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Raoni Padui
To cite this article: Raoni Padui (2011) Realism, Anti-Realism, and Materialism, Angelaki, 16:2,
89-101, DOI: 10.1080/0969725X.2011.591589
89
realism, anti-realism, and materialism
correlationism accommodates different forms of return philosophy to its ability to access the
thought, from its precursor – the empiricist belief in-itself, what he calls ‘‘the great outdoors,’’6 and
that to be is to be perceived, through an idealism this would mean acknowledging that the true
that believes that only what is within Geist can be meaning of the ancestral statement is nothing
actual, up to a phenomenological ontology that but its literal meaning. Although the correla-
claims that Being is the horizon in which Dasein tionist restriction to the facticity of the relation
understands beings. However different such between thought and being hides behind the piety
methods may be, they all involve some form of of finitude, it is Meillassoux’s contention that
critical distance from the naı̈ve realist position it masks a crypto-idealist thesis in which nothing
whereby something can be understood as existing can be without its relation to a world, or be
radically independent of its relation to thought, understood without the horizon of human
discourse, or language. To illustrate this point, understanding.
Meillassoux brings up the problem of ancestral- According to Meillassoux, such a correlationist
ity,5 that is, of a statement whose literal meaning turn was inaugurated by Kant’s so-called
refers to the existence and manifestation of ‘‘Copernican revolution.’’ However, while Kant
something radically anterior to human thought claims his fidelity to the Copernican decentering
or life as such. The response to and interpretation of thought, the actual outcome of the Critique of
of a statement such as ‘‘the earth was formed 4.56 Pure Reason is ultimately a betrayal of such
billion years ago’’ is the telltale sign of whether a Copernican turn. At the very moment when
or not a philosophy is correlationist. Literally, the mathematical sciences were able to begin to
such an ancestral statement should mean exactly comprehend the world in ways that were
what it says: that there actually was something explicitly detached from the anthropocentric
in existence prior to the existence of human model – that is, to access a dehumanized and
thinking, and that this happened in a time decentered cosmos – Kantian critical philosophy
completely independent of human, transcenden- initiated what Meillassoux calls a ‘‘Ptolemaic
tal, or phenomenological time. If one begins to counter-revolution’’7 in reaction to scientific
qualify the ancestral statement by showing that realism. In Meillassoux’s words:
the meaning of such a notion of existence is
grounded within Dasein, or language, or that the While modern science discovered for the first
naı̈ve clock-time of such scientific statements is time thought’s capacity to accede to knowl-
derivative of a more original internal time- edge of a world indifferent to thought’s
consciousness, and so on, one is succumbing to relation to the world, philosophy reacted to
the correlationist thesis. Meillassoux claims that this discovery by discovering the naivety of
its own previous ‘‘dogmatism’’, seeing in the
correlationism is unable to comprehend the literal
‘‘realism’’ of pre-Critical metaphysics the
meaning of such scientific statements, and that
paradigm of a decidedly outmoded conceptual
since Kant’s critical turn we have learned to naivety. The philosophical era of correlation
compensate for this insufficiency by calling any corresponds to the scientific era of decenter-
manner of direct realism ‘‘naı̈ve’’ or ‘‘dogmatic.’’ ing, and corresponds to it as its very solution.8
To this name-calling there is added a second-level
transcendental sphere in which the true (veri- There is something essentially reactive in the
table) meaning happens in distinction to the naı̈ve transcendental turn, a counter-revolutionary and
literal meaning. The correlationist is not a naı̈ve ultimately conservative re-centering of human
idealist either, for she does not claim that being is thought at the very moment when thought is able
reducible to thought; instead, the claim is always to relate to a de-sacralized and demystified world.
