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Tax-Exempt
Bond Financing:
How Does the
Puzzle Work?
Vicky Tsilas and Edith Brashares*
This article discusses tax-exempt bond financings of infrastructure projects and the
value and challenges associated with using public-private partnerships. The article ex-
plores the types of projects that have been financed to date as well as the administra-
tion’s proposals to encourage public-private partnerships.
INTRODUCTION
R
eports of our nation’s aging infrastructure and our need to pro-
vide additional investment to support its modernization have
revived discussions in Washington about what the best source
of financing is and which parties are most suitably equipped to pay for
it. The talk about infrastructure is not just limited to Washington; even
comedian John Oliver did a segment on financing infrastructure on his
HBO show (John Oliver, 2014). The federal government’s contribu-
tion to infrastructure investment comes in the form of grant and loan
programs as well as federal subsidies provided through the tax system.
Increasingly, the debate has focused on the role of the private sector and
whether federal government initiatives should encourage more private
sector funding.
This paper describes infrastructure spending by state and local govern-
ments and the traditional methods for funding these assets. Investment in
*Vicky Tsilas is a partner at Ballard Spahr LLP in Washington, DC. Edith Brashares is
director of the Business and International Taxation Division at the Office of Tax Analysis, U.S.
Treasury, Washington, DC. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect those of their employers. Vicky Tsilas can be reached by email at
tsilas@ballardspahr.com.
51
52 MUNICIPAL FINANCE JOURNAL
our bridges, highways, utility systems, and water and sewage facilities has
come from both the public and the private sectors. Given the importance
of transportation investment, we first discuss the experience with high-
way projects. Highway projects have been one of the main areas where
the public-private partnership (P3) structure has been used. We describe,
first, the traditional approach for building highways and the use of gov-
ernmental tax-exempt bonds for financing. We then use the Transporta-
tion Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program as a way
to examine increased private sector participation. We also examine P3s
and how private activity tax-exempt bonds are used by P3s for highway
construction. Finally, we discuss the arguments and experience with P3s
and describe some initiatives and proposals to expand P3 structures for
infrastructure.
of the capital spending for highways.1 Because many projects can take a
number of years to build and are longer-lived assets, bond financing is
frequently used to enable closer matching of payment for the asset with
its use (Kile, 2014). In general terms, borrowing enables the project to be
1
In 2014, revenues from excise taxes, primarily fuel taxes, credited to the Highway
Trust Fund were approximately $38 billion, and federal spending was closer to $45 billion.
The difference was that some general funds have been shifted to the Highway Trust Fund.
See http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/45416-TransportationScoring.pdf.
54 MUNICIPAL FINANCE JOURNAL
done sooner than if the funds must be saved before work can begin. How-
ever, there may be state limits on the amount of tax-exempt borrowing
for a particular project, and this can result in projects being delayed when
relying on tax-exempt financing.
This public spending is seen as raising overall economic output and is
done by governments for reasons related to economic efficiency. For exam-
ple, it may be difficult or economically inefficient to charge consumers for
use of infrastructure because infrastructure may have some public-good
characteristics. In this case, the services provided by the infrastructure
may be provided to an additional consumer at little or no extra cost. In
addition, some infrastructure services may be provided in the long run at
lowest cost by one provider, a “natural monopoly.” For example, instead
of having multiple sets of pipes, water is supplied by one facility in a given
area. Finally, the benefits of investing in infrastructure may extend beyond
where the specific infrastructure is built, so that private-sector provision
would be too low (CBO, 2015).
Tightly wrapped up with public spending on infrastructure is how these
assets are managed. The choice of public or private management can affect
financing choices. With regard to highway projects, we describe, first, the “tra-
ditional” approach for managing and financing these ventures because this is
still the primary way highways are maintained and built in the United States.
2
In general, the government contracts with private companies to perform the work, with
government employees, or their proxies, administering the contract.
