Pressure Relief Systems 2014 Rev A PDF

June 2014
PRESSURE RELIEF SYSTEMS

Acknowledgment
API STD - RP 520/ 521/ 526/ 537
Various Client/ Project Standards/ Specifications
DEDICATED TO:
Pictures from many sources, suppliers, internet
My friend Winston Yeo, KBR, Singapore/ Chevron, Thailand
Topics
Introduction
Relief Devices
Codes & Standards
Relieving Scenarios (Demands) & Loads
Sizing
Installation
Isolation
Design Features
PSV
Introduction PAHH
PIC/PAH
NOP
Control system maintains stable operation

Trip / shutdown system provides primary protection,
when control system fails
Relief system provides secondary protection, when
control and trip systems fail – ultimate protection or
last line of defence PIC
T0 Flare
PAHH
PALL
T0 Compressor
SDV
Well Fluids
Production
SDV
Separator
SDV
SDV
Oil/ Condensate
Produced Water
RV lifting: a serious incident
Code Vs Recommended Practice
Relief devices – key part of plant Layer of
Protections to protect plant and personnel. Prevent
production loss
Relief devices are required by national codes and
standards, mandated under law
Community Emergency Response

Emergency, Evacuation
Plant Emergency Response
Containment/ Evacuation Procedure
Mitigation
Mechanical mitigation, Relief System
Operator Action
Prevention
ASME is a Code. Compliance is mandatory.
SIS Trips
Operator Response
API is a recommended practice.
Controls & Monitoring
Controls, Alarms
Operator Supervision API is also getting adopted as a National /
Process International Standard
Where Pressure Relief is not possible
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Fast chemical reactions:

Pressure propagation rate is very high and loss of
containment may occurs before RV pops.
“hot spots,” decompositions & internal detonation/fires
Relieving rate requires large relief areas
Plugging, polymerization or deposition that may
partially or completely block RV
Relieved chemicals may polymerize and plug. PSV useless
Multi-phase relief: where rate is difficult to predict
Relief may create additional hazards due to stack
location or very large vent/ flare system
Use HIPPS
Relief Scenarios Tank drained. Pulled
vacuum
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Air freshener can in a closed

car - Thermal
Column internals - Pyrophoric fire
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Vacuum column fire Semi sub – what was left

RELIEF DEVICES
Relief Devices
Relief Valves
Rupture Disks
Rupture Pins
Buckling Pins
PVRV
Blow-off Hatches
Explosion Doors The link ed image cannot be display ed. The file may hav e been mov ed, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the correct file and location.
Relief Devices
This image cannot currently be display ed.

Relief Valves
Conventional
Balanced
Pilot
Conventional RV
Most common
Simple, cheap and reliable
Backpressure reduces capacity
Variable back pressure limited
to 10% of set pressure
Large spring required limits set
pressure of bigger PSV
Constant or superimposed
backpressure increases set
point on a 1 for 1 basis Why?
Set Press
100
150# RV Set Press, psig at 100°F
D–P Q R T
0 50
Back Press 285 165 100 65
Balanced Bellows RV
Not allowed per ASME section I
Back pressure max 30% on all except
smaller sizes. Up to 50% with capacity
correction
Fragile bellows. Mechanical limit imposed
by bellows
Bellows can plug; movement restricted In
plugging and polymerizing service
Bellows sealed in hydrate, solid, foaming
and coking services to keep foreign
matter out of bonnet
Bellows prone to fatigue and pin-hole
leaks. [Leaks take away ability to handle
backpressure; hence bonnet is vented. As
long vent is bigger than “holes” OK.]
Bonnet vent must be routed to safe
location in toxic service Why? Bellows original purpose was to protect the
spindle & guide from corrosive fluids. Beyond 30%
back pressure, lift and hence capacity affected
Balanced Disk RV This image cannot currently be display ed.
Backpressure acting on top and

bottom of disk cancels each other
Backpressure ha no effect on RV
opening or closing pressure

Set Press
100 RV Opening Pressure
RV Reseating Pressure
0 50
Back Press
Pilot RV
Process pressure on a differential area piston keeps the seat closed
Pilot: A small PSV that pops and removes piston top pressure,
allowing the main valve to open
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The link ed image cannot be display ed. The file may hav e been mov ed, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the correct file and location. Pilot
Pilot
Dome
Dome
Piston
Pilot Tube
Pilot Tube
Note: Piston top area > bottom area. For the same pressure, force on top > force on bottom, keeping the seat closed
More on Pilot RV
Process pressure on the larger piston (top) area opposes
pressure on the smaller seat, keeping the valve shut
Higher the process pressure, greater the downward force,
keeping the seat tightly closed. c.f spring loaded RV
A small auxiliary relief valve (pilot) controls the main RV. It
pops open relieving top pressure, opening main RV
Larger RVs can have higher set pressures; no longer limited by
spring force. c.f spring loaded RV
Full lift and capacity achieved near set pressure as there is no
heavy spring load to overcome
With pop action, full lift at set pressure; with modulating pilot,
full lift at relieving pressure; modulating pilot relieves only
what is required
Pilot is a small RV!
More on Pilot 1. As process pressure reaches set pressure, the
spring is compressed; lower feeding seat closes,
isolating process gas

2. Upper seat opens, venting gas and pressure in
dome; and opening RV
Process gas isolated during a relief – no flow pilot
Flowing pilot, discharges process gas before,
during and after a relief. Not recommended
2
Flowing design may lead to freezing or
particulates into the pilot
1 Based on one-shot venting or gradual venting
“pop” or “modulating” action
“Pop” or fast action is for rapid relief of gas.
Recommended. Spring loaded RV
“Modulating” allows RV opening with a small
pressure rise; fast response. Relieves what is
Spindle travel - decides
reqd. Diaphragm RV
blowdown. 3% blowdown possible
More on Pilot RV
Most have soft seats; remote sensing capability – pilot

tube intake need not be at RV inlet
Polymerizing, plugging service, sensing line can plug.
Use non-flow type or filtered sensing line in dirty service
Backpressure: Set pressure not affected unless pilot is
vented to header
Caution: Higher backpressure can lead to reverse flow
and product contamination, during start-up and
shutdown. Use check valve
Usual to have no-flow, pop action elastomer seat/ seal
type.
Less commonly used. May require prior approval
Liquid filled systems: Blowdown may change c.f gas service. Operating time too rapid -
producing water hammer or too slow. Pilot affected by particulate contamination or corrosion
Capacity - Back Pressure Impact
RV: ‘Nozzle’ or ‘orifice’ -

flow decided by:
Transition Point
upstream pressure, as long Sonic to Sun-sonic
as it is ‘critical’ or ‘sonic’
∆P, Pressure drop (P1-P2), if
sub-sonic
Back-pressure adds to
spring force, reduces lift
and flow (‘capacity’ of RV)
Back Pressure - Conventional RV
Backpressure affects lift;

impacts capacity severely
At 15% valve fully closed
Back Pressure - Balanced Bellows
Bellows nullify backpressure effect to an extent

At 30% capacity reduced

Difficult to have small bellows. Size D & E, may be a ‘modified’ F !!

