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“Money can´t buy me love”: Class and descriptive

representation in the Chilean presidential elections

CANDIDATE NUMBER: 82742


WORD COUNT (without graphs and tables): 9860
MSC SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS 2017-2018
METHODOLOGY INSTITUTE
SUPERVISOR: DR. BENJAMIN LAUDERDALE
10 AUGUST 2018

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Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the great support that I received preparing this dissertation.

First, to the Becas Chile programme of the Chilean government, for the funding of this

academic project. To have received this funding from a country which faces such urgent and

devastating needs, like ours, is a privilege and an honor. I will take with me the responsibility

this implies for the rest of my professional life.

Second, I wanted to acknowledge my family for their never-ending support and especially my

wife, Scarlett, who came with me to the other side of the world, to spend our first months as a

married couple under the cloudy skies of London.

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Abstract

Chile has presented falling levels of support for its political representatives. At the same time,

there is growing evidence of deficits in the descriptive representation of various social groups.

In this research, electoral data and data from several surveys are used to study the way these

two aspects are connected. First, data gathered by the United Nations’ Program for

Development is used to characterise the perception of misrepresentation and analyse the levels

of this perception in different social groups of the Chilean population. Second, the descriptive

characteristics of all the candidates of the Chilean presidential elections, since the end of the

dictatorship in 1989, are coded and this information is combined with the historical electoral

results. Finally, five opinion polls implemented by the Chilean NGO, Centro de Estudios

Publicos, are analysed. For the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections, an analysis is made

regarding the association between respondents and candidates sharing descriptive

characteristics and the voting preferences and opinions the respondents hold on the candidates.

The relevance of descriptive representation is further analysed by implementing a meta-

analysis for these two elections and the 1993, 1999, and 2005 presidential elections, focusing

on the association between sharing descriptive characteristics and the opinion held on

candidates.

Regarding class representation, evidence is found which is consistent with the descriptive

representation theoretical framework. According to the findings, respondents from lower

classes tend to have a stronger perception of misrepresentation by authorities. At the same time,

under some forms of measuring class membership and model assumptions, class distance,

between respondents and presidential candidates, is associated with a more negative opinion

of candidates.

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The findings are not consistent with descriptive representation theory when observing other

characteristics such as gender and geographical origins, or when observing electoral behaviour.

Thus, the findings reinforce the importance of class representation when compared to more

frequently studied descriptive aspects such as gender. Additionally, they suggest that there are

potential benefits from policies aimed at correcting the paradox of class being associated with

public opinion on candidates, but not with voting behaviour.

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Contents list

Abstract ............................................................................................................................. 3
Contents list ....................................................................................................................... 5
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 6
2. Background and literature review .............................................................................. 9
2.1. Meaningful Descriptive Characteristics ....................................................................... 11
2.1.1. Class (Social-Economic) ............................................................................................................. 12
2.1.2. Age ............................................................................................................................................ 17
2.1.3. Gender ...................................................................................................................................... 18
2.1.4. Spatial differences (centre-periphery) ....................................................................................... 18
2.1.5. Ethnicity, race, and cultural origin ............................................................................................. 19

3. Data and Methods ................................................................................................... 21


3.1. Preliminary analysis ................................................................................................................... 21
3.2. Main analysis: Elites, elections and relationship between elites and non-elites ......................... 24

4. Results ..................................................................................................................... 29
4.1. Preliminary analysis ................................................................................................................... 29
4.2. Main analysis: Elites, elections and relationship between elites and non-elites ......................... 40
5. Discussion and conclusion ........................................................................................ 74
5.1. Academic discussion .................................................................................................................. 74
5.2. Policy discussion ........................................................................................................................ 76
5.3. Conclusions and challenges for further research ....................................................................... 76

References ....................................................................................................................... 78
Appendix: Electoral results in presidential elections (since 1989) ...................................... 81
Appendix: Coding categories ............................................................................................ 83
Appendix: Coding of presidential candidates.................................................................... 84
Appendix: Dictionary for variables ................................................................................... 90

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1. Introduction

In 2017, the United Nation`s Development Program (PNUD is its Spanish acronym),

released a book called "Unequals". In this book, the PNUD presented an historical account

of the multidimensional facets of inequality in Chile. There are two elements in this text,

which are crucial in explaining the motivation for the present research: First, the critical

exclusion of important social groups from the Chilean polity. Chilean politicians shared

among themselves several traits which differentiated them from the general population. As

Pitkin (1972) famously asserted, in the “descriptive representation” perspective, the

representative represents a group in so much as it shares descriptive characteristics with

that group. Thus, under such perspective, if politicians were significantly different from the

general population they were failing to represent their constituencies. Second, the PNUD

approach and findings implied the revitalisation of the category of class as essential in the

analysis of exclusion and political representation, alongside the more studied aspects of

gender and ethnicity.

Additionally, the analysis of political representation has become especially relevant in the

context of falling levels of support and trust that politicians and candidates are facing in

Chile (e.g. CERC-MORI, 2016).

In the background of the above-mentioned aspects the present research seeks to bring forth

and investigate new elements relevant to the debate.

On the one hand, whether the deficits in descriptive representation explain the falling levels

of support for Chilean politicians and candidates is still to be proven. Specifically, in the

case of presidential candidates: is (the lack of) descriptive representation of Chilean

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presidential candidates associated with (less) favourable opinions towards those

politicians?

On the other hand, if the answer to the first question is affirmative, why are Chilean

representatives significantly different from the population? There seem to be at least two

possible explanations. The first one is a "supply-side" explanation. An extreme version of

this explanation is that Chileans do not vote for candidates that are more like them in

descriptive characteristics, simply because those candidates do not appear on the voting

ballot. A softer version of this explanation is that candidates with elite characteristics have

more access to relevant resources (economic, political, or of other nature). A second

explanation, from the "demand side", suggests a slightly more complex causal mechanism.

Even if voters have a more positive view of candidates who are more similar to them, it is

possible that this does not translate into their voting behaviour. This apparent paradox may

be the result of the electorate deciding its votes based on other factors, such as substantive

representation, or because in real elections voters have incomplete information and

candidates may influence perceptions, hiding or emphasising their descriptive attributes.

The present research brings suggestive evidence to contribute to the solution of some

aspects of these puzzles.

This document is structured in the following way: Chapter two, explains the main

conceptual background in the literature that surrounds the debate, including descriptive

representation theory and elite theory. From this literature review, “meaningful” descriptive

characteristics will be derived, for the Chilean context, including class.

Chapter three will describe the origins of the data, including the way the meaningful

descriptive characteristics were operationalised employing the available data. This chapter

will also describe the regression forms, explanatory variables, outcome variables, control

variables, and other relevant specifications for the analysis.

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Chapter four will present the results of the described analysis in two subchapters:

preliminary analysis and main analysis. The preliminary analysis will set the ground for the

elements of the main analysis. Firstly, data obtained by a survey undertaken by the PNUD

(2017) on the perception of the population regarding representativeness is analysed,

assessing correlations with the population's meaningful descriptive characteristics.

Secondly, the presidential candidates for the seven Chilean presidential elections, since the

return of the democratic rule, were coded using the meaningful characteristics. This

analysis will allow to show the restrictions on the options which Chileans face and how

they relate to electoral results. The main analysis will consist of analysing, through the

survey data of Centro de Estudios Públicos (a Chilean NGO), the 2013 and 2017

presidential elections individually, followed by a meta-analysis of five out of the seven

elections undertaken in Chile, since the end of the dictatorship.

Finally, chapter 5 will present academic and policy discussions emerging from the research

findings and will summarise the main conclusions and avenues for further research.

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2. Background and literature review

Following the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship, in 1989, there have been seven Chilean

presidential elections. A simple majority rule in two rounds defines the winner of these

elections: If none of the candidates obtains more than 50% in the first round, the candidates

with the two highest majorities pass to a second round of elections (PNUD, 2014). Until 2010,

the ruling coalition was the “Concertacion”, a centre-left coalition. In 2010, President Sebastian

Piñera was elected, backed by a centre-right coalition (PNUD, 2014). The next period (2014-

2018) saw the return of Michelle Bachelet (who was in office during the 2006-2010 period),

as the elected candidate of another centre-left coalition. Finally, in the recent 2017 elections,

Piñera was re-elected, returning into power, backed by a new centre-right coalition (a detailed

account of electoral results in Table 25).

Chile has shown declining levels of electoral participation. In the period between 1990 and

2016, Chilean electoral participation has fallen more than 35 points, down to only 50.9%, one

of the sharpest falls in the world (PNUD, 2016). Together with this falling electoral

participation, there has been an important increment in the reported mistrust towards politics,

which grew from 33%, in 1993, to 44%, in 2016 (CERC-MORI, 2016). In line with this trend,

in 1993, when asked for their opinion on the presidential candidates of that period’s elections,

the candidates obtained an average of 31.4% positive mentions. For 2017 the same proportion

was only 25.6%. Even more noticeably, the best-evaluated candidate in 1993, achieved 74.5%

of positive opinions. In 2017, none of the candidates achieved more than 40% of positive

opinions (CEP, 1993; CEP, 2017).

The falling levels of participation and support for presidential candidates have been

accompanied by the perception that politicians have relevant descriptive differences with the

general population (PNUD, 2017). This perception is coherent with deficits in the presence of

certain characteristics of officials in both the Chilean legislature and executive power (PNUD,

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2014; PNUD, 2017). Furthermore, the PNUD (2017) asserts that in Chile there are significant

differences in the real capacity of different groups to exercise their citizenship rights, which

violates the democratic principle of equality. This fact brings a distortion in the way society is

represented in the formal spaces of deliberations and decision making (such as the legislative

and executive) and the characteristics of those who participate in those spaces.

This assertion converges with both Pitkin´s (1972) theoretical perspective of descriptive

representation and the discussions on elite theory (e.g. Mosca, 1939; Pareto, 1935; Michels,

1962). On the one hand, in the descriptive representation perspective, the representative

represents a group in so much as it shares descriptive characteristics with that group: to

represent is to be something similar to the represented group. On the other hand, the elite theory

perspectives may be summarised in Mosca's (1939) assertion that "In all societies…two classes

of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less

numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that

power brings…" (p.50). While elite perspective means that the people ruling a country are

inherently different from the majority of the population, descriptive representation postulates

that these differences in the characteristics of the “ruling class” necessarily bring incomplete

representation. The combination of these two perspectives presents one of the main

complexities of the relationship between political elites and the non-elite members of the

population, which is the focus of the present research.

Discussions on descriptive representation have produced three main lines of research: i) the

relation between the presence of descriptive characteristics in public officials and the tendency

to behave in favour of the interests of groups who share those characteristics (e.g. Bratton &

Ray, 2002; Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Clots-Figueras, 2011; Celis, 2012; Krook et al.,

2014; McEvoy, 2016); ii) the relationship between descriptive representation of candidates and

voting preferences of the population (e.g. Dolan, 2004; Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Matson & Fine,

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2006; Trent et al., 2010; Campbell & Cowley, 2014a; Carnes & Lupu, 2016), and iii) the

relationship between descriptive representation and trust and satisfaction with public officials

and elected representatives (e.g. Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Howell and Fagan, 1988;

Mansbridge, 1999 Gay, 2002; Pantoja & Segura, 2003; Ulbig, 2007; Atkeson & Carillo, 2007).

This literature has confirmed the existence, in several contexts, of relevant links between the

descriptive characteristics of candidates and voting preferences and, central to this research, a

tendency for members of social groups to trust elected representatives with similar

characteristics. As Schmidt & Miles (2017) assert: “people from social groups are more trusting

of elected officials from their own social groups…" (p. 187). This tendency to trust similar

representatives may explain why the distorted representation of society, in which elites are

overrepresented in governments, may bring the mistrust of the population.

2.1. Meaningful Descriptive Characteristics

If descriptive representation is relevant, this is materialised in specific descriptive

characteristics. Defining those specific traits, to analyse elites and the way non-elites perceive

them, is not trivial. Behind this definition, there is an underlying assumption that having power

in a sphere of society is related to having power in the political sphere. This assumption is the

"agglutinative hypothesis", which states that: "[f]orms of power and influence are

agglutinative: Those with some form tend to acquire other forms also" (Lasswell and Kaplan,

1950, p.57). Therefore, to define meaningful descriptive characteristics is to define spheres of

power which are connected to political power.

The above-mentioned literature on the relationship between descriptive representation, voting

preferences, and trust and support is focused around a vast variety of characteristics including

gender, ethnicity, age, place of residence, education, prior occupation, and class. For this

research, relevant descriptive characteristics will be chosen based on the above-mentioned

literature review. One aspect is of particular interest to this study: social class.

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As the PNUD (2017) explains, social class is one of the aspects with the highest descriptive

representation deficiency in most democracies, yet it has not been as widely studied in this

context, as other categories have (e.g. gender and ethnicity) (p.380). The relative lack of

research in the relevance of social class, when analysing the impact of descriptive

representation, comes from a strong consensus in the academic debates originated in the late

seventies (Carnes and Lupu, 2015, p.4). The consensus can be summarised in Putnam (1976)

assertion that even though: "the assumption of a correlation between attitude and social origin

lies behind most studies of the social backgrounds of elites...most of the available evidence

tends to disconfirm this assumption" (in Carnes and Lupu, 2015, p.4). However, this assertion

has become increasingly challenged. As Carnes (2013) explains for the case of the USA: "a

person's class is one of the best predictors of a variety of behaviours…we may not like talking

about class, but it permeates just about everything we do…Including holding public office"

(p.4)

The following subchapters explain how these categories will be operationalised in the context

of the Chilean society.

