CASE
RULE 62: INTERPLEADER
1. Wack Wack Country Club Inc.
vs Won
G. R. No. 23851, March 26, 1976 either of the contending claimants. Otherwise,he
2. Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation vs Metro
Container Corporation
G. R. No. 127913, September
13, 2001
3. Lim vs Continental
Development Corporation
G. R. No. 41818, February 18,
1976
4. Arreza vs Diaz
G. R. No. 133113, August 30,
2001
5. Sy-Quia vs Sheriff of Ilocos
Sur and De Leon
G. R. No. L-22807, October
10, 1924
DOCTRINE
It must be filed within a reasonable time after a
dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by
may be barred by laches or undue delay. It is too
late when filed after judgment has been rendered
against him in favor of one of the contending
claimants, especially where he had notice of the
conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the
judgment and neglected the opportunity to
implead the adverse claimants in the suit where
judgment was entered.
If a property was mortgaged and right has
been consolidated after failure to redeem,
interpleader may no longer be filed by the lessee
who pretends not to know to whom payment
should be made, because the question in the
unlawful detainer suit is limited to the question of
physical or material possession of the
premises.
The remedy is afforded not to protect a person
against a double liability but to protect him
against a double vexation in respect of one
liability.
The court in a complaint for interpleader shall
determine the rights and obligations of the parties
and adjudicate their respective claims. Such
rights, obligations and claims could only be
adjudicated if put forward by the aggrieved party
in
assertion of his rights.
In respect to conflicting claims to property seized
by the sheriff in the foreclosure of a chattel
mortgage, the sheriff may bring an action of
interpleader under section 120 of the Code of
Civil Procedure in order to determine the
respective rights of the claimants. Though in such
cases it may ordinarily be better practice for the
1
 sheriff to sell the property and hold the proceeds
of the same subject to the outcome of the action
of interpleader, his action in suspending the sale
pending the determination of the action
interpleader seems justified by the facts in the
present case and the court will not interfere by
mandamus.

6. Ocampo v. Tirona When the court orders that the claimants litigate
G. R. No. 147812, April 6, among themselves, there arises in reality a new
2005 action and the former are styled interpleaders,
and in such a case the pleading which initiates
the action is called a complaint of interpleader
and not a cross-complaint.

7. Pagkalinawan vs Rodas when it is not provided in a judgment that the

G.R. No. L-1806 February 25, defendants are liable to pay jointly and severally
1948 a certain sum of money, none of them may be
compelled to satisfy in full said judgment.

8. Mesina vs Intermediate
Appellate Court
G. R. No. 70145, November
13, 1986
9. Vda. De Camilo vs Arcamo
G. R. No. 15653, September
29, 1961
10. Beltran vs People’s Homesite
and Housing Corporation
G. R. No. 25138, August 28,
1969
RULE 63:DECLARATORY RELIEF
AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Almeda vs Bathala Marketing As a rule, the petition for declaratory relief should
Industries, Inc. be dismissed in view of the pendency of a
G. R. No. 150806, January 28, separate action for unlawful detainer.
2008
Velarde vs Social Justice Society A justiciable controversy to an existing case or
G. R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004 controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is conjectural or
merely anticipatory. A petition filed with the trial

2
 court should contain a plain, concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim.

Philippine Deposit Insurance A petition for declaratory relief does not

Corporation vs CA essentially entail an executory process. There is
G. R. No. 126911, April 30, 2003 nothing in its nature, however, that prohibits a
counterclaim from being set-up in the same
action.

Department of Budget and

Management vs Manila’s Finest
Retirees
Association
G. R. No. 169466, May 9, 2007
Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation vs CA
G. R. No. 126911, April 30, 2003
Araneta vs Gatmaitan
G. R. No. 8895 and 9191, April 30,
1957
Jumamil vs Café A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract
G. R. No. 144570, September 21, to challenge its
2005 validity. Parties suing as taxpayers must
specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an
officer of the State for the purpose of executing
an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds.

Santos vs Aquino The petition for declaratory relief must be asked

G.R. Nos. 86181-82 January 13, before a violation of the ordinance is committed.
1992 In this case, it was shown that petitioner did not
pay the taxes already due. Another reason is that
petitioner is not the real party in the case.
Petitioner was only the manager of the theater,
not the owner and as such he is not entitled to
bring this action.

Edades vs Edades The case (hereditary rights in the property of

3
G.R. No. L-8964. July 31, 1956
Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority vs Viron Transportation
Co., Inc
G. R. No. 170656, August 15,
2007
Republic of the Philippines vs
Cipriano Orbecido III
G. R. No. 154380 October 5,
2005
Quisimbing vs Garcia
G. R. No. 175527 December 8,
2008
his
alleged father and incidentally the recognition of
his status as an illegitimate son of Emigdio) does
not fall under the authorized causes for an action
for declaratory relief. It does not concern a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument. It does
not affect a statute or ordinance whose
construction or validity is questioned.
The requisites are that (a) there must be
a justiciable controversy, (b) the
controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse, (c) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy, and (d) the issue invoked must be
ripe for judicial determination.
At the outset, we note that the petition for
authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory
relief. This case concerns the applicability of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between
two Filipino citizens where one later acquired
alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the
parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect
the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his
capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for
relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The
issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries,
litigation ensues and puts into question the
validity of his second marriage.
Where the law or contract has already been
contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume
jurisdiction over the action. Under such
circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action
has already accrued in favor of one or the other
party, there is nothing more for the court to
explain or clarify, short of a judgment or final
4

CJH Development Corporation vs.
Bureau of Internal Revenue
G. R. No. 172457 December 24,
2008
Ollada vs. Central Bank of the
Philippines
G. R. No. 11357, May 31, 1962
Lim vs. Republic
G. R. No. 29535 February 27,
1971
Dy Poco vs. Commissioner of
Immigration
G. R. No. 22313, March 31, 1966
order.
A petition for declaratory relief cannot properly
have a court decision as its subject matter. There
are other remedies available to a party who is not
agreeable to a decision whether it be a question
of law or fact. If it involves a decision of an
appellate court, the party may file a motion for
reconsideration or new trial in order that the
defect may be corrected. In case of ambiguity of
the decision, a party may file a motion for a
clarificatory judgment. One of the requisites of a
declaratory relief is that the issue must be ripe for
judicial determination. This means that litigation
is inevitable or there is no adequate relief
available in any other form or proceeding.
The rule is that an action for Declaratory Relief is
proper only if adequate relief is not available
through the means of other existing forms of
action or proceeding.
Declaratory relief in this jurisdiction is a special
civil action which may lie only when 'any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected
by statute or ordinance,' demands construction
thereof for a declaration of his rights thereunder.
None of the above circumstances exists in the
case under consideration. And this Court has
already held that there is no proceeding
established by law or the rules by which any
person claiming to be a citizen may get a
declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in
regard to his citizenship.
Where a declaratory judgment as to a disputed
fact would be determinative of issues rather than
a construction of definite stated rights, status,
and other relations, commonly expressed in
written instruments, the case is not one for
declaratory judgment." And, here, the material
issues are the citizenship of the mother and the
5

Singson vs. Republic
G. R. No. 21855 January 30,
1968
Government Service Insurance
System Employees Assocoation
vs. Alvendia
G.R. No. L-15614 May 30,
1960
Lim vs. Republic
G. R. No. 29535 February 27,
1971
Dela Llana vs. Commission on
Elections
illegitimacy of the petitioner, and the rights and
status of the latter which are sought to be
declared are dependent upon those disputed
issues.
Under our laws, there can be no action or
proceeding for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist
for the settlement of justiciable controversies,
which imply a given right, legally demandable
and enforceable, an act or omission violative of
said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned
by law, for said breach of right. As an incident
only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties
to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and
make a pronouncement relative to, their status.
Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond
judicial power . . . At times, the law permits the
acquisition of a given status, such as
naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no
similar legislation authorizing the institution of a
judicial proceeding to declare that a given person
is part of our citizenry.
DECLARATORY RELIEF; PETITION
UNNECESSARY IN MOOT CASES. If
declaratory relief is not necessary or not proper
where there is already an action pending in
another court involving the same issue, or where
the plaintiff has another more effective relief, with
more reason should it be improper or
unnecessary when it seeks judicial declaration
upon questions already determined in a case in
which the petitioner itself is a party.
It is now well settled . . . that there is no
proceeding established by law, or the rules, for
the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual . . . and that citizenship is not a proper
subject for declaratory judgment..
The matter of whether or not the holding of the
December 17, 1977 referendum is unnecessary
6
G. R. No. 47245, December 9, because the people, on several occasions, had
1977 already expressed their assent to the incumbent
President's continuance in office and their
approval of his programs of government, is a
political and non-justiciable question, involving as
it does the wisdom, no more and no less, of the
decision to call for a referendum.

Tanda vs. Aldaya DECLARATORY RELIEF; COURT DECISION

O. G. No. 11, 5175 September NOT PROPER SUBJECT OF ACTIONS;
15, 1956 REMEDY WHERE DECISION IS DOUBTFUL
OR AMBIGUOUS. — A court decision cannot be
the subject of declaratory relief for the simple
reason that if a party is not agreeable to a
decision either on questions of law or of fact, he
may file with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration or a new trial in order that the
defect may be corrected (section 1, Rule 37). The
same remedy may be pursued by a party with
regard to a decision of the Court of Appeals or of
the Supreme Court (section 1, Rule 54, section 1,
Rule 55, in connection with section 1, Rule 53). A
party may even seek relief from a judgment or
order of an inferior court on the ground of fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence if he
avails of that remedy within the terms prescribed
by section 1, Rule 38. In the present case, the
fundamental reason why the decision cannot be
the subject of declaratory relief is predicated
upon the principle of res judicata which stamps
the mark of finality in a case which has been fully
and definitely litigated in court.

Ollada vs. Central bank of the
Philippines
G. R. No. 11357, May 31, 1962
An action for declaratory relief should be filed
before there has been a breach of a contract,
statute or right. The rule is that an action for
Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief
is not available through the means of other
existing forms of action or proceeding.

Kawasaki Port Service xxx what is sought is a declaration not only that
Corporation vs. Amores private respondent is a corporation for there is no
G. R. No. 58340, July 16, 1991 dispute on that matter but also that it is separate
and distinct from C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha

7
 and therefore, not liable for the latter's
indebtedness. xxx

The prevailing rule is that "where a declaratory

judgment as to a disputed fact would be
determinative of issues rather than a construction
of definite stated rights, status and other
relations, commonly expressed in written
instrument, the case is not one for declaratory
judgment." Thus, considering the nature of a
proceeding for declaratory judgment, wherein
relief may be sought only to declare rights and
not to determine or try issues, there is more valid
reason to adhere to the principle that a
declaratory relief proceeding is unavailable where
judgment would have to be made, only after a
judicial investigation of disputed issues. In fact,
private respondent itself perceives that
petitioners may even seek to pierce the veil of
corporate identity.

University of the Philippines vs. With respect to the prayer of the complaint for
Court of Appeals "judgment declaring plaintiff Tasadays to be a
G. R. No. 97827, February 9, distinct ethnic community within the territory
1993 defined under Presidential Proclamation No.
995," the lower court is cautioned that the same
is akin to a prayer for a judicial declaration of
Philippine citizenship which may not be granted
in a petition for declaratory relief.

Indeed, it is not the province of the court to make

pronouncements on matters beyond its ken and
expertise. To be sure, in resolving the complaint
for damages, the court may find congruence in
what is justiciable and what falls within the field of
the sciences. Still, it is best to keep in mind that
its proper role and function is the determination of
legal issues.