Bellows fixed at at upper end. High back pressure lengthens
the bellows at the lower end, restricting seat lift
Back Pressure - Balanced Disk RV
Disk nullify backpressure effect to an extent
At 30% capacity reduced At 20% capacity reduced

Balanced Spindle type can withstand

higher backpressure; Sizes to 2J3 only
Back Pressure - Pilot RV
Flow
Flow follows closely nozzle flow

For k = 1.3 & BP = 70%. Flow:
Nozzle = 92% Pilot = 78%
Back flow Preventer:

Backpressure may open the
main valve when process
pressure is low as at start-up.
May contaminate products. C3
Refrigeration
Back Pressure Impact - Comparison
Set Pressure Vs Lift
Conventional
Pilot
Backpressure Impact - Tests

University of Milan Test on 5 Balanced RV, 2 J 3
Supposed to be good to 50% BP viz k = 1
Capacity Lost, % at BP, % Remarks This image cannot currently be display ed.
A 10 50
B 30 50
C 40 30
D 20 30 0% at 32%
E 60 18 bellow ruptured
Terminology - Refresher
Relief Valve: Valve opens in proportion to

overpressure. Liquid (incompressible fluids)
service
Safety Valve: Valve opens rapidly with pop action.
Vapour (compressible fluids) service
Safety Relief Valve: Either a safety or relief valve
Pressure Relief Valve: Generic term for all of
above
MAWP: Max Allowable Working Pressure on top of vessel
based on wall thickness provided at coincident
temperature. ≈> Design Pressure
Design Pressure: Equipment/ system design pressure at
design temperature
Set Pressure: Pressure at which RV is set to open. May be
same or less than Design Pressure
Overpressure: Pressure increase over set pressure
Relieving Pressure: Set pressure + Overpressure
Accumulation: Pressure increase over MAWP
Back pressure: Pressure at the outlet flange/ pressure in
discharge system
Where RV is set below MAWP, overpressure can
be higher to match MAWP + Accumulation
V-002
Superimposed back pressure - Affects set pressure.

Pressure at outlet flange before RV opens E-001
Constant superimposed BP: Always the same pressure. When RV
discharges to a closed system. Can be high ~ 50% of set pressure.
Variable superimposed BP: Varies based on flow from other
sources. When multiple sources discharge to a common header
Built-up back pressure - Does not affect set pressure but

affects capacity
Pressure that develops in the discharge header as a result of
flow thru RV
Total back-pressure = Superimposed + Built-up BP

Spring differential: Difference between set pressure and Why?
superimposed constant BP. It is not wise to give a
superimposed constant BP in a data sheet unless one exists.
Back Pressure - Example
Flare Stack
Normal Operating Press = 0.3 U Flare Header
∆P = 10 U due to flow from this +

other PSVs
SP = 100 Units ∆P = 5 U
Relief valve Flare Knockout Drum
Care needed while
specifying constant BP
Superimposed Constant Back Press = 0.3 U

Built-up Back Pressure = 15 U
Total Back Pressure = 15.3 U
Spring Differential (Set Pressure – Constant BP)
Spring set at: = 99.7 U
Back Pressure - More Info
Outlet: PSV Area Ratio
Area, in2
Backpressure adds to spring load, prevents full Size (Ao/A)
lift 1½ D 2 0.110 (31)
Flow and backpressure reduced; Valve opens again
1½ E 2 0.196 (17)
Close Open. Rapid cycling or chattering
1½ F 2 0.307 (11)
P1, backpressure at valve outlet flange is
known and NOT PB inside the valve at nozzle 2G3 0.503 (15)
outlet 2H3 0.785 (9)
Bigger the RV, smaller is Outlet: PSV area 3J4 1.287 (10)
(Ao/A) ratio; Higher is PB 3K4 1.838 (7)
PB, controls flow in sub-sonic cases 3L4 2.853 (5)
Vendors have come up with a correction factor 4M6 3.600 (8)
to Nozzle Coefft, to account for this – based on
valve body / nozzle geometry 4N6 4.340 (7)
4P6 6.380 (5)
Design Tip: Backpressure mechanical limit on RV is 6Q8 11.050 (5)

decided by bellows. Bigger the RV lower is PB
P2
6R8 16.000 (3)
allowable backpressure. Affects non-flowing RVs
8 T 10 26.000 (3)
too; forgotten by Process Engineers. See RP 526
Blowdown: Difference between set pressure and reseating
pressure, % of set pressure. Usually 3%
Cold differential test pressure: Set pressure with correction for
backpressure and/or temperature service condition
Simmer: Audible or visual release of fluid across the RV just prior
to opening at set pressure. Excessive simmering is detrimental
to valve seating surfaces
Chattering: Rapid opening and closing of RV in quick succession.
Wear and tear on seating surfaces leading to leak in normal
operation. Caused by:
Oversized RV
Inlet loss > 3%
Excessive back-pressure
Broken or leaking balanced bellows
Lift: Rise of the disc to open the RV
RV Operation - Refresher Boiler Board
Formula with Lift
As the seat lifts,

flow is thru (i) nozzle at full lift or (ii)
curtain for partial lift
Nozzle Area = πD²/4 S
Curtain Area = πDL; L = D/4
Usual lift is about 35 to 40% Seat Disk
Curtain
At PSV opening point,
Lift, L
press * area = spring load P
Increases
To reach full lift, additional Decrease
Skirt Blowdown
overpressure required, say 10% to Nozzle Diameter, D
compress the spring. Not enough.
Solution? Add a skirt to seat, to add Blowdown
‘area’ and redirect flow to add to lift Ring
Blowdown Ring, controls blowdown
Top: Short Simmer; long
blowdown
RV Operation - Refresher
Rupture Disks
Non-reclosing: Unlike a PSV that closes once the pressure <
set pressure, RDs remain open and discharge the contents. It
has to be replaced after an event
Non-reclosing
Good for large relief; instantaneous and unrestricted relief
For valuable/ toxic fluids (no leak) and viscous, high melting
point fluids
For corrosive and slurry (no exposed seat/ spring)
Used upstream and downstream of RV in corrosive services
Upstream of RV
Protects RV internals from corrosion – save $$ using standard
MOC; Prevents leakage thru RV; Prevents plugging and gumming
of RV; Allows in-situ calibration testing of RV
Downstream of RV Note: Max distance between RD and PSV = 5D
Protects RV internals from corrosion – save $$ using standard
MOC; Check leakage thru RV; Prevents fouling and gumming of
RV; Cushions impact of variable backpressure
In parallel to or in series with RV
Design Tip: RD + RV requires Combined Capacity Factor ≈ 0.9 factor on RV area; combined inlet ∆P <3%. RD burst
pressure ≈ 90-100% RV set pressure (ASMEVIII Div 1 UG-127 foot note 52 + UG132 (a)(4)(a))
Rupture Disks
Conventional tension loaded type
Op pressure <70% of burst pressure
Fragments and not used under RV This image cannot currently be display ed.
Reverse buckling disk

Op pressure <90% of burst pressure
Can withstand pressures in excess of
burst pressure on the outlet.
Non-fragmenting. Can be used under
RV
PAH set at >10% set point required
between RD & RV.
Liquid service disk
Reverse: Snap back action reqd to move
Disk full open without the stored the disc thru knife blade. May not be
compressed energy of vapour reliable in liquid service. Scored design
instead of knife-cut!
Rupture Disks
Why?
2 RDs in series may be required, if

variable backpressure is significant.
What is the gauge pressure?.
What it tells you?
Leakage thru RD can increase the

pressure in the cavity between RD
and RV, reduce dP across RD and
hinder RD opening. Provide a
PG/PAH/vent line d/s of RD Burst pressure dependency on design Vs
Operating temperature
Rupture Disk Vs Relief Valve
‘Combining RDs with RVs’, Roger

Bours, Chemical Engg, June 2014
Rupture Pins
As a replacement for relief valves. Non reclosing type.