2.1.1. Class (Social-Economic)

When asked about the main reasons for mistreatment in the Chilean society, the PNUD (2017)

found the following are the most commonly mentioned aspects:

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Figure 1: Perceived reasons for being mistreated1

Being a man 9

Ethnic, racial or cultural background 10

Educational level 23

Age 26

Work or Occupation 26

Other reason 27

Place where one lives 28

Being a woman 41

Social Class 43

0 10 20 30 40 50

Source: Modified from PNUD (2017)

As canbe seen in the graph, social class stands out as the main reason for such mistreatment.

Additionally, the qualitative research undertaken by the PNUD (2017), suggests that class may

be a particularly relevant characteristic in the issue of misrepresentation in Chile. Their

qualitative findings can be summarised with the following three conclusions (p. 387-388):

• People consider that the political leadership is isolated in its functions and that it does

not account for its action.

• People believe that this group (the political leaders) have a different socioeconomic

composition than the general population.

• Because of their socioeconomic differences, the political leadership does not

experience the same lifestyle that lay people do.

1
The percentages were calculated for the 41% of respondents who declared having experienced mistreatments. Respondent
could choose more than one alternative.

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Class seems to be in the centre of Chilean social life and mediates several of the interaction in

it. Defining "class" and operationalising such a definition to categorise the Chilean population

is a complex issue, which may be undertaken in several different ways. This research will

mainly rely on a categorisation based on consumption patterns (and indirectly income levels).

However, a complex category like this one has many different dimensions which will be

relevant. Following the PNUD’s (2017) classification, two other elements will be considered:

education and occupation. As expected, all of these elements are strongly correlated and put

together provide a more exhaustive understanding of the multiple implications of class. The

following table summarises some of these relevant relations in the Chilean context:

Table 1: Social Classes in Chile

Social Class Occupations Education Salary (per capita % of


(Average median in Chilean population
years) pesos)
Lower Class Unqualified manual 8,8 250.000 25,8
work, secondary
and service sector.
Manual work in the
primary sector
Middle Lower Qualified waged 11,2 376.048 50,7
Class labour and semi-
qualified in
extractive
agroindustry and
secondary sector.

Non-manual waged
labour in the
services sector and
small enterprise
owners
Middle Class Higher level 15 660.000 12,9
technicians, school
teachers low
ranking
professionals,

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micro-businesses
owners
Higher Middle Professionals, 17,2 1.400.000 10,6
Class and managers, and
Higher Class directives in large
public and private
firms

Source: PNUD (2017), with data from Casen (2015)

a. Consumption patterns

As the PNUD (2017, p.71) explains, a well-established nomenclature for social classes in Chile

comes from the marketing industry. Following the European Society for Opinion and

Marketing Research (ESOMAR), since the 1980s, the Chilean population has been classified

through a methodology adapted to the Chilean context by the Asociacion de Investigadores de

Mercado (AIM). This methodology divides the population according to five categories (ABC1,

C2, C3, D, and E). Each household is given a score, according to their ownership of certain

goods –which determines their consumption capacity— (such as refrigerator, car, and

dishwasher, among others) and the level of education of the head of the household. The lowest

10% is assigned to the E category, the following 35% is assigned to the D category, the

following 25% is assigned to the C3 category, and the following 20% is assigned to the C2

category. Finally, the highest category, ABC1, is given to the top 10% of the score (PNUD,

2017, p.71).

A positive aspect of using this classification is that, as the PNUD (2017, p.71) explains, the

classification has become so pervasive in Chilean society, that the category "ABC1" is even

used in everyday speech to refer to people from higher social-economic level.

b. Occupation

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Social class definition varies across the literature. However, most definitions are based on

occupational differences (Hout, 2008). Additionally, research has shown significant relevance

of the descriptive representation of occupation in voters’ preferences (e.g. Campbell and

Cowley, 2014a).

In the Chilean context, a subgroup of traditionally high-class occupations is especially relevant.

Following research conducted by Seminarium (Capital, 2014), the PNUD (2017) found that

80% of leadership positions in major firms, operating in Chile, employ people who studied

Commercial Engineering (Economics and Business Administration), Civil Engineering, and

Law. Following the PNUD classification, these three professions will be considered "elite"

characteristics. Together with these elite occupations, the PNUD (2017) describes "medicine"

as one of the best-remunerated professions, and, together with the mentioned three occupations,

includes it as a "prestige" occupations (p.34). For the purposes of the present research al four

professions will be considered elite occupations.

c. Education

High school education and higher education are two particularly informative elements in

determining the socioeconomic origins of the Chilean population and their expected future

incomes (PNUD, 2017, pp. 381-382). As Valenzuela et al. (2014) state, the Chilean schooling

system is considered one of the most extreme cases of socioeconomic status (SES) segregation:

“while low-SES students tend to attend public schools, middle-SES students tend to attend

voucher private schools, and high-SES students tend to attend non-subsidized private schools”

(p. 221). Within this highly segmented context, the PNUD (2017, p.382), elaborated a list of

16 schools, according to the frequencies in which they have been mentioned in prior researches,

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as “elite schools”2 . As expected, the vast majority of them (14) are private non-subsidized

schools, and only two are (highly selective) public schools.

Similarly, having a higher education is also a very informative element in Chilean inequalities.

By 2011, only 28% of the students from the poorest decile accessed higher education. In

contrast, for the highest decile, this proportion was 91% (Espinoza & Gonzalez, 2015).

Accessing higher education and the specific higher institution that accessed are good predictors

of work trajectories and the occupational status of Chileans (PNUD, 2017). A first important

distinction is between universities and other technical higher education institutions (known as

Institutos Profesionales and Centros de Formación Técnica). For example, by 2009, the

average student in technical higher education institutions was at least one decile lower in its

income level compared to the average university student (Orellana, 2011).

Within university education, a subgroup of two institutions is especially linked with higher

class and elite status: Pontificia Universidad Catolica and Universidad de Chile. An example

of this is the fact that 70% of the professionals, in 80% of the leadership positions in major

firms operating in Chile, obtained their degrees in those two institutions (Capital, 2014 in

PNUD, 2017). Following the PNUD classification, these two institutions will be considered

“elite” institutions.

2.1.2. Age

There are important differences in the average age of politicians in office and the general

population. Between 1990 and 2016, the median age, for Chileans over 18, was 42 years

2
The list corresponds to most frequently named schools in Seminarium (2003), Capital (2014), Thumala
(2007), Madrid (2016) and Zimmerman (2015). The schools are: Alianza Francesa, Colegio Alemán de Santiago, Liceo Alemán
de Santiago, Cordillera, Craighouse, Saint George’s College, San Ignacio El Bosque, Tabancura, Verbo Divino, Instituto Luis
Campino, Sagrados Corazones de Manquehue, Santiago College, Scuola Italiana, The Grange School, San Benito, Newland, Instituto
Nacional and Liceo José Victorino Lastarria

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(PNUD, 2017). For that same period, the median for political authorities (both in the legislative

and executive power) was 51 years.

2.1.3. Gender

For the period between 1990 and 2016, the average participation of male individuals in the

population was 49%. For that same period, the average of male political authorities (both in

the legislative and executive power) was 76.9% (PNUD, 2017).

2.1.4. Spatial differences (centre-periphery)

Chile has shown a particularly extreme version of the tendency to inequalities in the territorial

distribution of wealth (Veyl, 2015) For example, all the elite schools and universities

mentioned before are in the Metropolitan Region3, where the capital, Santiago, is located. As

Aroca and Atienza (2016) explain: “Chile stands as a classic instance of spatial inequality and

persistence of concentration despite economic growth and development…” (p. 239)

This concentration is most dramatically noticeable in the growing participation of the

percentage of the population that lives in the Metropolitan Region, which surpasses 40% (see

Figure 2).

3
Chile is divided administratively into 15 regions.

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Figure 2: Concentration of total population in the Metropolitan Region (1865-2009)

Source: Aroca & Atienza (2016, p.241) based on Chilean Census and CASEN (2009) and (2015)

This economic and demographic differences also have social and political expressions. Since

the XIX Century, the Chilean political system has shown an extreme concentration of power

in the “centre” (where the Metropolitan Region and Santiago are located) of the country (Ortiz

& Valenzuela, 2013). This concentration of power has been disputed by the other regions on

several occasions (Ortiz & Valenzuela, 2013).

2.1.5. Ethnicity, race, and cultural origin

According to the 2012 census, the Mapuche population consists of 1.842.607 inhabitants and

11.1% of the total Chilean population (Castillo, 2016). There is evidence that this element is

an essential descriptive characteristic. On the one hand, it has been shown that voters with

Mapuche background tend to vote for Mapuche candidates (Maureira, S. T., & Jaramillo-Brun,

2014). On the other hand, the PNUD (2017) has shown the lack of individuals with “prestige

professions” in this group.

An example of the lack of descriptive representation of this groups is that until 2017 there was

no Mapuche MPs and in the period between 1992 and 2016, less than 4, 5% of the candidates

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to local elections were Mapuche (PNUD, 2017, p.380). Furthermore, central to this research,

there has not been any Mapuche presidential candidate since the return of democracy.

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3. Data and Methods

This chapter presents the data and methods. One central element of the method of analysis is

the coding in meaningful categories. The way these categories were operationalised depended

on the conceptual background, the Chilean context and the available information. A summary

of all the employed categories is presented in Table 26 of the appendix.

3.1. Preliminary analysis

3.1.1. Descriptive characteristics and the perceived misrepresentation

For this part of the analysis, the data came from a survey undertaken by the PNUD (2017). This

face-to-face survey had a nation-wide sample population of Chileans, aged over 18, stratified

by region, gender, and socio-economic level. The sample size consisted of 2.613 individuals4.

The respondents were coded in the following categories5:

1. Education level (less than high school/high school/higher technical

education/university).

2. Occupation (elite-prestige occupations/non-elite-prestige occupations).

3. Geographical differences (Metropolitan Region/non-Metropolitan Region).

4. Gender (male/female).

5. Ethnicity (non-Mapuche/ Mapuche).

6. Age.

4
All the analyses were done taking into account the design effect
5
For this analysis, the respondents were only categorised in terms of the education level (and not the typology of elite/non-
elite educational institutions). Additionally, “elite occupations” category for respondents was broader than that employed to
categorise the candidates, as it included high-level military officials and other high-level professions.

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Education and occupation were used as alternative measurements of class. For this, an index

was constructed in which, a respondent with less education than high school would obtain a

score of 0, one with only high school education would obtain a score of 1, one with higher

technical education a score of 2, and one with a university education, a score of 3. Additionally,

if the respondent had an elite occupation, one more unit was added to the respondent´s elite

index (therefore, the index levels went from 0 to 4). Similarly, the index constructed through

consumption patterns was translated into five levels from 0 to 4 (E, D, C3, C2, and ABC1).

The analysis consisted in observing the associations6 between the descriptive characteristics of

the respondents with the answer given to four questions on the representativeness of authorities.

The four measured questions asked about the representativeness of authorities in the following

matters:

i) Whether the authorities care about “people like us”.

ii) Whether the authorities care about the electors.

iii) Whether the authorities would do something if there were a “serious problem in my

neighbourhood”.

iv) Whether the authorities are mainly interested in what business owners want.

The responses consisted of five levels from “definitely disagree” to “definitely agree”.

Additionally, the association of these characteristics with having voted in the presidential

elections (the 2013 election) was analysed (the answers were formulated in a simple yes/no

option).

The regression form for the analysis was ordinal logistic for the first four questions and logistic

(binary) for the voting question, with the following specifications:

(1) 𝑌1 = 𝛼 + 𝑧𝛾 + 𝑑𝜋 + 𝑡𝛿

6
The associations were studied while controlling for ideological tendencies (regarding left-right affiliation)

22
(2) 𝑌2 = 𝛼 + 𝑧𝛾 + 𝑐𝜎 + 𝑡𝛿

(3) 𝑌3 = 𝛼 + 𝑘µ + 𝑡𝛿

Where:

1. 𝑌1 ,𝑌2 and 𝑌3 are vectors of responses to the outcome questions.

2. 𝑘 is a matrix of all the explanatory variables (characteristics of the respondents).

3. 𝑧 is a matrix of the explanatory variables (characteristics of the respondents) excluding

education and occupation.

4. 𝑑 is the vector of values of the descriptive index of class (based on occupation and

education).

5. 𝑐 is the vector of values of the consumption index of class (based on consumption patterns).

6. t is a vector of the political affiliation of the respondent (used as a control variable).

Additionally, as a way of confirming the validity of the class indexes, the association between

the consumption pattern index and the other aspects of the respondents was analysed.

3.1.2. Descriptive statistics on elections and the supply side coding

The 40 presidential candidates of the seven elections undertaken since the return of democracy

(for more information on each election see Table 25), were codified in “meaningful” categories.

To classify the candidates, the characteristics used were:

1. Education level (high school/higher technical education/university).

2. High school typology (in terms of private (non-subsidized)7/public and elite/non-elite).

3. Higher education typology (elite institution/non-elite institution).

4. Occupation (elite-prestige occupations/non-elite-prestige occupations).

7
There were no candidates from private subsidised schools

23
5. Geographical differences (Metropolitan Region/non-Metropolitan Region).

