International Studies Review (2015) 17, 132–137

Utility vs. Inadequacy of Realist IR Theory: Assessing

China’s Rise
Review by James C. Hsiung
Department of Politics, New York University

Looking for Balance: China, the United States, and Power Balancing in East Asia. By Steve
Chan. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012. 282 pp., $50.00 hardcover (ISBN
978-0-8047-7820-6).

China, the United States, and Global Order. By Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 340 pp., $33.99 paperback (ISBN 978-0-521-
72519-4).

Great Games, Local Rules. By Alexander Cooley. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
252 pp., $29.95 hardcover (ISBN 978-0-19-992982-5).

The three books under review represent a third wave of intellectual dissent fol-
lowing the initial realist prognostication of China’s rise as a potent “threat” to
the world order under US hegemony. To varying degrees, they convey a thinly
veiled dissatisfaction with the earlier simplistic reading based on the realist con-
viction that any unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a threat, and so is a ris-
ing power. Each in its own way offers an alternative way of ascertaining China’s
rise and its possible effects on US influence. To fully grasp the implications of
this point, we need a review of the unfolding debates in reaction to both China’s
rise and to the realists’ reading of its dire consequences.
In the three decades that the world has been treated to the spectacle of China
steadily on the ascent, there has been no scholarly consensus as to what to make
of it, except among the realists (mostly in America) who drew the negative con-
clusion that it is a distinct threat. Some realists even openly advocated a US pol-
icy to block its rise (for example, Mearsheimer 2001). Other colleagues
predicted that the rising China, like other possible candidates, will seek to bal-
ance against the unipolar power of the United States (Waltz 2000:28–32; 41).
However, as Van Ness (2000) poignantly noted, well into the second decade after
the collapse of Soviet power, China, no more than the other candidates on
Waltz’s list for the next great power, has not shown even the slightest sign of
seeking to counterbalance the US unipolar dominance.

The First Two Waves of Discontent with Neorealist Theory as Tested in

Assessing China’s Rise

The Van Ness skepticism, in retrospect, represents a first wave of intellectual dis-
content with the neorealist mode of analysis. It coincided with the independently
rekindled interest in hierarchy, as opposed to anarchy, in conceptualizing about
the international system. The shift in focus from anarchy to hierarchy (Weber
2000; Lake 2003:303), coupled with a shift in state practices from power balancing

Hsiung, James C. (2015) Utility vs. Inadequacy of Realist IR Theory: Assessing China’s Rise. International Studies Review, doi:
10.1111/misr.12198
© 2015 International Studies Association
 James C. Hsiung 133

to bandwagoning,1 opened the floodgate to a widening scholarly debate (and

rethinking) on whether the realist fixation on power and power balancing alone
can adequately anticipate, or even accurately explain, the international behavior
of a rising power such as China.
The immediate result was a second wave of intellectual climate change, which
raised a common question about the (realist) fixation with power in America’s
agitations about a rising China. Lake (2006:23–30) suggested that if the United
States should lead by building (moral) authority, rather than relying solely on
brute power, it “might even succeed in locking China into an American-domi-
nated international order.” Other analysts—for example, Jack Kugler (2006) and
Richard Rosecrance (2006)—joined in a chorus about whether China as the ris-
ing power has the “intention” to challenge the system from outside the system.
The entry of the intention desideratum, in fact, opens the vista to an entirely
new line of inquiry into whether war or conflict is inevitable with the rise of a
new superpower. The answer would depend on whether the rising China trea-
sures security and not expansion. If so, then the United States, as the incumbent
hegemon, can help reverse the trap of the proverbial “security dilemma,” with
the end result that, by making China feel secure, the United States will guaran-
tee its own security, hence no war (Glaser 2001).

The Third Wave of Discontent with the Realist Paradigm in Assessing China’s
Rise

The three volumes under review here demonstrate the third wave of intellectual
dissent in assessing both China’s rise and the wisdom of the realist preoccupa-
tion with conflict and power balancing. While Steve Chan’s work is more theoret-
ically oriented and questions the validity of the [neo-] realist paradigm in
general, the other two studies offer their own perspectives on China by drawing
comparisons or linkages with the United States. Their ultimate aim is to demon-
strate an alternative way of grasping the implications of China’s rise as a great
power.