Tadeo vs. The Provincial Fiscal of The appellant not being one of the contracting
Pangasinan parties to the deed of sale but took part only as
G. R. No. 16474, January 31, 1962 notary public before whom they acknowledge the
execution thereof is not entitled to file an action
for declaratory judgment. None of his rights or

8

Chan vs. Galang
G. R. No. 21732, October 17, 1966 to entertain. It may refuse to exercise the power
Chua U vs Hon. Manuel Lim
G. R. No. 19639, February 26,
1965
Adlawan vs. The Intermediate
Appellate Court
G. R. No. 73022, February 9,
1989
Tolentino vs. Board of
Accountancy
G.R. No. L-3062, September 28
duties thereunder need be declared.
Declaratory relief is discretionary upon the court
to declare rights and to construe instruments in
any case where the declaration or construction is
not necessary and proper at the time under all
the circumstances (Section 5, Rule 64, formerly
Section 6, Rule 66, Rules of Court). The case at
bar is such one case, for the proper forum in
which to first resolve the disputed issue of
citizenship is the Board of Commissioners.
Courts are loath to interfere prematurely with
administrative proceedings, and will not assume
jurisdiction of declaratory judgment proceedings
until administrative remedies have been
exhausted.
A petition for declaratory relief will be denied
when other parties who would be necessarily
affected by the judgment are not represented in
the proceedings.
In such special civil action the judgment does not
essentially entail an executory process since
generally, other than a declaration of such rights
and duties, other affirmative reliefs, as these are
understood in ordinary civil actions, are not
sought by the proponent. However, the Court has
held that although the action is for a declaratory
judgment but the allegations in the complaints
are sufficient to make out a case for specific
performance or recovery of property with claims
for damages, and the defendants did not raise an
issue in the trial court to challenge the remedy or
form of the action availed of, the court can grant
such affirmative relief as may be warranted by
the evidence.
Where plaintiff seeks declaratory relief not for his
own personal benefit, or because his rights or
prerogatives as an accountant or as an
9

Commissioner of Customs et. al
vs Cloribel et. Al
G. R. No. 21036, June 30, 1977
Visayan Packing Corporation vs
Reparations Commission
G. R. No. 29673, November 12,
1987
individual, are adversely affected, but rather for
the benefit of persons belonging to other
professions or callings, who are not parties in this
case; or where plaintiff does not claim to have
suffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his
rights or prerogatives as an accountant by the
use of the disputed trade name by the
defendants, who also are certified accountants,
the case does not properly come under Rule 66.
In order that an action for declaratory relief may
be entertained, it must be predicated on the
following requisite facts or conditions: (1) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be
ripe for judicial determination.
A third-party complaint is inconceivable when the
main case is one for nothing more than a
declaratory relief. In a third-party complaint, the
defendant or third-party plaintiff is supposed to
seek contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief from the third-party defendant is
respect to the claim of the plaintiff against him.
There is nothing in the nature of a special civil
action for declaratory relief that proscribes the
filing of a counterclaim based on the same
transaction, deed or contract subject of the
complaint. A special civil action is after all not
essentially different from an ordinary civil action,
which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of
the Rules of Court, except that the former deals
with a special subject matter which makes
necessary some special regulation. But the
identity between their fundamental nature is such
that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits
may and do apply to special civil actions if not
inconsistent with or if they may serve to
supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules
governing special civil actions.
10
Baguio Citizens Action Inc et. al
vs The
City Council and City Mayor of
Baguio
G. R. No. 27247, April 20, 1983
RULE 64: REVIEW OF
JUDGMENTS AND FINAL
ORDERS OR RESOLUTIONS OF
THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND THE
COMISSION ON AUDIT
RULE 65 : CERTIORARI
Victorino Francisco vs Winai
Permskul
G. R. No. 81006, May 12, 1989
The non-inclusion of the squatters mentioned in
the Ordinance in question as party defendants in
this case cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance of Baguio. There is
nothing in Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court which says that the non-joinder of persons
who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the declaration is a jurisdictional
defect. Said section merely states that "all
persons shall be made parties who have or claim
any interest which would be affected by the
declaration; and no declaration shall, except or
otherwise provided in these rules, prejudice the
rights of persons not parties to the action.''
This section contemplates a situation where there
are other persons who would be affected by the
declaration, but were not impleaded as
necessary parties, in which case the declaration
shall not prejudice them.
If at all, the case may be dismissed not on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction but for the reason
stated in Section 5 of the same Rule stating that
"the Court may refuse to exercise the power to
declare rights and to construe instruments in any
case where a decision would not terminate the
uncertainly or controversy which gave rise to the
action, or any case where the declaration or
construction is not necessary and proper at the
time under all circumstances."
It is clear that where the decision of the appellate
court actually reproduces the findings of fact or
the conclusions of law of the court below, it is not
a memorandum decision as envisioned in the
above provision. The distinctive features of the
11

New Frontier Sugar Corporation
vs RTC
G. R. No. 165001, January 31,
2007
Jonhson Lee and Sonny Moreno
vs CA
G. R. No. 137914, December 4,
2003
memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by
an appellate court, and second, it incorporates by
reference the findings of fact or the conclusions
of law contained in the decision, order or ruling
under review.
At any rate, the reason for allowing the
incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid
the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of
the lower court, or portions thereof, in the
decision of the higher court. The idea is to avoid
having to repeat in the body of the latter decision
the findings or conclusions of the lower court
since they are being approved or adopted
anyway.
Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It is an
original and independent action that was not part
of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the
judgment or order complained of. More
importantly, since the issue is jurisdiction, an
original action for certiorari may be directed
against an interlocutory order of the lower court
prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy. A petition for certiorari should
be filed not later than sixty days from the notice
of judgment, order, or resolution, and a motion for
reconsideration is generally required prior to the
filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford
the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged
errors.
The general rule is that, where a motion to quash
is denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go to
trial without prejudice to reiterating the special
defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial
on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to
appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by
law. And, even in the exceptional case where
such denial may be the subject of a special civil
action for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration
must first be filed to give the trial court an
12

Microsoft Corporation vs Best
Deal Computer Center et. al.
G. R. No. 148029, September 24,
2002
Manuel Camacho vs Coresis et.
al.
G. R. No. 134372, August 22,
2002
opportunity to correct its error. Finally, even if a
motion for reconsideration were filed and denied,
the remedy under Rule 65 would still be
unavailable absent any showing of the grounds
provided for in Section l thereof. The petition
before the Court of Appeals, subject of this
appeal, did not allege any of such grounds.
A special civil action for certiorari will prosper
only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested.
For an abuse to be grave the power must be
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
act in contemplation of law. There is grave abuse
of discretion when respondent acts in a
capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of
its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
Even assuming that the orders were erroneous,
such error would merely be deemed as an error
of judgment that cannot be remedied by
certiorari. As long as the respondent acted with
jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in
the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more
than an error of judgment which may be reviewed
or corrected only by appeal.
From the records, we find no valid ground nor
cogent reason to hold that the respondent Office
had gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
assailed Resolution dated June 3, 1997.
Institutional academic freedom includes the right
of the school or college to decide for itself, its
aims and objectives and the methods on how
best to attain them, free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding
public welfare calls for some restraint. 22 It
encompasses the freedom to determine for itself
on academic grounds: who may teach, what may
13
 be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may
be admitted to study." 23 The right of the school
to confirm and validate the teaching method of
Dr. Daleon is at once apparent in the third
freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught."

Robert Del Mar vs Court of Well-settled is the rule that certiorari is not a
Appeals substitute for a lost appeal. Even if for this reason
G. R. No. 139008, March 18, alone, the petition should not be given due
2002 course.

Leung Ben vs P. J. O’Brien et. al. Where a Court of First Instance issues an
G.R. No. 13602 April 6, 1918 attachment for which there is no statutory
authority, it is acting irregularly and in excess of
its jurisdiction in the sense necessary to justify
the Supreme Court in entertaining an application
for a writ of certiorari and quashing the
attachment.

In such case the remedy on the attachment bond

or by appeal would not be sufficiently speedy to
meet the exigencies of the case. Attachment is
an exceedingly violent measure and its
unauthorized issuance may result in the infliction
of damage which could never be repaired by any
pecuniary award at the final hearing.

Matiano Tengco vs Vicente Where the jurisdiction which a court exercises is

Jocson et. al. special, created by an act of legislature, its
G.R. No. 19427 September 2, modes of proceedings and powers are regulated
1922 and defined by the law and it cannot, under any
supposed analogy to ordinary proceedings,
exercise any power beyond that which the act of
the legislature has given.

CONSOLIDATED CASE: PCGG vs Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in

Silangan Investors and Managers
et. al. and PCGG
vs Polygon Investors and
Managers et. al.
G. R. Nos. 167055-56 and 170673,
March 25, 2010
scope and inflexible in character. It is not a
general utility tool in the legal workshop. It offers
only a limited form of review. Its principal function
is to keep an inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction.
It can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction,
that is, one where the act complained of was
issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial

14

Julie’s Franchise Corporation et. In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the
al vs Hon Chandler Ruiz et. al.
G. R. No. 180988 August 28, 2009 only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will
Severino Vergara vs Ombudsman
G. R. No. 174567 March 13, 2009
body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving
and resolve questions or issues beyond its
competence such as errors of judgment. Errors of
judgment of the trial court are to be resolved by
the appellate court in the appeal by and of error
or via a petition for review on certiorari in this
Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to correct errors of
judgment. An error of judgment is one in which
the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by
an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one where the
act complained of was issued by the court
without or in excess of jurisdiction and which
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ
of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the
evidence of the parties, and its conclusions
anchored on the said findings and its conclusions
of law. As long as the court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the
exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing
more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by
an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
This Court has consistently adopted a policy of
non-interference in the exercise of the
Ombudsman's constitutionally mandated powers.
The Ombudsman, which is "beholden to no one,
acts as the champion of the people and the
preserver of the integrity of the public
service". However, this Court is not precluded
from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when
there is grave abuse of discretion, in which case
the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court may be
exceptionally invoked pursuant to Section 1,
15

Concepcion Vda. De Daffon vs
Court of Appeals
G. R. No. 129017 August 20, 2002 is not appealable. Hence, it may be the subject of
Article VIII of the Constitution. We have
enumerated instances where the courts may
interfere with the Ombudsman's investigatory
powers:
(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights
of the accused;
(b) When necessary for the orderly administration
of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions;
(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is
sub judice;
(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in
excess of authority;
(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation;
(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense;
(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution;
(i) Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance.
Petitioner argues that the order which denied the
Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order which
a special civil action for certiorari. However, for
certiorari to lie, it must be convincingly proved
that the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion, or an act too patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act
in contemplation of law; or that the trial court
exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and personal
hostility. In the case at bar, the trial court did not
16

Gabriel Duero vs Court of Appeals Indeed, ". . . the trial court was duty-bound to
G. R. No. 131282, January, 4,
2002
Eladio Dillena vs Court of Appeals The petition for certiorari which was belatedly
G. R. No. 77660, July 28, 1988
Remedios Velasco Vda de Caldito
vs Hon Rosalio Segundo et. al.
G. R. No. 58187, September 30,
1982
MMDA V. JANCOM
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. Thus, the Court of
Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition for
certiorari.
take judicial notice of the parameters of its
jurisdiction and its failure to do so, makes its
decision a 'lawless' thing." Since a decision of a
court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could
logically never become final and executory,
hence appeal therefrom by writ of error would be
out of the question. Resort by private respondent
to a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals was in order.
filed by petitioner before the Court of Appeals on
February 20, 1986 should have been dismissed
outright because the remedy of certiorari does
not lie where appeal has been lost. Certiorari
cannot take the place of an appeal.
Petitioner cannot avail of the remedy of certiorari
as a substitute for appeal as the questioned order
of dismissal is appealable. The proper remedy
should have been to appeal the same. No
circumstance had been shown to explain why
such procedure was not observed, nor to justify a
deviation from the same as to make available a
petition for certiorari in lieu of taking an
appropriate appeal. As may be noted, the petition
was filed more than one year after the issuance
of the order of dismissal complained of. Even in
situations wherein certiorari is allowed as a
remedy in lieu of appeal, said period may not be
considered as a reasonable time within which to
avail of such remedy. Moreover, the imputed
error to the challenged order is not jurisdictional
but merely one of judgment which is not
correctible by certiorari.
The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of
17
ENVIRONMENTAL the judgment on the merits is appeal. This is true
CORPORATION even if the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to
G. R. No. 147465, January 30, the court rendering the judgment is its lack of
2002 jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the
exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave
abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law
set out in the decision. The existence and
availability of the right of appeal proscribes a
resort to certiorari, because one of the
requirements for availment of the latter remedy is
precisely that "there should be no appeal"

The few significant exceptions were: when public

welfare and the advancement of public policy
dictate; or when the broader interests of justice
so require, or when the writs issued are null . . .
or when the questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority."