6. Gender (male/female).

7. Ethnicity (non-Mapuche/ Mapuche).

8. Age.

This classification allowed for a supply-side analysis of all the Chilean candidates, which was

crossed with the electoral results of these candidates, from the official Chilean electoral office

(SERVEL).

For this codification, the data for the candidates came from public information available in

public statements required by Chilean transparency laws, the Chilean Congress’s Library,

newspapers and public information disclosed during the campaigns. The results of this coding

process are presented in Table 27 in the appendix.

3.2. Main analysis: Elites, elections and relationship between elites and non-elites

For this part of the analysis, the data came from a survey undertaken by a Chilean NGO called,

Centro de Estudios Publicos. This survey, which has gathered opinion polls since the end of

the dictatorship, "…has acquired an uncontested national legitimacy" (Navia, 2003) in the

Chilean political debates. The survey´s sample size has fluctuated at around 1500 elements,

and its sample population is nation-wide Chileans, over the age of 18. It is stratified by gender,

socio-economic level, regions and smaller administrative units (provinces and communes). The

survey is implemented in a face-to-face8 modality.

The respondents of the CEP surveys for the 2017 and 2013 elections were codified following

the same categories as the ones from the PNUD survey.

8
All the analyses were done taking into account the design effect

24
Once the data set was modified to include the coded descriptive characteristics, the following

descriptive representation variables were created9:

1. In the case of age, a new variable resulting from the difference (in absolute terms)

between the age of the respondent and the politician.

2. In the case of discrete variables, a new dummy variable which has the value of one

when the characteristics match between the respondent and the candidate.

To test the validity of the class index, through consumption patterns, the correlations between

this measure and all other characteristics were analysed, in the same way as with the PNUD

data, for the 2013 and 2017 elections. As expected, both education and occupation are

significantly associated with this index. However, for 2017, ethnicity is associated with the

index, even when controlling for education and occupation. The same happens with age and

being from the Metropolitan Region for the 2013 elections. It is not possible to distinguish

whether this is an actual association between class and those attributes, which goes beyond

education and occupation, or if it is a problem with the validity of the index. The full regression

is presented at the end of the respective chapters.

The class index, through education and occupation, for respondents was constructed in the

same way as for the respondents of the PNUD (2017) survey. For the candidates, the class

index was constructed by adding the value of the dummies of education (one dummy that

equals one if the candidate studied in private school, another dummy that equals one if the

candidate studied in an elite school, another dummy that equals one if the candidate studied in

an elite university and, finally, another dummy that equals one if the candidate has an elite

occupation). This meant that, as the class index for respondents, the candidates were

9
Since all of the candidates finished high school and only candidates with less than 1% of votes did not finish university, the
level of education was not used as a matching characteristic but was only used to measure class in the respective class index
for the respondents. Similarly, as all of the candidates were non-Mapuche, a matching dummy was not created, and the
ethnicity of the respondents was only used as a control variable.

25
categorised into five groups, from 0 to 4. The distribution of the candidates in this index can

be viewed in Table 28 in the appendix.

The regressions for the analyses are ordinal logistic regressions for the evaluation of politicians

and multinomial logistic for the voting preferences. When analysing the voting preferences,

candidates with less than 5% of the votes were omitted (the analysis was done initially with all

candidates, with no difference in results). For opinion regressions, all candidates were included

(all respondents were asked to evaluate all candidates). The following are the models’

specifications:

(1) 𝑌3 = 𝛼 + 𝑥𝛽 + 𝑞𝜀

(2) 𝑌4 = 𝛼 + 𝑝𝛾 + 𝑑𝜋 + 𝑞𝜀

(3) 𝑌5 = 𝛼 + 𝑝𝛾 + 𝑐𝜎 + 𝑞𝜀

(4) 𝑌6 = 𝛼 + 𝑥𝛽 + 𝑤𝛾 + 𝑞𝜀 + 𝑤𝛾

(5) 𝑌7 = 𝛼 + 𝑝𝛾 + 𝑑𝜋 + 𝑞𝜀 + 𝑤𝛾

(6) 𝑌8 = 𝛼 + 𝑝𝛾 + 𝑐𝜎 + 𝑞𝜀 + 𝑤𝛾

Where:

1. 𝑌3 , 𝑌4 , 𝑌5 are vectors of the expressed voting preferences (categorical variable).

2. 𝑌6 ,𝑌7 𝑌8 are vectors of the evaluation given to politicians (ordinal variable).

3. 𝑥 is the matrix of all variables for matching characteristics (and age difference).

4. 𝑞 is the matrix of control variables (characteristics of the respondents and political

affiliation matching).

5. 𝑐 is the difference between the class indexes of respondents and candidates when

respondents’ class index is measured through consumption patterns.

6. d is the difference between the class indexes of respondents and candidates when

respondents class index is measured through occupation and education.

26
7. p is the matrix of all variables for matching characteristics which are not class related

8. w is a fix effect matrix of every candidate.

Control variables consisted of the respondents’ characteristics in terms of age, years of

education (when this was not incorporated in the respective index), ideology (in terms of right-

left). 10, and ethnic background. Additionally, for the opinion outcomes, a fixed effect variable

for each candidate was incorporated11, as well as controlling for the stated voting preference.

Another important control variable was an ideological distance variable. The candidates were

classified in terms of a right-left scale (following their public definitions, those of their coalition

or party, or according to the perceived political position of the candidates, as presented in one

of the survey’s questions). A “substantive distance” variable was thus created, to control for

this association. This means that the association measured in the explanatory variable can be

understood as the “marginal descriptive association”. This association can then be seen as

either reinforcing the substantive tendency or pushing to defect the political ideology.

The outcome variables were the voting preferences and evaluation given to the candidates.

The opinion consisted in evaluating a list of politicians, including the presidential candidates,

in five possible levels, from “very negative” to “very positive”.

3.2.1. Meta-analysis

A final analysis consisted of implementing a meta-analysis including the data of the CEP

surveys for the elections of 1993, 1999, and 2005. The meta-analysis was conducted on the

10
In the Chilean case, this is a better measure than party affiliation, as less than 30% of the respondents have any affiliation
to any party, compared to almost 50% that has an ideological affiliation in the right-left scale.
11
A fix effect per respondent was also incorporated as an alternative model. The outcomes of this model are
omitted from the presentation. However, details of any significant change when incorporating these variables
are given in footnotes.

27
association between class difference, measured through the consumption pattern index, and

the opinion on the candidates. For this analysis, both “fixed effect” and “random effect”

approaches were employed.

28
4. Results

This chapter presents the results of the analyses. For clarity purposes, intercepts and control

variables are omitted in the tables presented in the analysis12. The full regressions are shown

in the tables at the end of every subchapter. The variables are defined in the variable

dictionary available in Table 29 of the appendix.

4.1. Preliminary analysis

4.1.1. Descriptive characteristics and perceived misrepresentation

A first analysis is to corroborate that both the approach based on education and occupation and

the approach based on consumption patterns are measuring the same underlying characteristic:

class (intercept omitted for presentation).

Table 2: Validity of class index PNUD data

Class_Index_C
University 1.334 1.266
(5.60)** (5.09)**
Higher_Tec 1.674 1.685
(7.34)** (6.99)**
School 2.154 2.110
(12.08)** (11.48)**
Occupation 1.679 1.717
(8.55)** (8.72)**
Age -0.003
(0.67)
Man 0.069
(0.51)
MR 0.115
(0.81)
Non_Native 0.395

12
In parentesis, under the point estimates, are the respective statistics` values

29
(1.70)
N 2,583 2,504

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

The regression shows that education levels and occupation are significantly correlated with

consumption pattern index. Additionally, when controlling for education and occupation, none

of the other descriptive characteristics is significantly associated with the consumption index.

This relationship suggests that both indexes for class measure the same underlying concept,

and that other descriptive characteristics do not explain this concept. Given this confirmation,

the associations with the descriptive characteristic of class were measured in the two ways.

When running the regression between the survey questions and the descriptive characteristics

of the respondents (details of regressions are at the end of this subchapter) the following results

are found:

• Only age is associated with having voted.

• Being from the Metropolitan Region significantly increases the odds of having a better

perception of the representativeness of authorities with electors.

• Being of a higher class (measured in both ways) is associated with a higher belief that

the authorities will do something if there is a problem in the respondent´s

neighbourhood (a similar finding appears with age, but it is not robust to different

measurements of class).

• None of the descriptive characteristics is significantly associated with the belief that

political leaders are mainly concerned with business owners.

However, the most relevant finding for this research question is summarised in the following

table:

30
Table 3: perception of misrepresentation

People (1) (2) (3)


Like
Us
Non_Native 0.226 0.112 0.180
(0.47) (0.23) (0.37)
MR -0.109 -0.004 -0.014
(0.52) (0.02) (0.07)
Man -0.041 -0.002 0.027
(0.22) (0.01) (0.14)
Age 0.019 0.019 0.022
(2.91)** (3.02)** (3.24)**
Class_Index_C 0.247
(2.67)**
Class_Index_De 0.227
(2.91)**
University 0.085
(0.25)
Higher_Tec 0.006
(0.02)
School 0.582
(2.23)*
Occupation 0.321
(1.28)
N 895 890 890

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Class is found to be significant at the 1% level for the question of whether political leaders care

about "people like us" (as well as age). This finding is robust to both ways of measuring class.

This is consistent with the predictions that descriptive representation theory would suggest,

given that people of lower socioeconomic level are underrepresented in the polity. However,

even though other groups are strongly underrepresented, the same significant association is not

found for the other studied characteristics.

Summarizing, from this preliminary analysis two main conclusions are derived:

• The class indexes in both definitions are related to each other and not to other

descriptive characteristics, which is evidence in favour of their reliability.

31
• Perceptions of misrepresentation are associated with class and age (people of lower

classes and younger people have a stronger perception misrepresentation). However

other descriptive characteristics do not seem to show this association.

32
Full Regressions

Table 4: Full "Voted in previous elections" regression

Voted (1) (2) (3)


Non_Native -0.908 -0.971 -1.024
(1.64) (1.73) (1.82)
MR 0.546 0.580 0.626
(1.79) (1.89) (2.06)*
Man 0.047 0.126 0.004
(0.18) (0.47) (0.01)
Age 0.049 0.052 0.045
(5.03)** (5.25)** (4.61)**
Class_Index_C 0.104
(0.80)
2.Ideology 0.595 0.383 0.648
(1.21) (0.84) (1.25)
3.Ideology -0.325 -0.234 -0.198
(0.94) (0.67) (0.56)
4.Ideology 0.044 0.076 0.049
(0.08) (0.14) (0.09)
5.Ideology 0.069 0.108 0.061
(0.19) (0.29) (0.16)
Class_Index_De 0.122
(1.07)
University -0.633
(1.12)
Higher_Tec 1.064
(2.12)*
School -0.393
(1.04)
_cons -0.500 -0.472 0.172
(0.58) (0.63) (0.21)
N 904 898 904

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

33
Table 5: Full Perceived Representation 1

People Voters
Like Us
Non_Native 0.226 0.112 0.180 Non_Native -0.647 -0.654 -0.612
(0.47) (0.23) (0.37) (1.60) (1.56) (1.44)
MR -0.109 -0.004 -0.014 MR 0.589 0.704 0.695
(0.52) (0.02) (0.07) (2.89)** (3.45)** (3.42)**
Man -0.041 -0.002 0.027 Man -0.130 -0.101 -0.073
(0.22) (0.01) (0.14) (0.63) (0.48) (0.36)
Age 0.019 0.019 0.022 Age 0.001 0.000 0.004
(2.91)** (3.02)** (3.24)** (0.21) (0.05) (0.49)
Class_Index_C 0.247 Class_Index_C 0.183
(2.67)** (1.62)
2.Ideology 0.737 0.518 0.515 2.Ideology -0.435 -0.525 -0.529
(2.03)* (1.52) (1.47) (1.41) (1.69) (1.67)
3.Ideology 0.756 0.724 0.664 3.Ideology -0.376 -0.403 -0.519
(2.96)** (2.81)** (2.56)* (1.26) (1.35) (1.72)
4.Ideology 0.375 0.340 0.369 4.Ideology 0.044 -0.033 -0.033
(1.12) (1.05) (1.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09)
5.Ideology 0.268 0.297 0.273 5.Ideology -0.173 -0.202 -0.258
(1.02) (1.08) (1.01) (0.59) (0.66) (0.86)
cut1 _cons 1.299 0.773 1.089 cut1 _cons -1.697 -2.188 -1.799
(1.81) (1.30) (1.70) (2.20)* (3.46)** (2.58)*
cut2 _cons 3.241 2.738 3.063 cut2 _cons -0.160 -0.659 -0.240
(4.44)** (4.55)** (4.74)** (0.22) (1.12) (0.36)
cut3 _cons 4.212 3.674 4.003 cut3 _cons 0.513 -0.031 0.398
(5.86)** (6.10)** (6.23)** (0.71) (0.05) (0.60)
Class_Index_De 0.227 Class_Index_De 0.080
(2.91)** (0.80)
University 0.085 University 0.223
(0.25) (0.73)
Higher_Tec 0.006 Higher_Tec -0.386
(0.02) (1.43)
School 0.582 School 0.639
(2.23)* (1.89)
Occupation 0.321 Occupation -0.043

