[B.M. No. 1370.

May 9, 2005]

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING

EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter, dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from
[1]

payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid

accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to
the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from
July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December
1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be
assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil
Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones profession
while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years
when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment. [2]

On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment stating inter alia:
[3]

that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a
lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he
continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member
is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors
and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and
10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the
IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an
Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of
no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Courts
directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration
of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of
payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is
voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what
petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his
intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been
terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also
alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing
proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if
approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive
IBP members from payment of the annual dues.
In his reply dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is
[4]

questioning is the IBP Board of Governors Policy of Non-Exemption in the

payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not
they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy
of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from
constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process
clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual
membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he
has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law
practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership
dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law.
Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive
status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in
inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-members
reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption
from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice
of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was
working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must
belong, as distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the
rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. [5]

The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the
entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial support of
every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. [6]

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court,
in order to foster the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program the lawyers. [7]

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court,

under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar - [8]

which power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to

pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed,
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the
noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of
the Philippine Bar, thus:
[9]

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the
Court is attempting to levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax
purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it
follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means
to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the
power to impose such exaction.

The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of law is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted
by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member
resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.
 Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the
IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of
payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains
regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is
engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment
of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could
have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay
abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have
been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of
Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of members under
inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the
meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay
membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal
would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence
infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial
Edillon, in this wise:
[10]

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under
the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject
to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure
is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be
avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a

privilege burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of
[11]

membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such
privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
 WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from payment of IBP
dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by
the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure
to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses EDUARDO and A.C. No. 5039
TERESITA GARCIA,
Complainants, Present:

Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
- versus - Corona,
Carpio Morales, and
Garcia, JJ

Promulgated:
Atty. ROLANDO S. BALA,
Respondent. November 25, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

T he practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet the

high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any conduct that

shows a violation of the norms and values of the legal profession

exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

 The Case and the Facts

On April 8, 1999, Spouses Eduardo and Teresita Garcia filed before

this Court a Letter-Complaint[1] against Atty. Rolando S. Bala. According to
complainants, he failed to render a legal service contracted -- the
preparation of a petition for review that he was to file with the Court of
Appeals (CA) in connection with DARAB Case No. 5532. Moreover, he
supposedly refused to return the P9,200 legal fees they had paid him for
the purpose. Finally, he allegedly hurled invectives at them when they asked
him for a copy of the petition that he claimed to have filed.

This Court required respondent to comment on the Complaint. [2] He

failed to comply; thus, he was presumed to have waived his right to be
heard.[3] In its Resolution, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.[4]

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In her September 23, 2004 Report,[5] Investigating IBP Commissioner

Teresita J. Herbosa found respondent guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
 Despite due notice, he neither submitted a position paper nor
appeared at any of the hearings[6] called by the Commission. Thus, the case
was decided on the basis of complainants evidence.

According to the findings of Commissioner Herbosa, complainants

engaged the services of respondent (sometime in May 1998)[7] to appeal to
the CA the adverse Decision of the Department of Agrarian Relations
Adjudication Board (DARAB).[8] Instead, he erroneously filed a Notice of
Appeal[9] with the DARAB. Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, appeals
from the decisions of the DARAB
should be filed with the CA through a verified petition for
review.[10] Because of respondents error, the prescribed period for filing the
petition lapsed, to the prejudice of his clients.

Commissioner Herbosa gave no credence, however, to the allegation

of complainants that respondent had deceived them by resorting to a
wrong remedy. While opining that he might not have been in bad faith in
filing a notice of appeal instead of a petition for review, the commissioner
in her Report nonetheless held that his failure to use the proper legal
remedy constituted lack of professional competency that warranted an
appropriate sanction.[11]

The Report also concluded that respondent should be sanctioned for

his unjustified refusal and failure to return the money paid by his
clients.[12] Their payment totaled P9,200, broken down as follows: P5,000 to
write the appeal; P700 to mail it; and an additional P3,500 for writing the
pleading on short notice. He, however, failed to return the money despite
his promise -- and his obligation under the circumstances -- to do so.[13]

Finally, Commissioner Herbosa held that respondent should be

sanctioned further for uttering unsavory words against complainants during
one instance when they had called on him to ask for a copy of the
supposed appeal. Hence, she recommended that, aside from a fine
of P5,000 and the return to complainants of the amount of P9,200,
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months should be
imposed upon him.

Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

On March 12, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed

Resolution No. XVI-2005-74,[14] which adopted with modification the
Report and Recommendation of the investigating commissioner. It
recommended that respondent should be reprimanded and suspended
from the practice of law for six months; and that he should return, within
thirty days from his receipt of the Decision, the amount of P9,200, with
legal interest from the filing of the present Complaint with this Court.[15]

The Court's Ruling

 We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on

those who show that they possessed and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for it.[16] Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times
a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing.[17] They must perform their fourfold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with
the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[18]
Negligence for
Wrong Remedy

The Code of Professional Responsibility[19] mandates lawyers to serve

their clients with competence and diligence.[20] Rule 18.02 states that a
lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
Specifically, Rule 18.03 provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
 Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity
to the cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in them.[21] A client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense authorized by law, and is expected to rely on the
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.[22]

Evidently, respondent failed to champion the cause of his clients with

wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Despite
adequate time, he did not familiarize himself with the correct procedural
remedy as regards their case. Worse, he repeatedly assured them that the
supposed petition had already been filed.[23]

Since he effectively waived his right to be heard, the Court can only
assume that there was no valid reason for his failure to file a petition for
review, and that he was therefore negligent.

Conduct Unbecoming

Having become aware of the wrong remedy he had erroneously

taken, respondent purposely evaded complainants, refused to update them
on the appeal, and misled them as to his whereabouts. [24] Moreover, on
June 17, 1998, he uttered invectives at them when they visited him for an
update on the case.[25]
 Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a
lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
Accordingly, complainants had the right to be updated on the
developments and status of the case for which they had engaged the
services of respondent.[26] But he apparently denied them that right.

Furthermore, for using unsavory words against complainants, he

should also be sanctioned. Lawyers may be disciplined -- whether in their
professional or in their private capacity -- for any conduct that is wanting in
morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.[27] Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession at all times.

In addition, the Court notes the nonparticipation of respondent even

in the present proceedings. He ignored the directive for him to file his
comment,[28] just as he had disregarded the IBP hearing commissioners
orders[29] for the conduct of hearings, submission of documentary evidence
and position paper. Never did he acknowledge or offer any excuse for his
noncompliance.
Clearly, his conduct manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities.
Despite the fact that his profession and honor are at stake, he did not even
bother to speak a word in his defense. Apparently, he has no wish to
preserve the dignity and honor expected of lawyers and the legal
profession. His demeanor is clearly demeaning.

The Need to Reimburse

the Money Paid

Under the present factual circumstances, respondent should return the

money paid by complainants. First, his legal services were virtually nullified
by his recourse to the wrong remedy. Complainants would not have lost
their right to appeal had he acted competently.

Second, the legal fees were not commensurate to the services rendered.
Complainants engaged his legal services to appeal the DARAB Decision,
but all he did was to file a Notice of Appeal.[30]
Additionally, he had already promised them a refund of the money
paid, yet he failed to do so.

The Court may ascertain how much attorneys fees are reasonable
under the circumstances.[31] In the present case, the request of complainants
for a full refund of the attorneys fees they had paid effectively challenged
the contract; it was as though the parties had no express stipulation as to
those fees. [32] Quantum meruit therefore applies.

Quantum meruit -- meaning as much as he deserves -- is used as basis for

determining a lawyers professional fees in the absence of a
contract.[33]Lawyers must be able to show that they are entitled to reasonable
compensation for their efforts in pursuing their clients case, taking into
account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.[34] Based on the
circumstances of the present case, the legal services actually rendered by
respondent were too insignificant for remuneration because of the
uselessness of the remedy he took.

