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It is always great good fortune for an author to have his writings meet with a
receptive circle of readers who take them up in their own work and clarify
them further. Indeed, it may even be the secret of all theoretical productivity
that one reaches an opportune point in one’s own creative process when
others’ queries, suggestions, and criticisms give one no peace, until one has
been forced to come up with new answers and solutions. The four essays
collected here, in any event, jointly represent an ideal form of such a
challenge: I am now compelled to make further theoretical developments and
clari cations that lead me to a whole new stage of my own endeavours, well
beyond what I initially had in mind in The Struggle for Recognition. For this
reason, I will not concentrate here on interpretative issues regarding my
earlier work but will instead take up the problems and challenges that have
occasioned several revisions on my part. For this reason, it makes sense to
begin (in section I) with the points that Carl-Göran Heidegren makes, in terms
of a history of social theory, regarding my proposed theory of recognition.
The issues that still motivate me today can best be expressed via an
engagement with the conscientious interpretations he offers. The core of this
rejoinder is based on Heikki Ikäheimo’s and Arto Laitinen’s suggestions and
corrections, which they have used to develop my initial approach further, to
the point where the theoretical outlines of a precise and general concept of
recognition come into view. It is primarily these two contributions that helped
me develop a productive elaboration of my originally vague intuitions
(section II). By way of conclusion (in section III), I take up the penetrating
questions raised by Antti Kauppinen regarding the use of the concept of
recognition in the broader context of social criticism; he has compelled me to
take on several extremely helpful clari cations, and they give me the
opportunity, in conclusion, to summarize my overarching intentions.
I
In his attempt to reconstruct the emergence of my model of recognition out of
the interplay of ‘philosophical anthropology, social theory, and politics’,
Carl-Göran Heidegren is right to attribute a certain priority to philosophical
anthropology. My thinking was indeed shaped from the outset by the
methodological attitude of the tradition founded in the rst third of the
twentieth century by Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, and Arnold Gehlen;
despite all the conservative tendencies that could be identi ed in the content
of this tradition, I still consider it to be an enormous contribution that, in their
re exive analysis of the structures of our lifeworld, they (unlike Heidegger)
took an empirical approach and thereby systematically integrated results from
various disciplines within the human sciences.1 The special insight to which
such a philosophical anthropology leads can, I believe, now sensibly be
reformulated in John McDowell’s terminology: in the ongoing course of
history, which itself must not be conceived in purely scientistic terms, the
human lifeworld can be understood as the result of the emergence of a
‘second nature’, in which we habitually orient ourselves in a changing ‘space
of reasons’. I am convinced that philosophical anthropology could be brought
even further up to date if one were to consider the additional convergences of
these two approaches regarding their concept of value, their admission of
biological constraints, and their concept of perception; 2 but these initial
suggestions are enough, for present purposes, to make clear that, in the wake
of the excesses of linguistic analysis and historicism, philosophical
anthropology is still exceedingly relevant. When we also take into account
the work of Charles Taylor and Harry Frankfurt over the past few decades, we
can perhaps say that the existential structures of human beings’ second nature
are now being studied from the perspective of a linguistically informed
phenomenology for which scienti c results are not without systematic
signi cance.
The above attempt to update my theoretical work should not mislead
anyone about the fact that initially, without really having thought through the
methodology, I had set out to employ the young Hegel’s model of recognition
as the key to specifying the universal conditions under which human beings
can form an identity; the underlying intention was basically to conceptualize
the structures of mutual recognition analysed by Hegel not merely as
preconditions for self-consciousness but as practical conditions for the
development of a positive relation-to-self. This led me, in the form of an
‘empirically informed phenomenology’ , to differentiate the three forms of
recognition to which Heidegren’s essay refers, in their original characteriza-
tion; in the second part of this rejoinder, I shall address the question of how I
now view this differentiation, in light of the aforementioned methodology. In
any case, Heidegren is right that, already at that time, my core idea was to
Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions 501
Taken together, these more recent essays lead to the thesis that the early
childhood experiences of symbiosis have lifelong in uences, in that they
compel the subject to rebel again and again against the experience of not
having the other at our disposal. Accordingly, I now assume that the impulse
to rebel against established forms of recognition can be traced to a deep-
seated need to deny the independence of those with whom one interacts and to
have them, ‘omnipotently’, at one’s disposal. We would then have to say that
the permanence of the ‘struggle’ for recognition stems not from an
unsocializable ego’s drive for realization but rather from the anti-social
striving for independence that leads each subject to deny, again and again, the
other’s difference. Although I am convinced that I can put forward more
evidence for this speculative thesis than for the Meadean alternative, it too
raises an enormous problem regarding the connection with a theory of
recognition; for it is entirely unclear how these antisocial impulses are to be
connected to the moral experiences we have in mind when speaking of feeling
a lack of or a withholding of recognition.