34
(1.28) (0.18)
cut4 _cons 6.269 5.712 6.044 cut4 _cons 1.962 1.420 1.857
(7.63)** (8.15)** (8.18)** (2.65)** (2.43)* (2.75)**
N 895 890 890 N 885 880 880
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 6: Full Perceived Representation 2

Business Owners My Neighbourhood


Non_Native -0.220 -0.296 -0.249 Non_Nativ -0.157 -0.256 -0.245
e
(0.52) (0.71) (0.59) (0.36) (0.58) (0.55)
MR -0.322 -0.260 -0.271 MR 0.258 0.323 0.322
(1.70) (1.36) (1.41) (1.31) (1.64) (1.65)
Man 0.001 0.046 0.062 Man -0.302 -0.272 -0.272
(0.00) (0.24) (0.33) (1.60) (1.43) (1.41)
Age 0.011 0.014 0.015 age 0.016 0.016 0.018
(1.87) (2.40)* (2.52)* (2.72)** (2.85)** (2.98)**
Class_Index_C 0.099 Class_Inde 0.399
x_C
(1.06) (4.27)**
2.Ideology 0.264 0.089 0.063 2.Ideology 0.515 0.374 0.419
(0.73) (0.26) (0.18) (1.31) (0.97) (1.06)
3.Ideology 0.666 0.680 0.629 3.Ideology 0.175 0.210 0.150
(2.51)* (2.54)* (2.31)* (0.65) (0.77) (0.55)
4.Ideology 0.344 0.418 0.432 4.Ideology 0.068 0.139 0.154
(1.06) (1.30) (1.32) (0.23) (0.46) (0.50)
5.Ideology -0.178 -0.087 -0.093 5.Ideology -0.206 -0.104 -0.167
(0.64) (0.31) (0.33) (0.77) (0.37) (0.59)
cut1 _cons 0.114 0.102 0.313 cut1 _cons 0.386 -0.319 -0.085
(0.16) (0.19) (0.51) (0.56) (0.53) (0.14)
cut2 _cons 2.040 2.080 2.298 cut2 _cons 2.289 1.601 1.854
(2.85)** (3.73)** (3.66)** (3.28)** (2.69)** (2.97)**
cut3 _cons 3.337 3.364 3.584 cut3 _cons 3.290 2.574 2.829
(4.80)** (6.03)** (5.75)** (4.67)** (4.23)** (4.47)**
Class_Index_De 0.140 Class_Inde 0.414
x_De
(1.73) (4.86)**
University 0.212 University 0.193
(0.61) (0.64)
Higher_Tec -0.187 Higher_Te 0.442

35
c
(0.56) (1.45)
School 0.377 School 0.796
(1.41) (2.94)**
Occupation 0.292 Occupatio 0.141
n
(1.30) (0.57)
cut4 _cons 4.934 4.898 5.118 cut4 _cons 4.929 4.222 4.473
(6.36)** (7.58)** (7.15)** (6.29)** (6.16)** (6.37)**
N 893 887 887 N 879 873 873
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

36
4.1.2. Descriptive statistics on elections and the supply side coding

The following graph summarises the distribution of the studied characteristics across all

candidates of the first round of the Chilean presidential elections.

Figure 3:Candidates' Descriptive Characteristics - All elections

120,0% 60

100,0% 53 50
100,0%
80,0% 40
82,5% 80,0%
77,5% 77,5%
60,0% 67,5% 70,0% 30

53,8% 52,5%
40,0% 47,5% 20

20,0% 10

0,0% 0

During the period between 1990 and 2016, the presence of these characteristics in the general

Chilean population was the following: 49% were males, 7,7% were educated in private (non-

subsidized) schools, and 17,7% were university educated (PNUD, 2017). Additionally,

according to the 2012 national census, approximately 89% of the population was non-

Mapuche, and by 2015, around 40% of the Chilean population resided in the Metropolitan

Region (Aroca & Atienza, 2016). Finally, although definitions vary, according to the PNUD

(2017), approximately 10% of the population has higher middle class/ high-class occupations

and the Chilean median age (for people over 18) in the 1990-2016 period was 42. In other

words, the overrepresentation of all elite characteristics in the statistics presented in the

previous graph is noticeable.

37
One first conclusion is that, regarding the puzzle between supply side and demand side factors,

there have not been any candidates who have not finished high-school nor has there been any

candidates with a Mapuche background. Similarly, candidates without a university degree are

scarce (less than 8% of the candidates). Two characteristics which are particularly striking are

having studied in an elite school and an elite university. While these represent a minuscule

proportion of the population, almost 50% of the candidates went to one of these schools, and

more than 80% went to one of these universities.

This overall image of the characteristics of candidates is somewhat misleading. When the focus

is placed on the candidates with the two highest levels of voting (who pass to the second round),

elite characteristics generally become more prevalent, as can be seen in the following graph:

Figure 4: Candidates' Descriptive Characteristics - Top 2 Candidates

120,0% 100,0%
100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
100,0%
92,5% 92,9%
100,0% 85,7%
82,5% 85,7%
80,0% 77,5%
71,4%
80,0% 64,3% 70,0%
62,5%
57,1%
60,0% 47,5%
40,0%
20,0%
0,0%

All candidates Top 2 candidates

Apart from private schooling and belonging to the Metropolitan Region, all other elite

characteristics are equal or more frequent in the highest voted candidates13. These two highest

majorities, in all of the seven elections, have belonged to the two major political coalitions (the

centre-right and centre-left coalitions).

13
The median age of the top 2 candidates is 60.5 years (omitted form graph for presentation)

38
Even more noticeably, the following graphs present the frequency of the elite characteristics

for candidates who obtained less than 5% (13 candidates) of the votes and those who obtained

more than 5% (27 candidates).

Figure 5: Candidates' Descriptive Characteristics - 5% Candidates

120,0%
100,0%
100,0% 95,8% 100,0%
100,0%
100,0% 84,6% 87,5%
76,9% 79,2%
75,0%
80,0% 70,8% 69,2%
62,5% 61,5%
53,8% 54,2% 53,8%
60,0%
40,0% 23,1%
20,0%
0,0%

Candidates with more than 5% Candidates with less than 5%

Practically all of the elite characteristics are less frequent in the candidates with less than 5%

of the votes (except for age14 and gender).

Summarizing, from this preliminary analysis two main conclusions are derived:

• Elite characteristics are overrepresented in presidential candidates. Nevertheless,

except for education level and ethnicity, some alternative candidates possess non-elite

characteristics.

• Historically, voters have tended to vote for candidates who possess elite characteristics.

This tendency is observed even though other candidates, who may have been more

similar to them, did appear on the ballot, supported by parties or coalitions which were

not the traditional ones (who were not from the two main coalitions).

14
Median age for candidates with more than 5% is 53.2 and 54.2 for candidates with less than 5% (omitted form graph for
presentation)

39
4.2. Main analysis: Elites, elections and relationship between elites and non-elites

4.2.1. 2017 Elections

The following results, both for voting preferences and opinion, should be taken with precaution

before extrapolating to other presidential elections. On the one hand, in the 2017 elections, the

two main centre-right and right-wing candidates (Sebastian Piñera and Jose Antonio Kast),

who concentrated approximately 40% of the votes, both ranked on the top of the class elite

index. On the other hand, the two main centre-left and left candidates (Alejandro Guillier and

Beatriz Sanchez), who concentrated approximately another 40% of the votes, ranked on the

lowest and low levels of the index. This means voters faced unusually large class differences

between ideological lines. Furthermore, the difference in the class index between the two

leading candidates (Sebsatian Piñera and Alejandro Guillier) is the maximum possible, with 4

points. This is the highest difference for the seven elections, and it is mainly due to an unusually

low score of the centre-left candidate (for more details, see Table 28 in the appendix).

Electoral Preferences

When analysing the relevance of matching characteristics (without employing indexes) several

characteristics seem to be significant.

First, for each characteristic, a Wald test is applied to the null hypothesis that the characteristic

is simultaneously non-significant for all candidates (coefficient is zero in every equation of

every candidate). This null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% threshold for every characteristic,

meaning each characteristic is overall significant.

Second, when focusing on the two main candidates, the main centre-left candidate, Alejandro

Guillier, who is from out of the Metropolitan Region, has better odds of getting a vote from

someone from Santiago (compared to the main centre-right candidate, Sebastian Pinera). That

is to say, an inverse association to what descriptive representation theory would suggest. In

occupation --Alejandro Guillier has a non-elite occupation-- and age, the relationship follows

40
what descriptive representation theory would predict: people with non-elite occupations and

smaller age difference have higher odds of voting for him (compared with voting Sebastian

Pinera). Gender is non-significant. For the third most voted candidate, Beatriz Sanchez, all of

the matching characteristics are significant, but the geographical matching (she is from out of

the Metropolitan Region), gender matching (she is female) and age, have the opposite effect

than that suggested by descriptive theory (comparing with odds of voting for Sebastian Pinera).

With occupation, however, the relationship is as theory would predict (she has a non-elite

occupation). More in general, while the other descriptive characteristics have mixed or contrary

results to what descriptive theory would suggest, occupation seems to have the expected

positive sign for the relationship in all candidates.

To further research whether class descriptive characteristics, such as occupation, are relevant

for this association the two previously explained indexes were employed (one based on

education and occupation and one based on consumption patterns). The results of the regression

between voting preferences and the differences in class indexes of the respondents and the

candidates are presented in the end of this subchapter.

The results are robust in showing that class difference, measured in both indexes, have a

negative relationship with the odds of voting for a candidate (as well as in age distance). In

conclusion, for the 2017 presidential elections, it seems that the voters were divided across

class lines and that they tended to vote for candidates with similar class characteristics and

ages. However, their relationship with the other descriptive characteristics is non-significant or

contradictory with theory.

Opinion

The following table shows the estimates for the association between all matching descriptive

characteristics and opinion on the candidates (Model (2) controls for voting preference)

41
Table 7: Opinion. Matching Characteristics. 2017

Opinion (1) (2)


Mat_Metropolitan -0.031 -0.198
(0.38) (1.83)
Mat_Gender 0.005 -0.022
(0.07) (0.29)
D_Age -0.002 0.001
(0.53) (0.38)
Mat_Occupation 0.253 0.311
(2.30)* (2.68)**
N 3,357 2,849

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Occupation stands out as the only consistently significant descriptive matching variable. This

relationship becomes significant at the 1% level when controlling for voting preference.

A similar exercise as the one done for voting preference is done for the opinion of the

respondents on the candidates. That is, the regression is implemented with class distance

measured with the two class indexes. The result is presented in the following table.

Table 8: Opinion. Class indexes. 2017

Opinion (1) (2)


Mat_Metropolitan -0.046 -0.018
(0.56) (0.23)
Mat_Gender 0.001 0.008
(0.01) (0.11)
D_Age 0.000 0.002
(0.05) (0.50)
D_Class_Index_De -0.054
(1.60)
Class_Index_De -0.092
(3.18)**
D_Class_Index_C -0.171
(3.89)**
Class_Index_C -0.154
(3.78)**
N 3,349 3,516

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

42
The result shows that the class of the respondents is significant in both measurements.

However, class distance is only significant when evaluating class in terms of consumption

patterns15.

This relationship remains when controlling for voting preferences, as can be seen, in the

following table.

Table 9: Opinion given vote. Class indexes. 2017

Opinion (1) (2)


Mat_Metropolitan -0.220 -0.147
(2.04)* (1.38)
Mat_Gender -0.026 -0.012
(0.34) (0.16)
D_Age 0.003 0.004
(0.88) (1.26)
D_Class_Index_De -0.051
(1.42)
Class_Index_De -0.100
(3.20)**
D_Class_Index_C -0.186
(3.84)**
Class_Index_C -0.201
(4.41)**
N 2,841 2,989

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

15
When a fix effect per respondent is included, class distance measured by education and occupation becomes significant as
well.