Good for large loads
Usually in alternative paths to staged flares

Buckling Pins
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As a replacement for relief valves. Non reclosing type.

Instead of relieving, isolates the high pressure source;
eliminates flaring
Clapper, disk, piston or plunger valve held in place by a pin
When the pin buckles, the valve is instantly closed.
Not Approved by ASME. OK for Pipelines under Dept of
Transportation Code
Open This image cannot currently be display ed.
Closed
Pin
Pressure Vacuum Relief
PVRV/Blow-off Hatches/ Explosion Doors
PVRV
Low set pressure - from few mm of H2O to 1 bar( 15 psig)
Generally for Storage Tank protection

Blow-off Hatches/ Explosion Doors
For infrequent large releases
Used generally for Storage Tank protection
In furnace fire boxes (“Explosion Doors”)

RELIEF DEVICES SELECTION
Relief Devices - Selection
Type of relief valve

Based on backpressure and service
Steam service: direct spring loaded “pop action” type.
As back pressure on the valve rises
from conventional to balanced bellows to pilot
Rupture disks: Rapid rise in pressure, corrosive
services or for very large relieving areas
E.g. Heat Exchanger Tube Rupture, Reactor
RD + RV to avoid emissions or in corrosive service
RD + RV: Non fragmenting RD and consider combination
capacity reduction factor
Relief Devices - Comparison
Weighted Pallet Balanced Bellows – Metal Seat
Set Press constant with back press
Low Cost
Good Chemical & Temp compatibility
Very Low Set Pressure
Seat Leakage
Set Press, not adjustable Long simmer or blowdown
High over pressure 100%++ Limited bellows life
Affected by inlet press loss
Seat can be frozen
Affected by higher back pressure
Difficult to check Set Press in-place
Conventional PSV – Metal Seat
Lowest Cost
Good Chemical & Temp compatibility
Seat Leakage = Product Loss

Long simmer or blowdown
Affected by inlet press loss Soft Seat: Good tightness; but elastomer will
Affected by back pressure limit chemical & temp capability
Difficult to check Set Press in-place
Pilot - Soft Seat - Piston Type Pilot - Soft Seat - Diaphragm or Bellows
Smaller & Lighter Good for Low Press operation 3” WC
Excellent Seat Tightness Excellent Seat Tightness
Pop or Modulating Action Pop or Modulating Action
In-line maintenance of main valve In-line maintenance of main valve
Set Pressure can be tested in-situ. Only Set Pressure can be tested in-situ. Only
pilots are tested pilots are tested
Adaptable for remote press sensing Adaptable for remote press sensing
Remote unloading possible Remote unloading possible
Fully opens at Set Pressure
Not OK in polymerizing or dirty service Not OK in polymerizing or dirty service

Limited Chemical & Temp Compatibility Limited Chemical & Temp Compatibility
Limited Low Press Setting >15 psig Limited High Press Setting <50 psig
Not Allowed under ASME Sec I Liquid service limitations
Pilot – Metal Seat Rupture Disks
Excellent Seat Tightness Good tightness, if disk is intact
Wide choice in material
Set Pressure can be tested in-situ
Minimum space
Adaptable for remote press sensing For high capacity relief as in FCCU
Excellent Chemical & Temp For secondary relief in parallel to a RV
Compatibility
Wide tolerance in burst pressure
Only pop action available Non-reclosing
Premature rupture, with pressure
Pressure limited to 1200 psig pulsations
Temperature limited 1000°F
Relief Devices - Selection
Type Conventional Bellows Pilot
Default Selection
Back Press ≤ 10% ≤ 30% (Note 1) No limit
Max Op Press 90% SP 90% SP 90% SP (Note 2)
ASME Sec I
Remote Pressure Sensing/ Unloading
Plugging, Polymer, Dirty Service
1. Up to 50% with capacity correction 2. Up to 95% of set in revamp or high pressure situation
Rupture Disk RD/RV Combination

Rapid pressure rise Prevent atmospheric emissions
Corrosive, fouling polymerization services Reduce RV cost in corrosive service
Very large relieving area Not allowed for ASME Sec I
Always use non-fragmenting RD
Derate RV capacity by 10%
CODES & STANDARDS
Codes & Standards
Codes - ASME Vessels under 15
psig excluded
Section I for Steam Boilers
Section VIII for Unfired Pressure Vessels
Recommended Practices/ Standards - API
RP 520 Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving
Devices in Refineries
Part I Sizing and Selection and
Part II Installation
STD 521 Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems
STD 526 Flanged Steel Pressure Relief Valves
RP 2000 Relief load calculations for Storage Tanks
ASME is a Code. Compliance is mandatory.
API is a recommended practice.
API is also getting adopted as a National /

International Standard
Operating/ Design/ Set Pressure
Operating Pressure
+ margin = PAH or PCV Dump Pressure
+ margin = PAHH Pressure
+ margin = Design Pressure
RV is usually set at Design Pressure
Code allows a margin over set pressure – “overpressure” for full
capacity to be reached
10% overpressure for all contingencies, except fire
16% with multiple valve
21% overpressure for fire, an infrequent or rare case
Higher overpressure smaller RV, that is all!!
Why?
Note:
1. MAWP, based on installed wall thickness is not considered in RV set point.
Vessels are hydrotested to 130% of MAWP
2. RVs can be set below Design Pressure
3. Considering blowdown, RVs should above set 3-7% above PAHH
ASME/ API Guidelines
Process Engineers go by Design Pressure, rather

than MAWP, as MAWP is usually known much later.
For revamp: MAWP may be OK. Caution: Corroded

walls!
Where RV is set below MAWP, overpressure can

be higher to match MAWP + Accumulation
Single Vs Multiple Devices
Design Note: In high pressure service, large

valves may not be available. Instead of waiting
to find out at AFC stage, it helps if Process
Engineers can do a quick sizing and show
multiple valves, if required
For heat exchangers, one may need a small RV
for thermal and a bigger RD for tube rupture.
Set RV low so that on thermal demand, RD is
not ruptured
RELIEF SCENARIO ANALYSIS
Relief Scenario Analysis
Fatal Error X
Utility Failures Power Failed

Restart Giveup
Power Failure - Total or Partial
Instrument Air Failure
Cooling Medium Failure
Heating Medium or Steam Failure
Controllers Failure
Instrument Air failure to individual control valve
Control Valve Failure - Gas blowby
Blocked Outlet
Inadvertent opening / closing of manual valves
Check Valve Failure Utility failure may not result in major loads for
individual PSV. But being cumulative load,
they may govern the header and flare sizing
Common Mode / Cascading Failure
One failure results in another

Steam loss to Steam Turbines results in Power failure
Power loss to Air Compressor, leads to Inst Air failure
Power loss to pumps, leads to Cooling Medium failure
Analyzing cascading failures - difficult but
important This image cannot currently be display ed.
READ API RP 521. IT IS PAINFUL. BUT NO OTHER WAY!!

