SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
NATURE OF JUDICIAL POWER
It is evident, upon the foregoing
authorities, that the so called committee
on the rating of students for honor whose
actions are questioned in this case
exercised neither judicial nor quasi-
judicial functions in the performance of
its assigned task. From the above-quoted
portions of the decisions cited, it will be
gleaned that before a tribunal board, or
officer may exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a
law that gives rise to some specific rights
of persons or property under which
adverse claims to such rights are made,
and the controversy ensuing therefrom is
brought, in turn, before the tribunal,
board or officer clothed With power and
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authority to determine what that law is
and thereupon adjudicate the respective
rights of the contending parties. As
pointed out by appellees, however, there
is nothing on record about any rule of law
that provides that when teachers sit down
to assess the individual merits of their
pupils for purposes of rating them for
honors, such function involves the
determination of what the law is and that
they are therefore automatically vested
with judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Worse still, this Court has not even been
appraised by appellant of the pertinent
provisions of the Service Manual of
Teachers for Public Schools appellees
allegedly violated in the composition of
the committee they constituted
thereunder, and, in the performance of
that committee's duties. [Santiago vs.
Bautista, G.R. No. L-25024. March 30,
1970]
THE CONGRESS MAY DEFINE THE
JURISDICTION OF VARIOUS COURTS
Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does
not infringe any provision of the
Constitution. It does not impair the
inherent power of courts "to settle actual
controversies which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the
government" (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution).
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The power to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts belongs to the legislature, except
that it may not deprive the Supreme Court
of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated
in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution).
The President, in the exercise of her
legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution, issued Proclamation No. 50-
A prohibiting the courts from issuing
restraining orders and writs of injunction
against the APT and the purchasers of any
assets sold by it, to prevent courts from
interfering in the discharge, by this
instrumentality of the executive branch of
the Government, of its task of carrying out
"the expeditious disposition and
privatization of certain government
corporations and/or the assets thereof"
(Proc. No. 50), absent any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation,
not being inconsistent with the
Constitution and not having been
repealed or revoked by Congress, has
remained operative (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII,
1987 Constitution).
While the judicial power may appear to
be pervasive, the truth is that under the
system of separation of powers set up in
the Constitution, the power of the courts
over the other branches and
instrumentalities of the Government is
limited only to the determination of
"whether or not there has been a grave
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abuse of discretion (by them) amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in the
exercise of their authority and in the
performance of their assigned tasks (Sec.
1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Courts
may not substitute their judgment for that
of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the
discharge of its functions and the
implementation of its decisions in
connection with the acquisition, sale or
disposition of assets transferred to it.
[Mantruste Systems, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. Nos.
86540-41, November 6, 1989]
 Judicial Power – includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving
rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
 Jurisdiction – power to hear and
decide a case
 The second clause of Section 1,
Article VIII effectively limits the
“political question” area,
heretofore, was forbidden
territory for the courts.
 In Tocao vs Court of Appeals, the
Court held that the inherent
powers of the Court to amend and
control its processes and orders to
as to make them conformable with
law and justice includes the right
to reverse itself, especially when,
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in its honest opinion, it has 8. Salaries of judges may not be

committed an error or mistake in
judgment, and that to adhere to its
decision will cause injustice to a
party litigant.
 In De Leon vs Court of Appeals, it
said that the Court is not precluded
from examining its own ruling and
rectifying errors of judgment if
blind and stubborn adherence to
res judicata would involve the
sacrifice of justice to technicality.
CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS TO
INSURE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE
JUDICIARY
1. The Supreme Court is a
constitutional body; it may not be
abolished by the legislature.
2. The members of the Supreme
Court are removable only by
impeachment.
3. The Supreme Court may not be
deprived of its minimum original
and appellate jurisdiction:
appellate jurisdiction may not be
increased without its advice and
concurrence.
4. The Supreme Court has
administrative supervision over all
inferior courts and personnel,
5. The Supreme Court has the
exclusive power to discipline
judges/justices of inferior courts.
6. The members of the Judiciary have
security of tenure.
7. The members of the Judiciary may
not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
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reduces; the Judiciary enjoys fiscal
autonomy.
 Fiscal autonomy enjoyed by
the judiciary contemplates
guarantee of full flexibility to
allocate and utilize their
resources with the wisdom
and dispatch that their needs
require.
 It recognizes the power and
authority to levy, assess and
collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding
the highest rates authorized
by law for compensation and
pay plans of the government
and allocate and disburse
such sums as may be
provided by law or prescribed
by them in the course of the
discharge of functions.
9. The Supreme Court, alone, may
initiate and promulgate the Rules
of Court.
10. The Supreme Court, alone, may
order temporary detail of judges.
11. The Supreme Court can appoint all
officials and employees of the
Judiciary.
SANTIAGO VS BAUTISTA
NATURE OF JUDICIAL POWER; WHAT
ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTS
FACTS: Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil,
was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before

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his graduation, Ted and his parents  Judicial action- is the

sought the invalidation of the ranking of adjudication upon the rights of
the honor students. They filed a Certiorari parties who in general appear
case against the principal and teachers or are brought before the
who composed the committee on rating tribunal by notice or process,
honors.. Respondents filed a MTD and upon whose claims some
claiming that the action was improper, decision or judgment is
and even assuming it was proper, the rendered. The character of its
question has become academic (bc the action in a given case must
graduation already proceeded. They also decide whether that action is
argue that there was no GADALEJ on the judicial, ministerial, or
part of the teachers since the Committee legislative, or whether it be
on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, simply that of a public agent of
exercising judicial functions, under Rule the country or State, as in its
65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial varied jurisdictions it may by
function turns be each (In Re Saline
County Subscription, 100 Am.
DOCTRINE: Dec. 337,338, cited in
i. NATURE OF JUDICIAL POWER Southeastern Greyhound Lines
 In order that a special civil v. Georgia Public Service
action of certiorari may be Commission, 181 S.E/ 836-
invoked in this jurisdiction the 837)
following circumstances must  The exercise of Judicial
exist: (1) that there must be a Function is to determine what
specific controversy involving the law is and what the legal
rights of persons or property rights of parties are, with
and said controversy is brought respect to a matter in
before a tribunal, board, or controversy; and whether the
officer for hearing and officer is clothed with that
determination of their authority, and undertakes to
respective rights and determine those questions, he
obligations; (2) the tribunal, acts judicially.
board or officer before whom  Judicial power- has been
the controversy construing and variously defines as the
applying the laws to that end; authority to determine the
(3) the tribunal. board, or rights of persons or property
officer must pertain to that by arbitrating between
branch of the sovereign power adversaries in specific
which belongs to the legislative controversies at the instance of
or executive department. a party thereto; the authority
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exercised by that department
of government which is
charged with the declaration of
what the law is and the
construction so far as it is
written law; the authority
vested in the judges or in the
courts; the authority vested in
some court, officer or persons
to hear and determine when
the rights of persons or
property or the propriety of
doing an act is the subject
matter of adjudication.
 Judicial power implies the
construction of laws and the
adjudication of legal rights. It
includes the power to hear and
determine BUT not everyone
who may hear and determine
has judicial power.
NOTE: Not necessarily
include the power to hear
and determine and
determine a matter if not in
the nature of a suit or
action between the parties
 Judicial Function does not
solely depend upon the
operation of which it is
performed or the information
of the act in solving this
question, due regard must be
had to the organic law of the
state and the division of power
of government.
 It is not enough to make a
function judicial that it requires
discretion, deliberation,
thought and judgment. It must
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be the exercise of the
discretion and judgment within
the subdivision of the
sovereign power of which
belongs to the judiciary, or at
least, which does not belong to
the legislature or executive
department.
ii. WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI-
JUDICIAL ACTS
 It is the nature of the act to be
performed, rather than the
office, board, or body which
performs it, that determines
whether or not it is the
discharge of a judicial or quasi-
judicial function.
 Before a tribunal board, or
officer may exercise judicial or
quasi-judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law
that gives rise to some specific
rights of persons or property
under which adverse claims to
such rights are made, and the
controversy ensuing therefrom
is brought, in turn, before the
tribunal, board or officer
clothed with power and
authority to determine what
the law is there and parties.
 The so-called Committee for
Rating Honor Students are
neither judicial nor quasi-
judicial bodies in the
performance of its assigned
task.
 It is necessary that there be a
LAW that gives rise to some
specific rights of persons or
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property under which adverse assume jurisdiction over the

claims to such rights are made,
and the controversy ensuring
there from is brought in turn,
to the tribunal or board clothed
with power and authority to
determine.
LIMKAICHONG VS COMELEC
FACTS: Two petitions were consolidated
on the issue about the qualifications of
Jocelyn Limkaichong to run for, be elected
to, and assume and discharge the position
as Representative of the 1st District of
Negros Oriental. The contention of the
parties who sought her disqualification is
that she is not a natural-born citizen,
hence, she lacks the citizenship
requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. In the election that
ensued, she was voted for by the
constituents of Negros Oriental and
garnered the highest votes. She was
eventually proclaimed as the winner and
has since performed her duties and
responsibilities as Member of the House
of Representatives.
The proponents against Limkaichong's
qualification stated that she is not a
natural-born citizen because her parents
were Chinese citizens at the time of her
birth. They went on to claim that the
proceedings for the naturalization of Julio
Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality
due to procedural and substantial defects.
ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET should
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disqualification case.
HELD: Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed
by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she
had taken her oath of office, and she was
allowed to officially assume office on July
23, 2007. Accordingly, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, and
no longer the COMELEC, should now
assume the jurisdiction over the
disqualification case. Section 17, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and in Section
2509 of the OEC underscore the
exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's
jurisdiction over election contests relating
to its members.
DAZA VS SINGSON
FACTS: The HoR proportionally
apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among
several political parties represented in
that chamber in accordance with Art. VI
Sec 18. The Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a
political realignment in the HoR. 24
members of the Liberal Party joined the
LDP, reducing their former party to only
17 members.
On the basis of this development, the
House of Representatives revised its
representation in the CoA by withdrawing
the seat occupied by Daza and giving this
to the newly-formed LDP. On December
5th, the chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original

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members except the petitioner and
including therein Luis C. Singson as the
additional member from the LDP. Daza
came to the Supreme Court to challenge
his removal from the CoA and the
assumption of his seat by the Singson.
Acting initially on his petition for
prohibition and injunction with
preliminary injunction, SC issued a TRO
that same day to prevent both Daza and
Singson from serving in the CoA.
Daza contented that he cannot be
removed from the CoA because his
election thereto is permanent. He claimed
that the reorganization of the House
representation in the said body is not
based on a permanent political
realignment because the LDP is not a duly
registered political party and has not yet
attained political stability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the question
raised by the Daza is political in nature
and is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
HELD: No. The Court has the competence
to act on the matter at bar. The issue
involved is not a discretionary act of the
House of Representatives that may not be
reviewed by us because it is political in
nature. What is involved here is the
legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that
chamber in removing the petitioner from
the Commission on Appointments. The
term political question refers to those
questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
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full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality, of a particular measure.
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
PACU VS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
PROPER PARTY; JUSTICEABLE
CONTROVERSY
FACTS:The Philippine Association of
Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed
the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act No. 3075 and
Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws
sought to regulate the ownership of
private schools in the country. It is
provided by these laws that a permit
should first be secured from the Secretary
of Education before a person may be
granted the right to own and operate a
private school. This also gives the
Secretary of Education the discretion to
ascertain standards that must be followed
by private schools. It also provides that
the Secretary of Education can and may
ban certain textbooks from being used in
schools.

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PACU contends that the right of a citizen
to own and operate a school is guaranteed
by the Constitution, and any law requiring
previous governmental approval or
permit before such person could exercise
said right, amounts to censorship of
previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to
our system of law and government. PACU
also avers that such power granted to the
Secretary of Education is an undue
delegation of legislative power; that there
is undue delegation because the law did
not specify the basis or the standard upon
which the Secretary must exercise said
discretion; that the power to ban books
granted to the Secretary amounts to
censorship.
DOCTRINE:
PROPER PARTY
 A private individual
immediately in danger of
sustaining a direct injury as the
result of that action and is not
sufficient that he has merely a
general interest to invoke the
judicial power to determine the
validity of executive and
legislative action must show
that he has sustained or his
interest common to all
members of the public.
 “Courts will not pass upon the
constitutionality of a law” upon
the complaint of one who fails
to show that he is injured by its
operation.
 “The power of the courts to
declare a law unconstitutional
arises only when the interest of
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litigants require the use of that
judicial authority for their
protection against actual
interference, a hypothetical
threat being insufficient.”
 “Bona fide suit” – limited to the
decision of actual case and
controversies. The authority to
pass on the validity of statutes
is incidental to the decision of
such cases where conflicting
claims under the Constitution
and under a legislative act
assailed as contrary to the
Constitution are raised.
JUSTICEABLE CONTROVERSY
 Brought for a positive purpose,
nay , to obtain actual and
positive relief
 Courts do not sit to adjudicate
mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest herein
however intellectually solid the
problem may be.
MARIANO JR. VS COMELEC
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION ARE NOT
APPROPRIATE FOR JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION
FACTS: Juanito Mariano, a resident of
Makati, along with residents of Taguig
suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51
and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (“An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati
into a Highly Urbanized City to be known
as the City of Makati”). Another petition

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which contends the unconstitutionality of (PP1017) and is to be implemented by

R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law
Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and was aimed to suppress lawlessness and
concerned citizen. the connivance of extremists to bring
down the government.
DOCTRINE:
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION ARE NOT Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all
APPROPRIATE FOR JUDICIAL plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same
DETERMINATION time revoked all permits issued for
 The requisites before a litigant rallies and other public
can challenge the organization/meeting. Notwithstanding
constitutionality of a law are the cancellation of their rally permit,
well delineated. They are: Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf
i. There must be an actual David proceeded to rally which led to his
controversy; arrest.
ii. The question of
constitutionality must Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which
be raised by the proper Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided
party by the CIDG and they seized and
iii. The question of confiscated anti-GMA articles and write
constitutionality must ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA
be raised at the earliest news agency (Malaya) was raided and
opportunity; and seized. On the same day, Beltran of
iv. The decision on the Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest
constitutional question was however grounded on a warrant of
must be necessary to the arrest issued way back in 1985 for his
determination of the case actions against Marcos. His supporters
itself. cannot visit him in jail because of the
current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which

declared that the state of national
DAVID VS ARROYO emergency ceased to exist. David and
some opposition Congressmen averred
FACTS: In February 2006, due to the that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has
escape of some Magdalo members and the no factual basis and it cannot be validly
discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to declared by the president for such power
assassinate the president, then president is reposed in Congress. Also such
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) declaration is actually a declaration of
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
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that the emergency contemplated in the
Constitution are those of natural
calamities and that such is an
overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP
1017 is an overbreadth because it
encroaches upon protected and
unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued
that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP
1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP
1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017
is within the president’s calling out
power, take care power and take over
power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5
is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO
are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot
and academic by reason of the lifting of
the questioned PP. It is still in fact
operative because there are parties still
affected due to the alleged violation of the
said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition
of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP
1017 is constitutional in part and at the
same time some provisions of which are
unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the
following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual
Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove
that GMA has no factual basis in issuing
PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the
Solicitor General’s Consolidated
Comment and Memorandum shows a
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detailed narration of the events leading
to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the
Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of
the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements
from the communist leaders. There was
also the Minutes of the Intelligence
Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing
alliance between the NPA and the
military. Petitioners presented nothing
to refute such events. Thus, absent any
contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was
justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for
military aid. Indeed, judging the
seriousness of the incidents, GMA was
not expected to simply fold her arms and
do nothing to prevent or suppress what
she believed was lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. However, the
exercise of such power or duty must not
stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth
Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth
doctrine is an analytical tool developed
for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free
speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at
bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’
cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017
shows that it is not primarily directed to
speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP
to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence. Moreover, the

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overbreadth doctrine is not intended for
testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.’
Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are
considered ‘harmful’ and
‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are
entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only ‘spoken words’ and again, that
‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected
conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact
remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech,
which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out
Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the
Constitution, GMA declared PP
1017. The SC considered the President’s
‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom, it
stressed that ‘this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that
GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the
Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of
graduated powers. From the most to the
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least benign, these are: the calling-out
power, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
and the power to declare Martial Law.
The only criterion for the exercise of the
calling-out power is that ‘whenever it
becomes necessary,’ the President may
call the armed forces ‘to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.’ And such criterion has been
met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care
Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17,
Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.) the
president declared PP 1017. David et al
averred that PP 1017 however violated
Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it
arrogated legislative power to the
President. Such power is vested in
Congress. They assail the clause ‘to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to
all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction.’ The SC noted that such
provision is similar to the power that
granted former President Marcos
legislative powers (as provided in PP
1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP
1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants GMA the authority to promulgate
‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the
Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically
states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of

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Representatives.’ To be sure, neither tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of

Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify GMA’[s
exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees. The president can only “take
care” of the carrying out of laws but
cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over
Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the
taking over of private corporations or
institutions such as the Daily Tribune
without any authority from Congress. On
the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not
limited to natural calamities but rather it
also includes rebellion. The SC made a
distinction; the president can declare the
state of national emergency but her
exercise of emergency powers does not
come automatically after it for such
exercise needs authority from Congress.
The authority from Congress must be
based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other
emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited
period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to
such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be
exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP
1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a
Martial Law declaration and is not
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the calling out power of the president by
the president.
PORMENTO VS ESTRADA
ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL REQUISITES
FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW, THE EXISTENCE OF
AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
FACTS: Private respondent Joseph “Erap”
Ejercito Estrada was elected President of
the Republic of the Philippines in the
general elections held on May 11, 1998.
He was however ousted [“resigned”
according to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. No.
146738, March 2, 2001] from office and
was not able to finish his term. He sought
the presidency again in the general
elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner
Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed Erap’s
candidacy and filed a petition for the
latter’s disqualification, which was
however denied by the COMELEC
2nd Division. His motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied
by the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner filed the instant petition
for certiorari on May 7, 2010. However,
under the Rules of Court, the filing of such
petition would not stay the execution of
the judgment, final order or resolution of
the COMELEC that is sought to be
reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not even
pray for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary

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injunction. Hence, private respondent was

able to participate as a candidate for the
position of President in the May 10,
2010 elections where he garnered the
second highest number of votes.
DOCTRINE:
 As a rule, this Court may only
adjudicate actual, ongoing
controversies. The Court is
not empowered to decide moot
questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare
principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the result as to
the thing in issue in the case
before it. In other words, when
a case is moot, it becomes non-
justiciable.
 An action is considered “moot”
when it no longer presents a
justiciable controversy because
the issues involved have
become academic or dead or
when the matter in dispute has
already been resolved and
hence, one is not entitled to
judicial intervention unless the
issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties. There is
nothing for the court to resolve
as the determination thereof
has been overtaken by
subsequent events.
MACASIANO VS NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY
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REQUISITES OF JUDICAIL INQUIRY
FACTS: Petitioner seeks to have this
Court declare as unconstitutional Sections
28 and 44 of RA 7279, otherwise known
as the Urban Development and Housing
Act of 1992. He predicates his locus standi
on his being a consultant of the
Department of Public Works and
Highways pursuant to a Contract of
Consultancy on Operation for Removal of
Obstructions and Encroachments on
Properties of Public Domain and his being
a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that
said Sections 28 and 44 “contain the seeds
of a ripening controversy that serve as
drawback to his tasks and duties
regarding demolition of illegal structures,
because of the said sections, he is unable
to continue the demolition of illegal
structures which he assiduously and
faithfully carried out in the past. As a
taxpayer, he alleges that he has a direct
interest in seeing to it that public funds
are properly and lawfully disbursed.
On May 14, 1993, the SG filed his
comment to the petition. He maintains
that, the instant petition is devoid of merit
for non-compliance with the essential
requisites for the exercise of judicial
review in cases involving the
constitutionality of the law. He contends
that there is no actual controversy with
litigants asserting adverse legal rights or
interests, that the petitioner merely asks
for an advisory opinion, that the
petitioner is not the proper party to
question the Act as he does not state that

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he has property being squatted upon and Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr.,
that there is no showing that the question allowing Christie's of New York to auction
of constitutionality is the very lis mota off (82) Old Masters Paintings seized from
presented. He argues that Sections 28 and Malacañang and the Metropolitan
44 of the Act are not constitutionality Museum of Manila and the (71) cartons
infirm. of antique silverware in the custody of the
Central Bank of the Philippines, and such
DOCTRINE: other property as may subsequently be
REQUISITES OF JUDICAIL INQUIRY identified by PCGG and accepted by
i. There must be an actual CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions
controversy; of the agreement which were alleged to
ii. The question of be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late
constitutionality must President Marcos, his relatives and
be raised by the proper cronies for and in behalf of the Republic
party of the Philippines scheduled January
iii. The question of 11,1991.
constitutionality must On October 26,1990, Chairman
be raised at the earliest Eufemio C. Domingo of COA submitted to
opportunity; and President Aquino the audit result on the
iv. The decision on the Consignment Agreement that: (a) the
constitutional question authority of former PCGG Chairman
must be necessary to the Caparas to enter into the Consignment
determination of the case Agreement was of doubtful legality; (b)
itself. the contract was highly disadvantageous
 Judicial power is the right to to the government; (c) PCGG had a poor
determine actual controversies track record in asset disposal by auction
arising between adverse in the U.S.; and, (d) the assets subject of
litigants. auction were historical relics and had
cultural significance, hence, their disposal
was prohibited by law. Then the new
PCGG Chairman David M. Castro,
JOYA VS PCGG defended the contract made and refuting
the allegations of Chairman Domingo on
LEGAL STANDING November 15,1990. On that same date ,
Director of National Museum Gabriel S.
FACTS: On August 15,1990, Chairman Casal issued a certification that the items
Caparas of the PCGG, signed the subject of the Consignment Agreement
Consignment Agreement with the did not fall within the classification of
authority given by the President Aquino protected cultural properties and did not
on August 14,1990, through former specifically qualify as part of the Filipino
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cultural heritage. Hence the petition was
filed on January 7,1991.
DOCTRINE:
LEGAL STANDING
 NO question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a
law or governmental act may
be heard and decided by the
court UNLESS there is
compliance with the legal
requisites of judicial inquiry.
 The first two(2) requisites are
the most important among the
four
 One having no right or interest
to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as
party-plaintiff in an action,
 The Court will exercise its
power of judicial review only if
the case is brought before it by
a party who has legal standing
to raise the constitutional or
legal question.
 Legal Standing – a personal and
substantial interest in a case
such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being
challenged.
 Interest – material interest, an
interest in issue to be affected
by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the
question involve, or mere
incidental interest. Moreover,
the interest of the party
plaintiff must be personal and
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not one based on a desire to
vindicate the constitutional
right os f some third and
unrelated party.
LEGASPI VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FACTS: Citizen Valentin Legaspi requested
from the Civil Service Commission
information on the civil service
eligibilities of sanitarian employees in the
Health Department of Cebu City. The
Commission rejected the request,
asserting that Legaspi was not entitled to
the information. Legaspi instituted an
action for mandamus from the Court to
require that the information be provided.
HELD: The Court began by noting that
both the 1973 (Art. IV, Sec. 6) and 1987
(Art. III, Sec. 7) constitutions recognize
the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. Further, they
specify that information shall be
provided, subject only to limitations
provided by law. While the Solicitor
General interposed a procedural objection
challenging the requester’s standing in
this petition for mandamus, the Court
ruled that, in this case, the people are
regarded as the “real party in interest”
and the requester, as a citizen interested
in the execution of the laws, did not need
to show any legal or special interest in the
result.
Further, government agencies have no
discretion to refuse disclosure of, or

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access to, information of public concern
because the Constitution guarantees
access to information of public concern, a
recognition of the essentiality of the free
flow of ideas and information in a
democracy. That is, the government
agency denying information access has
the burden to show that the information
is not of public concern, or, if it is of public
concern, that the information has been
exempted by law from the operation of
the guarantee.
Here, the information was of a public
concern because it is the legitimate
concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil
service eligibility are occupied only by
eligible persons, and the Civil Service
Commission failed to cite any law limiting
the requester’s right to know. Thus, the
Court ordered the Civil Service
Commission to provide the information.
DUMLAO VS COMELEC
FACTS: Patricio Dumlao was the former
governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has
already retired from his office and he has
been receiving retirement benefits
therefrom. In 1980, he filed for reelection
to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law
provides, among others, that retirees
from public office like Dumlao are
disqualified to run for office. Dumlao
assailed the law averring that it is class
legislation hence unconstitutional. In
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general, Dumlao invoked equal protection
in the eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo
Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two
however have different issues. The suits
of Igot and Salapantan are more of a
taxpayer’s suit assailing the other
provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of
office of the elected officials, the length of
the campaign, and the provision which
bars persons charged for crimes from
running for public office as well as the
provision that provides that the mere
filing of complaints against them after
preliminary investigation would already
disqualify them from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and
Salapantan have a cause of action.
HELD: No. The SC pointed out the
procedural lapses of this case for this case
should have never been merged. Dumlao’s
issue is different from Igot’s. They have
separate issues. Further, this case does
not meet all the requisites so that it’d be
eligible for judicial review. There are
standards that have to be followed in the
exercise of the function of judicial review,
namely: (1) the existence of an
appropriate case; (2) an interest personal
and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that
the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that
the constitutional question be passed
upon in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was
met.

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at ages, say below 65. It may neither be

The SC ruled however that the provision
barring persons charged for crimes may
not run for public office and that the filing
of complaints against them and after
preliminary investigation would already
disqualify them from office as null and
void. The assertion that BP 52 is contrary
to the safeguard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws
is subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and
real differentiations, one class can be
treated and regulated differently from
another class. For purposes of public
service, employees 65 years of age, have
been validly classified differently from
younger employees. Employees attaining
that age are subject to compulsory
retirement, while those of younger ages
are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or
municipal positions, to require that
candidates should not be more than 65
years of age at the time they assume
office, if applicable to everyone, might or
might not be a reasonable classification
although, as the Solicitor General has
intimated, a good policy of the law should
be to promote the emergence of younger
blood in our political elective echelons. On
the other hand, it might be that persons
more than 65 years old may also be good
elective local officials. Retirement from
government service may or may not be a
reasonable disqualification for elective
local officials. For one thing, there can
also be retirees from government service
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reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65,
for a 65-year old retiree could be a good
local official just like one, aged 65, who is
not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective
local official (Dumalo), who has retired
from a provincial, city or municipal office,
there is reason to disqualify him from
running for the same office from which he
had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision.
BUGNAY CONSTRUCTION & DEV’T
CORP. VS LARON
FACTS: A lease contract between the City
of Dagupan and P & M Agro was executed
for the use of a city lot called the
Magsaysay Market Area. Subsequently,
the City filed a case to rescind the contract
due to the failure of P&M to comply with
the lease contract conditions. Thereafter,
the City issued a resolution granting the
lease of said lot to the petitioner Bugnay
COnstruction for the establishment of a
Magsaysay Market building. As a result,
respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's
suit against the City assailing the validity
of the lease contract between the
petitioner and the city. Ravanzo was the
counsel of P&M Agro in the earlier case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is
the real party in interest
HELD: No. The Court held that the

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respondent has no standing to file the
case. There was no disbursement of
public funds involved in this case since it
is the petitioner, a private party which
will fund the planned construction of the
market building.
KILOSBAYAN, INC. VS GUINGONA
FACTS: This is a special civil action for
prohibition and injunction, with a prayer
for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction which seeks to
prohibit and restrain the implementation
of the Contract of Lease executed by the
PCSO and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation in connection
with the on-line lottery system, also know
as lotto.
Petitioners strongly opposed the setting
up of the on-line lottery system on the
basis of serious moral and ethical
considerations. It submitted that said
contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A.
No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42.
Respondents contended, among others,
that, the contract does not violate the
Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the
issues of wisdom, morality and propriety
of acts of the executive department are
beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and
that the petitioners have no standing to
maintain the instant suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have
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the legal standing to file the instant
petition.
HELD: YES. As to the preliminary issue,
the Court resolved to set aside the
procedural technicality in view of the
importance of the issues raised. The Court
adopted the liberal policy on locus standi
to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members
of Congress, and even association of
planters, and non-profit civic
organizations to initiate and prosecute
actions to question the validity or
constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions,
or rulings of various government agencies
or instrumentalities.
PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of
RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of
1994.
GAA contains a special provision that
allows any members of the Congress the
REalignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses, provided that the total of said
allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives are the ones authorized
under the Constitution to realign savings,
not the individual members of Congress
themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes
certain provisions of the law and imposed
certain provisional conditions: that the
AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use

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savings to augment the pension funds
under the Retirement and Separation
Benefits of the AFP.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House
are allowed to approve the realignment.
HELD: Yes. Only the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House are allowed to
approve the realignment. Furthermore,
two conditions must be met: 1) the funds
to be realigned are actually savings, and
2) the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the items of expenditures to
which said transfer to be made.
TATAD VS GARCIA, JR.
FACTS:
In 1989, the government planned
to build a railway transit line along EDSA.
No bidding was made but certain
corporations were invited to prequalify.
The only corporation to qualify was the
EDSA LRT Consortium which was
obviously formed for this particular
undertaking. An agreement was then
made between the government, through
the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC), and EDSA LRT
Consortium. The agreement was based on
the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme
provided for by law (RA 6957, amended
by RA 7718). Under the agreement, EDSA
LRT Consortium shall build the facilities,
i.e., railways, and shall supply the train
cabs. Every phase that is completed shall
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be turned over to the DOTC and the latter
shall pay rent for the same for 25 years.
By the end of 25 years, it was projected
that the government shall have fully paid
EDSA LRT Consortium. Thereafter, EDSA
LRT Consortium shall sell the facilities to
the government for $1.00.
However, Senators Francisco
Tatad, John Osmeña, and Rodolfo Biazon
opposed the implementation of said
agreement as they averred that EDSA LRT
Consortium is a foreign corporation as it
was organized under Hongkong laws; that
as such, it cannot own a public utility such
as the EDSA railway transit because this
falls under the nationalized areas of
activities. The petition was filed against
Jesus Garcia, Jr. in his capacity as DOTC
Secretary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition shall
prosper.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court made a
clarification. The SC ruled that EDSA LRT
Consortium, under the agreement, does
not and will not become the owner of a
public utility hence, the question of its
nationality is misplaced. It is true that a
foreign corporation cannot own a public
utility but in this case what EDSA LRT
Consortium will be owning are the
facilities that it will be building for the
EDSA railway project. There is no
prohibition against a foreign corporation
to own facilities used for a public utility.
Further, it cannot be said that EDSA LRT
Consortium will be the one operating the
public utility for it will be DOTC that will
operate the railway transit. DOTC will be

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the one exacting fees from the people for

the use of the railway and from the
proceeds, it shall be paying the rent due
to EDSA LRT Consortium. All that EDSA
LRT Consortium has to do is to build the
facilities and receive rent from the use
thereof by the government for 25 years –
it will not operate the railway transit.
Although EDSA LRT Consortium is a
corporation formed for the purpose of
building a public utility it does not
automatically mean that it is operating a
public utility. The moment for
determining the requisite Filipino
nationality is when the entity applies for a
franchise, certificate or any other form of
authorization for that purpose.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a
cause of action.
HELD: Yes, petitioners have a cause of
action. The case at bar is of common
interest to all Filipinos. The right to a
balanced and healthy ecology carries with
it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. The said right
implies the judicious management of the
country’s forests. This right is also the
mandate of the government through
DENR. A denial or violation of that right
by the other who has the correlative duty
or obligation to respect or protect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. All
licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action.

OPOSA VS FACTORAN

FACTS: A taxpayer’s class suit was KILOSBAYAN VS MORATO

initiated by the Philippine Ecological
Network Incorporated (PENI) together FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC
with the minors Oposa and their parents. signed an Equipment Lease Agreement
All were duly represented. They claimed (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery
that as taxpayers they have the right to equipment and accessories to PCSO.
the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of
natural resources of the country’s ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal
rainforests. They prayed that a judgment annually). 30% of the net receipts is
be rendered ordering Honorable Factoran allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8
Jr, his agents, representatives and other years. PCSO is to employ its own
persons acting in his behalf to cancel all personnel and responsible for the
existing timber license agreements in the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease,
country and cease and desist from PCSO may purchase the equipment for
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was
or approving new timber license filed to declare ELA invalid because it is
agreements. the same as the Contract of Lease
Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to
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the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of second proceeding involves an

PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law
regarding public bidding. It violates Sec.
2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution.
Standing can no longer be questioned
because it has become the law of the case
Respondent's reply: ELA is different from
the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding
required. The power to determine if ELA
is advantageous is vested in the Board of
Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have
funds. Petitioners seek to further their
moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a
legal standing because they were not
parties to the contract
instrument or transaction identical with,
but in a form separable from the one dealt
with in the first proceeding, the Court is
free in the second proceeding to make an
independent examination of the legal
matters at issue. Since ELA is a different
contract, the previous decision does not
preclude determination of the petitioner's
standing. STANDING is a concept in
constitutional law and here no
constitutional question is actually
involved. The more appropriate issue is
whether the petitioners are REAL
PARTIES in INTEREST.

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners

have standing.
LOZADA VS COMELEC
HELD: NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply.
The previous ruling sustaining the FACTS: Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada together
standing of the petitioners is a departure with Romeo Igot filed a petition for
mandamus compelling the Commission
in interest because no constitutional on Elections (COMELEC) to hold an
issues were actually involved. LAW OF election to fill the vacancies in the Interim
THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor
present case is not the same one litigated their contention on Section 5 (2), Art. VIII
by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any
sense be regarded as the law of this case. NOTE: In case a vacancy arises in
The parties are the same but the cases are the Batasang Pambansa eighteen
not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot months or more before a regular
still apply. An issue actually and directly election, the Commission on
passed upon and determine in a former Election shall call a special election
suit cannot again be drawn in question in to be held within sixty (60) days
any future action between the same after the vacancy occurs to elect the
parties involving a different cause of Member to serve the unexpired
action. But the rule does not apply to term.
issues of law at least when substantially
unrelated claims are involved. When the
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COMELEC opposed the petition alleging
that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the
instant petition for they are not the
proper parties to institute the action; 2)
the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition; and 3) Section 5(2),
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does
not apply to the Interim Batasan
Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel
COMELEC to hold a special election to fill
vacancies in the legislature.
HELD: No. The SC’s jurisdiction over the
COMELEC is only to review by certiorari
the latter’s decision, orders or rulings.
This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C,
Section 11 of the New Constitution which
reads:
the purpose, and this power of the BP
may neither be subject to mandamus by
the courts much less may COMELEC
compel the BP to exercise its power of
appropriation. From the role BP has to
play in the holding of special elections,
which is to appropriate the funds for the
expenses thereof, it would seem that the
initiative on the matter must come from
the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the
vacancies would occur in the regular not
IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole
and exclusive prerogative of the
legislative body, the exercise of which
may not be compelled through a petition
for mandamus. What is more, the
provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of
the Constitution was intended to apply to
vacancies in the regular National
Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.