43
Full Regressions

Table 10: Full. Validity of class index. 2017

Class_Index_C
School 1.449 1.514
(9.80)** (9.38)**
Higher_Tec 0.896 0.905
(3.40)** (3.45)**
University 0.803 0.783
(2.67)** (2.54)*
Occupation 3.255 3.217
(9.86)** (9.59)**
/ cut1 -3.558 -2.353
(15.58)** (6.78)**
cut2 0.374 1.612
(3.67)** (5.05)**
cut3 3.276 4.621
(21.04)** (13.26)**
cut4 6.017 7.344
(21.70)** (17.31)**
Man 0.223
(1.76)
MR 0.054
(0.41)
Non_Native 0.863
(3.89)**
Age 0.007
(1.74)
N 1,332 1,301

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

44
Table 11: Full. Electoral preferences. 2017

Voting preferences – (1) Voting Preferences – Class (1) (2)


Matching Characteristics Distance
Marco_Enriquez_Ominami Non_Native -0.327 Marco_Enriquez_Ominami Non_Native -0.944 -0.763
(0.34) (3.39)** (2.57)*
Mat_Metropolitan -0.379 Mat_Metropolitan 0.189 0.206
(0.46) (0.91) (0.94)
Mat_Gender -0.295 Mat_Gender -0.357 -0.292
(0.52) (1.78) (1.61)
Mat_Occupation 3.669 D_Age -0.201 -0.142
(2.65)** (10.30)** (6.68)**
Education_Years -0.139 D_Class_Index_De -0.360
(2.27)* (7.02)**
D_Age -0.154 Class_Index_De -0.585
(2.68)** (5.77)**
Ideology 0.989 D_Ideology 0.011 0.193
(5.11)** (0.12) (2.20)*
Age -0.092 Ideology 0.953 0.915
(2.00)* (13.43)** (13.40)**
_cons 2.568 Age -0.124 -0.073
(0.68) (7.60)** (4.38)**
Carolina_Goic Non_Native 0.495 _cons 7.070 4.018
(0.48) (6.69)** (3.38)**
Mat_Metropolitan -1.319 Carolina_Goic Non_Native 0.143 0.625
(1.98)* (0.43) (1.62)
Mat_Gender -0.508 Mat_Metropolitan -1.070 -1.054
(0.89) (4.52)** (4.56)**
Mat_Occupation 4.249 Mat_Gender -0.542 -0.213
(5.06)** (2.92)** (1.12)
Education_Years -0.145 D_Age -0.059 -0.032
(1.84) (3.49)** (2.65)**
D_Age -0.074 D_Class_Index_De -0.977
(1.67) (16.17)**
Ideology 1.067 Class_Index_De -0.733
(5.18)** (7.12)**
Age -0.045 D_Ideology -0.318 -0.222
(1.09) (1.98)* (1.44)
_cons -1.914 Ideology 1.079 0.934
(0.53) (13.56)** (10.32)**
Alejandro_Guillier Non_Native 0.758 Age -0.030 -0.009
(1.13) (2.09)* (1.10)

45
Mat_Metropolitan 0.117 _cons 1.223 1.910
(0.29) (0.94) (2.04)*
Mat_Gender -0.055 Alejandro_Guillier Non_Native 0.340 0.151
(0.15) (1.47) (0.74)
Mat_Occupation 3.698 Mat_Metropolitan 0.436 1.007
(9.15)** (3.62)** (9.27)**
Education_Years -0.048 Mat_Gender 0.010 -0.223
(1.01) (0.09) (2.24)*
D_Age -0.067 D_Age -0.058 -0.053
(4.17)** (9.85)** (9.25)**
Ideology 1.545 D_Class_Index_De -0.830
(8.75)** (15.56)**
Age -0.023 Class_Index_De -0.275
(1.85) (5.57)**
_cons -4.978 D_Ideology -0.195 -0.326
(3.18)** (1.88) (2.90)**
Jose_Antonio_Kast Non_Native 13.698 Ideology 1.625 1.453
(22.79)** (24.84)** (24.63)**
Mat_Metropolitan 0.318 Age -0.013 -0.006
(0.48) (2.85)** (1.31)
Mat_Gender 0.776 _cons -1.996 -3.449
(1.21) (3.52)** (7.01)**
Mat_Occupation -0.055 Jose_Antonio_Kast Non_Native 13.759 14.903
(0.06) (69.33)** (90.09)**
Education_Years 0.003 Mat_Metropolitan 0.288 0.151
(0.03) (1.33) (0.70)
D_Age -0.196 Mat_Gender 0.799 0.696
(5.11)** (3.52)** (3.22)**
Ideology 0.117 D_Age -0.178 -0.166
(0.45) (13.41)** (11.80)**
Age -0.168 D_Class_Index_De -0.218
(3.91)** (2.74)**
_cons -5.950 Class_Index_De -0.040
(2.00)* (0.73)
Beatriz_Sanchez Non_Native -0.343 D_Ideology 0.210 0.265
(0.49) (1.58) (1.84)
Mat_Metropolitan -0.168 Ideology 0.171 0.170
(0.36) (1.51) (1.48)
Mat_Gender -0.664 Age -0.155 -0.143
(1.52) (9.76)** (9.30)**
Mat_Occupation 2.847 _cons -6.730 -9.146
(5.28)** (5.71)** (7.64)**
Education_Years -0.012 Beatriz_Sanchez Non_Native -0.704 -0.944

46
(0.21) (2.67)** (4.24)**
D_Age -0.217 Mat_Metropolitan -0.342 0.268
(5.94)** (2.14)* (1.85)
Ideology 1.324 Mat_Gender -0.894 -0.795
(5.71)** (5.43)** (5.56)**
Age -0.154 D_Age -0.227 -0.208
(4.59)** (15.53)** (15.53)**
_cons 5.093 D_Class_Index_De -1.417
(1.91) (17.48)**
N 484 Class_Index_De -0.032
(0.46)
D_Ideology 0.766 0.629
(6.54)** (5.94)**
Ideology 1.720 1.447
(19.69)** (19.95)**
Age -0.151 -0.141
(12.54)** (11.86)**
D_Class_Index_C -0.945
(11.12)**
Class_Index_C -0.385
(2.96)**
D_Class_Index_C -2.885
(11.74)**
Class_Index_C -1.146
(9.23)**
D_Class_Index_C 0.232
(3.93)**
Class_Index_C -0.463
(7.97)**
D_Class_Index_C -0.350
(3.86)**
Class_Index_C 0.200
(2.35)*
D_Class_Index_C -0.752
(8.22)**
Class_Index_C -0.012
(0.15)
_cons 7.026 5.810
(8.68)** (7.80)**
N 3,864 4,064
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

47
Table 12: Full. Opinion. 2017

Opinion – (1) (2) Opinion – (1) (2)


Class Matching
Distance Characteristics
(Given vote)
2Candidate -0.034 -0.276 2Candidate -0.059 0.113
(0.20) (1.59) (0.35) (0.57)
3.Candidate 0.440 0.173 3.Candidate 0.444 0.656
(2.55)* (0.95) (2.59)** (3.26)**
4.Candidate 0.989 0.925 4.Candidate 0.989 1.114
(5.75)** (5.49)** (5.79)** (5.55)**
5.Candidate 0.672 0.517 5.Candidate 0.776 0.979
(3.60)** (2.77)** (3.94)** (4.30)**
6.Candidate 0.121 0.115 6.Candidate 0.110 0.299
(0.68) (0.65) (0.62) (1.42)
7.Candidate 0.813 0.671 7.Candidate 0.926 1.261
(4.41)** (3.73)** (4.72)** (5.51)**
8.Candidate 0.921 0.744 8.Candidate 0.936 1.108
(5.70)** (4.48)** (5.86)** (5.88)**
Non_Native -0.175 -0.137 Mat_Metropolitan -0.031 -0.198
(1.31) (1.02) (0.38) (1.83)
Mat_Metropolitan -0.046 -0.018 Mat_Gender 0.005 -0.022
(0.56) (0.23) (0.07) (0.29)
Mat_Gender 0.001 0.008 D_Age -0.002 0.001
(0.01) (0.11) (0.53) (0.38)
D_Age 0.000 0.002 Mat_Occupation 0.253 0.311
(0.05) (0.50) (2.30)* (2.68)**
D_Class_Index_De -0.054 D_Ideology -0.577 -0.600
(1.60) (15.01)** (14.65)**
D_Ideology -0.578 -0.578 Education_Years -0.027 -0.029
(15.09)** (15.48)** (2.80)** (2.79)**
Class_Index_De -0.092 Non_Native -0.139 -0.033
(3.18)** (1.03) (0.24)
Ideology -0.133 -0.150 Ideology -0.129 -0.210
(4.09)** (4.66)** (3.98)** (5.06)**
/ cut1 -3.475 -4.009 Age -0.004 -0.005
(12.13)** (13.67)** (2.09)* (2.02)*
cut2 -1.705 -2.206 / cut1 -3.586 -3.437
(6.07)** (7.68)** (10.30)** (7.92)**
cut3 -0.329 -0.810 cut2 -1.811 -1.662

48
(1.19) (2.86)** (5.25)** (3.84)**
cut4 1.896 1.377 cut3 -0.434 -0.378
(6.71)** (4.80)** (1.27) (0.88)
D_Class_Index_C -0.171 cut4 1.790 1.916
(3.89)** (5.23)** (4.47)**
Class_Index_C -0.154 3Can_Vote 0.158
(3.78)** (0.50)
N 3,349 3,516 4.Can_Vote 0.439
(1.67)
5.Can_Vote 0.109
(0.36)
7.Can_Vote 0.009
(0.03)
8.Can_Vote 0.472
(1.62)
N 3,357 2,849
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

49
Table 13: Full. Opinion given vote. 2017

Opinion – Class Distance (Given (1) (2)


vote)
2Candidate 0.139 -0.197
(0.70) (0.94)
3.Candidate 0.657 0.291
(3.25)** (1.35)
4.Candidate 1.120 1.005
(5.54)** (5.02)**
5.Candidate 0.849 0.602
(3.89)** (2.74)**
6.Candidate 0.316 0.259
(1.50) (1.22)
7.Candidate 1.116 0.891
(5.12)** (4.13)**
8.Candidate 1.102 0.849
(5.82)** (4.32)**
3Can_Vote 0.260 0.100
(0.82) (0.33)
4.Can_Vote 0.542 0.321
(1.99)* (1.24)
5.Can_Vote 0.217 0.195
(0.71) (0.64)
7.Can_Vote 0.110 0.008
(0.43) (0.03)
8.Can_Vote 0.589 0.411
(1.97)* (1.42)
Non_Native -0.078 -0.019
(0.57) (0.14)
Mat_Metropolitan -0.220 -0.147
(2.04)* (1.38)
Mat_Gender -0.026 -0.012
(0.34) (0.16)
D_Age 0.003 0.004
(0.88) (1.26)
D_Class_Index_De -0.051
(1.42)
D_Ideology -0.605 -0.602
(14.78)** (15.22)**
Class_Index_De -0.100
(3.20)**

50
Ideology -0.216 -0.216
(5.20)** (5.35)**
/ cut1 -3.262 -4.040
(8.53)** (10.33)**
cut2 -1.492 -2.231
(3.93)** (5.76)**
cut3 -0.210 -0.928
(0.56) (2.41)*
cut4 2.085 1.318
(5.47)** (3.43)**
D_Class_Index_C -0.186
(3.84)**
Class_Index_C -0.201
(4.41)**
N 2,841 2,989
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

51
4.2.2. 2013 Elections

In these elections, the leading centre-left candidate, Michelle Bachelet, and the main centre-

right candidate, Evelyn Matthei, who together account for over 70% of the votes, present

smaller descriptive differences, compared to 2017 elections. They are both females, from the

Metropolitan Region, and have an elite occupation. The only difference they present is in

their elite index score, since the main centre-left candidate did not assist to a private, elite

school, as the main centre-right candidate did. This means that the difference in the elite

index is 2 points (more details in Table 27 and Table 28).

Electoral Preferences

The second most voted candidate, the main centre-right candidate, shows a significant

association with the geographic characteristic (she is from the Metropolitan Region) and for

occupation (she has an elite occupation) and non-significant for gender. The point estimation

for the first two is positive and negative for gender. However, since the base candidate, the

main centre-left candidate, has the same category of region (there are both from the

metropolitan region), occupation (they both have elite occupation) and gender (they are both

females), the results are not relevant for the question on the significance of descriptive

representation: a positive association for one candidate means a negative association for the

other. Therefore, not much can be concluded from this relation. Given that these two candidates

account for 70% of the votes, these elections were not defined by the associations captured in

descriptive theory representation

As for the third most voted candidate, Marco Enriquez Ominami, occupation shows a

significant association, with the expected sign (the candidate had a non-elite occupation) and

so does age. Finally, the fourth most voted candidate, Franco Parisi, shares the elite descriptive

characteristics with the two leading candidates (he is from the Metropolitan Region and has an

elite occupation), except for gender (he is male). Therefore, similarly to the case of voting

52
behaviour between the two first majorities, descriptive representation cannot account for the

voting behaviour of his electorate, in the case of geographic origin and occupation. As for

gender, this last attribute is significant for this candidate and has the sign that descriptive

representation would suggest (positive).

When employing the two class indexes, the following results are found:

Table 14: Voting preferences. Class indexes. 2013

Evelyn_Matthei
D_Class_Index_De -0.298
(1.92)
Class_Index_De 0.155
(1.50)
D_Class_Index_C 0.083
(0.50)
Class_Index_C 0.485
(4.47)**
MarcoEnriquez_Ominami
D_Class_Index_De -0.281
(1.70)
Class_Index_De 0.248
(1.76)
D_Class_Index_C -0.395
(2.33)*
Class_Index_C 0.396
(2.83)**
FrancoParisi
D_Class_Index_De -0.708
(4.02)**
Class_Index_De -0.232
(1.46)
D_Class_Index_C -0.890
(4.41)**
Class_Index_C -0.051
(0.31)
N 4,599 4,770

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

The distance in indexes is not significant for the second main candidate (Evelyn Matthei) and

significant when measured with consumption for the third most voted candidate (Marco

53
Enriquez Ominami). For the fourth most voted candidate, class difference seems to hold

significant association, robustly to the way it is measured.

Overall, the results give mixed if not contradictory evidence in terms of the relevance of

descriptive representation.

Opinion

When replicating the exercise implemented for the 2017 elections, analysing the relationship

between matching characteristics and opinion on the candidates, the following results are

obtained (Model (2) controls voting preferences)

Table 15: Opinion. Matching Characteristics. 2013

Opinion (1) (2)


Mat_Metropolitan -0.161 -0.138
(1.46) (1.22)
Mat_Gender -0.147 -0.157
(1.47) (1.50)
D_Age -0.004 -0.004
(0.95) (0.98)
Mat_Occupation 0.047 0.064
(0.30) (0.38)
N 3,166 2,927

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

No descriptive characteristic is significant16. The association remains non-significant when

controlling for voting preference as well.