a more nuanced one of equi-primordiality or of Meillassoux’s positive project is an attempt to
co-belonging. Against weak forms of subjective reconnect philosophy to the ‘‘great outside’’ of
idealism, the strong correlationist claims that the inhuman and ultimately contingent world
being is always already in relation to thinking. through a speculative materialism that resolutely
Against such a tendency, Meillassoux wants to gives up on the well-established gestures of
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realism, anti-realism, and materialism
the epistemological and the ontological that is core of any such argument must be
at the heart of Meillassoux’s argument for the thinkable.17
principle of factiality. In order to maintain the
Meillassoux is asking the correlationist to
correlational character of knowledge, that is,
present an epistemological deduction, a ground-
that we cannot know the absolute (the in-itself),
ing for their claim that the in-itself cannot be
we must presuppose that the facticity of this
thought. In so doing, he is able to maintain that
correlation is itself absolute: ‘‘We must show why
only if one can think the being of an in-itself
thought, far from experiencing its intrinsic limits
(in this case, the principle of factiality itself) can
through facticity, experiences rather its knowl-
edge of the absolute through facticity.’’14 one make the distinction between the in-itself
According to Meillassoux, it is the necessary and the for-us. However, as Peter Hallward has
contingency of the factical encounter that is itself also noted, this argument seems to involve an
absolute. His claim is that the epistemological ‘‘equivocation regarding the relation of thinking
anti-realism presented by the correlationist circle and being, of epistemology and ontology.’’18
itself implies or presupposes an ontological thesis, In saying that we have no access to the in-itself
insofar as ‘‘it already presupposes an implicit we do not mean to say that there can be no
admission of the absoluteness of the contin- in-itself, because we have no access to it. This
gency.’’15 The principle of factiality, which states conclusion could only be elicited if the correla-
the necessary contingency of givenness, its pure tion were a skeptical knowledge claim that
possibility of being-otherwise, is in Meillassoux’s needed to be defended. But it is precisely this
reading simply the explicit articulation of that epistemological grounding that is criticized by
which the correlationist must implicitly presup- most of the correlationist tradition, from Hegel
pose in her claim that the in-itself cannot be to Heidegger to Derrida. The ontological and
known. If Meillassoux is able to argue that the materialist question of whether or not being
facticity that grounds correlationism necessarily precedes thinking and its skepticism towards the
implies the ontological commitment he identifies absolute is not ‘‘based upon an argument,’’ that
as the principle of factiality, then the necessity of is, it is not grounded within an epistemological
contingency must be thought. deduction. Materialism is an ontological thesis
Of course, a strong correlationist will reply that posits that being can be independent of
that we must be simply agnostic here, and claim thinking, while realism posits the thinkability of
neither the necessity nor the contingency of this being independent of thinking. If correla-
facticity. Meillassoux, foreseeing any such coun- tionist skepticism is an anti-realism, it does not
terarguments that simply maintain an agnostic necessarily need to be an anti-materialism.
‘‘essential ignorance’’16 vis-à-vis the in-itself, In the argument from facticity, Meillassoux
responds directly to this complaint. But in his moves from one to the other, claiming that the
answer to this objection, he once again seems to existence of something prior or independent of
assume that correlationism is essentially a claim thought (materialism) can only be maintained
about knowledge, an epistemological position that if we can think or access being prior to thought
needs grounding: (realism). This move is clearly illegitimate,
insofar as it involves the claim that there can
The truth is that you are only able to think this be matter prior to thought if and only if one
possibility of ignorance because you have can think the being of matter prior to thought.
actually thought the absoluteness of this
In other words, it is grounding ontology in an
possibility, which is to say, its non-correla-
epistemology.