At the moment, I am not sure where to go from here. On the one hand lies
the speculative insight (in uenced by object-relations theory) that one might
be able to trace the fact that relations of recognition are permanently marked
by the possibility of con ict, ultimately, back to the need to rebel against all
forms of ‘recognized’ independence of the other, in order to recreate the
original situation of guaranteed, secure symbiosis; this type of approach could
help explain not only the tendency to compulsively deny the distinctiveness
of one’s romantic partners10 but also the historically recurring willingness, in
the face of social threats, to seek refuge in a homogeneous community that is
free from all the dissonances intrinsic to relations of mutual recognition. 11
This insight stands in contrast, however, with the decidedly more robust basic
conviction that the ‘struggle’ for recognition is provoked by a particular kind
of moral experience: the tendency to challenge established forms of mutual
recognition stems from the historically fuelled feeling that others unjustly fail
to recognize certain aspects of who one is. Whereas the rst thesis
presupposes a need, anchored in human nature, that generates the agonistic
character of relations of recognition, the second thesis appeals, by contrast, to
the moral vulnerability of humans, who turn to protest and rebellion only
when faced with certain experiences. It seems that the only way to bridge
these mutually exclusive ideas would be to explain the emergence of this
moral vulnerability in terms of the early childhood loss of the symbiotic
experience of security; on that assumption, the individual tendency to deny
that others are not at one’s disposal would be merely the ip-side of the
human interest in having essential components of who one is be socially
recognized. Before taking up that line of thought in the nal section, I would
like to address the question of what exactly it makes sense to understand
under the concept of an act of ‘recognition’.
Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions 505
II
Although it was enough, in replying to Heidegren, to look back to various
initial motives for my project, the essays by Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto
Laitinen confront me with substantial systematic challenges. For however
much recent shifts in political ethics have expanded the research literature on
questions of social recognition, the core conceptual content of what we today
call ‘recognition’ has hardly been addressed further; instead, the concept is
employed vaguely, usually with passing reference to Hegel, for attitudes and
practices by which individuals or social groups are af rmed in certain of their
qualities. What remains unclear is not merely the relation to the Kantian
concept of ‘respect’; more than ever before, it has also become clear that the
concept of recognition incorporates various semantic components that differ
in English, French, and German usage, and that the relationship between them
is not really transparent. Thus, in German, the concept appears to denote
essentially only that normative situation associated with awarding a social
status, whereas in English and French it encompasses the additional epistemic
sense of ‘identifying’ or ‘knowing again’ [Wiedererkennung ]; adding to this
dif culty is the fact that, in all three languages, the concept can be used in
speech acts in which one admits something or acknowledges a point, in which
case ‘recognition’ acquires a primarily self-referential sense.12 Finally, in
competition with the Hegelian usage, there is also now a Wittgensteinian
interpretative perspective, according to which ‘recognition’ stands for a
performative reaction to how people express themselves; especially owing to
the writings of Stanley Cavell,13 who makes do without any recourse to
Hegel, the category of ‘acknowledgment’ has made its way to the inner circle
of analytic philosophy.
