminated only by the award of the Industrial Tribunal after
remand. Therefore, the order of the High Court following Guest Keen William's case did not debar a fresh
consideration of the question by virtue of the rule or principle of res judicata. [768 A-B, E-F] Satyadhyan
Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajan Devi, [1960] 3 S.C.R.

590, followed.

Management, of N. Railway Co-operative Society v. Industrial Tribunal, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 476, explained.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1734 of 1967.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Award dated the May 19, 1967 of the Industrial Tribunal (1) at Allahabad
in Adjudication Case No. 15 of 1960.

S. V. Gupte, D. N. Mukherjee and Gautam Banerjee, for the appellant.

G. C. Bhattacharyaand M. V. Goswami, for respondents Nos. 1 and 3 to 8.

O. P. Rana, for respondent No. 9.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J. This is an appeal by special leave from an award of
the Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, dated May19, 1967.

757 The material facts May be stated, The appellant, which is a limited liability company and which later
on went into voluntary liquidation, was carrying on the business or undertaking of generation, distribution
and supply of electricity. One of such undertakings was the Electric Supply Undertaking at Allahabad in
the State of Uttar Pradesh. Its affairs and business were being% looked after and managed by Martin Bum
& Co. I-Ad., Calcutta. Some of the appellant's workmen in Allahabad and its surrounding area were
members of Bijli Mazdoor Sangh-a trade union registered under the Indian Trade Union Act, 1926. The
U.P. State Electricity Board compulsorily acquired and took over the assets of the appellant's aforesaid
undertaking or business with effect from 16/17th September 1964.
In accordance with the provisions of the Industrial, Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946, hereinafter
called the 'Act and the U.P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules 1946 the appellant submitted
draft Standing Orders defining the conditions of employment of its employees. On July 14, 1951 these
Orders' were certified by the Certifying Officer. Clause 32 of the Standing Orders was in the following
terms :"32. RETIREMENT-An employee who has served 30 years or who has reached the age of 55 will be
retired, but exemption to this may be granted by the Company in-special cases".

The workmen through the Bijli Mazdoor Sangh preferred an appeal under s. 6 of the Act from the order
of (the Certifying Officer to the State Industrial Tribunal which was the. appellate authority under the Act.
That appeal, however,, was dismissed. The Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd., Agra and Benaras Electric Light &
Power Co. Ltd., Varanasi, which is the appellant in the connected appeal (C.A. 164/68) also got certified
Standing Orders in similar terms. These electric undertakings, were also under the management of Martin
Burn & Co. Ltd. On July 16, 1959 notices were served on seven worlen with effect from September 1, 1959
on the ground that they had attained the age of superannuation or completed 30 years of service and
they were retired by reason of their having attained the age of superannuation.

Out of these workmen one of them Haider Ali died during the pendency of proceedings. The other six
employees have been impleaded as respondents Nos. 1 to 6 in the present appeal.

According to the appellant these, respondents accepted all the accumulations due to them in respect of
Provident Fund contributions made by the appellant in respect of them and by themselves and were also
paid gratuities credited to them in their respective Provident Fund accounts for their services prior to their
becoming members of the Provident Fund.

By an order dated February 22, 1960 made under s. 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act 1946 the
Government of U.P.

referred to the Industrial Tribunal (1) at Allahabad for adjudication an industrial dispute alleged to exist
between the appellant and its workmen on the following issues :

"Whether the employers have wrongfully arid/or unjustifiably retired their workmen, mentioned in the
Annexure, with effect from 1st August, 1959 ? If so, to what relief are the workmen entitled ?"
Respondents 1 to 6 and Haidcr Ali (since deceased) were the workmen mentioned in the Annexute. The
case of the workmen before the Industrial Tribunal was that they had entered service of the appellant
prior to the certification of the Standing Orders. At the time of their appointment there was no condition
that they would be liable to retirement after attaining any prescribed age or after putting in any fixed
period of service. A practice was in vogue that the workmen would continue in service till he was physically
fit.

Accordingly clause 32 of the certified Standing Orders was neither binding nor enforceable. The Industrial
Tribunal made an award on May 2, 1960 finding, interalia, (a) theemployers were within their rights in
retiring, the workmen concerned. (b) The act of the employers in compulsorily retiring the concerned
workmen,-from service could not be characterised as wrongful, illegal or unjustified and (c) the workmen
were entitled to no relief.

On June 14, 1960 the Bijli Mazdoor Sangh moved an application under s. 10(2) of the Act for amendment
and modification of clause 32 claiming fixation of retirement age at 60 years. On September 20, 1960 the
Union also filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court for quashing the award.
On April 22, 1961 the Certifying Officer modified clause 32 and fixed the ago, of retirement at 58 years.
On September 10, 1961 the appellate authority refixed the age of retirement at 55 years. Similarly appeals
were filed by the Agra Electric Co. and the Banaras Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd. in which similar orders
were made. On July 12, 1966 the, High Court recorded an order quashing the award.

It was held that Standing Order 32 was not applicable to the employees Who had entered service before
the certification of the Standing Orders. The Industrial Tribunal was directed to reheat the case and after
giving an opportunity to-the parties of being heard give an award in accordance with law. Finally the award
against which the appeal has been brought 759 was given on May 19, 1967. It was held in the award that
all the seven workmen had been wrongfully and unjustifiably retired and that they should be deemed to
have continued in service till September 16, 1964 from which date they would be taken to Wave been
retrenched. The appellant having been taken over by the U.P. State Electricity Board, it was directed that
the employers should pay full wages from the period August 1, 1959 to September 16, 1964 and
retrenchment compensation within s. 25-F read with s. 25-FF and s. 25-J of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947.

While deciding the writ petition the High Court relied on three decisions of this Court for holding that
where there is no age of superannuation prescribed for the employees of a concern a provision in the
Standing Orders certified subsequent to the date of employment regarding compulsory retirement will
not be applicable to them. The first decision is in Guest Keen, Williams Private Ltd. v. P. J.

Sterling & Others(1). In that case after the enforcement of the Act the industrial concern submitted its
draft Standing Orders for certification to the Certifying Officer. That Officer certified the Standing Orders
after giving the trade union of workmen an opportunity to be heard and after considering their objections.
The Standing Orders relating to retirement provided that the workmen shall retire from the service of the
company on reaching the age of 55 years.

The company gave notice to forty-seven of its workmen who were over the age of 55 years retiring them
and a dispute was raised about their retirement which was referred to the Tribunal for adjudication It was
ultimately held, by the Labour Appellate Tribunal that those workmen who were in employment prior to
the date of certification of the Standing Orders would not be governed by it and their retirement was
illegal. This Court examined the scheme of the Act including the relevant provisions. Notice was taken, in
particular, of the fact that when the standing Orders were submitted to the Certifying Officer all that he
could do was to satisfy himself that they made provision for other matters set out in the schedule to the
Act and that they were otherwise in conformity With its provisions.

Under s. 4, as it was originally enacted the Certifying Officer could not adjudicate upon the fairness or
reasonableness of the provisions of the Standing Orders.

This section was subsequently amended-in 1956 and the effect of the amendment was that the Certifying
Officer was enabled to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of the Standing
Orders. It was pointed out by the court that the scope for enquiry before the Certifying Officer prior to
the amendment of s. 4 was extremely limited. The only way in which the employees could claim
modification of the standing Orders prior to the amendment of s. 4 was by raising an industrial dispute in
that (1) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 348.
760 behalf. Subsequent to the amendment the employees could raise the same dispute before the
Certifying Officer and in a proper case they could apply for its modification under S.

10(2) of the Act. It was observed that the Standing Orders certified under the Act became part of the
terms of the employment by operation of S. 7 but if an industrial dispute arose in respect of such Orders
and it was referred to the Tribunal by the appropriate Government the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to
deal with it on the merits. It was, therefore, held that the Tribunal had to consider not only the propriety,
reasonableness and fairness of the rule but it had also to deal with the question as to whether the said
rule could and should be made applicable to employees who had already been employed without any
limit as to age of retirement. The decision in this case was followed in Workmen of Kettlewell Bullen &
Co. Ltd. v. Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd.(1). The next case in which a similar question arose in Salem Erode
Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v.

Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. Employees Union(2). It was claimed by the company which
was the employer there that the urgent need for increased production and supply of electrical energy
could be met if the existing rules embodied in two of its certified Standing Orders relating to holidays and
leave were suitably amended. The amendments proposed sought to introduce different rules relating to
holidays and leave for employees who were appointed before a specified date and those who joined
service after that date. Both the Certifying Officer and the appellate authority disallowed the
amendments. The company appealed, to this Court and the scheme of the Act was examined once again.
It was emphasised that after the amendment of s. 4 of the Act made in 1956 jurisdiction had been
conferred on the Certifying Officer as well as the appellate authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or
easonableness of the provisions of the Standing Orders.

Thus the jurisdiction had been widened.. Moreover under s.10(2) as originally enacted it was only the
employer who could make an application to the Certifying Officer to I have the Standing Orders modified.
By the amendment made in 1956 even workmen were enabled to exercise that right.

Addressing itself to the question whether it was permissible for an industrial establishment to have two
sets of Standing Orders to govern the relevant terms and conditions of its employees it was laid down
after an examination of the scheme of the relevant provisions of the Act in the light of the matters
specified in the Schedule that there was no scope for having separate Standing Orders\ in respect of any
one of them, It was said "........ the conclusion appears to be irresistible that the object of the Act is to
certify Standing Orders in (1) [1964] 2 L.L.J. 146.

(2) [1966] 2 S.C.R. 498.

761 respect of all the matters covered by the schedule and having regard to these matters Standing Orders
so certified would be uniform and would apply to all Workmen alike who are employed in any industrial
establishment".

It was considered that Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.(1) could afford no assistance because that matter
came to this Court from an industrial dispute which was the subject matter of industrial adjudication and
all that this Court did was to fixed the age of superannuation for workmen who had been employed prior
to the date of the certification of the relevant Standing Orders. That course was adopted in the special
and unusual circumstances of that case.
In the next decision Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Sri Alladin & Ors.(2) one of the main questions was
whether three workmen who had been employed long before 1951 when the cornpany's Standing Orders
were certified could be retired under Standing Order which prescribed the age of superannuation as 55
years. This Court took a view which seemingly runs counter to Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.(1).

It was held that the Standing Orders when certified would be binding on the employers as well as all the
workmen who were in employment at the time the Standing Orders came into force and those employed
thereafter as uniform conditions of service. The process of reasoning which prevailed was (1) the Act is a
beneficent piece of legislation, its object being to require employers in industrial establishments to define
with sufficient precision the conditions of employment of workmen employed therein and to make them
known to such workman. (2) Before the passing, of the Act there was nothing in law to prevent an
employer having different contracts of employment with workmen which led to confusion and made
possible discriminatory treatment. This was also clearly incompatible with the principles of collective
bargaining. (3) Section 3 of the Act was enacted to do away with such diversity and bargaining with each
individual workman. (4) Section 4 indicates that particulars of workmen in the employment on the date
of the submission of the draft Standing Orders or certification and not of those only who could be
employed in future after certification were to be given. (5) Sections 4 and 5 show that draft orders are
certifiable if they provide for all matters set out in the schedule and are otherwise in conformity with the
Act and if they are adjudicated as fair and reasonable by the Certifying Officer or the appellate authority.
The Certifying Officer has also to forward a copy of the draft Standing Orders to the Union (1) [1960] 1
S.C.R. 348.

(2) [1970] 1 S. C.R. 808.

762 or to the workmen in the prescribed manner and has to decide whether or not any modification or
addition should be made after hearing the, Union or the, workmen concerned.

Sections 6, 7, 9 and 10 contain provisions for appeal by aggrieved persons as also for sending of
authenticated copies by the Certifying Officer to the parties where no appeal is filed and further the
employer has to post the Standing Orders as finally certified in the manner prescribed. The employer or
the workmen can even apply for modification after expiry of six months from the date on which the
Standing Orders or the last modification thereof comes into operation. (7) The schedule, sets out the
matters which the Standing Orders must provide for.

For the reasons given above this Court held that the Act was meant to enable Standing Orders to be made
to bind not only those who were employed subsequent to their certification but also those who were
already in employment. If any other result were to follow there would be different conditions of
employment for different classes of workmen which would render the conditions of their service as
indefinite and diversified as before the ,enactment of the Act. Support was derived from the decision in
Salem Erode Electricity Distribution case(1) in which departure was made from the view previously taken
in the case of Guest Keen William,s Pvt. Ltd.(2) It has been urged before us on behalf of the respondents
that the decision in Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd. (2) still holds the field and the point which was decided
there and which arises in the present case did not come up for consideration in Salem Erode Electricity
Distribution Co.

Ltd.(1). In our opinion the principle applied in the latter case is fully supported by the scheme of the Act
and was rightly extended and applied 'in Agra Electric Supply Co.
Ltd. (3). We concur with the view expressed therein that it was not intended by the legislature that
different sets of conditions should apply to employees depending on whether a workman was employed
before the Standing Orders were certified or after, which would defeat the very object of the legislation.
In the preamble it is stated in categorical terms "whereas it is expedient to require employers in industrial
establishments to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make
the said conditions known to workmen employed by them". Not only the object but the scheme of the
Act is such that the employers must define precisely the ponditions of employment of all the employees
and have the same certified by the Certifying Officer against whose orders an appeal lies to the appellate
authority. The, right given to workmen to express their (1) [1966] 2 S.C.R. 498.

(3) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 808.

(2) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 348.

763 view and to raise objections is of great significance. They can even ask for modification of the Standing
Orders in accordance with s. 10 of the Act. Every possible safeguard has been provided for keeping the
workmen informed about their conditions of service so that they can take whatever steps they desire or
are advised to take in their interest before the Certifying Officer or the appellate authority.

It is also very difficult to conceive, taking each individual item in the schedule how there can be different
conditions for different employees depending upon the point of time when they came to be employed;
for instance item 3 relates to shift working. It is possible to suggest that for the same kind of work
employees who were in employment before the Standing Orders were certified would have different
hours of shift from the other employees who were employed subsequently. In the very nature of things a
great deal of irritation and annoyance between employees inter se would result if any such discrimination
is made in any of the items in the schedule. It has been rightly pointed out in Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd.
that this would only lead to industrial unrest and not industrial peace, the latter being the principal object
of legislation.

It must be remembered that in Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.

the Certifying Officer could not go into the reasonableness or fairness of the Standing Orders according
to s. 4 of the Act as it stood at the material time. The law was changed only in 1956. Perhaps that was one
of the main reasons which prompted the court in taking the view it did. But after the amendment of the
law in 1956 the Certifying Officer and the appellate authority are duty bound to examine the question of
fairness of the Standing Orders and there can be no justification now not to give, effect to the principle of
uniformity of conditions of service which is clearly contemplated by the provisions of the, Act.