Individual Failure
Exchanger Tube Rupture
Thermal Expansion of blocked in liquid
External Fire
Pressure (Surges) Transients – Liquid lines
Ingress of volatile (e.g. water) into hot oil
Fractionators/ Columns:
Reflux Failure
Loss of Cold Feed
Excess Heat to Reboiler
Reboiler Tube Rupture
Absorbent failure
Individual Failure
Abnormal Heat or Vapour Input

Accidental Mixing of Fluids. Remember
Bhopal?
Storage: Liquid Overfill Remember Buncefield
Human Error
Chemical Reactions Column Blows-off Top
Vacuum Relief
Atmospheric Tank Thermal Breathing
Owner may, at his risk, elect to exclude some scenarios,
considering administrative or instrument controls.
How are you going to control Hot Oil Coking?
Power Failure
All Electric Power driven equipment stop

Evaluate
Electrical one-line diagrams
Back-up power sources: in-plant generation / grid power
Single Equipment failure
Localized Power failure
Unit Power failure
Plant-wide or plant section-wide power failure
Consequence:
Vapour release from columns/ vessels
Air Cooler Fans: Natural draft credit: 25% of duty
Instrument Air Failure
All control valves revert to safe position - FC or

FO
Individual control valves: Analyse individually
Consequence:
Blocked outlet etc release
Impact on Flare: Analyse system by system
Simultaneous failure of Inst Air & Inst Electric Power
- unlikely This image cannot currently be display ed.
Steam/ Heating Oil Failure
All Steam Turbine driven equipment stop

Loss of Motive Power to eductors and ejectors
Loss of Heat to reboilers, exchangers
Loss of Stripping Steam to columns
Evaluate single failure, steam line blockage to a
single equipment + to individual unit
Cooling Medium Failure

Evaluate - impact on
Single equipment
Plant wide - Cooling Medium Pumps down
Partial credit, for multiple pumps driven by independent sources
Example - 2 electric motor + 2 steam turbine
No credit, if ‘independent’ pumps can be on stand-by or taken off
service for maintenance
Cooling Medium Loss to
Exchangers and condensers; Column Condenser - Reflux failure
Refrigeration Condenser - Blocked outlet on Refrigeration
Compressor
Loss of chilled water, refrigerant, etc
Compressor Lube Oil Coolers - Compressor trip
Consequence
Vapour release from columns/ vessels
Blocked Outlet
Causes
Inadvertent valve opening or closing by operator
Instrument / Mechanical / Utility failure
Panic response - Wrong action
Wrong interpretation when multiple alarms are activated
simultaneously. Multiple alarms may result in alarm fatigue, leading
to accidents. “Alarm Management Study” a MUST.
Source pressure > downstream design pressure.
Sources: Pumps, Compressor, Utility, HP upstream etc
‘LO’ or ‘CSO’ - not a good design; OK if Owner wants
‘LC’ valves on a high pressure source may leak
Design Tip: No double jeopardy! Only one valve closed or opened. Safety Engineer can say: Outlet SDVs got
closed but inlet SDV failed to close, asking PSV sized for both gas and liquid. No hard and fast rule.
Blocked Outlet
SDV – 2 or PCV-1 fails closed
PSV - 001 Size: Full inflow to V-001
Credit: LCV-1/LCV-2 normal liquid

flow - as only ONE valve is taken
blocked at a time. Caution: instant
flow via LCV < design. Credit?
PCV-1
Safety engineers: Both liquid and PSV - 001
vapor flow – as on a trip, SDVs in
liquid and vapor outlets might have SDV-2
closed with inlet SDV failing to close
Compromise: Check well flow at SDV-1 V-001
relieving pressure; usually less on SDV-4 SDV-3
high backpressure. (Not true, if
choke takes a high ∆P LCV-1
Arguments: On LCV-1 closing, liquid
can go via PCV-1. On LCV-2 closing, LCV-2
liquid can go via LCV-1 etc.
Blocked Outlet
LCV - 1 fails closed

PSV - 001
Pump P-001 shut-off V-001
pressure > E-001 tube P-001

LCV-1
side design pressure.

Relief rate: Based on E-001
pump head at PSV-001 Relieving

relieving pressure and
max suction pressure of Operating
pump P- 001 Head
Good design to have

pump outlet designed
Capacity
for shut-off head
Relief flow is less than Operating flow
Blocked Outlet
To satisfy ASME, a PSV

is required on
equipment at pump
outlet, even if its design
pressure > pump shut-
off pressure Relieving
Relief rate may be
nominal or Nil. Operating
If a PSV is provided for

Head
some other reason, say

fire, then it will do
Capacity
Pump suction valve & piping downstream of it to suit discharge conditions

Control Valve Failure
Causes
Instrument air failure; Signal (wiring) failure; DCS hardware/software failure
Improper manual operation by operator
Mechanical malfunction of control valve
Hand wheel left engaged on control valve
Plugging
Evaluate both Open and Closed position of control valve
No credit: for interlocks / Emergency Shutdown System in RV size;
Credit may be taken for total load to flare header
Credit may be taken for normally open flow paths and not affected
Simultaneous failure control valve and bypass: Owner preference
Options: No bypass; RO in bypass; bypass valve Cv same as control valve;
parallel but not-connected control valve; parallel control valve on its own
Control Valve Failure
PSV - 002
LCV - 1 fails open PSV - 001
PSV - 002 Size: SDV-2
Max flow thru LCV-1 V-2
V-001
minus V-2 normal flow SDV-1
Max flow thru LCV-1:
SDV-3
Max Cv + downstream
PSV - 002 relieving LCV-1
V-002
pressure + ∆P between
LCV and PSV
L-2
LCV – 1 fails closed
PSV - 001 Size: Blocked
outlet Note: Several approaches to gas blowby load estimation: All gas; gas volume
equivalent volume of liquid; both gas and liquid limited to max inflow etc.
Dynamic Simulation helps get realistic results
If it overloads or is the largest LP Flare load, consider same design pressure for
the d/s vessel to eliminate gas blowby case
Heat Exchanger Tube Failure The link ed image cannot be display ed. The file may hav e been mov ed, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the correct file and location.
Shell & Tube heat exchangers tubes

may fail due to thermal shock, vibration, corrosion etc
No PSV, if high pressure side design/ operating
pressure is ≤130% of design (= hydrotest) pressure of
low pressure side * temperature correction
130% or ‘0.77 rule’ does not mean tubes don’t rupture –
a common mistake
Evaluate potential overpressure of connected equipment
Evaluate potential chemical reactions when two sides mix
2 Options - tube failure at mid tube viz 2 orifices and
failure at tube sheet viz 1 nozzle + 1 orifice
For PCHEs, one full channel failure
No PSV for tube failure in double pipe exchangers
Heat Exchanger Tube Failure The link ed image cannot be display ed. The file may hav e been mov ed, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the correct file and location.
Credit: Flow thru normally open path

if LP fluid is gas or vapour
If LP side is liquid, pressure build-up to push and
accelerate large liquid mass. It is as good as blocked
Some consider tube rupture only when HP to LP
differential pressure > 65 bar (1,000 psi)
On tube rupture, pressure spike is rather quick.
Usually rupture disks are provided as spring loaded
RVs take time to react
Opening time: Rupture pin: 2ms; Rupture disk: 5ms; RV
25ms
Recommended to have 2 RDs at either end of LP side
Dynamic Simulation studies help, select location
Check Valve Failure
All valves leak or pass. In early designs check valve leak was
NOT considered
Check valves stop “bulk” flow but can’t avoid leak past them
Some considered check valve leak only in high pressure or dirty or
surging service. Some considered specially designed, power assisted
check valve can stop reverse flow. No longer valid
No credit to single check valve. Reduced flow area for 2
dissimilar check valves
Standard calculation methods available to estimate leak past a
check valve
Note: Along with leak, pressure is transmitted. That is HP side can
pressurize LP side shut-in This point out is missed out by Process Engineers in a
Hazop review
When a compressor trips, discharge from

