Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981

SAMUEL C. OCCENA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE
DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, respondents.

G.R. No. L-56404 April 2, 1981

RAMON A. GONZALES, MANUEL B. IMBONG, JO AUREA MARCOS-IMBONG, RAY ALLAN T. DRILON,

NELSON B. MALANA and GIL M. TABIOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL TREASURER and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions 1proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional
infirmity. Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former
delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The
rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law,
the Javellana 2 ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. To put it at its mildest, such an approach has the arresting
charm of novelty – but nothing else. It is in fact self defeating, for if such were indeed the case, petitioners have
come to the wrong forum. We sit as a Court duty-bound to uphold and apply that Constitution. To contend otherwise
as was done here would be, quite clearly, an exercise in futility. Nor are the arguments of petitioners cast in the
traditional form of constitutional litigation any more persuasive. For reasons to be set forth, we dismiss the petitions.

The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 3 and March 12, 1981. 4 On March 10 and 13
respectively, respondents were required to answer each within ten days from notice. 5 There was a comment on the
part of the respondents. Thereafter, both cases were set for hearing and were duly argued on March 26 by
petitioners and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for respondents. With the submission of pertinent data in
amplification of the oral argument, the cases were deemed submitted for decision.

It is the ruling of the Court, as set forth at the outset, that the petitions must be dismissed.

1. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion
of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, 6 dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its
ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six 7 to four. 8 It then concluded: "This being the vote of the
majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." 9 Such a
statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the
atmosphere. It made manifest that, as of January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With
such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the
Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed.
Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as
simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a
negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black 10 and Murphy, 11 the Supreme Court can
check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but
may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as
constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the
concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest
case in point is People v. Sola, 12 promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of
the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited. 13

2. We come to the crucial issue, the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how it
may be exercised. More specifically as to the latter, the extent of the changes that may be introduced, the number of
votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper submission. As was stated
earlier, petitioners were unable to demonstrate that the challenged resolutions are tainted by unconstitutionality.

(1) The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable provision in the
1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have
the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members
thereof." 14One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory
Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the
Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on
Amendments. 15When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister
Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do so is clearly
beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be
observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is Concerned, the question of the authority of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. In Occena v. Commission on Elections, 16 filed
by the same petitioner, decided on January 28, 1980, such a question was involved although not directly passed
upon. To quote from the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Antonio in that case: "Considering that the proposed
amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court
and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement
provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment." 17

(2) Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that
they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of
the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise and not to amend. It suffices to quote from
the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections 18 to dispose of
this contention. Thus: "3. And whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the
Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an
Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for
ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution.
4. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the
validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any
rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the
moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people." 19 There is here the adoption of the principle so well-known in
American decisions as well as legal texts that a constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing. 20 We
are not disposed to deviate from such a principle not only sound in theory but also advantageous in practice.

(3) That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper
submission. Again, petitioners have not made out a case that calls for a judgment in their favor. The language of the
Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent
body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible
proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has
been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a
constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang
Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the
requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed that
Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign
country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2
dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5
with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote
of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper
submission, the question may be viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse before the
holding of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the
people so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to the proposed changes. As
to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the
applicable provision: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment
or revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent
assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April
7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution. Thus any argument to the contrary is
unavailing. As for the people being adequately informed, it cannot be denied that this time, as in the cited 1980
Occena opinion of Justice Antonio, where the amendment restored to seventy the retirement age of members of the
judiciary, the proposed amendments have "been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, [ so that ] it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware
of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment [ s ]." 22

WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.

Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I vote to give due course to the petitions at bar and to grant the application for a temporary restraining order
enjoining the plebiscite scheduled for April 7, 1981.
1. Consistently with my dissenting opinion in Sanidad vs. Comelec 1 on the invalidity of the October 1976
amendments proposals to the 1973 Constitution for not having been proposed nor adopted in accordance with the
mandatory provisions thereof, as restated by me in Hidalgo vs. Marcos 2 and De la Llana vs. Comelec 3 , questioning
the validity of the December 17, 1977 referendum – exercise as to the continuance in office as incumbent President
and to be Prime Minister after the organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment
No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments, I am constrained to dissent from the majority decision of dismissal of the petitions.

I had held in Sanidad that the transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the
Constitution as well as to set up the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of the amendments
proposals has been withheld by the Constitution from the President (Prime Minister) as sole repository of executive
power and that so long as the regular National Assembly provided for in Article VIII of the Constitution had not come
to existence and the proposals for constitutional amendments were now deemed necessary to be discussed and
adopted for submittal to the people, strict adherence with the mandatory requirements of the amending process as
provided in the Constitution must be complied with. This means, under the prevailing doctrine of Tolentino vs.
Comelec 4 that the proposed amendments to be valid must come from the constitutional agency vested with the
constituent power to do so, i.e. in the Interim National Assembly provided in the Transitory Article XVII which would
then have to be convened and not from the executive power as vested in the President (Prime Minister) from whom
such constituent power has been withheld.

2. As restated by me in the 1977 case of Hidalgo, under the controlling doctrine of Tolentino, the October 1976
constitutional amendments which created the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the Interim National Assembly
were invalid since as ruled by the Court therein, constitutional provisions on amendments "dealing with the
procedure or manner of amending the fundamental law are binding upon the Convention and the other departments
of the government (and) are no less binding upon the people" and "the very Idea of deparcing from the fundamental
law is anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and repugnant to the essence of the rule of law." The proposed
amendments at bar having been adopted by the Interim Batasang Pambansa as the fruit of the invalid October,
1976 amendments must necessarily suffer from the same Congenital infirmity.

3. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity of the proposed amendments, I reiterate my stand
in Sanidad that the doctrine of fair and proper submission firs enunciated by a simple majority of six Justices (of an
eleven member Court prior to the 1973 Constitution which increased the official composition of the Court to fifteen)
in Gonzales vs. Comelec 5 and subsequently officially adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds majority vote
of the Court (of eight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully applicable in the case at bar. The three resolutions proposing
complex, complicated and radical amendments of our very structure of government were considered and approved
by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the
plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period
fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people to "sufficiently inform them of the amendments to be voted upon,
to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a genuine manner." 6

4. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people of a
proposed constitutional amendment" as stated by retired Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his separate opinion
in Gonzales bears repeating as follows: "... we take the view that the words 'submitted to the people for their
ratification,' if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution – a fundamental charter that is legislation direct
from the people, an expression of their sovereign will – is that it can only be amended by the people expressing
themselves according to the procedure ordained by the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid
before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote
blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them with the
proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the
incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word 'submitted' can only mean that the
government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every short to inform every citizen of the provisions to be
amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. ... What the Constitution in
effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or
agency within its structural framework to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or
rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair
submission, intelligent consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still approve the amendments no
matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For the people decree their own fate."

Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that "... The great men who builded the structure of
our state in this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said 'A good
Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for
stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought
evolved in excitement, or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone if the government is to be safe, can
be allowed efficacy ... Changes in government are to be feard unless benefit is certain.' As Montaign says: 'All great
mutation shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a
worse."'

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I vote to give due course to the petitions at bar and to grant the application for a temporary restraining order
enjoining the plebiscite scheduled for April 7, 1981.

1. Consistently with my dissenting opinion in Sanidad vs. Comelec 1 on the invalidity of the October 1976
amendments proposals to the 1973 Constitution for not having been proposed nor adopted in accordance with the
mandatory provisions thereof, as restated by me in Hidalgo vs. Marcos 2 and De la Llana vs. Comelec 3 , questioning
the validity of the December 17, 1977 referendum – exercise as to the continuance in office as incumbent President
and to be Prime Minister after the organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment
No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments, I am constrained to dissent from the majority decision of dismissal of the petitions.

I had held in Sanidad that the transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the
Constitution as well as to set up the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of the amendments
proposals has been withheld by the Constitution from the President (Prime Minister) as sole repository of executive
power and that so long as the regular National Assembly provided for in Article VIII of the Constitution had not come
to existence and the proposals for constitutional amendments were now deemed necessary to be discussed and
adopted for submittal to the people, strict adherence with the mandatory requirements of the amending process as
provided in the Constitution must be complied with. This means, under the prevailing doctrine of Tolentino vs.
Comelec 4 that the proposed amendments to be valid must come from the constitutional agency vested with the
constituent power to do so, i.e. in the Interim National Assembly provided in the Transitory Article XVII which would
then have to be convened and not from the executive power as vested in the President (Prime Minister) from whom
such constituent power has been withheld.

2. As restated by me in the 1977 case of Hidalgo, under the controlling doctrine of Tolentino, the October 1976
constitutional amendments which created the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the Interim National Assembly
were invalid since as ruled by the Court therein, constitutional provisions on amendments "dealing with the
procedure or manner of amending the fundamental law are binding upon the Convention and the other departments
of the government (and) are no less binding upon the people" and "the very Idea of deparcing from the fundamental
law is anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and repugnant to the essence of the rule of law." The proposed
amendments at bar having been adopted by the Interim Batasang Pambansa as the fruit of the invalid October,
1976 amendments must necessarily suffer from the same Congenital infirmity.

3. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity of the proposed amendments, I reiterate my stand
in Sanidad that the doctrine of fair and proper submission firs enunciated by a simple majority of six Justices (of an
eleven member Court prior to the 1973 Constitution which increased the official composition of the Court to fifteen)
in Gonzales vs. Comelec 5 and subsequently officially adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds majority vote
of the Court (of eight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully applicable in the case at bar. The three resolutions proposing
complex, complicated and radical amendments of our very structure of government were considered and approved
by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the
plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period
fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people to "sufficiently inform them of the amendments to be voted upon,
to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a genuine manner." 6

4. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people of a
proposed constitutional amendment" as stated by retired Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his separate opinion
in Gonzales bears repeating as follows: "... we take the view that the words 'submitted to the people for their
ratification,' if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution – a fundamental charter that is legislation direct
from the people, an expression of their sovereign will – is that it can only be amended by the people expressing
themselves according to the procedure ordained by the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid
before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote
blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them with the
proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the
incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word 'submitted' can only mean that the
government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every short to inform every citizen of the provisions to be
amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. ... What the Constitution in
effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or
agency within its structural framework to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or
rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair
submission, intelligent consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still approve the amendments no
matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For the people decree their own fate."

Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that "... The great men who builded the structure of
our state in this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said 'A good
Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for
stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought
evolved in excitement, or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone if the government is to be safe, can
be allowed efficacy ... Changes in government are to be feard unless benefit is certain.' As Montaign says: 'All great
mutation shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a
worse."'
 [G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997]

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA and MARIA ISABEL

ONGPIN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN,
ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding
members of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents, SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-
IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI),
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP) and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of initiative was
unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the
drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the
original proponent and the main sponsor of the proposed Article on Amendments or
[1] [2]

Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as innovative. Indeed it is, for both
[3]

under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or
revision of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional convention. For this and the other
[4]

reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition.

On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public
respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (hereafter, Delfin
Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
[5]

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for
Peoples Initiative, a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to
[6]

institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other
volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of
that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall
be established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars,
who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement
and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be
designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and
that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise
necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be
affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are
Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the
[7] [8] [9]

Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the
[10]
aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following
proposition:

DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT

OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION?

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people,
and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in
the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-
037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order (a) directing [11]

Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed constitutional
amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily
newspapers of general circulation at his own expense not later than 9 December 1996;
and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared:
Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together
with his two other lawyers; and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law
Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). Senator Roco, on that same
[12]

day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory
petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file
their memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda within five days. [13]

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein -- Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago,

Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin -- filed this special civil action for prohibition
raising the following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill
No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional Amendments by Peoples
Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the
Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.

(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically
provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of
peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo
Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in
1994: There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the
provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a
separate law.

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media.
This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter
take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.

(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern the conduct of
initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra
vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC
has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the
Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5)The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not
to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore,
outside the power of the peoples initiative.

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative; neither the COMELEC
nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.

To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners
allege that in the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the peoples initiative
spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-
registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions of
additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative
itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues
raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayers and
legislators suit. Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
[14]

ordinary course of law.

On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the
petition within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary
restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public
respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents
Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for peoples initiative to
amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their
Comment on the petition. They argue therein that:
[15]

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL

TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST
PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00) IF THE COMELEC GRANTS
THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.

2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF

THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN
THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN
AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES
SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF
THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE
DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571, 200.00;

3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE

GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY
PURSUANT TO ITS INITIATORY JURISDICTION UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT
IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;

4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A
DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;

5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991

PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE
RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT
SAID: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND
JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND
LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS.

6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A

PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO PROMULGATE SUCH
RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES
OF THIS ACT. (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);

7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE

OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN
ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE
DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED.
(PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).

Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a
Comment which starts off with an assertion that the instant petition is a knee-jerk
[16]

reaction to a draft Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution ... which is not formally
filed yet. What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an Initiatory Pleading or Initiatory
Petition, which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the
Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and
function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:

(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the
conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative
is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.

(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to
amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as of the day of the plebiscite.

(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.

(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution
because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically,
only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.

As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners

estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact
figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay
Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority government
expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997,
[17]

the Office of the Solicitor General contends that:

(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2
on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3,
which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines
the same as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5
repeatedly mentions initiative on the Constitution.

(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because,
being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the
law when he claimed that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.

(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not
deal with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution,
not a revision thereof.

(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and
under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the
provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
vs. COMELEC .

On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining
order; (b) noted the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary
Restraining Order filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latters
Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen
Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion
for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his
Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on
23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a
Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which
was later replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:

(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution
because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., it would involve a change from a political
[18]

philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the
change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on
synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done
[19]

by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited
to amendments.

(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national
and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, to open up the political
arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the
concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective
proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the common good; hence,
to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.

(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-
interest situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people
only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium
for good performance. [20]

(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements
the peoples initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who
may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the
contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the
signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may
oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification
of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the
COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such peoples
initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear
Delfins petition.

(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a
peoples initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively
pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the
Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
 On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in Intervention. He avers [21]

that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the peoples right to initiate
constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House
Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech
thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of
that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that
the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition
and to order its publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading
contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is
the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required number of registered
voters. He also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of
the authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required
number of signatures, as the COMELECs role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited
to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and supervision
of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition
in Intervention raising the following arguments:

(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution.

(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the
initiative to amend the Constitution.

(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number
of signatures.

(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by
Congress or a constitutional convention. [22]

On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for

Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave
to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and
MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the
respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated
Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its
Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the
respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt
of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following
pivotal issues, which the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised
in the pleadings so far filed:

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum
and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to
the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations
Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National
and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft
Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to,
the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely
intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing
municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature
stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition
for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.

5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a
pending case before the COMELEC.

After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously
their respective memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to
submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the
allegations and arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC
should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action
and that the Commissions failure or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal
and the Record of the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill
No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the
Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6
June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments
on the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. The parties [23]

thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. [24]

As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil
action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth
issue which appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I

THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE

PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.

Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to
the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil
action when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an
affirmative answer. Thus:

28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent
Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and
under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.

29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior
jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from
usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this
case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental
consequences on the body politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal
confusion and political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.

30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political
ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount
majesty of the Constitution.[25]

It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss
the Delfin Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to
entertain the petition. The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after
[26]

having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December
1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda. Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave
[27]

due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition,
together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of
hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELECs failure to act on Rocos
motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the
instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. -- Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein.

It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not supported by the
required minimum number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which
does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant
case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure in cases of transcendental
importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.: [28]

A partys standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure.

II

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM

OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This provision is not self-executory. In his book, Joaquin Bernas, a member of the
[29]

1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:

Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending
the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis
it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the
Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if
Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on
Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory
Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7
(Proposed Resolution No. 332). That section reads as follows:
[30]

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article ____ Section ____ of
the Constitution.[31]

After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee
submitted a new formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2;
thus:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the Members
of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon
a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter
of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose
amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered
voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. [32]

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are
left to the legislature. Thus:

FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.

First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no details
in the provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this
matter to the legislature?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does not
pass the necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?

MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with
respect to the budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could
be called. We deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In
any event, as envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after
five years from the date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that
could be proposed through the exercise of this initiative power would be after five years. It is
reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the National Assembly can come up with the
appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.

FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature - the details on how this is to be carried
out - is it possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is the work of
the legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as a body
could propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-
fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to the
people for ratification through the process of an initiative.

xxx

MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest
constituent power in the people to amend the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of
institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment
thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as
written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power
has primacy over all other legal mandates?

MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the
Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of
circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.

MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a
separate article in the constitution that would specifically cover the process and the modes of
amending the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again
concede to the legislature the process or the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending
the Constitution by people's initiative?

MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the
National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would
adequately cover all the conceivable situations. [33]

It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is
limited to proposals to AMEND -- not to REVISE -- the Constitution; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. ... This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which
came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members
felt that this system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we
removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. [34]

xxx

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a
separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of
initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the
Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes
(a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to
amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ.That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee. [35]

Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then

Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with the
following:

xxx

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into
account the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners
Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in
substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read as follows:"SECTION 2. -- AMENDMENTS
TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION

OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.

MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of the
sense contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
amendment. [36]

The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2

clearly showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the
right. Thus:

MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set
forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative...?

MR. DAVIDE. It can.

xxx

MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioners amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking
another body to set the proposition in proper form.

MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular
right would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the
percentage of the requirement.

MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for submission
to the people, may be subject to legislation.

MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none
of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded
here.

MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be
legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. [37]

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly

confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to -- NOT REVISION of -- the Constitution. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1

refers to "amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla
when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by
Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." [38]

Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments

through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an
amendment to the Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the
National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would require
a higher number. Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a
majority of the National Assembly is required, the import being that the process of amendment
must be made more rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting
an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to
reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it would require
another voting by the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10
percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the Commission
shall take up the Article on the Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions. [39]

The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and

the final version, which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against,
reads as follows:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as

follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST
TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH
EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS
SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE
YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION

OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. [40]

The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second

reading on 9 July 1986. Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner
[41]

Gascon was allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was

withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings
on 1 August 1986. [42]

However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be

amended by changing percent to per centum and thereof to therein and deleting the
phrase by law in the second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The
Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. This
[43] [44]

amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the
Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
 Has Congress provided for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who
answer the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator
Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the
right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or
rationale of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the
last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:

The Congress[45] shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

with

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for

the rules implementing the exercise of the right. The rules means the details on how [the
right] is to be carried out. [46]

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No.
21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage
and Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills
referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, which dealt with the initiative and referendum
[47]

mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No.
988, which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative
[48]

and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for
in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 solely dealt with [49]

initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government

units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House
Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the
Senate and by the House of Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
[50] [51]

But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to provide
for the implementation of the exercise of the right?
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act
does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution.The said section reads:

SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of
this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Underscoring supplied).

The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is
neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and
referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is
silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the
Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the
power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to laws, ordinances, or
resolutions.
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted
from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local
initiative and referendum and appropriately used the phrases propose and enact, approve
or reject and in whole or in part. [52]

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative,
and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the
percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case
of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for
initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things,
statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition,
the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;

c.2 the proposition;

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Underscoring supplied).

The use of the clause proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier,
excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle
II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided
for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means
that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If
Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering
that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the
initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is
national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and
Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the
classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on
its nature and character. It is national initiative, if what is proposed to be adopted or
enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is local initiative if
what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only
the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative
into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for
emphasis and clearer understanding:

SEC. 3. Definition of terms --

xxx

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;

a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Underscoring supplied).

Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle
on initiative on amendments to the Constitution. [53]

A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is

not accurate. Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum
are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election
called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation
of the Commission. (Underscoring supplied).

(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the
legislative bodies of local governments; thus:

SEC. 11. Indirect Initiative. -- Any duly accredited peoples organization, as defined by law, may
file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative
bodies....

and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the
findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which
could be petitions for both national and local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on Authority of Courts under subtitle III on Local
Initiative and Referendum is misplaced, since the provision therein applies to both
[54]

national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:

SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. -- Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts
from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the
Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.

Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for
the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local
legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on
the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national
legislation, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;

(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;

(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its
approval;

(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines; and

(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. [55]

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;

(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative bodys failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the
power of initiative as a consequence thereof;

(d) The formulation of the proposition;

(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;

(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;

(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government
unit concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;

(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered
voters for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;

(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

(k) The limitations on local initiative; and

(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. [56]

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No.
6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word Constitution in
Section 2; (b) defines initiative on the Constitution and includes it in the enumeration of the
three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of plebiscite as the process by which
the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the
people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who
should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved
proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount
system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. [57]

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiativeon
amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are
fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. [58]

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a
Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. The recognized exceptions to the
[59]

rule are as follows:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. [60]

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial

functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative
authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must
be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in
itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate; and (b) fixes astandard -- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable -- to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
[61]

maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. [62]

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No.