The next question for determination is whether clause 32 of the Standing Orders relating to age of
retirement could be certified in July 1951. On behalf of the respondents it has been pointed out that there
is no item in the schedule which covers the case of retirement or superannuation. Items 8 and 9 are in
these terms "8. Termination of employment and the notice thereof to be given by employer and workmen,

9. Suspension or dismissal for misconduct, and acts or omissions which constitute misconduct." The model
Standing Orders framed by the Central Government and by the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh
did not contain any clause relating to retirement or superannuation.
It was for the first time that on November 17,1959 item 11-C 764 relating to superannuation and
retirement was introduced by the State of U.P. in exercise of the rule-making powers conferred by S. 15
of the Act. In other States the item relating to age of retirement or superannuation was introduced either
by legislation or by the exercise of rule making power. In the State of Bombay s. 19 of the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) (Bombay Amendment) Act 1957 provided for insertion of item 10-A in the
Schdule which was "age for retirement or superannuation". According to counsel for the respondents
there was no item until the introduction of item 11-C in November 1959 in the schedule under which any
Standing Orders could be framed and got certified relating to the age of retirement and superannuation.
It has been maintained that items 8 and 9 cannot possibly include retirement and superannuation and
therefore till item 11-C was added in the schedule so far as the State of U.P. was concerned in November
1959 no Standing Orders could be legally or validly framed and certified providing for age of retirement
and superannuation. In Saroj Kumar Ghosh v. Orissa State Electricity Board(1) the Orissa High Court
considered this question a some length and expressed the view that where a Standing Order has been
certified by the Certifying Officer containing a clause relating to superannuation not covered by the
schedule of the Act nor by the model Standing Orders such certification cannot be valid under S. 4 of the
Act. The clause 'termination of employment' in item 8 of the schedule cannot be equated with the word
"superannuation". According to the Orissa High Court, superannuation is an event which comes more or
less in an automatic process. An age is fixed on the reaching of which the holder of office has no option
but to go out of office. There is no volition involved in that act. The employer and the employee have
notice of the matter long before the event is to occur and the event is such that it cannot be arrested by
either one of them if the rule is to be followed. On the other hand termination is a positive act by which
one party even against the desire of the other can bring about the end of employment. The judgment of
the learned single. judge in Management of the "HINDU", Madras v. Secretary Hindu Office & National
Press Employees Union and another(2) was dissented from. In that case the expression "termination of
employment" in item 8 was considered to be wide enough to include retirement of an employee at the
age of superannuation. The learned Madras Judge sought support from para 16 of the model Standing
Orders which is as follows "Every permanent workman shall be entitled to a service certificate at the time
of his dismissal discharge' or retirement from service"., (1) A.I.R. 1970 Orissa 126.

(2) A.I.R. 1961 Mad. 107.

765 In the model Standing Orders there was no clause providing for superannuation or retirement on
attaining a certain age.

In our judgment much assistance or help cannot be derived from para 16 of the model Standing Orders
as contained in schedule 1 to the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules 1946. Retirement
which is mentioned there may be under the terms of contract of employment entered into between the
employer and the employees. Section 2(oo) of (the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 throws a certain amount
of light on the matter. It is reproduced below :,"Retrenchment" means the termination by the employer
of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way
of disciplinary action, but does not include(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of
the workman on reaching the age of, superannuation if the contract of employment between the
employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf;" It shows, firstly, that
termination 'of service of a workman is distinct from retirement on reaching the age of superannuation;
secondly, retirement can take place on resch & the age of superannuation under the terms of the contract
of employment entered into between the employer and the workman. Therefore, the word "retirement"
in para 16 cannot be regarded as conclusive of the question whether termination of: employment includes
retirement and superannuation. In the schedule to the Act item 8 covers termination of employment and
the notice to be given either by the employer or the workman and item 9 relates to suspension or dismissal
for misconduct etc. Item 8 by virtue of the language employed does not appear to cover the case of super
annution which does not depend on any notice and which covers an event which is automatic and which
must be given effect to without any volition on the part of the employer or the workmen as pointed out
in the Orissa judgment. If termination is to be read in a wide sense as meaning employment coming to an
end there was a necessity to have item 9 because dismissal would then be covered by termination. In the
context in which the word ",termination" is used in item 8 it cannot mean each and every form of
termination or cessation of employment. From para 13 of the Model Slanding Orders contained in
schedule 1 to the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules 1946, it is apparent that item 8
is confined to termination of employment by notice in writing and does not contain any mention L1061
Sup. CI/72 766 of superannuation or retirement. It was perhaps this difficulty which prompted the state
or U.P. to introduce item 11-C in exercise of the rule making powers conferred by s. 15 of the Act and the
Bombay legislature to make similar amendment by legislation. it would follow that unless an employer
can include a clause relating to the age of retirement and superannuation and the Certifying Officer can
certify it even though no such item appears in the schedule to ,the Act clause 32 as certified in 1951, in
the present case, could not be regarded to be valid. The Madras High Court in the case of Management
of the 'Hindu', Madras(1) made some observations to the effect that there was no bar to the Standing
Orders making a provision for matters other than those specifically mentioned in the schedule so long as
,the Certifying Officer certifies them on he ground that they are fair and reasonable. The Orissa High Court,
however, in Sarojkumar Ghosh's(2) case did not subscribe to this view. Learned counsel for the appellant,
apart from relying on the Madras decision, has not addressed any arguments on the larger and wider
question as to whether even in the absence of any item in the schedule Standing Orders can be framed
on certain matters which may be regarded as fair and reasonable and which may be so certified by the
Certifying Officer. it is, however, unnecessary to decide this point in the present case because clause 32
of the Standing Orders on which the appellant has relied was certified in July 1951 when according to the
express language of s. 4 of the Act the Certifying Officer or the appellate authority was debareed from
adjudicating upon the fairness or, reasonableness of the provisions of any Standing Orders. It is difficult
to understand how the Certifying Officer at that point of time and before the amendment of s. 4 in 1956
could have possibly certified ;my Standing Order which did not relate to any item in the schedule on the
ground that it was fair or reasonable Indeed the function of the Certifying Officer, before the amendment
of 1956, was very limited as is clear from s. 3 (2) of the Act which says :

"Provision shall be made in such draft for every matter set out in this schedule which may be applicable
to the industrial establishment and were model Standing Orders have been prescribed, shall be, so far is
practicable, in conformity with such model".

We must, therefore, hold that, clause 32 of the Standing Orders as certified in July 1951 was not valid and
cannot be binding on the respondents. However, after item 11-C was introduced in the schedule so far as
the State of U.P. was concerned an item was added providing for the age of retirement and
superannuation. The Certifying Officer, when lie modified clause 32 and (1) AIR 1961 Mad. 107.

(2) AIR 1970 Orrissa 126.

767 fixed the retiring age at 58 on April 22, 1961 could have validly certified such clause as modified by
him. The necessary consequence will be that the respondents could not have been relied 'on the ground
of superannuation in July 1959 and they could be validly retired only on or after April 22, 1961 in
accordance ,with clause 32 as modified by the Certifying Officer. In other words, those out of the present
respondent who had attained the age of 58 years on April 22, 1961, could be regarded as having been
validly retired having reached the age of superannuation on that date under that clause.

In view of the previous decisions of this Court and in particular that of Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.(1) it
has not been disputed that in the industrial dispute which was referred it was open' 'to the Industrial
Tribunal or the Labour Court to determine the age of retirement or superannuation notwithstanding that
clause 32 of the Standing Orders as certified in 1961 had been legally ,And validly certified indeed in Guest
keen Williams Pvt.

Ltd.(1) It was not disputed that even this. Court could give an appropriate direction which might 'be
considered reasonable with regard to 'the age of superannuation as stated before according to clause 32
of 'the Standing Orders, as certified in April 1961, the age of superannuation was fixed at 58. The appellant
'filed an appears that in the cage of Agra Electric Supply Co.(2) also a appears that in the case of Agra
Electric supply Co.(4) also a similar Standing order had been certified and on appeal the age of -retirement
was reduced from 58 to 55 years by the appellate 'authority. This Court in that case held the Standing
Order fixing the age at 55 years applicable not only to those employees who were employed subsequently
but also to all workmen who were in employment at the time when the 'Standing Orders became legally
applicable. It does not appear in that case that any such argument was raised that the matter should be
remitted either to the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court to fix the age of superannuation or that this
Court itself might do so as was the course followed in the case of Guest keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.(1) in which
the age was fixed at 60 years with regard to those employees who had raised the dispute on the ground
that the Sanding Orders could not govern them as they had been employed before the Standing Orders
became applicable. After considering the entire material and keeping in mind the fact that according to
the appellate authority even the age of retirement at 55 was fair and reasonable we are of the view that
the age of superannuation of the respondents, in the present case, should be 58 years. In other words. it
will be the same as was fixed by the Certifying Officer by modifying clause 32 on April 22, 1961.