other running compressors can back flow
into the tripped one, pressurizing its
Suction Drum
Check Valve Failure
At a common manifold, when one of the stream stops

flowing or a pump/ compressor feeding it stops, fluids from
other streams may back flow thru the non-flow pipe
Header A 3 Workers Killed
Header B
Xmas Tree Wellhead inlet manifolds: A common check valve
Test Header or one per header
Well
Thermal Expansion
Liquid filled equipment / piping that is blocked-in and heated
Solar radiation; Hot side of exchanger; Heat tracing
Heat Exchangers: Cold side vapor pressure > design pressure
At ambient temperature; At hot side fluid inlet temperature; Heat
tracing
OSBL: Yard piping
10% overpressure for vessels and 33% for piping
CSO or LO valves can eliminate thermal PSV, provided Owner
agrees to administrative control The link ed image cannot be display ed. The file may hav e been mov ed, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the correct file and location.
Air freshener can in a closed

car - Thermal
Thermal Expansion
Thermal Expansion Massive Force
Liquid Ammonia Tank in a closed garage, exploded and
propelled the truck 40m
External Fire
Vacuum column fire
Pool fire under equipment, even if contents are not flammable
Radiant + direct heat boils liquid / expands vapour increasing
pressure
Equipment assumed blocked in and isolated when fire occurs and
inflow stopped
There can be exemptions for this rule, example, heat exchangers
ASME stamped equipment must be protected unless fire can be
ruled out or equipment/ system cannot be blocked-in
Piping and piping components do not require protection.
Interconnecting piping included in adjacent equipment
Equipment grouping: 8.6m (28.2’) radius (2,500 sq.ft area) and 7.6m
(25’) high from grade are grouped in a single fire zone
Liquid at NLL or HLL
Evaluate: Effects of chemical reaction, fluid decomposition and fluid
behaviour (foaming, frothing, etc.) Do NOT design for Jet Fire load as some
do. As API RP 521 says, jet fires are
handled by blowdown viz. removing fuel
Design Tip: API indicates max fire zone size. Use it wisely to reduce Blowdown load + Flare size
Caution: Corrosion
under insulation can
bring a vessel down
External Fire before fire does!. Need
Inspection windows
Fire NOT considered if:

Sloping or proper drainage eliminates pool fire possibility
No flammable hydrocarbon exists in the area
Air Coolers/ equipment located 7.6m (25’) above grade OR
over open grating
If fire load is relieved thru any passage that can’t be shut
If Owner instructs: “Equipment will be vented and drained
when taken out of service”. e.g. Pig launcher/ receiver
Credit for fireproof insulation as allowed by API; it
should withstand firewater jet impact
Gas vessel: Fire PSV not effective as vessel metal
temperature > Creep temperature PETRONAS: No fire PSV for gas vessels
Design Tip: If fire relief temperature > equipment design temperature, use design temp
for RV material and flange selection. Say so in data sheet. Vessel metal temperature will be
200-300°C > RV relief temperature. Vessel will fail/ rupture/ deform first before RV lifts
RP 521 Figures Temp °F %
External Fire • Heat up rate

• Time to Rupture
400
800
100
80
1,100 36
Vessel under fire RVs do NOT protect against structural failure when the vessel
will deform/ is exposed to extremely high temperatures during a fire
rupture before 1/3 Tensile

PSV lifts, as metal
wall rapidly loses
strength as its 2/3 Yield
temperature rises.
Blowdown Valves
are provided to
depressurize the
vessel within 15
minutes Max Temp
Against fire:
Blowdown
FW spray
Fireproofing
°C
°F
Pressure Surges
Water hammer. 24 t piping flew off
Transient Analysis required for 800m. Sheared off telephone poles
water, liquid filled or rundown OSBL lines

oil/condensate export pipelines
Transient Analysis is NOT required for
ISBL piping. Short runs and generally do NOT have quick
closing valves
Code allowed - short term - margins may be used
to avoid a PSV The link ed image cannot be display ed. The file may hav e been mov ed, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the correct file and location.
Design Tip: It is common for GRE Fire Water/ Sea Water

piping to burst during start-up, fill the Flare KOD and
bring the plant down. Have a good surge study; leave
design and construction/start-up to a single source. Take
exception from Owner, giving him the risk. Seawater flooding a column sank semi-sub
Column Cases Excess heat may not pressurize the
exchanger but will over pressure the column
Reflux failure is usually the controlling case:
Reflux Pump / Power Failure
Reflux Control Valve Fails Closed
Overhead Condenser Failure or Flooded on Draw-off Control Valve
Fails Closed
Non-condensable Accumulates in the Condenser
Operator Error: Block Valves Closed
Loss of Cold Feed
Feed Control Valve Fails Closed or Feed Pump Fails - Transient Surge
in Vapour Rate
Excess Heat to Reboilers
Steam or Heating Control Valve Fails Open
Excessive Fuel to Fired Reboiler Safety Alerts
Additional Vapours generated Column blows off top – leakage reacts
Column overflows – 15 killed; 150 injured
Reboiler Tube Rupture
Credit: Reduced vaporization in reboiler at relieving pressure.
Reduced ∆T relieving pressure reduces relief rate
Column Cases
Column load calculations is complicated
3 approaches – flash, gross overhead vapour, unbalanced heat; last
one gives the best estimate
Column Overhead Vapor, kg/h Unbalanced Heat, kg/h
DC Steam Stripper 60,000 168,000
DC Fractionator 296,000 448,000
HC Debutanizer 69,000 171,000

Dyn Sim load 60%. Case 2
PSV does not pop
Dynamic simulation can reduce The link ed image cannot be display ed. The file may hav e been mov ed, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the correct file and location.
column and reactor loads

DC Fractionator Conventional, kg/h Dyn Simulation, kg/h
.. Total power fail 448,000 259,000
.. Single power fail 85,000 0
.. Blocked outlet 258,000 172,000
From: “Optimize relief loads with dynamic simulation”, CL Xie, ZG Wang and YF Qin, HP, Dec 2013
Accidental Mixing of Fluids
Runaway reaction - Polymerization:
Some chemicals, when mixed in wrong
ratio or sequence may lead to run-away
reaction
Inadvertent mixing of reactive streams
Decomposition or polymerization due The link ed image cannot be display ed. The file may hav e been mov ed, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the correct file and location.
to abnormal heat input or loss of

cooling
See Safety Alert
Runaway Reaction Relief Rate
Determination is complex. Inputs from
Owner, Catalyst Manufacturer, Process
Licensor.
Owner/ Licensor to provide the relief
load. Pass them the responsibility
Bhopal. 4,000 to 10,000 dead; 500,000 injured

Liquid Overfill of Storage Tanks
Inflow exceeds outflow

Overfilling from an offsite
pump during start-up or
LAH/LAHH failure
Design Tip:
1. Let level transmitters for Control and Trip track each other.
2. While filling large tanks, let DCS put a time lock based on pumping rate and ullage
Vacuum Relief This image cannot currently be display ed.
Equipment may come under vacuum:

Fluid withdrawn without matching inflow
Excessive condensation in Column
Overhead Condenser
Condensation or cooling of vapours upon
atmospheric temperature drop
Compressor suction side blocked
Condensing side of exchanger blocked in
while cooling continues This image cannot currently be display ed.
Draining with vent closed