tional character. Let me make myself clear,
for this is the crux of the matter. So long as It is certainly true that the restriction of
you maintain that your skepticism towards philosophy to access and relation has historically
all knowledge of the absolute is based upon coincided with the rise of epistemology as first
an argument, rather than upon mere belief philosophy (often in an explicitly neo-Kantian
or opinion, then you have to grant that the vein). And as Rorty showed long ago in
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realism, anti-realism, and materialism
sensuous human activity, praxis, not subjec- as the attempt to critique its time by a certain
tively. Hence in opposition to materialism the form of removal or critical distance is necessarily
active side was developed by idealism – but related to the activity and activation of the social
only abstractly since idealism naturally does praxis within which it is imbedded. In the words
not know actual, sensuous activity as such.28
of Althusser: ‘‘It is counter to philosophy that
Marx claims that materialism fails if it thinks of Marxism insists that philosophy has an ‘exterior’ –
the world merely as an object of knowledge, or better expressed, that philosophy exists only
whether as an object of experience, perception, through and for this ‘exterior.’ This exterior
contemplation, or mathematical description. (which philosophy wishes to imagine it submits to
The reason for this is that it can only do so at Truth) is practice, the social practices.’’30
the expense of a misrecognition of the fact that Philosophy is rendered materialistic by maintain-
experience, perception, contemplation, and other ing that being is somehow prior to thinking.
modes of access and relation are themselves But idealism (in setting up the correlational turn
activities. Although Meillassoux protests against and positing the activity of thought) responds by
the finitude and facticity produced by Kant’s stating that the being that is prior to thinking
restriction of knowledge, he does not adequately is nothing but thought itself. In doing so, it splits
identify the actual reason why Kant develops the thinking into two and shows us another path to
hypothesis that a knowing subject cannot have materialism. For by saying that the being prior
immediate access to the world. The reason for to thinking is nothing other than thought itself,
such a restriction is related to the fact that the and that thinking is itself an activity, we are
mind is no longer seen as a passive wax tablet again at the materialist moment. Thinking as act,
upon which the world leaves its imprint. as practice, is the always already exterior and
Thinking is an act, it does things to the world, existing aspect of thought. Abstract thought, or
it is not simply a mirror to the world. The thinking that believes to be purely abstracted
correlationist move of Fichte and Hegel was from and unrelated to this prior domain, is really
not to attempt to put together thinking and the only the product of such real activity. Within this
world, but to show thought’s contribution to idealist tradition, we can claim the priority of
the production of world. If gluing back together being over thinking as the priority of thinking-
the thinking and being separated by thought’s as-act over thinking-as-thinking-about; that is,
abstractive capacities were the goal of critical the priority of the process and activity of thinking
philosophy, Meillassoux would be correct in over its representational and referential content.
claiming that the last two centuries have been This allows one to bypass the entire epistemic
abject failures. But Marx is clear in this first problematic of trying to leap over thought’s
thesis that the side of activity and praxis was mediation in order to get to a world that is
developed by idealism, not by the contemplative independent of thought. Remember that
forms of materialism. True, he is quick to Meillassoux claimed that any speculative materi-
complain that such a development, viewed alism must show that ‘‘absolute reality is an
from the inverted lens of idealism, locates the entity without thought.’’31 Meillassoux is here
determination and constitution on the side of driven to the epistemological game of trying to
the subject and of thought. But the idea that erase thought, which is unreal, in order to get
knowledge is activity we ultimately owe to Kant to a reality that is beyond thought. It is precisely
and to Fichte’s reading of Kant29 – that is, the temptation to think of thought as outside of
precisely to the correlationist move that reality that the materialist tradition has para-
Meillassoux wants to overturn. doxically avoided by taking the anti-realist and
The recognition that thinking is an existent anti-epistemological turn. Materialism should
activity places philosophy in relation to its non- treat thinking not merely as a relation of access
philosophical field. Philosophy cannot take its to be overcome in our attempt to grasp the ‘‘real
step back to the pure space of observation and tell world’’ but as an actual activity. Such a project
us what the real world looks like. That is, thought has a closer lineage to the critical idealism
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inaugurated by Kant (that Meillassoux calls knowledge. What Kant is pointing to through the
correlationism) than to any realism concerning thing-in-itself is the following: since philosophy is
ancestral statements. restricted to the sphere of access and relation,
we demarcate that sphere from the one that is
beyond relation and access. In other words, the
4 critical philosophy and the sciences
thing-in-itself is what it would be like to know
of objects an object when it is not known, or to relate to
However, we have still not answered the charge something to which we can have no relation.