(1) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 348.

(2) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 808 768 Lastly we must deal with the contention raised on behalf of the respondents
that the order of the Allahabad High Court made on July 12, 1966 quashing the award after following the
decision of this Court in Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd.(1) should be deemed to be final and should debar
any fresh consideration or decision of that point by virtue of the rule or principle of res-judicata. It is
noteworthy that the order of the Allahabad High Court was not final against which the matter could have,
been taken in appeal either to a division bench of the High Court or to this Court.

Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Management of Northern Railway Cooperative
Society Ltd. v.Industrial Tribunal Rajasthan, Jaipur and Another(2), where reference had been made by
the State Government to the Industrial Tribunal on the Railway Workers' Union having raised an industrial
dispute against the Management of the Northern Railway Cooperative Society Ltd. The society filed a writ
petition on the ground that the dispute having been raised by the Railway Workers' Union and not by the
Society's own employees the reference to the Tribunal was not competent. The High Court dismissed the
petition.
thereafter the Tribunal heard the matter and gave its decision in favour of the workman concerned. The
society appealed to this Court by special leave. It was held that the order of the High Court was not
interlocutory but was a final order in regard to the proceedings under Art. 226.

The appropriate remedy for the appellant in that case was to appeal against the High Court's order and
that not having been done the appellant's plea relating to the competency of the reference was barred
by res judicator as the same had been raised before the High Court and had been rejected.

The present case is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as the order made by the High Court was not final
and a remand had been directed presumably under Art. 227 of the Constitution.

That order in fact did not finally terminate any proceedings at all. The proceedings were terminated only
by the award against which the present appeal has been brought by special leave. We are unable to see
how the decision in the aforesaid case can afford any assistance to the respondents before us. Indeed the
case which is more apposite in Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v. Smt. Deorajin Debi & Another ( 3 ) . There an
order of remand had been made by the High Court while exercising powers under S. 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. It was observed, after referring to the various decisions of the Privy Council, that the order
of remand was interlocutory and did not pumort to dispose of the case. A party is not bound to appeal
against every interlocutory order which is a step in the procedure that leads up to a final decision or award.

(1) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 348.

(3) (1960) 3 S.C.R 590.

(2) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 476.

769 The following observations from this case may be reproduced with advantage "Interlocutory
judgments which have the force of a decree must be distinguished from other interlocutory judgments
which are a step towards the decision of the dispute between parties by way of a decree or a final order".

We are unable, therefore, to accede to the contention that the rule of res-judicata could be invoked by
the, respondent in the present case.

In the result the appeal is allowed and the order of the Industrial Tribunal is hereby set aside. According
to our decision the workmen concerned could not have been retired on the ground of superannuation in
accordance with clause 32 of the Standing Orders till it was certified after necessary modification on April
22, 1961. Even otherwise it has been held by us that the proper age of retirement in ,he case of those
employees who joined service prior to April 22, 1961 should be 58 years. The award, therefore, will be
that the concerned workmen should be deemed to have continued in service of the appellant till they had
at attained the age of 58 years. It is declared that they shall be entitled to be paid full wages and all other
dues to which they are entitled under ,the terms of their employment till they attained the age of 58
years. As regards any payments received by the workmen pursuant to the award or after the notice of
termination those shall also be adjusted accordingly and the appellant undertakes not to claim refund of
any amounts which have already between received by them in excess of the amounts due. No order as to
costs.

V.P.S. Appeal allowed.

The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Anr Vs. Krishna Kant
[1995] INSC 255 (3 May 1995)
Jeevan Reddy, B.P. (J) Jeevan Reddy, B.P. (J) Sen, S.C. (J) Nanavati G.T.
(J) B.P.Jeevan Reddy.J.
CITATION: 1995 AIR 1715 1995 SCC (5) 75 JT 1995 (4) 348 1995 SCALE (3)440

ACT:

HEAD NOTE:

Leave granted in all Special Leave Petitions.

The respondents in these appeals are the employees of the appellant-corporation, viz., Rajasthan State
Road Transport Corporation.Pursuant to disciplinary enquiries held against them on charges of
misconduct, their services were terminated. They filed civil suits for a declaration that the order
terminating their services is illegal and invalid and for a further declaration that they must be deemed to
have continued and are still continuing in the service of the Corporation with all consequential
benefits.The Corporation resisted the suits on the ground inter alia that the Civil court had no jurisdiction
to entertain the suits.The Trial court decreed the suits as prayed for. Appeals as also Second appeals
preferred by the Corporation were dismissed by the learned District Judge and High Court.

When these appeals came up for hearing before a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court, the apellant-
Corporation relied upon the principles enunciated in Paragraphs 23 and 24 of the judgment in Premier
Automobiles Limited etc. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay & Ors. etc. (1976 (1) S.C.C.496) and
in particular upon the decision in Jitendra Nath Biswas v. M/s. Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co. & Anr.
(1989 (3) S.C.C.582). The Bench was of the opinion, agreeing with the decision in Jitendra Nath Biswas,
that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the present suits but in view of the order dated October
18, 1989 in S.L.P.(C) No.9386 of 1988 (rendered by two-Judge Bench of this Court) holding a civil suit
concerning a similiar dispute to be maintainable, the Bench thought it appropriate that the appeals are
heard by a Bench of three Judges. It is pursuant to their order dated September 23, 1993 that these
appeals have been placed before this Bench.

The appellant-Corporation has been constituted under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950. It is a
statutory Corporation. Though Section 45 of the said Act empowers the Corporation to frame regulations
prescribing the conditions of service of its employees, no such regulations have been framed insofar as
the employees answering the description of "workman" as defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, are concerned. They are governed by the certified Standing Orders framed under and
in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.

These Standing Orders inter alia define "misconduct" and prescribe the procedure for conducting the
disciplinary proceedings against such employees.
The Corporation says that the disciplinary enquiries, which resulted in the dismissal of the respondents
were conducted perfectly in accordance with the Standing Orders, whereas the case of the
respondents/plaintiffs is that they were conducted in violation of the Standing Orders. The precise
question in these appeals is whether a suit of this nature is maintainable in a Civil Court. The Corporation
says that it is not. According to them the respondent's only remedy was to approach the Labour Court for
the reliefs sought for by them in the suit.

Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that "the courts shall (subject to the provisions herein
contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except the suits of which their cognizance is
either expressly or impliedly barred." The question is whether by virtue of the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act read with the Standing Orders aforesaid, the Civil Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance of
such suits is barred? This question calls for a brief reference to the relevant provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act as well as the Standing Orders Act, 1946.

The Industrial Disputes Act (the Act) was enacted to make provision for the investigation and settlement
of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes. The statement of objects and reasons appended to
the Bill (which became the Act) stated inter alia, "(T)he bill also seeks to re-orient the administration of
the conciliation machinery provided in the Trade Disputes Act. Conciliation will be compulsory in all
disputes in public utility services and optional in the case of other industrial establishments.

With a view to expedite conciliation proceedings, time limits have been prescribed for conclusion thereof
- fourteen days in the case of conciliation officer and two months in the case of Board of Conciliation, from
the date of notice of strike. A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings will be binding
for such periods as may be agreed upon by the parties and where no period has been agreed upon, for a
period of one year, and will continue to be binding until revoked by a three months' notice by either party
to the dispute." Section 2 defines certain expressions occurring in the Act. The expression "industrial
dispute" is defined in clause (k) in the following words:

"(K) 'industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between
employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment
or non- employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person;" The
expression "workman" is defined in clause (s), while the expression "employer" is defined in clause (g).

Sections 4 to 7 provide for appointment/constitution of Conciliation Officers, Boards of Conciliation,

Courts of Enquiry and Labour Courts while Sections 7-A and 7-B provide for constitution of Tribunals and
National Tribunals.