Ikäheimo’s and Laitinen’s contributions to this symposium have cleared
some very helpful paths into this thicket of conceptual confusions and
unanswered questions. Both authors address my original proposals with
analytic rigour, in attempts to reformulate them with suf cient independence
of Hegel for the tripartite distinction of love, rights, and esteem to acquire
systematic meaning; at the same time, the two proposed interpretative
strategies depart from one another enough to force me to make a choice
between them, a choice with signi cant implications. As far as I can see, there
are four premises that both authors share and that form the underpinnings for
their differing attempts at reconstruction. First, they are of the belief that the
original mode of ‘recognition’ consists in what the German meaning of the
word foregrounds: in the rst instance, it should be understood as a matter of
af rming the positive qualities of human individuals or groups, although
neither author rules out the possibility of establishing a systematic link to
other senses of the term. Second, Ikäheimo and Laitinen agree in
underscoring recognition’s character as an action: an act of recognition is
506 Axel Honneth
persons with the relevant properties. By contrast, the response model that I
would defend (with Laitinen), allows at most for the possibility of speaking of
a constitutive meaning in an indirect sense: the evaluative qualities that
subjects already have to ‘possess’, according to this model, would then be
conceived of as potentialities that recognitional responses transform into
actual capacities. This rather ingenious thesis does, however, need an
additional assumption if it is to explain how, with the help of the concept of
recognition, we are to imagine this transformation of potentiality into
actuality. It seems to me that an exceptionally apt explanation emerges from
an understanding that combines the insight into the constitutive role of
recognition with the response model: in our recognitional attitudes, we
respond appropriately to evaluative qualities that, by the standards of our
lifeworld, human subjects already possess but are actually available to them
only once they can identify with them as a result of experiencing the
recognition of these qualities. Although Laitinen himself gives no indication
of his theoretical sources, the in uence behind the concept of ‘identi cation’
here seems to be Harry Frankfurt’s concept of the person: according to his
account, a person counts as ‘autonomous’ in the strong sense only if she is able
to identify ‘wholeheartedly’ with her own desires and capabilities. 15 Going
beyond Frankfurt, however, we would have to say that this identi cation
presupposes recognition by others: with regard to the capabilities to which, in
virtue of my culture’s normative presuppositions, I am entitled as a subject, I
can really af rm only those capabilities that are reinforced as valuable through
the recognitional behaviour of those with whom I interact. To this extent, an
explanatory model of this sort actually represents a middle position between
pure constructivism and mere representationalism: although we make
manifest, in our acts of recognition, only those evaluative qualities that are
already present in the relevant individual, it is only as a result of our reactions
that he comes to be in a position to be truly autonomous, because he is then
able to identify with his capabilities.
Having thus explained the purpose in terms of which acts of recognition get
their normative signi cance in human life, I can now return to the idea of
progress that I saw myself having to defend in connection with moderate
value realism. I do not think we can do without a conception of progress if we
are to avoid the relativism that would ordinarily accompany claims to the
alterability of evaluative human qualities; if we are to elude the implication
that every evaluative predicate ever to have emerged in history has the same
normative validity, we must be able to derive, from the desired direction of
such changes, transhistorical standards for judging them. With regard to the
directional index – that is, progress – that we are permitted to presuppose
historically, we can get some insight from the foregoing discussion into the
underlying purpose of mutual recognition in human life: every new evaluative
quality whose con rmation through recognition increases a human subject’s
Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions 511
for a long time with social esteem seems to me to speak more in favour of the
second answer. Like Ikäheimo, Laitinen also favours an ahistorical
introduction of the basic types of recognition; in his case, however, this
strategy is linked to his value realism, which unlike me, he apparently wants
to understand in ontological terms.