Any decision, order, or ruling of the

Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the
aggrieved party within thirty days power to define, prescribe, and apportion
from his receipt of a copy thereof. the jurisdiction of various courts but may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its
There is in this case no decision, order or jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to Section 5 hereof.
be reviewed by this Court under its
certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in No law shall be passed reorganizing the
the aforequoted provision, which is the Judiciary when it undermines the security
only known provision conferring of tenure of its Members.
jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme
Court over the COMELEC. It is obvious MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS INC VS CA
that the holding of special elections in
several regional districts where vacancies FACTS: MSI entered into an 4 interim
exist, would entail huge expenditure of lease agreement with DBP, owner of
money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) Bayview Plaza Hotel, where it would
can make the necessary appropriation for operate the hotel for a minimum of 3
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months or until such time that the said
properties are sold to MSI or other 3rd
parties by DBP. The Bayview Hotel was
subsequently identified for privatization
under Proclamation No. 50 and was
consequently transferred from DBP to
Asset Privatization Trust for disposition.
The DBP notified MSI that it was
terminating the interim lease agreement
to effect the disposition of the property.
The APT granted the President of MSI's
condition an extension of 30 days within
which to effect the delivery of the
Bayview Hotel to APT.
However, MSI sent a letter to APT stating
that in their opinion, having leased the
property for more than 1 year the
agreement is long term in character and
MSI have acquired preference in buying
the property, while emphasizing that MSI
has a legal lien on the property because of
its advances for the hotel operations and
repairs which amounted to P12 Million.
APT answered MSI saying that there was
no agreement to that effect. The bidding
took place but MSI did not participate.
Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina Uy
Gongco Corporation were awarded the
property as the highest bidder for P85
Million. MSI filed a complaint with
injunction on awarding and transfer of
the property to the winning bidders. Trial
court granted, but the CA reversed the
trial court ruling for being violative to Sec
1 of Proclamation No. 50: "No court or
administrative agency shall issue any
restraining order or injunction against the
trust in connection with the acquisition,
sale or disposition of assets transferred to
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it. Nor shall such order or injunction be
issued against any purchaser of assets
sold by the Trust to prevent such
purchaser from taking possession of any
assets purchased by him."
The CA rejected the TC's opinion that said
proclamation is unconstitutional, rather it
up held that it continues to be operative
after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution by virtue of Section 3
Art.XVIII. It also noted that MSI has not
been deprived of its property rights since
those rights are non-existent and its only
property right was the alleged
reimbursable advances made to DBP,
which it may sue to collect in a separate
action. It further held that the issuance of
writ of preliminary injunction by the
lower court against APT may not be
justified as a valid exercise of judicial
power for MSI does not have a legally
demandable and enforceable right of
retention over the said property.
DOCTRINE:
THE CONGRESS HAS THE POWER TO
DEFINE THE EXTENT OF JURISDICTION
OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE
 The power to define, prescribe,
prescribe and appropriation of
the venue court belongs to the
legislature, except that it may
not be deprive the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction over
cases enumerated in Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution.
 While the judicial power may
appear to be pervasive, the
truth is that under the system

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of separation of powers set up FACTS: The Iloilo State College of

in the Constitution, the power
of the courts over the other
branches and instrumentalities
of the Government is limited
only to the determination of
“WON there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction”
I the exercise of their authority
and in the performance of their
assigned tasks.
 Courts may not substitute their
judgment for that of the APT,
nor block, by an injunction, the
discharge of its functions and
the implementation of its
decision in connection with the
acquisition, sale or disposition
of assets transferred to it.
 There can be no justification
for judicial interference in the
business of an administrative
agency, except when it violates
a citizen’s constitutional rights,
or commits a grave abuse of
discretion, or acts in excess of
or without jurisdiction.
MA. ELENA MALAGA, ET. AL. VS.
MANUEL R. PENACHOS, JR., ET.AL.
GR NO. 86995 03
SEPTEMBER 1992
Chartered Institution and GOCC,
defined.
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Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-
qualifications, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) caused the publication
in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988
issues of the Western Visayas Daily an
Invitation to Bid for the construction of a
Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The
notice announced that the last day for the
submission of pre-qualification
requirements was on December 2, 1988,
and that the bids would be received and
opened on December 12, 1988 at 3
o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing
business under the name of BE
Construction and Best Built Construction,
respectively, submitted their pre-
qualification documents at two o'clock in
the afternoon of December 2,
1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his
own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All
three of them were not allowed to
participate in the bidding as their
documents were considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners
filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC
against the officers of PBAC for their
refusal without just cause to accept them
resulting to their non-inclusion in the list
of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to
the resetting of the December 12, 1988
bidding and the acceptance of their
documents. They also asked that if the
bidding had already been conducted, the
defendants be directed not to award the
project pending resolution of their
complaint.

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term includes regulatory agencies,

On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued
a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and award the
project. The defendants filed a motion to
lift the restraining order on the ground
that the court is prohibited from issuing
such order, preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction in
government infrastructure project under
Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended
that the preliminary injunction had
become moot and academic as it was
served after the bidding had been
awarded and closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted
the restraining order and denied the
petition for preliminary injunction. It
declared that the building sought to be
constructed at the ISCOF was an
infrastructure project of the government
falling within the coverage of the subject
law.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a
government instrumentality subject to
the provisions of PD 1818?
RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code
defines a government instrumentality as
follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of
the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested
with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This
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chartered institutions, and government-
owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2
(5) Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered
institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any
agency organized or operating under a
special charter, and vested by law with
functions relating to specific
constitutional policies or objectives. This
term includes the state universities and
colleges, and the monetary authority of
the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory
Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that
ISCOF is a chartered institution and is
therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter
that ISCOF is a government
instrumentality. First, it was created in
pursuance of the integrated fisheries
development policy of the State, a priority
program of the government to effect the
socio-economic life of the nation. Second,
the Treasurer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall also be the ex-officio
Treasurer of the state college with its
accounts and expenses to be audited by
the Commission on Audit or its duly
authorized representative. Third, heads of
bureaus and offices of the National
Government are authorized to loan or
transfer to it, upon request of the
president of the state college, such
apparatus, equipment, or supplies and
even the services of such employees as

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can be spared without serious detriment There is a matter of greater consequence

to public service. Lastly, an additional
amount of P1.5M had been appropriated
out of the funds of the National Treasury
and it was also decreed in its charter that
the funds and maintenance of the state
college would henceforth be included in
the General Appropriations Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically
follow that ISCOF is covered by the
prohibition in the said decree as there are
irregularities present surrounding the
transaction that justified the injunction
issued as regards to the bidding and the
award of the project (citing the case of
Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
SECTION 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary
may not be reduced by the legislature
below the amount appropriated for the
previous year and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released.
Section 3
THE VETO POWER CANNOT BE
EXERCISED TO DEPRIVE THE SUPREME
COURT ITS FISCAL AUTONOMY
arising from this petition. The attempt to
use the veto power to set aside a
Resolution of this Court and to deprive
retirees of benefits given them by Rep. Act
No. 1797 trenches upon the constitutional
grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
We cannot overstress the importance of
and the need for an independent
judiciary. The Court has on various past
occasions explained the significance of
judicial independence. As envisioned in
the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy
enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit,
the Commission on Elections, and the
Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a
guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and
utilize their resources with the wisdom
and dispatch that their needs require. It
recognizes the power and authority to
levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding the highest
rates authorized by law for compensation
and play plans of the government and
allocate and disburse such sums as may
be provided by law or prescribed by them
in the course of the discharge of their
functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from
outside control. If the Supreme Court says
it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules
we need only 10 typewriters and sends its
recommendations to Congress without
even informing us, the autonomy given by
the Constitution becomes an empty and
illusory platitude.

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The Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman must
have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of
restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is
anathema to fiscal autonomy and
violative not only of the express mandate
of the Constitution but especially as
regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers
upon which the entire fabric of our
constitutional system is based. In the
interest of comity and cooperation, the
Supreme Court, Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman have
so far limited their objections to constant
reminders. We now agree with the
petitioners that this grant of autonomy
should cease to be a meaningless
provision. [Bengzon vs. Drilon, G.R. No.
103524, April 15, 1992]
BENGZON VS DRILON
FACTS: In 1990, Congress sought to
reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act
No. 1797) that were “repealed” during the
time of former President Ferdinand
Marcos. These old laws provided certain
retirement benefits to retired judges,
justices, and members of the
constitutional commissions. Congress felt
a need to restore these laws in order to
standardize retirement benefits among
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government officials. However, President
Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House
Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law
should not give preferential treatment to
certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and
justices filed a petition with the Supreme
Court asking the court to readjust their
pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797
was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644)
because the said PD was one of those
unpublished PDs which were subject of
the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the
repealing law never existed due to non-
publication and in effect, RA 1797 was
never repealed. The Supreme Court then
readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment
and son in the General Appropriations Bill
(GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted
additional budget for pensions of retired
justices. Congress however did the
allotment in the following manner:
Congress made an item entitled: “General
Fund Adjustment”; included therein are
allotments to unavoidable obligations in
different branches of the government;
among such obligations is the allotment
for the pensions of retired justices of the
judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed
the said lines which provided for the
pensions of the retired justices in the
judiciary in the GAB. She explained that
that portion of the GAB is already deemed
vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297. This
prompted Cesar Bengzon and several
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other retired judges and justices constitutional duties. The

to question the constitutionality of the
veto made by the President. The
President was represented by then
Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
DOCTRINE:
THE VETO POWER OF THE PRESIDENT
CANNOT B EEXERCISED TO DEPRIVE
THE SUPREME COURTOF ITS FISCAL
AUTHORITY
 The fiscal authority enjoyed by
the Judiciary, Civil Service
Commission, the Commission
on Audit, the Commission on
Elections, and the Office of the
Ombudsman contemplates a
guarantee of full flexibility to
allocate and utilize their
resources with the wisdom and
dispatch that their needs
require.
 It recognizes the power and
authority to levy, assess and
collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding
the highest rates authorized by
law for compensation and play
plans of the government and
allocate and disburse such
sums as may be provided by
law or prescribed by them in
the course of the discharge of
their functions.
 The Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman must have
the independence and
flexibility needed in the
discharge of their
imposition of restrictions and
constraints on the manner the
independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the
funds appropriated for their
operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy
 Interference with this fiscal
autonomy is not only a
violation of a mandate of the
Constitution but as well as the
principle of Separation of
Powers upon which the entire
fabric of the constitutional
system is based.
SECTION 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in
its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality
of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be heard by
the Supreme Court en banc, and all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including
those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential
decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members

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who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division
shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted thereon,
and in no case, without the concurrence of
at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case
shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the court in a decision rendered en banc or
in division may be modified or reversed
except by the court sitting en banc.
Section 4
Justice Regalado, the third in line. We
need only to state that the change in the
membership of the three divisions of the
Court with inevitable by reason of Mr.
Justice Feliciano's retirement. Such
reorganization is purely an internal
matter of the Court to which petitioner
certainly has no business at all. In fact, the
current "staggered" set-up in the
chairmanships of the Divisions is similar
to that adopted in 1988. In the year, the
Court's Third Division was likewise
chaired by then Chief Justice Fernan,
while the First and Second Divisions were
headed by the next senior Justices —
Narvasa and Melencio-Herrera,
respectively. [Limketkai Sons Milling,
Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 118509, September
5, 1996]

COMPOSITION OF THE DIVISIONS OF

THE SUPREME COURT IS INTERNAL IN LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING, INC. vs.
CHARACTER COURT OF APPEALS
What petitioner bewails the most is the (GR. NO. 118509 September 5, 1996)
present composition of the Third Division
which deliberated on private FACTS: Involved in the instant case is the
respondents' motions for reconsideration Motion of petitioner Limketkai Sons
and by a majority vote reversed the Milling, Inc., for reconsideration of the
unanimous decision of December 1, 1995. Court's resolution of March 29, 1996,
More specifically, petitioner questions the which set aside the Court's December 1,
assumption of Chief Justice Narvasa of the 1995 decision and affirmed in toto the
chairmanship of the Third Division and Court of Appeals' decision dated August
arrogantly rams its idea on how each 12, 1994. It is argued, albeit erroneously,
Division should be chaired, i.e., the First that the case should be referred to the
Division should have been chaired by Court En Banc as the doctrines laid down
Chief Justice Narvasa, the Second Division in Abrenica v. Gonda and De Garcia, 34
by Mr. Justice Padilla, the next senior Phil. 739, Talosig v. Vda. de Nieba, 43
Justice, and the Third Division by Mr. SCRA 473, and Villonco Realty Co. v.
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Bormaheco, Inc., et al., 65 SCRA 352,have
been modified or reversed. A more
circumspect analysis of these cases vis-a-
vis the case at bench would inevitably
lead petitioner to the conclusion that
there was neither reversal nor
modification of the doctrines laid down in
the Abrenica, Talosig and Villonco cases.
What petitioner bewails the most is the
present composition of the Third Division
which deliberated on private
respondents' motions for reconsideration
and by a majority vote reversed the
unanimous decision of December 1, 1995.
More specifically, petitioner questions the
assumption of Chief Justice Narvasa of the
chairmanship of the Third Division and
arrogantly rams its idea on how each
Division should be chaired, i.e., the First
Division should have been chaired by
Chief Justice Narvasa, the Second Division
by Mr. Justice Padilla, the next senior
Justice, and the Third Division by Mr.
Justice Regalado, the third in line.
year, the Court's Third Division was
likewise chaired by then Chief Justice
Fernan, while the First and Second
Divisions were headed by the next senior
Justices — Justices Narvasa and Melencio-
Herrera, respectively.
Suffice it to say that the Court with its
new membership is not obliged to follow
blindly a decision upholding a party's case
when, after its re-examination, the same
calls for a rectification. "Indeed", said the
Court in Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato, et al.,
250 SCRA 130, 136, "a change in the
composition of the Court could prove the
means of undoing an erroneous decision".
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL –
ARROYO G.R. No. 191002, March 17,
2010

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of FACTS: The compulsory retirement of

petitioner as to the composition of the Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
third division meritorious. 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
HELD: NO. We need only to stress that the These cases trace their genesis to the
change in the membership of the three controversy that has arisen from the
divisions of the Court was inevitable by forthcoming compulsory retirement of
reason of Mr. Justice Feliciano's Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
retirement. Such reorganization is purely seven days after the presidential election.
an internal matter of the Court to which Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section
petitioner certainly has no business at all. 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled
In fact, the current "staggered" set-up in within ninety days from the occurrence
the chairmanships of the Divisions is thereof” from a “list of at least three
similar to that adopted in 1988. In that nominees prepared by the Judicial and
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Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also
considering that Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making
appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January
18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief
Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the
JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most
senior of the Associate Justices of the
Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio
T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C.
Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last
two declined their nomination through
letters dated January 18, 2010 and
January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent
President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
does not apply to appointments in the
Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy
in the Supreme Court must be filled
within 90 days from its occurrence,
pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution; that had the framers
intended the prohibition to apply to
Supreme Court appointments, they could
have easily expressly stated so in the
Constitution, which explains why the
prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article
VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII
ample restrictions or limitations on the
President’s power to appoint members of
the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from “political vicissitudes”
and its “insulation from political
pressures,” such as stringent
qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified
period within which the President shall
appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by
the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an
insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so
once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of
course, whether the JBC may resume its
process until the short list is prepared, in
view of the provision of Section 4(1),
Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires
the President to appoint one from the
short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or
an Associate Justice) within 90 days from
the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President

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can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII
does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are
seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII
(Judicial Department), states: Section 4.
(1). The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in
its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they
could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily
and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they
could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily
and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.

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Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are
obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to
appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments
within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that
every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context,
i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume
that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and
Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to
cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention
in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear,
would have easily and surely inserted a
similar prohibition in Article VIII, most
likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL,
Petitioner, v. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondent.
Nachura, J.:
FACTS: Atty. Romulo Macalintal
questions the constitutionality of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal(PET) as an
illegal and unauthorized progeny of
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Section 4,Article VII of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether the creation of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional for
being a violation of paragraph 7, Section 4
of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
Whether the designation of members of
the supreme court as members of the
presidential electoral tribunal is
unconstitutional for being a violation of
Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution
HELD:
Constitutional Law
First Issue: Petitioner, a prominent
election lawyer who has filed several
cases before this Court involving
constitutional and election law issues,
including, among others, the
constitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003),cannot claim ignorance of: (1) the
invocation of our jurisdiction under
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution;
and (2) the unanimous holding thereon.
Unquestionably, theoverarching
frameworkaffirmed inTecson v.
Commission on Electionsis that the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
decide presidential and vice-presidential
election protests while
concurrentlyacting as an independent
Electoral Tribunal.

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Verba legisdictates that wherever
possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms
are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them
prevails. However, where there is
ambiguity or doubt, the words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers
orratio legis et anima. A doubtful
provision must be examined in light of the
history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances surrounding the framing of
the Constitution. Last,ut magis valeat
quam pereat the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole.
By the same token, the PET is not a
separate and distinct entity from the
Supreme Court, albeit it has functions
peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious
that the PET was constituted in
implementation of Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution, and it faithfully complies
not unlawfully defies the constitutional
directive. The adoption of a separate seal,
as well as the change in the nomenclature
of the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices into Chairman and Members of
the Tribunal, respectively, was designed
simply to highlight the singularity and
exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a
special electoral court. the PET, as
intended by the framers of the
Constitution, is to be an
institutionindependent,but not separate,
from the judicial department,i.e., the
Supreme Court.
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Second Issue: It is also beyond cavil that
when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves
a presidential or vice-presidential
election contest, it performs what is
essentially a judicial power. In the
landmark case ofAngara v. Electoral
Commission,Justice Jose P. Laurel
enucleated that "it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to
direct the course of government along
constitutional channels." In
fact,Angarapointed out that "[t]he
Constitution is a definition of the powers
of government." And yet, at that time, the
1935 Constitution did not contain the
expanded definition of judicial power
found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph
2 of the present Constitution.
DENIED
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have
the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases
affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law

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or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality
or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any
tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.
courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of
the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any Section 5

lower court is in issue.
TRIAL COURT MUST BE CAREFUL IN
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty DECIDING CONSTITUTIONAL
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. QUESTIONS
We stress at the outset that the lower
(e) All cases in which only an error or court had jurisdiction to consider the
question of law is involved. constitutionality of Section 187, this
authority being embraced in the general
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower definition of the judicial power to
courts to other stations as public interest determine what are the valid and binding
may require. Such temporary assignment laws by the criterion of their conformity
shall not exceed six months without the to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP
consent of the judge concerned. 129 vests in the regional trial courts
jurisdiction over all civil cases in which
(4) Order a change of venue or place of the subject of the litigation is incapable of
trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. pecuniary estimation, even as the accused
in a criminal action has the right to
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the question in his defense the
protection and enforcement of constitutionality of a law he is charged
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, with violating and of the proceedings
and procedure in all courts, the admission taken against him, particularly as they
to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution
Such rules shall provide a simplified and vests in the Supreme Court appellate
inexpensive procedure for the speedy jurisdiction over final judgments and
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all orders of lower courts in all cases in
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which the constitutionality or validity of discharge of the duty it cannot escape,

any treaty, international or executive that the challenged act must be struck
agreement, law, presidential decree, down. [Drilon vs. Lim, G.R. No. 112497,
proclamation, order, instruction, August 4, 1994]
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower RULES OF COURT WILL TAKE

courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the
consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of
laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. As the questioned
act is usually the handiwork of the
legislative or the executive departments,
or both, it will be prudent for such courts,
if only out of a becoming modesty, to
defer to the higher judgment of this Court
in the consideration of its validity, which
is better determined after a thorough
deliberation by a collegiate body and with
the concurrence of the majority of those
who participated in its discussion.
It is also emphasized that every court,
including this Court, is charged with the
duty of a purposeful hesitation before
declaring a law unconstitutional, on the
theory that the measure was first
carefully studied by the executive and the
legislative departments and determined
by them to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally
approved. To doubt is to sustain. The
presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the clearest showing
that there was indeed an infraction of the
Constitution, and only when such a
conclusion is reached by the requipped
majority may the Court pronounce, in the
PRECEDENCE OVER LAWS ON
MATTERS OF PROCEDURE
The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226
cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-
91 because the former grants a
substantive right which, under the
Constitution cannot be modified,
diminished or increased by this Court in
the exercise of its rule-making powers is
not entirely defensible as it seems.
Respondent correctly argued that Article
82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal
from decisions or final orders of the BOI
and in granting such right, it also
provided where and in what manner such
appeal can be brought. These latter
portions simply deal with procedural
aspects which this Court has the power to
regulate by virtue of its constitutional
rule-making powers.
Indeed, the question of where and in what
manner appeals from decisions of the BOI
should be brought pertains only to
procedure or the method of enforcing the
substantive right to appeal granted by
E.O. 226. In other words, the right to
appeal from decisions or final orders of
the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and
continues to be respected. Circular 1-91
simply transferred the venue of appeals
from decisions of this agency to
respondent Court of Appeals and