RODRIGUEZ V. COURT OF Clearly, where a police officer is dismissed by the

APPEALS PNP Director General and the dismissal is
G. R. No. 134278 August 7, 2002 affirmed by the NAPOLCOM National Appellate
Board, the proper remedy is to appeal the
dismissal with the DILG Secretary.

Neither certiorari nor mandamus can substitute

for appeal where the latter is the proper remedy.
The extraordinary remedies of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus will lie only when
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error of law in dismissing petitioner's special civil
action for certiorari and mandamus.

CONEJOS V COURT OF APPEALS Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari should be

G. R. No. 149473, August 9, summarily dismissed for adopting the wrong
2002 mode of appeal. Petitioner resorted to this special
civil action after failing to appeal within the fifteen
(15)-day reglementary period. This cannot be
countenanced. The special civil action of
certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an
appeal which petitioner already lost. Certiorari
lies only where there is no appeal nor any plain,

18

FELIZARDO V COURT OF
APPEALS
G. R. No. 112050 June 15, 1994
ESCUDERO V DULAY
G. R. No. 60578, February 23,
1988
ACAIN V INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. There is no reason why the
question being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether
the appellate court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitions, could not have
been raised on appeal. Concededly, there were
occasions when this Court treated a petition for
certiorari as one filed under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. However, the circumstances prevailing
in the instant case do not justify a deviation from
a general rule. Notably, the instant petition was
filed way beyond the reglementary period allowed
under Rule 45 without any justifiable reason
therefor nor any reasonable explanation being
proffered by petitioner.
When the Municipal Trial Court ruled that it could
act on the complaint for ejectment filed by the
private respondent even without prior barangay
conciliation proceedings, it committed a mere
error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. We have
held in many cases that while the referral of a
case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition
precedent for the filing of a complaint in court,
non-compliance therewith cannot affect the
jurisdiction which the court has already acquired
over the subject matter and over the person of
the defendant.
Hence, the remedy available to the petitioner was
to question the ruling of the court a quo in an
ordinary appeal and not, as he mistakenly did, in
a special civil action for certiorari.
Ordinarily, a special civil action under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court will not be a substitute or cure
for failure to file a timely petition for review on
certiorari (appeal) under Rule 45 of the Rules.
Where, however, the application of this rule will
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice, the rule may be relaxed.
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for
dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the
19
G. R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987 right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate
remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not
dismissing the case, and even assuming the
existence of the remedy of appeal, the Court
harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of
justice, a petition for certiorari may be
entertained, particularly where appeal would not
afford speedy and adequate relief.

SALUDES V. PAJARILLO Although an appeal from the decision of the

G.R. No. L-1121 July 29, 1947 municipal court was available, the same was not
an adequate remedy, there being an order of
execution issued by the municipal court, and
certiorari therefore lies.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V. The term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the
FLORENDO court, board or officer has jurisdiction over a case
G. R. No. 62082, February 26, but oversteps such jurisdiction while acting
1992 thereon.

Even when appeal is available and is the proper

remedy, this court has allowed a writ of certiorari
when the orders of the lower court were issued
either in excess of or without jurisdiction

JOSE V. ZULUETA It is true that in instances where the right to

G. R. No. 16598, May 31, 1961
appeal still existed but would be inadequate to
prevent the injury or wrong sought to be
recovered; as for instance where execution had
already been commenced, certiorari may be
allowed, however, this pronouncement cannot be
invoked in the instant case because not only is
there no showing that appeal from the disputed
orders would be inadequate and insufficient
remedy, but also that, the right to such appeal, at
the time the petition for certiorari was filed, has
already been lost and no longer available.

MARCELO V. DE GUZMAN An appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman

G. R. No. 29077 June 29, 1982 would neither be an adequate nor speedy
remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects

20

ST. PETER MEMORIAL PARK V.
CAMPOS, JR.
G. R. No. 38280 March 21, 1975
MARAHAY V. MELICOR
G. R. No. 44980 February 6,
1990
of the warrant. The seizure of her personal
property has resulted in total paralyzation of her
business, and recourse in appeal would have
unduly delayed recovery of the articles and
documents which have been improperly seized.
Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an
adequate and expeditious relief, certiorari can he
allowed as a mode of redress to prevent
irreparable damage and injury to a party.
A restraining order issued by the Supreme Court
enjoining a judge from enforcing his decision is
intended to retain the status quo insofar as said
decision and other circumstances surrounding it
are concerned. Any court action or order that
would change any circumstance of the decision is
necessarily included in the scope of the
restraining order. Thus, where the enjoined
decision had been appealed when the restraining
order was issued, an order dismissing the appeal
tended to change the status quo, since by reason
of the dismissal, the enjoined decision became
final, Said dismissal constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari.
Nevertheless, in the broader interests of justice,
this Court has given due course to the present
petition in consideration of the fact that this is not
the first time we have passed upon a petition for
certiorari, although the proper remedy is
appeal, where the equities warrant such
extraordinary recourse. This is especially true
where, as in the case, petitioner's affidavit of
merits shows that she has a good cause of
action, that her counsel's affidavit of merits avers
justifiable reasons for his non-appearance at said
hearing, and the trial court is faulted with gravely
abusing its discretion to the extent of denying due
process to therein plaintiff. Significantly, it was
respondent judge himself who advised petitioner
to avail of said remedy in his order dismissing
petitioner's second motion for
reconsideration, obviously because appeal would
not be a speedy and adequate remedy under the
21

ASIAN TRADING CORPORATION
V. COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. 76276 February 15,
1999
MANGALIAG V PASTORAL
G. R. No. 143951 October 25,
2005
SPOUSES ROMERO V. COURT OF Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit,
APPEALS
G. R. No. 142406, May, 16, 2005 court acquires over property involved in a suit,
circumstances and considering that dismissals on
technicalities are viewed with disapproval.
Apt and proper is the observation by the
respondent court that instead of filing a motion for
reconsideration of or appealing from, subject
judgment, the petitioners resorted to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is
unavailable under the antecedent facts and
circumstances.
Although this Court, the RTCs and the Court of
Appeals (CA) have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction,
such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
This Court is a court of last resort, and must so
remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the Constitution and
immemorial tradition.
refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a
pending the continuance of the action, and until
final judgment. Founded upon public policy and
necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the
properties in litigation within the power of the
court until the litigation is terminated, and to
prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation. Its notice is an
announcement to the whole world that a
particular property is in litigation and serves as a
warning that one who acquires an interest over
said property does so at his own risk or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over said
property.
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold
effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the
litigation within the power of the court until the
entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat
of the final judgment by successive alienations;
22

HEIRS OF HINOG V MELICOR
G. R. No. 140954 April 12, 2005
LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA,
TUNGOL AND TIBAYAN V.
COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. 143706, April 5, 2002
and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of
the land subject of the litigation to the judgment
or decree that the court will promulgate
subsequently.
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would
be an imposition upon the precious time of this
Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of cases, which in some instances
had to be remanded or referred to the lower court
as the proper forum under the rules of procedure,
or as better equipped to resolve the issues
because this Court is not a trier of facts.
An appellate court is imbued with sufficient
discretion to review matters, not otherwise
assigned as errors on appeal, in the following
instances:
(a) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter;
(b) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law;
(c) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at
a just decision and complete resolution of the
case or to serve the interests of justice or to
avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
(d) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on
appeal but raised in the trial court and are
matters of record having some bearing on the
issue submitted which the parties failed to raise
23

FORTUNE GUARANTEE AND
INSURANCE CORP. V. COURT OF
APPEALS
G. R. No. 110701 March 12,
2002
METRO TRANSIT ORGANIZATION
V. COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. 142133 November 19,
2002
or which the lower court ignored;
(e) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
closely related to an error assigned;
(f) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
upon which the determination of a question
properly assigned, is dependent.
Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper
remedy, as in this case, his petition may be
dismissed outright. However, in the interest of
substantial justice, the strict application of
procedural technicalities should not hinder the
speedy disposition of this case on the merits.
Thus, while the instant petition is one for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
assigned errors are more properly addressed in a
petition for review under Rule 45.
The general rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is indispensable before resort to
the special civil action for certiorari to afford the
court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its
error, if any.
However, the following have been recognized as
exceptions to the rule:
(a) where the order is a patent of nullity, as where
the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government
or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
24
 reconsideration would be useless;

(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process

and there is extreme urgency for relief;

(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order

of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable;

(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are

a nullity for lack of due process;

(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in

which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and

(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or

where public interest is involved."

Government of the United States This Court has allowed a direct invocation of its
of America v. Purganan original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
G. R. No. 148571 September 24, when there are special and important reasons
2002 therefor. In the interest of justice and to settle
once and for all the important issue of bail in
extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take
cognizance of the present case. Such
proceedings constitute a matter of first
impression over which there is, as yet, no local
jurisprudence to guide lower courts.

Butuan Bay Word Export
Corporation v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-45473 April 28, 1980
Indeed, before a petition for certiorari can be
brought against an order of a lower court, all
available remedies must be exhausted. Likewise,
in a host of cases. We ruled that before filing a
petition for certiorari in a higher court, the
attention of the lower court should first be called
to its supposed error and its correction should be
sought. If this is not done, the petition for
certiorari should be denied. The reason for this
rule is that issues which Courts of First Instance
are bound to decide should not summarily be
taken from them and submitted to an appellate
court without first giving such lower courts the
opportunity to dispose of the same with due

25

Philippine Consumers Inc v
National Telecommunications
Commission
G. R. No. 63318 November 25,
1983
Yau v Manila Banking Corp.
G. R. No. 126731 July 11, 2002
Aquino v National Labor Relations
Commission
G. R. No. 98108 September 3,
1993
deliberation.
CERTIORARI; REMEDY AVAILABLE DESPITE
EXSISTENCE OF APPEAL IF DICTATED BY
PUBLIC WELFARE AND ADVANCEMENT OF
PUBLIC POLICY.
Anent the question that petitioner should have
appealed the decision of respondent NTC,
instead of filing the instant petition, suffice it to
say that certiorari is available despite existence
of the remedy of appeal where public welfare and
the advancement of public policy so dictate, or
the orders complained of were issued in excess
of or without jurisdiction.
The petition before the appellate court could have
been dismissed outright since, as a rule, the CA,
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, will not
take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, unless the lower court has been given
the opportunity to correct the error imputed to it.
This Court has settled that as a general rule, the
filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition
sine qua non in order that certiorari shall lie.
However, there are settled exceptions to this
Rule, one of which is where the assailed order is
a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction, which is evident in this case.
On the procedural issues raised, we hold that
where an interlocutory order was allegedly issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, such order may be
questioned before this Court on a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court. To delay the review of the order until the
appeal from the decision of the main case, would
not afford the party adversely affected by the said
order a speedy, plain and adequate remedy.
Regarding the failure of petitioner to file a motion
for reconsideration before the NLRC, such failure
may be excused where the order sought to be
reviewed is a patent nullity.
26
Bache and Co. v Ruiz
G. R. No. 32409 February 27,
1971
When the questions raised before this Court are
the same as those which were squarely raised in
and passed upon by the court below, the filing of
a motion for reconsideration in said court before
certiorari can be instituted in this Court is no
longer a prerequisite.