This Court has imposed the penalty of suspension for six months for
a lawyers negligence in failing to perfect an appeal.[35] Considering the
similarity of the circumstances with those prevailing in this case, we find
the imposition of the same penalty reasonable.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rolando S. Bala is found guilty of negligence

and conduct unbecoming a lawyer; he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six months, effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Furthermore, he is ORDERED to pay Spouses Eduardo and Teresita
Garcia the amount of P9,200 -- with legal interest from April 8, 1999 --
within 30 days from his receipt of this Decision. He is
further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offenses will be
dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as

attorney. Further, let other copies be served on the IBP and on the Office
of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ,
ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C.
Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for
disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction
and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who
flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%,
respectively — invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one
examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before
the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed,
according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe
that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations — to
raise the grades — prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or
request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned
reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now
when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due
process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their
grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford
sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately
decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International
Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate
with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and
authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the
bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who
flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%,
72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a
grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was
considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on
the matter, with which request they complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same
was done and his reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or
re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed
only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court
required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within
ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing
average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him
"to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by
the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while
respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27,
1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his
answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his
unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by
the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-
110,) rec.).

In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-
evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and
Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo,
Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a
number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline
for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was
likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded
as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public
International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code
No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg.
Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a
notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This
notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify
in the investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of
the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y
Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University,
was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court
of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted
with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent
Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical
injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this
fact which he is required under the rules to do.

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October
2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents
Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.

Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia,
where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only
his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their
direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became
the basis for their cross-examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the
investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under
which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the
examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the
practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of
the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an
extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring
back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the
owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing mark;
 4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation
and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based
on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3
and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to
5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972
affidavit with following additional statements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no
longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation
and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;

4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did
not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable
Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on
the following circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971,

relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the
point that with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of
bar candidates I have always followed him and considered his
instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable
Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative
but to take his words;

b) That considering this relationship and considering his

misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the
consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee.
Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the
Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for
fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such

recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in
Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original correction
of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and
Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:

On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the
last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400)
which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at
about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two
companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code
number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me
to review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the examinee
obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee
had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall
correctly, in remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as
I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so
because the same was still within my control and authority as long as the particular
examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number decode and the
examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the
examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or
revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly low
grade to said examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as
it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I
re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with
the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with
the result that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing
with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me
that the code number of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his
name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade
card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized
grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my
personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy
thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo
P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement
and in additional alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international

law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to
know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his
name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met
him even up to the present;

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such
review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to
make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the
 examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's
assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of
express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the
Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained
as much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be
identified as an examiner. ...;

5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening
at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did
not appear to me that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed,
the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus
looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour
that he used to see me:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when
I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661,
my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the
examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial
law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar
Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know and that there
was nothing irregular in that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with
notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points,
resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as
heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee
consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the
rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it
as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the
names of the candidates.

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no
knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did
not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or
rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.;
emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books
to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
 3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in
Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another
subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying
that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to
75%then he would make the general passing average.

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I
remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the
mark and revised also the mark in the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the
Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in
question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any
personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in
Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me
that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He
requested me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I
had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had done well in
other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him
in Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked
that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving
of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my
attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in
good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would
reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely within my
discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to
address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the
presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item
of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased
the grades in some items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same
grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the
new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few
points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his
sworn statement, adding the following:
 xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade
of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein
respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having
verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the
request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of
such omission, that —

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not
aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the
authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or
suggest that the grade of a particular examination notebook be
revised or reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the
highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the
request was legitimate.

xxx xxx xxx

c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein

respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject
that the said examine failed, herein respondent became convinced
that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously
given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's
honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should also
be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent
downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the examinee,
from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:

xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar
Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other
subjects except Mercantile Law;

That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate
the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No.
1613) showing a grade of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular
Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
 That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade
sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn
statement of April 17, 1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-

evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in
absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made during one of
the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only
one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of
the candidate concerned, which I did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-
evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time
this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and
the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers
on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that
those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the
examiners shortly earlier to the effect that

... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be

given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation
and/or re-checking.