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provided a different period of appeal, i.e.,
fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not
make an incursion into the substantive
right to appeal. [First Lepanto Ceramics,
Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 110571, March 10,
1994]
COMELEC CANNOT PROMULGATE
RULES GOVERNING PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE COURTS OF JUSTICE
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC
cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing
of certain pleadings in the regular courts.
The power to promulgate rules
concerning pleadings, practice and
procedure in all courts is vested on the
Supreme Court.
DRILON VS. LIM
(GR. NO. 112497 AUGUST 4, 1994)
FACTS:
The principal issue in this case is the
constitutionality of Section 187 of the
Local Government Code reading as
follows: Procedure For Approval And
Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And
Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public
Hearings. — The procedure for approval
of local tax ordinances and revenue
measures shall be in accordance with the
provisions of this Code: Provided, That
public hearings shall be conducted for the
purpose prior to the enactment thereof;
Provided, further, That any question on
the constitutionality or legality of tax
ordinances or revenue measures may be
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raised on appeal within thirty (30) days
from the effectivity thereof to the
Secretary of Justice who shall render a
decision within sixty (60) days from the
date of receipt of the appeal: Provided,
however, That such appeal shall not have
the effect of suspending the effectivity of
the ordinance and the accrual and
payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied
therein: Provided, finally, That within
thirty (30) days after receipt of the
decision or the lapse of the sixty-day
period without the Secretary of Justice
acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved
party may file appropriate proceedings
with a court of competent jurisdiction.
Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice
had, on appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer, declared
Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as
the Manila Revenue Code, null and void
for noncompliance with the prescribed
procedure in the enactment of tax
ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public
policy.
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City
of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of
Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution
and sustained the ordinance, holding
inter alia that the procedural
requirements had been observed. More
importantly, it declared Section 187 of the
Local Government Code as
unconstitutional because of its vesture in
the Secretary of Justice of the power of
control over local governments in
violation of the policy of local autonomy

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mandated in the Constitution and of the
specific provision therein conferring on
the President of the Philippines only the
power of supervision over local
governments. The Secretary argues that
the annulled Section 187 is constitutional
and that the procedural requirements for
the enactment of tax ordinances as
specified in the Local Government Code
had indeed not been observed.
Parenthetically, this petition was
originally dismissed by the Court for non-
compliance with Circular 1-88, the
Solicitor General having failed to submit a
certified true copy of the challenged
decision. However, on motion for
reconsideration with the required
certified true copy of the decision
attached, the petition was reinstated in
view of the importance of the issues
raised therein.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the RTC of Manila has
jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of Section 187 of the
Local Government Code.
(2) Whether or not the Supreme Court
has appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments and orders of lower courts.
HELD: Yes to both. We stress at the outset
that the lower court had jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of Section
187, this authority being embraced in the
general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding
laws by the criterion of their conformity
to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP
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129 vests in the regional trial courts
jurisdiction over all civil cases in which
the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, even as the accused
in a criminal action has the right to
question in his defense the
constitutionality of a law he is charged
with violating and of the proceedings
taken against him, particularly as they
contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover,
Article VIII, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution vests in the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments and orders of lower courts in
all cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower
courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the
consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of
laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. As the questioned
act is usually the handiwork of the
legislative or the executive departments,
or both, it will be prudent for such courts,
if only out of a becoming modesty, to
defer to the higher judgment of this Court
in the consideration of its validity, which
is better determined after a thorough
deliberation by a collegiate body and with
the concurrence of the majority of those
who participated in its discussion.

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The Supreme Court upheld the assailed

BUSTOS VS. LUCERO
(GR. NO. L-2068, March 8, 1949)
TUASON, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner, an accused in a
criminal case, filed a motion with trial
court, praying that the record of the case
be remanded to the justice of the peace
court of Masantol, the court of origin, in
order that he might cross-examine the
complainant and her witnesses in
connection with their testimony, on the
strength of which warrant was issued for
the arrest of the accused. The motion was
denied.
According to the memorandum submitted
by the petitioner's counsel in support of
his motion, the accused, assisted by
counsel, appeared at the preliminary
investigation. The justice of the peace
informed him of the charges and asked
him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty,
upon which he entered the plea of not
guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the
complainant present her evidence so that
she and her witnesses could be examined
and cross-examined in the manner and
form provided by law." The fiscal and the
private prosecutor objected, invoking
section 11 of rule 108, and the objection
was sustained. "In view thereof, the
accused's counsel announced his
intention to renounce his right to present
evidence," and the justice of the peace
forwarded the case to the trial court.
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denial, saying that respondent judge did
not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in
abuse of discretion in refusing to grant
the accused's motion to return the record
for the purpose set out therein. Hence, the
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES: Whether or not Section 11 of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court infringes
section 13, Article VIII of the 1935
Constitution. ( now Section 5(5), Article 8,
1987 Constitution)
HELD: No. The Supreme Court, in its
Resolution dated March 8, 1949 opined
that Section 11 of Rule 108, like its
predecessors, is an adjective law and not
a substantive law or substantive right.
Substantive law creates substantive rights
and the two terms in this respect may be
said to be synonymous. Substantive rights
is a term which includes those rights
which one enjoys under the legal system
prior to the disturbance of normal
relations. (60 C.J., 980.) Substantive law is
that part of the law which creates, defines
and regulates rights, or which regulates
the rights and duties which give rise to a
cause of action; that part of the law which
courts are established to administer; as
opposed to adjective or remedial law,
which prescribes the method of enforcing
rights or obtains redress for their
invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S., 1026.)
While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the
defendant the right to cross-examine
witnesses in a preliminary investigation,
his right to present his witnesses remains

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unaffected, and his constitutional right to which is a power to adopt a general,

be informed of the charges against him
both at such investigation and at the trial
is unchanged. In the latter stage of the
proceedings, the only stage where the
guaranty of due process comes into play,
he still enjoys to the full extent the right
to be confronted by and to cross-examine
the witnesses against him. The degree of
importance of a preliminary investigation
to an accused may be gauged by the fact
that this formality is
frequently waived.
The distinction between "remedy" and
"substantive right" is incapable of exact
definition. The difference is somewhat a
question of degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands,
89 F., 467; Beazell vs. Ohio, supra.) It is
difficult to draw a line in any particular
case beyond which legislative power over
remedy and procedure can pass without
touching upon the substantive rights of
parties affected, as it is impossible to fix
that boundary by general condition. (State
vs. Pavelick, 279 P., 1102.) This being so,
it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in
making rules should step on substantive
rights, and the Constitution must be
presumed to tolerate if not to expect such
incursion as does not affect the accused in
a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive
him of a defense, but operates only in a
limited and unsubstantial manner to his
disadvantage. For the Court's power is not
merely to compile, revise or codify the
rules of procedure existing at the time of
the Constitution's approval. This power is
"to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts,"
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complete and comprehensive system of
procedure, adding new and different rules
without regard to their source and
discarding old ones.
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. VS.
COURT OF APPEALS
(GR. NO. 110571 MARCH 10, 1994)
FACTS:
BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto
Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its
BOI certificate of registration by changing
the scope of its registered product from
"glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles."
Opositor Mariwasa moved for
reconsideration of said BOI decision. This
motion having been denied, Mariwasa
filed a petition for review with
respondent court.
The CA temporarily restrained the BOI
from implementing its decision. This TRO
lapsed by its own terms 20 days after its
issuance, without respondent court
issuing any preliminary injunction.
Petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss
Petition and to Lift Restraining Order" on
the ground that the CA has no appellate
jurisdiction over BOI Case No. 92-005, the
same being exclusively vested with the
Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of
the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
The appellate court denied the motion to
dismiss. Thus, a petition for certiorari and
prohibition was filed before this Court.

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Petitioner claims that the CA acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
issuing the questioned resolution.
Petitioner argues that the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 and Circular 1-91,
"Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals
to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order
or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be
the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to
respondent court because the procedure
for appeal laid down therein runs
contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which
provides that appeals from decisions or
orders of the BOI shall be filed directly
with this Court.
Mariwasa counters that whatever
"obvious inconsistency" or "irreconcilable
repugnancy" there may have been
between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O.
226 on the question of venue for appeal
has already been resolved by Circular 1-
91 of the Supreme Court, which was
promulgated four years after E.O. 226 was
enacted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court
has the power to prescribe rules to
eliminate unnecessary contradictions and
confusing rules of procedure.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court, pursuant to its
Constitutional power under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to
promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and
by way of implementation of B.P. 129,
issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules
governing appeals to the Court of Appeals
from final orders or decisions of the Court
of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies
to eliminate unnecessary contradictions
and confusing rules of procedure.
Contrary to petitioner's contention,
although a circular is not strictly a statute
or law, it has, however, the force and
effect of lawaccording to settled
jurisprudence. In Inciong v. de Guia, a
circular of this Court was treated as law.
In adopting the recommendation of the
Investigating Judge to impose a sanction
on a judge who violated Circular No. 7 of
this Court dated September 23, 1974, as
amended by Circular No. 3 dated April 24,
1975 and Circular No. 20 dated October 4,
1979, requiring raffling of cases, this
Court quoted the ratiocination of the
Investigating Judge, brushing aside the
contention of respondent judge that
assigning cases instead of raffling is a
common practice and holding that
respondent could not go against the
circular of this Court until it is repealed or
otherwise modified, as "Laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall
not be excused by disuse, or customs or
practice to the contrary." to petitioner's
contention, although a circular is not
strictly a statute or law, it has, however,
the force and effect of law according to
settled jurisprudence. In Inciong v. de
Guia, a circular of this Court was treated
as law. In adopting the recommendation
of the Investigating Judge to impose a

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sanction on a judge who violated Circular

No. 7 of this Court dated September 23,
1974, as amended by Circular No. 3 dated
April 24, 1975 and Circular No. 20 dated
October 4, 1979, requiring raffling of
cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination
of the Investigating Judge, brushing aside
the contention of respondent judge that
assigning cases instead of raffling is a
common practice and holding that
respondent could not go against the
circular of this Court until it is repealed or
otherwise modified, as "Laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall
not be excused by disuse, or customs or
practice to the contrary."
ARULEO VS. CA
227 SCRA 311 [1993]
FACTS:Aruelo and Gatchalian were Vice-
Mayoralty candidates in Batangas,
Bulaean. Gatchalian was declared the
winner. Thereupon, Aruelo filed with the
RTC a civil case protest in the same
elections. Aruelo claims that in elections
contests, the COMELEC Rules give the
respondent only 5 days from summons to
file his answer and that this 5- day period
has lapsed. According to him, the tiling of
Motions to Dismiss and Motion to Bill of
particulars is prohibited by Sec. 1 Rule 13
of COMELEC. Rules of Procedures, hence,
the filling by Gatchalian of said pleadings
did not suspend the running of the 5-day
period.
ISSUE: Is Aruelo’s contention correct?
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HELD: NO. Part VI of the Come lee Rules
does not provide that MTDE and Bill of
particulars are not allowed in election
contest pending before the regular courts
constitutionally speaking. Comelec cannot
adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of
certain pleadings in the regular courts.
The power to promulgate rules
concerning pleadings, practice and
procedure in all courts is vested on the SC.
Gatchalian received a copy of the RTC
order denying his motion for Bill of
Particulars on August 6, 1992. Under
Sec.1 (b) Rule 12of the Revised Rules of
Court, a party has at least five days to file
his answer I after receipt of the order
denying his motion for a bill of particulars.
His answer was filed right on time.
JAVELLANA VS. DILG
GR 102549, AUGUST 10, 1992
FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Erwin B. Javellana
was an elected City Councilor of Bago City,
Negros Occidental. In 1989, City Engineer
Ernesto C. Divinagracia sued Javellana for:
(1) violation of Department of Local
Government (DLG) Memorandum
Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of
Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic
Act No. 6713," and (2) for oppression,
misconduct and abuse of authority.
Divinagracia's complaint alleged that
Javellana has continuously engaged in the
practice of law without securing authority
for that purpose, as required; that
petitioner, as counsel for Antonio Javiero

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and Rolando Catapang, sued Divinagracia
for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement
with Damages" putting him in public
ridicule; and that Javellana also appeared
as counsel in several cases without prior
authority of the DLG Regional Director.
Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari
praying that DLG Memoramdum Circulars
Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of
the new Local Government Code (RA
7160) be declared unconstitutional and
null and void because:
(1) they violate Article VIII, Section 5 of
the 1987 Constitution and
(2) They constitute class legislation, being
discriminatory against the legal and
medical professions for only sanggunian
members who are lawyers and doctors
are restricted in the exercise of their
profession while dentists, engineers,
architects, teachers, opticians, morticians
and others are not so restricted (RA 7160,
Sec. 90 (b-l]).
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned
memorandum circulars and Section 90 of
the Local Government Code
unconstitutional.
HELD: NO. As a matter of policy, this
Court accords great respect to the
decisions and/or actions of
administrative authorities not only
because of the doctrine of separation of
powers but also for their presumed
knowledgeability and expertise in the
enforcement of laws and regulations
entrusted to their jurisdiction With
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respect to the present case, we find no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondent, Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG), in issuing
the questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-38
and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss the administrative
charge against him.
In the first place, complaints against
public officers and employees relating or
incidental to the performance of their
duties are necessarily impressed with
public interest for by express
constitutional mandate, a public office is a
public trust. The complaint for illegal
dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang
against City Engineer Divinagracia is in
effect a complaint against the City
Government of Bago City, their real
employer, of which petitioner Javellana is
a councilman.
Hence, judgment against City Engineer
Divinagracia would actually be a
judgment against the City Government. By
serving as counsel for the complaining
employees and assisting them to
prosecute their claims against City
Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner
violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58
(in relation to Election 7[b-2) of RA 6713)
prohibiting a government official from
engaging in the private practice of his
profession, if such practice would
represent interests adverse to the
government.
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 and

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DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUDGES MUST

violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution is completely off tangent.
Neither the statute nor the circular
trenches upon the Supreme Court's
power and authority to prescribe rules on
the practice of law. The Local Government
Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No.
90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct
for public officials to avoid conflicts of
interest between the discharge of their
public duties and the private practice of
their profession, in those instances where
the law allows it. Section 90 of the Local
Government Code does not discriminate
against lawyers and doctors. It applies to
all provincial and municipal officials in
the professions or engaged in any
occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides
that sanggunian members .may practice
their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except
during session hours. " If there are some
prohibitions that apply particularly to
lawyers, it is because of all the
professions, the practice of law is more
likely than others to relate to, or affect,
the area of public service.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for
lack of merit.
SECTION 6. The Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervision over all courts
and the personnel thereof.
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FIRST BE REFERRED TO THE SUPREME
COURT
However, We agree with petitioner that in
the absence of any administrative action
taken against him by this Court with
regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's
power of administrative supervision over
all courts and its personnel, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987
Constitution exclusively vests in the
Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of
this power, it is only the Supreme Court
that can oversee the judges' and court
personnel's compliance with all laws, and
take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation
thereof. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its
investigation of petitioner on the powers
granted to it by the Constitution, for such
a justification not only runs counter to the
specific mandate of the Constitution
granting supervisory powers to the
Supreme Court over all courts and their
personnel, but likewise undermines the
independence of the judiciary.

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Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer
the matter of petitioner's certificates of
service to this Court for determination of
whether said certificates reflected the
true status of his pending case load, as the
Court has the necessary records to make
such a determination. The Ombudsman
cannot compel this Court, as one of the
three branches of government, to submit
its records, or to allow its personnel to
testify on this matter, as suggested by
public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-
complaint. [Maceda vs. Vasquez, G.R. No.
102781, April 22, 1993]
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials
apply. [Raquiza vs. Castañeda, Jr., A.M.
No. 1312-CFI, January 31, 1978]
MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ
221 SCRA 464 [1993]
FACTS: Petitioner Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda seeks the review of the following
orders of the office of the Ombudsman:
1.) The order dated September 18, 1991
denying ex parte motion refer to the SC
filed by the Petitioner and

2.) The order dated November 22, 1951

REQUIRED QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE IF denying the petitioner's motion for
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST reconsideration and directing petitioners
JUDGES to file his counter affidavit and other
The rules even in an administrative case controverting evidences.
demands that if the respondent Judge
should be disciplined for grave In his affidavit-complaint, respondent
misconduct or any graver offense, the Napoleon Abiera asserts that petitioner
evidence presented against him should be falsely certified that all civil and criminal
competent and derived from direct cases which have been submitted for
knowledge. The judiciary, to which decision or determination for a period of
respondent belongs, no less demands that 90 days have been determined and
before its member could be faulted, it decided on or before January 31, 1998
should be only after due investigation and where in truth and in fact, petitioner
based on competent proofs, no less. This knew that no decision had been rendered
is all the more so when as in this case the in the cases that have been submitted for
charges are penal in nature. decision. Respondent Abiera further
alleged that petitioner similarly falsified
The ground for the removal of a judicial his certificate of service.
officer should be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where Petitioner counters that he had been
the charges on which the removal is granted by this court an extension of 90
sought is misconduct in office, willful days to decide said cases, and that the
neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the
The general rules in regard to case since the offense charged arose from
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the judge's performance of his official
duties, which is under control of this
Court.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the
Ombudsman could entertain criminal
complaints for the alleged falsification of
a judge's certification submitted to the
supreme court to the SC, and assuming
that it can, whether a referral should be
made first to the SC.
HELD: The Court disagrees with the first
part if the petitioners basic argument,
there is nothing in the decision in Orap
that would restrict it only to offenses
committed by a judge unrelated to his
official duties. A judge who falsifies his
certificate is administratively liable to the
SC for serious misconduct and inefficiency
under Sec. 1 Rule 140 of the rules of Court
and criminally liable to the state under
the revised Penal Code for his felonious
Act.
intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the doctrine separation of power.
The Ombudsman cannot justify it's
investigation of petitioner on the powers
granted to it by Constitution, for such a
justification not only runs counter to the
specific mandate of the constitution
grating supervisory powers to SC overall
courts and their personnel, but likewise
undermines the independence of the
judiciary. Thus, the Ombudsman should
first refer the matter of petitioner's
certificate of service to this court for
determination of whether said certificate
reflected the true status of his pending
case load, as the Court has the necessary
records to make such determination. The
Ombudsman cannot compel this court, as
one of the three branches of government,
to submit its records, or to allow its
personnel to testify on this matter, as
suggested by public respondent Abiera in
his affidavit complaint.