Cool down and condensing after
steaming a vessel
Vacuum Relief
Equipment that could come under vacuum is

designed to withstand full vacuum
Note: For large diameter columns and storage tanks,
cost of designing to full vacuum is prohibitive
Check the consequences of air mixing with vessel
inventory before providing vacuum relief. Usual to
provide Nitrogen padding/ blanketing
No RV required if Owner instructs that his
administrative procedures can prevent vacuum
Draining test water; Steam condensing after a steam-out
Atmospheric Tank Protection
Inbreathing (vacuum relief) is required for
Maximum outflow without matching inflow
Vapour shrinkage due to atmosphere cooling –
showers etc The link ed image cannot be display ed. The file may hav e been mov ed, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the correct file and location.
Blanket gas supply valve fails/ closed

Out breathing (pressure relief) required for
Maximum inflow without matching outflow
Vapour expansion due to atmosphere warming
Blanket gas supply valve fails open
Vapour outlet valve fails/ closed
Fire relief required unless tank has frangible
roof
Fire generally does not engulf the entire tank
Atmospheric Tank Protection
Refer API 2000, for calculation of relief load

N2/ gas padding for thermal inbreathing/ outbreathing
PVRV for thermal inbreathing/ outbreathing
Gauge hatch / manway vents for fire relief
Tanks have a low design pressure, mmWC. PVRV/
manway are weight loaded; sizing by vendor
PVRVs installed directly on roof nozzle The link ed image cannot be display ed. The file may hav e been mov ed, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the correct file and location.
Blanket Gas Regulators Emergency Vent

Gauge Hatch
and
Manhole Cover
PVRV
Fired Heater
Blocked outlet and thermal

No PSV required for process coils, unless mandated
or underrated
PSV required for BFW and Steam coils – Code/ IBR
Thermal PSV in Hot Oil WHRU
Residual heat in refractory/ insulation. Not effective
against oil coking inside the tube
Pumps & Compressors
Centrifugal Pump
Usually designed for shut-off or highest head at zero flow
Reciprocating/ Positive Displacement Pump/ Compressor
RV for blocked outlet. Due to pulsation in discharge pressure keep good
margin between operating and set pressure
Centrifugal Compressor
Suction side for settle-out pressure. 2-3 stages in a common casing may
settle-out together + Check valve leak
Refrigeration or low temp service ~ vapour pressure at ambient
temperature
Discharge/ Casing: Design for surge pressure at 105% speed with maximum
[suction pressure; molecular weight] and minimum suction temperature [Oil
& Gas Industry practice] or RV provided at 120% of Normal Operating Press
Inter-stage: Usually fire case
When a compressor trips, discharge from

other running compressors can back flow
into the tripped one, pressurizing its
Suction Drum
Typical Relief Cases – Oil & Gas
Flowline - Blocked Outlet/ Thermal

Inlet Sep - Blocked Outlet
LP Sep - Blocked Outlet/ Gas Blowby
Compressor - Fire/ Check Valve Leakage
Compressor Last Stage - Blocked Outlet ?
Glycol Contactor – Fire
Fuel Gas KOD - PCV Failure
Glycol Pump - Blocked Outlet
Filters - Fire
Air Vessels - Fire
RVs may not be the right solution…
For a few cases, RV is impractical. Instrumented safeguards is needed

Hot Oil WHRU.
Hot Oil Boiling Pt at Relief Press >≈ Incoming Flue Gas Temp
Heat to boiling fluid ≈ zero
Hot oil will decompose and coke before it boils
Instrumented protection to remove source of heat + minimum flow at all
times + thermal PSV against residual heat in WHRU
Export pipeline of 1,000 MMSCFD
A huge flare. HIPPS contains the HP fluid avoiding a release
Instrumented Protection to isolate the HP source such as compressor
and/or HIPPS (2 independent SDV) from 2 “independent” trip systems.
READ ASME CODE CASE 2211-1, now part of RP 521, Annex E
Design Tip: HIPPS/ IPF requires Documented User Approval.

Design Tip: SDVs leak, Ha Ha Only User may specify pressure protection by system design.
SIZING
Design Tip: Analyzing Relief Scenarios and Estimating Relief

Loads is the important part. Sizing is a matter of routine.
RV Sizing
KW TZ
A=
CP1KdKb M
3 Equations
KW
Vapour - Critical A=
P1KdKbKnKsh
Steam - Critical (ASME Div VIII)
Liquid
KQ G
A=
38KdKwKv P1-P2
K = Sizing constant Kn = Correction factor for Napier Equation
W = Relief flow rate Ksh = Correction factor for steam superheat
C = Coefficient Kv = Correction factor for viscosity
P1 = Upstream relieving pressure P2 = Total back pressure
Kd = Coefficient of discharge SG = Specific gravity of liquid
Kb /Kw = Back pressure correction factor Liquid sizing: trial & error step required.
Start with an assumed size to determine
Z = Compressibility Re and hence Kv. Repeat to match
M = Molecular weight See API for sizing 2 Phase Flow.
T = Upstream relieving temperature Older method of vapor + liquid
area is no longer valid
A = Required orifice area
RV Sizing
Subcritical Flow – Vapour, pilot and conventional

Valid for RVs that have their cold spring setting
adjusted to compensate for the constant superimposed
BP
Built-up back pressure <10% or allowable accumulation
K = Sizing constant
W = Relief flow rate
P1 = Upstream relieving pressure KW ZT
P2 = Downstream or backpressure A=
Kd = Coefficient of discharge
F2Kd MP1(P1-P2)
F2 = Coefficient of sub-critical flow
Z = Compressibility Do NOT interpret this equation
M = Molecular weight allows >10% back pressure
T = Upstream relieving temperature
A = Required orifice area
RV Sizing
Coefficient of Discharge Kd
Depends on relief valve design
National Boiler Board certifies capacities of all RVs
Manufacturer back calculates Kd from certified capacity
and test conditions
If unknown, assume 0.975 for vapour and 0.65 for liquid
RV capacity must be checked based on vendor Kd
For all vapour and liquid RVs, manufacturer should
supply sizing calculation based on his Kd
Design Tip: Kd varies from manufacturer to manufacturer. Our calculations should

not be passed to clients. Final calcs from supplier should be the deliverable.
RV Standard Sizes
Standard RV Sizes
API 526 Orifice Designation
RVs made in standard sizes Size Area, in2
Each standard orifice given a D 0.110
letter designation E 0.196
F 0.307
Select a standard size larger
than the calculated one G 0.503
H 0.785
If calculated size, marginally
J 1.287
exceeds a standard size, it may
K 1.838
be OK, as the actual orifice area
for most RVs are higher than the L 2.853
standard API area. Actual areas M 3.600

are listed in National Boiler N 4.340
Board Book P 6.380
Q 11.050
R 16.000
T 26.000
RV Standard Sizes
Standard RV Sizes
API 526 Orifice Designation
RV Inlet x Outlet Sizes Size Area, in2
Size D E F G H J K L M N P Q R T D 0.110
1 x2 E 0.196
1½ x 2 F 0.307
1½ x 3 G 0.503
2 x3
H 0.785
3 x4
J 1.287
3 x6
K 1.838
4 x6
6 x8
L 2.853
6 x 10 M 3.600
8 x 10 N 4.340
P 6.380
Q 11.050
R 16.000
T 26.000
Standard RV Sizes
Air/Gas/Steam Service
API area is not actual RV area