that Meillassoux mounts against correlationism’s What we find here is a delimitation of the
reactive or counter-revolutionary tendency to sphere of philosophy, above all in the notion
deny the validity of the sciences to access that it does not deal directly or immediately
the world as it is in-itself. The conservative with objects. Such a direct relation to objects can
re-centering of the finite subject at the heart of happen in two ways, both of which are, after
philosophy is read by Meillassoux as a fearful Kant’s critique, non-philosophical: first, the
response against the recognition that the sciences empirical-realist relation to objects of experience
were suddenly usurping the previous space of within the domain of the experimental sciences
philosophy – namely, the ability to state the and, second, the transcendent and speculative
truth about the world. Meillassoux is certainly relation to the objects of special metaphysics
correct in stating that the critical turn involves (God, World, Soul). According to Kant, philoso-
a restriction of philosophy to relation, or phy is not experimental science, nor is it theology
co-relation. Kant himself defines transcendental or speculative physics.34 The proper domain of
philosophy as a shift away from the object itself philosophy is not knowledge and the under-
as the subject matter of philosophy and towards standing, but thinking and Reason. The relation-
our relation to the object: ‘‘I entitle transcen- ship between concepts and intuitions, that is, the
dental all knowledge which is occupied not so sphere of the understanding, is not for Kant the
much with objects as with the mode of our proper domain of philosophy: ‘‘Philosophical
knowledge of objects.’’32 The correlation that knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason
Kant sets up between the transcendental unity of from concepts.’’35 Reason, as the true domain
apperception and its objects includes a restriction of philosophy, is the source of principles that do
to the sphere of relation. The thing-in-itself is not themselves relate immediately to objects of
really a byproduct of such a restriction, for it is experience, but only mediately through the
that which is allowed to occupy the empty place understanding, which is why Kant unequivocally
of the object understood as existing beyond states that the principle of the unity of reason, for
relation: example, ‘‘does not prescribe any law for objects,
and does not contain any general ground of the
Now a thing in itself cannot be known through possibility of knowing or of determining objects
mere relations; and we may therefore conclude as such.’’36 Philosophical thinking, within the
that since outer sense gives us nothing but
domain of Reason, is a second-order knowledge
mere relations, this sense can contain in its
that reflects upon the reflection upon experience.
representation only the relation of an object to
the subject, and not the inner properties of the Kant’s argument is roughly the following:
object in itself.33 philosophy’s realm is thinking and Reason, but
Reason does not prescribe laws or ground for
While philosophy becomes a philosophy of access objects, the understanding does that, therefore,
and of relation, it simultaneously attests to a philosophy does not deal directly with objects.
limitation of philosophy itself. The thing-in-itself This puts philosophy in a secondary, mediate
is nothing but an acknowledgement of an relation to the understanding – a relation that is
untenable and problematic realism, namely, simultaneously one of ground and dependency.
that the object itself, beyond our relations, is That is, philosophy depends on the understand-
unknown and beyond the sphere of philosophical ing’s relation to objects in order to produce the
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realism, anti-realism, and materialism
functions and relations upon which it works, but is grounded in the idealist science, but the objects
it also brings the understanding under the unity about which the claim is rendered ‘‘realistic’’ are
of principles and system. Philosophy simulta- outside the immediate scope of philosophy.
neously grounds and is conditioned by our Meillassoux is correct to show that the literal
relation to the world of objects. Nevertheless, statement of the ancestral claim is hereby severed
it does not prescribe principles, grounds, or from its correlational meaning, but such a
determinations to those objects themselves. severance actually is the recognition of a non-
Fichte and Hegel’s rewritings of Kantian philosophical space – a delimitation of philoso-
critical philosophy deepen the severance phy. In one breath Fichte grounds realism
between philosophy and empirical objects. in idealism, in another he acknowledges a non-
German idealism should be understood not as philosophical ground: ‘‘The second is only
working towards a more all-encompassing intelligible on the basis of the first; realism has
absolute, but instead towards a more restricted grounds, indeed, apart from that, for we are
and closed absolution from the sphere of constrained to it by our own nature, but it has no
objects. In the second introduction to the known and comprehensible grounds.’’38 Despite
Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte is quick to defend Fichte’s famous protests against Kant’s thing-in-
his project of science from misinterpretations that itself, in the separation between philosophical
fail to distinguish between the two series that are grounds from these unknown and incomprehen-
operative in the work, the spontaneously realist sible grounds of realism, Fichte is pointing to the
series of the self and the reflective, second-order space external to philosophy in the same way that
idealist series of the philosopher reflecting on Kant’s thing-in-itself did.