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the
results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees
that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and
have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions
or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of
such motions or requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable
Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be
denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.

It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to

bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his

hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was
inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does
not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers
having brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter
concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a
grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the
disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought the
notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus
enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned
is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such
serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all good
faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing
that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the
matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on the
basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo,
particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the
examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation
was in order,

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:

Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of
February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division) after
lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it
a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any
object and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the
basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I
saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently
belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the
right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building
from San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern
corner of the fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of the
number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of
 the post to which it is attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4-
Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).

With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to

look for a ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, I found a
ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to
"954". This number became doubly impressive to me because the
sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that
is so significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively
to link or connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus even
in assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees from
1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant
up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with
said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-
Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a
Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at
the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as
Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as
Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and
the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).

The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these

incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the
Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the
last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still
confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by
Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties.
From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a
new life for me having been saved from the possibility of being
among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out
of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27,
1947, I got married and since then we begot children the youngest of
whom was born on February 27, 1957.

Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I
resumed my work which at the time was on the checking of the
notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing
the office code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my
mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of
the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language
and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in
all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential
Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they
merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to
the respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the
said Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to
their discretion and judgment.

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of

the two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting
and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:
 (a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but
with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of
this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked
as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to
50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and

(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average

of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the
time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the
data thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and
International Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The
notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified
and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and
International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the
original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh.
10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is
precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of
Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only
one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile
Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the latter, under the
facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the
Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners
concerned;

5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-
check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that
there was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless
very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the
weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is
devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the
first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets
and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the
number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of
respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio

Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required by the latter
respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.

xxx xxx xxx

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider
"failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a
"passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar confidant
 do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official
business?

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a
reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?

5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated
March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio
Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the
respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized
anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.

But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the
Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the
benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of
Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or
especially for him and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar
candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's
grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of
policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's
examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-
evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not
far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in
herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused
actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this
could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the members of
the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves
and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these
inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only
goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this

Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well
as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy
between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is
contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that
they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and
cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the
answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners
to make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected
notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the
custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was
in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that
as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if
he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one
on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change
of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-
examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the
examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said
subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-
examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75%
from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and
with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang.
Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said
booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56,
57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil
Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the
passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street,
Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and
previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review
the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that
"they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent
Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent
Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were
reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in
his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent
Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum
that read as follows:

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal

fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of
memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify of
language and soundness of reasoning.

Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that
respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further believing
that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of
Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law,
from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by
him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136,
instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53,
rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing
grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to
deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in
Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a
notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said
notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public International
Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%,
said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is
possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help
out examinees who are failing in just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the request and
thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-
evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased
to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding
corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with
Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp.
43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the
passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter,
who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he
had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law
— that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a
fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then
the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and
seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the
examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the
revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The
examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65,
66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when
the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to
him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a
matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing
subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this
was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by
him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing
grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision
of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of
his quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the
examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner
concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee
adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63;
Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by
respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This
information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely
seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular
paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's
notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then
reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to
71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or
decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular
examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make
the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that
there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he
had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook
of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and
with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned
to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second
week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent
Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No.
661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-
examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine
who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is
84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the
grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an
increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It
belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V,
pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias

ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners
concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that
eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%,
or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971
Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's
examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his
lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee
to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed
only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo
sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No.
1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He
maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation;
that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant
but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left
alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum
was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination
papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not
only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose
declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent
Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No.
1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing
of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the
records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him
by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and
confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers
of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein,
ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied
and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang
failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only
66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee
failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang
was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark
and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The
averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as
follows:
 BAI

1. Political Law Public

International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points

BAI

Labor Laws and Social

Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.

2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points

or 33 weighted points.