In the case at bar time is of the essence in view

of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by
respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue against petitioner corporation, On
account of which immediate and more direct
action becomes necessary.

Lastly, the rule does not apply where, as in this

case, the deprivation of petitioners' fundamental
right to due process taints the proceeding against
them in the court below not only with irregularity
but also with nullity.

National Electrification In the eyes of the law, the two disputed Orders
Administration v Court of Appeals were patent nullities, thus excepting the instant
G. R. No. 32490 December 29, case from the general rule that before Certiorari
1983 or Mandamus may be availed of petitioner must
first file a Motion for Reconsideration.
Respondent Judge, in effect, deprived petitioner
of its right to appeal and any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, hence, making petitioner's resort to the
instant petition a virtual necessity.

Public interest being involved, a Motion for

Reconsideration need not be availed of.
Petitioner averred that time was of the essence
because respondents were in the process of
executing the assailed judgment of the Trial
Court with precipitate haste, the enforcement of
which would have impaired petitioner
corporation's operations and funds.

Motion for Reconsideration is no longer a

prerequisite where there is urgent necessity and
any further delay would prejudice the interests of

27

Vda. De Sayman v Court of
Appeals
G. R. No. 25596 April 28, 1993
Peroxide Philippines Corporation
v Court of Appeals
G. R. No. 92813 July 31, 1991
Central Bank v Cloribel
G. R. No. 26971 April 11, 1972
the Government.
It is true that as a general rule, a motion for
reconsideration should precede recourse to
certiorari in order to give the trial court an
opportunity to correct the error that it may have
committed. The said requirement is not absolute
and may be dispensed with in instances where
the filing of a motion for reconsideration would
serve no useful purpose, such as when the
motion for reconsideration would raise the same
point stated in the motion.
In the case at bar, the question of whether a writ
of execution may issue under the circumstances
obtaining is purely one of law, and the need for
urgent relief therefrom is patent from the fact that
the trial court had already issued a writ for the
execution of the judgment complained of in the
petition for relief.
A motion for reconsideration was correctly
dispensed with by respondent court since the
questions raised in the certiorari proceeding had
beer duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court. Also, under the circumstances therein a
motion for reconsideration would serve no
practical purpose since the trial judge had
already had the opportunity to consider and pass
upon the questions elevated on certiorari to
respondent court.
It is true that petitioner herein did not seek a
reconsideration of the order complained of, and
that, as a general rule, a petition for certiorari will
not be entertained unless the respondent has
had, through a motion for reconsideration, a
chance to correct the error imputed to him. This
rule is subject, however, to exceptions, among
which are the following, namely: 1) where the
issue raised is one purely of law; 2) where public
interest is involved; and 3) in case of urgency.
These circumstances are present in the case at
bar. Moreover, Judge Cloribel has already had an
28

Laguna Metts Corporation v Court If the Court intended to retain the authority of the
of Appeals
G. R. No. 185220 July 27, 2009 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such
Ouano vs. PGTT International
Investment Corporation
G. R. No. 134230 July 17, 2002
Relampagos v Cumba and
Commission on Elections
opportunity to consider and pass upon the very
same questions raised in the petition herein, so
that a motion for reconsideration of his contested
order would have served no practical purpose.
The rule requiring exhaustion of remedies does
not call for an exercise in futility.
proper courts to grant extensions under Section 4
authority would have been preserved. The
removal of the said paragraph under the
amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section
4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer
be any extension of the 60-day period within
which to file a petition for certiorari.
The rationale for the amendments under A.M.
No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use
(or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule
65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of
justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing
extensions to file petition on compelling grounds
did away with the filing of such motions. As the
Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be
filed strictly within 60 days from notice of
judgment or from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration.
Concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant a party
seeking any of the extraordinary writs the
absolute freedom to file his petition with the court
of his choice. This Court is a court of last resort,
and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform
the functions assigned to it by the Constitution
and immemorial tradition. The hierarchy of courts
determines the appropriate forum for such
petitions. Thus, petitions for the issuance of such
extraordinary writs against the first level
("inferior") courts should be filed with the RTC,
and those against the latter, with the CA.
Although the Constitution grants the COMELEC
appellate jurisdiction, it does not grant it any
29
G. R. No. 118861 April 27, 1995 power to exercise original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus, unlike in the case of this Court which
is specifically conferred with such authority in
Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It also pointed out that
the doctrine laid down in Pimentel vs. COMELEC
(101 SCRA 769 [1980]) — that neither the
Constitution nor any law has conferred
jurisdiction on the COMELEC to issue such writs
— still finds application under the 1987
Constitution.

Monteban v Tanglao-Dacanay It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review

G. R. No. 136062 April 7, 2005
of facts and evidence is not the province of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra
ordinem — beyond the ambit of appeal. Stated
elsewise, factual matters, now being raised by
petitioner, cannot normally be inquired into by
this Court in acertiorari proceeding. It cannot be
tasked to go over the proofs presented by the
parties and analyze, assess and weigh them
again, in order to ascertain if the trial and the
appellate courts were correct in according
superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of
one party or the other.

Uy v Sandiganbayan special civil action for certiorari is limited to the

G. R. No. 11544 July 6, 2004
determination of whether or not public
respondent acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the assailed decisions. Grave abuse of
discretion means such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. We do not find any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of
the Sandiganbayan in this case.

RULE 65: PROHIBITION

30
Pacificador v Commission on
Elections
G. R. No. 178259 March 13,
2009
Clearly, not only does prohibition not lie against
the COMELEC First Division which has the
mandate and power to hear and decide pre-
proclamation controversies; the assailed
Resolution has also become final and executory
in view of the failure of petitioners to file a timely
motion for reconsideration of said Resolution in
accordance with the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure and the Rules of Court.

Rivera v Espiritu The assailed agreement is clearly not the act of a

G. R. No. 135547 January 23, tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising
2002 judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. It
is not the act of public respondents Finance
Secretary Edgardo Espiritu and Labor Secretary
Bienvenido Laguesma as functionaries of the
Task Force. Neither is there a judgment, order or
resolution of either public respondents involved.
Instead, what exists is a contract between a
private firm and one of its labor unions, albeit
entered into with the assistance of the Task
Force. The first and second requisites for
certiorari and prohibition are therefore not
present in this case. Furthermore, there is
available to petitioners a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
While the petition is denominated as one for
certiorari and prohibition, its object is actually the
nullification of the PAL-PALEA agreement. As
such, petitioners' proper remedy is an ordinary
civil action for annulment of contract, an action
which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the
regional trial courts. Neither certiorari nor
prohibition is the remedy in the present case.

Vera v Avelino Petitioners pray for a writ of prohibition. Under

G.R. No. L-543 August 31, 1946 the law, prohibition refers only to proceedings of
any tribunal, corporation, board, or person,
exercising functions judicial or ministerial. (Rule
67, section 2, Rules of Court.) As the
respondents do not exercise such kind of
functions, theirs being legislative, it is clear the
dispute falls beyond the scope of such special
remedy.

31
The Nacionalista Party v Bautista The authorities and decision of courts are almost
G.R. No. L-3452 December 7, unanimous that prohibition will not lie to
1949 determine the title of a de facto judicial officer,
since its only function is to prevent a usurpation
of jurisdiction by a subordinate court.

Montes v Court of Appeals The act sought to be enjoined having taken place
G. R. No. 143797 May 4, 2006 already, there is nothing more to restrain. Thus,
the instant petition has been unmade as a mere
subject matter of purely theoretical interest.
Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an
act that is already fait accompli.

Gonzales v Narvasa Clearly, prohibition is an inappropriate remedy

G. R. No. 140835 August 14, since the body sought to be enjoined no longer
2000 exists. It is well established that prohibition is a
preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an
act that is already fait accompli. At this point, any
ruling regarding the PCCR would simply be in the
nature of an advisory opinion, which is definitely
beyond the permissible scope of judicial power.

Tan v Commission on Elections
G. R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986
Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself
is challenged for non-compliance with
constitutional requisites, the fact that such
plebiscite had been held and a new province
proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case
before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot
and academic. Continuation of the existence of
this newly proclaimed province which petitioners
strongly profess to have been illegally born,
deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so
that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation,
the commission of that error should not provide
the very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong.
For this Court to yield to the respondents' urging
that, as there has been fait accompli, then this
Court should passively accept and accede to the
prevailing situation is an unacceptable
suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as
respondents so propose is a proposition fraught
with mischief. Respondents' submission will

32

RULE 65: MANDAMUS
Sy Ha versus Emilio Galang
G. R. No. L-18513 April 27,
1963
Mantrade/FMMC Division
Employees and Workers Union
versus Bacungan
G. R. No. L-48437 September 30,
1986
create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court
decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and
indicating what the law is and should be, this
might tempt again those who strut about in the
corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior
motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the
boundaries of political subdivisions, either
brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will
abstain from entertaining future challenges to
their acts if they manage to bring about a fait
accompli.
It should be recalled that this is a petition for
mandamus which will only lie to compel an officer
to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary
duty, for, as it was aptly held, mandamus will not
issue to control the exercise of discretion of a
public officer where the law imposes upon him
the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to
any matter in which he is required to act,
because it is his judgment that is to be exercised
and not that of the court. 2 Likewise, it was held
that the determination of whether or not an
applicant for a visa has a non-immigrant status,
or whether his entry into this country would be
contrary to public safety, is not a simple
ministerial function, but one involving the
exercise of discretion, which cannot be controlled
by mandamus.
Respondent corporation contends that
mandamus does not lie to compel the
performance of an act which the law does not
clearly enjoin as a duty. True it is also that
mandamus is not proper to enforce a contractual
obligation, the remedy being an action for specific
performance (Province of Pangasinan vs.
Reparations Commission, November 29, 1977,
80 SCRA 376). In the case at bar, however, in
view of the above-cited subsequent decisions of
this Court clearly defining the legal duty to grant
holiday pay to monthly salaried employees,
mandamus is an appropriate equitable remedy
33

University of the Philippines
versus Judge Ruben Ayson
G. R. No. 88386 August 17, 1989
Niceta Suanes versus The Chief
Accountant of the Senate
G. R. No. L-2460 October 26,
1948
Benjamin Aquino versus Herminio Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that can
Mariano
G. R. No. L-30485 May 31, 1984 where the ordinary forms of procedure are
One Heart Sporting Club, Inc.
versus Court of Appeals
G. R. No. L-53790 October 23,
1981
(Dionisio vs. Paterno, July 23, 1980, 98 SCRA
677; Gonzales vs. Government Service
Insurance System, September 10, 1981, 107
SCRA 492).
Mandamus will not lie against the legislative
body, its members, or its officers to compel the
performance of duties purely legislative in their
character which rightly pertain to their legislative
functions and over which they have exclusive
control.
In the case at bar, there is no pure or exclusive
legislative function involved. The instant action
relates to the performance of respondents'
ministerial duty to disburse to the Electoral
Tribunal the funds that rightly belong to it. "The
Courts will not interfere by mandamus
proceedings with the legislative department of the
government in the legitimate exercise of its
powers, except to enforce mere ministerial acts
required by law to be performed by some officer
thereof."
be resorted to only in cases of extreme necessity
powerless to afford relief where there is no other
clear, adequate and speedy remedy. Before a
writ of mandamus may be issued, it is obligatory
upon the petitioner to exhaust all remedies in the
ordinary course of law. He must show that the
duty sought to be performed must be one which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office.
The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable where
the question in dispute is purely a legal one. In
the present case, the specific question submitted
34

Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority versus Concerned
Citizens of Manila Bay
G. R. Nos. 171947-48, December
18, 2008
RULE 66: QUO WARRANTO
Municipality of San Narciso,
Quezon versus Antonio Mendez
G.R. No. 103702 December 6,
1994
for resolution before the court a quo is whether or
not P.D. 1535 intended to grant Dipolog
Coliseum, an extension in the operation of its
cockpit. The question being purely legal, there
was no need for private respondent to exhaust
administrative remedies and its action in seeking
judicial redress is therefore justified.
While the implementation of the MMDA's
mandated tasks may entail a decision-making
process, the enforcement of the law or the very
act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may be compelled by
mandamus.
A discretionary duty is one that "allows a person
to exercise judgment and choose to perform or
not to perform." Any suggestion that the MMDA
has the option whether or not to perform its solid
waste disposal-related duties ought to be
dismissed for want of legal basis.
The special civil action of quo warranto is a
"prerogative writ by which the Government can
call upon any person to show by what warrant he
holds a public office or exercises a public
franchise." When the inquiry is focused on the
legal existence of a body politic, the action is
reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo
warranto or any other credit proceeding. It must
be brought "in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines" and commenced by the Solicitor
General or the fiscal "when directed by the
President of the Philippines ....... " Such officers
may, under certain circumstances, bring such an
action "at the request and upon the relation of
another person" with the permission of the court.
The Rules of Court also allows an individual to
commence an action for quo warranto in his own
name but this initiative can be done when he
claims to be "entitled to a public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another."
35
Newman vs United States The District Code makes a distinction between a
238 US 537 April 13, 1915 "third person" and an "interested person" in
maintaining quo warranto proceedings.

While every citizen and every taxpayer is

interested in the enforcement of law and in
having only qualified officers execute the law,
such general interest is not a private but a public
interest, which is not sufficient to authorize the
institution of quo warranto proceedings.

The mere fact that one is a citizen and taxpayer

of the District of Columbia does not make him an
interested party who may maintain quo warranto
proceedings against the incumbent of an office
on the consent of the court, although the law
officers of the government refuse such consent.

An interested person within the meaning of the

provisions of the District Code in regard to quo
warranto proceedings is one who has an interest
in the office itself peculiar to himself whether the
office be elective or appointive.

Ferdinand Topacio versus In the instance in which the Petition for Quo
Associate Justice of the Warranto is filed by an individual in his own
Sandiganbayan Gregory Santos name, he must be able to prove that he is entitled
Ong to the controverted public office, position, or
G. R. No. 179895 December 18, franchise; otherwise, the holder of the same has
2008 a right to the undisturbed possession thereof. In
actions for Quo Warranto to determine title to a
public office, the complaint, to be sufficient in
form, must show that the plaintiff is entitled to the
office. In Garcia v. Perez, this Court ruled that the
person instituting Quo Warranto proceedings on
his own behalf, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court, must aver and be able to show
that he is entitled to the office in dispute. Without
such averment or evidence of such right, the
action may be dismissed at any stage.

Philippine Long Distance A franchise is a property right and cannot be

Telephone Company vs National revoked or forfeited without due process of law.

36
Telecommunications and
Cellcom, Inc
G. R. No. 88404 October 18,
1990
MADRIGAL VS LECAROZ
G. R. No. 46218 October 23,
1990
UNABIA VS CITY MAYOR
G. R. No. 8759 May 25, 1956
The determination of the right to the exercise of a
franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such
privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more
properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo
warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule,
belongs to the State "upon complaint or
otherwise" the reason being that the abuse of a
franchise is a public wrong and not a private
injury. A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be
declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose
brought by the State because a franchise is
granted by law and its unlawful exercise is
primarily a concern of Government.
The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is
to the effect that a petition for quo warranto and
mandamus affecting titles to public office must be
filed within one (1) year from the date the
petitioner is ousted from his position.
We find this provision to be an expression of
policy on the part of the State that persons
claiming a right to an office of which they are
illegally dispossessed should immediately take
steps to recover said office and that if they do not
do so within a period of one year, they shall be
considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment. There are weighty reasons of
public policy and convenience that demand the
adoption of a similar period for persons claiming
rights to positions in the civil service. There must
be stability in the service so that public business
may (sic) be unduly retarded; delays in the
statement of the right to positions in the service
must be discouraged.
In view of the period of one year within which
actions for quo warranto may be instituted, any
person claiming right to a position in the civil
service should also be required to file his petition
for reinstatement within the period of one year
otherwise he is thereby considered as having
abandoned his office.
37
CRISTOBAL VS. MELCHOR
G. R. No. 43203 July 29, 1977
FORTUNO VS. PALMA
G. R. No. 70203 December 18,
1987
CAESAR VS. GARRIDO
G.R. No. 30705 March 25, 1929
LUISON VS. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-10981 April 25,
19581
'The pendency of administrative remedies does
not operate to suspend the period of one year
within which a petition for quo warranto should be
filed. While it may be desirable that administrative
remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled
or bound to do so, and as said remedies neither
are pre-requisite to nor bar the institution of quo
warranto proceedings, they should not be
allowed to suspend the period of one year. Public
interest requires that the right to a public office
should be determined as speedily as practicable'
In quo warranto proceedings instituted for the
sole purpose of questioning the legality of the
election of the directors of a corporation . . .
preliminary injunction does not lie to prevent said
directors and officers from discharging their
offices and to restore the former directors, and
the issuance thereof constitute an excess of
jurisdiction and abuse of discretion.
A proceeding in the nature of quo warranto, to try
the question of the eligibility of a candidate for
office, can only be instituted against one who has
been proclaimed as elected to the disputed
office.
A candidate who files a protest against one who
has been proclaimed as having received the
highest number of votes basing his protest
merely on the ground of his ineligibility to hold
office, cannot disguise his action so as to make
his protest a justification to be seated in office. In
other words, he cannot convert an action for quo
warranto into an election protest. This is because
these two cases are fundamentally different in
nature and in purpose. In quo warranto, "there is
not, strictly speaking, a contest, and the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate," while in a
protest, "the question is as to who received a
plurality of the legally cast ballots"
38
GAERLAN VS. CATUBIG
G. R. No. 23964 June 1, 1966
TEODORO M. CASTRO vs
AMADO DEL CASTILLO as
Commissioner of Civil Service
G. R. No. L-17915 January 31,
1967
PEDRO T. ACOSTA vs DAVID
FLOR
G.R. No. 2122 September 13,
1905
DR. NENITA PALMA-FERNANDEZ
vs DR. ADRIANO DE LA PAZ, DR.
SOSEPATRO
AGUILA, and THE SECRETARY
OF HEALTH
G.R. No. 78946 April 15, 1988
Distinction should be drawn between quo
warranto referring to an office filed by election
and quo warranto involving an office held by
appointment. In the first case, what is to be
determined is the eligibility of the candidate elect,
while in the second case, what is determined is
the legality of the appointment. In quo warranto
proceedings referring to offices filed by election,
when the person elected is ineligible, the court
cannot declare that the candidate occupying the
second place had been elected, even if he were
eligible, since the law only authorizes a
declaration of election in favor of the person who
has obtained a plurality of votes, and has
presented his certificate of candidacy. In quo
warranto proceedings referring to offices filed by
appointment, the court determines who had been
legally appointed and can and ought to declare
who is entitled to occupy the office.
The action of quo warranto involving right to an
office, must be instituted within the period of one
year. This provision is an expression of policy on
the part of the State that persons claiming a right
to an office of which they are illegally
dispossessed should immediately take steps to
recover said office and that if they do not do so
within a period of one year, they shall be
considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment.
A private person can not maintain an action for
the removal of a public officer unless he alleges
that he is entitled to the same office. When such
an allegation is made but not proven, the court is
justified in dismissing the case without inquiring
into the right of the defendant to retain the office.
An action for quo warranto must be filed within
one year after the cause of action accrues (Sec.
16, Rule 66, Rules of Court), and the pendency
of administrative remedies does not operate to
suspend the running of the one-year period.
39
JESUS GALANO, ET. AL. vs
NEMESIO ROXAS, Mayor of San
Mateo, Rizal
G.R. No. L-31241 September 12,
1975
RULE 67: EXPROPRIATION
Charles River Bridge vs. Warren
Bridge
11 Pet. 420, 641, U.S. 1837
BARDILLON vs BARANGAY
MASILI OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA
G.R. No. 146886 April 30, 2003
A petition for quo warranto and mandamus
affecting titles of office must be filed within one
(1) year from the date the petitioner is ousted
from his position. This period is not interrupted by
the prosecution of any administrative remedy.
Accordingly, after said period had lapsed the
remedy of the aggrieved party, if any lies
exclusively with administrative authorities.
While it may be desirable that administrative
remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled
or bound to do so; and as said remedies neither
are prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo
warranto proceedings, it follows that he who
claims the right to hold a public office allegedly
usurped by another and who desires to seek
redress in the courts, should file the proper
judicial action within the reglementary period.
Public interest requires that the right to public
office should be determined as speedily as
practicable.
The Court held that the state had not entered a
contract that prohibited the construction of
another bridge on the river at a later date. The
legislature neither gave exclusive control over the
waters of the river nor invaded corporate privilege
by interfering with the company's profit-making
ability. In balancing the rights of private
property against the need for economic
development, the Court found that the community
interest in creating new channels of travel and
trade had priority and it was enhanced by
opening a second bridge. The Court
acknowledged that only Congress had the
power to regulate interstate commerce, but
the states possessed a ―police power,‖ entitling
them to enact regulatory laws for the public
benefit.
An expropriation suit does not involve the
recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with
the exercise by the government of its authority
40