Although Laitinen leaves open at the start of his essay whether we should
understand the evaluative qualities of persons in ontological terms, it
becomes clear in the course of his argument that this is precisely his view. My
suggested way out, which involves speaking merely of these evaluative
qualities’ social and experiential [lebensweltlich] ‘reality’, is not the route he
seems to want to take; that is why he answers the question as to which types of
recognition are to be distinguished, by referring to the various values that can
be seen as be tting human essence. It is not surprising that Laitinen thereby
comes to the tripartite distinction, since his conceptual orientation, like
Ikäheimo’s, is Hegelian: human subjects can be recognized for good reasons
because they possess either the same dignity as all others or exceptional
capacities or speci c signi cance for others. From what I said earlier
regarding Laitinen’s distinction between potentiality and actuality, it is clear
that we are to understand these three values as objective, timeless potentials
of human essence: as a result of the corresponding recognitional responses of
legal respect, of love, and of esteem, subjects come to be able to identify with
the three evaluative qualities to which they always already potentially have
access, independently of all historical transformations. For the reasons
mentioned, I do not agree with such a strong value realism, which
presupposes a nite number of realizable human values; this type of view
ignores, as a matter of principle, not only the social constitution of all
evaluative qualities but also the possibility that new values could emerge.17 In
my view, the ‘space of reasons’ is also a historically changing domain; the
evaluative human qualities to which we can respond rationally in recognizing
others form ethical certitudes whose character changes unnoticeably with the
cultural transformations of our lifeworld. If we assume, in addition, that these
changes in our ethical knowledge have occurred in the direction of increasing
individuality and inclusion, then the three forms of recognition that Ikäheimo
and Laitinen both presuppose can be understood as the result of a historical
learning process: in our lifeworld, we, the children of modernity, have learned
to perceive in other human subjects three potential evaluative qualities to
which we can respond appropriately with the relevant recognitional
behaviour, according to the kind of relationship in question; what we then
do, in such acts of recognition, involves publicly making explicit the
knowledge that we have acquired in the process of socialization.
Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions 513
III
In my response to the systematic proposals of Ikäheimo and Laitinen, the
central issue was the appropriate understanding of the concept of recognition.
Faced with the choice between the attribution model and the response model,
I took the path of a moderate value realism: we are to understand
‘recognition’ as a behavioural reaction in which we respond rationally to
evaluative qualities that we have learned to perceive, to the extent to which
we are integrated into the second nature of our lifeworld. This formulation
does not, however, make adequately clear why the concept of ‘recognition’,
thus understood, refers to a moral action; we are, of course, dealing with an
action that is mediated by evaluative reasons, but that is far from enough to
show that this must also be a matter of acting morally. The intended
connection rst arises with Kant’s claim that ‘[r]espect is properly the
representation of a worth [or ‘value’: Wert] that infringes upon my self-
love’,18 that is, something’s (or someone’s) value can require us to constrain
our actions in a non-egoistical manner. Joseph Raz seems to have something
similar in mind when he writes that ‘the value of what is of value determines
what action, if any, it is a reason to perform’.19 The implication of this line of
thinking is that the reason why acts of recognition must be moral acts is that
they are determined by the value or worth of other persons; acts of recognition
are oriented not towards one’s own aims but rather towards the evaluative
qualities of others. If this is so, then we would have to be able to distinguish as
many forms of moral action as there are values of human beings to be
recognized; I have thus concluded, in several recent essays, that we should
distinguish three sources of morality, which are meant to correspond to the
differentiated forms of recognition found in our lifeworld.20 My proposal thus
overlaps only super cially with that of Arnold Gehlen, who also distinguishes
three sources of morality; contrary to Heidegren’s assertions, I take my
starting-point not from functional demands of human nature but rather from
aspects of the value of human persons, aspects that have become
differentiated as the result of a historical learning process.
With these remarks, I am already approaching the theme that is at the core
of Antti Kauppinen’s essay. In mentioning the implications that I wish to
draw for moral philosophy from the historically justi ed distinction between
three forms of recognition, I am once again underscoring the point of all my
efforts here: basically, what I am concerned with is the attempt to use the
concept of recognition to develop the normative foundations on the basis of
which social criticism can be justi ed. The astute comments that Kauppinen
directs at this goal of my work are extremely well suited to helping me clarify
matters further. Even just the few pages he devotes to the opaque eld of
social criticism make it possible to specify precisely my theoretical point of
departure: in contrast to approaches that try to criticize social relations
514 Axel Honneth
for granted that human beings need the experience of recognition in order to
relate to their capabilities and potentials in a way that permits a free,
uncoerced realization of their personality. Taking a page from Laitinen, I
should perhaps now say that social recognition represents the necessary
condition for subjects being able to identify with their valuable qualities and,
accordingly, develop genuine autonomy. This premise remains a claim within
philosophical anthropology, even though I now emphasize much more than
previously the historical alterability of forms of recognition; it is still a matter
of the invariant dependence of humans on the experience of recognition, even
though its forms and contours can become differentiated in the course of
historical transformations. For me, the decisive point that Kauppinen makes
in connection with my anthropological starting assumptions is the proposal
that he makes in connection with the ‘implicit’ character of norms of
recognition: he recommends that these be understood, following Robert
Brandom, as generalized behavioural expectations that we follow, not
explicitly or consciously, but rather implicitly; accordingly, we become
aware of the norms that regulate our behaviour in the form of ‘knowing how’
only in those moments when our expectations are disrupted; the interruption
of our action forces us to make explicit the portion of our latent background
beliefs that is ineluctable for making sense of the situation. I see no dif culty
in incorporating this suggestion with the ideas I developed earlier, regarding
the basis for acts of recognition in our socially acquired background
knowledge: if we think of norms of recognition as patterns of response that we
master in the course of acquiring evaluative knowledge, this must be a matter
of ‘knowing how’ that we can never completely articulate in explicit rules.