6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS
ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations
to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No.
6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or
(b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the completeness
and the sufficient standard tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.

Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power
of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has
validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a
petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number
of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required
number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that
the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather
signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly
initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel
before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue
[63]

through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of
registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in
[64]

the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars,
[65]

the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. [66]

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the
COMELEC. The latter knew that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or
proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for
which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said
petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing
more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6
December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy,
and resources.
 The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to
lift the term limits of the elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not
a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.

CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments on the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood,
energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under
that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hreby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on
Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to
the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition
(UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent
as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo,Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres
Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part; related to a co-petitioner and co-counsel of the petitioners.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., joins the separate, concurring opinions of Justices Puno,
Francisco and Panganiban.
Puno, Vitug, , Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., has separate opinions.
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED

VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x--------------------------------------------------------x

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.

x ------------------------------------------------------ x

ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA,
JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.

x------------------------------------------------------ x

ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.

x--------------------------------------------------------x

BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its
Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary General Joel
Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS
FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion
Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA
WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson
Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay,
JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the
Solidarity of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human
Rights,Intervenors.

x--------------------------------------------------------x

LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL,Intervenors.

x--------------------------------------------------------x

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.

x ------------------------------------------------------- x

TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.

x ------------------------------------------------------- x

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO,

MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and
AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.

x ------------------------------------------------------- x

RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.

x -------------------------------------------------------- x

PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F.
BALAIS, Intervenors.

x -------------------------------------------------------- x

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.

x ------------------------------------------------------- x

SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.

x ------------------------------------------------------- x

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and
RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.

x -------------------------------------------------------- x

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors.

x --------------------------------------------------------x

SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY
MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors.

x -----------------------------------------------------x

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors.

x -----------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe,, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.

Antecedent Facts

On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino
Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled
"Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their
petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in
the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.7

The Ruling of the COMELEC

On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for
lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's
ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.9

In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside
the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative
petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims
that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the
"will of the sovereign people."

In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners
to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for
"entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the
Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.

In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the
Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735
and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative."

Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's
petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain
that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing
to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section
2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere
amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.

The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving the parties'
memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.

The Issues

The petitions raise the following issues:

1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and

3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's
petition.

The Ruling of the Court

There is no merit to the petition.

The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a
people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based
alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following
the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal
by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x
x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:

MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional
amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people
when they are asked to sign?
 MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign.
Now, who prepares the draft?

MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and they are
asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional amendment.

MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment"
should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that
"before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should
sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature."

The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First,
the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people
who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains
the full text of the proposed amendments.

The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so
attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several
millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it
is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the
full text of the proposed amendments before signing.

The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of people's initiative from the United States where
various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States15 which allow initiative petitions, the
unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before
they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments.16

The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts. Thus,
in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit
Court of Appeals, declared:

[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first
seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the
subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the
contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the
petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly
misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems
particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition,
who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the
ballot.17 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:

The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are described in
similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so
that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x x
(publication of full text of amended constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the elector to
have x x x the section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he
must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote in the dark.")
(Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is
proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.19

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the
proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text
of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such
full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group
invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their
private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain
the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably
their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their
supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.

Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed
as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet20 after the oral
arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with
this Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7
September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.

The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group's
Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:

Province: City/Municipality: No. of

Legislative Barangay:
District: Verified

Signatures:

PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE
GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII
AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"

I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of
the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.

Precinct Name Address Birthdate Signature Verification

Number
Last Name, MM/DD/YY
First Name,
M.I.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
_________________ _________________ __________________
Barangay Official Witness Witness
(Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign)

There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the
signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to
it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.

The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to
the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft
of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not
the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the
Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition
which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft of
their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they
circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the draft
of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B.
Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:

I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a registered
voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories hereto.
(Emphasis supplied)

The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition. However, the
"Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"22 has posted the full text of Resolution No.
2006-02, which provides:

RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02

RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF
AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common
stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on Charter
Change;

WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional
Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of Representatives in
Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;

WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to
recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December
2005;

WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which militates against
the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;

WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to amend the
Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform
agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue
the same;

WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES

OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS
(SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH
PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;

DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century
Park Hotel, Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)

ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or
the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the
porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through people's initiative and
referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative
Commission24 are vastly different from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition
or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.

For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing
Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact on
the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's
proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of
the existing Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.

The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the filing of the 25
August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together
with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together with
the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the
Lambino Group's proposed changes.

In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
 After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged in the
Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory
Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition was what
they had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group
alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments."

The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the
COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the
Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the
draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the
draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.

It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that they
circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:

[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not
read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground
that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327,
283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with
the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the
proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)

The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with the
COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City
Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain
the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated "the
petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally
stated during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August
2006.

The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the
measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed
change attached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires
that the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires
the people to sign on the petition itself.

Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or attached
to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were
not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris
Secundumpulls the rug from under their feet.

It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August 2006 during
the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The
Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that they printed and circulated, together
with the signature sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group
circulated the amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted
circulating only very limited copies of the petition.

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft
petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other
supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he could not state with certainty how many additional
copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000
copies because he himself caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.

Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits
that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative
x x x."25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino
Group failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed
the signature sheets.

Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one copy each of the
petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of
the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each
signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature
sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.

With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3
million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion
is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes.
If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes, either on
the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such
attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission binds the
Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-
compliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of
the Constitution.

For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the
proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes,
among which are:

1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can be
re-elected indefinitely;26

2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the
present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the
interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office; 27

3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28

These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The
people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three
proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes
merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.

During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people during the
signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local
elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However, the text of the proposed
changes belies this.

The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:

Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which
shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. x x
x x (Emphasis supplied)

Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007
local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held
simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have easily written
the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This would have insured that the
elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections following the ratification of the proposed
changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the
regular Parliament simultaneously with any future local elections.

Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This allows
incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of office,
and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is
contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire
nation.

This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to
rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the signature sheets did not contain the
full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to
believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with the local elections.

The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The
proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:

Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of
local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and the people
should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can
answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two
propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.

Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated
subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:

Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial
responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment
amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the amendment's
proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the
electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant
case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and
effect and violates the requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis
supplied)

Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court of Alaska
warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:

Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule was
enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues
to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth
and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate independently of any
structured or supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining
silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed,
initiative promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers
and eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly,
there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly
distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be undertaken
by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not have
known that their signatures would be used to propose an amendment mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.

Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to amend or
revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007
elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend
or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim
Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.

However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so soon the
Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative
proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or
revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even know the nature
and effect of the proposed changes.

There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006. The
proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:

Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until noon of the
thirtieth day of June 2010.

After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the interim Parliament
does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision
for the present members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007,
three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain
members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.

The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers
of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010,
the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the House of Representatives to the exclusion of
the present Senators.

The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed
the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate against the
Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the
interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of Representatives.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed
amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the
Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that
the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as
amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from
the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.

The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court
trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the
petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed
amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.

In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition."

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the
Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or

(2) A constitutional convention.

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through
Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The
third mode is through a people's initiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission:

MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given
to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete
committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to
this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested
on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this
year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section
1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the
Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x

xxxx

MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the
Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning
Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if
it were a self-executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a
total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes
(a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to
amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
 MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.

xxxx

MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1.
So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."

MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)

There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between
"amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a
people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the
Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot
propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.

This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v.
Jordan,32the Supreme Court of California ruled:

The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only to
the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the Constitution' and does
not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution
may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a
convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed
initiative measure (hereinafter termed 'the measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure became
law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not
properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention,
and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33

It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended or revised, it
can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one of the
specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference between an amendment and a
revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is not an amendment
as that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be
based in large part on the revision of the constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision'
authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed
to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2,
and hence failed of adoption, x x x.

While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is,
nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.

To call it an amendment is a misnomer.

Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to the people
through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new
constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1.
xxxx

Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose amendments to the
Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the
constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million
signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.

As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34

It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the manner
prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other
than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-constitutional and
revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have
power to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly
manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a
constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change
the fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and
duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution ― that a people's initiative may only amend,
never revise, the Constitution.

The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the
Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the
scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the
earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:

[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions
contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon
which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and
abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or
change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the
purpose for which it was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the
substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without
altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our
Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative
test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial
entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court examines only
the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry
is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to
amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry.
Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or
the fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."39

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential
to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches
of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a
revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government.

The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers
and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters
the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.

By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is
beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is
readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the
Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original
intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new
conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or
of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to
what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary
system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a
switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)

In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized
where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme
Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
 The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral
Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in
the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States
Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to
visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American
form of government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of government in this state
and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities
necessary to carry on government.

xxxx

We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the people at the
General Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit further amendments to revise
and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after submission of
appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the
government of this State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of
Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too
numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.

The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many sessions of the
Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to
give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could disappear
very quickly if we were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition
here.43(Emphasis supplied)

The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino Group's
initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and
legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the executive department.

In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would be affected
by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than 105
provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo,
Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of
government than the initiative in Adams.

The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of procedure,
not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the
Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of the deliberative body work full-
time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called
"amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an "occupation,
profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.

Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:

99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for both
"amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same
provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the
apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common people
in general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not
their occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional
convention delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is their occupation,
profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain
only to the process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the
constitutional provisions.

100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in
the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)

The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed
changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the
Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the present initiative
constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However, since the
Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the
Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land.

The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's
theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do
not deviate from such categorical intent and language.45 Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent
and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the
form of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting
inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory
advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a
revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have attempted to
advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:

Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed by
initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the
legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions
initiated by the people.

Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution that
cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the distinction between amendment and
revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that
revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure
proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts on
existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined group of
citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic principles
of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot
appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.

We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by
initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may
not be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article
XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:

"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of
amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a means of revising the
constitution." x x x x

It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the
constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an individual,
through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x x x

Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to constitutional
revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the framers and the
plain language of the Constitution.

We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the other end
red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there
is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where
revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three
co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the
Constitution.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other
section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a
change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change
reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a
revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is
an amendment and not a revision.49

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than
the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system
of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three examples are located at the far green end
of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is located.

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word
of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the
word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the
entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change
will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the
structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis
of the existing Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body
with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several
provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other
hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded
proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.

In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:

Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception
of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and
 Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law
prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of
the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable
inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which
requires a future separate constitutional amendment.

Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the
oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to
reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable
inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.

The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a
provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is
between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary system of government," and the
inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government."

Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to
― the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the few countries
with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known
parliamentary forms of government ― the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or
Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize
that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government?

This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for
amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires
harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's
initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.

In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus,
the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting
the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution."

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to
revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not
change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled
that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on
amendments to the Constitution.

This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be
resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts
will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.51

Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend
the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.

Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an initiative on
the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."

The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006
filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed
the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners."
In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the
signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the
COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.

The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing
more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the
Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative
embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate.
Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative

In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's ruling
in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For
following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the
present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the
public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19,
1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.

5. Conclusion

The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens
of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the
clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.

To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and
turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution
outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its
own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur
well for the rule of law in this country.

An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast53 − approved our
Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the
people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed modes for
amending or revising the Constitution.

No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change
our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they
ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means subverting the people's
sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the
Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.

Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the specific
modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution ― the
people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society ― becomes easily susceptible to
manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution
ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.

The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group unabashedly
states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains
its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional
reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of
the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's
voice" or "sovereign will" in the present initiative.

This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which
embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the
Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter
basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and
desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio

Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

____________________

EN BANC

G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS V.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET AL.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
 Without the rule of law, there can be no lasting prosperity and
certainly no liberty.
Beverley McLachlin 1
Chief Justice of Canada

After a deep reflection on the issues raised and a careful evaluation of the parties' respective arguments -- both oral
and written -- as well as the enlightened and enlightening Opinions submitted by my esteemed colleagues, I am fully
convinced that the present Petition must be dismissed.

I write, however, to show that my present disposition is completely consistent with my previous Opinions and votes
on the two extant Supreme Court cases involving an initiative to change the Constitution.

In my Separate Opinion in Santiago v. Comelec,2 I opined "that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally,
the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), Republic Act 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than
sufficient

__________________

'SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.'

"With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is equivalent to
burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What Citizen
Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future effort to
exercise the right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of
initiative does not justify a ban against its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the
right time and for the right reason.

Taken Together and Interpreted Properly,

the Constitution, R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 Are Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives

"While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the majority openly concedes — intended by the
legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate an initiative on the
Constitution. I completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and
Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative, sufficiently implements the right of
the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall no longer repeat nor
elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, that "provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally
construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights
granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, that any "effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's
initiatives ought to be rejected."

"No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of this, R.A. 6735
wisely empowered the Commission on Election "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution
2300 on 16 January 1991. Such Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the conduct of
initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws," not by the incumbent
Commission on Elections but by one then composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms.
Alfredo

authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution."

__________________

E. Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of
these Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission, and thus we cannot
ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to give life to a
cherished right of our people.

"The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and local legislations, it is
void in reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such differentiation. The source of and
authority for the Resolution is the same law, R.A. 6735.

"I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly
Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient authority to
implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution.

Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa

Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
 "I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order issued by this Court
on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising
their right of initiative. In fact, I believe that such restraining order as against private respondents should not
have been issued, in the first place. While I agree that the Comelec should be stopped from using public
funds and government resources to help them gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has no
power to restrain them from exercising their right of initiative. The right to propose amendments to the
Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech and free assembly. And certainly, it would be
tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading others to conform to his/her
beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire once said, 'I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death
your right to say it.' After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice Holmes
wrote, 'freedom for the thought that we hate.'

Epilogue

"By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. Initiative, like referendum and
recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All three are institutionalized
legacies of the world-admired EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites, they are hallowed
expressions of popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic rights of our people to be used as

Six months after, in my Separate Opinion in People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
Comelec,3 I joined the rest of the members of the Court in ruling "by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to the Comelec in dismissing the petition filed by

__________________

Constitution x x x." While concededly, petitioners in this case were not direct parties in Santiago,
nonetheless the Court's injunction against the Comelec covered ANY petition, not just the Delfin petition
which was the immediate subject of said case. As a dissenter in Santiago, I believed, and still do, that
the majority gravely erred in rendering such a sweeping injunction, but I cannot fault the Comelec
for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio decidendi.
Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to
obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition
was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of
the Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of
this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.

Second Issue:
Sufficiency of RA 6735

"I repeat my firm legal position that RA 6735 is adequate to cover initiatives on the Constitution, and
that whatever administrative details may have been omitted in said law are satisfactorily provided by
Comelec Resolution 2300. The promulgation of Resolution 2300 is sanctioned by Section 2, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, which vests upon the Comelec the power to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." The Omnibus
Election Code likewise empowers the electoral body to "promulgate rules and regulations implementing the
provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer x x x."
Finally and most relevantly, Section 20 of Ra 6735 specifically authorizes Comelec "to promulgate rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act."

"In my dissent in Santiago, I wrote that "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and for
the right reason." Let me explain further.

The Right Thing

"A people's initiative is direct democracy in action. It is the right thing that citizens may avail themselves of to
articulate their will. It is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. Even the majority
implicitly conceded its value and worth in our legal firmament when it implored Congress "not to tarry any
longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for implementation of the right (of initiative) of
the people x x x." Hence, in the en banc case of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Comelec, [G.R. No.
125416, September 26, 1996], this Court unanimously held that "(l)ike elections, initiative and referendum
are powerful and valuable modes of expressing popular

PIRMA therein," since the Commission had "only complied" with the Santiago Decision.

__________________

sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect and
promote their legitimate exercise."

The Right Way

"From the outset, I have already maintained the view that "taken together and interpreted properly and
liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide
more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the
 Constitution." Let me now demonstrate the adequacy of RA 6735 by outlining, in concrete terms, the steps
to be taken – the right way – to amend the Constitution through a people's initiative.

"Pursuant to Section 3(f) of the law, the Comelec shall prescribe the form of the petition which shall contain
the proposition and the required number of signatories. Under Sec. 5(c) thereof, the petition shall state the
following:

'c.1 contents or text of the [provision or provisions] sought to be x x x amended, x x x;

c.2 the proposition [in full text];

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor [fully and clearly explained];

c.4 that it is not one of exceptions provided herein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.'

"Section 8(f) of Comelec Resolution 2300 additionally requires that the petition include a formal designation
of the duly authorized representatives of the signatories.

"Being a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures becomes a condition precedent to the filing of
the petition, and is jurisdictional. Without such requisite signatures, the Commission shall motu proprio reject
the petition.

"Where the initiators have substantially complied with the above requirements, they may thence file the
petition with the Comelec which is tasked to determine the sufficiency thereof and to verify the signatures on
the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards. In deciding whether
the petition is sufficient, the Comelec shall also determine if the proposition is proper for an initiative, i.e., if it
consists of an amendment, not a revision, of the Constitution. Any decision of the electoral body may be
appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice.

I added "that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 will
not ipso

__________________

"Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, and after the determination of its sufficiency, the Comelec
shall publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation,
and set the date of the plebiscite. The conduct of the plebiscite should not be earlier than sixty (60) days, but
not later than ninety (90) days after certification by the Comelec of the sufficiency of the petition. The
proposition, if approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite, becomes effective as of the day of
the plebiscite.

"From the foregoing, it should be clear that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity
of Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a
plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far from it. Among others, PIRMA must still satisfactorily hurdle the
following searching issues:

1. Does the proposed change – the lifting of the term limits of elective officials -- constitute a mere
amendment and not a revision of the Constitution?

2. Which registry of voters will be used to verify the signatures in the petition? This question is relevant
considering that under RA 8189, the old registry of voters used in the 1995 national elections was voided
after the barangay elections on May 12, 1997, while the new list may be used starting only in the elections of
May 1998.

3. Does the clamor for the proposed change in the Constitution really emanate from the people who signed
the petition for initiative? Or it is the beneficiaries of term extension who are in fact orchestrating such move
to advance their own political self-interest?

4. Are the six million signatures genuine and verifiable? Do they really belong to qualified warm bodies
comprising at least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative district is represented
by at least 3% of the registered voters therein?

"I shall expound on the third question in the next section, The Right Reason. Question Nos. 1 and 2 above,
while important, are basically legal in character and can be determined by argumentation and memoranda.
However, Question No. 4 involves not only legal issues but gargantuan hurdles of factual determination.
This to my mind is the crucible, the litmus test, of a people's petition for initiative. If herein petitioners, led by
PIRMA, succeed in proving -- not just alleging -- that six million voters of this country indeed want to amend
the Constitution, what power on earth can stop them? Not this Court, not the Comelec, not even the
President or Congress.
facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far from it." I
stressed that PIRMA must show the following, among others:

__________________

"It took only one million people to stage a peaceful revolution at EDSA, and the very rafters and foundations
of the martial law society trembled, quaked and crumbled. On the other hand, PIRMA and its co-petitioners
are claiming that they have gathered six million signatures. If, as claimed by many, these six million
signatures are fraudulent, then let them be exposed and damned for all history in a signature-verification
process conducted under our open system of legal advocacy.

"More than anything else, it is the truth that I, as a member of this Court and as a citizen of this country,
would like to seek: Are these six million signatures real? By insisting on an entirely new doctrine of statutory
inadequacy, the majority effectively suppressed the quest for that truth.

The Right Reason

"As mentioned, the third question that must be answered, even if the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity
of Comelec Resolution 2300 were upheld by the majority is: Does the clamor for the proposed change to the
Constitution really emanate from the people who signed the petition for initiative? Or is it the beneficiaries of
term extension who are in fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political self-interests? In other
words, is PIRMA's exercise of the right to initiative being done in accordance with our Constitution and our
laws? Is such attempted exercise legitimate?

"In Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, we described initiative, along with referendum, as the 'ultimate
weapon of the people to negate government malfeasance and misfeasance.' In Subic Bay, we specified that
'initiative is entirely the work of the electorate x x x a process of lawmaking by the people themselves without
the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives.' As ponente of Subic Bay, I stand
foursquare on this principle: The right to amend through initiative belongs only to the people – not
to the government and its minions. This principle finds clear support from utterances of many
constitutional commissioners like those quoted below:

"[Initiative is] a reserve power of the sovereign people, when they are dissatisfied with the National
Assembly x x x [and] precisely a fallback position of the people in the event that they are dissatisfied." --
Commissioner Ople

"[Initiative is] a check on a legislative that is not responsive [and resorted to] only if the legislature is not as
responsive to the vital and urgent needs of people." -- Commissioner Gascon

(1) The proposed change -- the lifting of term limits of elective officials -- "constitute[s] a mere amendment and not a
revision of the Constitution."