P3 PROJECTS AND TAX-EXEMPT BOND FINANCING 55
Under the traditional approach, the public agency retains a high degree
of control over the project during its useful life, but governments tend to
bear all of the risks, too. If the design must be modified while it is being
built, the government bears the cost for changing the design as well as for
project delays that may result because often these contracts are not a fixed
price, but pass on cost overruns. Similarly, the design and the quality of the
structure can lower maintenance costs, but it is difficult for the contract to
ensure that these maintenance costs are accounted for in the design stages
because they are not paid by the private contractors. Finally, by financing
the project, government and the state and local taxpayers bear the risk that
tolls or related tax revenues will be inadequate to pay for the project.
3
According to the Joint Committee on Taxation (2015), the exclusion of interest on
general purpose state and local government debt has consistently been one of the biggest
corporate tax expenditures since 1975.
4
Generally, tax-exempt bonds are viewed as a costly mechanism for delivering a federal
subsidy to the issuer of the bonds, because the revenue foregone by the federal government
in connection with the exemption is greater than the subsidy received by the issuer.
56 MUNICIPAL FINANCE JOURNAL
5
Treas. Reg. 1.141-3(b).
6
Rev. Proc. 97-13, 1997-1 C.B. 632 as supplemented and modified by Notice 2014-67.
P3 PROJECTS AND TAX-EXEMPT BOND FINANCING 57
and managing them take up these tasks. Local governments, for example,
may plow the snow and repave roads because these activities occur con-
tinually. The key to engaging the private sector is that governments must
be able to write contracts that account for contingencies for road design,
build, and maintenance issues. Ideally, governments could use incentive
payments, penalties, and milestones in contracts to align the private con-
tractors’ and the government’s incentives. Some argue that these results
are more easily achieved with P3s.
7
See DOT: http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/safetealu/factsheets/tifia.htm.
58 MUNICIPAL FINANCE JOURNAL
Private Activity
Tax-exempt
Value of
Maintain
Project
Operate
Contract ($
Finance
Design
TIFIA
Bonds
Bonds
Build
billions Date
2013) Opening
Given that governments are also concerned with operation and mainte-
nance, it is natural to consider including these activities as well into one
contract. Doing this, however, can raise issues with financing with respect
to governmental tax-exempt bond rules.
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
The term “Public-Private Partnership” (P3) is broadly used to refer to
an arrangement between a private entity and a public agency—typically a
state government—for a project in which the private entity assumes some
level of risk beyond that typically associated with providing its services
to the public entity. The Department of Transportation defines “public-pri-
vate partnerships as contractual agreements between a public agency and a
private entity that allow for greater private participation in the delivery of
[a] transportation project.”8 There are a number of ways to structure a P3,
as suggested in Table 2. A private party may agree to a model that involves:
design-build, operate and maintain, design-build-operate-maintain, and
design-build-finance-operate-maintain. In each of these models, the level
of investment, control, and risk the private party assumes over the project
can vary. In addition to providing needed funds, private financing may
encourage more efficient management of costs and risks because this gives
private partners incentives to finish projects on time and under budget. As
with the design-build projects, this shift is designed to more closely align
the private contractor’s interests with those of the government.
Although the P3 approach varies as to the extent of private involvement,
in its purest form, the private sector takes over all aspects of operation. For
“greenfield” projects, this can include design, build, operate, and main-
tain as well as finance. The Dulles Greenway in Virginia is an example
in which all stages were run by a private partnership and depended upon
tolls to pay for the private debt financing as well as a return to the private
equity invested. In this case, the private sector designed, built, and oper-
ated the road and could potentially reap any efficiencies from combining
these operations. In addition, the private sector took the financing risks
that tolls collected from users would be adequate to finance the highway,
with the public sector bearing little risk. Similarly, for highways already
built, such as the Indiana Toll Road, under the pure approach, the private
sector acts as a concessionaire operating and maintaining the roadway for
a long period in exchange for collecting the tolls to pay off private debt
and provide a return to private equity. In cases such as the Indiana Toll
Road, the private sector may make an upfront payment to the govern-
8
See DOT: http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/p3/defined/.