DE LA PAZ MASIKIP vs THE CITY
OF PASIG
G.R. No. 136349 January 23,
2006
THE CITY OF MANILA vs
CHINESE COMMUNITY OF
MANILA, ET AL.
G. R. No. L-14355 October 31,
1919
J. M. TUAZON & CO., INC. vs THE
LAND TENURE
ADMINISTRATION,
G.R. No. L-21064 June 30, 1970
MUNICIPALITY OF BIÑAN vs
HON. JOSE MAR GARCIA
and right to take property for public use. As such,
it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should
be filed with the regional trial courts.
The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above
Rule clearly constitutes the responsive pleading
which takes the place of an answer to the
complaint for expropriation. Such motion is the
pleading that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff
to expropriate the defendant's property for the
use specified in the complaint. All that the law
requires is that a copy of the said motion be
served on plaintiff's attorney of record. It is the
court that at its convenience will set the case for
trial after the filing of the said pleading.
The right of expropriation is not inherent power in
a municipal corporation and before it can
exercise the right some law must exist conferring
the power upon it. A municipal corporation in this
jurisdiction cannot expropriate public property.
The land to be expropriated must be private, and
the purpose of the expropriation must be public. If
the court. upon trial, finds that neither of said
condition exists, or that either one of them fails,
the right to expropriate does not exist. If the
property is taken in the ostensible behalf of a
public improvement which it can never by any
possibility serve, it is being taken for a use not
public, and the owner's constitutional rights call
for protection by the courts.
The conclusion that inevitably was called for is
worded thus: "It is, therefore, imperative that we
declare, as we now do, that Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 3453 which prohibits the filing of an
ejectment proceeding, or the continuance of one
that has already been commenced, even in the
absence of expropriation proceedings offends our
Constitution and, hence, is unenforceable."
There are two (2) stages in every action of
expropriation. The first is concerned with the
41
G.R. No. 69260 December 22, 1989 determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of
dismissal of the action, "of condemnation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be condemned, for
the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal,
if this be ordained, would be a final one, of
course, since it finally disposes of the action and
leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on
the merits. So, too, would an order of
condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as
the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings
before the Trial Court, "no objection to the
exercise of the right of condemnation (or the
propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard." The
second phase of the eminent domain action is
concerned with the determination by the Court of
"the just compensation for the property sought to
be taken." This is done by the Court with the
assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. The order fixing the just
compensation on the basis of the evidence
before, and findings of, the commissioners would
be final, too. It would finally dispose of the
second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more
to be done by the Court regarding the issue.
Obviously, one or another of the parties may
believe the order to be erroneous in its
appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or
otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied
party may seek reversal of the order by taking an
appeal therefrom.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY The outcome of the first phase of expropriation

vs. HEIRS OF ISIDRO proceedings, which is either an order of
GUIVELONDO expropriation or an order of dismissal, is final
G.R. No. 154411 June 19, 2003 since it finally disposes of the case. On the other
hand, the second phase ends with an order fixing
the amount of just compensation. Both orders,
being final, are appealable. An order of

42

CITY OF ILOILO vs HON. LOLITA
CONTRERAS-BESANA,
G.R. No. 168967 February 12,
2010
APO FRUITS CORPORATION vs
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 164195 February 6,
2007
THE MANILA RAILROAD
COMPANY vs. ROMANA
VELASQUEZ, MELECIO ALLAREY
and
DEOGRACIAS MALIGALIG
G.R. No. L-10278 November 23,
1915
condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the
question of whether or not the plaintiff has
properly and legally exercised its power of
eminent domain. Once the first order becomes
final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority
to expropriate and its public use can no longer be
questioned.
When the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement
of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for
eminent domain, the just compensation should
be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. Even under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the
1964 Rules of Procedure, under which the
complaint for expropriation was filed, just
compensation is to be determined "as of the date
of the filing of the complaint." Here, there is no
reason to depart from the general rule that the
point of reference for assessing the value of the
Subject Property is the time of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of
expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed
no power is absolute). The limitation is found in
the constitutional injunction that "private property
shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation" and in the abundant
jurisprudence that has evolved from the
interpretation of this principle. Basically, the
requirements for a proper exercise of the power
are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
The Supreme Court may substitute its own
estimate of value as gathered from the record
submitted to it, in cases where the only error of
the commissioners is that they have applied
illegal principles to the evidence submitted to
them; or that they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of the evidence; or that they have
used an improper rule of assessment in arriving
at the amount of the award; provided always that
43

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, vs COURT OF
APPEALS and NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 160890 November 10,
2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. HOLY TRINITY REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORP.
G.R. No. 172410 April 14, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON
G.R. No. 166429 December 19,
2005
the evidence be clear and convincing and the
amount allowed by the commissioners is grossly
inadequate or excessive.
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings,
the general rule is that the just compensation
which the owner of condemned property is
entitled to is the market value. Market value is
"that sum of money which a person desirous but
not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but
not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price
to be given and received therefor."
Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the
implementing agency of the government pays
just compensation twice: (1) immediately upon
the filing of the complaint, where the amount to
be paid is 100% of the value of the property
based on the current relevant zonal valuation of
the BIR (initial payment); and (2) when the
decision of the court in the determination of just
compensation becomes final and executory,
where the implementing agency shall pay the
owner the difference between the amount already
paid and the just compensation as determined by
the court (final payment).
The most crucial difference between Rule 67 and
Rep. Act No. 8974 concerns the particular
essential step the Government has to undertake
to be entitled to a writ of possession........ Rule 67
merely requires the Government to deposit with
an authorized government depositary the
assessed value of the property for expropriation
for it to be entitled to a writ of possession. On the
other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the
Government make a direct payment to the
property owner before the writ may issue.
Moreover, such payment is based on the zonal
valuation of the BIR in the case of land, the value
of the improvements or structures under the
replacement cost method, or if no such valuation
is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the
proffered value of the property to be seized.
44
NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION vs HON.
ENRIQUE T. JOCSON
G.R. Nos. 94193-99 February 25,
1992
BIGLANG-AWA vs HON. JUDGE
BACALLA
G.R. Nos. 139927 and 139936.
November 22, 2000
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs CARMEN M. VDA. DE
CASTELLVI, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974
Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time
thereafter, the petitioner has the right to take or
enter upon the possession of the property
involved upon compliance with P.D. No. 42 which
requires the petitioner, after due notice to the
defendant, to deposit with the Philippine National
Bank in its main office or any of its branches or
agencies, "an amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the property for purposes of taxation."
This assessed value is that indicated in the tax
declaration. The court has the discretion to
determine the provisional value which must be
deposited by the plaintiff to enable it "to take or
enter upon the possession of the property."
Notice to the parties is not indispensable.
The only requisites for authorizing immediate
entry in expropriation proceedings are: (1) the
filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in
form and substance; and (2) the making of a
deposit equivalent to the assessed value of the
property subject to expropriation. Upon
compliance with the requirements the issuance of
the writ of possession becomes "ministerial."
The requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary
period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of
legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use
must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
45
Diudipio Earth Savers
Multipurpose Association, Inc. et
al vs DENR Sec. Elisea Gozun
G.R. No. 157882 March 30, 2006
Normally, of course, the power of eminent
domain results in the taking or appropriation of
title to, and possession of, the expropriated
property; but no cogent reason appears why said
power may not be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of the condemned
property, without loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an easement right
of way.

Manila Electric Company vs Prior to the determination of just compensation,

Pineda the property owners may rightfully demand to
G. R. No. 58791 February 13, withdraw from the deposit made by the
1992 condemnor in eminent domain proceedings.
Upon an award of a smaller amount by the court,
the property owners are subject to a judgment for
the excess or upon the award of a larger sum,
they are entitled to a judgment for the amount
awarded by the court. Thus, when the
respondent court granted in the Orders dated
December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 the
motions of private respondents for withdrawal of
certain sums from the deposit of petitioner,
without prejudice to the just compensation that
may be proved in the final adjudication of the
case, it committed no error.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES The existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of

vs COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF PAMPANGA
G. R. No. 27006 June 30, 1979
the person or persons claiming ownership of the
properties to be expropriated would not preclude
the commencement of the action nor prevent the
court from assuming jurisdiction thereof. The
Rules merely require, in such eventuality, that the
entity exercising the right of eminent domain
should state in the complaint that the true
ownership of the property cannot be ascertained
or specified with accuracy.

Manila Water District vs Sixto De It appearing from the plaintiff's motion to dismiss,
los Angeles filed during the pendency of this appeal, that the
55 Phil 776 expropriation of the land is no longer a public

46
 necessity, the proceedings should be dismissed,
and the cause remanded to the lower court for
the determination of damages suffered by the
defendants for the use and occupation of the land
by the plaintiff.

Republic v. Baylosis Since it is obvious that the preliminary deposit

96 Phil. 461 serves the double purpose of a prepayment upon
the value of the property, if finally expropriated,
and as an indemnity against damages in the
eventuality that the proceedings should fail of
consummation, it would be premature to order its
withdrawal before the damages resulting from the
owners' dispossession of the property shall have
been determined and adjudicated, because this
would unjustly deprive them of this legal
safeguard for the payment of their damages in
case they are finally held to have the right to
collect such damages in the same proceedings.

Inasmuch as the only issue involved in the

decision denying plaintiff's right to expropriate the
land of defendants, is the propriety or impropriety
of said expropriation, the latter's right to damages
not having been litigated therein, said decision
cannot be res judicata as to the matter of
damages, with the result that said defendants
may still prove and recover their damages in this
action.

RULE 68: FORECLOSURE OF

REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
Soriano vs Enriquez In an action to foreclose a mortgage under the
G.R. No. 34147 September 24, Code of Civil Procedure, all persons liable to pay
1935 the mortgage debt, including any deficiency, are
necessary parties to the action. all of them have
an interest in the proceedings.

De Villa vs Fabricante In a foreclosure of mortgage if the encumbered

G.R. No. L-13063 April 30, 1959 property is sold to another person, the mortgage
debtor, as well as the person to whom it is sold,
must both be made defendants in the suit.

47
DE LA RIVA v REYNOSO
GR L-41701 August 9, 1935
Top Rate International Services vs Equity of redemption is the right of the mortgagor
Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. L-67496 July 7, 1986 default in the performance of the conditions of the
HUERTA ALBA RESORT INC. vs
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 128567 September 1,
2000
LIMPIN vs Intermediate Appellate
Section 255 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides that only the second mortgagee or any
other person claiming a right or interest
subordinate to the mortgage sought to be
foreclosed be included in the complaint to
foreclose a real estate mortgage, but it will be
noted that there is no provision in said Code
prohibiting the joinder of a first mortgagee in a
complaint filed for the same purpose by the
second mortgagee. And there is less reason for
the prohibition where, as in the present case, the
joinder of the first mortgagee was made with the
latter's consent and conformity. We see no good
reason to hold that in a suit to foreclose a real
estate mortgage, the second mortgagee cannot
join the first mortgagee as defendant, with the
latter's consent and when the principal obligation
or the terms of the mortgage had become due
and payable.
to redeem the mortgaged property after his
mortgage but before the sale of the property or
the confirmation of the sale, whereas the right of
redemption means the right of the mortgagor to
repurchase the property even after confirmation
of the sale, in cases of foreclosure by banks,
within one year from the registration of the sale.
"The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different
from and should not be confused with the right of
redemption. The right of redemption in relation to
a mortgage — understood in the sense of a
prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged property
after registration of the foreclosure sale — exists
only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a
judicial foreclosed of the mortgage. No such right
is recognized in a judicial foreclosed except only
where the mortgagee is the Philippine National
Bank or a bank or banking institution.
The effect of the failure to implead a subordinate
48
Court lien-holder or subsequent purchaser or both is to
G.R. No. 70987 January 30, 1987 render the foreclosure ineffective as against
them, with the result that there remains in their
favor the "unforeclosed equity of redemption."
But the foreclosure is valid as between the
parties to the suit.

Juan De Castro, et al versus The matter of redemption is wholly statutory.

Intermediate Appellate Court Only such persons can redeem from an
G.R. No. 73859 September 26, execution sale as are authorized to do so by
1988 statute. In determining whether a person is
included within the terms of a redemption statute,
the principle is stated to be that, if one is in privity
in title with the mortgagor, and he has such an
interest that he would be a loser by the
foreclosure, he may redeem. Redemption is
proper where made by debtors, grantee, or
assignee for the benefit of creditors, or assignee
or trustee in insolvency proceedings.

Commissioner of Internal But the Supreme Court had occasion under its
Revenue versus United Coconut resolution in Administrative Matter 99-10-05-0 to
Planters Bank rule that the certificate of sale shall issue only
G.R. No. 179063 October 23, upon approval of the executive judge who must,
2009 in the interest of fairness, first determine that the
requirements for extrajudicial foreclosures have
been strictly followed. For instance, in United
Coconut Planters Bank v. Yap, this Court
sustained a judge's resolution requiring payment
of notarial commission as a condition for the
issuance of the certificate of sale to the highest
bidder.