the self: It is only with Hegel, though, that we get an
explicit distinction between the condition and
The philosopher says only in his own name: ground and an articulation of the inversion of
Everything that exists for the self, exists
grounding relations within the sphere of philoso-
through the self. The self, however, itself
phy.39 Philosophy is an inverted world when
says in its own philosophy: As surely as I am
and live, something exists outside me, which is
related to the genetic materialism of the experi-
not there by my doing. How it arrives at such mental sciences. Although philosophy comes too
a claim, the philosopher explains by the late, that is, it arrives always after the fact of our
principles of his philosophy. The first stand- workings on and relations to the world, it reverses
point is that of pure speculation; the second, this dependency, this condition, into an indepen-
that of life and scientific knowledge (in a sense dence or grounding. Here is an example from the
contrasted with that of the Science of Philosophy of Nature:
Knowledge).37
Not only must philosophy be in agreement
Philosophy as science is a second-order reflective with our empirical knowledge of Nature, but
knowledge that must be differentiated from the origin and formation of the Philosophy
science that relates directly to objects. of Nature presupposes and is conditioned by
Meillassoux would object here, and show how empirical physics. However, the course of a
Fichte begins to create the grounding relation science’s origin and the preliminaries of its
between the transcendental field and the realist- construction are one thing, while the science
itself is another. In the latter, the former
empirical field, claiming that philosophy
can no longer appear as the foundation of the
grounds the naı̈ve and dogmatic realist position.
science; here, the foundation must be the
However, one must notice that the transcenden- necessity of the Notion.40
tal, or philosophic-reflective second series, only
grounds the realist claims of the empirical realist, Philosophy is understood by Hegel as always
it does not, and could not, ground the truth already conditioned by and presupposing empiri-
or determinations of the objects of such a cal scientific knowledge. Nonetheless, philosophy
realism. The intelligibility of the realist claim inverts such a relation and turns such origin and
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condition into a product by grounding the claims philosophy is restricted and does not deal directly
of our realist and materialist sciences. This is with the domain of objects or beings, and (3) this
because philosophy for Hegel does not deal with critical stance involves an inversion in grounding-
finite objects, but with our relation to finite relation. These three must be understood
objects after they have already been negated. If together in order to defend against a major
one wants to comprehend what an object is, or and dangerous misinterpretation of the critical
how old the world is, or when human beings came tradition: that is, the notion that critique is
to inhabit the earth, the experimental sciences, a meta-discourse about objects and that such a
not philosophy, should be one’s true ally. meta-discourse is the true, more originary ground
Although those statements may be correct, their of the meaning of such objects. Meillassoux
truth, which involves an inversion of the condi- correctly protests against this self-inflation of
tion/ground relation once they have made their philosophical discourse. But Heidegger is here
entry into the correlational circle, is articulated identifying the three moves together, that is,
within philosophy.41 But this ultimately means a philosophy is the ground of the positive sciences
separation or restriction of philosophy, since it if and only if there is the restriction away from
must await such negations of the sphere of the sphere of beings and a separation from the
finitude in order to be self-grounding. In other positive sciences. Such a restriction creates the
words, philosophy’s ground, which is absolute for critical space which in turn grounds aspects
Hegel (that is, self-grounded and unconditioned), of the beings upon which it is always already
is simultaneously and necessarily conditioned. dependent. Disengaging one of the three critical
In this sense, the passage from the philosopher moves identified above, namely separation,
who was against all ‘‘tenderness for the finite’’ to restriction, and inversion, would turn philosophy
the one most adamantly pious about our into a meta-discourse about the whole, and inflate
ontological finitude is no great leap. The the philosophy of finitude into a crypto-idealist
ontological difference is used by Heidegger grounding of all naı̈ve and dogmatic realism.