However, we agree with petitioner that in The rationale for the foregoing
the absence of any administrative action pronouncement is evident in this case.
taken against him by this Court with Administratively, the question before us
regard to his certificate of service, the is this, should a judge, having been
investigation being conducted by the granted by this court an extension of time
Ombudsman over all courts and its to decide before him, report these cases in
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of his certificate of service. As this question
separation of powers. Articles VIII, Sec. 6 had not yet been raised these cases less
of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests resolved by, this Court how could be the
in the SC administrative supervision over Ombudsman resolve the present criminal
all courts and court personnel, from the complaint that requires the resolution of
presiding Justice of the CA that can this question.
oversee the judge's and court personnel's
compliance commit any violation thereof. In fine, where the criminal complaint
No other branch of government may against a judge or other court employees
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arises from their administrative duties,
the ombudsman must defer action on said
complaints and refer the same to this
Court for determination whether said
judge or court employee had acted within
the scope of their administrative duties.
Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby
granted. The Ombudsman is hereby
directed to dismiss the complaint filed by
the public respondent Atty. Napoleon
Abiera and to refer the same to this court
for appropriate action.
RAQUIZA V JUDGE CASTAÑEDA, JR.
ISSUE: WON there is basis on the
recommendation of the investigator to
dismiss the complaint of the petitioner.
HELD: The court reviewed the records,
testimonies of the witnesses, and other
evidences submitted by the parties and
find the recommendation of the
investigator as fully supported with
enough evidence to merit the dismissal of
the complaint against the respondent
judge. The court held that a ground for
removal of a judicial officer should be
established beyond reasonable doubt
most especially if it involves misconduct,
corruption and incompetence.

FACTS: The cases involves a petition to

order the transfer of Special Proceedings
No. 6824 of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga (Testate Estate of the late Don
Alfonso Castellvi) from the sala of
respondent judge, Hon. Mariano
Castañeda to another branch and
administrative complaint against the
same judge for "(1) violation of the Anti-
Graft Law; (2) rendering decision
knowing it to be unjust and illegal (3)
extortion by means of oppression; and (4)
bribery. The court refers the
administrative complaint to Justice
Bautista of CA for investigation. After the
conduct of the investigation, Justice
Bautista recommends the dismissal of the
charges against the respondent judge for
lack of merit.
SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be
appointed Member of the Supreme Court or
any lower collegiate court unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A
Member of the Supreme Court must be at
least forty years of age, and must have
been for fifteen years or more a judge of a
lower court or engaged in the practice of
law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the
qualifications of judges of lower courts, but
no person may be appointed judge thereof
unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and
a member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a
person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence.

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First, on the issue of standing, the

petitioners have standing as
KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION ET the issue involved is of utmost
AL v ERMITA importance—the citizenship of a
FACTS: person to be appointed as a
member of the Supreme Court.
Petitioner filed a petition to set Second, on the principal issue of
aside the appointment the case, the Court took judicial
of Gregory Ong as Associate notice of Ong’s petition to be
Justice of the Supreme Court. admitted to the Philippine Bar. In
Petitioner alleged that Ong is not his petition to be admitted to the
a natural-born citizen and thus, is Philippine bar, respondent
disqualified to become a alleged that he is qualified to be
member of the Supreme Court. admitted because among others
Respondent Ermita, on the other he is a Filipino citizen, and that
hand, contended that Ong was he became a citizen because his
appointed from a list father became a naturalized
of candidates given by the JBC Filipino citizen and being a minor
and they have referred the then, thus he too became a
matter back to the latter for the Filipino citizen. As part of his
determination of evidence, he submitted his birth
the issue regarding Ong’s certificate and the naturalization
citizenship. Respondent Ong papers of his father.
contended that he is truly a It was on basis of these
natural-born citizen, following a allegations under oath and the
series of changes in nationalities submitted evidence of no less
and whatnot with respect to his than Ong that the Court allowed
ancestors. He also contended that him to take his oath as a lawyer.
the petitioner has no standing It is clear therefore, that from the
to file the said petition. records of this Court, Ong is a
naturalized Filipino citizen. The
HELD: alleged subsequent recognition of
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his natural-born status by the approve of the appointment.

Bureau of Immigration and the
DOJ cannot amend the final
decision of the trial court stating
that Ong and his mother were
naturalized along with his father.
Furthermore, as the
petitioner correctly submitted,
no substantial change in an entry
in the civil register can be made
without a judicial order. Change
in the citizenship status is a
substantial change. The long
string of events that Ong alleged
leading to him being a natural-
born citizen, all entail factual
assertions that need to be
threshed out in proper judicial
proceedings.
NOTE: In this case, there has
been no ouster from an
appointment. There may be
approval of the appointment
but it lacks other acts that
will complete the appointment.
The last act in an appointment is
the delivery of the commission. It
is now up to the appointee—he
must accept the appointment,
take an oath of office, assume
office, etc. It doesn’t end here.
The CSC can either reject or
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When the appointee doesn’t
pursue all the acts to assume
office, the question is whether or
not he can be held liable. The law
doesn’t provide really that there
is a period to accept or reject an
appointment.
SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council
is hereby created under the supervision of
the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
(2) The regular Members of the Council
shall be appointed by the President for a
term of four years with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Of the
Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall
serve for four years, the professor of law
for three years, the retired Justice for two
years, and the representative of the private
sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be
the Secretary ex officio of the Council and
shall keep a record of its proceedings.

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(4) The regular Members of the Council
shall receive such emoluments as may be
determined by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court shall provide in its annual
budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal
function of recommending appointees to
the Judiciary. It may exercise such other
functions and duties as the Supreme Court
may assign to it.
(sic) short list of nominees to the
President of the Republic of the
Philippines for the appointment of a Chief
Justice of the Honorable Court;
Whether the President of the Republic of
the Philippines may legitimately, validly
and constitutionally appoint a Chief
Justice of the Honorable Court, in
replacement of the removed and
impeached Honorable Renato C. Corona;

Whether the respondent Honorable JBC

FAMELA R. DULAY v. JUDICIAL AND
BAR COUNCIL AND PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.
Please take notice that the Court en banc
issued a Resolution dated JULY 3, 2012,
which reads as follows: cralaw
"G.R No. 202143 (Famela R. Dulay v.
Judicial and Bar Council and Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., as Executive Secretary.). - This
is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order, filed by petitioner
Famela R. Dulay against the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) and Executive Secretary
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., raising the following
issues:
Whether the respondent Honorable JBC
can legitimately, validly and
constitutionally accepts (sic) application
for nomination and interview of nominees
for the position of a Chief Justice of the
Honorable Court and, thereafter, submits
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can constitutionally be headed by a
retired Associate Justice of the Honorable
Court, instead of an incumbent Chief
Justice of the Honorable Court.
Petitioner claims that the President of the
Republic of the Philippines cannot
legitimately, validly, and constitutionally
appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, because the 1987 Constitution only
empowers him to appoint members or
Justices but not the Chief Justice. She adds
that the Chief Justice should be replaced
and designated exclusively from among
their peers. Petitioner also contends that
the JBC cannot be validly, legally and
constitutionally headed by a retired
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,
because the Constitution specifically
provides that it be headed by the
incumbent Chief Justice and no other.
We dismiss the petition.
At the outset, we look into the locus
standi of petitioner to institute the
present petition.

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As held in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Accordingly, she is wanting in legal

Council:
xxx In public or constitutional litigations,
the Court is often burdened with the
determination of the locus standi of the
petitioners due to the ever-present need
to regulate the invocation of the
intervention of the Court to correct any
official action or policy in order to avoid
obstructing the efficient functioning of
public officials and offices involved in
public service. It is required, therefore,
that the petitioner must have a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy.
Indeed a liberal approach had been
adopted in several notable cases.
Petitioner may not be as adversely
affected by the action complained against
as are others provided that she
sufficiently demonstrates in her petition
that she is entitled to protection or relief
from the Court in the vindication of a
public right. The assertion of a public
right as a predicate for challenging an
official action rests on the theory that the
petitioner represents the public in
general.
In this case, however, petitioner has not
shown in her petition that she is entitled
to protection or relief from the Court. She
did not even explain her capacity in
instituting the present special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition. Nowhere
in her petition did she assert her right
either as citizen or taxpayer filing her
petition on behalf of the public who are
directly affected by the issues.
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standing to institute the instant petition.
Outright dismissal of the present petition
is, therefore, warranted.
Even if we ignore the technical defect and
we look into the merits of the case, the
petition is still bound to be dismissed.
Simply stated, petitioner seeks the
resolution of two substantive issues:
(1) whether or not the President of the
Philippines has the constitutional power
to appoint the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court; and
(2) whether or not the JBC can validly be
headed by a person other than the
incumbent Chief Justice.
We answer in the affirmative to both
questions.
Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution,
provides for the appointment of Justices
and Judges, to wit:
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
Such appointments need no confirmation. x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
In interpreting the above-stated
constitutional provision, petitioner
considers only the Associate Justices as
the "members of the Supreme Court"
thereby excluding the Chief Justice from
the President's appointing power. Said
interpretation is baseless.

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A plain reading of the constitutional
provisions on the Judicial Department in
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
clearly shows that the phrase "Members
of the Supreme Court" and the words
"Members" and "Member" are repeatedly
used to refer to the Justices of the
Supreme Court without distinction
whether he be the Chief Justice or any of
the Associate Justices or all fifteen
Justices.
Section 4 (l),[8] Article VIII thereof
defines the composition of the Supreme
Court, namely, "a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices" who may sit
en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of
three, five, or seven Members; Section 4
(2)[9] and (3)[10] describe the manner of
conducting business in the Court whether
it be En Banc or in division; Section 7
(1)[11] enumerates the qualifications of
the Members of the Court and the other
members of the Judiciary; Section
11[12] provides for the security of tenure
in the Judiciary; Section 12[13] states the
prohibition on non-judicial assignments
of the Members of the Supreme Court and
of other courts; and Section 13[14] lays
down the process of decision-making. In
all of these provisions, the phrase
"Members of the Supreme Court" was
repeatedly used to refer not only to the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
but includes the Chief Justice. Thus, in
Section 9 of the same Article VIII on the
appointment of Justices and Judges, the
phrase "Members of the Supreme Court"
clearly refers to the fifteen Justices of the
Court - one Chief Justice and fourteen (14)
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Associate Justices - who are within the
appointing power of the President.
Although decided under a different
Constitution, we reiterate the Court's
pronouncement in Vargas v. Rilloraza[15]
that "there can be no doubt that the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices required x x
x to compose the Supreme Court are the
regular members of the Court."[16]
We, likewise, do not agree with petitioner
that the JBC can only be headed by the
incumbent Chief Justice and no other.
Petitioner, in effect, argues that the JBC
cannot perform its task without an
incumbent Chief Justice. To follow this
logic would lead to an eventuality where a
vacancy in the Judiciary will not be filled if
a vacancy occurs in the JBC. We can
likewise infer from this argument that if
the Office of the Chief Justice is vacated,
the same will not be filled because there
will be no "incumbent Chief Justice" to act
as Chairman of the JBC.
We definitely cannot sustain these
arguments. The principal function of the
JBC is to recommend appointees to the
Judiciary.[17] For every vacancy, the JBC
submits to the President a list of at least
three nominees and the President may
not appoint anybody who is not in the
list.[18] Any vacancy in the Supreme
Court is required by the Constitution to be
filled within 90 days from the occurrence
thereof.[19] This 90-day period is
mandatory. It cannot, therefore, be
compromised only because the
constitutionally-named Chairman could
not sit in the JBC. Although it would be
preferable if the membership of the JBC is

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complete, the JBC can still operate to
perform its mandated task of submitting
the list of nominees to the President even
if the constitutionally-named ex-officio
Chairman does not sit in the JBC. This
intention is evident from the exchanges
among the Commissioners during the
deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, viz.:
MR. DE CASTRO. I understand that our
justices now in the Supreme Court,
together with the Chief Justice, are only
11.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. DE CASTRO. And the second sentence
of this subsection reads: "Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof."
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right.
MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a mandate to
the executive to fill the vacancy?
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. That is
borne out of the fact that in the past 30
years, seldom has the Court had a
complete complement.
MR. DE CASTRO. By that time, upon
ratification of this Constitution, the
Judicial and Bar Council shall be in
operation.
MR. CONCEPCION. We hope so.
MR. DE CASTRO. And one of the members
thereof is a Member of Congress.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right.
MR. DE CASTRO. An ex officio member. By
the time this is ratified, Congress is not
yet convened and there will still be an
election; so there will still be a delay of
more than 90 days. Maybe before the
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vacancies occur in the Supreme Court,
they will be filled up by the President.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is possible.
MR. DE CASTRO. Therefore, it will take
perhaps until November or December
before the four other justices will be
appointed, if we follow the Judicial and
Bar Council. Or can the Judicial and Bar
Council function without the presence yet
of a member of Congress who is an ex-
officio member?
MR. CONCEPCION. It can operate without
the ex-officio member because a majority
would be enough, although it would be
preferable if it were complete.
MR. DE CASTRO. So that upon ratification
of this Constitution, it is possible, and the
President may do it by appointing the
members of the Judicial and Bar Council
without first a representative from
Congress.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is correct.
MR. DE CASTRO. So that we can
immediately fill up the four vacancies in
the Supreme Court.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is correct.
MR. DE CASTRO. I am asking this just for
the record, that the vacancies in the
Supreme Court be immediately filled up
so that our backlog of cases can be
immediately attended to.
x x x (Emphases supplied)
Considering, however, that complete
membership in the JBC is preferable and
pursuant to its supervisory power over
the JBC, this Court should not be deprived
of representation. The most Senior Justice
of this Court who is not an applicant for
the position of Chief Justice should

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participate in the deliberations for the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It

selection of nominees for the said vacant
post and preside over the proceedings in
the absence of the constitutionally-named
Ex-Officio Chairman, pursuant to Section
12 of Republic Act No. 296, or the
Judiciary Act of 1948, to wit:
Section 12. Vacancy in office of Chief
Justice. - In case of vacancy in the office of
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or
of his inability to perform the duties and
powers of his office, they shall devolve
upon the Associate Justice who is first in
precedence, until such disability is
removed, or another Chief Justice is
appointed and duly qualified. This
provision shall apply to every Associate
Justice who succeeds to the office of Chief
Justice. (Emphasis supplied.)
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we
DISMISS the petition."
is this practice that petitioner has
questioned in this petition. Respondents
argued that the crux of the controversy is
the phrase “a representative of Congress.”
It is their theory that the two houses, the
Senate and the House of Representatives,
are permanent and mandatory
components of “Congress,” such that the
absence of either divests the term of its
substantive meaning as expressed under
the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the
system of choice by the Framers, requires
that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its
mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus,
when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of “a representative
from Congress,” it should mean one
representative each from both Houses
which comprise the entire Congress.

ISSUES:

CHAVEZ VS JBC 1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the
exercise of the power of judicial review
FACTS: In 1994, instead of having only 7 have been met in this case?
members, an eighth member was added
to the JBC as two representatives from 2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the Senate and the House of
from the House of Representatives and Representatives making 8 instead of 7
one from the Senate, with each having sitting members unconstitutional?
one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En
Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 3. What is the effect of the Court's finding
and 2001, decided to allow the that the current composition of the JBC is
representatives from the Senate and the unconstitutional?
House of Representatives one full vote
each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero HELD:
and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the
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1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial
review is subject to several limitations,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (b) the person challenging
the act must have “standing” to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that he has
sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (c) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will
be allowed to litigate only when these
conditions sine qua non are present,
especially when the constitutionality of an
act by a co-equal branch of government is
put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’
contention that petitioner lost his
standing to sue because he is not an
official nominee for the post of Chief
Justice. While it is true that a “personal
stake” on the case is imperative to have
locus standi, this is not to say that only
official nominees for the post of Chief
Justice can come to the Court and
question the JBC composition for being
unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens
and nominates other members of the
Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this
regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited
to the nominations for the highest
magistrate in the land. A vast number of
aspirants to judicial posts all over the
country may be affected by the Court’s
ruling. More importantly, the legality of
the very process of nominations to the
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positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of
the controversy. The claim that the
composition of the JBC is illegal and
unconstitutional is an object of concern,
not just for a nominee to a judicial post,
but for all citizens who have the right to
seek judicial intervention for rectification
of legal blunders.
2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-
quoted provision, it can readily be
discerned that the provision is clear and
unambiguous. The first paragraph calls
for the creation of a JBC and places the
same under the supervision of the Court.
Then it goes to its composition where the
regular members are enumerated: a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired member of the
Court and a representative from the
private sector. On the second part lies the
crux of the present controversy. It
enumerates the ex officio or special
members of the JBC composed of the Chief
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice and “a representative
of Congress.”

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generic sense. No particular allusion

The use of the singular letter “a”
preceding “representative of Congress” is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any
other construction. It is indicative of what
the members of the Constitutional
Commission had in mind, that is, Congress
may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the
intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would
sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in
no uncertain terms, so provided.
One of the primary and basic rules in
statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-
settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed
in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. As much as possible,
the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to
the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on
the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Verba legis
non est recedendum – from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.
Applying the foregoing principle to this
case, it becomes apparent that the word
“Congress” used in Article VIII, Section
8(1) of the Constitution is used in its
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whatsoever is made on whether the
Senate or the House of Representatives is
being referred to, but that, in either case,
only a singular representative may be
allowed to sit in the JBC.
It is worthy to note that the seven-
member composition of the JBC serves a
practical purpose, that is, to provide a
solution should there be a stalemate in
voting. This underlying reason leads the
Court to conclude that a single vote may
not be divided into half (1/2), between
two representatives of Congress, or
among any of the sitting members of the
JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned
practice can possibly cause disorder and
eventually muddle the JBC’s voting
process, especially in the event a tie is
reached. The aforesaid purpose would
then be rendered illusory, defeating the
precise mechanism which the
Constitution itself createdWhile it would
be unreasonable to expect that the
Framers provide for every possible
scenario, it is sensible to presume that
they knew that an odd composition is the
best means to break a voting deadlock.
The respondents insist that owing to the
bicameral nature of Congress, the word
“Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution should be read as
including both the Senate and the House
of Representatives. They theorize that it
was so worded because at the time the
said provision was being drafted, the
Framers initially intended a unicameral
form of Congress. Then, when the

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Constitutional Commission eventually law by recognizing that the existence of a

adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the
Framers, through oversight, failed to
amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the
Constitution.
It is evident that the definition of
“Congress” as a bicameral body refers to
its primary function in government – to
legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction
of the role of each house in the process.
The same holds true in Congress’ non-
legislative powers. An inter-play between
the two houses is necessary in the
realization of these powers causing a
vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot
simply discount. This, however, cannot be
said in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two
houses exists in the workings of the JBC.
Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken
to mean the entire legislative department.
statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot
always be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The doctrine is applicable
when a declaration of unconstitutionality
will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid law. Thus,
it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would
put the accused in double jeopardy or
would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law
creating it.3
Under the circumstances, the Court finds
the exception applicable in this case and
holds that notwithstanding its finding of
unconstitutionality in the current
composition of the JBC, all its prior official
actions are nonetheless valid.