Leonio Barrameda versus Carmen The court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of
Gontang possession in favor of the purchaser at public
G.R. No. L-24110 February 18, auction of the property mortgaged without the
1967 necessity of an independent action when the
mortgagor continues in the possession thereof
after the confirmation of the sale by final decree.

Ramos vs. Manalac The issuance of a writ of possession in a

G.R. No. L-2610 June 16, 1951 foreclosure proceeding is not an execution of
judgment within the purview of section 6, Rule

49
 39, of the Rules of Court, but is merely a
ministerial and complementary duty of the court
to put an end to the litigation which the court can
undertake even after the lapse of five years,
provided the statute of limitations and the rights
of third person have not intervened in the
meantime.

The general rule is that after a sale has been

made under a decree in a foreclosure suit, the
court has the power to give possession to the
purchaser, and the latter will not be driven to an
action at law to obtain possession. The power of
the court to issue a process and place the
purchaser in possession, is said to rest upon the
ground that it has power to enforce its own
decree and thus avoid circuitous actions and
vexatious litigation.

The Government of the Philippine A court authorizing the mortgagee in a decree of

Islands vs Margarita Torralba Vda. foreclosure of mortgage to recover from the
De Santos mortgagor the deficiency of the mortgage credit
G.R. No. L-41573 August 3, before the sale and before it is known whether or
1935 not a deficiency exists, exceeds its jurisdiction,
and the authority so given is null and void.

El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs Where the defendant in a mortgage foreclosure

Palanca lives out of the Islands and refuses to appear
G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, otherwise submit himself to the authority of the
1918 court, the jurisdiction of the latter is limited to the
mortgaged property, with respect to which the
jurisdiction of the court is based upon the fact
that the property is located within the district and
that the court, under the provisions of law
applicable in such cases, is vested with the
power to subject the property to the obligation
created by the mortgage. In such case personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is
nonessential and in fact cannot be acquired.

Philippine Trust Co. v. Tan Siua One who mortgages his property to secure the
G.R. No. L-29736 February 28, debt of another without expressly assuming
1929 personal liability for such debt cannot be
compelled to pay the deficiency remaining due

50
 after the mortgage is foreclosed.

Reyes vs Rosenstock Where during his lifetime E executed a mortgage

G.R. No. L-23718 August 28, on real property to R upon which R brought a suit
1925 to foreclose and obtained a decree against E for
the amount of the debt and the foreclosure of the
mortgage, after which E died, and an executor of
his estate was appointed, and the property was
then sold to satisfy the decree, leaving a
deficiency judgment, under the provisions of the
second clause of section 708 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, R may then prove his deficiency
judgment before the committee on claims against
the estate of E.

Bachrach Motors Company vs Most of the provisions of the Code of Civil

Icarangal and Oriental Procedure are taken from that of California, and
Commercial In that jurisdiction the rule has always been, and
68 Phil. 287 still is, that a party who sues and obtains a
personal judgment against a defendant upon a
note, waives thereby his right to foreclose the
mortgage securing it.

Alpha Insurance and Surety Co. Even if the Development Bank of the Philippines
Inc. vs Reyes were just an ordinary first mortgagee without any
G. R. No. 26274 July 31, 1981 preferential liens under Republic Act No. 85 or
Commonwealth Act 459, the statutes mentioned
in the Associated Insurance case relied upon by
the trial court, it would he unquestionable that
nothing may be done to favor the plaintiff-
appellant, a mere second mortgagee, until after
the obligations of the debtors-appellees with the
first mortgagee have been fully satisfied and
settled. In law, strictly speaking, what was
mortgaged by the debtors-appellees to the
second mortgagee was no more than their equity
of redemption.

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs Inasmuch as the opposition to the confirmation of

Green the sale made by the sheriff pursuant to the
G.R. No. L-24127 November 23, execution only alleged as a ground that the price
1925 for which the mortgaged property was sold was
absolutely inadequate and. unreasonable, and

51
 whereas it has heretofore been held by this court
that a smaller price, for which the same property
was sold at the first auction, notwithstanding that
it was inadequate, was not sufficient by itself
alone to annul the order confirming the sale
(which was annulled for a different reason);
therefore, the fact that the opponent was not
given an opportunity to present evidence in
support of the allegations of his opposition does
not constitute a prejudicial error which would
nullify the order confirming the sale made by the
sheriff.

Tiglao vs Botones Notice and hearing of a notice

G.R. No. L-3619 October 29, for confirmation of a sheriff's sale is essential to
1951 the validity of the order of confirmation. An order
of confirmation, void for lack of notice and
hearing, may be set aside at any time.

Moratorium cannot be invoked against a motion

for confirmation of sheriff's sale and
corresponding motion for writ of possession filed
pursuant to a final foreclosure judgment.

Ocampo vs Domalanta et. al. An order of confirmation of sale of real estate in

G. R. No. 21011 August 30, judicial foreclosure proceedings cuts off all
1967 interests of the mortgagor in the real estate sold,
vests them in the purchaser, and retroacts to the
date of the sale.

Where a suit merely challenges the legality of the

sheriffs foreclosure sale made in an anterior
proceeding for foreclosure of mortgage between
the same parties, such suit is barred by
conclusiveness of judgment, since the issue
raised should be "deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment which appears
upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which
was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto"

Ponce De Leon vs Rehabilitation We have already declared that" . . . (only

Finance Corporation foreclosure of mortgages to banking institutions
G. R. No. 24571 December 18, (including the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation)

52
1970 and those made extrajudicially are subject to
legal redemption, by express provision of statute,
..."

The terms 'banking institution' and 'bank,' as

used in this Act, are synonymous and
interchangeable and specifically include banks,
banking institutions, commercial banks, savings
banks, mortgage banks, trust companies,
building and loan associations, branches and
agencies in the Philippines of foreign banks,
hereinafter called Philippine branches, and all
other corporations, companies, partnerships, and
associations performing banking functions in the
Philippines.

Consolidated Bank vs Petitioner has acquired by operation of law the

Intermediate Appellate Couet right of redemption over the foreclosed properties
G. R. No. 73976 May 29, 1987 pursuant to Sec. 6 of Act No. 3135, to wit: "In all
such cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made
. . . any person having a lien on the property
subsequent to the mortgage . . . may redeem the
same at any time within the term of one year from
and after the date of sale. It has been held that
"an attaching creditor may succeed to the
incidental rights to which the debtor was entitled
by reason of his ownership of the property, as for
example, a right to redeem from a prior
mortgage"

Barican et.al vs. Intermediate The well-settled rule is that the purchaser in a
Appellate Court foreclosure sale of a mortgaged property is
G. R. No. 79906 June 20, 1988 entitled to a writ of possession and that upon an
ex-parte petition of the purchaser, it is ministerial
upon the court to issue such writ of possession in
favor of the purchaser.

However, the rule is not an unqualified one.

There is no law in this jurisdiction whereby the
purchaser at a sheriff's sale of real property is
obliged to bring a separate and independent suit
for possession after the one-year period for
redemption has expired and after he has
obtained the sheriff's final certificate of sale.

53

Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage bank vs Pardo et. al.
G. R. No. 55354 June 30, 1987
RULE 69: PARTITION
Ciriaco Fule vs. Anastacio Fule
G. R. No. L-29008 February 8,
1929
Eulalia Russel, et al. vs. Hon.
Augustine A. Vestil
G. R. 119347 March 17, 1991
There is neither legal ground nor reason of public
policy precluding the court from ordering the
sheriff in this case to yield possession of the
property purchased at public auction where it
appears that the judgment debtor is the one in
possession thereof and no rights of third persons
are involved.
Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, the purchaser
at the auction sale, in this instance, the
petitioner/mortgagee, is entitled to a writ of
possession pending the lapse of the redemption
period upon a simple motion and upon the
posting of a bond. It has been held that in such a
case, "no discretion is left to the
court." Furthermore, " [s]uch petition shall be . . .
in the form of an ex parte motion . . ." This was
the recourse in fact taken by the petitioner. There
is accordingly no necessity for the petitioner to
file an ejectment case. The remedy of the
mortgagors-respondents is to have "the sale . set
aside and the writ of possession cancelled," in
accordance with Section 8 of the Act.
PARTITION; COLLATIONABLE
ADVANCEMENTS; RIGHT TO PARTITION AS
AFFECTED BY VALUE OF ADVANCEMENTS.
An action for partition cannot be maintained by a
coheir who is in possession of portions of the
common inheritance which are of a value in
excess of the value of the share that would come
to him upon a judicial division of the property.
While the complaint also prays for the partition of
the property, this is just incidental to the main
action, which is the declaration of nullity of the
document above-described. It is axiomatic that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of
the relief sought, irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
54
 asserted therein.

Maglucot-Aw et. al. vs. Maglucot An action of partition is comprised of two phases:
et. al. first, an order for partition which determines
G. R. No. 132518 March 28, whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and
2000 whether partition is proper; and, second, a
decision confirming the sketch or subdivision
submitted by the parties or the commissioners
appointed by the court, as the case may be. The
first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is
taken up with the determination of whether or not
a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise
legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested
in the property. This phase may end with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a
partition either because a co-ownership does not
exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end,
upon the other hand, with an adjudgment that a
co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is
proper in the premises and an accounting of
rents and profits received by the defendant from
the real estate in question is in order. ........ The
second phase commences when it appears that
"the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition" directed by the court. In that event,
partition shall be done for the parties by the court
with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second stage may well also
deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and
its approval by the court after the parties have
been accorded opportunity to be heard thereof,
and an award for the recovery by the party or
parties thereto entitled of their just share in the
rents and profits of the real estate in question."
Such an order is, to be sure, final and
appealable.

Miranda vs Court of Appeals The order recognizing the right of the plaintiff to a
G. R. No. 33007 June 18, 1976 partition is not the judgment, for under Section 7
of Rule 71, 2 it is only after hearing (the report of
the commissioners) that the court is supposed to
render a final judgment.

55
LIM DE MESA vs Court of Appeals In the decision ordering partition, the execution of
G.R. No. 109387 April 25, 1994 that part of the judgment which will not
necessitate any further proceedings may be
enforced. Further proceedings, such as the
appointment of commissioners to carry out the
partition and the rendition and approval of the
accounting, may be had without prejudice to the
execution of that part of the judgment which
needs no further proceedings. Thus, it has been
held that execution was entirely proper to enforce
the defendant's obligation to render an
accounting and to exact payment of the money
value of the plaintiffs' shares in the personal
property and attorney's fees due defendants, as
well as the costs of the suit and damages.

Pancho, et al. v. Villanueva, et al. On action for partition shall be commenced and
G.R. No. L-8604 July 25, 1956 tried in the province where the property or any
part thereof lies.

It appearing that petitioners' predecessors-in-

interest had never been in possession of the
property in question, they could not have
acquired the same by acquisitive prescription and
the action of respondents, as co-owners of said
property, to demand its partition could not have
prescribed.

MANUEL T. DE GUIA vs COURT An action to demand partition is imprescriptible

OF APPEALS and not subject to laches. Each co-owner may
G.R. No. 120864 October 8, demand at any time the partition of the common
2003 property unless a co-owner has repudiated the
co-ownership under certain conditions.

DELIMA, ET. AL. vs HON. From the moment one of the co-owners claims
COURT OF APPEALS that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the
G.R. No. L-46296 September properties and denies the others any share
24, 1991 therein, the question involved is no longer one of
partition but of ownership. In such case, the
imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no
longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-
owners has adversely possessed the property as
exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest
ownership by prescription.