Taxation 74% 74% = no re-

evaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.

or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or

22 weighted points.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =

11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and Practical

Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5)
subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was
increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the
integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor
only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty
dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who — Political Law and
Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation
or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him
by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects
taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative
data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to
the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing
average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of
the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the
Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the
examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be
addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such
initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of
the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of
betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite
belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation,
leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from
70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more
properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of
absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For
certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any
dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of
reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave
injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said
more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the
Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said
re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of
good faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto
Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the
case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far
better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of
Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject.
Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter
shown.

The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook,
unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3-
Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to
why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man
desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent
Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he
filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing
that it was just an after-thought.

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO

RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE
ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO
FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT
FROM 57% TO 66%.

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on
Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the
Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and
Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these
two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI,
pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-
evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty
dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of
these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of
the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of
the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing
the date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not
presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the
Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45,
rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential
Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162,
p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in
Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and
record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613
(Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however,
that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing
in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of
Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the
notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as
Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the
figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to
their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee
presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the
Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the
examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was
not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an
examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that
was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging
to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the
Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code
Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-
evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was
taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp.
59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the
Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political
Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of
the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the
Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V,
p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo,
Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back
to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:

Labor Laws 3%

Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political
Law are as follows:

BA

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27

weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner
Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing
grades. These are:

Political Law 70%

Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:

BA

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
 Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in
Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which
violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner
Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee
because even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his
answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-
evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential
Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-
evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations
and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the
corresponding investigation conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.

The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his
answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law,
Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and
principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan —
Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a
bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and
Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a
member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners
in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer
between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the
Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court.
Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the
admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules
of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar
Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in
connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and
must be strictly adhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in
five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any
authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as
Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971
Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not
possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not
clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-
evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the
examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether
the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with
the rules.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the
character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for
admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending
in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was
required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character
(Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully
ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing
the Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the
case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the
Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not
only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all
other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used
by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the
disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to
show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all
his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and
determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it,
the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be
gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its
dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for
admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and
third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already
required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no
pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the
fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to
reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the
applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a
Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case
No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from
the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the
City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his
applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing
and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964,
1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he
declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the
Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally
to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that
he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license
to practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in

withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to
whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an
indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).

[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he
applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of
the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law
Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).

The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the
clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the
Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed
truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and his
standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of indictments
against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts
which should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as were
available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the
court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his
having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case
including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by
the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen
years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite
attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member
of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him
to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was,
as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case.
Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar,
WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking
out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which
merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a
disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer
of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit
him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases)
[52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is
not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the
admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others,
of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T.
Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in
their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack
of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar
examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil.
399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro,
the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the
crime of falsification of public documents.

IV

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge),
Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty.
Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
respondents.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction
of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All,
however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks
without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the
same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and
WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-
evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the
Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care
and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar
Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who
would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should
have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the
average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective
and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the
examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on
the Bar examinations could have been avoided.

Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath
that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with
respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political
Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the
grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent
Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said
that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I
cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp.
60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have
passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook
and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I
believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before
to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said
'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over
the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were
wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not
complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the
grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents
Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in
grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by
the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:

Montecillo —

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of

the paper?

A Yeas, your Honor.

Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the
absence of such information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time"

(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5,
Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer
dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
40-41, and 72, rec.).

Pamatian —

3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the
 owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the
grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo,
..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Manalo —

(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent
carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the
benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that
particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced
that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but
he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing
grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Pardo —

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that
particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the representation
of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the
herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the
re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded
integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the
said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which
were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE
find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-
examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the
highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are required
to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative
thereto.

V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that
respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or
support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into
helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said
examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations
(p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice
Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's
insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in
his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the
investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against
Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia
"until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as
a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does
not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the
grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for
the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian
advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian
mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian)
before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was
divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an
indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his
actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to
undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent
Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable
consideration.

