G.R. No.

175842

NILO MACAYAN, JR. y MALANA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

LEONEN, J.:

Facts: Annie Uy Jao filed a complaint against Nilo Macayan for Robbery. Jao is the owner of
Lanero Garments Ext (Lanero). In 1995, she hired Macayan as a sample cutter and to undertake
materials purchasing for her garments business. In 2000, when her business was doing poorly, she
allowed her employees to engage on other engagements to extend their income; provided
that the Lanero would still be their main priority. Upon learning that Macayan and his wife is
working on a rival company, she confronted the latter and despite demands, Macayan took for
granted his work at Lanero. Later on, Macayan voluntarily stopped reporting to work. He latter
on filed an illegal dismissal case against Jao.

During the pendency of the illegal dismissal case, Macayan allegedly threatened Jao that her
family would be harmed and/or kidnapped if she did not give him P200,000.00. The following
day, Macayan allegedly called Jao to reiterate his threat and to specify the time and place —
February 16, 2001, sometime between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. at McDonald's Banawe Branch — in
which the P200,000.00 should be handed to him. Jao claimed that she was sure it was Macayan
speaking to her, as the person on the phone addressed her as "Madam," which was how he
customarily called her. Jao sought the help of NBI for entrapment operation. The latter asked her
to prepare P4,000 to be marked and used at the operation. Upon handling of the marked
money by Macayan, the NBI immediately proceeded the arrest.

According to Macayan’s testimony, he was boxed on the right side of Macayan's face and told
him, "Tatanga-tanga ka. Pupunta ka rito ng walang kasama, ikaw ngayon ang me [sic] kaso."He
was also physically abused by an NBI operative.

The Information charging him with robbery dated February 20, 2001 was then prepared, and the
criminal case was filed and raffled to Branch 101 of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City

RTC convicted him of robbery.

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines at the appellate
stage, did not file an appellee's brief. Instead, it filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of
Appellee's Brief recommending that Macayan be acquitted. It asserted that his guilt was not
established beyond reasonable doubt.

CA AFFIRMED Macayan's conviction and increasing the duration of the penalty imposed. It
reasoned that Jao's sole, uncorroborated testimony was nevertheless positive and credible.
Macayan filed for Motion of Reconsideration- DENIED.

Issue: Whether the guilt of Macayan was established beyond reasonable.

Held: Macayan is acquitted. Decision of CA is reversed.

Consistent with the rule on burden of proof, the requisite quantum of evidence in criminal cases,
and in light of the points highlighted by both Macayan and the Office of the Solicitor General,
we find that the prosecution failed to establish Macayan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
a reversal of the rulings of the trial court and Court of Appeals is in order. Macayan must be
acquitted.

As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the resolution of this case hinges
on whether Jao was indeed threatened and/or intimidated by Macayan into giving him money,
that is, whether he extorted money from Jao. Per Jao's own testimony, there were two (2)
instances in which she was threatened and/or intimidated: first, immediately after the
postponement of the February 12, 2001 conference in the illegal dismissal case; and second,
when Macayan called her on February 13, 2001 and set a rendezvous for handing over the
extorted money. It was proven by the records that Jao was absent in any of the 11 conference
for illegal dismissal, it casts doubt whether Macayan threaten her after the conference. The
prosecution could have addressed the deficiency in Jao’s allegation that she was threatened
on February 12, 2001 by presenting as witness the other person who was supposedly present in
the incident: Angel, Jao’s secretary. However, she was never presented as a witness.
Furthermore, The prosecution itself acknowledged that there is no basis for ascertaining the
identity of Macayan as the caller other than the caller’s use of "Madam" in addressing Jao.

Jurisprudence has established the standard for appreciating the credibility of a witness' claim:

For evidence to be believed, however, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve under the circumstances. The test to determine the value of the
testimony of a witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the
experience of mankind. Whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies
outside of judicial cognizance.61

Jao's inconsistent conduct, coupled with flimsy justifications for acting as she did, betrays the
absurdity and unreliability of her claims and ultimately, of her as a witness.
SILKAIR (SINGAPORE) PTE. LTD., G.R. No. 184398

Petitioner, Promulgated: February 25, 2010

- versus -

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent.

Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Facts: SilkAir PTE, LTD. a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Singapore with a
Philippine representative office in Cebu City, is an online international carrier plying the
Singapore-Cebu-Singapore and Singapore-Cebu-Davao-Singapore routes. On June 24, 2002,
petitioner filed with the BIR an administrative claim for the refund of Three Million Nine Hundred
Eighty-Three Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Pesos and Forty-Nine Centavos (P3,983,590.49) in
excise taxes which it allegedly erroneously paid on its purchases of aviation jet fuel from Petron
Corporation (Petron) from June to December 2000.