_________________

"[Initiative is an] extraordinary power given to the people [and] reserved for the people [which] should not be
frivolously resorted to." -- Commissioner Romulo

"Indeed, if the powers-that-be desire to amend the Constitution, or even to revise it, our Charter itself
provides them other ways of doing so, namely, by calling a constitutional convention or constituting
Congress into a constituent assembly. These are officialdom's weapons. But initiative belongs to the people.

"In the present case, are PIRMA and its co-petitioners legitimate people's organizations or are they merely
fronts for incumbents who want to extend their terms? This is a factual question which, unfortunately, cannot
be judicially answered anymore, because the Supreme Court majority ruled that the law that implements it,
RA 6735, is inadequate or insufficient insofar as initiatives to the Constitutions are concerned. With such
ruling, the majority effectively abrogated a constitutional right of our people. That is why in my Separate
Opinion in Santiago, I exclaimed that such precipitate action "is equivalent to burning the whole house to
exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain." I firmly maintain that to defeat PIRMA's
effort, there is no need to "burn" the constitutional right to initiative. If PIRMA's exercise is not "legitimate," it
can be exposed as such in the ways I have discussed – short of abrogating the right itself. On the other
hand, if PIRMA's position is proven to be legitimate – if it hurdles the four issues I outlined earlier – by all
means, we should allow and encourage it. But the majority's theory of statutory inadequacy has pre-empted
– unnecessarily and invalidly, in my view – any judicial determination of such legitimacy or illegitimacy. It has
silenced the quest for truth into the interstices of the PIRMA petition.

The Right Time

"The Constitution itself sets a time limitation on when changes thereto may be proposed. Section 2 of Article
XVII precludes amendments "within five years following [its] ratification x x x nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter." Since its ratification, the 1987 Constitution has never been amended. Hence, the five-year
prohibition is now inoperative and amendments may theoretically be proposed at any time.

"Be that as it may, I believe – given the present circumstances – that there is no more time to lift term limits
to enable incumbents to seek reelection in the May 11, 1998 polls. Between today and the next national
(2) The "six million signatures are genuine and verifiable"; and they "really belong to qualified warm bodies
comprising at

__________________

elections, less than eight (8) months remain. Santiago, where the single issue of the sufficiency of RA 6735
was resolved, took this Court three (3) months, and another two (2) months to decide the motion for
reconsideration. The instant case, where the same issue is also raised by the petitioners, took two months,
not counting a possible motion for reconsideration. These time spans could not be abbreviated any further,
because due process requires that all parties be given sufficient time to file their pleadings.

"Thus, even if the Court were to rule now in favor of the adequacy of RA 6735 – as I believe it should – and
allow the Comelec to act on the PIRMA petition, such eight-month period will not be enough to tackle the
four weighty issues I mentioned earlier, considering that two of them involve tedious factual questions. The
Comelec's decision on any of these issues can still be elevated to this Court for review, and reconsiderations
on our decisions on each of those issues may again be sought.

"Comelec's herculean task alone of verifying each of the six million signatures is enormously time-
consuming, considering that any person may question the authenticity of each and every signature, initially
before the election registrar, then before the Comelec on appeal and finally, before this Court in a separate
proceeding. Moreover, the plebiscite itself – assuming such stage can be reached – may be scheduled only
after sixty (60) but not more than ninety (90) days, from the time the Comelec and this Court, on appeal,
finally declare the petition to be sufficient.

"Meanwhile, under Comelec Resolution 2946, political parties, groups organizations or coalitions may start
selecting their official candidates for President, Vice President and Senators on November 27, 1997; the
period for filing certificates of candidacy is from January 11 to February 9, 1998; the election period and
campaign for national officials start on February 10, 1998, while the campaign period for other elective
officials, on March 17, 1998. This means, by the time PIRMA's proposition is ready – if ever – for submission
directly to the voters at large, it will have been overcome by the elections. Time will simply run out on
PIRMA, if the intention is to lift term limits in time for the 1998 elections.

"That term limits may no longer be lifted prior to the 1998 elections via a people's initiative does not detract
one whit from (1) my firm conviction that RA 6735 is sufficient and adequate to implement this constitutional
right and, more important, (2) my faith in the power of the people to initiate changes in local and national
laws and the Constitution. In fact, I think the Court can deliberate on these two items even more serenely
and wisely now that the debates will be free from the din and distraction of the 1998 elections. After all,
jurisprudence is not merely for the here and now but, more so, for the hereafter and the morrow. Let me
therefore stress, by way of epilogue, my unbending credo in favor of our people's right to initiative.

least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein."

__________________

Epilogue

"I believe in democracy – in our people's natural right to determine our own destiny.

"I believe in the process of initiative as a democratic method of enabling our people to express their will and
chart their history. Initiative is an alternative to bloody revolution, internal chaos and civil strife. It is an
inherent right of the people – as basic as the right to elect, the right to self-determination and the right to
individual liberties. I believe that Filipinos have the ability and the capacity to rise above themselves, to use
this right of initiative wisely and maturely, and to choose what is best for themselves and their posterity.

"Such beliefs, however, should not be equated with a desire to perpetuate a particular official or group of
officials in power. Far from it. Such perpetuation is anathema to democracy. My firm conviction that there is
an adequate law implementing the constitutional right of initiative does not ipso facto result in the victory of
the PIRMA petition or of any proposed constitutional change. There are, after all, sufficient safeguards to
guarantee the proper use of such constitutional right and to forestall its misuse and abuse. First, initiative
cannot be used to revise the Constitution, only to amend it. Second, the petitioners' signatures must be
validated against an existing list of voters and/or voters' identification cards. Third, initiative is a reverse
power of and by the people, not of incumbent officials and their machinators. Fourth and most important of
all, the signatures must be verified as real and genuine; not concocted, fictitious or fabricated. The only legal
way to do this is to enable the Commission on Elections to conduct a nationwide verification process as
mandated by the Constitution and the law. Such verification, it bears stressing, is subject to review by this
Court.

"There were, by the most generous estimate, only a million people who gathered at EDSA in 1986, and yet
they changed the history of our country. PIRMA claims six times that number, not just from the National
Capital Region but from all over the country. Is this claim through the invention of its novel theory of statutory
insufficiency, the Court's majority has stifled the only legal method of determining whether PIRMA is real or
not, whether there is indeed a popular clamor to lift term limits of elected officials, and whether six million
voters want to initiate amendments to their most basic law. In suppressing a judicial answer to such
questions, the Court may have unwittingly yielded to PIRMA the benefit of the legal presumption of legality
 and regularity. In its misplaced zeal to exterminate the rats, it burned down the whole house. It
unceremoniously divested the people of a basic constitutional right.

In both Opinions, I concluded that we must implement "the right thing [initiative] in the right way at the right time and
for the right reason."

In the present case, I steadfastly stand by my foregoing Opinions in Santiago and PIRMA. Tested against them, the
present Petition of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado must be DISMISSED. Unfortunately, the right thing is
being rushed in the wrong way and for the wrong reasons. Let me explain.

No Grave Abuse

of Discretion by Comelec

As in PIRMA, I find no grave abuse of discretion in Comelec's dismissal of the Lambino Petition. After all, the
Commission merely followed the holding in Santiago permanently

____________________

"In the ultimate, the mission of the judiciary is to discover truth and to make it prevail. This mission is
undertaken not only to resolve the vagaries of present events but also to build the pathways of tomorrow.
The sum total of the entire process of adversarial litigation is the verity of facts and the application of law
thereto. By the majority cop-out in this mission of discovery, our country and our people have been deprived
not only of a basic constitutional right, as earlier noted, but also of the judicial opportunity to verify the truth."

enjoining the poll body "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system."

Indeed, the Comelec did not violate the Constitution, the laws or any jurisprudence.4 Neither can whim,
caprice, arbitrariness or personal bias be attributed to the Commission.5 Quite the contrary, it prudently
followed this Court's jurisprudence in Santiago and PIRMA. Even assuming arguendo that Comelec erred in ruling
on a very difficult and unsettled question of law, this Court still cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the poll
body with respect to that action.6

The present Lambino Petition is in exactly the same situation as that of PIRMA in 1997. The differences pointed out
by Justice Reynato S. Puno are, with due respect, superficial. It is argued that, unlike the present Lambino
Petition, PIRMA did not contain verified signatures. These are distinctions that do not make a difference. Precisely,
Justice Puno is urging a remand, because the verification issue is "contentious" and remains unproven by
petitioners. Clearly, both the PIRMA and the Lambino Petitions contain unverified signatures. Therefore, they
both deserve the same treatment: DISMISSAL.

Besides, the only reason given in the unanimous Resolution on PIRMA v. Comelec was that the Commission had
"only complied" with this Court's Decision in Santiago, the same reason given by Comelec in this case. The
Separate Opinions in PIRMA gave no other reason. No one argued, even remotely, that the PIRMA Petition
should have been dismissed because the signatures were unverified.

To stress, I adhere to my Opinion in PIRMA that, "[b]eing a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures
becomes a condition precedent to the filing of the petition, and is jurisdictional.7 Without those signatures, the
Comelec shall motu proprio reject the petition."

So, until and unless Santiago is revisited and changed by this Court or the legal moorings of the exercise of the right
are substantially changed, the Comelec cannot be faulted for acting in accord with this Court's
pronouncements. Respondent Commission has no discretion, under any guise, to refuse enforcement of any
final decision of this Court.8 The refusal of the poll body to act on the Lambino Petition was its only recourse. Any
other mode of action would appear not only presumptuous, but also contemptuous. It would have constituted
defiance of the Court and would have surely been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious
disregard of the supremacy of this Court as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.

Even assuming further that this Court rules, as I believe it should (for the reasons given in my Opinions in Santiago
and PIRMA), that Republic Act 6735 is indeed sufficient to implement an initiative to amend the Constitution, still, no
grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Comelec for merely following prevailing jurisprudence extant at the
time it rendered its ruling in question.

Only Amendments,

Not Revisions

I reiterate that only amendments, not revisions, may be the proper subject of an initiative to change the
Constitution. This principle is crystal clear from even a layperson's reading of the basic law.9

I submit that changing the system of government from presidential to parliamentary and the form of the legislature
from bicameral to unicameral contemplates an overhaul of the structure of government. The ponencia has amply
demonstrated that the merger of the legislative and the executive branches under a unicameral-parliamentary
system, "[b]y any legal test and under any jurisdiction," will "radically alter the framework of government as set forth
in the Constitution." Indeed, the proposed changes have an overall implication on the entire Constitution; they
effectively rewrite its most important and basic provisions. The prolixity and complexity of the changes cannot be
categorized, even by semantic generosity, as "amendments."

In addition, may I say that of the three modes of changing the Constitution, revisions (or amendments) may be
proposed only through the first two: by Congress or by a constitutional convention. Under the third mode -- people's
initiative -- only amendments are allowed. Many of the justices' Opinions have cited the historical, philosophical and
jurisprudential bases of their respective positions. I will not add to the woes of the reader by reiterating them here.

Suffice it to say that, to me, the practical test to differentiate an amendment from a revision is found in the
Constitution itself: a revision may be done only when the proposed change can be drafted, defined,
articulated, discussed and agreed upon after a mature and democratic debate in a deliberative body like
Congress or a Convention. The changes proposed must necessarily be scrutinized, as their adoption or non-
adoption must result from an informed judgment.

Indeed, the constitutional bodies that drafted the 1935, the 1972 and the 1987 Constitutions had to spend many
months of purposeful discussions, democratic debates and rounds of voting before they could agree on the
wordings covering the philosophy, the underlying principles, and the structure of government of our Republic.

Verily, even bills creating or changing the administrative structure of local governments take several weeks or even
months of drafting, reading, and debating before Congress can approve them. How much more when it comes to
constitutional changes?

A change in the form of government of our country from presidential-bicameral to parliamentary-unicameral is

monumental. Even the initiative proponents admit this fact. So, why should a revision be rammed down our people's
throats without the benefit of intelligent discussion in a deliberative assembly?

Added to the constitutional mandate barring revisions is the provision of RA 6735 expressly prohibiting petitions for
initiative from "embracing more than one subject matter."10 The present initiative covers at least two subjects: (1) the
shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government; and (2) the change from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature.11 Thus, even under Republic Act 6735 -- the law that Justice Puno and I hold to be sufficient and valid --
the Lambino Petition deserves dismissal.

12 Percent and 3 Percent Thresholds

Not Proven by Petitioners

The litmus test of a people's petition for initiative is its ability to muster the constitutional requirement that it be
supported by at least 12 percent of the registered voters nationwide, of which at least 3 percent of the registered
voters in every legislative district must be represented. As pointed out by Intervenors One Voice, Inc., et al.,
however, records show that there was a failure to meet the minimum percentages required.12

Even Justice Puno concedes that the 12 percent and 3 percent constitutional requirements involve "contentious
facts," which have not been proven by the Lambino Petition. Thus, he is urging a remand to the Comelec.

But a remand is both imprudent and futile. It is imprudent because the Constitution itself mandates the said
requisites of an initiative petition. In other words, a petition that does not show the required percentages is
fatally defective and must be dismissed, as the Delfin Petition was, in Santiago.

Furthermore, as the ponencia had discussed extensively, the present Petition is void and unconstitutional. It points
out that the Petition dismally fails to comply with the constitutional requirement that an initiative must be directly
proposed by the people. Specifically, the ponencia has amply established that petitioners were unable to show that
the Lambino Petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed changes.

So, too, a remand is futile. Even if the required percentages are proven before the Commission, the Petition
must still be dismissed for proposing a revision, not an amendment, in gross violation of the Constitution.
At the very least, it proposes more than one subject, in violation of Republic Act 6735.

Summation

Petitioners plead with this Court to hear the voice of the people because, in the words of Justice Puno who supports
them, the "people's voice is sovereign in a democracy."

I, too, believe in heeding the people's voice. I reiterate my Separate Opinion in PIRMA that "initiative is a
democratic method of enabling our people to express their will and chart their history. x x x. I believe that Filipinos
have the ability and the capacity to rise above themselves, to use this right of initiative wisely and maturely, and to
choose what is best for themselves and their posterity."

This belief will not, however, automatically and blindly result in an initiative to change the Constitution, because the
present Petition violates the following:

· The Constitution (specifically Article XVII, which allows only amendments, not revisions, and requires definite
percentages of verified signatures)

· The law (specifically, Republic Act 6735, which prohibits petitions containing more than one subject)
· Jurisprudence (specifically, PIRMA v. Comelec, which dismissed the Petition then under consideration on the
ground that, by following the Santiago ruling, the Comelec had not gravely abused its discretion).

I submit further that a remand of the Lambino Petition is both imprudent and futile. More tellingly, it is a cop-out, a
hand-washing already discredited 2000 years ago. Instead of finger-pointing, I believe we must confront the
issues head on, because the people expect no less from this august and venerable institution of supreme justice.

Epilogue

At bottom, the issue in this case is simply the Rule of Law.13 Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a treasured
feature of the Filipino constitutional system. It was born out of our world-admired and often-imitated People Power,
but its misuse and abuse must be resolutely rejected. Democracy must be cherished, but mob rule vanquished.

The Constitution is a sacred social compact, forged between the government and the people, between each
individual and the rest of the citizenry. Through it, the people have solemnly expressed their will that all of them shall
be governed by laws, and their rights limited by agreed-upon covenants to promote the common good. If we are to
uphold the Rule of Law and reject the rule of the mob, we must faithfully abide by the processes the
Constitution has ordained in order to bring about a peaceful, just and humane society. Assuming arguendo that
six million people allegedly gave their assent to the proposed changes in the Constitution, they are nevertheless still
bound by the social covenant -- the present Constitution -- which was ratified by a far greater majority almost
twenty years ago.14 I do not denigrate the majesty of the sovereign will; rather, I elevate our society to the loftiest
perch, because our government must remain as one of laws and not of men.

Upon assuming office, each of the justices of the Supreme Court took a solemn oath to uphold the Constitution.
Being the protectors of the fundamental law as the highest expression of the sovereign will, they must subject to the
strictest scrutiny any attempt to change it, lest it be trivialized and degraded by the assaults of the mob and
of ill-conceived designs. The Court must single-mindedly defend the Constitution from bogus efforts falsely
attributed to the sovereign people.

The judiciary may be the weakest branch of government. Nonetheless, when ranged against incessant voices from
the more powerful branches of government, it should never cower in submission. On the other hand, I daresay that
the same weakness of the Court becomes its strength when it speaks independently through decisions that rightfully
uphold the supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule of Law. The strength of the judiciary lies not in its lack of
brute power, but in its moral courage to perform its constitutional duty at all times against all odds. Its might is in its
being right.15

During the past weeks, media outfits have been ablaze with reports and innuendoes about alleged carrots offered
and sticks drawn by those interested in the outcome of this case.16 There being no judicial proof of these allegations,
I shall not comment on them for the nonce, except to quote the Good Book, which says, "There is nothing hidden
that will not be revealed, and nothing secret that will not be known and come to light."17

Verily, the Supreme Court is now on the crossroads of history. By its decision, the Court and each of its members
shall be judged by posterity. Ten years, fifty years, a hundred years -- or even a thousand years -- from now, what
the Court did here, and how each justice opined and voted, will still be talked about, either in shame or in pride.
Indeed, the hand-washing of Pontius Pilate, the abomination of Dred Scott, and the loathing of Javellana still linger
and haunt to this day.

Let not this case fall into the same damnation. Rather, let this Court be known throughout the nation and the world
for its independence, integrity, industry and intelligence.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., Respondents.

G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, JR. and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

SEPARATE OPINION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

I agree with the opinion of our esteemed colleague, Justice Reynato Puno, that the Court's ruling in Santiago v.
COMELEC1 is not a binding precedent. However, it is my position that even if Santiago were reversed and Republic
Act No. 6735 (R.A. 6735) be held as sufficient law for the purpose of people's initiative to amend the Constitution,
the petition for initiative in this case must nonetheless be dismissed.

There is absolutely no showing here that petitioners complied with R.A. 6735, even as they blindly invoke the said
law to justify their alleged people's initiative. Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735 requires that "[a] petition for an initiative on
the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein." On the other hand, Section 5(c)2 of the same law requires that the petition should state,
among others, the proposition3 or the "contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed." If we were to apply Section 5(c) to an initiative to amend the Constitution, as
petitioners submit, the petition for initiative signed by the required number of voters should incorporate therein a text
of the proposed changes to the Constitution. However, such requirement was not followed in the case at bar.

During the oral arguments, petitioner Lambino admitted that they printed a mere 100,000 copies of the text of the
proposed changes to the Constitution. According to him, these were subsequently distributed to their agents all over
the country, for attachment to the sheets of paper on which the signatures were to be affixed. Upon being asked,
however, if he in fact knew whether the text was actually attached to the signature sheets which were distributed for
signing, he said that he merely assumed that they were. In other words, he could not tell the Court for certain
whether their representatives complied with this requirement.

The petition filed with the COMELEC, as well as that which was shown to this Court, indubitably establish that the
full text of the proposed changes was not attached to the signature sheets. All that the signature sheets contained
was the general proposition and abstract, which falls short of the full text requirement of R.A. 6735.

The necessity of setting forth the text of the proposed constitutional changes in the petition for initiative to be signed
by the people cannot be seriously disputed. To begin with, Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution unequivocally
states that "[a]mendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein." Evidently, for
the people to propose amendments to the Constitution, they must, in the first instance, know exactly what they are
proposing. It is not enough that they merely possess a general idea of the proposed changes, as the Constitution
speaks of a "direct" proposal by the people.

Although the framers of the Constitution left the matter of implementing the constitutional right of initiative to
Congress, it might be noted that they themselves reasonably assumed that the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendments would be shown to the people during the process of signature gathering. Thus –

MR. RODRIGO. Section 2 of the complete committee report provides: "upon petition of at least 10 percent of
the registered voters." How will we determine that 10 percent has been achieved? How will the voters
manifest their desire, is it by signature?

MR. SUAREZ. Yes, by signatures.

MR. RODRIGO. Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional
amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people when
they are asked to sign?

MR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign.
Now, who prepares the draft?

MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.4

It may thus be logically assumed that even without Section 5(c) of R.A. 6735, the full text of the proposed changes
must necessarily be stated in or attached to the initiative petition. The signatories to the petition must be given an
opportunity to fully comprehend the meaning and effect of the proposed changes to enable them to make a free,
intelligent and well-informed choice on the matter.

Needless to say, the requirement of setting forth the complete text of the proposed changes in the petition for
initiative is a safeguard against fraud and deception. If the whole text of the proposed changes is contained in or
attached to the petition, intercalations and riders may be duly avoided. Only then can we be assured that the
proposed changes are truly of the people and that the signatories have been fully apprised of its implications.

If a statutory provision is essential to guard against fraud, corruption or deception in the initiative and referendum
process, such provision must be viewed as an indispensable requirement and failure to substantially comply
therewith is fatal.5 The failure of petitioners in this case to comply with the full text requirement resultantly rendered
their petition for initiative fatally defective.