precisely in order to maintain the proper My response to Meillassoux is thus simply to
ontological space for philosophy against the divert the dangers he finds in correlationism by
positive sciences that relate directly to their redefining what is actually happening in the
specific ontic domain. In his early lecture course critical turn. The important concept of finitude
on The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, attested to in the critical turn is not human
Heidegger uses the ontological difference as this finitude but the finitude of philosophy itself,
critical stance between the positive sciences and that is, the notion that philosophy is conditioned
philosophy we have already seen in Kant, Fichte, by other procedures (generally called sciences or
and Hegel: faculties) which operate directly upon objects.
Philosophy is so conditioned, or dependent,
Only by taking this critical stance do we keep because it is constituted by its severance and
our own standing inside the field of philoso- separation from their specific domain. It is true,
phy. Therefore, in distinction from the then, that correlationist thought will not be
sciences of the things that are, of beings, able to deal with the literal realist meaning of
ontology, or philosophy in general, is the statements such as ‘‘the universe came into being
critical science, or the science of the inverted
13.5 billion years ago.’’ However, there is no
world. With this distinction between being and
reason why it should, unless it wants to enter the
beings and the selection of being as the theme
we depart in principle from the domain of specifically scientific debate within the experi-
beings.42 mental sciences about whether or not that is
correct, and leave the space of philosophy.
Notice that Heidegger includes all the moves we Critical philosophy does not necessarily imply
have identified in the critical tradition: (1) the a grounding relation to the empirical or ontic
space of philosophy requires a separation from world, for such a grounding relation can only be
the space of the sciences, (2) the space of understood in conjunction to the inversion proper
97
realism, anti-realism, and materialism
to its domain, and its domain only through a does imply a general form of anti-realism, and
severance or de-limitation that attests to its if one pushed most critical philosophers into an
conditionality. Althusser understood this move- epistemological corner about the truth of the
ment perfectly when he distinguished philosophy ancestral statement, they would probably have to
from the sphere of objects in the first four theses answer in anti-realist terms. But they would do so
of Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy reluctantly, insofar as they do not see philosophy
of Scientists, and even more precisely in his late as either primarily an epistemological endeavor
essay ‘‘The Transformation of Philosophy,’’ or as competent to decide in matters about the
where he states: objects of the empirical sciences. Critical philo-
sophy does not preclude materialism when it is
Philosophy borrows the model for its pure understood as distinct from realism, nor does it
rational discourse from the existing sciences. undermine all claims of science about objects or
Thus it is subjected to the ‘‘real sciences,’’
entities by showing their reducibility to relation
which are its condition of possibility. Yet
and mediation. If that is correct, despite the
within its own discourse, an inversion occurs:
philosophical discourse transforms its act of fascinating attempt at proposing a speculative
submission to the sciences and situates itself, materialism, Meillassoux’s chal-
as ‘‘philosophy,’’ above the sciences, assuming lenge fails to argue for the
power over them.43 necessity of such an enterprise
and the supposed dangers of the
Badiou is simply following his master when he critical turn.
differentiates philosophy from its conditions and
describes the danger inherent in the suturing notes
of philosophy to any one of these conditions.44
This should alert us to something deeply I would like to thank the ‘‘Cornell Theory Reading
Group’’ for the opportunity to present and discuss
continuous between the Kantian critical condition
the ideas in this paper.Their conferences have been
and the materialism of Althusser and Badiou, a perfect model of what true interdisciplinary and
namely, the relegation of philosophy to an open inquiry in the humanities should be like.
operation conditioned by its separation from the I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewer
empirical domain of objects. at Angelaki for comments on an earlier draft.