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional

act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at
all. This rule, however, is not absolute.
Under the doctrine of operative facts,
actions previous to the declaration of SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. Court and judges of lower courts shall be
They are not nullified. This is essential in appointed by the President from a list of at
the interest of fair play. least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an Such appointments need no confirmation.
exception to the general rule, only applies
as a matter of equity and fair play. It
nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional

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For the lower courts, the President shall import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the
issue the appointments within ninety days 1987 Constitution that they have adopted.
from the submission of the list.

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect

to the intent of the people, through the
SECTION 10. The salary of the Chief Justice discussions and deliberations of their
and of the Associate Justices of the representatives, in the spirit that all
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower citizens should bear their aliquot part of
courts shall be fixed by law. During their the cost of maintaining the government
continuance in office, their salary shall not and should share the burden of general
be decreased. income taxation equitably. [Nitafan vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.
No. L-78780, July 23, 1987]
Section 10
NITAFAN VS. COMMISSION OF
SALARIES OF JUDGES ARE SUBJECT TO
INTERNAL REVENUE
TAX
152 SCRA 284 [1987]
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes
Congress to pass a law fixing another rate
FACTS: Petitioners David Nitafan
of compensation of Justices and Judges
Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano
but such rate must be higher than that are duly appointed and qualified Judges of
which they are receiving at the time of
the RTC, NCR Manila. They sought to
enactment, or if lower, it would be prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin
applicable only to those appointed after
respondent Commission of Internal
its approval. It would be a strained
Revenue and Finance Office of the SC from
construction to read into the provision an
making any deductions of withholding
exemption from taxation in the light of
taxes from their salaries. They submit that
the discussion in the Constitutional a tax withheld from their compensation as
Commission. judicial officers constitute a decrease or
With the foregoing interpretation, and as
diminution of their salaries contrary to
stated heretofore, the ruling that "the the provision of Sec.10 of Art.VIII of the
imposition of income tax upon the salary
Constitution mandating that "during their
of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so
continuance in office, their salary shall
violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. not be decreased.
Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David
must be declared discarded. The framers ISSUE: Is the deduction in the said
of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of
salaries in violation of Sec.10 of Art.VIII?
the people, have expressed in clear and
unmistakable terms the meaning and
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HELD: SECTION 11. The Members of the Supreme

YES. The draft proposal of Sec 10 Art VIII
reads as "their salary shall not be
decreased" and the words "not subjected
to income tax" was deleted so as to give
substance to equality among the three
branches of government. Thus, the clear
intent of the Constitutional Commission
was to delete the proposed express grant
of exemption from payment of income tax
to members of the Judiciary. In the course
of deliberations, it was made clear that
the salaries of members of the Judiciary
would be subject to general income tax
does not fall within their continuance in
office. The court disregarded the ruling in
Perfecto vs. Meer that declared the
salaries of members of the Judiciary
exempt from payment of income tax and
considered such payment as diminution
of their salaries during their continuance
in office.
Furthermore, in constructing Sec 10 Art
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it is plain
that the Constitution authorizes Congress
to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation of Justice and Judges but
such rate must be higher than that which
they are receiving at the time of the
enactment, of if lower, it would be
applicable only to the appointed after its
approval. It would be strained
construction to read into the provision an
exemption from taxation when the true
intent of the framers was to make the
salaries of the Judiciary taxable.
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Court and judges of lower courts shall hold
office during good behavior until they
reached the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of
their office. The Supreme Court en banc
shall have the power to discipline judges of
lower courts, or order their dismissal by a
vote of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Section 11
NOT ALL DISCIPLINARY CASES NEED
TO BE HEARD EN BANC
At any rate, the very text of the present
Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows
that there are actually two situations
envisaged therein. The first clause which
states that "the Supreme Court en banc
shall have the power to discipline judges
of lower courts," is a declaration of the
grant of that disciplinary power to, and
the determination of the procedure in the
exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It
was not therein intended that all
administrative disciplinary cases should
be heard and decided by the whole Court
since it would result in an absurdity, as
will hereafter be explained.
The second clause, which refers to the
second situation contemplated therein
and is intentionally separated from the
first by a comma, declares on the other
hand that the Court en banc can "order
their dismissal by a vote of a majority of

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the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted therein." Evidently, in this
instance, the administrative case must be
deliberated upon and decided by the full
Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers
administrative disciplinary power to the
Court en banc, on February 9, 1993 a
Court En Banc resolution was adopted,
entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. — In the
Matter of the Amendment and/or
Clarification of various Supreme Courts
Rules and Resolutions," and providing
inter alia:
For said purpose, the following are
considered en banc cases:
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed
is the dismissal of a judge, officer or
employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a
lawyer, or either the suspension of any of
them for a period of more than one (1)
year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or
both.
This resolution was amended on March
16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the
aforequoted provision was maintained.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to
deliberate upon and participate in all
administrative matters or cases
regardless of the sanctions, imposable or
imposed, would result in a congested
docket and undue delay in the
adjudication of cases in the Court,
especially in administrative matters, since
even cases involving the penalty of
reprimand would require action by the
Court en banc. This would subvert the
constitutional injunction for the Court to
adopt a systematic plan to expedite the
decision or resolution of cases or matters
pending in the Supreme Court of the
lower courts, 9 and the very purpose of
authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in
divisions of three, five or seven members.
Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only
cases involving dismissal of judges of
lower courts are specifically required to
be decided by the Court en banc, in
cognizance of the need for a thorough and
judicious evaluation of serious charges
against members of the judiciary, it is
only when the penalty imposed does not
exceed suspension of more than one year
or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the
administrative matter may be decided in
division. [People vs. Gacott, Jr., G.R. No.
116049, July 13, 1995]
DE LA LLANA vs. ALBA
(G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982)
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 entitled "An Act Reorganizing the
Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefore
and for other Purposes," the same being
contrary to the security of tenure
provision of the Constitution as it
separates from the judiciary Justices and
judges of inferior courts from the Court of
Appeals to municipal circuit courts except

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the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and security of tenure guarantee as

the Court of Tax Appeals, unless
appointed to the inferior courts
established by such Act. They likewise
impute lack of good faith in its enactment
and characterize as undue delegation of
legislative power to the President his
authority to fix the compensation and
allowances of the Justices and judges
thereafter appointed and the
determination of the date when the
reorganization shall be deemed
completed. The Solicitor General
maintains that there is no valid
justification for the attack on the
constitutionality of the statute, it being a
legitimate exercise of the power vested in
the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the
judiciary, the allegations of absence of
good faith as well as the attack on the
independence of the judiciary being
unwarranted and devoid of any support
in law.
incumbent justices and judges with good
performance and clean records can be
named anew in legal contemplation
without interruption in the continuity of
their service; that the provision granting
the President authority to fix the
compensation and allowances of the
Justices and judges survives the test of
undue delegation of legislative power, a
standard having been clearly adopted
therefore; that the reorganization
provided by the challenged Act will be
carried out in accordance with the
President's constitutional duty to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed,
and the judiciary's commitment to guard
constitutional rights.
PEOPLE VS. HON. ESTAQUIO GACOTT
(G.R. No. 116049 March 20, 1995)

ISSUE: Whether or not BP Blg. 129 is FACTS: Respondents Strom and Reyes
unconstitutional. were charged with violation of the Anti-
Dummy Law. The accused filed a Motion
HELD: Yes. It is constitutional. After an to Quash/Dismiss, arguing that since the
intensive and rigorous study of all the power to prosecute is vested exclusively
legal aspects of the case, the Supreme in the Anti- Dummy Board under RA 1130,
Court dismissed the petition, the the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has
unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board
129 not having been shown. It held that has already been abolished by Letter of
the enactment thereof was in answer to a Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972.
pressing and urgent need for a major Respondent judge granted the motion.
reorganization of the judiciary; that the The prosecution moved for
attendant abolition of the inferior courts reconsideration but respondent judge
which shall cause their incumbents to denied the same in an order, the pertinent
cease from holding office does not impair portions of which are quoted hereunder:
the independence of the judiciary and the “. . . . It may be ignorance of the law to
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insist that the law, Republic Act 1130 was
repealed or amended by Letter of
Instruction (sic) No. 2, Series of 1972 as
what the City Prosecutor has harped all
along. A Letter of Instruction (sic) is not
law by any standard and neither has it the
force and effect of law. A contrary
contention would be violative of Article 7
of the New Civil Code which provides that
laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones and of the Rules of Statutory
Construction.
Besides, penal statutes are strictly
construed against the State and liberally
in favor of the accused. The rules in all
criminal prosecutions is that all counts
are resolved in favor of the accused. In the
case at bar, the court seriously doubts
that the City Prosecutor has the power or
the authority to investigate violations of
the Anti-Dummy Law and to file and to
prosecute cases of this kind before our
courts, as that is lodged with the Anti-
Dummy Board under R. A. 1130.”
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge
in granting the Motion to Quash gravely
abused his discretion as to warrant the
issuance of a writ of certiorari.
HELD: Obviously, respondent judge did
not even bother to read the text of the
cited LOI; otherwise, he would have
readily acknowledged the validity of the
argument advanced by the prosecution.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D
No. 1, issued by the former President
Marcos under his martial law powers
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have the same force and effect as the laws
enacted by Congress. As held by the
Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs.
Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all
proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions and acts promulgated, issued,
or done by the former President are part
of the law of the land, and shall remain
valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless
modified, revoked or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions, or other acts of the
President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal
order issued by former President Marcos
in the exercise of his martial law powers
to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as
neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been
expressly impliedly revised, revoked, or
repealed, both continue to have the force
and effect of law. (Rollo, pp. 7- 8).
Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the
Constitution explicitly ordains: Sec. 3. All
existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions, and
other executive issuances not inconsistent
with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed, or
revoked. But even more glaring than
respondent judge's utter inexcusable
neglect to check the citations of the
prosecution is the mistaken belief that the
duty to inform the court on the applicable
law to a particular case devolves solely
upon the Prosecution or whoever may be
the advocate before the court.
Respondent judge should be reminded
that courts are duty bound to take judicial
notice of all the laws of the 1 and (Sec. 1,
Rule 129 Rules of Court). Being the trier

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of facts, judges are presumed to be well-
informed of the existing laws, recent
enactments and jurisprudence, in keeping
with their sworn duty as members of the
bar (and bench) to keep abreast of legal
developments The Court is fully aware
that not every error or mistake of a judge
in the performance of his duties is subject
to censure. But where, as in the present
case, the error could have been entirely
avoided were it not for public
respondent's irresponsibility in the
performance of his duties, it is but proper
that respondent judge be reprimanded
and his order of dismissal set aside for
grave ignorance of the law. For,
respondent judge's error is not a simple
error in judgment but one amounting to
gross ignorance of the law which could
easily undermine the public's perception
of the court's competence.
“By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on
June 21, 1988 by the Honorable
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon.
Rodolfo C. Fariñas, I was designated as a
member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice created pursuant to
Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of
12 December 1986, as amended by
Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988.
In consonance with Executive Order RF6-
04, the Honorable Provincial Governor of
Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a
member of the Committee. For your ready
reference, I am enclosing herewith
machine copies of Executive Order RF6-
04 and the appointment. Before I may
accept the appointment and enter in the
discharge of the powers and duties of the
position as member of the Ilocos (Norte)
Provincial Committee on Justice, may I
have the honor to request for the issuance
by the Honorable Supreme Court of a
Resolution, as follows:

SECTION 12. The Members of the Supreme
Court and of other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
IN RE: MANZANO
[A.M. NO. 88-7-1861-RTC. OCTOBER 5,
1988.]
FACTS: On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U.
Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a
letter which reads:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the
appointment and to assume and
discharge the powers and duties attached
to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the
Committee as neither violative of the
Independence of the Judiciary nor a
violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of
the second paragraph of Section 7, Article
IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will
not in any way amount to an
abandonment of my present position as
Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional
Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and as a
member of the Judiciary; x x x”

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ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his
Judge Manzano as member of the sworn responsibility no leas than the
Provincial Committeee on Justice violates maintenance of respect for the judiciary
the Constitution. can be satisfied with nothing less."

HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the
members of the Supreme Court and other
courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions
(Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge
Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice, which discharges
administrative functions, will be in
violation of the Constitution, the Court is
constrained to deny his request. Former
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his
concurring opinion in the case of Garcia
vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets
forth:
“While the doctrine of separation of
powers is a relative theory not to be
enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical
demands of government precluding its
doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a
member of the judiciary being required to
assume a position or perform a duty non-
judicial in character. That is implicit in the
principle. Otherwise there is a plain
departure from its command. The essence
of the trust reposed in him is to decide.
Only a higher court, as was emphasized
by Justice Barredo, can pass on his
actuation. He is not a subordinate of an
executive or legislative official, however
eminent. It is indispensable that there be
no exception to the rigidity of such a
norm if he is, as expected, to be confined
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This declaration does not mean that RTC
Judges should adopt an attitude of
monastic insensibility or unbecoming
indifference to Province/City Committee
on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they
form part of the structure of government.
Their integrity and performance in the
adjudication of cases contribute to the
solidity of such structure. As public
officials, they are trustees of an orderly
society. Even as non-members of
Provincial/City Committees on Justice,
RTC judges should render assistance to
said Committees to help promote the
landable purposes for which they exist,
but only when such assistance may be
reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of
their judicial duties. ACCORDINGLY, the
aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U.
Manzano is DENIED.
SECTION 13. The conclusions of the
Supreme Court in any case submitted to it
for decision en banc or in division shall be
reached in consultation before the case is
assigned to a Member for the writing of the
opinion of the Court. A certification to this
effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be
issued and a copy thereof attached to the
record of the case and served upon the
parties. Any Member who took no part, or

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dissented, or abstained from a decision or FACTS: Leticia Tupasi-Valenzuela opened

resolution must state the reason therefor.
The same requirements shall be observed
by all lower collegiate courts.
Section 13
CERTIFICATION IS NOT REQUIRED IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
The challenge hurled against this Court's
decision as violative of the 1987
Constitution due to lack of certification by
the Chief Justice that the conclusions of
the Court were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to a member
for the writing of the opinion of the Court,
is bereft of basis. The certification
requirement refers to decisions in
judicial, not administrative cases. From
the very beginning, resolutions/decisions
of the Court in administrative cases have
not been accompanied by any formal
certification. In fact, such a certification
would be a superfluity in administrative
cases, which by their very nature, have to
be deliberated upon considering the
collegiate composition of this Court. The
certification in AM No. R-510-P entitled
"Apolinario de Sarigumba vs. Deputy
Sheriff Pasok," cited in the Petition, is but
an oversight. [Prudential Bank vs.
Castro, A.C. No. 2756, March 15, 1988]
PRUDENTIAL BANK, PETITIONER VS.
COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS
Savings Account No. 5744 and Current
Account No. 01016-3 in the Valenzuela
Branch of petitioner Prudential Bank,
with automatic transfer of funds from the
savings account to the current account.
On June 1, 1988, Leticia Tupasi-
Valenzuela deposited in her savings
account Check No. 666B (104561 of even
date) the amount of P35,271.60, drawn
against the Philippine Commercial
International Bank (PCIB). Taking into
account that deposit and a series of
withdrawals, Leticia Tupasi-Valenzuela as
of June 21, 1988 had a balance of
P35,993.48 in her savings account and
P776.93 in her current account, or total
deposits of P36,770.41, with Prudential
Bank.
Thereafter, Leticia Tupasi-Valenzuela
issued Prudential Bank Check No. 983395
in the amount of P11,500.00 post-dated
June 20, 1988, in favor of one Belen
Legaspi. It was issued to Legaspi as
payment for jewelry which private
respondent had purchased. Legaspi, who
was in jewelry trade, endorsed the check
to one Philip Lhuillier, a businessman also
in the jewelry business. When Lhuillier
deposited the check in his account with
the PCIB, Pasay Branch, it was dishonored
for being drawn against insufficient funds.
Lhuillier's secretary informed the
secretary of Legaspi of the dishonor. The
latter told the former to redeposit the
check. Legaspi's secretary tried to contact
private respondent but to no avail.

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Upon her return from the province,
Leticia Tupasi-Valenzuela was surprised
to learn of the dishonor of the check. She
went to the Valenzuela Branch of
Prudential Bank on July 4, 1988, to
inquire why her check was dishonored.
She approached one Albert Angeles
Reyes, the officer in charge of current
account, and requested him for the ledger
of her current account. Private
respondent discovered a debit of P300.00
penalty for the dishonor of her Prudential
Check No. 983395. She asked why her
check was dishonored when there were
sufficient funds in her account as
reflected in her passbook. Reyes told her
that there was no need to review the
passbook because the bank ledger was
the best proof that she did not have
sufficient funds. Then, he abruptly faced
his typewriter and started typing.
present suit for damages before the RTC
of Valenzuela.
After trial, the court rendered a decision
on August 30, 1991, dismissing the
complaint of Leticia Tupasi-Valenzuela, as
well as the counterclaim filed by the
defendant, now petitioner.
Undeterred, Leticia Tupasi-Valenzuela
appealed to the Court of Appeals. On
January 31, 1996, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision in her favor, setting
aside the trial court's decision and
ordering herein petitioner to pay private
respondent the sum of P100,000.00 by
way of moral damages; P50,000.00
exemplary damages; P50,000.00 for and
as attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
Petitioner filed a timely motion for
reconsideration but it was denied.

Later, it was found out that the check in
the amount of P35,271.60 deposited by
Leticia Tupasi-Valenzuela on June 1, 1988,
was credited in her savings account only
on June 24, 1988, or after a period of 23
days. Thus the P11,500.00 check was
redeposited by Lhuillier on June 24, 1988,
and properly cleared on June 27, 1988.
Because of this incident, the bank tried to
mollify Leticia Tupasi-Valenzuela by
explaining to Legaspi and Lhuillier that
the bank was at fault. Since this was not
the first incident Leticia Tupasi-
Valenzuela had experienced with the
bank, she was unmoved by the bank's
apologies and she commenced the
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of
Appeals has erred and gravely abused its
discretion in awarding moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees to
be paid by Prudential Bank to Leticia
Tupasi-Valenzuela
HELD: No. Admittedly, as found by both
the respondent appellate court and the
trial court, petitioner bank had committed
a mistake. It misposted private
respondent's check deposit to another
account and delayed the posting of the
same to the proper account of the private
respondent. The mistake resulted to the
dishonor of the private respondent's
check.