This conceptual result actually only explains why the theory of recognition
takes the form of social criticism that Kauppinen terms ‘reconstructive’: the
critique relies on norms of recognition that it must make explicit via a form of
reconstruction, because the validity of those norms has the character of
implicit knowledge. This does not yet show that the concept of recognition
can also accomplish the more ambitious tasks that Kauppinen associates with
the strong version of reconstructive critique; that would require demonstrat-
ing that the norms of recognition that are reconstructed in each case are not of
a merely contingent character but have, rather, necessarily universalistic
content. This is where we come to the most dif cult questions that Kauppinen
directs at my approach; he is not sure to what extent a society’s implicit norms
of recognition can yield a universalistic basis for forms of critique that
attempt to connect up with the self-understanding of their addressees.
In my rebuttal, I will skip over the questions that Kauppinen treats under
the rubric of a ‘Priority Challenge’. I currently think it is possible, without too
many dif culties, to use the historical, sociological, and psychological
literature to indicate the priority that normative questions of recognition must
have, from the perspective of those affected, ahead of other moral interests;
516 Axel Honneth
moreover, I have recently attempted to work out, in several recent texts, the
explanatory proof for a prioritization of this sort.21 For me, the real challenge
begins at the point where Kauppinen doubts these norms of recognition can
yield an adequate basis for a universalistic justi cation of my critical
aspirations. The rst problem that arises in this context results once again
from my repeated assertion that recognitional behaviour serves to enable
autonomy or self-realization; this formulation leaves the impression that
recognition is accorded the role of a merely instrumental value, whereas
autonomy or self-realization occupies the truly decisive position as the
highest moral value. I shall rst reply brie y to the charge of ‘instrument-
alism’ just voiced, before I then turn to the charge of cultural ‘particularism’.
The suspicion of instrumentalism arises from my starting assumption that
social recognition is a necessary condition for the individual autonomy of
persons. The character of that claim changes markedly, however, as soon as
one notes additionally that these acts of recognition also represent the morally
appropriate response to individuals’ evaluative qualities; for what was
initially just a ‘condition’ loses its purely instrumental meaning in coming to
be also a matter of meeting a moral or ethical demand. Just as Kant locates
both a precondition and an obligation in the concept of ‘respect’, one must see
the concept of ‘recognition’ as simultaneously representing both as well: it is
in virtue of being in accordance with individuals’ potential evaluative
qualities that recognition comes to be a condition for the development of their
autonomy. In this sense, it would be a mistake to follow Kauppinen in
speaking of ‘recognition’ as merely secondary to a primary goal of ‘self-
realization’; on the contrary, the point is that individuals’ autonomy can reach
its fullest development only via the relevant recognitional responses, and it
would thus be entirely inappropriate to draw a primary/secondary distinction
here.
