ABELARDO APORTADERA v. MANUEL C.

SOTTO +

CONCEPCION, J.:

In the general elections held on November 10, 1959, petitioner Abelardo Aportadera and respondent
Manuel C. Sotto obtained 66,209 and 78,346 votes respectively for the office of Vice-Governor of the
province of Davao. Accordingly, on December 16, 1959, the corresponding board of canvassers
proclaimed respondent as the candidate elected for said Office.

In due time, petitioner instituted this quo warranto proceedings, upon the ground that, at the time of
said election, respondent was not a qualified voter of the Province of Davao, for he was a voter duly
registered in Precinct No. 16-A of the fourth legislative district of Manila, in the election years 1953,
1955, 1957 and 1959; that on October 3, 1959, respondent registered as a new voter in Precinct No. 9 of
Davao City without first "securing the transfer to Davao Province or City or the cancellation of his
registration as a voter" in said Precinct No., 16-A of Manila; that he belatedly filed, with the office of the
City Treasurer of Manila, an application for such cancellation on October 30,1959, or 34 days beyond the
period prescribed by law therefor, for which reason, said application should be considered illegal and
void; that in order to register as a new voter in Davao, respondent subscribed a voter's affidavit stating
that he was "not at present actually registered in any other precinct", thus committing a felony
punishable under Article 172, in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and that by
committing such crime, respondent disqualified himself as a voter, and, hence, became ineligible to the
office of Vice-Governor of Davao.

Respondent moved to dismiss the petition for the reason that it does not state a cause of action. After
due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao granted the motion and, accordingly, dismissed the
petition, with costs against petitioner. Hence, the latter has interposed the present appeal which is
before this Court, only questions of law being raised by him.

Section 2071 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1095, provides:

"No person shall be eligible to a provincial office unless at the time of the election he is a qualified voter
of the province, has been a bonafide resident therein for at least one year prior to the election, and is
not less than twenty-five years of age."

This case hinges on the question whether or not respondent is a "qualified voter" of Davao province.
Petitioner maintains the negative view upon two (2) grounds, namely: (1) that respondent is not a duly
registered voter of Davao, because, before being registered as such, he had failed to apply for the
cancellation of his registration as a voter in the City of Manila; and (2) that, having committed the
aforementioned felony in registering himself as a voter in Davao, he had become disqualified to vote,
and, consequently, to run for Vice-Governor.

The first ground is predicated upon the theory that registration as a voter is a condition essential to be a
"qualified voter". There is no merit in this pretense, which has already been rejected in Yra vs Abano (52
Phil., 380), Vivero vs. Murillo (52 Phil., 695), and Larena vs. Teves (61 Phil., 36). Registration is essential
to the exercise of the right of suffrage, not to the possession thereof. Indeed, only those who have such
right may be registered. In other words, the right must be possessed before the registration. The latter
does not confer it.

It is argued that the cases cited are no longer controlling because section 431 of the Old Election Code
provided:

"Every male person who is not a citizen or subject of a foreign power, twenty-one years of age or over,
who shall have been a resident of the Philippines, for one year and of the municipality in which he shall
offer to vote for six months next preceding the day of voting, is entitled to vote in all elections if
comprised within either of the following three classes:

"(a) Those who, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands upon the twenty-eight day of August,
nineteen hundred and sixteen, were legal voters and had exercised the right of suffrage.

"(b) Those who own real property to the value of five hundred pesos, or who annually pay thirty pesos
or more of the established taxes.

"(c) Those who are able to read and write either Spanish, English or a native language."

whereas section 98 of the Revised Election Code reads:

"Every citizen of the Philippines, whether male or female twenty-one years or over, able to read and
write, who has been a residient the Philippines for one year and of the Municipality in which he has
registered during the six months immediately preceding, who is not otherwise disqualified, may vote in
the said precinct at any election."

Petitioner lays stress upon the clause "in which he had registered," in this section 98, to bolster up the
claim that registration is one of the qualifications to be a voter. He overlooks, however, the fact that
registration in a given precinct is mentioned in said provision, in order that a person "may vote in said
precinct." In any event, said section 98 cannot be construed as adding registration to the original
requirements of a qualified voter, for, otherwise, it would conflict with Article V of the Constitution,
pursuant to which:

"Suffrage may be exercised by male citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
twenty-one years of age or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
preceding the election. The National Assembly shall extend the right of suffrage to women, if in a
plebiscite which shall be held for that purpose within two years after the adoption of this Constitution,
not less than three hundred thousand women possessing the necessary qualifications shall vote
affirmatively on the question."

Inasmuch as registration is not essential, under this Article, for the possession of the right of suffrage,
defendant's contention cannot be sustained without holding that section 98 of the Revised Election
Code seeks to amend said provision of our fundamental law, and, hence, without becoming
unconstitutional.