56
Emmanuel Cordova vs Miguel The rule regarding prescription among co-heirs is
Cordova that generally prescription cannot be pleaded
102 Phil 1182 between them except when one heir openly and
adversely occupies the property for a period
sufficiently long to entitle him to ownership under
the law. As long as the other heirs acknowledge
their co-ownership or do not set up any adverse
title to the property, prescription is unavailable.
Tested under the above principle, the pleadings
in this case do not allege enough facts indicative
of adverse possession on the part of defendants,
which may serve as basis for the claim of
prescription. In any event, the ground on which
prescription is based does not appear to be
indubitable, and under the rules the court may do
well to defer the action on the motion to dismiss
until after trial on the merits.

ARRIOLA vs ARRIOLA More importantly, Article 159 (Family Code)

G.R. No. 177703 January 28, imposes the proscription against the immediate
2008 partition of the family home regardless of its
ownership. This signifies that even if the family
home has passed by succession to the co-
ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any
one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the
family home into an ordinary property, much less
dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The
rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the
family home cannot subjugate the rights granted
under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family
home.

Valmonte V Court of Appeals Private respondent's action, which is for partition

G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996 and accounting under Rule 69, is in the nature of
an action quasi in rem. Such an action is
essentially for the purpose of affecting the
defendant's interest in a specific property and not
to render a judgment against him.

FRANCISCO DEL VAL ET AL. vs. Where a life-insurance policy is made payable to
ANDRES DEL VAL one of the heirs of the person whose life is
G.R. No. 9374 February 16, 1915 insured, the proceeds of the policy on the death

57
 of the insured belong exclusively to the
beneficiary and not to the estate of the person
whose life was insured; and such proceeds are
his individual property and not the property of the
heirs of the person whose life was insured.

Lavarro v Labitoria Trees and plants annexed to the land are parts
54 Phil 788 thereof, and unless rights or interests in such
trees or plants are claimed in the registration
proceedings by others, they become the property
of the persons to whom the land is adjudicated.
By timely proceedings in equity matters of that
character, if fraudulent, may sometimes be
corrected.

That all improvements were determined and

adjudicated by the court in the former case and
that the matter was res judicata.

Noceda v. Court of Appeals There is no co-ownership where portion owned is

G.R. No. 119730. September 2, correctly determined and identifiable, though not
1999 technically described, or that said portions are
still embraced in one and the same certificate of
title does not make said portions less
determinable or identifiable, or distinguishable,
one from the other, nor that dominion over each
portion less exclusive, in their respective owners.
A partition legally made confers upon each heir
the exclusive ownership of the property
adjudicated to him.

Crucillo v. Intermediate Appellate As the existence of the oral partition of the estate
Court of Balbino A. Crucillo by his heirs has been well
G.R. No. 65416 October 26, 1999 established, it stands to reason and conclude that
Rafael Crucillo could validly convey his share
therein to the spouses Felix Noceda and Benita
Gatpandan-Noceda who then became the true
and lawful owners thereof, including the ancestral
house existing thereon. Petitioners have,
therefore, no right to redeem the same property
from the spouses Noceda because when the sale
was made, they were no longer co-owners
thereof, the same having become the sole
property of respondent Rafael Crucillo.

58
De Borja v. Jugo The respondent judge did not abuse his
G.R. No. L-45297 July 16, 1937 discretion in not permitting the petitioner to
intervene in the case for partition of property
mentioned in the decision. In this jurisdiction the
right to intervene in an action is not absolute. It
depends upon the sound discretion of the court
and when there is no evidence that the person
who desires to intervene as such has an interest
in the subject matter of the litigation, his right
thereto should not be recognized

Sepulveda v. Pelaez Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an

G.R. No. 152195. January 31, 2005 interest in the property are indispensable parties;
as such, an action for partition will not lie without
the joinder of the said parties. The mere fact that
Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the co-
ownership between him and the respondent does
not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a
complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a
declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject
property; and, second, the conveyance of his
lawful shares.

Heirs of Bartolome Infante v. The trial court had jurisdiction to decree a

Court of Appeals partition of real estate in an action for
G.R. No. 77202 June 22, 1988 reconveyance, on the ground that the petitioners
therein were already barred by estoppel from
impugning said court's jurisdiction.

Heirs of Jardin v Heirs of Hallasgo While the action for partition of the thing owned in
G.R. No. L-55225 September 30, common does not prescribe, the co-ownership
1982 does not last forever since it may be repudiated
by a co-owner. In such a case, the action for
partition does not lie. What may be brought by
the aggrieved co-owner is an accion
reinvindicatoria or action for recovery of title and
possession. That action may be barred by
prescription. "If the co-heir or co-owner, having
possession of the hereditary or community
property, holds the same in his own name, that
is, under the claim of exclusive ownership, he

59

RULE 70: FORCIBLE ENTRY AND
UNLAWFUL DETAINER
VICTORIANO ENCARNACION vs
NIEVES AMIGO
G.R. No. 169793 September 15,
2006
GOLDEN GATE REALTY CORP.
VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT
G.R. NO. 74289 JULY 31 1987
may acquire the property by prescription if his
possession meets all the other requirements of
the law, and after the expiration of the
prescriptive period, his co-heir or co-owner may
lose their right to demand partition, and their
action may then be held to have prescribed"
In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for
the recovery of possession of real property are:
1.Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding
which may be either that for forcible entry
(detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio),
which is a summary action for recovery of
physical possession where the dispossession
has not lasted for more than one year, and
should be brought in the proper inferior court;
2.Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the
recovery of the real right of possession, which
should be brought in the proper Regional Trial
Court when the dispossession has lasted for
more than one year; and
3.Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de
reivindicacion, which is an action for the recovery
of ownership which must be brought in the proper
Regional Trial Court.
When the private respondents defaulted in the
payment of rents in the amount of P18,000.00,
they lost their rights to remain in the premises.
Hence, when the petitioner demanded payment
of the P18,000.00 due and unpaid rentals or a
case for ejectment would be filed against them,
the owner was giving strong notice that "you
either pay your unpaid rentals or I will file a court
case to have you thrown out of my property." The
word "vacate" is not a talismanic word that must
be employed in all notices. The alternatives in
this case are clear cut. The tenants must pay
rentals which were fixed and which became
60

La Campana Food Products, Inc
versus Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-88246 June 4, 1993
SALANDANAN VS SPS MENDEZ
G.R. NO. 160280 March 13,2009
WONG VS. CARPIO
G.R. No. 50264 October 21, 1991
payable in the past, failing which they must move
out.
The trial court denied the motion, holding that the
complaint had alleged therein that the plaintiff
gave notice to the defendant that he would be
sued for ejectment if he failed to pay the rentals.
This Court, agreeing with the lower court, said
that there was no necessity to categorically use
the word "vacate" in the lessor's demand.
Verily, in ejectment cases, the word "possession"
means nothing more than actual physical
possession, not legal possession, in the sense
contemplated in civil law. The only issue in such
cases is who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the property involved,
independently of any claim of ownership set forth
by any of the party-litigants. It does not even
matter if the party's title to the property is
questionable.
The act of entering the property and excluding
the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily
implies the exertion of force over the property,
and this is all that is necessary. Under the rule,
entering upon the premises by strategy or stealth
is equally as obnoxious as entering by force. The
foundation of the action is really the forcible
exclusion of the original possessor by a person
who has entered without right. The words "by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth"
include every situation or condition under which
one person can wrongfully enter upon real
property and exclude another who has had prior
possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters
upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes
of person already clothed with lawful possession,
but without the consent of the latter, and there
plants himself and excludes such prior possessor
from the property, the action of forcible entry and
detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even
though no force is used by the trespasser other
than such as is necessarily implied from the mere
61
 acts of planting himself on the ground and
excluding the other party.

JAVIER vs VERIDIANO II. A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case

G.R. No. L-48050 October 10, 1994
disposes of no other issue than possession and
declares only who has the right of possession,
but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for
determination of who has the right or title of
ownership.

Victorino Quinagoran vs. Court of a complaint must allege the assessed value of
Appeals the real property subject of the complaint or the
G.R. NO. 155179 August 24, interest thereon to determine which court has
2007 jurisdiction over the action. This is because the
nature of the action and which court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is
determined by the material allegations of the
complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the
plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is
filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to some or all of the claims asserted
therein.

ABRIN VS CAMPOS Well-settled is the rule that what determines the

G.R. No. 52740 November 12, nature of the action, as well as the Court which
1991 has jurisdiction over the case, is the allegation
made by the plaintiff in his complaint. To resolve
the issue of jurisdiction, the Court must interpret
and apply the law on jurisdiction vis-a-vis the
averments of the complaint. The defenses
asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss are
not to be considered in resolving the issue of
jurisdiction, otherwise the question of jurisdiction
could depend entirely upon the defendant.

Go, Jr. Vs Court of Appeals What determines the cause of action is the
G. R. No. 142276 August 14, nature of defendant's entry into the land. If the
2001 entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed
against the intruder within one year therefrom is
forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is
legal but the possession thereafter became
illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which
must be filed within one year from the date of the

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 last demand.

ANICETO G. MEDEL vs TIBURCIO There can be no doubt that the action of unlawful
MILITANTE detainer, under section 80 of the Code of Civil
G.R. No. 16096 March 30, 1921 Procedure, is appropriate; and it is not necessary
that the plaintiff should resort primarily to
ejectment in the Court of First Instance. By the
very language of section 80, the possessory
remedy is given to the landlord whenever the
right of the tenant to retain possession is ended,
and no good reason occurs to us why the plain
intent of the statute should not be given effect in
a case like that now before us. As will be seen
from the language of the complaint, the plaintiff
seeks to recover possession only, without raising
the question of title; the right to have possession
is proved; and it cannot be permitted that the
defendant should defeat this action merely by
inserting in his answer a claim of ownership in
himself. Whether the court of a justice of the
peace has jurisdiction to entertain an action of
this character must be determined from the form
in which the complaint is drawn — not from the
allegations of the answer.

MATEO MADDAMMU vs JUDGE Plaintiff's complaint in the respondent Court

OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF purports to be one for forcible entry, but the facts
MANILA alleged therein fail to show that such is the nature
G.R. No. L-48940 June 22, of the action. In forcible entry cases, the only
1943 issue is physical possession or possession de
facto of a real property. To confer jurisdiction
upon the respondent Court the complaint should
have alleged prior physical possession of the
house by plaintiff or by his vendors and
deprivation of such possession by defendant
through any of the means specified by the Rule.
(Rule 72, sec. 1). Had plaintiff alleged that
defendant unlawfully turned him out of
possession of the property in litigation, the
allegation would have been sufficient, because
plaintiff's prior physical possession may then be
implied therefrom.

SARONA, ET AL. vs FELIPE Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts

63
VILLEGAS merely tolerated are "those which by reason of
G.R. No. L-22984 March 27, neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of
1968 property allows his neighbor or another person to
do on the property; they are generally those
particular services or benefits which one's
property can give to another without material
injury or prejudice to the owner,
who permits them out of friendship or
courtesy." He adds that: "[t]hey are acts of little
disturbances which a person, in the interest of
neighborliness or friendly relations,permits others
to do on his property, such as passing over the
land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water
from a well." And, Tolentino continues, even
though "this is continued for a long time, no right
will be acquired by prescription." Further
expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes:
"There is tacit consent of the possessor to the
acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every
case of knowledge and silence on the part of the
possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By
virtue of tolerance that is considered as an
authorization, permission or license, acts of
possession are realized or performed. The
question reduces itself to the existence or non-
existence of the permission."

BAYOG vs HON. ANTONIO M.

NATINO
G.R. No. 118691 July 5, 1996
BARANDA vs. PADIOS
G.R. No. L-61371 October 21,
1987
Francisco Lu versus Orlando Ana
Siapno
A.M. MTJ-99-1199. July 6, 2000
Andres Dy and Julia Dy versus
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 93756 March 22, 1991

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