With these re ections, I am already working within one of the two possible
solutions that Kauppinen distinguishes, namely, the one he labels the
‘foundationalist possibility’. I do indeed assume that we should understand
autonomy or self-realization as the overarching telos of our human form of
life, in terms of which our internal critique can orient itself. In order to
understand how a universalistic approach of this sort can be combined with
the idea of internal critique, however, two things need to be made more
precise. I have spoken throughout of ‘autonomy’ or ‘self-realization’ in the
most neutral sense possible, in which we attribute to every human being an
interest in being able to freely determine and realize his own desires and
intentions; that is why, on my view, this way of specifying the goal does not
entail any culturally speci c commitments, or even the designation of
particular conceptions of the good. On the contrary, a formal concept of
‘autonomy’ or ‘self-realization’ should rather let differences come to the fore
regarding the various cultural ways of realizing, within history, the telos of a
Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions 517
speculative terrain here. As is true of Habermas and his approach, I too need a
plausible concept of progress for the theory of recognition if I am to justify the
universalistic content of my internalist approach to critique; and as in the case
of his writings – indeed, in a much more underdeveloped and confusing way –
the building blocks for such a conception are lying around in my writings,
without ever really tting together. What is, above all, unclear to me is how to
square the anthropological speculations about anti-social human tendencies
with the suggestions I have made in connection with the structural surplus
regarding the validity of recognition norms. But the authors of the essays
collected here can take comfort in the fact that there may well be no greater
compliment to the signi cance of their criticisms than the admission that I am
confronted here with problems that are dif cult to solve.
NOTES
1 Cf. Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, Social Action and Human Nature, trans. Raymond Meyer
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), ch. 2.
2 John McDowell, ‘Two Sorts of Naturalism’, in Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 167–97.
3 Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination , trans. Paul Stern (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1986), Lecture 11.
4 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Con icts,
trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).
5 Honneth, ‘Redistribution as Recognition’ , in Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribu-
tion or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (London: Verso, forthcoming).
6 Arnold Gehlen, Moral und Hypermoral: Eine pluralistische Ethik (Frankfurt a/M:
Athenäum, 1969).
7 Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1997).
8 Axel Honneth, ‘Facetten des vorsozialen Selbst. Eine Erwiderumg auf Joel Whitebook’ ,
Psyche 55 (2001), pp. 790–802.
9 Axel Honneth, ‘Postmodern Identity and Object-Relations Theory: On the Supposed
Obsolence of Psychoanalysis’ , Philosophical Explorations 2 (1999), pp. 225–42; Axel
Honneth, ‘Das Werk der Negativitä t. Eine psychoanalytische Revision der Anerken-
nungstheorie’ , in Bohleber and Sibylle Drews (eds), Die Gegenwart der Psychoanalyse –
Die Psychoanalyse der Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2001), pp. 238–45.
10 Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of
Domination (New York: Basic Books, 1988).
11 Axel Honneth, ‘“Angst und Politik” – Stärken und Schwächen der Pathologiediagnose von
Franz Neumann’, in Mattias Iser and David Strecker (eds), Kritische Theorie der Politik:
Franz Neumann – eine Bilanz (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, forthcoming).
12 Cf. the entry on ‘Recognition’ , in Michael J. Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1992).
13 Stanley Cavell, ‘Knowing and Acknowledging’ , in Must We Mean What We Say?
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 238–66.
14 John McDowell, ‘Two Sorts of Naturalism’, op. cit.; Sabina Lovibond, Ethical Formation
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), ch. 1.
15 Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), chs. 7 and 12; and his Necessity, Volition, and Love (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), esp. chs. 7, 11, and 14.
16 Axel Honneth, ‘Redistribution as Recognition’, op. cit.
Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions 519
17 Hans Joas, Die Entstehung der Werte (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1997); English translation
forthcoming from Polity Press.
18 Immanuel Kant, ‘Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals’, in Mary J. Gregor (trans.
and ed.), Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 56,
second footnote [Akädemie edition 4: 401–2].
19 Joseph Raz, Value, Respect, and Attachment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), p. 166.
20 Axel Honneth, Das Andere der Gerechtigkeit (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 2000), part II;
English trans. forthcoming from Polity Press.
21 Axel Honneth, ‘Redistribution as Recognition’, op. cit.
22 Axel Honneth, ‘Between Hermeneutics and Hegelianism: John McDowell and the
Challenge of Moral Realism’, in Nicholas H. Smith (ed.), Reading McDowell (London:
Routledge, 2002), pp. 246–66.