Actual area and nozzle coefft vary from
manufacturer to manufacturer
2J3 API Area = 1.287 in2
Actual area = 1.427 to 1.635 in2
Coeffts = 0.788 to 0.975
National Board certified capacity - based
on nozzle coefft and orifice area - varies
Why the difference?
In 1962 ASME Sec VIII derated certified
capacities by 10%. Manufacturers did not KA is more comparable.
derate their advertised capacity or nozzle Explanation AG/Crosby
coefft, but increased nozzle area by 10%. But Advertised KA = 0.975*1.287 = 1.255
API orifice areas as advertised remain same. National Board = 0.788*1.635 = 1.288
API (K= 0.9) = 0.9*1.287 = 1.158
Actual capacity may be 10-16% more

Board RV Area is based on So don’t jump from P to R (73%) when
• Nozzle bore for full lift valves calculated size marginally exceeds
• Lift for restricted lift valve standard size
Thermal Expansion
Relief Rate, q = αv.φ
K.d.c
αv = cubic expansion coefft of liquid at expected temp
φ = Heat Transfer Rate
Exchangers: use max Heat Duty
Solar Radiation: use as per Project Design Basis
K = Sizing constant
d = Relative Density
c = Specific heat of trapped liquid
For thermal protection of piping, generally ¾” D 1” threaded

or 1” D 2” flanged RVs are provided; No calculations done
Fire Relief
Liquid:
Latent heat for multi-component is tricky, but rules of thumb help. λ = 50 to 100 units
Assumed that entire heat goes to boil-off.
With large liquid inventory, only a small part goes to vaporization; rest heats the liquid
Gas:
Temperature, T2, calculated under fire may exceed base equipment design temperature.
RV with required inlet flange rating is usually not available. In RV data sheet, specify
design temperature and indicate that T2 is for area calculation only.
Fire Relief - Blowdown
Without BDV, internal pressure (Hoop’s stress) rises over time;
metal’s ability to hold pressure (yield strength) falls with increasing
temperature. The vessel will fail when internal stress exceeds ability
Blowdown brings down internal pressure and stress. As long as
internal stress is below allowable stress, vessel will not rupture
Judiciously use to extend blowdown time when blowdown rate is
higher than design inflow capacity to reduce flare size
Stress
Ka
Boom
Time, minutes
RP 521 Figures
Fire Relief - Blowdown • Heat up rate
• Time to Rupture
API RP 521: Thinner plates (LP service)

heat up faster; higher the temperature,
Flow + Pressure
Flow = Foe-θt
faster it ruptures
If BDV initial pressure (PAHH/PSV) >> Pressure = Poe-θt
operating pressure, zoning can cut

peak rate Time
Take one source at a time. Loads from this Groups 1 +2 + 3

and adjacent equipment within a fire zone
(8.6m radius x 7.6m high) are taken at Group 1, then Group 2 and last Group 3
BDV initial pressure; rest at operating 50% reduction
pressure
Staggered blowdown can reduce flare
Flow
capacity Time
Staggered Blowdown
• Each BDV with secured air vessel,
sized for 3 valve strokes; PAL; 2 check
valves at inlet; no bleeding devices
like regulators
From: “Design staggered depressurization sequence for flare systems”, R Dole, S Bhatt and S Sridhar, HP, Dec 2013
INSTALLATION & ISOLATION
Design Tip: Improper installation restricts capacity. Next

time you visit a plant, walk around and cringe in horror!!.
Inlet Line Resonant Chatter in a pilot can self-destruct it
Size on RV rated flow - not on relief load

Inlet loss <3% to avoid chatter, except with Friction Loss
remote sensing pilots
Bleed
If inlet ∆P >3% with pilots, use actual inlet
pressure to size RV
Entrance Loss
Upstream of demister. from vapour space; 1 Velocity Head
below Normal Liquid Level for PRV
10d min from Control Valve
Free draining to source; Bleed/drain @inlet
Nozzle Entrance Loss Friction Loss
1 VH if RV is off vessel
Bleed
½ VH if RV is off outlet pipe Hard T
RV mounted upright
Inlet line/ Vessel Nozzle ≥ RV inlet Entrance Loss
½ Velocity Head
Design Tip: Common Error: Ignoring ∆P in common piping,

specially in a group of vessels protected by a single RV.
Inlet 3%
It is difficult to meet <3% criteria when

Inlet pipe area/ RV area < 3. Results in body bowl
choking. Usually in bigger RV
Suggestions:
Have a higher inlet example 4P6; have 6P8 0.7854*4^2/P(6.38) = 1.97
Insert a size 9.5 between P and Q 6.38^11.05 0.7854*6^2/P(6.38) = 4.43
0.7854*6^2/9.5 = 2.973
Reduce RV lift to reduce area viz Q 9.5
Latter 2 reduce RV area to desired to cut rated flow and ∆P
Study of 14,863 RVs indicate 20% fails to meet 3% limit
90 off 4P6 RVs with inlet L= 4 to 116’. ∆P = 1.2 to 19.4%.
63% > 3%
From: “Address inlet pressure loss concerns with restricted lift relief devices”, Smith D, Yoram S, HP, Mar 2014
Like high inlet loss, high back-pressure can make
Outlet a RV chatter. As soon as RV closes, flow stops,
back-pressure falls, making the RV to open
Safe Location
Atmospheric Discharge
To Safe Location - for steam, air and N2; not HC
Weep or drain hole in outlet low point
To Closed Drain ¼“ drain hole
Thermal etc RV
Avoid, if cross contamination is possible
Avoid if water in drain will freeze
To Flare
Line should free drain to flare header; Top entry
No liquid accumulation Free Drain
Backpressure limitation
Outlet line size ≥ RV outlet
< 70% sonic and ρV² criteria
Inlet/ Outlet Isolation
Inlet & outlet Isolation valves
Not permitted by ASME Section I; not recommended by ASME LO
Section VIII
If required by Owner, then both should be FB locked open (“LO” or
“CSO”)
LO
If a spare RV is required by Owner,
install with FB inlet & outlet valves 600 mm gap
Inlet valve of one RV is LO and the other LC
Some Owners require interlocked valve to ensure that one RV is
always in service
Why?
Both outlet valves should be LO. LO
LO
A (globe) vent valve across RV to depressurize before
draining LC
A 2nd ball isolation valve located 600mm upstream of vent valve in LO
HP service, if globe valve is stuck on icing ~ JT cooling
A bleed valve u/s of RV inlet block valve ~ in-situ testing
If Owner agrees, a single common LO outlet valve for all RVs
in a system, say compressor train or Fuel Gas System
Inlet & Outlet Piping
Inlet
Lead Size, in 2 3 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Eq L, ft open system 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Closed system 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
Fittings No off Eq L, ft each
3 Elbows 4 4 5 8 9 12 14 16 18 20 23
1 Hard T 10 14 19 28 37 47 55 62 72 82 90
1 Reducer 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 13
0 Gate Valve 2 2 3 4 6 7 9 10 11 12 14
Eq L, ft - Open system 48 53 62 81 94 115 130 144 161 178 197
Eq L, ft - Closed system 98 103 112 131 144 165 180 194 211 228 247
Outlet
Lead Size, in 2 3 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Eq L, ft open system 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Closed system 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Fittings No off Eq L, ft each

3 Elbows 4 4 5 8 9 12 14 16 18 20 23
1 Hard T 10 14 19 28 37 47 55 62 72 82 90
1 Reducer 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 13
0 Gate Valve 2 2 3 4 6 7 9 10 11 12 14
Eq L, ft - Open system 48 53 62 81 94 115 130 144 161 178 197