Section 9-A provides that any change in the conditions of service applicable to any workman in respect of
matters specified in the Fourth Schedule shall be effected only in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by it. Section 10 is relevant for our purposes since it provides for reference of disputes to
Boards, courts or Tribunals.It provides for the government referring an industrial dispute to specified
authorities for adjudication, where it is of the opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended.
Section 10-A provides for voluntary reference of an industrial dispute to arbitration. Section 11 prescribes
the procedure and powers of the Courts and Tribunals while Section 11-A confers upon the Labour Court
and Tribunals an express power to substitute the punishment awarded in the domestic enquiry if it is
satisfied that such a course is called for in the circumstances of a given case. Section 12 prescribes the
duties of conciliation officers. It says that "where an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the
conciliation officer may, or where the disputes relates to a public utility service and notice under Section
22 has been given, shall hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner." The duty of such officer
is to bring about a settlement as far as possible and if he fails in that effort, to make a report to the
government. The government is thereupon empowered to refer the dispute to appropriate Tribunal or
Court for adjudication. Sub-section (6) provides that a report under Section 12 shall be submitted within
fourteen days of the commencement of the conciliation proceedings unless of course extended by
agreement between the parties to the dispute. Section 14 provides that a court shall decide a matter
referred to it within six months of the commencement of enquiry. Section 15 directs the authorities to
decide the matters expeditiously and within the period specified in the order of reference. Section 16
provides for submission of the award by the Tribunal/Court, while Section 17 provides for its publication
by the Government in the prescribed manner. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 then says "subject to the
provisions of Section 17-A, the award published under Sub-section (1) shall be final and shall not be called
in question by any court in any manner whatsoever". Section 18 provides for a settlement between the
parties to an industrial dispute while Section 19 provides for certain matters incidental thereto. Chapter-
V prohibits strikes and lock-outs. Chapter - VA and Chapter V-B contain several provisions of a substantive
nature regulating retrenchment and lay-off of workmen, closure of industrial establishments and other
related matters. Chapter - VI deals with penalties. Section 29 provides that any person who commits a
breach of any award which is binding upon him shall be punishable with imprisonment or with fine or with
both as provided therein. Chapter-VII contains certain miscellaneous provisions. Section 33- C provides
for recovery of money due from an employer to a workman in the manner provided thereby. The forum
prescribed is the Labour Court. For the purpose of these appeals, it may not be necessary to refer to the
five schedules appended to the Act.

The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 was enacted by Parliament to require employers
in industrial establishments to define formally the conditions of employment under them with sufficient
precision and to make them known to the workers. The Act applies to every industrial establishment
wherein 100 or more workers are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding 12 months.
Clauses (c), (d) and (e) define the expressions "certified officer", "employer" and "industrial
establishment". The expression "workman" carries the same meaning as is assigned to it in the Industrial
Disputes Act.

Section 3 makes it obligatory upon every industrial establishment to frame Standing Orders in respect of
matters set out in the Schedule to the Act and submit the same to the certified officer who shall, after
making the necessary enquiry, certify the same, on being satisfied that they have been framed in
accordance with the Act. Upon such certification, the Standing Orders become binding upon both the
employer and the employees. They are required to be published in the manner prescribed by the Act.
Model Standing Orders have been framed which are to be effective till the certified Standing Orders are
made and published under the Act. Failure to submit or frame Standing Orders by the employer is made
punishable by Section 13 while Section 13-A prescribes the forum for determination of questions arising
with respect to the application or interpretation of the certified Standing Orders. Section 13-A reads as
follows :

"13-A.-Interpretation, etc., of standing orders. If any question arises as to the application or interpretation
of a standing order certified under this Act, any employer or workman [or a trade union or other
representative body of the workmen] may refer the question to any one of the Labour Courts constituted
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and specified for the disposal of such proceeding by the
appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette, and the Labour Court to which the
question is so referred, shall after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide the question
and such decision shall be final and binding on the parties." The schedule to the Act specifies the matters
which have to be provided for in the Standing Orders.

Rules have been made called 'Industrial Employment Standing Orders (Central) Rules, 1946.

The nature of the Standing Orders and the meaning and scope of Section 13-A:

With a view to clear the ground, we may deal with these two issues debated before us at some length.
The first one relates to the nature and character of the certified Standing Orders. We may indicate the
relevance of this discussion. Sri Jitender Sharma, learned counsel for respondents-workmen submits that
the certified Standing Orders have statutory force and their violation enables the Civil Court to decree
reinstatement in service and that bar of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act does not operate in such a
case. He relies upon the holding in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram (1975 (3) S.C.R.618). The appellant's
counsel, however, dispute this proposition. Bereft of authority, we find it difficult to agree with Sri Sharma.
The certified Standing Orders are not in the nature of delegated/subordinate legislation. It is true that the
Act makes it obligatory upon the employer (of an industrial establishment to which the Act applies or is
made applicable) to submit draft Standing Orders providing for the several matters prescribed in the
Schedule to the Act and it also provides the procedure - inter alia, the certifying officer has to examine
their fairness and reasonableness - for certification thereof. Yet it must be noted that these are conditions
of service framed by the employer - the employer may be a private corporation, a firm or an individual
and not necessarily a statutory Corporation - which are approved/certified by the prescribed statutory
authority, after hearing the concerned workmen. The Act does not say that on such certification, the
Standing Orders acquire statutory effect or become part of the statute. It can certainly not be suggested
that by virtue of certification, they get metamorphosed into delegated/subordinate legislation. Though
these Standing Orders are undoubtedly binding upon both the employer and the employees and
constitute the conditions of service of the employees, it appears difficult to say, on principle, that they
have statutory force. The decisions of this Court, however, read differently though some dissonance is to
be found among them. In Baqalkot Cement Co.Ltd. V. R.K.Pathan & Ors. (1962 Suppl.(2) S.C.R.697), the
question was whether the certifying officer had the power to add a condition prescribing the procedure
for applying for leave and the authority competent to sanction it. The Court held that the officer did
possess such a power. In that connection, Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Bench, referred to the
object and scheme of the enactment and observed:

"That is why the Legislature took the view that in regard to industrial establishments to which the Act
applied, the conditions of employment subject to which industrial labour was employed, should be well-
defined and should be precisely known to both the parties. With that object, the Act has made relevant
provisions for making Standing Orders which, after they are certified, constitute the statutory terms of
employment between the industrial establishments in question and their employees. That is the principal
object of the Act." In Buckingham and Carnatic Co.Ltd V. Venkatiah & Anr. (1964 (4) S.C.R.265) the service
of the respondent-employee was terminated under and as provided by the Standing Orders.

The order of termination was interferred with by the Labour Court, whose award was affirmed by the
Letter Patent Bench of the High Court. The appellant's contention was that once it has acted in accordance
with the Standing Orders, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with it. In that connection,
Gajendragadkar,J. speaking for the Bench, observed:
"The certified Standing Orders represent the relevant terms and conditions of service in a statutory form
and they are binding on the parties atleast as much, if not more, as private contracts embodying similar
terms and conditions of service".

In The Workmen of Dewan Tea Estate & Ors. v. The Management (1964 (5) S.C.R.548) the contention of
the management was that Standing Order 8(a)(i), having been certified before insertion of the definition
of "lay-off" by Section 2(kkk) in the Industrial Disputes Act, should be construed in the light of the said
definition. While rejecting the said argument, Gajendragadkar,J. observed thus with respect to the nature
of the Standing Orders:

"It will be recalled that the Standing Orders which have been certified under the Standing Orders Act
became part of the statutory terms and conditions of service between the industrial employer and his
employees. Section 10(1) of the Standing Orders Act provides that the Standing Orders finally certified
under this Act shall not, except on agreement between the employer and the workmen, be liable to
modification until the expiry of six months from the date on which the Standing Orders or the last
modification thereof came into operation. If the Standing Orders or the last modification thereof came
into operation. If the Standing Orders thus become the part of the statutory terms and conditions of
service, they will govern the relations between the parties unless, of course,it can be shown that any
provision of the Act is inconsistent with the said Standing Orders." In Workmen and Buckingham &
Carnatic Mills, Madras V. Buckingham and Carnatic Mills, Madras (1970 (1) L.L.J.26) Vaidialingam, J.,
speaking for a Bench of two learned Judges, stated:

"(T)he labour court has observed that the standing orders of the company which have been certified under
the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, though binding on the employer and the workers
have no statutory force and, in consequence, they are merely directive and not mandatory. It has further
observed that any non-compliance of the standing orders whill not render an enquiry bad, for that reason.