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In cases decided by the Supreme Court, it
ruled that “In every case, the depositor
expects the bank to treat his account
with the utmost fidelity, whether such
account consists only of a few hundred
pesos or of millions. The bank must
record every single transaction
accurately, down to the last centavo,
and as promptly as possible. This has
to be done if the account is to reflect at
any given time the amount of money
the depositor can dispose of as he sees
fit, confident that the bank will deliver
it as and to whomever he directs. A
blunder on the part of bank, such as
the dishonor of a check without good
reason, can cause the depositor not a
little embarrassment if not also
financial loss and perhaps even civil
and criminal litigation. The point is that
as a business affected with public interest
and because of the nature of its functions,
the bank is under obligation to treat the
account of its depositors with meticulous
care, always having in mind the fiduciary
nature of their relationship”.
The Prudential bank's negligence was the
result of lack of due care and caution
required of managers and employees of a
firm engaged in so sensitive and
demanding business as banking.
Accordingly, the award of moral damages
by the respondent Court of Appeals could
not be said to be in error nor in grave
abuse of its discretion.
WHEREFORE, the assailed DECISION of
the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED,
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with MODIFICATION. Cost against the
petitioner.
DOCTRINE "A bank is under obligation to
treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care whether such account
consists only of a few hundred pesos or of
millions of pesos. Responsibility arising
from negligence in the performance of
every kind of obligation is demandable.
While petitioner's negligence in this case
may not have been attended with malice
and bad faith, nevertheless, it caused
serious anxiety, embarrassment and
humiliation". Hence we ruled that the
offended party in said case was entitled to
recover reasonable moral damages”.
CONSING V. COURT OF APPEALS,
177SCRA 14 (1989)
FACTS: Merlin Consing (pet) sold a house
and lot to Caridad Santos. Provided in
their contract of sale were particular
terms of payment in which the purchase
price shall be paid (installment basis, plus
interest). In the process, Santos defaulted
in her payments. Consing demanded for
her payment and had planned to resort to
court litigation. Santos expressed her
willingness to settle her obligation.
However, this is upon the condition that
the Consings comply with all the laws and
regulations on subdivision and after
payment to her damages as a
consequence of the use of a portion of her
lot as a subdivision road. In response, the

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Consings submitted a revised subdivision
plan.
Contention c/o Consing
CA did not comply with the certification
requirement.
Purpose of certification requirement
• To ensure that all court decisions are
reached after consultation with members
of the court en banc or division, as the
case may be
• To ensure that the decision is rendered
by a court as a whole, not merely by a
member of the same
• To ensure that decisions are arrived
only after deliberation, exchange of ideas,
and concurrence of majority vote
ISSUE: WON Court erred in arriving to its
conclusion without meeting certification
requirement
are reached after consultation with the
members of the court sitting en banc or in
a division before the case is assigned to a
member thereof for decision-writing. The
decision is thus rendered by the court as a
body and not merely by a member thereof
[I Record of the Constitutional
Commission 498-500], This is in keeping
with the very nature of a collegial body
which arrives at its decisions only after
deliberation, the exchange of views and
ideas, and the concurrence of the required
majority vote.
The absence, however, of the certification
would not necessarily mean that the case
submitted for decision had not been
reached in consultation before being
assigned to one member for the writing of
the opinion of the Court since the regular
performance of official duty is presumed
[Sec. 5 (m) of Rule 131, Rules of Court].
The lack of certification at the end of the
decision would only serve as evidence of
failure to observe the certification
requirement and may be basis for holding
the official responsible for the omission to
account therefor [See I Record of the
Constitutional Commission 460]. Such
absence of certification would not have
the effect of invalidating the decision.

HELD: The certification is a new

provision introduced by the framers of
the 1987 Constitution. Its purpose is to SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered
ensure the implementation of the by any court without expressing therein
constitutional requirement that decisions clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate on which it is based.
courts, such as the Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals,

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No petition for review or motion for reaches the legal conclusions, renders its
reconsideration of a decision of the court ruling and, having done so, ends. [Nicos
shall be refused due course or denied Industrial Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 88709,
without stating the legal basis therefore. February 11, 1992]

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND

CIRCUMSTANCES ARE ADDITIONAL
GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS
It is a requirement of due process that the
parties to a litigation be informed of how
it was decided, with an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. The court cannot
simply say that judgment is rendered in
favor of X and against Y and just leave it at
that without any justification whatsoever
for its action. The losing party is entitled
to know why he lost, so he may appeal to
a higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision should be
reversed. A decision that does not clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the law
on which it is based leaves the parties in
the dark as to how it was reached and is
especially prejudicial to the losing party,
who is unable to pinpoint the possible
errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal.
In one case, this Court, exasperated over
the inordinate length of a decision rife
with irrelevant details, castigated the trial
judge for his "extraordinary verbiage."
Kilometric decisions without much
substance must be avoided, to be sure,
but the other extreme, where substance is
also lost in the wish to be brief, is no less
unacceptable either. The ideal decision is
that which, with welcome economy of
words, arrives at the factual findings,
DISMISSAL ON THE BASIS OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION DOES NOT REQUIRE A
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE
LAW INVOLVED
It may be argued that a dismissal based
on lack of jurisdiction is not considered a
judgment on the merits and so is not
covered by the aforecited provision.
There is no quarrel with this established
principle. However, the rule would be
applicable only if the case is dismissed on
the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction and
not when some other additional ground is
invoked.
A careful perusal of the challenged order
will show that the complaint was
dismissed not only for lack of jurisdiction
but also because of the insufficiency of the
evidence to prove the invalidity of the
sheriff's sale. Regarding this second
ground, all the trial court did was
summarily conclude "from the very
evidence adduced by the plaintiff" that
the sheriff's sale "was in complete accord
with the requirements of Section 3, Act
3135." It did not bother to discuss what
that evidence was or to explain why it
believed that the legal requirements had
been observed. Its conclusion was
remarkably threadbare. Brevity is
doubtless an admirable trait, but it should
not and cannot be substituted for

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substance. As the ruling on this second resolution certainly cannot be stigmatized

ground was unquestionably a judgment
on the merits, the failure to state the
factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to
the order. [Nicos Industrial Corp. vs. CA,
G.R. No. 88709, February 11, 1992]
MINUTE RESOLUTIONS ARE NOT
REQUIRED TO STATE THE FACTS AND
THE LAW
It is thus not self-evident that petitioner
could justly lay claim to a grievance. For if
the situation is subjected to a searching
analysis, it cannot be denied that what is
really involved is just a mere incident in
the prosecution of petitioner. Had he
prevailed, he would have been entitled to
provisional liberty. Under the
circumstances, as the facts of the case
clearly demonstrate, with the plea for
habeas corpus being unavailing, we felt
that a minute resolution which certainly
would require less time than a full-blown
decision, was not inappropriate. Precisely,
the leniency shown the parties to dwell at
length on their respective contentions
should disprove any suspicion that the
decision arrived at was reached without
according the parties the fundamental
fairness to which they are entitled under
the Constitution. Since, at the most, the
relief sought by petitioner will not, in any
way, foreclose the ultimate outcome of
the cases against him one way or the
other, we deemed that the constitutional
provision invoked did not strictly call for
application. In that sense, a minute
as in any wise failing to abide by a
constitutional command. [Mendoza vs.
CFI, G.R. No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973]
The Court reminds all lower courts,
lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of
the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions
and decrees them as final and executory,
as where a case is patently without merit,
where the issues raised are factual in
nature, where the decision appealed from
is supported by substantial evidence and
is in accord with the facts of the case and
the applicable laws, where it is clear from
the records that the petition is filed
merely to forestall the early execution of
judgment and for non-compliance with
the rules. The resolution denying due
course or dismissing the petition always
gives the legal basis. "[T]he Court is not
'duty bound' to render signed Decisions
all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate Decisions and/or Minute
Resolutions, provided a legal basis is
given, depending on its evaluation of a
case" (Italics supplied). This is the only
way whereby it can act on all cases filed
before it and, accordingly, discharge its
constitutional functions. The Court
ordinarily acts on the incidents or basic
merits of three hundred (300) to four
hundred (400) cases through its three
Divisions every Monday and Wednesday
when the Divisions meet and on one
hundred (100) to one hundred twenty
(120) cases every Tuesday and Thursday
that it meets en banc or around one
thousand (1,000) cases a week. It is only
on Fridays and week-ends that the

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members of the Court work in their
separate chambers or at home because
the Court does not meet in session —
either in Divisions or En Banc.
For a prompt dispatch of actions of the
Court, minute resolutions are
promulgated by the Court through the
Clerk of Court, who takes charge of
sending copies thereof to the parties
concerned by quoting verbatim the
resolution issued on a particular case. It is
the Clerk of Court's duty to inform the
parties of the action taken on their cases
by quoting the resolution adopted by the
Court. The Clerk of Court never
participates in the deliberations of a case.
All decisions and resolutions are actions
of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely
transmits the Court's action. [Borromeo
vs. CA, G.R. No. 82273, June 1, 1990]
NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION VS.
COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. NO. 88709, FEBRUARY 11, 1992)
FACTS: In its complaint, petitioners
alleged that on January 24, 1980, NICOS
Industrial Corporation obtained a P2M
loan from private respondent United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and to
secure payment thereof, executed a real
estate mortgage on two parcels of land.
The mortgage was foreclosed for alleged
non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff's
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sale was held without re-publication of
the required notices after the original
date for the auction was changed without
the knowledge or consent of the
mortgagor. UCPB was the highest and
lone bidder and the mortgaged lands
were sold to it. UCPB sold all its rights to
the properties to private respondent
Manuel Co, who transferred them to
Golden Star Industrial Corporation,
another private respondent, upon whose
petition a writ of possession was issued to
it. NICOS and the other petitioners filed
suit for "annulment of sheriff's sale,
recovery of possession, and damages,
with prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction."
Golden Star and Evangelista filed a 7-page
demurrer to the evidence where they
argued that the action was a derivative
suit that came under the jurisdiction of
the Securities and Exchange Commission;
that the mortgage had been validly
foreclosed; that the sheriff's sale had been
held in accordance with Act 3135; that the
notices had been duly published in a
newspaper of general circulation; and
that the opposition to the writ of
possession had not been filed on time. No
opposition to the demurrer having been
submitted despite notice thereof to the
parties, Judge Nestor F. Dantes considered
it submitted for resolution and on June 6,
1986, issued the following —
ORDER
Acting on the "Demurrer to Evidence"
dated April 30, 1986 filed by defendants

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Victorino P. Evangelista and Golden Star
Industrial Corporation to which plaintiff
and other defendants did not file their
comment/opposition and it appearing
from the very evidence adduced by the
plaintiff that the Sheriff's Auction Sale
conducted on July 11, 1983 was in
complete accord with the requirements of
Section 3, Act 3135 under which the
auction sale was appropriately held and
conducted and it appearing from the
allegations in paragraph 13 of the
plaintiff's pleading and likewise from
plaintiff Carlos Coquinco's own testimony
that his cause is actually-against the other
officers and stockholders of the plaintiff
Nicos Industrial Corporation ". . . for the
purpose of protecting the corporation and
its stockholders, as well as their own
rights and interests in the corporation,
and the corporate assets, against the
fraudulent ants and devices of the
responsible officials of the corporation, in
breach of the trust reposed upon them by
the stockholders . . ." a subject matter not
within the competent jurisdiction of the
Court, the court finds the same to be
impressed with merit.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff's complaint is
hereby dismissed. The Defendants'
respective counterclaims are likewise
dismissed. The Writ of Preliminary
Injunction heretofore issued is dissolved
and set aside. It is this order that is now
assailed by the petitioners on the
principal ground that it violates the
aforementioned constitutional
requirement. The petitioners claim that it
is not a reasoned decision and does not
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clearly and distinctly explain how it was
reached by the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a failure to
state clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law in which the order of dismissal is
based.
HELD: Yes.The questioned order is an
over-simplification of the issues, and
violates both the letter and spirit of
Article VIII, Section 14, of the
Constitution.It is a requirement of due
process that the parties to a litigation be
informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the conclusions of the
court. The
court cannot simply say that judgment is
rendered in favor of X and against Y and
just leave it at that without any
justification whatsoever for its action. The
losing party is entitled to know why he
lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if
permitted, should he believe that the
decision should be reversed. A decision
that does not clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the law on which it is based
leaves the parties in the dark as to how it
was reached and is especially prejudicial
to the losing party, who is unable to
pinpoint the possible errors of the court
for review by a higher tribunal.
It is important to observe at this point
that the constitutional provision does not
apply to interlocutory orders, such as one
granting a motion for postponement or
quashing a subpoena, because it "refers
only to decisions on the merits and not to

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orders of the trial court resolving
incidental matters." As for the minute
resolutions of this Court, we have already
observed in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals
that — The Supreme Court disposes of the
bulk of its cases by minute resolutions
and decrees them as final and executory,
as where a case is patently without merit,
where the issues raised are factual in
nature, where the decision appealed from
is supported by substantial evidence and
is in accord with the facts of the case and
the applicable laws, where it is clear from
the records that the petitions were filed
merely to forestall the early execution of
judgment and for non-compliance with
the rules. The resolution denying due
course or dismissing a petition always
gives the legal basis. xxx xxx xxx
The Court is not duty bound to render
signed decisions all the time. It has ample
discretion to formulate decisions and/or
minute resolutions, provided a legal basis
is given, depending on its evaluation of a
case. The order in the case at bar does not
come under either of the above
exceptions. As it is settled that an order
dismissing a case for insufficient evidence
is a judgment on the merits, it is
imperative that it be a reasoned decision
clearly and distinctly stating therein the
facts and the law on which it is based.
MENDOZA VS. CFI
G.R. NO. L-35612-14 JUNE 27, 1973
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FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for
habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus.
Said petitions were dismissed by the
court for lack of merit due to the fact that
petitioner failed to sustain the burden of
showing that his confinement was
marked by illegality or that the order
cancelling the bail previously issued was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, this petition for reconsideration.
ISSUES: WON the petitioner can invoke
the habeas corpus rule. Granted that
petitioner may not be released on a
habeas corpus proceeding, is he, however,
entitled to bail?
HELD:
1. NO. Habeas corpus could be invoked by
petitioner if he were able to show the
illegality of his detention. There is aptness
and accuracy in the characterization of
the writ of habeas corpus as the writ of
liberty. Rightfully it is latitudinarian in
scope. It is wide-ranging and all
embracing in its reach. It can dig deep
into the facts to assure that there be no
toleration of illegal restraint. Detention
must be for a cause recognized by law.
The writ imposes on the judiciary the
grave responsibility of ascertaining
whether a deprivation of physical
freedom is warranted. This it has to
discharge without loss of time. The party
who is keeping a person in custody has to
produce him in court as soon as possible.
What is more,
he must justify the action taken. Only if it
can be demonstrated that there has been
no violation of one's right to liberty will

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he be absolved from responsibility. Unless
there be such a showing, the confinement
must thereby cease. The above
formulation of what is settled law finds no
application to the present situation.
Petitioner's deprivation of liberty is in
accordance with a warrant of arrest
properly issued after a determination by
the judge in compliance with the
constitutional provision requiring the
examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses
produced. No allegation to the contrary
may be entertained. There was no
question, however, as to the legality of the
warrants of arrest previously issued to
petitioner. Habeas corpus, under the
circumstances, would not therefore lie.
2. NO. BAIL is the remedy by which,
notwithstanding the absence of any flaw
in one's confinement, provisional liberty
may still be had. Such a remedy, as a
matter of fact, was granted him in
accordance with an order of the municipal
court of Mulanay. Thereafter, however,
the bail was revoked by the Court of First
Instance in the order now challenged.
Such actuation he would now condemn as
a grave abuse of discretion. Before
conviction, every person is bailable except
if charged with capital offense when the
evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right
flows from the presumption of innocence
in favor of every accused who should not
be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a
regime of liberty is honored in the
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observance and not in the breach. It is not
beyond the realm of probability, however,
that a person charged with a crime,
especially so where his defense is weak,
would just simply make himself scarce
and thus frustrate the hearing of his cage.
A bail is intended as a guarantee that such
an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the
language of Cooley, a mode short of
confinement which would, with
reasonable certainty, insure the
attendance of the accused for the
subsequent trial. Nor is there anything
unreasonable in denying this right to one
charged with a capital offense when
evidence of guilt is strong, as the
likelihood is, rather than await the
outcome of the proceeding against him
with a death sentence, an ever-present
threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction
would be too great to be resisted.
The precise question however, is whether
once the provisional liberty has been thus
obtained, it could be terminated by the
cancellation of the bail. The two basic
objections are:
One was that petitioner, when the bail
was granted, was still at large. The
municipal court, therefore, could not have
granted bail in accordance with our ruling
in Feliciano v. Pasicolan. Thus: "'The
constitutional mandate that all persons
shall before conviction be bailable except
those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong, is subject to the
limitation that the person applying for
bail should be in custody of the law, or
otherwise deprived of his liberty. The

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purpose of bail is to secure one's release
and it would be incongruous as to grant
bail to one who is free.'"
Secondly, and what is worse, the
prosecution was never given a chance to
present its evidence. The authoritative
doctrine in People v. San Diego is thus
squarely in point: "Whether the motion
for bail of a defendant who is in custody
for a capital offense be resolved in
summary proceeding or in the course of a
regular trial, the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it
may desire to introduce before the Court
should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in
the criminal case involved in the instant
special civil action, the prosecution
should be denied such an opportunity,
there would be a violation of procedural
due process, and order of the Court
granting bail should be considered void."
No grave abuse of discretion to justify the
grant of the writ certiorari prayed for has
been shown. That is why our resolution
sought to be reconsidered should stand.
Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of the Judicial
Records Office of this Court, with
usurpation of judicial functions, for
allegedly "maliciously and deviously
issuing biased, fake, baseless and
unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry
of Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273. This is not
the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed
charges/complaints against officials of the
Court. In several letter complaints filed
with the courts and the Ombudsman
Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he
"suffered injustices," because of the
disposition of the four (4) cases he
separately appealed to this Court which
were resolved by minute resolutions,
allegedly in violation of Sections 4 (3),13
and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. His invariable complaint is
that the resolutions which disposed of his
cases do not bear the signatures of the
Justices who participated in the
deliberations and resolutions and do not
show that they voted therein. He likewise
complained that the resolutions bear no
certification of the Chief Justice and that
they did not state the facts and the law on
which they were based and were signed
only by the Clerks of Court and therefore
"unconstitutional, null and void."