When evaluating the association with class distance, the following are the results.

16
When a fixed effect variable per respondent is included, age distance becomes significant and negative (as expected by
descriptive representation theory).

54
Table 16: Opinion. Class indexes. 2013

Opinion (1) (2)


Mat_Metropolitan -0.172 -0.142
(1.61) (1.34)
Mat_Gender -0.150 -0.144
(1.51) (1.48)
D_Age -0.004 -0.003
(0.95) (0.66)
D_Class_Index_De 0.053
(0.58)
Class_Index_De 0.055
(0.64)
D_Class_Index_C 0.009
(0.09)
Class_Index_C 0.032
(0.36)
N 3,169 3,295
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Once again, none of the associations is statistically significant17. This result does not change

when controlling for voting preferences, as the following table shows.

Table 17: Opinion given vote. Class indexes. 2013

Opinion (1) (2)


Mat_Metropolitan -0.139 -0.122
(1.24) (1.13)
Mat_Gender -0.161 -0.163
(1.55) (1.59)
D_Age -0.005 -0.003
(1.05) (0.73)
D_Class_Index_De 0.032
(0.55)
Class_Index_C 0.005 -0.005
(0.06) (0.05)
D_Class_Index_C 0.017
(0.16)
N 2,930 3,036

17
When a fixed effect variable per respondent is included, age distance becomes significant and negative (as expected by
descriptive representation theory).

55
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Class (and other descriptive characteristics) distance does not seem to be a significant

variable in its association with the respondents´ opinions, for the 2013 elections.

56
Full Regressions

Table 18: Full. Validity of class index. 2013

Class_Index_C
School 1.464 1.739
(8.15)** (8.73)**
Higher_Tec 0.971 0.912
(4.07)** (3.86)**
University 2.149 2.104
(5.09)** (4.95)**
Occupation 1.143 0.935
(3.40)** (2.78)**
/ cut1 -3.934 -2.809
(13.64)** (6.23)**
cut2 0.591 1.765
(5.32)** (4.59)**
cut3 3.934 5.107
(18.94)** (11.92)**
cut4 5.587 6.799
(16.90)** (12.88)**
Man -0.089
(0.53)
MR 0.353
(2.02)*
Non_Native 0.368
(1.25)
Age 0.013
(2.62)**
N 1,384 1,353

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

57
Table 19: Full. Electoral preferences. 2013

Evelyn_Matthei Mat_Metropolitan 0.395 Evelyn_Matthei Non_Native 1.111 0.977


(3.53)** (5.72)** (4.78)**
Mat_Gender -0.111 Mat_Metropolitan 0.373 0.387
(0.96) (2.44)* (2.56)*
Mat_Occupation 0.488 Mat_Gender 0.508 0.499
(3.13)** (3.12)** (3.17)**
Education_Years 0.124 D_Age 0.005 0.014
(6.35)** (0.60) (1.79)
D_Age 0.007 D_Class_Index_De -0.298
(1.35) (1.92)
Non_Native 0.913 D_Ideology -2.118 -2.207
(4.19)** (15.80)** (17.46)**
D_Ideology -0.075 Class_Index_De 0.155
(1.07) (1.50)
_cons -3.585 Ideology -2.712 -2.718
(10.93)** (27.14)** (27.82)**
MarcoEnriquez_Ominami Mat_Metropolitan -0.206 _cons 6.941 5.557
(1.07) (12.35)** (10.30)**
Mat_Gender 0.363 MarcoEnriquez_Ominami Non_Native 0.111 -0.281
(1.83) (0.31) (0.77)
Mat_Occupation 4.224 Mat_Metropolitan 0.389 0.447
(12.66)** (2.38)* (2.88)**
Education_Years 0.070 Mat_Gender 0.303 0.326
(1.82) (1.77) (2.02)*
D_Age -0.119 D_Age -0.110 -0.096
(7.13)** (12.18)** (11.78)**
Non_Native -0.516 D_Class_Index_De -0.281
(1.58) (1.70)
D_Ideology 1.301 D_Ideology 1.108 0.939
(10.40)** (9.00)** (7.91)**
_cons -4.395 Class_Index_De 0.248
(10.23)** (1.76)
FrancoParisi Mat_Metropolitan -1.092 Ideology -0.308 -0.311
(5.71)** (5.42)** (5.62)**
Mat_Gender 0.518 _cons -0.669 -0.915
(2.80)** (1.00) (1.46)
Mat_Occupation -0.887 FrancoParisi Non_Native -0.650 -0.927
(4.18)** (2.78)** (3.90)**
Education_Years 0.197 Mat_Metropolitan -0.827 -0.886
(13.13)** (4.42)** (4.65)**

58
D_Age -0.048 Mat_Gender 0.676 0.620
(9.49)** (3.52)** (3.40)**
Non_Native -0.595 D_Age -0.039 -0.026
(2.65)** (7.73)** (5.60)**
D_Ideology 0.370 D_Class_Index_De -0.708
(3.06)** (4.02)**
_cons -2.771 D_Ideology -0.345 -0.433
(9.75)** (2.12)* (2.91)**
N 4,590 Class_Index_De -0.232
(1.46)
Ideology -0.879 -0.854
(6.18)** (6.63)**
D_Class_Index_C 0.083
(0.50)
Class_Index_C 0.485
(4.47)**
D_Class_Index_C -0.395
(2.33)*
Class_Index_C 0.396
(2.83)**
D_Class_Index_C -0.890
(4.41)**
Class_Index_C -0.051
(0.31)
_cons 4.510 4.081
(5.44)** (6.10)**
N 4,599 4,770
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

59
Table 20: Full. Opinion. 2013

Opinion – (1) (2) Opinion – (1) (2)


Class Distance Matching
Characteristics
(Given vote)
2Candidate 2.003 2.034 2Candidate 1.997 2.091
(8.66)** (9.13)** (8.63)** (8.45)**
3.Candidate 1.281 1.261 3.Candidate 1.242 1.257
(6.19)** (6.19)** (5.14)** (4.85)**
4.Candidate 0.985 0.951 4.Candidate 0.985 1.039
(4.82)** (4.82)** (4.81)** (4.78)**
5.Candidate 0.164 0.319 5.Candidate 0.208 0.242
(0.79) (1.48) (1.08) (1.20)
6.Candidate 1.132 1.073 6.Candidate 1.134 1.161
(5.25)** (4.98)** (5.22)** (5.08)**
7.Candidate 0.694 0.717 7.Candidate 0.656 0.658
(2.73)** (2.98)** (2.29)* (2.21)*
8.Candidate 0.613 0.606 8.Candidate 0.656 0.726
(2.23)* (2.26)* (2.48)* (2.52)*
9.Candidate 0.136 0.267 9.Candidate 0.142 0.212
(0.65) (1.22) (0.68) (0.96)
Non_Native -0.154 -0.155 Mat_Metropolitan -0.161 -0.138
(0.88) (0.88) (1.46) (1.22)
Mat_Metropolitan -0.172 -0.142 Mat_Gender -0.147 -0.157
(1.61) (1.34) (1.47) (1.50)
Mat_Gender -0.150 -0.144 D_Age -0.004 -0.004
(1.51) (1.48) (0.95) (0.98)
D_Age -0.004 -0.003 Mat_Occupation 0.047 0.064
(0.95) (0.66) (0.30) (0.38)
D_Class_Index_De 0.053 D_Ideology -0.711 -0.697
(0.58) (13.31)** (11.76)**
D_Ideology -0.712 -0.689 Education_Years -0.002 -0.010
(13.29)** (12.57)** (0.15) (0.69)
Class_Index_De 0.055 Non_Native -0.152 -0.006
(0.64) (0.87) (0.03)
Ideology -0.290 -0.280 Ideology -0.293 -0.273
(7.08)** (6.77)** (7.11)** (4.97)**
cut1 _cons -4.052 -4.056 cut1 _cons -4.238 -4.093
(10.43)** (9.88)** (12.24)** (10.70)**
cut2 _cons -2.447 -2.397 cut2 _cons -2.629 -2.470
(6.35)** (5.94)** (7.75)** (6.53)**

60
cut3 _cons -0.566 -0.552 cut3 _cons -0.748 -0.660
(1.46) (1.37) (2.20)* (1.74)
D_Class_Index_C 0.009 2Can_Vote -0.109
(0.09) (0.61)
Class_Index_C 0.032 3.Can_Vote 0.380
(0.36) (1.55)
cut4 _cons 1.509 1.545 4.Can_Vote -0.164
(3.75)** (3.73)** (0.73)
N 3,169 3,295 6.Can_Vote 0.044
(0.15)
7.Can_Vote -1.096
(1.04)
8.Can_Vote 0.833
(1.64)
9.Can_Vote 0.204
(0.13)
cut4 _cons 1.324 1.374
(3.69)** (3.44)**
N 3,166 2,927
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

61
Table 21: Full. Opinion given vote. 2013

Opinion – Class Distance (Given


vote)
2Candidate 2.098 2.130
(8.49)** (8.94)**
3.Candidate 1.309 1.278
(5.96)** (5.92)**
4.Candidate 1.038 0.988
(4.78)** (4.72)**
5.Candidate 0.217 0.348
(1.06) (1.52)
6.Candidate 1.164 1.091
(5.11)** (4.81)**
7.Candidate 0.709 0.732
(2.69)** (2.96)**
8.Candidate 0.708 0.662
(2.47)* (2.28)*
9.Candidate 0.215 0.330
(0.97) (1.43)
2Can_Vote -0.096 -0.124
(0.54) (0.72)
3.Can_Vote 0.377 0.335
(1.54) (1.38)
4.Can_Vote -0.168 -0.171
(0.74) (0.76)
6.Can_Vote 0.033 -0.038
(0.11) (0.13)
7.Can_Vote -1.087 -1.193
(1.02) (1.13)
8.Can_Vote 0.826 0.737
(1.62) (1.43)
9.Can_Vote 0.256 0.295
(0.17) (0.19)
Non_Native -0.008 -0.008
(0.04) (0.04)
Mat_Metropolitan -0.139 -0.122
(1.24) (1.13)
Mat_Gender -0.161 -0.163

62
(1.55) (1.59)
D_Age -0.005 -0.003
(1.05) (0.73)
D_Class_Index_De 0.032
(0.55)
D_Ideology -0.694 -0.672
(11.77)** (11.20)**
Class_Index_C 0.005 -0.005
(0.06) (0.05)
Ideology -0.274 -0.256
(5.01)** (4.69)**
cut1 _cons -3.907 -3.889
(9.81)** (8.78)**
cut2 _cons -2.288 -2.213
(5.82)** (5.04)**
cut3 _cons -0.479 -0.446
(1.22) (1.02)
D_Class_Index_C 0.017
(0.16)
cut4 _cons 1.557 1.624
(3.78)** (3.58)**
N 2,930 3,036
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

63
4.2.3. Meta-analysis for class and opinion (1993-2017)

Given the different results on the relevance of class obtained in the 2013 elections and the 2017

elections, a meta-analysis is conducted, with focus on the association between class measured

by consumption patterns and opinion. The reason for omitting the analysis for class in terms of

education and occupation is that occupation of the respondents is only measured in the 2013

and 2017 elections. Additionally, the way education is measured (the possible responses) has

suffered several changes over the last two decades. The class index, through consumption

patterns, has been consistently measured and following the same standardised methodology.

The individual results for the 1993, 1999, and 2005 elections included in this analysis (for

which there was available data) are shown in the following table18.

Table 22: Opinion. Class indexes. 1993/1999/2005

Opinion 1993 1999 2005


Mat_Metropolitan -0.148 -0.057 -0.009
(1.83) (0.73) (0.13)
Mat_Gender -0.064 -0.107 0.130
(0.98) (1.65) (2.02)*
D_Age 0.037 0.006 0.005
(1.23) (2.02)* (1.44)
D_Class_Index_C -0.035 -0.132 -0.237
(0.53) (2.44)* (4.13)**
Class_Index_C 0.009 -0.154 -0.133
(0.15) (3.03)** (2.83)**
N 7,081 3,334 3,504
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

18
Native American status was not available for the 1993 and 1999 elections. The opinion data for three candidates with less
than 1% of intention to vote were not collected in the 1999 elections

64
The results show that, for two out of the three elections, class distance was significantly

associated with a more negative perception of the candidates19. Combining this with the

previous analysis means class distance was significant in three out of the five analysed

elections. When controlling for voting preference, the results remain similar, as can be seen in

the following table.

Table 23: Opinion given vote. Class indexes. 1993/1999/2005

Opinion 1993 1999 2005


Mat_Metropolitan -0.237 -0.053 0.006
(2.65)** (0.62) (0.09)
Mat_Gender -0.088 -0.141 0.134
(1.40) (2.04)* (2.01)*
D_Age 0.029 0.006 0.005
(1.00) (1.80) (1.45)
D_Class_Index_C -0.029 -0.148 -0.246
(0.49) (2.55)* (4.01)**
Class_Index_C -0.018 -0.160 -0.172
(0.36) (2.84)** (3.36)**
N 6,534 2,965 3,296

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Meta-analyses are usually used where several different estimations, obtained in the context of

different studies, are pooled together to give an overall estimation. In this research, meta-

analysis is used to pool together data collected at different moments, allowing for eventual

heterogeneity of the measured associations over time. Following, Hunter and Schmidt (2000),

a first element to define when conducting a meta-analysis is the level of heterogeneity between

the several estimations. Even though in this case the estimations are obtained from samples of

the same population, in terms of being representative of the Chilean electorate, it is possible

that the measured relationship has changed over time and between the different surveys. If this

19
When including a fix effect per respondent, the significance of the associations is the same (non-significant
for 1993 and significant for 1999 and 2005, at the 5% threshold)

65
were the case, a simple pooling together of the data would not be an adequate reflection of this

association and the way it has variated. The meta-analysis will allow to not only measure an

“average” association, but also how much the association has varied between surveys.