We may straightaway say that these observations of the labour court are erroneous. The labour court has
misunderstood the decisions of this Court on this point. This Court has held that standing orders, which
have been certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, become part of the
statutory terms and conditions of service between the industrial employer and his employees and that
they will govern the relations between the parties - vide workers of Dewan Tea Estates & Ors. v. Their
Manager (1964 (1) LLJ 358)." In D.K.Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. (1993 (3) S.C.C.259) K.Ramaswamy, J.
has observed:

"It is settled law that certified standing orders have statutory force which do not expressly exclude the
application of the principles of natural justice." It is evident from a perusal of the above decisions that
while the first decision referred to the certified Standing Orders as constituting " the statutory terms of
employment". they were described as "conditions of service in a statutory form" and as "binding on the
parties at least as much, if not more, as private contracts embodying similar terms and conditions of
service" in the second decision. The third decision, reiterated the holding in the first decision. So far as
the two last-mentioned decisions are concerned, it is obvious, they only purport to set out the purport of
the earlier decisions. Vaidialingam,J. used the very expression "part of the statutory terms and conditions
of service", while K.Ramaswamy,J. stated more emphatically that "certified standing orders have statutory
force". It must, however, be said that in the decision rendered by Ramaswamy,J., the question as to the
nature and character of the certified Standing Orders did not arise for consideration; the said observation
was made in another context. The concensus of these decisions is: the certified Standing Orders constitute
statutory terms and conditions of service. Though we have some reservations as to the basis of the above
dicta as pointed out supra, we respectfully accept it both on the ground of stare decisis as well as judicial
discipline. Even so, we are unable to say that they constitue "statutory provisions" within the meaning of
the dicta in Sukhdev Singh where it was held: "(T)he employees of these statutory bodies have a statutory
status and they are entitled to declaration of being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in
contravention of statutory provisions". Indeed, if it is held that certified Standing Orders constitute
statutory provisions or have statutory force, a writ petition would also lie for their enforcement just as in
the case of violation of the Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Neither a suit
would be necessary nor a reference under Industrial Disputes Act. We do not think the certified Standing
Orders can be elevated to that status. It is one thing to say that they are statutorily imposed conditions of
service and an altogether different thing to say that they constitute statutory provisions themselves.

So far as the meaning and ambit of Section 13-A of the Standing Orders Act is concerned, a good amount
of debate took place before us. Certain decisions of the High Courts have also been brought to our notice.
The Section provides that "if any question arises as to the application or interpretation of a Standing Order
certified under this Act," any employer or workman or their union may refer the question to " the Labour
Court constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and specified for the disposal of such
proceedings by the appropriate Government by notification in the official gazette". The determination of
the Labour Court is made final and binding on the parties.

The contention of Sri Altaf Ahmed, learned Additional Solicitor General is that any and every violation of
Standing Order entitles the workman to appoach the Labour Court directly under this provision and obtain
relief. He submits that the Labour Court is empowered under this provision to adjudicate disputes
between workmen and employer arising from the certified Standing Orders and grant such relief as is
appropriate in the circumstances of the case. We are afraid, we cannot give effect to this submission.
Acceptance of the said submission would mean that Section 13-A creates a parallel forum for adjudication
of the very questions which the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal has been empowered to adjudicate
under the Industrial Disputes Act and that too without the requirement of a reference by the Government.
While we agree that language of Section 13-A is not very clear, it cannot certainly be understood as
creating a forum for adjudication of industrial disputes involving the application and/or interpretation of
the Standing Orders. That is the function of the Courts and Tribunals constituted under the Industrial
Disputes Act. The limited purpose of Section 13-A is to provide a forum for determination of any question
arising "as to the application or interpretation" of the certified Standing Orders as such, in case either the
employer or the employee(s) entertain a doubt as to their meaning or their applicability. Probably it was
thought that a decision of the appointed forum on the said question would itself facilitate the resolution
of an industrial dispute, whether existing or apprehended. So far as the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal
or other adjudicatory bodies under the Industrial Disputes Act are concerned, it is agreed on hands - and
we endorse it - that where a dispute is referred to any of them they are undoubtedly competent to go
into and decide questions as to the application or interpretation of the certified Standing Orders insofar
as they are necessary for a proper adjudication of the question or dispute referred.

The scope of "Industrial Dispute".

The expression "Industrial Dispute" is defined in Section 2(k) to mean any dispute or differeence

(i) between employers and employers;

(ii) between employers and workmen; and

(iii) between workmen and workmen, provided such dispute is connected with the employment, non-
employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person. It is well settled by several
decisions of this court that a dispute between the employer and an individual workman does not
constitute an industrial dispute unless the cause of the workman is espoused by a body of workmen [See
Bombay Union of Journalist v. "The Hindu" (1961 (2) L.L.J.436 (SC)]. Of course, where the dispute concerns
the body of the workers as a whole or to a section thereof, it is an industrial dispute. It is precisely for this
reason that Section 2-A was inserted by Amendment Act 35 of 1965. It says, "where any employer
discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any
dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such
discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute
notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute". By virtue of
this provision, the scope of the concept of industrial dispute has been widened, which now embraces not
only Section 2(k) but also Section 2-A. Section 2-A, however, covers only cases of discharge, dismissal,
retrenchment or termination otherwise of services of an individual workman and not other matters, which
means that - to give an example - if a workman is reduced in rank pursuant to a domestic enquiry, the
dispute raised by him does not become an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2-A. (However,
if the union or body of workmen espouses his cause, it does become an industrial dispute.) We have given
only one instance; there may be many disputes which would not fall within Section 2(k) or Section 2-A. It
is obvious that in all such cases, the remedy is only in a Civil Court or by way of arbitration according to
law, if the parties so choose. The machinery provided by the Industrial Disputes Act for resolution of
disputes (in short, Sections 10 or 12) does not apply to such a dispute.

Secondly, where a right or obligation is created by the Industrial Disputes Act, it is agreed by all sides that
disputes relating to such right or obligation can only be adjudicated by the forums created by the Act. This
is Principle No.3 in Premier Automobile.

The core question:

We may now indicate the area of dispute. It is this:

where a dispute between the employer and the employee does not involve the recognition or
enforcement of a right or obligation created by the Industrial Disputes Act and where such dispute also
amounts to an industrial dispute within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act, whether the Civil Court's
jurisdiction to entertain a suit with respect to such dispute is barred? To put it nearer to the facts of these
appeals, the question can be posed thus: Where the dispute between the employer and the workman
involves the recognition, application or enforcement of certified Standing Orders, is the jurisdiction of the
Civil Court to entertain a suit with respect to such dispute is barred? This question involves the perennial
problem concerning the jurisdiction of the Civil Court vis-a-vis Special Tribunals, a subject upon which the
decisions of this Court, let alone other courts, is legion. We do not, however, propose to burden this
judgment with all of them. We shall refer only to those which have dealt with the question in the context
of Industrial Disputes Act. By way of introduction though, we may refer to the summary of principles
enunciated in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. (1968 (3) SCR 662 = AIR 1969 SC 78). They are the following:

"(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Court's jurisdiction
must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil courts would normally do in
a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act
have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental
principles of judicial procedure.

(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the
particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not
decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil court.

Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular
Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the
latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the
determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and
liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated
with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.

(3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals
constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference
from the decision of the Tribunals.

(4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be
challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within
the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit.

(5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional
limits or illegally collected a suit lies.

(6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of
the authority and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is
an express prohibition in the particular Act.

In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevent enquiry.