Eq L, ft - Closed system 73 78 87 106 119 140 155 169 186 203 222
Design Tip: It is a pain; but MUST review RV inlet and outlet
Poor Piping piping and pump suction piping in 3D model. Easier to do
than “wish I could bury myself in sand” feeling at site
Pipers locate RVs at “convenient” locations – viz

access, ignoring inlet ∆P. Need to check piping 3D
model
Horizontal dead legs collect trash / liquid in service
RVs in turbulent zone can chatter and get damaged
Downstream of a Pressure Reduction Station – Fuel Gas?
Downstream of orifice plates/ flow nozzles
Downstream of pulsating compressor / pump discharge. Pilot
RVs may be better because of high seat loading
Ideal Piping
Difficult to achieve but

recommended by
suppliers
Common Errors Prod Sep LC
Ignoring static head Hydrocyclone

Between upstream & downstream
equipment as in the case of Prod Sep
and d/s vessel or Hydrocyclone
Pump at
Between PSV and piping at a lower deck Upper Deck Piping at
Lower Deck
Ignoring ∆P in common piping,
specially in a group of vessels Friction Loss
protected by a single RV
Ignoring mechanical limit on
backpressure. Bigger the RV lower is
backpressure allowed.
150# RV Outlet Press Limit, psig at 100°F
Size D–J M R T
Design Tip: Important to check mechanical limit on
Convn 285 285 60 30
backpressure on flowing and non-flowing RVs.
Forgotten by Process Engineers. See RP 526 Bellow 230 80 60 30
PSV - 001 HP | LP
HIPPS Errors PAHH

PALL
PAHH Riser SDV

PALL
HIPPS used SDV-1 SDV-2 SDV-3 HP Section LP Section

HP | LP
Against PCV / choke failure
Blocked outlet/ stuck pig/ hydrate blockage Subsea Flowline
In
HP | LP
subsea section to derate flowline/riser,
Fortified Section
instead of designing for shut-in pressure This image cannot currently be display ed.
Subsea Wells
Topside piping
Check
Pressure build-up in trapped LP section by This image cannot currently be display ed.
the time PAHHs detect and fully closes SDVs

Provide minimum length of fortified or HP
section d/s of HIPPS SDVs - pig/ hydrate
blockage, SDV leakage
Need to provide a PSV in LP SDVs leak!
RV Discharge Velocity & Noise
Force Flow
Tail pipes may operate at high velocities
Based on Process input, piping to calculate the

reaction forces
RV may need supports to counter momentum and

velocity effects of the flowing fluid
Dual outlet PSV can help mitigate – resultant force
Noise levels should be calculated per RP 520

Provide noise insulation or relocate RV away
Flow Induced Vibration
Flow induced vibrations may result in fatigue

failure.
May require piping supports, increased wall
thickness, etc The link ed image cannot be display ed. The file may hav e been mov ed, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the correct file and location.

Failure to update Relief Studies
Codes and standards; methods/ assumptions

keep changing … additional insights,, Flarenet
RVs in old plants should be revisited every 10 years
If control valves/ equipment have been replaced
In Oil & Gas plants, GORs, liquid profiles change
RELIEF SYSTEM DESIGN
Relief System Design
Analyze Relief Scenarios Analysis

Calculate Relief Loads and RV Size for each
Scenario to get Governing Case Sizing
Summarize results for each RV for each
contingency to determine Peak Load to Flare
Info Required
1. Heat and Material Balance
2. Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs)
3. Piping and Instrumentation Drawings (P&IDs)
4. Instrument Data (Control Valve, Bypass, RO sizes, etc.)
5. Mechanical and Rotating Equipment Data
Total Load Reduction via Dyn Sim
On total plant failure cases, viz Power, Cooling
Water, Air, it is unlikely all the PSVs will pop at the
same instant + maintain initial rate
Columns may take time build to relief pressure
Dynamic simulation can help find realistic load
Note: Compressor interstage drum pops in total system
study but does not impact total load
Total Power Failure Conventional, kg/h Dyn Sim - Individual, kg/h Dyn Sim – System, kg/h
Fractionator 448,000 259,000 140,000
Comp Interstage Drum 0 0 160,000
Stripper Feed Drum 45,000 45,000 50,000
Debutanizer 72,000 72,000 5,000
Total 565,000 376,000 355,000
Total Load Reduction via Dyn Sim
Dyn Sim total load is 275,000. But

design taken as 355,000 kg/h
Total Power Failure Conventional, kg/h Dyn Sim - Individual, kg/h Dyn Sim – System, kg/h
Fractionator 448,000 259,000 140,000
Comp Interstage Drum 0 0 160,000
Stripper Feed Drum 45,000 45,000 50,000
Debutanizer 72,000 72,000 5,000
Total 565,000 376,000 355,000
Still Accidents Happen
Boiler started Hydrotest done with
Boat hits platform PSV not bolted right without purging cold water
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Some of these accidents are not preventable by RVs but by

• Common Sense
• Good Operating Practice
• Good Instrumentation & Controls
Bend d/s of water
CS bend used instead Injection or LCV = No gas detectors in
of AS in H2 plant Erosion-corrosion Internal in Flare KOD onshore plant
Piping Support Not

Fire Proofed Missing Check at UC Pig “Launched” Water Hammer
THANK YOU

Pressure Relief Systems 2014 Rev A PDF

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June 2014

PRESSURE RELIEF SYSTEMS

Control system maintains stable operation

Community Emergency Response

Fast chemical reactions:

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Air freshener can in a closed

Vacuum column fire Semi sub – what was left

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Backpressure acting on top and

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100 RV Opening Pressure

isolating process gas

Most have soft seats; remote sensing capability – pilot

RV: ‘Nozzle’ or ‘orifice’ -

Backpressure affects lift;

Bellows nullify backpressure effect to an extent

At 30% capacity reduced

Difficult to have small bellows. Size D & E, may be a ‘modified’ F !!

Disk nullify backpressure effect to an extent

At 30% capacity reduced At 20% capacity reduced

Balanced Spindle type can withstand

Flow follows closely nozzle flow

Back flow Preventer:

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Backpressure Impact - Tests

Relief Valve: Valve opens in proportion to

Superimposed back pressure - Affects set pressure.

Built-up back pressure - Does not affect set pressure but

Total back-pressure = Superimposed + Built-up BP

Normal Operating Press = 0.3 U Flare Header

∆P = 10 U due to flow from this +

Superimposed Constant Back Press = 0.3 U

Design Tip: Backpressure mechanical limit on RV is 6Q8 11.050 (5)

As the seat lifts,

Reverse buckling disk

2 RDs in series may be required, if

What it tells you?

Leakage thru RD can increase the

‘Combining RDs with RVs’, Roger

As a replacement for relief valves. Non reclosing type.

Usually in alternative paths to staged flares

As a replacement for relief valves. Non reclosing type.

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Generally for Storage Tank protection

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Type of relief valve

Seat Leakage = Product Loss

Not OK in polymerizing or dirty service Not OK in polymerizing or dirty service

Rupture Disk RD/RV Combination

API is also getting adopted as a National /

Process Engineers go by Design Pressure, rather

For revamp: MAWP may be OK. Caution: Corroded

Where RV is set below MAWP, overpressure can

Design Note: In high pressure service, large

Utility Failures Power Failed

One failure results in another

READ API RP 521. IT IS PAINFUL. BUT NO OTHER WAY!!

Abnormal Heat or Vapour Input

All Electric Power driven equipment stop

All control valves revert to safe position - FC or