It is unnecessary, therefore, to pass upon the validity of respondent's registration in Davao, owing to his
failure to seasonably apply for the cancellation of his registration in Manila, for even if he had not been
registered at all in Davao, this could not decisively affect the question whether or not he is a "qualified
voter," if he meets the condition prescribed in said Article V of the Constitution, and, in addition thereto,
has the age and residence required in section 2071 adverted to above, which are not impugned by
petitioner herein.

Upon the other hand, the disqualifications to vote are set forth in section 99 of the Revised Election
Code, which is of the following tenor:

"The following persons shall not be qualified to vote:

(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment,
such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon.

(b) Any person who has been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property.

(c) Any person who has violated his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

(d) Insane or feeble-minded persons.

(e) Persons who cannot prepare their ballots themselves."

Admittedly, subdivisions (c), (d), and (e) of this section are inapplicable to the case at bar. Neither does
the offense allegedly committed by respondent fall under subdivisions (a) and (b), inasmuch as a "final
judgment" of conviction is necessary for the application thereof, and, admittedly, no such judgment has
been rendered against him.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant,
Abelardo Aportadera. It is so ordered.
Asistio v agguire
Agustin v comelec

In 1997, the petitioner was naturalized as a citizen of the United States

of America (USA). 3 On October 5, 2012, 4 he filed his certificate of candidacy
(CoC) for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte to
be contested in the May 13, 2013 local elections. 5 As the official candidate of
the Nacionalista Party, 6 he declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the
office he was seeking to be elected to; that he was a natural born Filipino
citizen; and that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos
Norte for 25 years. 7
On October 10, 2012, respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a rival mayoralty
candidate, filed in the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or to
Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin, docketed as SPA
No. 13-023 (DC), 8 alleging that the petitioner had made a material
misrepresentation in his CoC by stating that he had been a resident of the
 Municipality of Marcos for 25 years despite having registered as a voter
therein only on May 31, 2012. The petition stated the sole ground thuswise:
THE DECLARATION UNDER OATH MADE BY THE
RESPONDENT THAT HE IS ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE OR SEEK
TO BE ELECTED TO (sic) CONSTITUTES MATERIAL
MISREPRESENTATION FOR THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER (sic) HE
HAS NOT RESIDED AS REQUIRED BY LAW FOR A PERIOD OF
ONE YEAR IN THE LOCALITY HE SEEKS TO BE ELECTED.
||| (Agustin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207105, [November 10, 2015])

eligibility of the petitioner as a candidate for the position of Mayor

of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. (Agustin v. Commission on
|||

Elections, G.R. No. 207105, [November 10, 2015])

we uphold the declaration by the COMELEC En Banc that the petitioner

was ineligible to run and be voted for as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos,
Ilocos Norte. It is not disputed that on October 6, 2012, 36 after having
renounced his USA citizenship and having already filed his CoC, he travelled
abroad using his USA passport, thereby representing himself as a citizen of
the USA. He continued using his USA passport in his subsequent travels
abroad 37 despite having been already issued his Philippine
passport on August 23, 2012. 38 He thereby effectively repudiated his oath of
renunciation on October 6, 2012, the first time he used his USA passport after
renouncing his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012. Consequently, he could
be considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four days from
October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012. cSEDTC

The petitioner's continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA

through using his USA passport after the renunciation of his USA citizenship
reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen. 39 Such reversion
disqualified him from being elected to public office in the Philippines
||| (Agustin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207105, [November 10, 2015])
Pontawe v comelec

Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez were the candidates for the positions of
Mayor and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan, respectively, of the Nacionalista
Party (NP) during the elections of January 30, 1980 in Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan. On the other, Rosario T. Cabangon and Alfredo Flores were the
candidates for Mayor and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan, respectively, of
the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). On January 24, 1980,
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualified Federico Pontawe and
Wilfredo Lopez on the ground of turncoatism in PDC Case No. 42.
The Nacionalista Party, on January 29, 1980, upon receipt of the notice of
the COMELEC of said disqualification, nominated Carlos Pontawe, son of the
disqualified Federico Pontawe, and Louie Lopez, to substitute for
Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez, respectively. On the same day, January
29, 1980, disqualified candidates Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez filed a
Petition for Certiorari with this Court to Annul the resolution of
the COMELEC ordering their disqualification. The petition was docketed as G. R.
No. L-52433. However, upon separate manifestations of Federico Pontawe and
Wilfredo Lopez that they were abandoning their appeal, this Court,on April 24,
1980 and June 10, 1980, dismissed G. R. No. L-52433. LLphil