To conduct this analysis, first, the meta-analysis is implemented assuming "fixed effect"

(association in this case) (Mantel & Haenszel, 1959).

The following graph presents the results (in odds ratio) assuming “fixed effect” (association):

66
Figure 6: Class-Opinion Metanalysis. Fixed

67
Figure 7: Class-Opinion Metanalysis. Vote Controlled. Fixed

68
The heterogeneity test (chi-squared) cannot be rejected at the 5% threshold (p=0,19). It is,

therefore, suggestive evidence that it is possible to pool these estimations assuming a "fixed

effect" (association in this case). Under this assumption, the aggregate association is significant

and negative: one additional point in class distance diminishes between 13% (controlling for

voting preference) and 14% (not controlling for vote) the odds of being in a higher category of

public opinion20. This would imply that the association has been present over the measuring

period (25 years).

In any case, as the following graphs show, under the assumption of “random effects” or

heterogeneity in the associations (considering the variance between estimations) (DerSimonian

& Laird, 1986), the overall association is still significantly negative.

20
When including a fix effect per respondent, the associations are also significant at the 5% level, for both random and fix
effect models.

69
Figure 8: Class-Opinion Metanalysis. Random

70
Figure 9: Class-Opinion Metanalysis. Vote Controlled. Random

71
Full Regressions

Table 24: Full. Opinion and Opinion given vote. 1993/1999/2005

Opinion Opinion –
– Class Class
(1993) (1999) (2005) (1993) (1999) (2005)
Distance Distance
(Given vote)
2Candidate -1.024 -1.372 2Candidate -1.002 -1.370
(8.43)** (12.81)** (8.52)** (12.47)**
3.Candidate 2.042 -0.083 3.Candidate 2.191 -0.071
(12.17)** (0.69) (14.04)** (0.55)
4.Candidate -0.178 -0.622 4.Candidate -0.141 -0.640
(1.44) (5.80)** (1.17) (5.80)**
5.Candidate 0.477 1.570 5.Candidate 0.480 1.592
(2.99)** (16.29)** (3.26)** (15.84)**
6.Candidate -0.219 1.734 6.Candidate -0.220 1.717
(1.35) (18.46)** (1.45) (16.99)**
Mat_Metropolitan -0.148 -0.057 -0.009 2Can_Vote -0.175 -0.005
(1.83) (0.73) (0.13) (0.63) (0.04)
Mat_Gender -0.064 -0.107 0.130 3.Can_Vote -0.271 -0.356
(0.98) (1.65) (2.02)* (1.69) (4.48)**
D_Age 0.037 0.006 0.005 4.Can_Vote -0.220 -1.006 -0.590
(1.23) (2.02)* (1.44) (0.70) (1.91) (3.02)**
D_Class_Index_C -0.035 -0.132 -0.237 5.Can_Vote -0.082 -0.363
(0.53) (2.44)* (4.13)** (0.44) (1.18)
D_Ideology -0.533 0.134 -0.644 6.Can_Vote 0.124 -0.608
(15.72)** (4.04)** (20.45)** (0.54) (1.96)
Ideology -0.133 0.088 Mat_Metropolitan -0.237 -0.053 0.006
(4.62)** (3.58)** (2.65)** (0.62) (0.09)
Class_Index_C 0.009 -0.154 -0.133 Mat_Gender -0.088 -0.141 0.134
(0.15) (3.03)** (2.83)** (1.40) (2.04)* (2.01)*
/ cut1 -3.911 -1.441 -4.843 D_Age 0.029 0.006 0.005
(17.80)** (7.04)** (17.49)** (1.00) (1.80) (1.45)
cut2 -1.892 0.319 -3.248 D_Class_Index_C -0.029 -0.148 -0.246
(9.29)** (1.58) (11.93)** (0.49) (2.55)* (4.01)**
cut3 -0.290 1.417 -1.920 D_Ideology -0.545 0.122 -0.673
(1.45) (6.97)** (7.15)** (16.06)** (3.50)** (20.75)**
cut4 1.648 3.576 0.566 Ideology -0.112 0.034
(7.82)** (16.88)** (2.11)* (3.52)** (1.12)
mb_p15_ 3.Candidate -0.333 Class_Index_C -0.018 -0.160 -0.172

72
(3.00)** (0.36) (2.84)** (3.36)**
Non_Native -0.017 / cut1 -4.100 -2.065 -5.143
(0.10) (15.23)** (5.34)** (16.66)**
N 7,081 3,334 3,504 cut2 -2.105 -0.345 -3.517
(8.02)** (0.90) (11.60)**
cut3 -0.523 0.689 -2.226
(2.01)* (1.79) (7.46)**
cut4 1.427 2.790 0.247
(5.34)** (7.17)** (0.84)
mb_p15_ 3Candidate -0.326
(2.79)**
3Can_Vote -0.381
(1.01)
Non_Native 0.001
(0.01)
N 6,534 2,965 3,296
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

73
5. Discussion and conclusion

This chapter presents discussions that branch out from the results of the research and the main

inferable conclusions. The discussions are divided into "academic discussions" and "policy

discussions". As expectable, the two are connected, but such a distinction is implemented for

clarity purposes.

5.1. Academic discussion

Regarding the academic debates, one of the most relevant findings is the evidence that class

matters in terms of descriptive representation. This may seem like a fairly modest assertion,

however, given the academic landscape of the last decades, this is not a trivial finding. In this

research, class seems more relevant in descriptive representation than other much more studied

aspects, such as gender.

One of the expressions of the recent reincorporation of class in the debates over descriptive

representation has been the surge of survey experiments to test the relevance of this attribute

in the relationship between candidates and the general population, by making the respondents

choose between two hypothetical candidates variating in their class characteristics (e.g.

Hainmuller et al., 2014; Carnes & Lupu, 2016; Campbel & Cowley, 2014a, Campbel &

Cowley, 2014b).

Within this emerging literature, the present research brings forth three relevant elements.

First, as was already mentioned, most of the research has been undertaken in well-established

democracies21. Relatively “new democracies”, like the Chilean one, present different

challenges and relationships. One of them is, undoubtedly, the implementation of the

democratic principles of democracy, such as equality, which needs to replace previous

principles of their dictatorial pasts.

21
An exception is Carnes and Lupu (2016), who incorporates this discussion to the context of Argentina

74
Second, this research has shown that the associations found in electoral relationships need not

be equal to those that organise public support. In other words, there is a necessity to study these

two aspects separately: an attribute that may not mobilise votes may mobilise public opinion.

Examples such as Campbel & Cowley, (2014a), in which along with electoral preferences,

broader issues of perception of candidates are studied seem to show this is an important aspect.

Finally, this research shows the importance of complementing survey experiments and other

Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) studies with observational studies such as this one.

There is a relative consensus that in "low information" decisions, voters decide by resorting to

stereotyping candidates by group affiliation, such as belonging to a demographic group

(Hamilton 1981). In this sense, one of the more challenging aspects of interpreting the results

of several survey experiments is that it is not clear that the sort of information that the

respondents are exposed to in the experiments (low information races) is relatable to the sort

of information to which electors are exposed22. This is especially relevant as candidates react

strategically to the preferences of voters, highlighting or hiding aspects. Additionally, voters

are presented with different sources of information from which it may be difficult to discern

the truth. Furthermore, this difficulty variates across attributes. While an attribute such as

gender or ethnicity may be relatively straightforward (through names and physical

characteristics), class is harder to recognise. It is harder to presume that in real life elections a

relatively uninterested voter would know the prior occupation or income of a candidate. The

fact that this research has shown that, despite this difficulty, class is associated with differences

in public opinion is, therefore, a relevant contribution to the academic debate.

22
Typically in these survey expermients, the respondents would be faced with short descriptions of hypothetical candidates
differing in the studied characteristic.

75
5.2. Policy discussion

The research presents suggestive evidence that, regarding policy, if an objective is to improve

public opinion on politicians, having more candidates that represent class diversity may help.

This is of particular interest given the recent context of Chile, which implemented gender

quotas in the latest parliamentary elections. The fact that gender and ethnicity (the latest

parliamentary elections also saw the election of the first Mapuche MP since the return of

democracy) has dominated the debates may explain why these two have been the first to be

tackled. Additionally, the fact that implementing gender quotas is a relatively simple measure

which cannot be easily replicated for class may have also contributed to it.

This research has shown that class is associated to public opinion while giving mixed or

contradictory evidence on its relevance for voting preferences. Thus, fruitful public policies

could be devised to address this apparent inconsistency. Government policies that promote

class diversity in representation may be relevant to improve the perception of the public on

politicians. However, the way in which such policy would be enacted is less clear. Since the

implementation of quotas, in this case, does not seem possible, other measures such as political

education directed at poorer members of the population may be an alternative.

5.3. Conclusions and challenges for further research

The present research has brought forth evidence that the members of lower classes (and

younger people) in Chile present stronger perceptions of misrepresentation by the political

elite. Additionally, this research has shown the over-representation of elite characteristics in

the Chilean presidential candidates and has also presented evidence that class distance is

associated with a more negative public perception of those candidates. However, somewhat

unexpectedly when considering the previous findings, matching descriptive characteristics

76
(such as class) and voting preferences do not seem to be positively associated, as would be

expected by descriptive representation theory.

Class distance was not found to be significant when measured with an alternative measurement

of class (through education and occupation). Due to the available data, it was not possible to

confirm the mentioned associations through a meta-analysis. As more data becomes available,

future researches may include this alternative index in a meta-analysis.

A relevant shortcoming of this research, which will hopefully be overcome by future research,

is associated to the particular type of election studied: presidential election. This is uninominal

and national, and therefore does not allow for as many variations and detail analysis as

subnational elections which, also, may show higher variations in the characteristics of

candidates. (For example, there are mayors and parliamentary members who do belong to the

Mapuche people). Further development for this research would be to replicate it in the

subnational level, such as local governments and the legislative. This could provide more

robust evidence to extrapolate the findings on presidential elections to other elections.

Hopefully the findings of this research will help promote such research at the sub-national level

in the near future.

77
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Appendix: Electoral results in presidential elections (since 1989)

Table 25: Electoral results in presidential elections since the return of democracy

Election Total valid Candidates (first Electoral Electoral


year votes (not round) result result
including (votes) (votes)
blank and
null votes)

1989 6.979.859 Hernán Büchi Buc 2.052.116 29,40%

Francisco Javier Errázuriz 1.077.172 15,43%


Talavera

Patricio Aylwin Azócar 3.850.571 55,17% President

1993 6.968.950 Manfred Max Neef 387.102 5,55%

Eugenio Pizarro Poblete 327.402 4,70%

Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle 4.040.497 57,98% President

Cristián Reitze Campos 81.675 1,17%

Arturo Alessandri Besa 1.701.324 24,41%

José Piñera Echeñique 430.950 6,18%

1999 7.055.128 Arturo Frei Bolívar 26.812 0,38%

Sara María Larraín Ruiz-Tagle 31.319 0,44%

Gladys Marín Millie 225.224 3,19%

Tomas Hirsch Goldschmidt 36.235 0,51%

Ricardo Lagos Escobar 3.383.339 47,96% President

Joaquin Lavin Infante 3.352.199 47,51% Passed to


second round
2005 6.942.041 Sebastián Piñera Echeñique 1.763.694 25,41% Passed to
second round

Michelle Bachelet Jeria 3.190.691 45,96% President

Tomas Hirsch Goldschmidt 375.048 5,40%

Joaquín Lavin Infante 1.612.608 23,23%

2009 6.977.544 Jorge Arrate Mac-Niven 433.195 6,21%

Marco Enríquez-Ominami 1.405.124 20,14%


Gumucio

Sebastián Piñera Echenique 3.074.164 44,06% President

Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle 2.065.061 29,60% Passed to


second round

81
2013 6.585.808 Franco Aldo Parisi Fernandez 666.015 10,11%

Marcel Claude Reyes 185.072 2,81%

Ricardo Israel Zipper 37.744 0,57%

Marco Enriquez-Ominami 723.542 10,99%


Gumucio

Roxana del Carmen Miranda 81.873 1,24%


Meneses

Michelle Bachelet Jeria 3.075.839 46,70% President

Evelyn Matthei Fornet 1.648.481 25,03% Passed to


second round
Alfredo Sfeir Younis 154.648 2,35%

Tomás Jocelyn-Holt Letelier 12.594 0,19%

2017 6.596.329 Carolina Goic Boroevic 387.780 5,88%

Jose Antonio Kast Rist 523.213 7,93%

Sebastián Piñera Echenique 2.417.216 36,64% President

Alejandro Guillier Alvarez 1.497.116 22,70% Passed to


second round
Beatriz Sanchez Munoz 1.336.824 20,27%

Marco Enríquez-Ominami 376.471 5,71%


Gumucio

Eduardo Artes Brichetti 33.690 0,51%

Alejandro Navarro Brain 24.019 0,36%

Source: adapted from Chilean Electoral Service (SERVEL) in <https://historico.servel.cl/>


and <http://pv.servelelecciones.cl/> (2018)

82
Appendix: Coding categories
Table 26: Coding map for descriptive characteristics

Grouping Characteristic Dimension 1 Dimension 2 Code Class


Index
Class Consumption Socio-Economic ESOMAR-AIM ABC1 4
patterns level classification C2 3
C3 2
D 1
E 0
Education Level Higher Education University 3

Technical higher education 2


School High school 1
Less than High school 0
School Typology Typology of Private non-subsidized 1
schools by
ownership

Public and private subsidized 0


Typology of Elite institution 1
schools by elite Non-elite institution 0
status23
Higher Education Typology of Elite institution 1
Typology higher24
education
institutions by
elite status Non-elite institution 0
Occupation Typology of Typology of Elite-prestige occupations25 1
occupations occupations by
elite status Non-elite-prestige 0
occupations
Non- Age Age26 -
Class Gender Typology of Male -
gender Female -
Spatial Typology of Metropolitan Region -
differences geographical Out-of-Metropolitan-Region -
differences27
Ethnicity, race, Typology of Non-Mapuche -
and cultural origin ethnicity, race, Mapuche28 -
and cultural origin

23 Not available for respondents.


24 Not available for respondents.
25 Business and economics, engineering, law, and medicine.
26 Subtracting the year of birth of the candidate or respondent to the year of the corresponding elections.
27 This will be assigned by place of birth.
28 In the case of candidates, this category will be designated by last names. Chilean law (Law 19.253, known as “indigenous

law”) recognizes last names (of either the father or mother) as evidence of affiliation to an indigenous group, such as
Mapuche. A list of frequent Mapuche last names is available in Painemal (2011). In respondents, belonging to an ethnic
group is one of the self-reported elements of the identification module.