Is Realist Balancing Theory Adequate for Assessing China’s Rise?

Chan’s work can be considered as a separate discourse on both the rich contri-
butions and “debilitating limitations” (p. 3), even ill-effects, of balance-of-power
theory, but uses China—or to be more exact, its treatment by the balancing the-
orists (especially as translated into US policy)—as an empirical illustration of his
critique. In doing so, he makes some thought-provoking constructive points on
these “limits” or even unintended, self-defeating effects. Due to space con-
straints, we focus on only the most potent parts of Chan’s critique.

1
Elsewhere (Hsiung 2012:251–257), I have dealt with China’s bandwagoning behavior in its relations with the
United States. Here, let me succinctly sum up a few notable examples in which China bandwagoned with the Uni-
ted States: (i) In response to President George W. Bush’s urgings, China brokered the Six-Party Talks on the Kor-
ean Peninsula, 2003–2007. Stalin would have manipulated the North Korean threat as a gambit to challenge US
hegemony; (ii) In 2010, China supported the United States in securing the adoption of UN Security Council Reso-
lution 1929 on sanctions against Iran; (iii) China abstained from, rather than vetoed, the US-sponsored 2011 UN
Security Council resolution on Libya; (iv) China cosponsored, with the United States, the UN Security Council reso-
lution on sanctions against North Korea in March 2013. In the book being reviewed here Steve Chan noted that
Asian neighbors also have chosen to bandwagon with, rather than balancing against, China. Abramowitz and Bos-
worth (2006), also supported by Kang (2003:57–86), found the same bandwagoning behavior of China’s neighbors
(with the exception of Japan, Taiwan, and India, for understandable reasons).
134 Utility vs. Inadequacy of Realist IR Theory

First, the claim of structural determinism is hardly sustainable. According to

structural realism (or neorealism), states are positional, not atomic, in an anar-
chical system whose units (states) are variably endowed with resources and power
capabilities. Their instinct for survival is directly attuned to how power distrib-
utes (in other words, configures) across the system, and to the strategic impera-
tive of alliance making against an overwhelming power, to counter the power
imbalance (or balance deficit). If that logic be true, then China’s neighbors
should be driven by this structural imbalance to counteract its rise. But, the non-
occurrence of this outcome, he notes, is intriguing since there is no regional
security community that may dampen the impulse to balance (Chapter 3).
Second, ideas/concepts such as “balance” can be and are used in confusing
and inconsistent ways. In reality, states do not conform to the expectations of
balance-of-power theories. Instead of other states (including China) balancing
against US hegemonic power, it is the United States that is trying to balance
against China, the rising power—when the latter does not even possess 80% of
the United States’ military power, a threshold held by the power-transition the-
ory to be necessary if a rising power is going to challenge the hegemon (p.
223f).
Third, Chan’s discourse makes additional scattered critiquing commentaries
on both balancing theory and the policies it has inspired. On theory, it argues
that neither historical outcomes nor historical processes have generally con-
formed to balance-of-power theories. One example is that hierarchy has repeat-
edly triumphed over anarchy, as found in instances in which Rome, the Qin
Dynasty, the Inca Empire, imperial China, Britain, and the United States have, at
one time or another, successfully established regional or global hegemony, a
condition contrary to anarchy. On policy, Chan claims that due to their empha-
sis on armaments and alliances, balancing policies entail significant opportunity
costs and can trigger a spiral of competition and self-defeating consequences (p.
224).
Fourth, although without invoking the term geoeconomics, Chan at times is
implying a distinction between, and a possible mix of, geopolitical conflict and
what may be considered geoeconomic cooperation in the post-Cold War age of
economic globalization. For example, invoking Scott Kastner’s (2009) study,
Chan highlights the expanding trade across the Taiwan Strait as a paradigmatic
example of how economic interdependence can thrive even between ostensible
(geopolitical) adversaries (p. 99). While Asian states have turned away from (geo-
political) balancing policies as traditionally prescribed by balance-of-power theo-
ries, Chan notes, they have pursued a policy emphasizing economic
performance at home and an intensifying economic integration with the mam-
moth China market.