On January 31, 1980, Carlos Pontawe and Louie Lopez were proclaimed by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan as the duly elected
Municipal Mayor and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan, respectively. As a
consequence, on February 11, 1980, Rosario Cabangon and three other KBL
candidates who lost in theelections filed an election protest against
Carlos Pontawe, Louie Lopez and two others in the then Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan (Dagupan City).
On February 2, 1981, the lower court declared the election of
Carlos Pontawe and Louie Lopez as null and void and proclaimed Rosario
Cabangon and Alfredo Flores as duly elected Mayor and Member of the
Sangguniang Bayan, respectively.
On November 3, 1981, the COMELEC affirmed the decision of the trial court.
This decision of the COMELEC is the subject of the petition for certiorari in G. R.
No. L-59343. The petition was given due course and the parties have filed their
respective memoranda. In the meantime, Carlos Pontawe and Louie Lopez were
allowed to continue in their respective positions as Mayor and Member of the
Sangguniang Bayan pending the final determination of this case.
(Pontawe v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 59343, 61497, [April 24, 1985],
|||

220 PHIL 406-421)

hether or not Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez were still

candidates on election day. If they were, then the votes
"Pontawe" or "Lopez" would be considered stray (Pontawe v. |||

Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 59343, 61497, [April 24, 1985], 220 PHIL
406-421)

Section 28, of The 1978 Election Code allows the substitution of

candidates who may have been disqualified after the last day for
filing the certificates of candidacy. The substitution may be on or
before mid-day of the day of the election. A substitute is one who
takes the place of another who is no longer a candidate,
otherwise the former would be an additional, not a substitute
candidate. And, if the disqualification is not immediately
executory, there would be no need of nominating a substitute.
Having been disqualified before election day, the votes "Pontawe"
and "Lopez" could not be counted for Federico and Wilfredo, but
should be credited as they were by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers in favor of Carlos and Louie. (Pontawe v. Commission on |||

Elections, G.R. No. 59343, 61497, [April 24, 1985], 220 PHIL 406-421)

Papandayan, Jr. vs COMELEC [381 SCRA 133]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Municipal Corporation, Qualification of Elective Officials, Residence)

Facts: In the May 14, 2001 elections, 3 candidates ran for the position of mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del
Sur, namely: petitioner Papandayan Jr., respondent Balt, who was the incumbent mayor seeking
reelection, and Bantuas. Respondent Balt sought the disqualification of petitioner alleging that
petitioner was not a resident of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a permanent resident of
Bayang, Lanao del Sur.

Petitioner claimed that he was a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran; that in 1990, he transferred his domicile
from Bayang to Tangcal and stayed there with his wife, a native of Tangcal; that he managed an
agricultural land in Tubaran; and that he filed in 1998 his COC for the position of municipal mayor of
Tubaran, which he later withdraw.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him disqualified in a
resolution, on the ground that he is not a resident of Tubaran.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified to run as an elective official.

Held: No. The petitioner has duly proven that, although he was formerly a resident of Bayang, he later
transferred residence to Tangcal, Tubaran as shown by his actual and physical presence therein for 10
years prior to the May 14, 2001 elections.

Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) provides that an elective official
must be a “…resident therein (barangay, municipality, city or province) for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the day of the election…”

Domicile and residence are synonymous. The term residence as used in election law, imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, couple with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business, pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.

Requisites in order to acquire a new domicile by choice are: there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.

Respondent Lazaro, who was then Vice Governor of Laguna, assumed by

succession the office of the Governor. Later, she filed her certificate of candidacy
for the gubernatorial position of Laguna.
Herein petitioner Pangkat Laguna, a duly registered political party, filed
with the COMELEC a petition which sought to disqualify respondent as candidate
in the gubernatorial race for acts violative of Section 80 and Section 261 (v) of
the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC Second Division granted the petition; however, said
resolution was reversed by the COMELEC en banc upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent.
Petitioner assailed the resolution of the COMELEC en banc for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court held that the act of respondent as Chief Executive of
the Province of Laguna in ordering the purchase of various items and the
consequent distribution thereof to the constituents of Laguna, in line with the
local government unit's sports and education program was not constitutive of the
act of election campaigning or partisan political activity contemplated and
explicitly prescribed under the pertinent provisions of Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
 Likewise, evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish and substantiate
petitioner's bare allegation that — in furtherance of the public bidding conducted
on 28 March 2001 — public funds were ever released, disbursed or expended
during the 45-day prohibitive period provided under the law. Absent such clear
and convincing proof, the Court found no cogent reason to disturb the factual
findings and conclusions of respondent COMELEC.
(Pangkat Laguna v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 148075, [February 4,
|||

2002], 426 PHIL 480-490)