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official
release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary
as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes,
Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount
of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on
April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes,
Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No.
90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972:
Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5,
1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent
Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to
him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings
while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a
loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars
($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from
his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in
the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under
Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00
bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00
was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in
his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein involved did not
push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965
to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married
sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000
(P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on
January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his
sister at the time he received the $200 was not even presented by respondent during
the investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he
considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode
or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address
of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records.
Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is
among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the
conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-
gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.

On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes
house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14,
1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of inscription). On February 28,
1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed
by respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143.
Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry
No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled
on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor
of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to
respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a
month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation
and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his
assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the
same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities).
 2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956
VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January,
1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car
was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to
1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his
1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972)
Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was
P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link or
tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by respondent
Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the
money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came
from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of
the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential
Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the
matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on
October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was
required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is
indicative of a consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January
15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially
claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house
and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in
relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:

(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act

constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing
himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once
it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets
and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as
they are part of the records of this Court.

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E.
Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar
Confidant.

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of
the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies
at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958,
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the
Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of
Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans
Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time,
therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans
Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the
date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).

It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the
availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his
pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already
19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of
Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that
he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears,
however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the
MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita
Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-
56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St.,
Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine
Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location
of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational
benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings
(Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of
Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V,
pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building
and is obliquely across the City Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he

investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability
benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans
investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that
he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49,
rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at
Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later
he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the
Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During
the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no
communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not
remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the
Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII,
p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was
bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent
Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces,
otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof
on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served
into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta.
Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up
operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar
Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from
the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the
bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS

HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG,
alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED
STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,

vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was
admitted to the Bar.

About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter
was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and
later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys,
because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not
completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the
Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and

(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom
— which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for
examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal
education".

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but
he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S.
Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to
a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his
army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any
certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary
to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from
Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate
(1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano
University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of
Quisumbing College, in his school records.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1äwphï1.ñët

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his
own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it
would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies
(2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he
would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant
for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had
successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the
Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").

Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his
false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the
Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked.
The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the
regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao.
And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. 2385 March 8, 1989

JOSE TOLOSA, complainant,

vs.
ALFREDO CARGO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit- Complaint dated 7 March
1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality.
Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in
his house and elsewhere. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981, his wife left his conjugal
home and went to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro
Manila and that since then has been living with respondent at that address.

Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May
1982 denying the allegations of complainant. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had
been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in view
of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her),
much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his
wife and mother as to what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the
beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former."
(Rollo, p. 8).

Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made
a number of further allegations, to wit:

(a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that respondent
had taken;

(b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of
complainant's wife last May 1981, and visited her at the hospital
everyday;

(c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing
respondent but that she had refused to do so;

(d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances
where she was living although she had no means of livelihood; and

(e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent.
Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982, denying the further allegations of complainant, and
stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35.00 by way of
financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital.

By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982, the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. The Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings
which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986, at which hearings complainant and respondent
presented evidence both testimonial and documentary.

The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms:

1. That respondent had been courting his wife, Priscilla (tsn, May 12,
1982, p. 9).

2. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in Cubao

and Sto. Domingo, Quezon City (tsn, pp. 13-15, May 12, 1983).

3. That sometime in June, 1982, his wife left their conjugal house at
No. 1 Lopez Jaena Street, Galas, Quezon City, to live with
respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro
Manila (tsn, pp. 16- 17, May 12, 1983).

4. That while Priscilla was staying there, she acquired household

appliances which she could not afford to buy as she has no source of
income (tsn, pp. 10-11, Sept. 10, 1985, Exh. 'M', N' and 'Q').

5. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May, 1982, at the FEU

Hospital, respondent paid for her expenses and took care of her (tsn,
pp. 18-20, June 15, 1983). In fact, an incident between respondent
and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn, pp. 5-8, Sept. 20,
1983, Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l').

6. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place

involving respondent and complainant at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio
Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 8- 10, July 29, 1983; Exh.
'B', 'B-l' and 'K').

7. That again in Quezon City, incidents involving respondent and

complainant were brought to the attention of the police (Exhibits 'F'
and 'G').

8. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality

against respondent with the CLAO and that respondent was
suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). (Rollo, pp. 33-35).

Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner:

a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her

difficult relationship with complainant; that Priscilla left complainant
because she suffered maltreatment, physical injuries and public
humiliation inflicted or caused by complainant;
 b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla, nor lived with her at No.
45 Sisa St., Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner of the
house where Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend and former client
whom respondent visited now and then;

c) That respondent only gave P35.00 to Priscilla in the FEU Hospital,

as assistance in her medical expenses; that he reprimanded
complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla in the hospital which led
to their being investigated by the security guards of the hospital;

d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with her
in Cubao or Sto. Domingo Church in 1980;

e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45 Sisa

Street, Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila from her earnings;

f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab him
at No. 1 Galas St., Quezon City; that said incident was between
Priscilla's brother and complainant;

g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St., Tenejeros,

Malabon, Metro Manila and/or he had a quarrel with complainant at
45 Sisa St., Malabon; that the quarrel was between Priscilla's brother,
Edgardo Miclat, and complainant; that respondent went there only to
intervene upon request of complainant's wife (see tsn, June 21,
1984). (Rollo, pp. 35-37).

The Solicitor General then submitted the following

FINDINGS

1. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No.1 Lopez

Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City.

2. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage, and

they (complainant and Priscilla) considered respondent also their
'ninong'.

3. That respondent and complainant are neighbors, their residences

being one house away from each other.

4. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for advice,
because of her differences with complainant.

5. That Priscilla, in fact, left their conjugal house and lived at No. 45
Sisa St., Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner of
the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and former
client of respondent.

6. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying in

Malabon.
 7. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had indeed
happened.

8. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at No. 1

Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City; but complainant was staying
two or three houses away in his mother's house.

9. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality

against respondent in CLAO, where respondent was found guilty and
suspended for one year. (Rollo, pp. 37-39).

In effect, the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been
sustained by sufficient evidence. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General found that the
respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following:

1. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite of

complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy that he was having an affair
with his wife.

2. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner

is admittedly a friend and former client of respondent.

3. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend, in

spite of his differences with complainant.

4. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents

involving complainant and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. 'B', B-1', 'F', 'G',
['G-1'] and ['I'])

5. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she

was confined in the FEU Hospital, in spite again of his differences
with complainant. (Rollo, pp. 39-40).

Thus, the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by
avoiding any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant, thereby
causing possible trouble in the complainant's family," which behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer
and an officer of the court." (Rollo, p. 40). The Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty.
Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months and be severely
reprimanded.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that
respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of
immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law may be properly imposed upon respondent.

At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with
the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of
the court. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also so
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those
moral standards.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming
a member of the Bar and an officer of the court, and to WARN him that continuation of the same or
similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 3149 August 17, 1994

CERINA B. LIKONG, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. ALEXANDER H. LIM, respondent.

Florentino G. Temporal for complainant.

Trabajo Lim Law Office for respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty. Alexander H. Lim, seeking the latter's
disbarment for alleged malpractice and grave misconduct.

The circumstances which led to the filing of this complaint are as follows:

Sometime in September 1984, complainant obtained a loan of P92,100.00 from a certain Geesnell L.
Yap. Complainant executed a promissory note in favor of Yap and a deed of assignment, assigning
to Yap pension checks which she regularly receives from the United States government as a widow
of a US pensioner. The aforementioned deed of assignment states that the same shall be
irrevocable until the loan is fully paid. Complainant likewise executed a special power of attorney
authorizing Yap to get, demand, collect and receive her pension checks from the post office at
Tagbilaran City. The above documents were apparently prepared and notarized by respondent
Alexander H. Lim, Yap's counsel.

On 11 December 1984, about three (3) months after the execution of the aforementioned special
power of attorney, complainant informed the Tagbilaran City post office that she was revoking the
special power of attorney. As a consequence, Geesnell Yap filed a complaint for injunction with
damages against complainant. Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while
Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico B. Aumentado appeared for complainant (as defendant).