83
Appendix: Coding of presidential candidates
Table 27: Candidates Coding

Electi Candida Fin Tech Unive Priva Elite Elite Elite Age Male Metr Non- Information source29
on tes (first ish nical rsity te Scho Unive Occu opolit Mpa
year round) ed Highe (non- ol rsity patio an uche
Hi r subsi n Regio
gh Educ dized n
Sc ation schoo
ho l)
ol

1989 Hernán 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 40 1 0 1 Monckeberg , M. O. (2017) El poder de la UDI. Santaigo: Penguin Random


Büchi House.
Buc
Francisc 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 47 1 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Francisco_Javier
o Javier _Err%C3%A1zuriz_Talavera
Errázuri
z
Talaver
a
Patricio 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 71 1 0 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Patricio_Aylw
Aylwin in_Az%C3%B3car
Azócar

1993 Manfre 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 61 1 0 1 https://www.max-neef.cl/ "La generación del cambio climático: una


d Max aproximación desde el enfoque del cao", by Manuel Guzman. P.351
Neef
Eugenio 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 51 1 0 1 https://www.lemondediplomatique.cl/Padre-Eugenio-Pizarro-Poblete-50.html
Pizarro http://blogs.periodistadigital.com/ungido-para-
Poblete evangelizar.php/2013/01/23/ungido-para-evangelizar-a-los-pobres-y-d
30

29
All information from internet retrieved on 20 June 2018
30
Seminarist. The Episcopal Seminar of Santiago has an agreement with the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, through which seminarist may obtain a university degree in theology.
However, for the analysis, the candidate was considered to hold a vocational (technical) degree.

84
Eduard 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 51 1 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Eduardo_Frei
o Frei _Ruiz-Tagle
Ruiz-
Tagle
Cristián 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 43 1 1 1 http://www.anim.cl/la-anim-estrena-directiva-y-renueva-su-gestion/
Reitze http://impresa.lasegunda.com/2017/07/28/A/U0372HUQ/OM3732D3
Campos https://web.archive.org/web/20131017104517/http://blog.felipebarriga.cl/do
31 wnloads/servel_junaeb/inscritos/INSCRI13V.txt
http://www.caras.cl/tag/cristian-
reitze/http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id={eef3c6ee-b758-42df-
8281-9363ba123712}
Arturo 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 70 1 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Arturo_Aless
Alessan andri_Besa
dri Besa
José 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 45 1 1 1 http://www.josepinera.org/josepinera/jp_jp.htm
Piñera http://ciperchile.cl/2010/11/11/verbo-divino-los-secretos-y-el-poder-del-
Echeñiq colegio-favorito-de-la-elite/ https://www.sebastianpinera.cl/biografia/ (implicit
ue birth in Santiago)
1999 Arturo 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 60 1 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Erwin_Arturo
Frei _Frei_Bol%C3%Advar
Bolívar
Sara 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 47 0 1 1 http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id={cef0abbc-0c94-40d4-8eb5-
María e33fa61ab886}
Larraín
Ruiz-
Tagle
Gladys 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 59 0 0 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Gladys_del_C
Marín armen_Mar%C3%ADn_Millie
Millie

Tomas 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 43 1 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Tom%C3%A1
Hirsch s_Ren%C3%A9_Hirsch_Goldschmidt
Goldsch
midt
Ricardo 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 61 1 1 1 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ricardo-Lagos
Lagos
Escobar

31
Finished university studies after being a candidate. For the analysis only the technical degree was considered

85
Joaquin 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 46 1 1 1 http://www.joaquinlavin.cl/#Resumen_y_datos_biograficos
Lavin
Infante
2005 Sebasti 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 56 1 1 1 https://www.sebastianpinera.cl/biografia/
án
Piñera
Echeñiq
ue
Michell 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 54 0 1 1 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Michelle-Bachelet
e http://www.uchile.cl/portal/presentacion/historia/grandes-figuras/presidentes-
Bachele de-chile-ex-alumnos-de-la-u/22624/michelle-bachelet-jeria
t Jeria
Tomas 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 49 1 1 1 Previously given
Hirsch
Goldsch
midt
Joaquín 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 52 1 1 1 Previously given
Lavin
Infante

2009 Jorge 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 68 1 1 1 http://blogs.cooperativa.cl/opinion/jorge-arrate/


Arrate
Mac-
Niven
Marco 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 36 1 1 1 http://biografias.bcn.cl/wiki/Marco_Antonio_Enr%C3%ADquez-
Enríque Ominami_Gumucio http://www.marcoenriquezominami.cl/project/infancia/
z-
Omina
mi
Gumuci
o
Sebasti 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 60 1 1 1 Previously given
án
Piñera
Echeniq
ue
Eduard 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 67 1 1 1 Previously given
o Frei
Ruiz-
Tagle

86
2013 Franco 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 46 1 1 1 https://web.archive.org/web/20120508205841/http://parisielpoderdelagente.c
Aldo l/site/bienvenidos/ (spent a few years in Instituto Nacional, but finished in
Parisi military school)
Fernand
ez
Marcel 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 56 1 1 1 http://www.lasegunda.com/Noticias/Nacional/2013/09/880126/las-razones-
Claude del-candidato-marcel-claude-desciendo-de-un-zapatero-frances-anarquista
Reyes https://www.publimetro.cl/cl/candidatos/2013/05/03/marcel-claude.html
Ricardo 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 63 1 0 1 http://ricardoisraelpresidente2014.blogspot.com/p/programa-de-
Israel gobierno.html
Zipper http://www.lasegunda.com/Noticias/Impreso/2013/09/879010/las-mil-y-una-
historias-de-ricardo-israel-el-centro-perdido-que-quiere-representar-el-
candidato
Marco 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 40 1 1 1 Previously given
Enrique
z-
Omina
mi
Gumuci
o
Roxana 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 46 0 1 1 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/bachelet-es-
del mentira_b_4175429.html?guccounter=1
Carmen https://web.archive.org/web/20130529230356/http://roxanamiranda.cl/roxan
Mirand a-miranda/
a
Menese
s
Michell 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 62 0 1 1 Previously given
e
Bachele
t Jeria
Evelyn 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 60 0 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Evelyn_Matt
Matthei hei_Fornet
Fornet
Alfredo 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 66 1 1 1 http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/alfredo-sfeir-el-economista-y-lider-
Sfeir espiritual-que-aspira-a-llegar-a-la-moneda/ Servicio de Registro Civil e
Younis Identificación, Circunscripción: Recoleta, Nro. inscripción: 1.898, Año: 1947
(infromation on place and date of birth)
Tomás 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 50 1 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Tom%C3%A1
Jocelyn- s_Jocelyn_Holt_Letelier

87
Holt
Letelier

2017 Carolina 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 45 0 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Carolina_Goi


Goic c_Boroevic
Boroevi
c
Jose 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 51 1 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_A
Antonio ntonio_Kast_Rist
Kast
Rist
Sebasti 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 68 1 1 1 Previously given
án
Piñera
Echeniq
ue
Alejand 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 64 1 0 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Alejandro_Ren
ro %C3%A9_Eleodoro_Guillier_%C3%81lvarez
Guillier
Alvarez
Beatriz 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 47 0 0 1 http://www.emol.com/especiales/2017/actualidad/nacional/elecciones/candid
Sanchez ata-sanchez.asp http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/beatriz-sanchez-la-politica/
Munoz
Marco 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 44 1 1 1 Previously given
Enríque
z-
Omina
mi
Gumuci
o
Eduard 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 66 1 0 1 http://unionpatriotica.cl/artespresidente/
o Artes http://www.t13.cl/noticia/politica/eduardo-artes-union-patriotica-candidato
Brichett
i
Alejand 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 59 1 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Alejandro_Nav
ro arro_Brain
Navarro
Brain

88
Table 28: Class Index for Candidates

1989 1993 1999 2005 2009 2013 2017


Class Class Class Class Class Class Class
Candidate Candidate Candidate Candidate Candidate Candidate Candidate
index index index index index index index

Sebastián Franco Aldo


Hernán Büchi Manfred Max Arturo Frei Jorge Arrate Carolina Goic
3 2 3 Piñera 4 3 Parisi 2 2
Buc Neef Bolívar Mac-Niven Boroevic
Echeñique Fernandez

Marco
Francisco Javier Sara María
Eugenio Pizarro Michelle Enríquez- Marcel Claude Jose Antonio
Errázuriz 4 2 Larraín Ruiz- 2 2 3 2 4
Poblete Bachelet Jeria Ominami Reyes Kast Rist
Talavera Tagle
Gumucio
Sebastián
Patricio Aylwin Eduardo Frei Gladys Marín Tomas Hirsch Ricardo Israel Sebastián Piñera
2 4 0 3 Piñera 4 2 4
Azócar Ruiz-Tagle Millie Goldschmidt Zipper Echenique
Echenique
Marco
Cristián Reitze Tomas Hirsch Joaquín Lavin Eduardo Frei Enriquez- Alejandro
3 3 3 4 3 0
Campos Goldschmidt Infante Ruiz-Tagle Ominami Guillier Alvarez
Gumucio
Roxana del
Arturo Ricardo Lagos Carmen Beatriz Sanchez
4 3 0 1
Alessandri Besa Escobar Miranda Munoz
Meneses
Marco Enríquez-
José Piñera Joaquin Lavin Michelle
4 3 2 Ominami 3
Echeñique Infante Bachelet Jeria
Gumucio
Evelyn Matthei Eduardo Artes
4 0
Fornet Brichetti

Alfredo Sfeir Alejandro


4 0
Younis Navarro Brain

Tomás Jocelyn-
4
Holt Letelier

89
Appendix: Dictionary for variables
Table 29: Variables dictionary

Name Definition Possible values


Education_Years
Years of Education Integer value from 0 to
99
School Respondent has high school education or higher 0/1
Higher_Tec Respondent has higher technical education or 0/1
higher
University Respondent has university education 0/1
Non_Native Not belonging to Native population (Mapuche) 0/1
MR Respondent is from the Metropolitan Region 0/1
Man Respondent is Male 0/1
Age Age of respondent Integer values higher
than 17
i.Candidate Fix effect for candidate (variable has value of 1 0/1
when the evaluated candidate is candidate i)
i.Can_Vote Fix effect for voting preference (variable has 0/1
value of 1 when the expressed voting preference
is candidate i)
Ideology Ideology of respondent. Lower levels are “more 0,1,2,3,4
to the right”. Higher levels are “more to the left”
D_Ideology Difference, in absolute value, in political 0,1,2,3,4
ideology between candidate and respondent
Mat_Occupation Both candidate and respondent have an elite 0/1
occupation or both candidate and respondent
have a non-elite occupation
Mat_Metropolitan Both candidate and respondent are from the 0/1
Metropolitan Region or both candidate and
respondent are not from the Metropolitan Region
Mat_Gender Both candidate and respondent are male or both 0/1
candidate and respondent are female
D_Age Age difference, in absolute terms, between Integer values higher
candidate and respondent than 0
Class_Index_De Class index of respondent measured through 0,1,2,3,4
occupation and education
D_Class_Index_De Difference in class indexes of respondent and 0,1,2,3,4
candidate, in absolute terms. Respondent´s class
is measured through occupation and education
Class_Index_De Class index of respondent measured through 0,1,2,3,4
consumption patterns
D_Class_Index_C Difference in class indexes of respondent and 0,1,2,3,4
candidate, in absolute terms. Respondent´s class
is measured through consumption patterns

90