Since the BIR took no action on petitioners claim for refund, petitioner sought judicial recourse
and filed on June 27, 2002, a petition for review with the CTA to prevent the lapse of the two-
year prescriptive period within which to judicially claim a refund under Section 229 of the
NIRC. Petitioner invoked its exemption from payment of excise taxes in accordance with the
provisions of Section 135(b) of the NIRC, which exempts from excise taxes the entities covered by
tax treaties, conventions and other international agreements; provided that the country of said
carrier or exempt entity likewise exempts from similar taxes the petroleum products sold to
Philippine carriers or entities. In this regard, petitioner relied on the reciprocity clause under
Article 4(2) of the Air Transport Agreement entered between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Republic of Singapore.

July 27, 2006, the CTA First Division found that petitioner was qualified for tax exemption under
Section 135(b) of the NIRC, as long as the Republic of Singapore exempts from similar taxes
petroleum products sold to Philippine carriers, entities or agencies under Article 4(2) of the Air
Transport Agreement quoted above. However, it ruled that petitioner was not entitled to the
excise tax exemption for failure to present proof that it was authorized to operate in the
Philippines during the period material to the case due to the non-admission of some of its
exhibits, which were merely photocopies, including Exhibit A which was petitioners Certificate of
Registration with the SEC and Exhibits P, Q and R which were its operating permits issued by the
CAB to fly the Singapore-Cebu-Singapore and Singapore-Cebu-Davao-Singapore routes for the
period October 1999 to October 2000.

Petitioner also asserts that despite its failure to present the original copy of its SEC Registration
during the hearings, the CTA should take judicial notice of its SEC Registration since the same
was already offered and admitted in evidence in similar cases pending before the CTA

Issue: Whether the CTA should have taken judicial notice of SilkAir’s SEC registration.
Held: No, as quoted by the SC from the CTA en banc: Each and every case is distinct and
separate in character and matter although similar parties may have been involved. Thus, in a
pending case, it is not mandatory upon the courts to take judicial notice of pieces of evidence
which have been offered in other cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in
the same court. Evidence already presented and admitted by the court in a previous case
cannot be adopted in a separate case pending before the same court without the same being
offered and identified anew.

The cases cited by petitioner concerned similar parties before the same court but do not cover
the same claim. A court is not compelled to take judicial notice of pieces of evidence offered
and admitted in a previous case unless the same are properly offered or have accordingly
complied with the requirements on the rules of evidence. In other words, the evidence
presented in the previous cases cannot be considered in this instant case without being offered
in evidence.

Furthermore, documents are not among the matters which the law mandatorily requires the
Court to take judicial notice of, without any introduction of evidence, as petitioner would have
the CTA do. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court .
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181036

Plaintiff-Appellee, Promulgated: July 6, 2010

- versus -

ADRIANO LEONARDO y DANTES,

Accused-Appellant.

PEREZ, J.

Facts: Adriano Leonardo y Dantes was charged with 13 separate Information with the crime of
rape, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, committed against AAA. The appellant is the brother-
in-law of her foster mother, DDD, and the brother of her foster father, EEE. AAA and Leonardo
were neighbours, whenever AAA was alone, Leonardo seized every opportunity to rape and
molest the AAA, he fondled and inserted his finger inside the vagina of AAA multiple times and
he also successfully inserted his penis on AAA’s vagina several times through intimation by
showing AAA his knife. The last sexual advances of the appellant to AAA happened on 11 May
2002 at around 7:00 oclock in the evening near the well located at the back of the house of the
appellant. During that time AAA was removing their washed clothes from the clothesline at the
back of the house of the appellant. Leonardo ordered AAA to buy packed of cigarette, after
handing over the cigarette, appellant showed AAA his knife preventing her from leaving and
ordering her to undress. When AAA was totally naked, the appellant touched her private parts
and told her to lie down on the grassy ground. She felt itchy as she was lying on the grassy
ground. While in that position, the appellant went on top of AAA, inserted his penis into her
vagina and made push and pull movements. AAA felt pain.

When AAA went home, her aunt, CCC, who was there cooking, asked her why she was pale
and uneasy. Her aunt also wondered why she was scratching her back. AAA did not
immediately tell CCC what truly happened. However, when CCC became so persistent to know
what really happened to her, AAA began to cry. She then disclosed to CCC what happened to
her on that day, as well as all her harrowing experiences in the hands of the appellant. CCC
instantly called up AAAs biological mother, BBB, whose house was only three meters away from
CCC and informed her of AAAs ordeal. Thereafter, BBB came to accompany AAA in going to
the police station to report what the appellant did to her. At the police station, AAA gave her
written statements against the appellant.