The petition for initiative is likewise irretrievably infirm because it violates the one subject rule under Section 10(a) of
R.A. 6735:

SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures.— The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:

(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x

The one subject rule, as relating to an initiative to amend the Constitution, has the same object and purpose as the
one subject-one bill rule embodied in Article VI, Section 26(1)6 of the Constitution.7 To elaborate, the one subject-
one bill rule was designed to do away with the practice of inserting two or more unrelated provisions in one bill, so
that those favoring one provision would be compelled to adopt the others. By this process of log-rolling, the adoption
of both provisions could be accomplished and ensured, when neither, if standing alone, could succeed on its own
merits.

As applied to the initiative process, the one subject rule is essentially designed to prevent surprise and fraud on the
electorate. It is meant to safeguard the integrity of the initiative process by ensuring that no unrelated riders are
concealed within the terms of the proposed amendment. This in turn guarantees that the signatories are fully aware
of the nature, scope and purpose of the proposed amendment.

Petitioners insist that the proposed changes embodied in their petition for initiative relate only to one subject matter,
that is – the shift from presidential to a parliamentary system of government. According to petitioners, all of the other
proposed changes are merely incidental to this main proposal and are reasonably germane and necessary
thereto.8An examination of the text of the proposed changes reveals, however, that this is not the case.

The proposed changes to the Constitution cover other subjects that are beyond the main proposal espoused by the
petitioners. Apart from a shift from the presidential to a parliamentary form of government, the proposed changes
include the abolition of one House of Congress,9 and the convening of a constituent assembly to propose additional
amendments to the Constitution.10 Also included within its terms is an omnibus declaration that those constitutional
provisions under Articles VI and VII, which are inconsistent with the unicameral-parliamentary form of government,
shall be deemed amended to conform thereto.

It is not difficult to see that while the proposed changes appear to relate only to a shift in the form of government, it
actually seeks to affect other subjects that are not reasonably germane to the constitutional alteration that is
purportedly sought. For one, a shift to a parliamentary system of government does not necessarily result in the
adoption of a unicameral legislature. A parliamentary system can exist in many different "hybrid" forms of
government, which may or may not embrace unicameralism.11 In other words, the shift from presidential to
parliamentary structure and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature is neither the cause nor effect of the other.

I also fail to see the relation of convening a constituent assembly with the proposed change in our system of
government. As a subject matter, the convening of a constituent assembly to amend the Constitution presents a
range of issues that is far removed from the subject of a shift in government. Besides, the constituent assembly is
supposed to convene and propose amendments to the Constitution after the proposed change in the system of
government has already taken place. This only goes to show that the convening of the constituent assembly is not
necessary to effectuate a change to a parliamentary system of government.

The omnibus statement that all provisions under Articles VI and VII which are inconsistent with a unicameral-
parliamentary system of government shall be deemed amended is equally bothersome. The statement does not
specify what these inconsistencies and amendments may be, such that everyone is left to guess the provisions that
could eventually be affected by the proposed changes. The subject and scope of these automatic amendments
cannot even be spelled out with certainty. There is thus no reasonable measure of its impact on the other
constitutional provisions.

The foregoing proposed changes cannot be the subject of a people's initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution. Taken together, the proposed changes indicate that the intendment is not simply to effect substantial
amendments to the Constitution, but a revision thereof. The distinction between an amendment and revision was
explained by Dean Vicente G. Sinco, as follows:

"Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire
document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or
perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that
characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That
intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine
which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an
entirely new one.

The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions.
The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of
considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to
add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that
seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect."12
The foregoing traditional exposition of the difference between amendment and revision has indeed guided us
throughout our constitutional history. However, the distinction between the two terms is not, to my mind, as
significant in the context of our past constitutions, as it should be now under the 1987 Constitution. The reason for
this is apparent. Under our past constitutions, it was Congress alone, acting either as a constituent assembly or by
calling out a constitutional convention, that exercised authority to either amend or revise the Constitution through the
procedures therein described. Although the distinction between the two terms was theoretically recognized under
both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the need to highlight the difference was not as material because it was only
Congress that could effect constitutional changes by choosing between the two modalities.

However, it is different now under the 1987 Constitution. Apart from providing for the two modes of either Congress
constituting itself as a constituent assembly or calling out for a constitutional convention, a third mode was
introduced for proposing changes to the Constitution. This mode refers to the people's right to propose amendments
to the fundamental law through the filing of a petition for initiative.

Otherwise stated, our experience of what constitutes amendment or revision under the past constitutions is not
determinative of what the two terms mean now, as related to the exercise of the right to propose either amendments
or revision. The changes introduced to both the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 could have indeed been deemed an
amendment or revision, but the authority for effecting either would never have been questioned since the
same belonged solely to Congress. In contrast, the 1987 Constitution clearly limits the right of the people to
directly propose constitutional changes to amendments only. We must consequently not be swayed by examples of
constitutional changes effected prior to the present fundamental law, in determining whether such changes are
revisory or amendatory in nature.

In this regard, it should be noted that the distinction laid down by Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. Executive
Secretary13 related to the procedure to be followed in ratifying a completely new charter proposed by a
constitutional convention. The authority or right of the constitutional convention itself to effect such a revision was
not put in issue in that case. As far as determining what constitutes "amendments" for the purpose of a people's
initiative, therefore, we have neither relevant precedent nor prior experience. We must thus confine ourselves to
Dean Sinco's basic articulation of the two terms.

It is clear from Dean Sinco's explanation that a revision may either be of the whole or only part of the Constitution.
The part need not be a substantial part as a change may qualify as a revision even if it only involves some of the
important provisions. For as long as the intention and plan to be carried out contemplate a consideration of all the
provisions of the Constitution "to determine which should be altered or suppressed, or whether the whole document
should be replaced with an entirely new one," the proposed change may be deemed a revision and not merely an
amendment.

Thus, it is not by the sheer number alone of the proposed changes that the same may be considered as either an
amendment or revision. In so determining, another overriding factor is the "original intention and plan authorized to
be carried out" by the proposed changes. If the same relates to a re-examination of the entire document to see
which provisions remain relevant or if it has far-reaching effects on the entire document, then the same constitutes a
revision and not a mere amendment of the Constitution.

From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that a combination of the quantitative and qualitative test is necessary in
assessing what may be considered as an amendment or revision. It is not enough that we focus simply on the
physical scope of the proposed changes, but also consider what it means in relation to the entire document. No
clear demarcation line can be drawn to distinguish the two terms and each circumstance must be judged on the
basis of its own peculiar conditions. The determination lies in assessing the impact that the proposed changes may
have on the entire instrument, and not simply on an arithmetical appraisal of the specific provisions which it seeks to
affect.

In McFadden v. Jordan,14 the California Supreme Court laid down the groundwork for the combination of
quantitative and qualitative assessment of proposed constitutional changes, in order to determine whether the same
is revisory or merely amendatory. In that case, the McFadden court found the proposed changes extensive since at
least 15 of the 25 articles contained in the California Constitution would either be repealed in their entirety or
substantially altered, and four new topics would be introduced. However, it went on to consider the qualitative
effects that the proposed initiative measure would have on California's basic plan of government. It observed that
the proposal would alter the checks and balances inherent in such plan, by delegating far-reaching and mixed
powers to an independent commission created under the proposed measure. Consequently, the proposal
in McFadden was not only deemed as broad and numerous in physical scope, but was also held as having a
substantive effect on the fundamental governmental plan of the State of California.

The dual aspect of the amendment/revision analysis was reiterated by the California Supreme Court in Raven v.
Deukmeijan.15 Proposition 115, as the initiative in that case was called, would vest in the United States Supreme
Court all judicial interpretative powers of the California courts over fundamental criminal defense rights in that state.
It was observed that although quantitatively, the proposition did "not seem so extensive as to change directly the
substantial entirety of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions," the same,
nonetheless, "would substantially alter the substance and integrity of the state Constitution as a document of
independent force and effect." Quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of
Equalization,16 the Raven court said:

". . . apart from a measure effecting widespread deletions, additions and amendments involving many
constitutional articles, 'even a relatively simple enactment may accomplish such far reaching changes in the
nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision also…[A]n enactment which purported to
vest all judicial power in the Legislature would amount to a revision without regard either to the length or
 complexity of the measure or the number of existing articles or sections affected by such change.'"
(Underscoring supplied and citations omitted)

Thus, in resolving the amendment/revision issue, the California Court examines both the quantitative and qualitative
effects of a proposed measure on its constitutional scheme. Substantial changes in either respect could amount to a
revision.17

I am persuaded that we can approach the present issue in the same manner. The experience of the courts in
California is not far removed from the standards expounded on by Dean Sinco when he set out to differentiate
between amendment and revision. It is actually consistent, not only with our traditional concept of the two terms, but
also with the mindset of our constitutional framers when they referred to the disquisition of Justice Antonio
in Javellana.18 We must thus consider whether the proposed changes in this case affect our Constitution in both its
substantial physical entirety and in its basic plan of government.

The question posed is: do the proposed changes, regardless of whether these are simple or substantial,
amount to a revision as to be excluded from the people's right to directly propose amendments to the
fundamental law?

As indicated earlier, we may apply the quantitative/qualitative test in determining the nature of the proposed
changes. These tests are consistent with Dean Sinco's traditional concept of amendment and revision when he
explains that, quantitatively, revision "may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater part
of it, or perhaps only some of its provisions." In any case, he continues, "the factor that characterizes it as an act of
revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out." Unmistakably, the latter statement refers to
the qualitative effect of the proposed changes.

It may thus be conceded that, quantitatively, the changes espoused by the proponents in this case will affect only
two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution, namely, Article VI (Legislative Department) and
Article VII (Executive Department), as well as provisions that will ensure the smooth transition from a presidential-
bicameral system to a parliamentary-unicameral structure of government. The quantitative effect of the proposed
changes is neither broad nor extensive and will not affect the substantial entirety of the 1987 Constitution.

However, it is my opinion that the proposed changes will have serious qualitative consequences on the Constitution.
The initiative petition, if successful, will undoubtedly alter, not only our basic governmental plan, but also redefine
our rights as citizens in relation to government. The proposed changes will set into motion a ripple effect that will
strike at the very foundation of our basic constitutional plan. It is therefore an impermissible constitutional revision
that may not be effected through a people's initiative.

Petitioners' main proposal pertains to the shifting of our form of government from the presidential to the
parliamentary system. An examination of their proposal reveals that there will be a fusion of the executive and
legislative departments into one parliament that will be elected on the basis of proportional representation. No term
limits are set for the members of parliament except for those elected under the party-list system whose terms and
number shall be provided by law. There will be a President who shall be the head of state, but the head of
government is the Prime Minister. The latter and his cabinet shall be elected from among the members of parliament
and shall be responsible to parliament for the program of government.

The preceding proposal indicates that, under the proposed system, the executive and legislature shall be one and
the same, such that parliament will be the paramount governing institution. What this implies is that there will be no
separation between the law-making and enforcement powers of the state, that are traditionally delineated between
the executive and legislature in a presidential form of government. Necessarily, the checks and balances inherent in
the fundamental plan of our U.S.-style presidential system will be eliminated. The workings of government shall
instead be controlled by the internal political dynamics prevailing in the parliament.

Our present governmental system is built on the separation of powers among the three branches of government.
The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and the
judiciary to the application of laws. This separation is intended to prevent a concentration of authority in one person
or group that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of our republican institutions.
In the words of Justice Laurel, the doctrine of separation of powers is intended to secure action, to forestall
overaction, to prevent despotism and obtain efficiency.19

In the proposed parliamentary system, there is an obvious lack of formal institutional checks on the legislative and
executive powers of the state, since both the Prime Minister and the members of his cabinet are drawn from
parliament. There are no effective limits to what the Prime Minister and parliament can do, except the will of the
parliamentary majority. This goes against the central principle of our present constitutional scheme that distributes
the powers of government and provides for counteraction among the three branches. Although both the presidential
and parliamentary systems are theoretically consistent with constitutional democracy, the underlying tenets and
resulting governmental framework are nonetheless radically different.

Consequently, the shift from presidential to parliamentary form of government cannot be regarded as anything but a
drastic change. It will require a total overhaul of our governmental structure and involve a re-orientation in the
cardinal doctrines that govern our constitutional set-up. As explained by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a switch from the
presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure.20 It cannot, by any standard, be deemed as a mere constitutional amendment.

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding
original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary
 to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to
be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of
the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire
document, to determine how and to what extent they should be altered.21 (Underscoring supplied)

The inclusion of a proposal to convene a constituent assembly likewise shows the intention of the proponents to
effect even more far-reaching changes in our fundamental law. If the original intent were to simply shift the form of
government to the parliamentary system, then there would have been no need for the calling out of a constituent
assembly to propose further amendments to the Constitution. It should be noted that, once convened, a constituent
assembly can do away and replace any constitutional provision which may not even have a bearing on the shift to a
parliamentary system of government. The inclusion of such a proposal reveals the proponents' plan to consider all
provisions of the constitution, either to determine which of its provisions should be altered or suppressed or whether
the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.

Consequently, it is not true that only Articles VI and VII are covered by the alleged people's initiative. The proposal
to convene a constituent assembly, which by its terms is mandatory, will practically jeopardize the future of the
entire Constitution and place it on shaky grounds. The plan of the proponents, as reflected in their proposed
changes, goes beyond the shifting of government from the presidential to the parliamentary system. Indeed, it could
even extend to the "fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and republican state."

To say that the proposed changes will affect only the constitution of government is therefore a fallacy. To repeat, the
combined effect of the proposed changes to Articles VI and VII and those pertaining to the Transitory Provisions
under Article XVIII indubitably establish the intent and plan of the proponents to possibly affect even the
constitutions of liberty and sovereignty. Indeed, no valid reason exists for authorizing further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution if the intention of the proposed changes is truly what it purports to be.

There is no question here that only amendments to the Constitution may be undertaken through a people's initiative
and not a revision, as textually reflected in the Constitution itself. This conclusion is inevitable especially from a
comparative examination of Section 2 in relation to Sections 1 and 4 of Article XVII, which state:

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

xxxx

SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later
than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by
the Commission of Elections of the sufficiency of the petition. (Underscoring supplied)

It is clear that the right of the people to directly propose changes to the Constitution is limited to amendments and
does not include a revision thereof. Otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to provide for Section 2 to
distinguish its scope from the rights vested in Congress under Section 1. The latter lucidly states that Congress may
propose both amendments and a revision of the Constitution by either convening a constituent assembly or calling
for a constitutional convention. Section 2, on the other hand, textually commits to the people the right to
propose only amendments by direct action.

To hold, therefore, that Section 2 allows substantial amendments amounting to revision obliterates the clear
distinction in scope between Sections 1 and 2. The intention, as may be seen from a cursory perusal of the
above provisions, is to provide differing fields of application for the three modes of effecting changes to the
Constitution. We need not even delve into the intent of the constitutional framers to see that the distinction in scope
is definitely marked. We should thus apply these provisions with a discerning regard for this distinction.
Again, McFadden22 is instructive:

". . . The differentiation required is not merely between two words; more accurately it is between two
procedures and between their respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow elementary
principles of statutory construction, must be understood to have a substantial field of application, not to be x
x x a mere alternative procedure in the same field. Each of the two words, then, must be understood to
denote, respectively, not only a procedure but also a field of application appropriate to its procedure. The
people of this state have spoken; they made it clear when they adopted article XVIII and made amendment
relatively simple but provided the formidable bulwark of a constitutional convention as a protection against
 improvident or hasty (or any other) revision, that they understood that there was a real difference between
amendment and revision. We find nothing whatsoever in the language of the initiative amendment of 1911
(art. IV, § 1) to effect a breaking down of that difference. On the contrary, the distinction appears to be x x x
scrupulously preserved by the express declaration in the amendment x x x that the power to propose and
vote on "amendments to the Constitution" is reserved directly to the people in initiative proceedings, while
leaving unmentioned the power and the procedure relative to constitutional revision, which revisional power
and procedure, it will be remembered, had already been specifically treated in section 2 of article
XVIII. Intervenors' contention--that any change less than a total one is but amendatory--would reduce to the
rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. Each situation involving the question of
amendment, as contrasted with revision, of the Constitution must, we think, be resolved upon its own facts."

Thus, our people too have spoken when they overwhelmingly ratified the 1987 Constitution, with the provisions on
amendments and revisions under Article XVII. The voice and will of our people cannot be any clearer when they
limited people's initiative to mere amendments of the fundamental law and excluded revisions in its scope. In this
regard, the task of the Court is to give effect to the people's voice, as expressed unequivocally through the
Constitution.

Article XVII on amendments and revisions is called a "constitution of sovereignty" because it defines the
constitutional meaning of "sovereignty of the people." It is through these provisions that the sovereign people have
allowed the expression of their sovereign will and have canalized their powers which would otherwise be plenary. By
approving these provisions, the sovereign people have decided to limit themselves and future generations in the
exercise of their sovereign power.23 They are thus bound by the constitution and are powerless, whatever their
numbers, to change or thwart its mandates, except through the means prescribed by the Constitution itself.24

It is thus misplaced to argue that the people may propose revisions to the Constitution through people's initiative
because their representatives, whose power is merely delegated, may do so. While Section 1 of Article XVII may
be considered as a provision delegating the sovereign powers of amendment and revision to Congress,
Section 2, in contrast, is a self-limitation on that sovereign power. In the words of Cooley:

x x x Although by their constitutions the people have delegated the exercise of sovereign powers to the
several departments, they have not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty. They retain in their own
hands, so far as they have thought it needful to do so, a power to control the governments they create, and
the three departments are responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed, changed or abolished by
them. But this control and direction must be exercised in the legitimate mode previously agreed upon. The
voice of the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can be of legal force only when expressed at the
times and under the conditions which they themselves have prescribed and pointed out by the Constitution,
or which, consistently with the Constitution, have been prescribed and pointed out for them by statute; and if
by any portion of the people, however large, an attempt should be made to interfere with the regular working
of the agencies of government at any other time or in any other mode than as allowed by existing law, either
constitutional or statutory, it would be revolutionary in character, and must be resisted and repressed by the
officers who, for the time being, represent legitimate government.25 (Underscoring supplied)

Consequently, there is here no case of "the spring rising above its source." Nor is it one where the people's
sovereign power has been relegated to a lesser plane than that of Congress. In choosing to exercise self-limitation,
there is no absence or lack of even a fraction of the sovereign power of the people since self-limitation itself is an
expression of that sovereign power. The people have chosen to delegate and limit their sovereign power by
virtue of the Constitution and are bound by the parameters that they themselves have ordained. Otherwise, if the
people choose to defy their self-imposed constitutional restraints, we will be faced with a revolutionary situation.26

It has repeatedly been emphasized that ours is a democratic and republican state.27 Even as we affirm, however,
that aspect of direct democracy, we should not forget that, first and foremost, we are a constitutional democracy.
To uphold direct democracy at the expense of the fundamental law is to sanction, not a constitutional, but an extra-
constitutional recourse. This is clearly beyond the powers of the Court who, by sovereign mandate, is the guardian
and keeper of the Constitution.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G.R. NO. 174153

RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ENRICO B. AUMENTADO TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED

VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), petitioners-intervenors,
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, petitioners-intervenors,
SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) AND VICTORINO F.
BALAIS,petitioners-intervenors,
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T.
TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE AND CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., oppositors-intervenors,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., oppositor-intervenor,
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, oppositor-intervenor,
BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FROUM, MIGRANTE,
GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS,LEONARDO
SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, AND DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, oppositors-intervenors,
LORETA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, oppositors-
intervenors,
LUWALHATI ANTONINO, oppositor-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F.ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO,
MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS AND
AMADO GAT INCION, oppositors-intervenors,
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR. AND SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY
A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCIRO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM, AND PANFILO M.
LACSON, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA AND PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, oppositors-intervenors,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY AND CEBU CHAPTER, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR AND
RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, oppostors-intervenors,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., oppositor-
intervenor;

G.R. NO. 174299

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. AND RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR. AND
COMMISSIONERS RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR. ROMEO A. BRAWNER,
RENE V. SARMIENTO AND JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

CONCURRING OPINION

SANDOVAL–GUTIERREZ, J.:

Vox populi vox Dei -- the voice of the people is the voice of God. Caution should be exercised in choosing one's
battlecry, lest it does more harm than good to one's cause. In its original context, the complete version of this Latin
phrase means exactly the opposite of what it is frequently taken to mean. It originated from a holy man, the monk
Alcuin, who advised Charlemagne, "nec audiendi qui solent dicere vox populi vox Dei quum tumultuositas vulgi
semper insaniae proxima sit," meaning, "And those people should not be listened to who keep on saying, 'The
voice of the people is the voice of God,' since the riotousness of the crowd is always very close to
madness."1 Perhaps, it is by providence that the true meaning of the Latin phrase is revealed upon petitioners and
their allies – that they may reflect upon the sincerity and authenticity of their "people's initiative."