A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on

23 January 1985, preventing complainant from getting her pension checks from the Tagbilaran City
post office. Yap later filed an urgent omnibus motion to cite complainant in contempt of court for
attempting to circumvent the preliminary injunction by changing her address to Mandaue City. Upon
motion by Yap, the court also issued an order dated 21 May 1985 expanding the scope of the
preliminary injunction to prevent all post offices in the Philippines from releasing pension checks to
complainant.
On 26 July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion to allow the latter to withdraw the pension
checks. This motion does not bear the signatures of complainant's counsel of record but only the
signatures of both parties, "assisted by" respondent Attorney Alexander H. Lim.

On 2 August 1985, complainant and Yap entered into a compromise agreement again without the
participation of the former's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was stated that complainant
Cerina B. Likong admitted an obligation to Yap of P150,000.00. It was likewise stated therein that
complainant and Yap agreed that the amount would be paid in monthly installments over a period of
54 months at an interest of 40% per annum discounted every six (6) months. The compromise
agreement was approved by the trial court on 15 August 1985.

On 24 November 1987, Cerina B. Likong filed the present complaint for disbarment, based on the
following allegations:

7. In all these motions, complainant was prevented from seeking assistance, advise
and signature of any of her two (2) lawyers; no copy thereof was furnished to either
of them or at least to complainant herself despite the latter's pleas to be furnished
copies of the same;

8. Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was not necessary for her to
consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the
settlement; (b) she would only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a
new lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry
about the documents foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to
court afterwards to save her time; and in any event respondent already took care of
everything;

9. Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud,
deception and some other form of mendacity practiced on her by respondent;

10. Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority assumed to represent

complainant and connived in her defeat; . . . 1

Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel for complainant,

Atty. Roland B. Inting had abandoned his client. Atty. Lim further stated that the other counsel, Atty.
Enrico Aumentado, did not actively participate in the case and it was upon the request of
complainant and another debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he (respondent) made the compromise
agreement.

Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify her lawyers but was informed that
her lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.

Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandoned by her lawyers. Complainant stated
that respondent never furnished her lawyers with copies of the compromise agreement and a motion
to withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited by Yap.

At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise agreement are indeed grossly
loaded in favor of Geesnell L. Yap, respondent's client.

Complainant's original obligation was to pay P92,100.00 within one (1) year from 4 October 1984.
There is no provision in the promissory note signed by her with respect to any interest to be paid.
The only additional amount which Yap could collect based on the promissory note was 25% of the
principal as attorney's fees in case a lawyer was hired by him to collect the loan.

In the compromise agreement prepared by respondent, dated 2 August 1985, complainant's debt to
Yap was increased to P150,000.00 (from 92,100.00) after the lapse of only ten (10) months. This
translates to an interest in excess of seventy-five percent (75%) per annum. In addition, the
compromise agreement provides that the P150,000.00 debt would be payable in fifty-four (54)
monthly installments at an interest of forty percent (40%) per annum. No great amount of
mathematical prowess is required to see that the terms of the compromise agreement are grossly
prejudicial to complainant.

With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant's counsel of the compromise agreement, it
is of record that complainant was represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys. Inting and Aumentado.
Complainant states that respondent prevented her from informing her lawyers by giving her the
reasons enumerated in the complaint and earlier quoted in this decision.

There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform opposing counsel of the compromise
agreement. Neither is there any showing that respondent informed the trial court of the alleged
abandonment of the complainant by her counsel.

Instead, even assuming that complainant was really abandoned by her counsel, respondent saw an
opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was the execution of the compromise
agreement which, as previously discussed, is grossly and patently disadvantageous and prejudicial
to complainant.

Undoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession.

Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:

9. Negotiations with opposite party.

A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of

controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should
he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but
should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer
most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party
not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise
him as to the law.

The Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 8.02 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful
or neglectful counsel.

Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The violation of the aforementioned rules of professional conduct by respondent Atty. Alexander H.
Lim, warrants the imposition upon him of the proper sanction from this Court. Such acts constituting
malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left unpunished for not only do they erode confidence
and trust in the legal profession, they likewise prevent justice from being attained.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby imposed the penalty of

SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective immediately upon his
receipt of this decision.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal record as attorney and member of
the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.