In the RTC, Leonardo was found guilty of 6 counts of rape. CA affirmed the conviction,

Appellant tried to argue that AAA’s testimony was uncorroborated hence, insufficient to convict
him.

Issue: Whether AAA’s testimony is enough to convict Leonardo.

Held: Yes, while it is true that aside from AAA herself, the prosecution did not present any other
witness who actually saw that the appellant raped and sexually abused AAA, such fact was not
fatal to the prosecutions cause. There is no claim that other witnesses saw or could have seen
the crime but were not presented in court. Indeed, credibility does not go with numbers. The
testimony of a single witness, if categorical and candid, suffices.

It is of judicial notice that the crime of rape is usually committed in a private place where only
the aggressor and the rape victim are present. Further, AAA has positively identified the
appellant as the person who raped and sexually abused her and this negates the theory
proffered by the appellant that the laceration found on AAAs vagina could have been caused
by AAAs sexual intercourse with either of her two boyfriends.

G.R. No. 165168 July 9, 2010

SPS. NONILON (MANOY) and IRENE MONTECALVO, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS (Substitutes) OF EUGENIA T. PRIMERO, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, ALFREDO T.
PRIMERO, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts: The property involved in this case is a portion of a parcel of land (860 sqm) registered in
the name of Eugenia Primero. In the early 1980s she leased the lot to Irene Montecalvo, she
eventually entered into an un-notarized Agreement with Irene with the following stipulations:

o Irene would deposit the amount of P40,000.00 which shall form part of the down
payment equivalent to 50% of the purchase price.

o During the term of negotiation of 30 to 45 days from receipt of said deposit, Irene would
pay the balance of the down payment.

o In case of default in the payment of the down payment, the deposit would be returned
within 10 days from the lapse of said negotiation period and the Agreement deemed
terminated.

o If the negotiations pushed through, the balance would be paid in 10 equal monthly
installments from receipt of the down payment, with interest

Irene failed to pay the full down payment within the stipulated negotiation period. Nonetheless,
she continued to stay on the disputed property, and still made several payments. On the other
hand, Eugenia did not return the deposit and refused to accept further payments only in 1992.
Irene caused a survey of lot and the segregation of a portion but Eugenia opposed her claim
and asked her to vacate the property. Eugenia and the heirs of her deceased husband filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Irene and her husband before the MTC of Iligan City.
Parties stipulated that the issue to be resolved was whether their Agreement had been
rescinded and novated.
MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction since the issue is not susceptible of pecuniary
estimation. MTC's Decision dismissing the ejectment case became final as Eugenia and her
children did not appeal therefrom. Irene and Nonilon retaliated by instituting Civil Case with the
RTC of Lanao del Norte for specific performance, to compel Eugenia to convey the lot in
question. RTC rendered dismissed the complaint and the counterclaim for lack of legal and
factual bases; ordered petitioners to pay rentals due, and 12% legal interest

Petitioners appealed to the CA, CA rendered affirmed the RTC Decision.

Motion for Reconsideration was filed but CA denied the same for lack of merit

Issue: Whether the trial court was correct in fixing the legal interest rate at 12%.

Held: Yes. Lastly, petitioners argue that the courts below erred in imposing a P2,500.00 monthly
rental from 1985 onwards, since said amount is far greater than the last agreed monthly rental
(December 1984) of P500.00.

In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC "that the trial court had authority to fix a
reasonable value for the continued use and occupancy of the leased premises after the
termination of the lease contract, and that it was not bound by the stipulated rental in the
contract of lease since it is equally settled that upon termination or expiration of the contract of
lease, the rental stipulated therein may no longer be the reasonable value for the use and
occupation of the premises as a result of the change or rise in values. Moreover, the trial court
can take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of real estate especially of business
establishments". The appellate court likewise held that the petitioners failed to discharge their
burden to show that the said price was exorbitant or unconscionable. Hence, the CA found no
reason to disturb the trial court's decision ordering the petitioners to pay P2,500.00 as monthly
rentals. The appellate court further held that "to deprive Eugenia of the rentals due her as the
owner-lessor of the subject property would result to unjust enrichment on the part of Irene."