I will not deny that the self-restriction of the
1 Badiou 157^78.
philosophy of finitude often has, as a matter of
fact, hidden several self-inflating claims about its 2 For an informative and sympathetic review of
ability to ground the positive sciences behind Meillassoux’s book, see Harman.
pious deflationary humility. As Robert Pippin 3 For a more detailed presentation of the concept
notes, the double move of simultaneous humility of correlationism, see Harman; and Brassier
and arrogance is constitutive of modernity: 58 ^ 69.
‘‘The modern ethos is always self-deflating as
4 Meillassoux, After Finitude 5^9.
self-inflating, and is always both at the same
time.’’45 The self-inflating piety in such gestures 5 Ibid. 9^14.
is even more dangerous, Badiou and Meillassoux 6 Ibid. 7.
remind us, when the philosopher becomes a
handmaiden to the poet or to the priest, or worst, 7 Ibid.118.
to the amalgamation of both, the prophet-poet, 8 Ibid.177.
and completely abandons her relation to the
9 This second part of the argument is criticized by
scientist. But hopefully I have pointed towards Hallward 51^57. The question of whether or not
some ways in which Kant’s critical turn and mathematics can do the work that Meillassoux
its subsequent development does not have the wants it to do is beyond the scope of this paper.
meaning Meillassoux wants to give it through his However, since my goal is to deny that materialism
critique of correlationism. Critical philosophy must involve either realism or the ability to think
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the absolute, the argument of whether mathe- 23 Adorno 192.
matics can help us think the absolute ontologically
24 Latour 1^23,145^73.
is beside the point. Although there is an interest-
ing debate to be had about whether Cantorian 25 Daston and Galison; and Galison.
mathematics can help us produce a speculative
26 Putnam.
position that is both materialist and realist,
the present paper wants to claim that we can cir- 27 Quine.
cumvent the epistemological problems of realism
28 Marx 99.
(and, for that matter, nominalism about mathema-
tical objects) by remaining within a tradition 29 Fichte 29^ 85.
of correlationism that is materialist and anti-
epistemological. 30 Althusser 248.
99
realism, anti-realism, and materialism
finite, and untrue on its own account.But the Braver, Lee. A Thing of this World: A History
truth rests only on the form, i.e., on the of Continental Anti-realism. Evanston, IL:
posited Concept and the reality that corre- Northwestern UP, 2007. Print.
sponds to it; truth of this kind is not
present in the qualitative judgment, how- Daston, Lorraine, and Peter Galison. Objectivity.
ever. (Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic 249) New York: Zone, 2007. Print.
Dummett, Michael. Truth and the Past. New York:
42 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology 17.
Columbia UP, 2004. Print.
Thus when Heidegger famously articulates the
correlation between Dasein and Being in Being Fichte, J.G. Science of Knowledge.Trans. Peter Heath
and Time, he simultaneously has this restriction to and John Lachs. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982.
the ontological domain in mind.One can quote the Print.
famous sentence to support Meillassoux’s point
between the co-belonging thinking and being Galison, Peter. ‘‘Objectivity is Romantic.’’ The
in the correlationist thesis: ‘‘Of course only as Humanities and the Sciences. ACLS Occasional
long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an under- Paper No. 47 (1999): 15^ 43. Print.
standing of Being is ontically possible), ‘is there’ Hacking, Ian. Historical Ontology. Cambridge, MA:
Being [‘gibt es’ Sein]’’ (Heidegger, Being and Time
Harvard UP, 2002. Print.
255). But this statement can only be understood
with the often omitted previous sentence, which Hallward, Peter. ‘‘Anything is Possible.’’ Radical
reads: ‘‘But the fact that Reality is ontologically Philosophy 152 (2008): 51^57. Print.
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Raoni Padui
Department of Philosophy
Villanova University
800 Lancaster Ave.
Villanova, PA 19085
USA
E-mail: raoni.padui@villanova.edu