History has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the name of God. Wars were waged, despotism
tolerated and oppressions justified – all these transpired as man boasted of God's imprimatur. Today, petitioners
and their allies hum the same rallying call, convincing this Court that the people's initiative is the "voice of the
people" and, therefore, the "voice of God." After a thorough consideration of the petitions, I have come to realize
that man, with his ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating the voice of God. It is against this
kind of genius that the Court must guard itself.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

In 1996, the Movement for People's Initiative sought to exercise the power of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution which reads:

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter,

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

The exercise was thwarted by a petition for prohibition filed with this Court by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, et
al., entitled "Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin, petitioners, v. Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding
members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents."2 The case was
docketed as G.R. No. 127325. On March 19, 1997, this Court rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners, holding
that Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. No. 6735), An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned." A majority of eight (8) Justices fully concurred
with this ruling, while five (5) subscribed to the opposite view. One (1) opined that there is no need to rule on the
adequacy of R.A. No. 6735.

On motion for reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices reconsidered their positions. One (1) filed an
inhibition and the other one (1) joined the minority opinion. As a consequence, of the thirteen (13) Justices who
participated in the deliberation, six (6) voted in favor of the majority opinion, while the other six (6) voted in favor of
the minority opinion.3

A few months thereafter, or on September 23, 1997, the Court dismissed a similar case, entitled People's Initiative
for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission on Elections4 on the ground that the COMELEC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed PIRMA's Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to
the Constitution "it appearing that that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of the Court in
G.R. no. 127325 (Santiago v. COMELEC) promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10,
1997." Seven (7) Justices voted that there was no need to re-examine its ruling, as regards the issue of the
sufficiency of R.A. No. 6735. Another Justice concurred, but on the different premise that the case at bar is not the
proper vehicle for such re-examination. Five (5) Justice opined otherwise.

This time, another group known as Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with the Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines (ULAP), have gathered signatures in support of the proposed amendments to the Constitution, which
entail a change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, thus:

A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:

Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall
be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces,
representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least
three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each
district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province
must have at least one member.

(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years
old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected
by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof,
except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be
equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.

B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read, as
follows:

Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be
exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a
majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament
for the program of government.

C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory
Provisions," which shall read, as follows:

Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at
noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987
Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.

(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent President, the
incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or
removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall
assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.

Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception
of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and
Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatium up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress,"
"Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that
any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of Parliament" and
any and all references to the "President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime
Minister."

Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception
of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby be amended and Sections
7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1
hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary
System of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate,"
"House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and
 all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of
Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall
continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It
shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the
incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.

(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth
day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially
convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime
Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim
Parliament from among themselves.

(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day
of June 2010.

(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.

Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the
members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the
members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such
powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President."

(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament which shall be
synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. The duty elected
Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim
Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.

Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on its upper right hand portion is the abstract of the
proposed amendments, quoted as follows:

Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Article VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form
of government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government,
in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in government; and providing an Article XVIII
as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?

On August 25, 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Enrico B. Aumentado, herein petitioners, filed with the COMELEC
a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution.5 Five (5) days thereafter, they filed an Amended Petition alleging
that they are filing the petition in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who
have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. They claimed that the signatures of
registered voters appearing on the signature sheets, constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered
voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the
registered voters, were verified by their respective city or municipal election officers.

Several organizations opposed the petition. 6

In a Resolution dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the petition, citing as basis this Court's
ruling in Santiago, permanently enjoining it "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative
on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system."

Hence, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus praying that this Court set aside the COMELEC Resolution
and direct the latter tocomply with Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 4 x x x

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by
the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.

I vote to dismiss the petition of Lambino, et al. in G.R. No. 174153 and grant the petition of Mar-len Abigail Binay, et
al. in G.R. No. 174299. Here, petitioners pray that the COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners be required to
show why they should not be punished for contempt7 of court for disregarding the permanent injunction issued by
this Court in Santiago.

I
Respondent COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion
Without necessarily brushing aside the other important issues, I believe the resolution of the present petition hinges
on this singular issue -- did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied Lambino, et al.'s
petition for initiative to amend the Constitution on the basis of this Court's Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC?

In other words, regardless of how the other remaining issues are resolved, still, the ultimate yardstick is the
attendance of "grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the COMELEC.

Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of
discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.8

The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due course to the petition for initiative on the basis of a case
(Santiago) decided by this Court cannot, in any way, be characterized as "capricious or whimsical," "patent and
gross," or "arbitrary and despotic." On the contrary, it was the most prudent course to take. It must be stressed
that in Santiago, this Court permanently enjoins respondent COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance
of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted." It being a fact that Congress has not enacted a sufficient law, respondent COMELEC has no alternative
but to adhere to Santiago. Otherwise, it is vulnerable to a citation for contempt. As succinctly stated by Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban (then Associate Justice) in his Separate Opinion in the subsequent case of PIRMA vs.
COMELEC:9

x x x I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's
ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had no
choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA
petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted
defiance of the Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious
disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.

It need not be emphasized that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court reigns supreme. All courts, tribunals and
administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions are obliged to conform to its pronouncements. It has the
last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. In other words, there is only
one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings.10 As a warning to lower
court judges who would not adhere to its rulings, this Court, in People v. Santos,11 held:

Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application
of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he
may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal
views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land,
and that any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel,
unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is here said, a
Judge still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself
in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned
(Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.

Clearly, respondent COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition of Lambino, et al. for it
merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago.

Significantly, in PIRMA vs. COMELEC,12 a unanimous Court implicitly recognized that its ruling in Santiago is the
established doctrine and that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in invoking it, thus:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the
public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
complied with the dispositions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
resolution on June 10, 1997.

Indeed, I cannot characterize as a "grave abuse of discretion" the COMELEC's obedience and respect to the
pronouncement of this Court in Santiago.

II
The doctrine of stare decisis
bars the re-examination of Santiago

It cannot be denied that in Santiago, a majority of the members of this Court or eight (8) Justices (as against five (5)
Justices) concurred in declaring R.A. No. 6735 an insufficient law. When the motion for reconsideration was denied
via an equally-divided Court or a 6-6 vote, it does not mean that the Decision was overturned. It only shows that the
opposite view fails to muster enough votes to modify or reverse the majority ruling. Therefore, the original Decision
was upheld.13 In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,14 this Court ruled that the denial of a
motion or reconsideration signifies that the ground relied upon have been found, upon due deliberation, to
be without merit, as not being of sufficient weight to warrant a modification of the judgment or final order.

With Santiago being the only impediment to the instant petition for initiative, petitioners persistently stress that the
doctrine of stare decisis does not bar its re-examination.
I am not convinced. The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere translates "stand by the decisions and disturb
not what is settled."15 As used in our jurisprudence, it means that "once this Court has laid down a principle of
law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it would adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases
in which the facts are substantially the same as in the earlier controversy."16

There is considerable literature about whether this doctrine of stare decisis is a good or bad one, but the doctrine is
usually justified by arguments which focus on the desirability of stability and certainty in the law and also by notions
of justice and fairness. Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his treatise, The Nature of the Judicial Process stated:

It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way
between another. 'If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It
would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided
against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am
plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would
be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule
rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the
courts.17

That the doctrine of stare decisis is related to justice and fairness may be appreciated by considering the
observation of American philosopher William K. Frankena as to what constitutes injustice:

The paradigm case of injustice is that in which there are two similar individuals in similar
circumstances and one of them is treated better or worse than the other. In this case, the cry of
injustice rightly goes up against the responsible agent or group; and unless that agent or group can establish
that there is some relevant dissimilarity after all between the individuals concerned and their circumstances,
he or they will be guilty as charged.18

Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent re-examining and, if need be, overruling prior decisions, "It is
x x x a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the
case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by the current justices. This policy x x x 'is based on the
assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system;
i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable
assurance of the governing rules of law.19 Accordingly, a party urging overruling a precedent faces a rightly
onerous task, the difficulty of which is roughly proportional to a number of factors, including the age of the
precedent, the nature and extent of public and private reliance on it, and its consistency or inconsistency with
other related rules of law. Here, petitioners failed to discharge their task.

Santiago v. COMELEC was decided by this Court on March 19, 1997 or more than nine (9) years ago. During that
span of time, the Filipino people, specifically the law practitioners, law professors, law students, the entire judiciary
and litigants have recognized this Court's Decision as a precedent. In fact, the Santiago doctrine was applied by this
Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA. Even the legislature has relied on said Decision, thus, several bills have
been introduced in both Houses of Congress to cure the deficiency. I cannot fathom why it should be overturned or
set aside merely on the basis of the petition of Lambino, et al. Indeed, this Court's conclusion in Santiago that R.A.
No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is concerned remains a precedent and must be upheld.

III
The proposed constitutional changes constitute revisions and not mere amendments

Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the means for its amendment and revision. Thus:

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(2) A Constitutional Convention.

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered votes, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

At the outset, it must be underscored that initiative and referendum, as means by which the people can directly
propose changes to the Constitution, were not provided for in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Thus, under these
two (2) Constitutions, there was no demand to draw the distinction between an amendment and a revision, both
being governed by a uniform process. This is not so under our present Constitution. The distinction between an
amendment and a revision becomes crucial because only amendments are allowed under the system of people's
initiative. Revisions are within the exclusive domain of Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members, or
of a Constitutional Convention.

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission is explicit that Section 2, Article XVII covers
only amendments, thus:

The sponsor, Commissioner Suarez, is recognized.

 MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given
us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed
provision governing initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to
this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested
on the theory that this matter of initiative which came about because of the extraordinary developments this
year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section
1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the
Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President, will the distinguished proponent of the amendment yield to a few
questions?

MR. DAVIDE: With pleasure, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG: My first question, Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line I refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision?"

MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision"

MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.20

Considering that the initiative on the Constitution only permits amendments, it is imperative to examine whether
petitioners' proposed changes partake of the nature of amendments, not revisions.

The petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC by Lambino, et al. sought to amend the following provisions of the
1987 Constitution: Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Article VI (The Legislative Department); Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4
of Article VII (The Executive Department). It further includes Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) for the purpose of
insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government.

Succinctly, the proposals envision a change in the form of government, from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-
parliamentary; conversion of the present Congress of the Philippines to an Interim National Assembly; change in the
terms of Members of Parliament; and the election of a Prime Minister who shall be vested with executive power.

Petitioners contend that the proposed changes are in the nature of amendments, hence, within the coverage of a
"people's initiative."

I disagree.

The noted constitutionalist, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, characterized an amendment and a revision to the Constitution as follows:

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding
original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary
to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to
be dangerous. In revision however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-
examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all
implications for the document to determine how and to what extent they should be altered.21

Obviously, both "revision" and amendment" connote change; any distinction between the two must be based upon
the degree of change contemplated. In Kelly v. Laing,22 the Supreme Court of Michigan made the following
comparison of the two terms:

"Revision" and "amendment" have the common characteristics of working changes in the charter, and are
sometimes used in exactly the same sense but there is an essential difference between them.

"Revision" implies a reexamination of the whole law and a redraft without obligation to maintain the
form, scheme, or structure of the old. As applied to fundamental law, such as a constitution or charter, it
suggests a convention to examine the whole subject and to prepare and submit a new instrument whether
the desired changes from the old are few or many. Amendment implies continuance of the general plan
and purpose of the law, with corrections to better accomplish its purpose. Basically, revision suggests
fundamental change, while amendment is a correction of detail.
Although there are some authorities which indicate that a change in a city's form of government may be
accomplished by a process of "amendment," the cases which so hold seem to involve statutes which only
distinguish between amendment and totally new charters.23 However, as in Maine law, where the statute authorizing
the changes distinguishes between "charter amendment" and "charter revision," it has been held that "(a) change
in the form of government of a home rule city may be made only by revision of the city charter, not by its
amendment."24

In summary, it would seem that any major change in governmental form and scheme would probably be interpreted
as a "revision" and should be achieved through the more thorough process of deliberation.

Although, at first glance, petitioners' proposed changes appear to cover isolated and specific provisions only,
however, upon careful scrutiny, it becomes clear that the proposed changes will alter the very structure of our
government and create multifarious ramifications. In other words, the proposed changes will have a "domino
effect" or, more appropriately, "ripple effect" on other provisions of the Constitution.

At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the power reserved to the people to effect changes in the Constitution
includes the power to amend anysection in such a manner that the proposed change, if approved, would "be
complete within itself, relate to one subject and not substantially affect any other section or article of the
Constitution or require further amendments to the Constitution to accomplish its purpose."25 This is clearly
not the case here.

Firstly, a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government affects the well-enshrined doctrine of
separation of powers of government, embodied in our Constitution, by providing for an Executive, Legislative and
Judiciary Branches. In a Parliamentary form of government, the Executive Branch is to a certain degree, dependent
on the direct or indirect support of the Parliament, as expressed through a "vote of confidence." To my mind, this
doctrine of separation of powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our Constitution, that any change
affecting such doctrine must necessarily be a revision.

In McFadden vs. Jordan,26 the California Supreme Court ruled as follows:

It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the
people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose x x x. Consequently, if
the scope of the proposed initiative measure now before us is so broad that if such measure became
law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may
not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional
convention. x x x.

Secondly, the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of government is not a mere amendment, but is in
actuality a revision, as set forth in Adams v. Gunter27:

The proposal here to amend Section I of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral
Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in
the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States
Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to
visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American
form of government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of the government in this
state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities
necessary to carry on government.

Thirdly, the proposed changes, on their face, signify revisions rather than amendments, especially, with the inclusion
of the following "omnibus provision":

C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-
Parliamnetary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions" which
shall read, as follows:

xxxxxxxxx

Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President, with the
exceptions of Section 1,2,3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended x x x x x
x and all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and numbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim
up to 14,unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed
amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary system of government x x x x x x .

xxxxxxxxx

Section 4. (1) x x x

(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the Interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution, consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.

The above provisions will necessarily result in a "ripple effect" on the other provisions of the Constitution to make
them conform to the qualities of unicameral-parliamentary form of government. With one sweeping stroke, these
proposed provisions automatically revise some provisions of the Constitution. In McFadden, the same practice was
considered by the Court to be in the nature of substantial revision, necessitating a constitutional convention. I
quote the pertinent portion of its ruling, thus:

There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the various and many articles and sections of our
present Constitution which would be affected, replaced or repealed. It purports only to add one new article
but its framers found it necessary to include the omnibus provision (subdivision (7) of section XII) that "If any
section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of the constitution is in conflict with any of the provisions of
this article, such section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase is to the extent of such conflict hereby
repealed. x x x Consequently, if the scope of the proposed intitiative measure now before us is so broad that
if such measure become law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be be effected,
then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a
constitutional convention.28

Undoubtedly, the changes proposed by the petitioners are not mere amendments which will only affect the Articles
or Sections sought to be changed. Rather, they are in the nature of revisions which will affect considerable portions
of the Constitution resulting in the alteration of our form of government. The proposed changes cannot be taken in
isolation since these are connected or "interlocked" with the other provisions of our Constitution. Accordingly, it has
been held that: "If the changes attempted are so sweeping that it is necessary to include the provisions
interlocking them, then it is plain that the plan would constitute a recasting of the whole Constitution and
this, we think, it was intended to be accomplished only by a convention under Section 2 which has not yet
been disturbed."29

I therefore conclude that since the proposed changes partake of the nature of a revision of the Constitution, then
they cannot be the subject of an initiative. On this matter, Father Bernas expressed this insight:

But why limit initiative and referendum to simple amendments? The answer, which one can easily glean
from the rather long deliberation on initiative and referendum in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is
practicality. In other words, who is to formulate the revision or how is it to be formulated? Revision, as
concretely being proposed now, is nothing less than a rebuilding of the Philippine constitutional
structure. Who were involved in formulating the structure? What debates ensued? What records are there
for future use in interpreting the provisions which may be found to be unclear?

In a deliberative body like Congress or a Constitutional Convention, decisions are reached after much
purifying debate. And while the deliberations proceed, the public has the opportunity to get involved. It is
only after the work of an authorized body has been completed that it is presented to the electorate for final
judgment. Careful debate is important because the electorate tends to accept what is presented to it
even sight unseen.30

IV
R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient to implement the People's initiative

Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter,

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

On its face, Section 2 is not a self-executory provision. This means that an enabling law is imperative for its
implementation. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6735 in order to breathe life into this constitutional provision.
However, as previously narrated, this Court struck the law in Santiago for being incomplete, inadequate,
or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned.

The passage of time has done nothing to change the applicability of R.A. No. 6735. Congress neither amended it
nor passed a new law to supply its deficiencies.

Notwithstanding so, this Court is being persuaded to take a 360-degree turn, enumerating three (3) justifications
why R.A. No. 6735 must be considered a sufficient law, thus:

1) The text of R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to the right of people to initiate changes to the
Constitution;

2) The legislative history of R.A. No. 6735 reveals the clear intent of the lawmakers to use it as instrument
to implement the people's initiative; and

3) The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. No. 6735 demonstrate the legislative intent to use it
as instrument to implement people's initiative.

I regret to say that the foregoing justifications are wanting.

A thorough reading of R.A. No. 6735 leads to the conclusion that it covers only initiatives on national and local
legislation. Its references to initiatives on the Constitution are few, isolated and misplaced. Unlike in the initiatives
on national and local legislation, where R.A. No. 6735 provides a detailed, logical, and exhaustive enumeration on
their implementation,31 however, as regards initiative on the Constitution, the law merely:

(a) mentions the word "Constitution" in Section 2;32

(b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative
in Section 3;33

(c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be
approved or rejected by the people;34

(d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition;35 and

(e) provides the date for the effectivity of the approved proposition.36

In other words, R.A. No. 6735 does not specify the procedure how initiative on the Constitution may be
accomplished. This is not the enabling law contemplated by the Constitution. As pointed out by oppositor-intervenor
Alternative Law Groups Inc., since the promulgation of the Decision in Santiago, various bills have been introduced
in both Houses of Congress providing for a complete and adequate process for people's initiative, such as:

· Names, signatures and addresses of petitioners who shall be registered voters;

· A statement of the provision of the Constitution or any part thereof sought to be amended and the
proposed amendment;

· The manner of initiation - in a congressional district through a petition by any individual, group, political
party or coalition with members in the congressional district;

· The language used: the petition should be printed in English and translated in the local language;

· Signature stations to be provided for;

· Provisions pertaining to the need and manner of posting, that is, after the signatures shall have been
verified by the Commission, the verified signatures shall be posted for at least thirty days in the respective
municipal and city halls where the signatures were obtained;

· Provisions pertaining to protests allowed any protest as to the authenticity of the signatures to be filed with
the COMELEC and decided within sixty (60) days from the filing of said protest.

None of the above necessary details is provided by R.A. No. 6735, thus, demonstrating its incompleteness and
inadequacy.

V
Petitioners are not Proper Parties to
File the Petition for Initiative

VI
The Petition for Initiative Filed with the COMELEC Does not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution and R.A. No. 6735

I shall discuss the above issues together since they are interrelated and inseparable. The determination of whether
petitioners are proper parties to file the petition for initiative in behalf of the alleged 6.3 million voters will require an
examination of whether they have complied with the provisions of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

To reiterate, Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. (Underscoring supplied)

The mandate of the above constitutional provisions is definite and categorical. For a people's initiative to prosper,
the following requisites must be present:

1. It is "the people" themselves who must "directly propose" "amendments" to the Constitution;

2. The proposed amendments must be contained in "a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters;" and
 3. The required minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters "must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters" of "every legislative district."

In this case, however, the above requisites are not present.

The petition for initiative was filed with the COMELEC by petitioners Lambino and Aumentado, two registered
voters. As shown in the "Verification/Certification with Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping" contained in their petition,
they alleged under oath that they have caused the preparation of the petition in their personal capacity as registered
voters "and as representatives" of the supposed 6.3 million registered voters. This goes to show that the
questioned petition was not initiated directly by the 6.3 million people who allegedly comprised at least 12% of the
total number of registered voters, as required by Section 2. Moreover, nowhere in the petition itself could be
found the signatures of the 6.3 million registered voters. Only the signatures of petitioners Lambino and
Aumentado were affixed therein "as representatives" of those 6.3 million people. Certainly, that is not the petition
for people's initiative contemplated by the Constitution.

Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no authority whatsoever to file the petition "as representatives" of the
alleged 6.3 million registered voters. Such act of representation is constitutionally proscribed. To repeat,
Section 2 strictly requires that amendments to the Constitution shall be "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters." Obviously,
the phrase "directly proposed by the people" excludes any person acting as representative or agent of the 12% of
the total number of registered voters. The Constitution has bestowed upon the people the right to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution. Such right cannot be usurped by anyone under the guise of being the people's
representative. Simply put, Section 2 does not recognize acts of representation. For it is only "the people"
(comprising the minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein) who are the proper parties to initiate a
petition proposing amendments to the Constitution. Verily, the petition filed with the COMELEC by herein petitioners
Lambino and Aumentado is not a people's initiative. Necessarily, it must fail.