60 MUNICIPAL FINANCE JOURNAL
ment for the right to operate the road ($3.8 billion for 75 years),9 which
is similar to selling the public asset, with the private sector bearing all the
risk. These two examples point to the difficulties with having the private
sector bear all the risk. In both cases, the toll revenue projections were too
optimistic and both projects have run into financial difficulties. Although
these may be a modern-day lesson in why the government is involved in
highways, they are also part of the reason for TIFIA.
Using a P3 structure can mean that it will be faster to build the project.
One contract covering multiple phases may take less time to negotiate and
enables intermingling of cost overruns with excess profits across phases.
Moreover, projects may obtain financing faster because they can work
around states’ self-imposed limits on borrowing and tap private funds.
However, the risk that tolls will be inadequate has resulted in a broadening
over time of financing arrangements, with the private sector willing to bear
less of the project risk. In response over time, instead of receiving uncer-
tain tolls, the private sector receives more fixed availability payments.
This has the effect of transferring from the private contractor to the public
the risk that the tolls will not provide adequate financing.10
There has also been a move to use subsidized borrowing to replace pri-
vate borrowing using taxable bonds. In particular, TIFIA and the quali-
fied private activity bonds described below are being used more as time
goes on to finance P3 projects. This move lowers the private partners’
costs at the expense of federal taxpayers and can increase the state and
local government’s share of risk if they are ultimately liable. As a result,
these newer P3 projects have diminished incentives associated with pri-
vate financing to control costs and be completed quickly. To ensure that
the private contractor has “skin in the game” and has aligned interests with
those of the government, most P3s continue to require equity investments
by the private parties.
9
See Schmitt and Chung (2014).
10
This may be a desirable outcome in encouraging more vehicles on toll roads and off
smaller local roads that are not subject to tolls.
P3 PROJECTS AND TAX-EXEMPT BOND FINANCING 61
11
U.S. Code Section 141(b).
12
Section 141(e).
13
Section 142(a).
14
For calendar year 2015, the amount used under U.S. Code Section 146(d)(1) to calcu-
late the state ceiling for the volume cap for private activity bonds is the greater of (1) $100
multiplied by the state population, or (2) $301,515,000. See IRS Rev. Proc. 2014-61. In ad-
dition, states may carry forward unused amounts during the three calendar years following
the calendar year in which carry-forward amounts arose. Section 146(f)(3)(A).
15
Section 142(m)(2)(A).
62 MUNICIPAL FINANCE JOURNAL
the I-635 LBJ Freeway in Texas includes private activity bonds as well as
other funding sources, with the private developer setting and receiving toll
revenues for 52 years as compensation.16
16
See DOT: http://www.dot.gov/policy-initiatives.
P3 PROJECTS AND TAX-EXEMPT BOND FINANCING 63
The Treasury Report notes that P3 investment remains a small part of total
U.S. infrastructure investment and that between 2007 and 2013, the $22.7
billion of public and private funds invested in P3 transportation projects
represented only 2% of overall capital investment in the nation’s highways
during that same period. The Report concludes that although public invest-
ment is a critical part of infrastructure funding, P3s should be embraced
because they “can infuse projects with private capital, management, and
expertise to bolster total infrastructure investment while also exploiting
untapped efficiencies in infrastructure provision” (U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment, 2014, p. 17). Thus, the main advantage of P3s is in providing road-
ways more efficiently. Kile (2014), however, focusing on financing, argues,
after examining a limited number of P3 projects, that while including a
private partner does not result in additional money for roads, in some cases
it does appear to speed up financing so that the highways are built sooner.
All-in capital costs are similar whether financed by the government or a P3.
Critics of P3s point out that there are many inherent limitations with
P3 arrangements. One of the limitations listed for P3s is that not all states
have passed legislation authorizing P3s. In fact, in 2015, about 34 states
and Puerto Rico had passed laws authorizing P3s for highway and bridge
projects.17 Moreover, even in states where P3 legislation has been enacted,
the degree of support for P3s varies depending on what types of P3 arrange-
ments the legislation permits.