(7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions
above set down apply." Dhulabhai, it must be remembered, concerned a dispute arising under a sales tax
enactment. Most of the decisions referred to therein concerned taxing enactments. Having regard to the
facts of that case, therefore, it would fall under principle No.2 enunciated therein.

Premier Automobiles was decided by a Bench comprising A.Alagiriswami, P.K. Goswami and N.L.Untwalia,
JJ. The Court found that the dispute concerned therein involved adjudication of rights/obligations created
by the Industrial Disputes Act which means that it fell under Principle No.2 in Dhulabhai. Even so, the
Court considered several decisions, English and Indian, on the subject and enunciated the following
principles in Paras 23 and 24:

"23. To sum up, the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to an industrial
dispute may be stated thus:

(1) if the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under
the Act the remedy lies only in the civil court.
(2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law
and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suiter
concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy.

(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act,
then the only remedy available to the suitor is to act an adjudication under the Act.

(4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter V-A then
the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case
may be.

24. We may, however, in relation to principle No.2 stated above hasten to add that there will hardly be a
dispute which will be an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and yet will be
one arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law only and not under the Act. Such a
contingency, for example, may arise in regard to the dismissal of an unsponsored workman which in view
of the provision of law contained in Section 2A of the Act will be an industrial dispute even though it may
otherwise be an individual dispute. Civil Courts, therefore, will have hardly an occasion to deal with the
type of cases falling under principle No. 2. Cases of industrial disputes by and large, almost invariabley,
are bound to be covered by principle No.3 stated above." It is the Principle No.2, and particularly the
qualifying statements in Para 24, that has given rise to good amount of controversy. According to Principle
No. 2, if the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common
law and not under the Industrial Disputes Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative and it is left
to the person concerned either to approach the Civil Court or to have recourse to the machinery provided
by Industrial Disputes Act. But Principle No.2 does not stand alone; it is qualified by Para

24. Now what does Para 24 say? It says

(i) in view of the definition of "industrial dispute" in the Industrial Disputes Act, there will hardly be an
industrial dispute arising exclusively out of a right or liability under the general or common law. Most of
the industrial disputes will be disputes arising out of a right or liability under the Act.

(ii) Dismissal of an unsponsored workman is an individual dispute and not an industrial dispute (unless of
course, it is espoused by the Union of Workmen or a body of workmen) but Section 2-A has made it an
industrial dispute.

Because of this "civil courts will have hardly an occasion to deal with the type of cases falling under
principle No.2". By and large, industrial disputes are bound to be covered by Principle No.3. (Principle
No.3 says that where the dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or obligation created by the Act,
the only remedy available is to get an adjudication under the Act.) Before we proceed to consider the
effect and impact of Para 24 on Principle No.2 in Para 23, it would be appropriate to refer briefly to the
decisions referred to in Para 26 of the said judgment. The Court approved the following decisions:

(i) Krishnan v. East India Distilleries and Sugar Factories Ltd., Nellikuppam (1964 (1) L.L.J.217 : A.I.R.1964
Mad.81), a decision rendered by a Single Judge of the Madras High Court. It was held therein that "the
jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted impliedly to try a case which could form subject-matter of an
industrial dispute collectively between the workmen and their employer."
(ii) Madura Mills Company Ltd. v. Guruvammal (1967 (2) L.L.J.397 : (1967) 2 Mad. L.J.287), decided by
Alagiriswami, J., (at that time a Judge of the Madras High Court). It was a case concerning the enforcement
of a right created by Industrial Disputes Act.

(iii) The decision of a learned Single Judge of Mysore High Court in Nippani Electricity Company (Private)
Ltd. (by its director V.R. Patravali) v. Bhimarao Laxman Patil (1969 (1) L.L.J.268: 1968 Lab IC 1571), a
decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Pigment Lakes and Chemical Manufacturing
Co. Private Ltd. v. Sitaram Kashiram Konde [71 Bom LR 452: 1970 Lab IC 115 (Bom)] and the decision of a
learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in N.A.Madhavan v. State of Kerala (1970 (1) L.L.J. 272)
where it was held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with matters mentioned in Chapter V-A is
impliedly barred.

(iv) The decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in M/s. Austin Distributors Pvt. Ltd. v. Nil
Kumar Das [1970 Lab IC 323 (Cal.)], which arose from a suit for recovery of damages for wrongful dismissal.
There was no prayer for reinstatement. The High Court held that Civil Court's jurisdiction is not barred,
inasmuch as the only ground upon which the dismissal was impugned was in violation of the contract of
service governed by general law. A decision of the Mysore High Court in Syndicate Bank v. Vincent Robert
Lobo [(1971) 2 L.L.J.46: 1971 Lab IC 1055 (Mys.)] to the same effect.

The Court disapproved the decision of a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Bidyut Kumar
Chatterjee v. Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta [(1970) 2 L.L.J.148: 1971 Lab IC 708 (Cal.)] to the
extent it went against the principles enunciated in Premier Automobiles.

Now, coming back to Principle No.2 and its qualification in Para 24, we must say that Para 24 must be read
harmoniously with the said principle and not in derogation of it - not so as to nullify it altogether.

Indeed, Principle No.2 is a reiteration of the principle affirmed in several decisions on the subject including
Dhulabhai. Principle No.2 is clear whereas Para 24 is more in the nature of a statement of fact. It says that
most of the industrial disputes will be disputes involving the rights and obligations created by the Act. It,
therefore, says that there will hardly be any industrial dispute which will fall under Principle No.2 and that
almost all of them will fall under Principle No.3. This statement cannot be understood as saying that no
industrial dispute can ever be entertained by or adjudicated upon by the Civil Courts. Such an
understanding would not only make the statement of law in Principle No.2 wholly meaningless but would
also run counter to the well-established principles on the subject. It must accordingly be held that the
effect of Principle No.2 is in no manner whittled down by Para 24. At the same time, we must emphasise
the policy of law underlying the Industrial Disputes Act and the host of enactments concerning the
workmen made by Parliament and State legislatures. The whole idea has been to provide a speedy,
inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes arising between workmen and their employers.
The idea has been to ensure that the workmen do not get caught in the labyrinth of Civil Courts with their
layers upon layers of appeals and revisions and the elaborate procedural laws, which the workmen can ill
afford. The procedures followed by Civil Courts, it was thought, would not facilitate a prompt and effective
disposal of these disputes. As against this, the Courts and Tribunals created by the Industrial Disputes Act
are not shackled by these procedural laws nor is their award subject to any appeals or revisions. Because
of their informality, the workmen and their representatives can themselves prosecute or defenn their
cases. These forums are empowered to grant such relief as they think just and appropriate.
They can even substitute the punishment in many cases. They can make and re-make the contracts,
settlements, wage structures and what not. Their awards are no doubt amenable to jurisdiction of the
High Court under Article 226 as also to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, but they are extra-
ordinary remedies subject to several self-imposed constraints. It is, therefore, always in the interest of the
workmen that disputes concerning them are adjudicated in the forums created by the Act and not in a
Civil Court. That is the entire policy underlying the vast array of enactments concerning workmen. This
legislative policy and intendment should necessarily weigh with the Courts in interpreting these
enactments and the disputes arising under them.