When China Is Seen Not as a Spoiler, Much Less a Threat

The other two books reviewed here likewise approach China not as a spoiler,
much less as a threat. Providing an English-school perspective, the study by Rose-
mary Foot and Andrew Walter places China along with the United States at the
center of relations in the international system, and considers their bilateral rela-
tionship to be of central importance to any assessment of the dynamic stability
of global order. Among the various ways global order can be defined, the coau-
thors seem to view it as consisting of a framework of global governance, resulting
from the observance by players of certain key norms. Their analyses are pre-
mised on the projection of China as an equal partner with the United States in
the governance of the international system. Instead of the constructivist concern
 James C. Hsiung 135

with whether norms constrain behavior, the book is ultimately concerned with
the extent to which the respective behavior of China and the United States con-
forms to key global order norms. The coauthors seem to believe that this mode
of analysis is capable of yielding a more reliable conclusion on whether China is
a threat than can the realist paradigm. Through this comparison, the study dem-
onstrates the degree of Chinese behavioral consistency with global order norms,
relative to the American behavioral consistency with the same norms.
In this comparative light, the study is able to establish that China is “relatively
hostile” toward norms favoring protection of civil and human rights, while the
United States is “relatively hostile” to the norms of non-intervention (p. 21). Fur-
thermore, by postulating certain normative issue areas, such as the use of force,
macroeconomic policy surveillance, the NPT, and climate change, closer compar-
ative analysis of the Chinese and American behaviors can identify variations in
their respective adherence to these norms. Without going into the details of it, I
would single out a general, and more comprehensive, finding from the study’s
comparisons, to the effect that for China, more often in the position of a norm-
taker than a norm-maker, the questions of distributive fairness, legitimate proce-
dure, and consistency with domestic policy norms and priorities have been much
more important than they would have been if it had substantive input into the
process of norm creation. The United States, on the other hand, “has historically
been unwilling to abide by rules and norms set by others, but it has also been
unwilling to abide consistently by the rules that it played a central role in estab-
lishing,” one example being the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (p. 297).
Following the comparisons made in this vein, the reader will have the unavoid-
able feeling that the two English coauthors were hinting, perhaps intentionally,
that the proverbial kettle should not call the pot black. Complex economic inter-
dependence has also encouraged both the Chinese and US governments to uti-
lize relevant norms in trade and finance as a way of mediating disputes.
Instances like these augur well for the future of global order.
The book ends with a conditional “optimistic reading” of the future of global
order, which is based on an assessment that can be best represented in the fol-
lowing statement: “Strikingly, given that many still see contemporary global order
as associated with American values and power, China’s generally rising levels of
behavioral consistency within it have been driven by a reasonable association
between domestic values and some global norms.” The coauthors saw this trend
as resulting largely from the Chinese leadership’s reshaping of domestic social
and political values “in ways that are more consistent with existing global order
norms (exceptions to which include the areas of civil and political rights and
democratic forms of domestic governance)” (p. 299). In other words, the “suc-
cessful adaptation” of Chinese leaders to basic global order norms will be
“extraordinary” for global growth as well as for poverty reduction in China.
Between the lines, the coauthors see the future stability of the global order as
subject to the interactions between the United States as the norm-maker and
China as the norm-taker.