The courts below correctly took judicial notice of the nature of the leased property subject of the
case at bench based on its location and commercial viability. As described in the Agreement,
the property is immediately in front of St. Peter's College. More significantly, it is stated in the
Declaration of Real Property submitted by the petitioners as evidence in the trial court, that the
property is used predominantly for commercial purposes. The assessment by the trial court of the
area where the property is located is therefore fairly grounded.
631 SCRA 652, SEPTEMBER 29, 2010, 3RD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V JUANITO CABIGQUEZ ALASTRA

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS: In 2001, the victim AAA,widowed mother of ten children, was robbed of P3,000 cash and
P7,000 worth of grocery items at gun point inside their store by Romula Grondiano. After such
act, the look out Juanito Alastra entered the store and rape AAA in front of three of her minor
children. The trial court found Cabigquez and his co-accused guilty of qualified rape and
robbery. They were also ordered to pay indemnity, moral damages and actual damages in the
sum of P10,000 for the stolen items and cash. For the actual damages the trial court took judicial
notice of the value of the stolen goods.

The appellant questioned the amount of actual damages insisting there was no basis for the
actual cost of the items taken from the store. The Court of Appeals sustained such award.

ISSUE: WON the trial court has the power to take judicial notice of the value of the stolen goods?

HELD: YES. The Supreme Court cited the case of People v Martinez wherein the court ruled that
the trial court has the power to take judicial notice of the value of stolen goods because these
are matters of public knowledge or capable of unquestionable demonstration. Judicial
cognizance, which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace
evidence since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to
achieve. Surely, matters like the value of the appliances, canned goods and perfume are
undeniably within public knowledge and easily capable of unquestionable demonstration.
Here, what is involved are common goods for everyday use and ordinary stocks found in small
sari-sari stores like private complainants store, i.e., milk, soap, coffee, sugar, liquor and cigarettes.
The RTC was thus correct in granting the reasonable amount of P10,000.00 as computed by the
private complainant representing the value of stolen merchandise from her store.
 CARLOS DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 165153
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Acting Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LIBERTY BROADCASTING NETWORK, BRION,
INC. and EDGARDO QUIOGUE, *ABAD, and

Respondents. **PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:
August 25, 2010
BRION, J.:

Facts: Carlos C. de Castro, worked as a chief building administrator at LBNI. On

May 31, 1996, LBNI dismissed de Castro on the grounds of serious misconduct,
fraud, and willful breach of the trust reposed in him as a managerial
employee. Allegedly, de Castro committed theft, diversion of company funds,
receiving money from suppliers, disrespect and disorderly behavior. He filed a
case in the NLRC . The Labor Arbiter found the affidavits of LBNIs witnesses to be
devoid of merit, noting that (1) witnesses Niguidula and Balais had altercations
with de Castro prior to the execution of their respective affidavits; (2) the affidavit
of Cristino Samarita, one of the suppliers from whom de Castro allegedly asked
for commissions, stated that it was not de Castro, but Balais, who personally
asked for money; and (3) Jose Aying, another supplier, recanted his earlier
affidavit. LBNI appealed the Labor Arbiters ruling to the NLRC. Initially, the NLRC
reversed the Labor Arbiters decision but on de Castros motion for
reconsideration, the NLRC reinstated the Labor Arbiters decision. CA reversed the
decision. SC ruled in favor of De Castro.
In a motion for reconsideration, LBNI argues that it is currently under
rehabilitation; hence, the proceedings in this case must be suspended.

Issue: Whether the court should suspend the execution of the decision due to the
on-going rehabilitation.

Held: Yes. LBNIs motion was denied in our Resolution of December 12, 2005 for
being premature, as de Castro then had yet to file his reply to LBNIs comment on
the petition.Thereafter, nothing was heard from LBNI regarding the Stay Order or
the rehabilitation proceedings it instituted before the RTC of Makati, Branch
138. Even the memorandum, dated May 4, 2006, that LBNI filed with the Court
contained no reference to the rehabilitation proceedings.

The filing of a memorandum before the Court is not an empty requirement,

devoid of legal significance. In A.M. No. 99-2-04-SC, the Court declared that issues
raised in previous pleadings but not included in the memorandum shall be
deemed waived or abandoned. Being a summation of the parties previous
pleadings, the memoranda alone may be considered by the Court in deciding or
resolving the petition. Thus, on account of LBNIs omission, only the issues raised
in the parties memoranda principally, the validity of de Castros dismissal from
LBNI were considered by the Court in resolving the case.

The Court does not take judicial notice of proceedings in the various courts of
justice in the Philippines. At the time we decided the present case, we were thus
not bound to take note of and consider the pendency of the rehabilitation
proceedings, as the matter had not been properly brought to our
attention. Nevertheless, with LBNIs manifestation that it is still undergoing
rehabilitation, the Court resolves to suspend the execution of our September 23,
2008 Decision. The suspension shall last up to the termination of the
rehabilitation proceedings, as provided in Section 11, in relation to Section 27,
Rule 4 of the Interim Rules.

The pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings does not affect the Courts
jurisdiction to resolve the case, but merely suspends the execution of the
September 23, 2008 Decision.