Cororarilly, the plea that this Court should "hear" and "heed" "the people's voice" is baseless and misleading. There
is no people's voice to be heard and heeded as this petition for initiative is not truly theirs, but only of
petitioners Lambino and Aumentado and their allies.

VII
The issues at bar are not political questions.

Lambino and Aumentado, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, vehemently argue that: (1) "the validity of the exercise of
the right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the fact that over six
million registered voters indicated their support of the Petition for initiative is a purely political question;" and (2)
"[t]he power to propose amendments to the Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people.
Hence, the determination by the people to exercise their right to propose amendments under the system of initiative
is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the ambit of a political question."

The "political question doctrine" was first enunciated by the US Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden.37 Faced with the
difficult question of whether the Supreme Court was the appropriate institution to define the substantive content of
republicanism, the US Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Roger B. Taney, concluded that "the sovereignty
in every State resides in the people, as to how and whether they exercised it, was under the circumstances
of the case, a political question to be settled by the political power." In other words, the responsibility of settling
certain constitutional questions was left to the legislative and executive branches of the government.

The Luther case arose from the so-called "Dorr Rebellion" in the State of Rhode Island. Due to increased migration
brought about by the Industrial Revolution, the urban population of Rhode Island increased. However, under the
1663 Royal Charter which served as the State Constitution, voting rights were largely limited to residents of the rural
districts. This severe mal-apportionment of suffrage rights led to the "Dorr Rebellion." Despairing of obtaining
remedies for their disenfranchisement from the state government, suffrage reformers invoked their rights under the
American Declaration of Independence to "alter or abolish" the government and to institute a new one. The
reformers proceeded to call for and hold an extralegal constitutional convention, drafted a new State Constitution,
submitted the document for popular ratification, and held elections under it. The State government, however,
refused to cede power, leading to an anomalous situation in that for a few months in 1842, there were two opposing
state governments contending for legitimacy and possession of state of offices.

The Rhode Island militia, under the authority of martial law, entered and searched the house of Martin Luther, a Dorr
supporter. He brought suit against Luther Borden, a militiaman. Before the US Supreme Court, Luther's counsel
argued that since the State's archaic Constitution prevented a fair and peaceful address of grievances through
democratic processes, the people of Rhode Island had instead chosen to exercise their inherent right in popular
sovereignty of replacing what they saw as an oppressive government. The US Supreme Court deemed the
controversy as non-justiciable and inappropriate for judicial resolution.

In Colgrove v. Green,38 Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, coined the phrase "political thicket" to describe situations
where Federal courts should not intervene in political questions which they have neither the competence nor the
commission to decide. In Colgrove, the US Supreme Court, with a narrow 4-3 vote branded the apportionment of
legislative districts in Illinois "as a political question and that the invalidation of the districts might, in requiring
statewide elections, create an evil greater than that sought to be remedied."

While this Court has adopted the use of Frankfurter's "political thicket," nonetheless, it has sought to come up with a
definition of the term "political question." Thus, in Vera v. Avelino,39 this Court ruled that properly, political questions
are "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government." In Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco,40 the Court held that the term political question
connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

In Aquino v. Enrile,41 this Court adopted the following guidelines laid down in Baker v. Carr42 in determining whether
a question before it is political, rather than judicial in nature, to wit:

1) there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political

department; or

2) there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or

3) there is the sheer impossibility of deciding the matter without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or

4) there is the sheer impossibility of the Court's undertaking an independent resolution without expressing
lack of respect due the coordinate branches of government; or

5) there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or

6) there exists the potentiality of embarrassment arising from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.

None of the foregoing standards is present in the issues raised before this Court. Accordingly, the issues are
justiciable. What is at stake here is the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the issues raised before this Court are political in nature, it is not precluded
from resolving them under its expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
following Daza v. Singson.43 As pointed out in Marcos v. Manglapus,44 the present Constitution limits resort to the
political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial power which the Court, under previous charters, would
have normally and ordinarily left to the political departments to decide.

CONCLUSION

In fine, considering the political scenario in our country today, it is my view that the so-called people's initiative to
amend our Constitution from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary is actually not an initiative of the
people, but an initiative of some of our politicians. It has not been shown by petitioners, during the oral arguments in
this case, that the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures understood what they signed. In fact,
petitioners admitted that the Constitutional provisions sought to be amended and the proposed amendments were
not explained to all those registered voters. Indeed, there will be no means of knowing, to the point of judicial
certainty, whether they really understood what petitioners and their group asked them to sign.

Let us not repeat the mistake committed by this Court in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary.45 The Court then
ruled that "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect," although it had notice that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was not validly ratified by the people in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The Court concluded,
among others, that the viva voce voting in the Citizens' Assemblies "was and is null and void ab initio." That was
during martial law when perhaps majority of the justices were scared of the dictator. Luckily at present, we are not
under a martial law regime. There is, therefore, no reason why this Court should allow itself to be used as a
legitimizing authority by the so-called people's initiative for those who want to perpetuate themselves in power.

At this point, I can say without fear that there is nothing wrong with our present government structure.
Consequent1y, we must not change it. America has a presidential type of government. Yet, it thrives ideally and has
become a super power. It is then safe to conclude that what we should change are some of the people
running the government, NOT the SYSTEM.

According to petitioners, the proposed amendment would effect a more efficient, more economical and more
responsive government.

Is there hope that a new breed of politicians, more qualified and capable, may be elected as members and leaders
of the unicameral-parliament? Or will the present members of the Lower House continue to hold their respective
positions with limitless terms?

Will the new government be more responsive to the needs of the poor and the marginalized? Will it be able to
provide homes for the homeless, food for the hungry, jobs for the jobless and protection for the weak?

This is a defining moment in our history. The issue posed before us is crucial with transcendental significance. And
history will judge us on how we resolve this issue – shall we allow the revision of our Constitution, of which we are
duty bound to guard and revere, on the basis of a doubtful people's initiative?
Amending the Constitution involving a change of government system or structure is a herculean task affecting the
entire Filipino people and the future generations. Let us, therefore, entrust this duty to more knowledgeable people
elected as members of a Constitutional Convention.

Yes, the voice of the people is the voice of God. But under the circumstances in this case, the voice of God is
not audible.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174299.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G.R. No. 174153

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. 174299

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and
Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE
V. SARMIENTO, and JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

I am convinced beyond cavil that the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) did not commit an abuse of
its discretion in dismissing the amended petition before it. The proposals of petitioners incorporated in said amended
petition are for the revision of the 1987 Constitution. Further, the amended petition before the respondent
COMELEC is insufficient in substance.

The Antecedents

On August 25, 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the COMELEC a petition
entitled "IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE 1987 CONSTITUTION THROUGH A
PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE: A SHIFT FROM A BICAMERAL PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENTARY
GOVERNMENT BY AMENDING ARTICLES VI AND VII; AND PROVIDING TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE
ORDERLY SHIFT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL TO THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM." The case was docketed as
EM (LD)-06-01. On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed an amended petition. For brevity, it is referred to as the petition
for initiative.

Petitioners alleged therein, inter alia, that they filed their petition in their own behalf and together with those who
have affixed their signatures to the signature sheets appended thereto who are Filipino citizens, residents and
registered voters of the Philippines, and they constitute at least twelve percent (12%) of all the registered voters in
the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three percent (3%) of all the registered voters
therein.

Petitioners further alleged therein that the filing of the petition for initiative is based on their constitutional right to
propose amendments to the 1987 Constitution by way of people's initiative, as recognized in Section 2, Article XVII
thereof, which provides:

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right."

According to petitioners, while the above provision states that "(T)he Congress shall provide for the implementation
of the exercise of this right," the provisions of Section 5(b) and (c), along with Section 7 of Republic Act (RA)
6735,1are sufficient enabling details for the people's exercise of the power. The said sections of RA 6735 state:
 Sec. 5. Requirements. – (a) To exercise the power x x x

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the
total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised
only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years
thereafter.

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;

c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written
or printed at the top of every page of the petition.

xxxx

Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.

They also alleged that the COMELEC has the authority, mandate and obligation to give due course to the petition
for initiative, in compliance with the constitutional directive for the COMELEC to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."2

Petitioners incorporated in their petition for initiative the changes they proposed to be incorporated in the 1987
Constitution and prayed that the COMELEC issue an order:

1. Finding the Petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;

2. Directing the publication of the Petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and
local circulation; and

3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after the Certification by this
Honorable Commission of the sufficiency of this Petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their
sovereign will on the proposition.

Petitioners pray for such other reliefs deemed just and equitable in the premises.

The Ruling of the respondent COMELEC

On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC promulgated the assailed Resolution denying due course and dismissing the
petition for initiative. The COMELEC ruled that:

We agree with the petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional duty to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as in this case, initiative.

This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution particularly on
initiative.

Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

"Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may, likewise, be directly proposed by the people through
initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. x x x.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right."

The aforequoted provision of the Constitution being a non-self-executory provision needed an enabling law
for its implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the constitutional right of the people under a system
of initiative to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolution, Congress enacted RA 6735.
 However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago v. Commission on Elections struck down the
said law for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative
on amendments to the Constitution is concerned

The Supreme Court, likewise, declared that this Commission should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot be given due course since the Supreme
Court categorically declared RA 6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.

This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of the right of the people under a system
of initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the pronouncement of the High Court that in the
absence of a valid enabling law, this right of the people remains nothing but an "empty right," and that this
Commission is permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. (Citations omitted.)

Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to this Court on a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

The Petitioners' Case

In support of their petition, petitioners alleged, inter alia, that:

I.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR
INITIATIVE, BECAUSE THE CITED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC, CONSIDERING THAT
UPON ITS RECONSIDERATION AND FINAL VOTING ON 10 JUNE 1997, NO MAJORITY VOTE WAS
SECURED TO DECLARE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 AS INADEQUATE, INCOMPLETE AND
INSUFFICIENT IN STANDARD.

II.

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 AND EXISTING
APPROPRIATION OF THE COMELEC PROVIDE FOR SUFFICIENT DETAILS AND AUTHORITY FOR
THE EXERCISE OF PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE, THUS, EXISTING LAWS TAKEN TOGETHER ARE
ADEQUATE AND COMPLETE.

III.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE
PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, THEREBY VIOLATING AN EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND
DISREGARDING AND CONTRAVENING THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE.

A.

THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION
FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS.

1.

THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED TO GIVE THE PEOPLE THE

POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS AND THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES ARE NOW
GIVING VIBRANT LIFE TO THIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

2.

PRIOR TO THE QUESTIONED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997, THE RIGHT OF

THE PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THE SOVEREIGN POWER OF INITIATIVE AND RECALL
HAS BEEN INVARIABLY UPHELD

3.

THE EXERCISE OF THE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS IS A POLITICAL

QUESTION WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE.

4.
 BY SIGNING THE SIGNATURE SHEETS ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE
DULY VERIFIED BY THE ELECTION OFFICERS, THE PEOPLE HAVE CHOSEN TO
PERFORM THIS SACRED EXERCISE OF THEIR SOVEREIGN POWER.

B.

THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION
FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS

C.

THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION ISSUED IN SANTIAGO V. COMELEC ONLY APPLIES TO THE

DELFIN PETITION.

1.

IT IS THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION AND NOT OTHER STATEMENTS

IN THE BODY OF THE DECISION THAT GOVERNS THE RIGHTS IN CONTROVERSY.

IV.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED OR NEGLECTED TO ACT OR PERFORM A DUTY

MANDATED BY LAW.

A.

THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE COMELEC IS TO SET THE INITIATIVE FOR PLEBISCITE. 3

Petitioners Failed to Allege and Demonstrate All the Essential

Facts To Establish the Right to a Writ of Certiorari

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

A writ for certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set out in the petition and established:

(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. x x x4

The Court has invariably defined "grave abuse of discretion," thus:

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For
certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of
the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions.5

There is thus grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it acts in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough.6 The only question involved is jurisdiction, either the lack or excess thereof, and abuse of
discretion warrants the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when the same is grave, as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility. A writ
of certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.7 An error of
judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible only by an
appeal.8

In the present case, it appears from the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC that it denied the petition for initiative
solely in obedience to the mandate of this Court in Santiago v. Commission on Elections.9 In said case, the Court En
Banc permanently enjoined the COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system. When the COMELEC denied the petition for initiative, there was as yet no valid law
enacted by Congress to provide for the implementation of the system.

It is a travesty for the Court to declare the act of the COMELEC in denying due course to the petition for initiative as
"capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." In fact, in
so doing, the COMELEC merely followed or applied, as it ought to do, the Court's ruling in Santiago to the effect that
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative is a non self-executory provision and requires an
enabling law for its implementation. In relation thereto, RA 6735 was found by the Court to be "incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the constitutional provision on initiative.
Consequently, the COMELEC was "permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system." The decision of the Court En Banc interpreting RA 6735 forms part of the legal
system of the Philippines.10 And no doctrine or principle laid down by the Court En Banc may be modified or
reversed except by the Court En Banc,11 certainly not by the COMELEC. Until the Court En Banc modifies or
reverses its decision, the COMELEC is bound to follow the same.12 As succinctly held in Fulkerson v. Thompson:13

Whatever was before the Court, and is disposed of, is considered as finally settled. The inferior court is
bound by the judgment or decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into execution according to the
mandate. The inferior court cannot vary it, or judicially examine it for any other purpose than execution. It
can give no other or further relief as to any matter decided by the Supreme Court even where there is error
apparent; or in any manner intermeddle with it further than to execute the mandate and settle such matters
as have been remanded, not adjudicated by the Supreme Court….

The principles above stated are, we think, conclusively established by the authority of adjudged cases. And
any further departure from them would inevitably mar the harmony of the whole judiciary system, bring its
parts into conflict, and produce therein disorganization, disorder, and incalculable mischief and confusion.
Besides, any rule allowing the inferior courts to disregard the adjudications of the Supreme Court, or to
refuse or omit to carry them into execution would be repugnant to the principles established by the
constitution, and therefore void.14

At this point, it is well to recall the factual context of Santiago as well as the pronouncement made by the Court
therein. Like petitioners in the instant case, in Santiago, Atty. Jesus Delfin, the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), et al., invoked Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution as they filed with the
COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, By People's Initiative" (the
Delfin petition). They asked the COMELEC to issue an order fixing the time and date for signature gathering all over
the country; causing the necessary publications of said order and their petition in newspapers of general and local
circulation and instructing municipal election registrars in all regions all over the country and to assist petitioners in
establishing signing stations. Acting thereon, the COMELEC issued the order prayed for.

Senator Miriam Santiago, et al. forthwith filed with this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the COMELEC from
implementing its order. The Court, speaking through Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice), granted the
petition as it declared:

1. RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned";

2. COMELEC Resolution No. 230015 invalid insofar as it prescribed rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution because the COMELEC is without authority to promulgate the rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative; and

3. The Delfin petition insufficient as it did not contain the required number of signatures of registered voters.

The Court concluded in Santiago that "the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system." The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING RA 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the Delfin petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on December 18, 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.16

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santiago in another petition which was filed with the Court by PIRMA and the
spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (who were parties in Santiago) docketed as PIRMA v. Commission on
Elections.17 The said petitioners, undaunted by Santiago and claiming to have gathered 5,793,213 signatures, filed a
petition with the COMELEC praying, inter alia, that COMELEC officers be ordered to verify all the signatures
collected in behalf of the petition and, after due hearing, that it (COMELEC) declare the petition sufficient for the
purpose of scheduling a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Like the Delfin petition in Santiago, the PIRMA petition
proposed to submit to the people in a plebiscite the amendment to the Constitution on the lifting of the term limits of
elected officials.

The opinion of the minority that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in PIRMA has no basis. The
COMELEC, in its Resolution dated July 8, 1997, dismissed the PIRMA petition citing the permanent restraining
order issued against it by the Court in Santiago. PIRMA and the spouses Pedrosa forthwith elevated the matter to
the Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over,
and thereby dismissing, their petition for initiative to amend the Constitution.

The Court dismissed outright, by a unanimous vote, the petition filed by PIRMA and the spouses Albert Pedrosa.
The Court declared that the COMELEC merely complied with the dispositions in the decision of the Court in
Santiago and, hence, cannot be held to have committed a grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing the petition
before it:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the
public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19,
1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.

The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the second issue posed by the
petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief
Justice and six (6) other members of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and
Torres, JJ., voted that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-
examination of said second issue since the case a bar is not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5)
other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban, JJ., opined that
there was need for such a re-examination. x x x

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.18 (Underscoring supplied.)

In the present case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) takes the side of petitioners and argues that the
COMELEC should not have applied the ruling in Santiago to the petition for initiative because the permanent
injunction therein referred only to the Delfin petition. The OSG buttresses this argument by pointing out that the
Temporary Restraining Order dated December 18, 1996 that was made permanent in the dispositive portion
referred only to the Delfin petition.

The OSG's attempt to isolate the dispositive portion from the body of the Court's decision in Santiago is futile. It
bears stressing that the dispositive portion must not be read separately but in connection with the other portions of
the decision of which it forms a part. To get to the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof
should be resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and does
appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in the fallo thereof.19

The pronouncement in the body of the decision in Santiago permanently enjoining the COMELEC "from entertaining
or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have
been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system" is thus as much a part of the Court's decision
as its dispositive portion. The ruling of this Court is of the nature of an in rem judgment barring any and all
Filipinos from filing a petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
have been validly enacted. Clearly, the COMELEC, in denying due course to the present petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution conformably with the Court's ruling in Santiago did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. On the contrary, its actuation is in keeping with the salutary principle of hierarchy of courts. For the Court
to find the COMELEC to have abused its discretion when it dismissed the amended petition based on the ruling of
this Court in Santiago would be sheer judicial apostasy.

As eloquently put by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts
should take their bearings."20 This truism applies with equal force to the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body for, after
all, judicial decisions applying or interpreting laws or the Constitution "assume the same authority as the statute
itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria
which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those duty bound to
enforce obedience thereto."21

Petitioners Cannot Ascribe

Grave Abuse of Discretion on
the COMELEC Based on the
Minority Opinion in Santiago

It is elementary that the opinion of the majority of the members of the Court, not the opinion of the minority, prevails.
As a corollary, the decision of the majority cannot be modified or reversed by the minority of the members of the
Court.

However, to eschew the binding effect of Santiago, petitioners argue, albeit unconvincingly, that the Court's
declaration therein on the inadequacy, incompleteness and insufficiency of RA 6735 to implement the system of
initiative to propose constitutional amendments did not constitute the majority opinion. This contention is utterly
baseless.

Santiago was concurred in, without any reservation, by eight Justices,22 or the majority of the members of the Court,
who actually took part in the deliberations thereon. On the other hand, five Justices,23 while voting for the dismissal
of the Delfin petition on the ground of insufficiency, dissented from the majority opinion as they maintained the view
that RA 6735 was sufficient to implement the system of initiative.

Given that a clear majority of the members of the Court, eight Justices, concurred in the decision in Santiago, the
pronouncement therein that RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned" constitutes a definitive ruling on the matter.

In the Resolution dated June 10, 1997, the motions for reconsideration of the Santiago decision were denied with
finality as only six Justices, or less than the majority, voted to grant the same. The Resolution expressly stated that
the motion for reconsideration failed "to persuade the requisite majority of the Court to modify or reverse the
Decision of 19 March 1977."24 In fine, the pronouncement in Santiago as embodied in the Decision of March 19,
1997 remains the definitive ruling on the matter.

It bears stressing that in PIRMA, petitioners prayed for the Court to resolve the issue posed by them and to re-
examine its ruling as regards RA 6735. By a vote of seven members of the Court, including Justice Justo P. Torres,
Jr. and Justice Jose C. Vitug, the Court voted that there was no need to resolve the issue. Five members of the
Court opined that there was a need for the re-examination of said ruling. Thus, the pronouncement of the Court
in Santiago remains the law of the case and binding on petitioners.

If, as now claimed by the minorty, there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago, the Court should have
resolved to set aside its original resolution dismissing the petition and to grant the motion for reconsideration and the
petition. But the Court did not. The Court positively and unequivocally declared that the COMELEC merely followed
the ruling of the Court in Santiago in dismissing the petition before it. No less than Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno
concurred with the resolution of the Court. It behooved Justice Puno to dissent from the ruling of the Court on the
motion for reconsideration of petitioners precisely on the ground that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court
in Santiago. He did not. Neither did Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who was a member of the Court.

That RA 6735 has failed to validly implement the people's right to directly propose constitutional amendments
through the system of initiative had already been conclusively settled in Santiago as well as in PIRMA. Heeding
these decisions, several lawmakers, including no less than Solicitor General Antonio Eduardo Nachura when he
was then a member of the House of Representatives,25 have filed separate bills to implement the system of initiative
under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

In the present Thirteenth (13th) Congress, at least seven (7) bills are pending. In the Senate, the three (3) pending
bills are: Senate Bill No. 119 entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by
Senator Luisa "Loi" P. Ejercito Estrada; Senate Bill No. 2189 entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to
Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago; and Senate Bill No. 2247 entitled An Act
Providing for a System of People's Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution introduced by Senator
Richard Gordon.