Now let us examine the facts of the appeals before us in the light of the principles adumbrated Premier
Automobiles. The first thing to be noticed is the basis upon which the plaintiffs-respondents have claimed
the several reliefs in the suit. The basis is the violation of the certified Standing Orders in force in the
appellant- establishment. The basis is not the violation of any terms of contract of service entered into
between the parties governed by the Law of Contract. At the same time, it must be said, no right or
obligation created by the Industrial Disputes Act is sought to be enforced in the suit. Yet another
circumstance is that the Standing Orders Act does not itself provide any forum for the enforcement of
rights and liabilities created by the Standing Orders. The question that arises is whether such a suit falls
under Principle No.3 of Premier Automobiles or under Principle No.2? We are of the opinion that it falls
under Principle No.3. The words "under the Act" in Principle No.3 must, in our considered opinion, be
understood as referring not only to Industrial Disputes Act but also to all sister enactments - [like Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act] which do not provide a special forum of their own for enforcement
of the rights and liabilities created by them. Thus a dispute involving the enforcement of the rights and
liabilities created by the certified Standing Orders has necessarily got to be adjudicated only in the forums
created by the Industrial Disputes Act provided, of course, that such a dispute amounts to an industrial
dispute within the meaning of Sections 2(k) and 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act or such enactment says that
such dispute shall be either treated as an industrial dispute or shall be adjudicated by any of the forums
created by the Industrial Disputes Act. The Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain such suits. In other
words, a dispute arising between the employer and the workman/workmen under, or for the enforcement
of the Industrial Employment Standing Orders is an Industrial Dispute, if it satisfies the requirements of
Section 2(k) and/or Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and must be adjudicated in the forums
created by the Industrial Disputes Act alone. This would be so, even if the dispute raised or relief claimed
is based partly upon certified Standing Orders and partly on general law of contract.

But then it is argued that while a person can go and file a suit straightaway, he cannot resort to the forums
under Industrial Disputes Act directly and that access to these forums is premised upon the appropriate
government referring the dispute to them. The submission is no doubt attractive ex facie but not on
deeper scrutiny. Firstly, the descretion to refer is not arbitrary. It has to be exercised to effectuate the
objects of the enactment. An arbitrary refusal to refer is not un-challengeable. The Courts normally lean
in favour of making a reference rather than the other way. In view of the manner in which the several
governments have been acting over the last several decades there seems no basis for the apprehension
that this power will be exercised arbitrarily. The circumstance suggested cannot, therefore, militate
against the view taken by us herein.

The view taken by us finds support in the decision of this Court in Jitendra Nath Biswas (1989 (3)
S.C.R.640).
That was also a case where the conditions of service of the workmen were governed by the certified
Standing Orders. The Court held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. Indeed
this is also the opinion expressed by the Bench which referred these appeals to a larger Bench. The Bench
observed:

"The case of the respondents is that the said action has been taken in contravention of the Standing
Orders framed by the Corporation under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. The instant
cases are, therefore, governed by the decision in Jitendra Nath Biswas case (supra) and in accordance with
the said decision it must be held that the jurisdiction of the civil courts is excluded. It may be stated that
from the point of view of the workmen also the remedy of adjudication available under the Act would be
more beneficial to them than that of a civil suit inasmuch as the civil court cannot grant the relief of
reinstatement which relief can be granted by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal." We are in respectful
agreement with the said opinion.

Coming to the order dated October 18, 1989 in S.L.P.(C) No.9386 of 1988 made by a Bench of two learned
Judges, the important fact to be noticed is that in that suit, no allegation of violation of the certified
Standing Orders was made. The only basis of the suit was violation of principles of natural justice. It
was,therefore, held that it was governed by Principle No.2 in Premier Automobiles. In this sense, this
order cannot be said to lay down a proposition contrary to the one in Jitendra Nath Biswas. We may also
refer to a decision of this Court rendered by Untwalia,J., on behalf of a Bench comprising himself and A.P.
Sen,J., in S.K. Konde v. Pigment Lakes and Chemical Manufacturing Co. Private Ltd. (1979 (4) SCC 12). That
was a case arising from a suit instituted by the workman for a declaration that termination of his service
is illegal and for reinstatement.

In the alternative, he claimed compensation for wrongful termination. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court
was sustained by this Court on the ground that he has made out a case for awarding compensation though
the Civil Court could not decree reinstatement. Though the report does not indicate the basis put forward
by the workman-plaintiff therein, the Court found on an examination of all the facts and circumstances of
the case that "it is not quite correct to say that the suit filed by the appellant is not maintainable at all in
a civil court." Obviously it was a case where the dispute related to enforcement of rights flowing from
general law of contract and not from certified Standing Orders. This decision cannot also be read as laying
down a different proposition from Premier Automobiles.

The learned counsel for the respondents invited our attention to certain decisions of the High Courts to
indicate how the dicta in Premier Automobiles has been understood. It may not be necessary to refer to
them in view of the preceding discussion.

We may now summarise the principles flowing from the above discussion:

(1) Where the dispute arises from general law of contract, i.e., where reliefs are claimed on the basis of
the general law of contract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said to be not maintainable, even though
such a dispute may also constitute an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) or Section
2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

(2) Where, however, the dispute involves recognition, observance or enforcement of any of the rights or
obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by
the said Act.
(3) Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance or enforcement of rights and
obligations created by enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 - which can be
called 'sister enactments' to Industrial Disputes Act - and which do not provide a forum for resolution of
such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act
provided they constitute industrial disputes within the meaning of Section 2(k) and Section 2-A of
Industrial Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such dispute shall be either treated as an
industrial dispute or says that it shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the Industrial
Disputes Act. Otherwise, recourse to Civil Court is open.

(4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act are not equally
effective for the reason that access to the forum depends upon a reference being made by the appropriate
government. The power to make a reference conferred upon the government is to be exercised to
effectuate the object of the enactment and hence not unguided. The rule is to make a reference unless,
of course, the dispute raised is a totally frivolous one ex-facie. The power conferred is the power to refer
and not the power to decide, though it may be that the government is entitled to examine whether the
dispute is ex-facie frivolous, not meriting an adjudication.

(5) Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, we commend to the Parliament and the State Legislatures
to make a provision enabling a workman to approach the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal directly - i.e.,
without the requirement of a reference by the government - in case of industrial disputes covered by
Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way in removing the misgivings with
respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act.

(6) The certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial Employment
(Standing Order) Act, 1946 are statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon the
employers and employees, though they do not amount to "statutory provisions". Any violation of these
Standing Orders entitles an employee to appropriate relief either before the forums created by the
Industrial Disputes Act or the Civil Court where recourse to Civil Court is open according to the principles
indicated herein.

(7) The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act and its sister enactments is to provide an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy, inexpensive,
informal and un-encumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and appeals upon appeals and revisions
applicable to civil courts. Indeed, the powers of the Courts and Tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act
are far more extensive in the sense that they can grant such relief as they think appropriate in the
circumstances for putting an end to an industrial dispute.

Applying the above principles, we must hold that the suits filed by the respondents in these appeals were
not maintainable in law. Even so, the question is whether we should set aside the decrees passed in their
favour by the Civil Courts. So far as Civil Appeal No.3100 of 1991 is concerned, this Court had, while
granting leave (in S.L.P.(C) No.194 of 1991) ordered on January 29, 1991 that "insofar as respondent is
concerned, he (appellants' counsel) states that he will abide by the decree.

Application for stay is rejected". Therefore, there is no question of setting aside the decree concerned in
this appeal. However, so far as the other appeals are concerned, the position is slightly different. In Civil
Appeal No.4948 of 1991 and in civil appeals 5386,5387/95 arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.10902 of 1992,
13152 of 1993 and 10263 of 1993, not only there is no such condition but this Court had granted stay as
prayed for by the appellant-Corporation. In two other matters viz., in Civil Appeal No.9314 of 1994 and
civil appeal 5389/95 arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.14169 of 1993 the only order is to issue notice. Having
regard to the facts and circumstances of these matters, we modify the decrees in these matters (except
the decree concerned in Civil Appeal No.3100 of 1991) by reducing the backwages to half. The decrees in
all other respects are left undisturbed. These orders are made in view of the fact that the position of law
was not clear until now and it cannot be said that the respondents had not acted bonafide in instituting
the suits. Appeals disposed of accordingly.

It is directed that the principles enunciated in this judgment shall apply to all pending matters except
where decrees have been passed by the Trial Court and the matters are pending in appeal or second
appeal, as the case may be.

All suits pending in the Trial Court shall be governed by the principles enunciated herein - as also the suits
and proceedings to be instituted hereinafter.

There shall be no order as to costs in these appeals.

Proceedings which have become final shall not be reopened by virtue of this Judgment.