China as Part of a Great-Power Game with the United States and Russia

The study by Alexander Cooley, the third book under review here, likewise treats
China not as an isolated target, as if under the scrutiny of realist theorists moti-
vated by a singular aim of identifying whether it is a threat to world order.
Instead, it purports to examine the dynamics of interactions between the United
States, China, and Russia in a great-power game as they each tried to extend
their influence over Central Asia, between 2001 and 2011.
136 Utility vs. Inadequacy of Realist IR Theory

Each of the three powers has a different interest in Central Asia. The United
States and China have been motivated not by a direct interest, but by a pressing
need to stabilize adjacent regions: Afghanistan for the United States, and the
north-western province of Xinjiang for China. Russia on the other hand has
sought to play a dominant role in a region that consists of five former Soviet
republics. The most interesting finding of the book is its explanation of the con-
sequences of what the author calls the problem of “multiple principals,” which
breeds reduced influence and authority for any of the principals over the smaller
states in the region. All of the latter have learned to play the great powers off
one another. Since Central Asia is a microcosm of the larger world, it is impor-
tant to note the experiences and results of the new regional contests of a multi-
polar world, which can be summarized most succinctly as follows: (i) The
evolution of US power can be characterized as increasing hard power but dimin-
ished influence (soft power) (p. 172); (ii) Despite its efforts, Russia failed to
hang on to a “privileged role.” For example, its oil–gas pipeline monopoly was
broken in December 2009, when the new Central Asia–China pipeline began
flowing east from Turkmenistan (p. 164); (iii) As elsewhere, China tends to gain
in influence in Central Asia by “public goods provision” (that is, by short-term
crisis lending, debt assistance, and concessionary infrastructure financing) (p.
174). This often neglected point seems to render anachronistic Hillary Clinton’s
attribution of “neo-colonialism” to China’s comparable deeds in similarly helping
the poor in Africa.
The book’s other value lies in its hidden message for those concerned with
twenty-first-century world politics, namely, it is not sufficient to view the rise of
China in light of a dyadic game facing the United States, involving either contest
or cooperation. At least in the Central Asian region, it requires the perspective
of a new triadic game recalling the “strategic triangle” of the 1970s and 1980s,
although to a lesser geographic extent, while the lineup and the comparative
strategic importance of China and Russia may be very different. The ultimate
message, however, is that China’s rise is not necessarily a zero-sum game for US
hegemonic power.

Concluding Remarks

All three books were written just about the time when the world was beginning to
be awakened to a well-documented open secret—that China’s current rise is its
second ascent—with the publication in 2007 of the monumental work, Contours of
the World Economy, 1–2030 A.D., by Angus Maddison, the noted British economist
with a flair for quantitative exploration of the past. According to the massive sta-
tistical data accumulated by Maddison (as best summarized in Maddison 2007:
Table A-4), China’s GDP was consistently larger than the combined total of the
whole of Europe between the year 1 AD and 1820 AD. Using aggregate data,
mostly from Maddison’s statistics, Kishore Mahbubani (2008:5) noted that in the
first century AD Asia (mainly China and India) accounted for 76.3% of the global
GDP, against Europe’s 10.8%. Luminaries like Kissinger (2011:11) and Joseph
Nye (2011:179) publicly flaunted their knowledge that China had its first rise
before 1820 and that the present rise is a comeback. Even a book explicitly titled
China into Its Second Rise (Hsiung) came out in 2012.
This long digression anticipates a rhetorical question: If the three works under
review here had been written with this very point in mind—that China is cur-
rently rising for a second time—would they have been pitched differently? I
don’t know about the other two books, but for Chan’s specific critique of neore-
alism, he probably would have, first, noted that in the Westphalian system there
 James C. Hsiung 137

is no precedent of a country that was on top of the world for well over a millen-
nium and is re-rising a second time following a century and a half going under,
albeit down but not out. Secondly, he probably would have raised a question of
crucial theoretical importance, namely, is the international behavior of a re-ris-
ing state going to be any different from that of the first-time upstarts? This is of
crucial theoretical importance because all previous rising powers that proved
either aggressive or predatory, or both—this formed the empirical basis for the
realist (especially neorealist) doctrine that unbalanced power, whoever wields it,
is a threat—were without exception first-time upstarts. They included as follows:
postindustrial Britain, Napoleonic France, post-Meiji Japan, post-Bismarck Ger-
many, and the Stalinist (and post-Stalin) Soviet Union. I am sure, for Chan at
least, this point is worth pondering in his next examination of international rela-
tions theory.

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