In the House of Representatives, there are at least four (4) pending bills: House Bill No. 05281 filed by
Representative Carmen Cari, House Bill No. 05017 filed by Representative Imee Marcos, House Bill No. 05025 filed
by Representative Roberto Cajes, and House Bill No. 05026 filed by Representative Edgardo Chatto. These House
bills are similarly entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution.

The respective explanatory notes of the said Senate and House bills uniformly recognize that there is, to date, no
law to govern the process by which constitutional amendments are introduced by the people directly through the
system of initiative. Ten (10) years after Santiago and absent the occurrence of any compelling supervening
event, i.e., passage of a law to implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution,
that would warrant the re-examination of the ruling therein, it behooves the Court to apply to the present case the
salutary and well-recognized doctrine of stare decisis. As earlier shown, Congress and other government agencies
have, in fact, abided by Santiago. The Court can do no less with respect to its own ruling.

Contrary to the stance taken by petitioners, the validity or constitutionality of a law cannot be made to depend on the
individual opinions of the members who compose it – the Supreme Court, as an institution, has already determined
RA 6735 to be "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned" and therefore the same remains to be so regardless of any change in
the Court's composition.26 Indeed, it is vital that there be stability in the courts in adhering to decisions deliberately
made after ample consideration. Parties should not be encouraged to seek re-examination of determined principles
and speculate on fluctuation of the law with every change in the expounders of it.27

Proposals to Revise the Constitution,

As in the Case of the Petitioners'
Proposal to Change the Form of
Government, Cannot be Effected
Through the System of Initiative,
Which by Express Provision of
Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, is Limited to Amendments
Even granting arguendo the Court, in the present case, abandons its pronouncement in Santiago and declares RA
6735, taken together with other extant laws, sufficient to implement the system of initiative, still, the amended
petition for initiative cannot prosper. Despite the denomination of their petition, the proposals of petitioners to
change the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of
government are actually for the revision of the Constitution.

Petitioners propose to "amend" Articles VI and VII of the Constitution in this manner:

A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:

"Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall
be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces,
representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least
three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each
district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province
must have at least one member.

"(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years
old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected
by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof,
except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be
equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts."

B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read, as follows:

"Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be
exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a
majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament
for the program of government.

C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions," which
shall read as follows:

Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at
noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987
Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.,

(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent President, the
incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or
removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall
assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.

Section 2. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the
exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be
amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained
and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress,"
"Senate," "House of Representatives" and "House of Congress," "Senator[s] or "Member[s] of the House of
Representatives" and "House of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all
references therein to "Member[s] of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member[s]
of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and or "Acting President" shall be changed to
read "Prime Minister."

Section 3. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the
exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended and
Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained
and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with
Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral
Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress,"
"Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that
any and all references therein to "Member[s] of Congress," "Senator[s]" or "Member[s] of the House of
Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and of "Acting President" shall be changed to read
"Prime Minister."

Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall
continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It
shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the
incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.

(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth
day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially
convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its session for the election of the interim Prime
 Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim
Parliament from among themselves.

(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day
of June 2010.

(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.

"Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the
members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the
members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such
powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President."

(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be
synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. [Thereafter, the
Vice-President, as Member of Parliament, shall immediately convene the Parliament and shall initially
preside over its session for the purpose of electing the Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority
vote of all its members, from among themselves.] The duly-elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise
and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the
term of the incumbent President and Vice President.28

Petitioners claim that the required number of signatures of registered voters have been complied with, i.e., the
signatories to the petition constitute twelve percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country, wherein each
legislative district is represented by at least three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein. Certifications
allegedly executed by the respective COMELEC Election Registrars of each municipality and city verifying these
signatures were attached to the petition for initiative. The verification was allegedly done on the basis of the list of
registered voters contained in the official COMELEC list used in the immediately preceding election.

The proposition, as formulated by petitioners, to be submitted to the Filipino people in a plebiscite to be called for
the said purpose reads:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?29

According to petitioners, the proposed amendment of Articles VI and VII would effect a more efficient, more
economical and more responsive government. The parliamentary system would allegedly ensure harmony between
the legislative and executive branches of government, promote greater consensus, and provide faster and more
decisive governmental action.

Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII pertinently read:

Article XVII

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

It can be readily gleaned that the above provisions set forth different modes and procedures for proposals for the
amendment and revision of the Constitution:

1. Under Section 1, Article XVII, any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution may be proposed by –

a. Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

b. A constitutional convention.

2. Under Section 2, Article XVII, amendments to the Constitution may be likewise directly proposed by the
people through initiative.
The framers of the Constitution deliberately adopted the terms "amendment" and "revision" and provided for their
respective modes and procedures for effecting changes of the Constitution fully cognizant of the distinction between
the two concepts. Commissioner Jose E. Suarez, the Chairman of the Committee on Amendments and Transitory
Provisions, explained:

MR. SUAREZ. One more point, and we will be through.

We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is, "amendment." However, the Committee finally
agreed to use the terms – "amendment" or "revision" when our attention was called by the honorable Vice-
President to the substantial difference in the connotation and significance between the said terms. As a
result of our research, we came up with the observations made in the famous – or notorious – Javellana
doctrine, particularly the decision rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar, wherein he made the following
distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of an existing Constitution: "Revision" may involve a
rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a
change of specific provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire
Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a
consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to
the needs of the times.

The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new
fundamental Charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.

So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be employed in the
formulation of the Article governing amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.30

Further, the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted the term "revision" in Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution because it was their intention to reserve the power to propose a revision of the Constitution to Congress
or the constitutional convention. Stated in another manner, it was their manifest intent that revision thereof shall not
be undertaken through the system of initiative. Instead, the revision of the Constitution shall be done either by
Congress or by a constitutional convention.

It is significant to note that, originally, the provision on the system of initiative was included in Section 1 of the draft
Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions. The
original draft provided:

SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article __ Section __ of the
Constitution.31

However, after deliberations and interpellations, the members of the Commission agreed to remove the provision on
the system of initiative from Section 1 and, instead, put it under a separate provision, Section 2. It was explained
that the removal of the provision on initiative from the other "traditional modes" of changing the Constitution was
precisely to limit the former (system of initiative) to amendments to the Constitution. It was emphasized that the
system of initiative should not extend to revision.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given
to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete
committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to
this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested
on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this
year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1.
The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the
Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the
operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x32

The intention to exclude "revision" of the Constitution as a mode that may be undertaken through the system of
initiative was reiterated and made clear by Commissioner Suarez in response to a suggestion of Commissioner
Felicitas Aquino:

MR. SUAREZ. Section 2 must be interpreted together with the provisions of Section 4, except that in Section
4, as it is presently drafted, there is no take-off date for the 60-day and 90-day periods.
 MS. AQUINO. Yes. In other words, Section 2 is another alternative mode of proposing amendments to the
Constitution which would further require the process of submitting it in a plebiscite, in which case it is not
self-executing.

MR. SUAREZ. No, not unless we settle and determine the take-off period.

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms
of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate
section as if it were a self-executing provision?

MR SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total
overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and
(b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given
to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned by the Committee.33

Then Commissioner Hilario P. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice) also made the clarification with respect to the
observation of Commissioner Regalado Maambong:

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."34

After several amendments, the Commission voted in favor of the following wording of Section 2:

AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE

THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER
OF REGISTERED VOTERS OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY
AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER
THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.

Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII as eventually worded read:

Article XVII

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(3) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(4) A constitutional convention.

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative,
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

The final text of Article XVII on Amendments or Revisions clearly makes a substantial differentiation not only
between the two terms but also between two procedures and their respective fields of application. Ineluctably, the
system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII as a mode of effecting changes in the Constitution is strictly limited
to amendments – not to a revision – thereof.

As opined earlier, the framers of the Constitution, in providing for "amendment" and "revision" as different modes of
changing the fundamental law, were cognizant of the distinction between the two terms. They particularly relied on
the distinction made by Justice Felix Antonio in his concurring opinion in Javellana v. Executive Secretary,35 the
controversial decision which gave imprimatur to the 1973 Constitution of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, as
follows:

There is clearly a distinction between revision and amendment of an existing constitution. Revision may
involve a rewriting of the whole constitution. The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand,
 envisages a change of only specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the
entire constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts of the existing constitution of the addition of
provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already
considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times. The 1973 Constitution is not a mere
amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental charter embodying new political,
social and economic concepts.36

Other elucidation on the distinction between "amendment" and "revision" is enlightening. For example, Dean Vicente
G. Sinco, an eminent authority on political law, distinguished the two terms in this manner:

Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire
document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or
perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the factor
that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That
intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine
which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an
entirely new one.

The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions.
The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of
considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or
to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that
seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.37

In the United States, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Wheeler v. Board of Trustees38 had the occasion to make the
distinction between the two terms with respect to Ga.L. 1945, an instrument which "amended" the 1877 Constitution
of Georgia. It explained the term "amendment:"

"Amendment" of a statute implies its survival and not destruction. It repeals or changes some provision, or
adds something thereto. A law is amended when it is in whole or in part permitted to remain, and something
is added to or taken from it, or it is in some way changed or altered to make it more complete or perfect, or
to fit it the better to accomplish the object or purpose for which it was made, or some other object or
purpose.39

On the other hand, the term "revision" was explained by the said US appellate court:

x x x When a house is completely demolished and another is erected on the same location, do you have a
changed, repaired and altered house, or do you have a new house? Some of the materials contained in the
old house may be used again, some of the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not alter the
fact that you have altogether another or a new house. We conclude that the instrument as contained in
Ga.L. 1945, pp. 8 to 89, inclusive, is not an amendment to the constitution of 1877; but on the contrary it is a
completely revised or new constitution.40

Fairly recently, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, a member of the Constitutional Commission, expounded on the distinction
between the two terms thus:

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding
original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary
to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to
be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplate a re-examination of
the entire document – or of provisions of the document (which have overall implications for the entire
document or for the fundamental philosophical underpinnings of the document) – to determine how and to
what extent it should be altered. Thus, for instance, a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary
system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a
switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system because of its effect on other important provisions of
the Constitution.

It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum of change in the
document. Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision. Hence, I must reject the
puerile argument that the use of the plural form of "amendments" means that a revision can be achieved by
the introduction of a multiplicity of amendments! 41

Given that revision necessarily entails a more complex, substantial and far-reaching effects on the Constitution, the
framers thereof wisely withheld the said mode from the system of initiative. It should be recalled that it took the
framers of the present Constitution four months from June 2, 1986 until October 15, 1986 to come up with the draft
Constitution which, as described by the venerable Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma, the President of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, "gradually and painstakingly took shape through the crucible of sustained sometimes
passionate and often exhilarating debates that intersected all dimensions of the national life."42

Evidently, the framers of the Constitution believed that a revision thereof should, in like manner, be a product of the
same extensive and intensive study and debates. Consequently, while providing for a system of initiative where the
people would directly propose amendments to the Constitution, they entrusted the formidable task of its revision to a
deliberative body, the Congress or Constituent Assembly.
The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state, containing the principles upon which the government is
founded, and regulating the division of sovereign powers, directing to what persons each of those powers is to be
confided and the manner in which it is to be exercised.43 The Philippines has followed the American constitutional
legal system in the sense that the term constitution is given a more restricted meaning, i.e., as a written organic
instrument, under which governmental powers are both conferred and circumscribed.44

The Constitution received its force from the express will of the people. An overwhelming 16,622,111, out of
21,785,216 votes cast during the plebiscite, or 76.30% ratified the present Constitution on February 2,
1987.45 In expressing that will, the Filipino people have incorporated therein the method and manner by which the
same can be amended and revised, and when the electorate have incorporated into the fundamental law the
particular manner in which the same may be altered or changed, then any course which disregards that express will
is a direct violation of the fundamental law.46

Further, these provisions having been incorporated in the Constitution, where the validity of a constitutional
amendment or revision depends upon whether such provisions have been complied with, such question presents for
consideration and determination a judicial question, and the courts are the only tribunals vested with power under
the Constitution to determine such question.47

Earlier, it was mentioned that Article XVII, by the use of the terms "amendment" and "revision," clearly makes a
differentiation not only between the two terms but also between two procedures and their respective fields of
application. On this point, the case of McFadden v. Jordan48 is instructive. In that case, a "purported initiative
amendment" (referred to as the proposed measure) to the State Constitution of California, then being proposed to
be submitted to the electors for ratification, was sought to be enjoined. The proposed measure, denominated as
"California Bill of Rights," comprised a single new article with some 208 subsections which would repeal or
substantially alter at least 15 of the 25 articles of the California State Constitution and add at least four new topics.
Among the likely effects of the proposed measure were to curtail legislative and judicial functions, legalize gaming,
completely revise the taxation system and reduce the powers of cities, counties and courts. The proposed measure
also included diverse matters as ministers, mines, civic centers, liquor control and naturopaths.

The Supreme Court of California enjoined the submission of the proposed measure to the electors for ratification
because it was not an "amendment" but a "revision" which could only be proposed by a convention. It held that from
an examination of the proposed measure itself, considered in relation to the terms of the California State
Constitution, it was clear that the proposed initiative enactment amounted substantially to an attempted revision,
rather than amendment, thereof; and that inasmuch as the California State Constitution specifies (Article XVIII §2
thereof) that it may be revised by means of constitutional convention but does not provide for revision by initiative
measure, the submission of the proposed measure to the electorate for ratification must be enjoined.

As piercingly enunciated by the California State Supreme Court in McFadden, the differentiation required (between
amendment and revision) is not merely between two words; more accurately it is between two procedures and
between their respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory
construction, must be understood to have a substantial field of application, not to be a mere alternative procedure in
the same field. Each of the two words, then, must be understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but
also a field of application appropriate to its procedure.49

Provisions regulating the time and mode of effecting organic changes are in the nature of safety-valves – they must
not be so adjusted as to discharge their peculiar function with too great facility, lest they become the ordinary
escape-pipes of party passion; nor, on the other hand, must they discharge it with such difficulty that the force
needed to induce action is sufficient also to explode the machine. Hence, the problem of the Constitution maker is,
in this particular, one of the most difficult in our whole system, to reconcile the requisites for progress with the
requisites for safety.50

Like in McFadden, the present petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution is, despite its denomination,
one for its revision. It purports to seek the amendment only of Articles VI and VII of the Constitution as well as to
provide transitory provisions. However, as will be shown shortly, the amendment of these two provisions will
necessarily affect other numerous provisions of the Constitution particularly those pertaining to the specific powers
of Congress and the President. These powers would have to be transferred to the Parliament and the Prime Minister
and/or President, as the case may be. More than one hundred (100) sections will be affected or altered thereby:

1. Section 19 of Article III (Bill of Rights) on the power of Congress to impose the death penalty for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes;

2. Section 2 of Article V (Suffrage) on the power of Congress to provide for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting;

3. All 32 Sections of Article VI on the Legislative Department;

4. All 23 Sections of Article VII on the Executive Department;

5. The following Sections of Article VIII (Judicial Department):

- Section 2 on power of Congress to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various
courts;

- Section 7 on the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts;
 - Section 8 on the composition of Judicial Bar Council (JBC) which includes representatives of
Congress as ex officio members and on the power of the President to appoint the regular members
of the JBC;

- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the members of the Supreme Court and judges
of lower courts;

- Section 16 on duty of Supreme Court to make annual report to the President and Congress.

6. The following Sections of Article IX (Constitutional Commissions);

- (B) Section 3 on duty of Civil Service Commission to make annual report to the President and
Congress;

- (B) Section 5 on power of Congress to provide by law for the standardization of compensation of
government officials;

- (B) Section 8 which provides in part that "no public officer shall accept, without the consent of
Congress, any present, emolument, etc. x x x"

- (C) Section 1 on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and Commissioners of the
Commission on Elections with the consent of the Commission on Appointments;

- (C) Section 2 (7) on the power of the COMELEC to recommend to Congress measures to minimize
election spending x x x;

- (C) Section 2 (8) on the duty of the COMELEC to recommend to the President the removal of any
officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action x x x;

- (C) Section 2 (9) on the duty of the COMELEC to submit to the President and Congress a report on
the conduct of election, plebiscite, etc.;

- (C) Section 5 on the power of the President, with the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC,
to grant pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and
regulations;

- (C) Section 7 which recognizes as valid votes cast in favor of organization registered under party-
list system;

- (C) Section 8 on political parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system;

- (D) Section 1 (2) on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA) with the consent of the Commission of Appointments;

- Section 4 on duty of the COA to make annual report to the President and Congress.

7. The following Sections of Article X (Local Government):

- Section 3 on the power of Congress to enact a local government code;

- Section 4 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over local government
units (LGUs);

- Section 5 on the power of LGUs to create their own sources of income x x x, subject to such
guidelines as Congress may provide;

- Section 11 on the power of Congress to create special metropolitan political subdivisions;

- Section 14 on the power of the President to provide for regional development councils x x x;

- Section 16 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over autonomous
regions;

- Section 18 on the power of Congress to enact organic act for each autonomous region as well as
the power of the President to appoint the representatives to the regional consultative commission;

- Section 19 on the duty of the first Congress elected under the Constitution to pass the organic act
for autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

8. The following Sections of Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers):

- Section 2 on the impeachable officers (President, Vice-President, etc.);

 - Section 3 on impeachment proceedings (exclusive power of the House to initiate complaint and
sole power of the Senate to try and decide impeachment cases);

- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the Ombudsman and his deputies;

- Section 16 which provides in part that "x x x no loans or guaranty shall be granted to the President,
Vice-President, etc.

- Section 17 on mandatory disclosure of assets and liabilities by public officials including the
President, Vice-President, etc.

9. The following Sections of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony):

- Section 2 on the power of Congress to allow, by law, small-scale utilization of natural resources
and power of the President to enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations and duty to
notify Congress of every contract;

- Section 3 on the power of Congress to determine size of lands of public domain;

- Section 4 on the power of Congress to determine specific limits of forest lands;

- Section 5 on the power of Congress to provide for applicability of customary laws;

- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish an independent economic and planning agency to
be headed by the President;

- Section 10 on the power of Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens or domestic corporations(at

least 60% Filipino-owned) certain areas of investment;

- Section 11 on the sole power of Congress to grant franchise for public utilities;

- Section 15 on the power of Congress to create an agency to promote viability of cooperatives;

- Section 16 which provides that Congress shall not, except by general law, form private
corporations;

- Section 17 on the salaries of the President, Vice-President, etc. and the power of Congress to
adjust the same;

- Section 20 on the power of Congress to establish central monetary authority.

10. The following Sections of Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights):

- Section 1 on the mandate of Congress to give highest priority to enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of people x x x

- Section 4 on the power of Congress to prescribe retention limits in agrarian reform;

- Section 18 (6) on the duty of the Commission on Human Rights to recommend to Congress
effective measures to promote human rights;

- Section 19 on the power of Congress to provide for other cases to fall within the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Human Rights.

11. The following Sections of Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, etc.):

- Section 4 on the power of Congress to increase Filipino equity participation in educational

institutions;

- Section 6 which provides that subject to law and as Congress may provide, the Government shall
sustain the use of Filipino as medium of official communication;

- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish a national language commission;

- Section 11 on the power of Congress to provide for incentives to promote scientific research.

12. The following Sections of Article XVI (General Provisions):

- Section 2 on the power of Congress to adopt new name for the country, new national anthem, etc.;

- Section 5 (7) on the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff which may be extended by the President in
times of war or national emergency declared by Congress;
 - Section 11 on the power of Congress to regulate or prohibit monopolies in mass media;

- Section 12 on the power of Congress to create consultative body to advise the President on
indigenous cultural communities.

13. The following Sections of Article XVII (Amendments or Revisions):

- Section 1 on the amendment or revision of Constitution by Congress;

- Section 2 on the duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of the system of initiative;

- Section 3 on the power of Congress to call constitutional convention to amend or revise the
Constitution.

14. All 27 Sections of Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions).

The foregoing enumeration negates the claim that "the big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be
affected."51Petitioners' proposition, while purportedly seeking to amend only Articles VI and VII of the Constitution
and providing transitory provisions, will, in fact, affect, alter, replace or repeal other numerous articles and sections
thereof. More than the quantitative effects, however, the revisory character of petitioners' proposition is apparent
from the qualitative effects it will have on the fundamental law.

I am not impervious to the commentary of Dean Vicente G. Sinco that the revision of a constitution, in its strict
sense, refers to a consideration of the entire constitution and the procedure for effecting such change;
while amendment refers only to particular provisions to be added to or to be altered in a constitution.52

For clarity and accuracy, however, it is necessary to reiterate below Dean Sinco's more comprehensive
differentiation of the terms:

Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire
document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or
perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the factor
that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That
intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine
which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an
entirely new one.