There are also a number of financing risks cited for why public entities
should not enter into P3s for financing infrastructure projects. Some oppo-
nents argue that while private financing could allow certain states to cir-
cumvent budgetary or legal constraints regarding how much debt the state
can borrow, it does not expand the resources available to the state to repay
the debt, potentially creating implications for a state’s finances. Another
argument made against P3s is that a long-term arrangement between a
public entity and a private party for assets can ultimately turn out to be a
bad policy decision for the public entity. For example, the SR-91 Express
Lanes in California were eventually purchased back by a California trans-
portation authority because the private operator had a non-compete clause
inhibiting the government from expanding alternative roadways despite
the need. Moreover, critics of P3 models state that the public entity must
ensure that it has a clear understanding of the value of the assets it will
contribute to the partnership. Otherwise, inaccurate modeling of costs
could result in the P3 model incorrectly appearing to be less costly than
anticipated. Finally, negotiating P3 arrangements may result in consider-
able legal and administrative costs and time that may outweigh the cost
17
See Association for the Improvement of American Infrastructure: www.aiai-infra.
com, and also www.fhwa.dot.gov.
64 MUNICIPAL FINANCE JOURNAL
savings that could result from the P3 deals. Indeed, the recent canceling of
the Route 460 P3 project in Virginia highlights one of the hazards, where
public contract negotiations appear to have resulted in payments of up to
$250 million without any roadway being built.
CONCLUSIONS
In some respect, the discussion about P3s is one of degree. Even under
the “traditional” financing approach for highways, governments contract
with the private sector to do much of the construction, if not maintenance.
P3s bundle together more of these activities to encourage internalizing
costs and realizing savings. However, P3s also require modifications of
financing tools as well as sophisticated contracting. Although the jury is
still out on many of the P3 highway projects, given the long life of high-
way assets, the approach is being expanded into other infrastructure areas.
For its part, the Obama administration has launched the Build America
Investment Initiative to encourage P3s. The initiative includes a 2016 budget
proposal for a new category of tax-exempt qualified private activity bonds
called Qualified Public Infrastructure Bonds (QPIBs) that are eligible to
finance specific categories of facilities financed with exempt facility bonds
under current law. A significant aspect of this proposal is that, unlike other
categories of qualified private activity bonds, QPIBs are not subject to the
bond volume cap requirement and the alternative minimum tax (AMT) pref-
erence for interest on qualified private activity bonds. Exclusion from the
volume cap requirement is designed to facilitate use of these bonds for larger
projects, such as sewage and water facilities. This exclusion from the AMT
preference puts the QPIBs on the same footing as governmental bonds.
Facilities eligible for QPIB financing include most categories of infra-
structure eligible for private activity bonds, including highways. However,
there are two core eligibility requirements for QPIBs: a governmental
ownership requirement and a public use requirement.18 Existing categories
of exempt facilities that overlap with QPIBs could be accommodated.19
18
The ownership requirement can be met even if the property is leased to the private
sector, provided that certain conditions are met. The proposal provides a safe harbor for
establishing governmental ownership of financed projects so that property leased by a gov-
ernmental unit is treated as owned by the governmental unit if (1) the lessee makes an irre-
vocable election (binding on the lessee and all successors in interest under the lease) not to
claim depreciation or an investment credit related to such property, (2) the lease term is not
more than 80% of the reasonably expected economic life, and (3) the lessee has no option
to purchase the property other than at fair market value (at the time the option is exercised).
19
Existing categories would be removed on the effective date of the proposal (which ap-
plies to bonds issued starting January 1, 2016), subject to a transitional exception for quali-
fied highway or surface freight transfer facilities. Alternatively, the proposal provides that
Congress consider continuing the existing categories of exempt facilities that overlap with
QPIBs for privately owned projects, subject to the unified annual state bond volume cap.
P3 PROJECTS AND TAX-EXEMPT BOND FINANCING 65
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