BORROMEO VS. COURT OF APPEALS The Supreme Court through its Third
(G.R. NO. L-82273, JUNE 1, 1990) PER Division disposed of Borromeo's petition
CURIAM in a four-page resolution which more than
adequately complies with the
FACTS: Petitioner Joaquin T. Borromeo constitutional requirements governing
charges Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and resolutions refusing to give due course to
Alfredo P. Marasigan, Division Clerk of petitions for review. The petition and its
Court and Asst. Division Clerk of Court, incidents were discussed and deliberated
respectively, of the Third Division, and upon by the Justices of the Third Division.
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The Court reminds all lower courts,
lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of
the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions
and decrees them as final and executory,
as where a case is patently without merits
where the issues raised are factual in
nature, where the decision appealed from
is supported by: substantial evidence and,
is in accord with the facts of the case and
the applicable laws, where it is clear from
the records that the petition is filed
merely to forestall the early execution of
judgment and for non-compliance with
the rules.
ISSUES:
1. WON the certification of the Chief
Justice is imperative in minute resolutions.
2. WON the resolution in question lacked
necessary facts and law on which they are
based.
HELD:
1. NO. Minute resolutions need not be
signed by the members of the Court who
took part in the deliberations of a case
nor do they require the certification of the
Chief Justice. For to require members of
the court to sign all resolutions issued
would not only unduly delay the issuance
of its resolutions but a great amount of
their time would be spent on functions
more properly performed by the Clerk of
court and which time could be more
profitably used in the analysis of cases
and the formulation of decisions and
orders of important nature and character.
Even with the use of this procedure, the
Court is still struggling to wipe out the
backlogs accumulated over the years and
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meet the ever increasing number of cases
coming to it. Remedial-legislation to meet
this problem is also pending in Congress.
In discharging its constitutional duties,
the Court needs the fun time and
attention of its Clerks of Court and other
key officials. Its officers do not have the
time to answer frivolous complaints filed
by disgruntled litigants questioning
decisions and resolutions of the Court and
involving cases deliberated upon and
resolved by the Court itself. As earlier
stated, all resolutions and decisions are
actions of the Court, not its subordinate
personnel. The Court assumes full
responsibility: for all its acts. Its
personnel cannot answer and should not
be made to answer for acts of the Court.
2. NO. In Macario Tayamura, et al. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (May
21, 1987), the Court clarified the
constitutional requirement that a decision
must express clearly and distinctly the
facts and law on which it is based as
referring only to decisions. Resolutions
disposing of petitions fall under the
constitutional provision which states that,
"No petition for review ... shall be refused
due course ...without stating the legal
basis therefore" (Section 14, Article VIII,
Constitution). When the Court, after
deliberating on a petition and any
subsequent pleadings, manifestations,
comments, or motions decides to deny
due course to the petition and states that
the questions raised are factual or no
reversible error in the respondent court's
decision is shown or for some other legal

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basis stated in the resolution, there is
sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.
KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.) INC.,
VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. NO. 127682, APRIL 4, 1998)
FACTS:
NIDC granted petitioner KIPI a direct loan
of P8M and a P2M guarantee to secure
PNB. As security thereof, KIPI executed in
favor of NIDC a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage, covering, among others, a
parcel of land with all its improvements.
Upon full payment of KIPI's account with
NIDC and the P2.0 M Credit Line with
Respondent PNB, NIDC executed a Deed
of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage,
which provided that: "Whereas, the credit
accommodations had been fully paid by
the Borrower to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) and NIDC which
subsequently returned the owner's copy
of the TCT No. 469737 of the petitioner
and accordingly the Deed of Release and
Cancellation of Mortgage was registered
with the Registry of Deed. However, it
appeared that there were some accounts
chargeable to KIPI on deferred letters of
credit opened which came to the
knowledge of PNB only in 1981 and 1982.
Hence, PNB requested for the return of
the owner's copy of TCT No. 469737 and
the said title was returned to PNB.
PNB filed a "Petition for Correction of
Entry and Adverse Claim" with the office
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of the Registry of Deeds of Makati, and
was able to have the same annotated. It
then filed a Petition of Sale to extra-
judicially foreclose various properties
belonging to KIPI. KIPI received an
undated Notice of Sheriff's Sale to the
effect that the land covered by TCT No.
469737 would be foreclosed extra-
judicially on December 19, 1983 at 9:00
a.m. Petitioner challenged the foreclosure
sale saying that it was null and void
because the Deed of Release necessarily
includes the mortgage to the PNB. The
Court did not agree that the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage on the whole
property is null and void. And due to the
unfavorable decision Petitioner filed a
pleading denominated as a Motion for
Leave to file Incorporated Second Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution
sayibg that the "minute resolutions" it
assails are supposedly in violation of
Section 14, Article VIII of the present
Constitution. It insinuates that such
procedure adopted by this Court is a
culpable constitutional violation and can
be subject of impeachment proceedings.
ISSUE: WON the minute resolutions of the
court are in violation of Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution.
HELD: NO. It has been stressed that these
"resolutions" are not "decisions" within
the above constitutional requirements;
they merely hold that the petition for
review should not be entertained and
even ordinary lawyers have all this time
so understood it; and the petition to
review the decision of the Court of

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Appeals is not a matter of right but of

sound judicial discretion, hence there is
no need to fully explain the Court's denial
since, for one thing, the facts and the law
are already mentioned in the Court of
Appeals' decision.
The constitutional mandate is applicable
only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e.,
given due course and after the filing of
briefs or memoranda and/or other
pleadings, but not where the petition is
refused due course, with the resolution
therefor stating the legal basis thereof.
Thus, when the Court, after deliberating
on a petition and subsequent pleadings,
decides to deny due course to the petition
and states that the questions raised are
factual or there is no reversible error in
the respondent court's decision, there is
sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.
The Court reminds all lower courts,
lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of
the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions
and decrees them as final and executory,
as where a case is patently without merit,
where the issues raised are factual in
nature, where the decision appealed from
is supported by substantial evidence and
is in accord with the facts of the case and
the applicable laws, where it is clear from
the records that the petition is filed
merely to forestall the early execution of
judgment and for non-compliance with
the rules. The resolution denying due
course or dismissing the petition always
gives the legal basis.
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PRUDENTIAL BANK VS. CASTRO
(A.M. NO. 2756, MARCH 15, 1988) PER
CURIAM
FACTS: Respondent Grecia filed a
"Petition for Redress and Exoneration and
for Voluntary Inhibition", praying that the
decision of November 12,1987, and the
resolution of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the said decision be set
aside and a new one entered by this Court
dismissing the administrative complaint
and exonerating the respondent.
Respondent’s ire results from an
administrative case filed against him and
the subsequent collective decision of the
Court to disbar him. Respondent
questions the validity of Court’s decision
due to the fact that the said decision is
violative of the 1987 Constitution due to
lack of certification by the Chief Justice
and that the conclusions of the Court
were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to a member for the
writing of the opinion of the Court.
ISSUE: WON the certification of the Chief
Justice is required for the validity of the
assailed decision.
HELD: NO. The certification requirement
refers to decisions in judicial, not
administrative cases. From the very
beginning, resolutions/decisions of the
Court in administrative cases have not
been accompanied by any formal
certification. In fact, such a certification
would be a superfluity in administrative
cases, which by their very nature, have to

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be deliberated upon considering the
collegiate composition of this Court. But
even if such a certification were required,
it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of
the Court in its decision were arrived at
after consultation and deliberation. The
signatures of the members who actually
took part in the deliberations and voted
attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam
decision, or an opinion of the Court as a
whole, there is no ponente although any
member of the Court may be assigned to
write the draft. In such cases, a formal
certification is obviously not required.
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION
vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 114323. July 23, 1998
FACTS: The dispute between the parties
had its origin in the non-delivery of the
4,300 metric tons of oil well cement to the
petitioner. The petitioner is a foreign
corporation owned and controlled by the
Government of India while the private
respondent is a private corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines. A contract was entered
into between the two parties whereby the
private respondent undertook to supply
the petitioner 4,300 metric tons of oil well
cement for a consideration of
US$477,300.00. Notwithstanding the fact
that the private respondent had already
received payment and despite several
demands made by the petitioner, the
private respondent failed to deliver the oil
well cement. Thereafter, negotiations
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ensued between the parties and they
agreed that the private respondent will
replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil
well cement with Class "G" cement cost
free at the petitioner's designated port.
However, upon inspection, the Class "G"
cement did not conform to the
petitioner's specifications. The petitioner
then informed the private respondent
that it was referring its claim to an
arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their
contract.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N.
Malhotra, resolved them dispute in
petitioner's favor. To enable the
petitioner to execute the award in its
favor, it filed a Petition before the Court of
the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India
(foreign court), praying that the decision
of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of
Court" in India. The foreign court refused
to admit the private respondent’s
objections for failure to pay the required
filing fees. Thus, an order was issued
ordering privare respondent to pay
petitioner. Despite notice sent to the
private respondent of the foregoing order
and several demands by the petitioner for
compliance therewith, the private
respondent refused to pay the amount
adjudged by the foreign court as owing to
the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner
filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City
for the enforcement of the
aforementioned judgment of the foreign
court. The private respondent moved to
dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds:

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(1) plaintiffs lack of legal capacity to sue;
(2) lack of cause of action; and
(3) plaintiffs claim or demand has been
waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished.
The RTC dismissed private respondent’s
complaint for lack of a valid cause of
action. Anent the issue of the sufficiency
of the petitioner's cause of action,
however, the RTC found the referral of the
dispute between the parties to the
arbitrator under Clause 16 of their
contract erroneous. The RTC
characterized the erroneous submission
of the dispute to the arbitrator as a
“mistake of law or fact amounting to want
of jurisdiction”. Consequently, the
proceedings had before the arbitrator
were null and void and the foreign court
had therefore, adopted no legal award
which could be the source of an
enforceable right.
The petitioner then appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In
its decision, the appellate court concurred
with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator
did not have jurisdiction over the dispute
between the parties, thus, the foreign
court could not validly adopt the
arbitrator's award. In addition, the
appellate court observed that the full text
of the judgment of the foreign court
contains the dispositive portion only and
indicates no findings of fact and law as
basis for the award. Hence, the said
judgment cannot be enforced by any
Philippine court as it would violate the
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constitutional provision that no decision
shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.
Upon denial of the motion for
reconsideration, petitioner filed
thepresent petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the arbitrator had
jurisdiction over the dispute between the
petitioner and the private respondent
under Clause 16 of the contract.
(2) Whether or not the judgment of the
foreign court is enforceable in this
jurisdiction in view of the private
respondent's allegation that it is bereft of
any statement of facts and law upon
which the award in favor of the petitioner
was based.
HELD:
1. It is noted that the non-delivery of the
oil well cement is not in the nature of a
dispute arising from the failure to execute
the supply order/contract design,
drawing, instructions, specifications or
quality of the materials as provided for in
the Clause 16 of their Contract. That
Clause 16 should pertain only to matters
involving the technical aspects of the
contract is but a logical inference
considering that the underlying purpose
of a referral to arbitration is for such
technical matters to be deliberated upon
by a person possessed with the required
skill and expertise which may be
otherwise absent in the regular courts.

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This Court agrees with the appellate court
in its ruling that the non-delivery of the
oil well cement is a matter properly
cognizable by the regular courts as
stipulated by the parties in Clause 15 of
their contract:
All questions, disputes and differences,
arising under out of or in connection with
this supply order, shall be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the court, within
the local limits of whose jurisdiction and
the place from which this supply order is
situated. We believe that the correct
interpretation to give effect to both
stipulations in the contract is for Clause
16 to be confined to all claims or disputes
arising from or relating to the design,
drawing, instructions, specifications or
quality of the materials of the supply
order/contract, and for Clause 15 to cover
all other claims or disputes. But the Court
finds merit on the contention that the
failure of the replacement cement to
conform to the specifications of the
contract is a matter clearly falling within
the ambit of Clause 16. Undoubtedly,
what was referred to arbitration was no
longer the mere non-delivery of the cargo
at the first instance but also the failure of
the replacement cargo to conform to the
specifications of the contract, a matter
clearly within the coverage of Clause 16.
2. As specified in the order of the Civil
Judge of Dehra Dun, "Award Paper No.
3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree". This
is a categorical declaration that the
foreign court adopted the findings of facts
and law of the arbitrator as contained in
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the latter's Award Paper. Award Paper No.
3/B-1, contains an exhaustive discussion
of the respective claims and defenses of
the parties, and the arbitrator's
evaluation of the same. Inasmuch as the
foregoing is deemed to have been
incorporated into the foreign court's
judgment the appellate court was in error
when it described the latter to be a
"simplistic decision containing literally,
only the dispositive portion". The
constitutional mandate that no decision
shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein dearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based
does not preclude the validity of
"memorandum decisions" which adopt by
reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the
decisions of inferior tribunals. Hence,
even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by
reference is allowed if only to avoid the
cumbersome reproduction of the decision
of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in
the decision of the higher court. This is
particularly true when the decision
sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and
thorough discussion of the facts and
conclusions arrived at, as in this case,
where Award Paper No. 3/B-1 consists of
eighteen (18) single spaced pages.
Furthermore, the recognition to be
accorded a foreign judgment is not
necessarily affected by the fact that the
procedure in the courts of the country in
which such judgment was rendered
differs from that of the courts of the
country in which the judgment is relied
on. Thus, if under the procedural rules of

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the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid
judgment may be rendered by adopting
the arbitrator's findings, then the same
must be accorded respect. In the same
vein, if the procedure in the foreign court
mandates that an Order of the Court
becomes final and executory upon failure
to pay the necessary docket fees, then the
courts in this jurisdiction cannot
invalidate the order of the foreign court
simply because our rules provide
otherwise.
The foreign judgment being valid, there is
nothing else left to be done than to order
its enforcement, despite the fact that the
petitioner merely prays for the remand of
the case to the RTC for further
proceedings. As this Court has ruled on
the validity and enforceability of the said
foreign judgment in this jurisdiction,
further proceedings in the RTC for the
reception of evidence to prove otherwise
are no longer necessary.
VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO VS. WINAI
PERMSKUL AND THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. NO. 81006 MAY 12, 1989
petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to
answer for unpaid rentals or any damage
to the leased premises except when
caused by reasonable wear and tear. On
May 31, 1985, the private respondent
vacated the property. He thereafter
requested the refund of his deposit minus
the sum of P1,000.00, representing the
rental for the additional ten days of his
occupancy after the expiration of the
lease. The petitioner rejected this request.
He said the lessee still owed him for other
charges, including the electricity and
water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for
repainting of the leased premises to
restore them to their original condition.
The private respondent sued in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. After
the submission of position papers by the
parties, a summary judgment was
rendered, sustaining the complainant and
holding that the repainting was not
chargeable to him. This decision was
appealed to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and was affirmed by Judge Jose C.
de la Rama on January 14, 1987. This was
done in a memorandum decision reading
in full as follows:

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FACTS: On May 21, 1984, the petitioner After a careful and thorough perusal,
leased his apartment in Makati to the
evaluation and study of the records of this
private respondent for a period of one case, this Court hereby adopts by
year for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 reference the findings of fact and
a month. Pursuant to the lease contract, conclusions of law contained in the
the private respondent deposited with the
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decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and
finds that there is no cogent reason to
disturb the same.
The decision was affirmed by the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. The defendant went
to the Court of Appeals, his petition for
review was denied hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the memorandum
decision of the regional trial court violates
Article VIII Section 14 of the Constitution.
RULING: NO. There is no question that
the purpose of the law in authorizing the
memorandum decision is to expedite the
termination of litigations for the benefit of
the parties as well as the courts
themselves. Concerned with the mounting
problem of delay in the administration of
justice, the Constitution now contains a
number of provisions aimed at correcting
this serious difficulty that has caused
much disaffection among the people. The
memorandum decision can be welcomed
indeed as an acceptable method of dealing
expeditiously with the case load of the
courts of justice, but expediency alone, no
matter how compelling, cannot excuse
non-compliance with the Constitution; or
to put it more familiarly, the end does not
justify the means. In the case at bar, the
court finds that a judgment was made by
the metropolitan trial court in compliance
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with the rule on summary procedure. It is
not really correct to say that the Court of
Appeals did not review the memorandum
decision of the regional trial court which
was the subject of the petition for review.
A reading of its own decision will show
that it dealt extensively with the
memorandum decision and discussed it at
some length in the light of the
observations and reservations. The law
does not define the memorandum
decision and simply suggests that the
court may adopt by reference the findings
of fact and the conclusions of law stated in
the decision, order or resolution on
appeal before it. When a law is questioned
before the Court, the presumption is in
favor of its constitutionality. The Court
has deliberated extensively on the
challenge posed against the
memorandum decision as now authorized
by law.
ODCHIGUE-BONDOC VS TAN TIONG BIO,
GR 186652, OCTOBER 6, 2010
FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint for
estafa against Fil-Estate officials including
its Corporate Secretary, herein
respondent. Petitioner denies the
allegations.
The DOJ, by resolution signed by the Chief
State Prosecutor for the Secretary of
Justice, motu proprio dismissed the
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petition on finding that there was no preliminary investigation is not a

showing of any reversible error.
The CA set aside the DOJ Secretary’s
resolution holding that it committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
Resolution dismissing respondent’s
petition for review without therein
expressing clearly and distinctly the facts
on which the dismissal was based, in
violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the
Constitution (No decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based).
Petitioner asserts in this present petition
for review on certiorari that the
requirement in Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the
Constitution applies only to decisions of
“courts of justice”, and it does not extend
to decisions or rulings of executive
departments such as the DOJ.
quasi-judicial proceeding, but is
merely inquisitorial since the
prosecutor does not determine the
guilt of innocence of the accused.
While the prosecutor makes the
determination whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is
probable cause, he cannot be said to
be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the
courts, ultimately, that pass judgment
on the accused.
2. No. The Secretary of Justice in
reviewing a prosecutor’s order or
resolution via appeal or petition for
review cannot be considered a quasi-
judicial proceeding since the DOJ is
not a quasi-judicial body. Sec 14, Art.
VIII of the Constitution does not thus
extend to resolutions issued by the
DOJ Secretary.

Respondent counters that the SECTION 15. (1) All cases or matters filed
constitutional requirement is not limited after the effectivity of this Constitution
to courts as it extends to quasi-judicial must be decided or resolved within twenty-
and administrative bodies, as well as to four months from date of submission for
preliminary investigations conducted by the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by
these tribunals. the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
lower collegiate courts, and three months
ISSUE: for all other lower courts.
1. Whether or not a prosecutor exercises
quasi-judicial power. (2) A case or matter shall be deemed
2. Whether or not the DOJ Secretary submitted for decision or resolution upon
exercises quasi-judicial power. the filing of the last pending, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules of
HELD: Court or by the court itself.
1. No. A prosecutor does not exercise
adjudication or rule-making powers. A
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(3) Upon the expiration of the

corresponding period, a certification to this
effect signed by the Chief Justice or the
presiding judge shall forthwith be issued
and a copy thereof attached to the record
of the case or matter, and served upon the
parties. The certification shall state why a
decision or resolution has not been
rendered or issued within said period.

(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable

mandatory period, the court, without
prejudice to such responsibility as may
have been incurred in consequence thereof,
shall decide or resolve the case or matter
submitted thereto for determination,
without further delay.

SECTION 16. The Supreme Court shall,

within thirty days from the opening of each
regular session of the Congress, submit to
the President and the Congress an annual
report on the operations and activities of
the Judiciary.

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