The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions.
The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of
considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or
to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that
seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.53

A change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, following the above
distinction, entails a revision of the Constitution as it will involve "alteration of different portions of the entire
document" and "may result in the rewriting of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only
some of its important provisions."

More importantly, such shift in the form of government will, without doubt, fundamentally change the basic plan and
substance of the present Constitution. The tripartite system ordained by our fundamental law divides governmental
powers into three distinct but co-equal branches: the legislative, executive and judicial. Legislative power, vested in
Congress which is a bicameral body consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate, is the power to
make laws and to alter them at discretion. Executive power, vested in the President who is directly elected by the
people, is the power to see that the laws are duly executed and enforced. Judicial power, vested in the Supreme
Court and the lower courts, is the power to construe and apply the law when controversies arise concerning what
has been done or omitted under it. This separation of powers furnishes a system of checks and balances which
guards against the establishment of an arbitrary or tyrannical government.

Under a unicameral-parliamentary system, however, the tripartite separation of power is dissolved as there is a
fusion between the executive and legislative powers. Essentially, the President becomes a mere "symbolic head of
State" while the Prime Minister becomes the head of government who is elected, not by direct vote of the people,
but by the members of the Parliament. The Parliament is a unicameral body whose members are elected by
legislative districts. The Prime Minister, as head of government, does not have a fixed term of office and may only
be removed by a vote of confidence of the Parliament. Under this form of government, the system of checks and
balances is emasculated.

Considering the encompassing scope and depth of the changes that would be effected, not to mention that the
Constitution's basic plan and substance of a tripartite system of government and the principle of separation of
powers underlying the same would be altered, if not entirely destroyed, there can be no other conclusion than that
the proposition of petitioners Lambino, et al. would constitute a revision of the Constitution rather than an
amendment or "such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement
or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed."54 As has been shown, the effect of the adoption of the
petitioners' proposition, rather than to "within the lines of the original instrument" constitute "an improvement or
better carry out the purpose for which it was framed," is to "substantially alter the purpose and to attain objectives
clearly beyond the lines of the Constitution as now cast."55
To paraphrase McFadden, petitioners' contention that any change less than a total one is amendatory would reduce
to the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. A case might, conceivably, be presented
where the question would be occasion to undertake to define with nicety the line of demarcation; but we have no
case or occasion here.

As succinctly by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, "a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a
revision because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral
system to a unicameral system because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution. It is thus clear
that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the
fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision."56

The petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution filed by petitioners Lambino, et al., being in truth and in
fact a proposal for the revision thereof, is barred from the system of initiative upon any legally permissible
construction of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

The Petition for Initiative on

Amendments to the Constitution
is, on its Face, Insufficient in
Form and Substance

Again, even granting arguendo RA 6735 is declared sufficient to implement the system of initiative and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, as it prescribed rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution, is valid, still, the petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution must be dismissed for
being insufficient in form and substance.

Section 5 of RA 6735 requires that a petition for initiative on the Constitution must state the following:

1. Contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed,
as the case may be;

2. The proposition;

3. The reason or reasons therefor;

4. That it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

5. Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

6. An abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.

Section 7 thereof requires that the signatures be verified in this wise:

SEC. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.

The law mandates upon the election registrar to personally verify the signatures. This is a solemn and important
duty imposed on the election registrar which he cannot delegate to any other person, even to barangay officials.
Hence, a verification of signatures made by persons other than the election registrars has no legal effect.

In patent violation of the law, several certifications submitted by petitioners showed that the verification of signatures
was made, not by the election registrars, but by barangay officials. For example, the certification of the election
officer in Lumbatan, Lanao del Sur reads in full:

LOCAL ELECTION OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION57

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that based on the verifications made by the Barangay Officials in this
City/Municipality, as attested to by two (2) witnesses from the same Barangays, which is part of the
2nd Legislative District of the Province of Lanao del Sur, the names appearing on the attached signature
sheets relative to the proposed initiative on Amendments to the 1987 Constitution, are those
of bonafide resident of the said Barangays and correspond to the names found in the official list of registered
voters of the Commission on Elections and/or voters' affidavit and/or voters' identification cards.

It is further certified that the total number of signatures of the registered voters for the City/Municipality of
LUMBATAN, LANAO DEL SUR as appearing in the affixed signatures sheets is ONE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY (1,180).

April 2, 2006

IBRAHIM M. MACADATO
Election Officer

(Underscoring supplied)
The ineffective verification in almost all the legislative districts in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) alone is shown by the certifications, similarly worded as above-quoted, of the election registrars of Buldon,
Maguindanao;58 Cotabato City (Special Province);59 Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao;60 Matanog,
Maguindanao;61 Parang, Maguindanao;62 Kabantalan, Maguindanao;63 Upi, Maguinadano;64 Barira,
Maguindanao;65 Sultan, Mastura;66 Ampatuan, Maguindanao;67 Buluan, Maguindanao;68 Datu Paglas,
Maguindanao;69 Datu Piang, Maguindanao;70 Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao;71 Pagalungan, Maguindanao;72Talayan,
Maguindanao;73 Gen. S.K. Pendatun, Maguindanao;74 Mamasapano, Maguindanao;75 Talitay,
Maguindanao;76 Guindulungan, Maguindanao;77 Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Maguindanao;78 Datu Unsay,
Maguindanao;79 Pagagawan, Maguindanao;80 Rajah Buayan, Maguindanao;81 Indanan, Sulu;82 Jolo,
Sulu;83Maimbung, Sulu;84 Hadji Panglima, Sulu;85 Pangutaran, Sulu;86 Parang, Sulu;87 Kalingalan Caluang,
Sulu;88 Luuk, Sulu;89 Panamao, Sulu;90 Pata, Sulu;91 Siasi, Sulu;92 Tapul, Sulu;93 Panglima Estino, Sulu;94 Lugus,
Sulu;95 and Pandami, Sulu. 96

Section 7 of RA 6735 is clear that the verification of signatures shall be done by the election registrar, and by no one
else, including the barangay officials. The foregoing certifications submitted by petitioners, instead of aiding their
cause, justify the outright dismissal of their petition for initiative. Because of the illegal verifications made
by barangay officials in the above-mentioned legislative districts, it necessarily follows that the petition for initiative
has failed to comply with the requisite number of signatures, i.e., at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three percent (3%) of the
registered voters therein.

Petitioners cannot disclaim the veracity of these damaging certifications because they themselves submitted the
same to the COMELEC and to the Court in the present case to support their contention that the requirements of RA
6735 had been complied with and that their petition for initiative is on its face sufficient in form and substance. They
are in the nature of judicial admissions which are conclusive and binding on petitioners.97 This being the case, the
Court must forthwith order the dismissal of the petition for initiative for being, on its face, insufficient in form and
substance. The Court should make the adjudication entailed by the facts here and now, without further proceedings,
as it has done in other cases.98

It is argued by petitioners that, assuming arguendo that the COMELEC is correct in relying on Santiago that RA
6735 is inadequate to cover initiative to the Constitution, this cannot be used to legitimize its refusal to heed the
people's will. The fact that there is no enabling law should not prejudice the right of the sovereign people to propose
amendments to the Constitution, which right has already been exercised by 6,327,952 voters. The collective and
resounding act of the particles of sovereignty must not be set aside. Hence, the COMELEC should be ordered to
comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution via a writ of mandamus. The submission of petitioners,
however, is unpersuasive.

Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce a public right and to compel the persons of a public
duty most especially when mandated by the Constitution.99 However, under Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, for a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition is a ministerial act or
duty and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that petitioner has a well-defined,
clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a
duty upon a public official and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty should be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of an official discretion nor judgment.100

To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show a well defined, clear and certain right to warrant the
grant thereof.101 In this case, petitioners failed to establish their right to a writ of mandamus as shown by the
foregoing disquisitions.

Remand of the Case to the

COMELEC is Not Authorized by
RA 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300

The dissenting opinion posits that the issue of whether or not the petition for initiative has complied with the requisite
number of signatures of at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein,
involves contentious facts. The dissenting opinion cites the petitioners' claim that they have complied with the
same while the oppositors-intervenors have vigorously refuted this claim by alleging, inter alia, that the signatures
were not properly verified or were not verified at all. Other oppositors-intervenors have alleged that the signatories
did not fully understand what they have signed as they were misled into signing the signature sheets.

According to the dissenting opinion, the sufficiency of the petition for initiative and its compliance with the
requirements of RA 6735 on initiative and its implementing rules is a question that should be resolved by the
COMELEC at the first instance. It thus remands the case to the COMELEC for further proceedings.

To my mind, the remand of the case to the COMELEC is not warranted. There is nothing in RA 6735, as well as in
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, granting that it is valid to implement the former statute, that authorizes the
COMELEC to conduct any kind of hearing, whether full-blown or trial-type hearing, summary hearing or
administrative hearing, on a petition for initiative.
Section 41 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 provides that "[a]n initiative shall be conducted under the control and
supervision of the Commission in accordance with Article III hereof." Pertinently, Sections 30, 31 and 32 of Article III
of the said implementing rules provide as follows:

Sec. 30. Verification of signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.

Sec. 31. Determination by the Commission. – The Commission shall act on the findings of the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum.

If it should appear that the required number of signatures has not been obtained, the petition shall be
deemed defeated and the Commission shall issue a declaration to that effect.

If it should appear that the required number of signatures has been obtained, the Commission shall set the
initiative or referendum in accordance with the succeeding sections.

Sec. 32. Appeal. – The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency and insufficiency of the
petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice
hereof.

Clearly, following the foregoing procedural rules, the COMELEC is not authorized to conduct any kind of hearing to
receive any evidence for or against the sufficiency of the petition for initiative. Rather, the foregoing rules require of
the COMELEC to determine the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative on its face. And it has already
been shown, by the annexes submitted by the petitioners themselves, their petition is, on its face, insufficient in form
and substance. The remand of the case to the COMELEC for reception of evidence of the parties on the contentious
factual issues is, in effect, an amendment of the abovequoted rules of the COMELEC by this Court which the Court
is not empowered to do.

The Present Petition Presents a

Justiciable Controversy; Hence,
a Non-Political Question. Further,
the People, Acting in their Sovereign
Capacity, Have Bound Themselves
to Abide by the Constitution

Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of government.102 A political question has two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised
by the people in their primary political capacity; and (2) matters which have been specifically designated to some
other department or particular office of the government, with discretionary power to act.103

In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Arroyo v. De Venecia,104 Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno
explained the doctrine of political question vis-à-vis the express mandate of the present Constitution for the courts to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government:

In the Philippine setting, there is more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For Section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "... to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and
1972 Constitutions. It was also not xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM [Constitutional Commission] granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience
under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse
of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the
CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the
Legislative departments of government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the government can no longer invoke the
political question defense.

xxxx

To a great degree, it diminished its [political question doctrine] use as a shield to protect other abuses of
government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with new power to review acts of any branch or
instrumentality of the government ". . . to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."

Even if the present petition involves the act, not of a governmental body, but of purportedly more than six million
registered voters who have signified their assent to the proposal to amend the Constitution, the same still constitutes
a justiciable controversy, hence, a non-political question. There is no doubt that the Constitution, under Article XVII,
has explicitly provided for the manner or method to effect amendments thereto, or revision thereof. The question,
therefore, of whether there has been compliance with the terms of the Constitution is for the Court to pass upon.105
In the United States, in In re McConaughy,106 the State Supreme Court of Minnesota exercised jurisdiction over the
petition questioning the result of the general election holding that "an examination of the decisions shows that the
courts have almost uniformly exercised the authority to determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or
ratification of constitutional amendments." The cases cited were Dayton v. St. Paul,107 Rice v. Palmer,108 Bott v.
Wurtz,109 State v. Powell,110 among other cases.

There is no denying that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them."111 However, I find to be tenuous the asseveration that "the
argument that the people through initiative cannot propose substantial amendments to change the Constitution turns
sovereignty in its head. At the very least, the submission constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the
direct sovereignty of the people."112 In effect, it is theorized that despite the unambiguous text of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution withholding the power to revise it from the system of initiative, the people, in their sovereign
capacity, can conveniently disregard the said provision.

I strongly take exception to the view that the people, in their sovereign capacity, can disregard the Constitution
altogether. Such a view directly contravenes the fundamental constitutional theory that while indeed "the ultimate
sovereignty is in the people, from whom springs all legitimate authority"; nonetheless, "by the Constitution which
they establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither the
officers of the state, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this
fundamental law."113 The Constitution, it should be remembered, "is the protector of the people, placed on guard by
them to save the rights of the people against injury by the people."114 This is the essence of constitutionalism:

Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political institutions and ourselves, hoping that
democracies, historically always turbulent, chaotic and even despotic, might now become restrained,
principled, thoughtful and just. So we bound ourselves over to a law that we made and promised to keep.
And though a government of laws did not displace governance by men, it did mean that now men,
democratic men, would try to live by their word.115

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative is limited only to proposals to amend to the
Constitution, and does not extend to its revision. The Filipino people have bound themselves to observe the manner
and method to effect the changes of the Constitution. They opted to limit the exercise of the right to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through initiative, but did not extend the same to the revision thereof. The petition
for initiative, as it proposes to effect the revision thereof, contravenes the Constitution. The fundamental law of the
state prescribes the limitations under which the electors of the state may change the same, and, unless such course
is pursued, the mere fact that a majority of the electors are in favor of a change and have so expressed themselves,
does not work a change. Such a course would be revolutionary, and the Constitution of the state would become a
mere matter of form.116

The very term Constitution implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained
therein for its revision indicated the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the
substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature.117

The Filipino people have incorporated the safety valves of amendment and revision in Article XVII of the
Constitution. The Court is mandated to ensure that these safety valves embodied in the Constitution to guard
against improvident and hasty changes thereof are not easily trifled with. To be sure, by having overwhelmingly
ratified the Constitution, the Filipino people believed that it is "a good Constitution" and in the words of the learned
Judge Cooley:

x x x should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for
stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the
thought evolved in excitement or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the government is
to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. Changes in government are to be feared unless the benefit is certain.
As Montaign says: "All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil;
another evil may succeed and worse.118

Indisputably, the issues posed in the present case are of transcendental importance. Accordingly, I have
approached and grappled with them with full appreciation of the responsibilities involved in the present case, and
have given to its consideration the earnest attention which its importance demands. I have sought to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution at whatever hazard. I share the concern of Chief Justice Day in Koehler v. Hill:119 "it is
for the protection of minorities that constitutions are framed. Sometimes constitutions must be interposed for the
protection of majorities even against themselves. Constitutions are adopted in times of public repose, when sober
reason holds her citadel, and are designed to check the surging passions in times of popular excitement. But if
courts could be coerced by popular majorities into a disregard of their provisions, constitutions would become mere
'ropes of sand,' and there would be an end of social security and of constitutional freedom. The cause of
temperance can sustain no injury from the loss of this amendment which would be at all comparable to the injury to
republican institutions which a violation of the constitution would inflict. That large and respectable class of moral
reformers which so justly demands the observance and enforcement of law, cannot afford to take its first reformatory
step by a violation of the constitution. How can it consistently demand of others obedience to a constitution which it
violates itself? The people can in a short time re-enact the amendment. In the manner of a great moral reform, the
loss of a few years is nothing. The constitution is the palladium of republican freedom. The young men coming
forward upon the stage of political action must be educated to venerate it; those already upon the stage must be
taught to obey it. Whatever interest may be advanced or may suffer, whoever or whatever may be 'voted up or voted
down,' no sacrilegious hand must be laid upon the constitution."120

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174299.
 ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G.R. No. 174153 (RAUL LAMBINO, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.) and

G.R. No. 174299 (MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.).

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

SEPARATE OPINION

AZCUNA, J.:

"Why, friends, you go to do you know not what."

-- Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, Sc. 2.

Article XVII of the Constitution states:

AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered votes therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by
a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.

Sec. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later
than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by
the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.

This Article states the procedure for changing the Constitution.

Constitutions have three parts – the Constitution of Liberty, which states the fundamental rights of the people; the
Constitution of Government, which establishes the structure of government, its branches and their operation; and
the Constitution of Sovereignty, which provides how the Constitution may be changed.

Article XVII is the Constitution of Sovereignty.

As a result, the powers therein provided are called constituent powers. So when Congress acts under this provision,
it acts not as a legislature exercising legislative powers. It acts as a constituent body exercising constituent powers.

The rules, therefore, governing the exercise of legislative powers do not apply, or do not apply strictly, to the actions
taken under Article XVII.

Accordingly, since Article XVII states that Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of the
people's right directly to propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, the act of Congress pursuant
thereto is not strictly a legislative action but partakes of a constituent act.

As a result, Republic Act No. 6735, the act that provides for the exercise of the people of the right to propose a law
or amendments to the Constitution is, with respect to the right to propose amendments to the Constitution, a
constituent measure, not a mere legislative one.
The consequence of this special character of the enactment, insofar as it relates to proposing amendments to the
Constitution, is that the requirements for statutory enactments, such as sufficiency of standards and the like, do not
and should not strictly apply. As long as there is a sufficient and clear intent to provide for the implementation of the
exercise of the right, it should be sustained, as it is simply a compliance of the mandate placed on Congress by the
Constitution.

Seen in this light, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 relating to the procedure for proposing amendments to
the Constitution, can and should be upheld, despite shortcomings perhaps in legislative headings and standards.

For this reason, I concur in the view that Santiago v. Comelec1 should be re-examined and, after doing so, that the
pronouncement therein regarding the insufficiency or inadequacy of the measure to sustain a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution should be reconsidered in favor of allowing the exercise of this sovereign right.

And applying the doctrine stated in Senarillos v. Hermosisima,2 penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in relation to Article
8 of the Civil Code, that a decision of this Court interpreting a law forms part of the law interpreted as of the time of
its enactment, Republic Act No. 6735 should be deemed sufficient and adequate from the start.

This next point to address, there being a sufficient law, is whether the petition for initiative herein involved complies
with the requirements of that law as well as those stated in Article XVII of the Constitution.

True it is that ours is a democratic state, as explicitated in the Declaration of Principles, to emphasize precisely that
there are instances recognized and provided for in the Constitution where our people directly exercise their
sovereign powers, new features set forth in this People Power Charter, namely, the powers of recall, initiative and
referendum.

Nevertheless, this democratic nature of our polity is that of a democracy under the rule of law. This equally important
point is emphasized in the very Preamble to the Constitution, which states:

". . . the blessings of . . . democracy under the rule of law . . . ."

Such is the case with respect to the power to initiate changes in the Constitution. The power is subject to limitations
under the Constitution itself, thus: The power could not be exercised for the first five years after the Constitution took
effect and thereafter can only be exercised once every five years; the power only extends to proposing amendments
but not revisions; and the power needs an act of Congress providing for its implementation, which act is directed
and mandated.

The question, therefore, arises whether the proposed changes in the Constitution set forth in the petition for initiative
herein involved are mere amendments or rather are revisions.

Revisions are changes that affect the entire Constitution and not mere parts of it.

The reason why revisions are not allowed through direct proposals by the people through initiative is a practical one,
namely, there is no one to draft such extensive changes, since 6.3 million people cannot conceivably come up with
a single extensive document through a direct proposal from each of them. Someone would have to draft it and that
is not authorized as it would not be a direct proposal from the people. Such indirect proposals can only take the
form of proposals from Congress as a Constituent Assembly under Article XVII, or a Constitutional Convention
created under the same provision. Furthermore, there is a need for such deliberative bodies for revisions because
their proceedings and debates are duly and officially recorded, so that future cases of interpretations can be
properly aided by resort to the record of their proceedings.

Even a cursory reading of the proposed changes contained in the petition for initiative herein involved will show on
its face that the proposed changes constitute a revision of the Constitution. The proposal is to change the system of
government from that which is bicameral-presidential to one that is unicameral-parliamentary.

While purportedly only Articles VI, VII, and XVIII are involved, the fact is, as the petition and text of the proposed
changes themselves state, every provision of the Constitution will have to be examined to see if they conform to the
nature of a unicameral-parliamentary form of government and changed accordingly if they do not so conform to it.
For example, Article VIII on Judicial Department cannot stand as is, in a parliamentary system, for under such a
system, the Parliament is supreme, and thus the Court's power to declare its act a grave abuse of discretion and
thus void would be an anomaly.

Now, who is to do such examination and who is to do such changes and how should the changes be worded? The
proposed initiative does not say who nor how.

Not only, therefore, is the proposed initiative, on this score, a prohibited revision but it also suffers from being
incomplete and insufficient on its very face.

It, therefore, in that form, cannot pass muster the very limits contained in providing for the power under the
Constitution.

Neither does it comply with Republic Act No. 6735, which states in Section 10 that not more than one subject shall
be proposed as an amendment or amendments to the Constitution. The petition herein would propose at the very
least two subjects – a unicameral legislature and a parliamentary form of government. Again, for this clear and
patent violation of the very act that provides for the exercise of the power, the proposed initiative cannot lie.
This does not mean, however, that all is lost for petitioners.

For the proposed changes can be separated and are, in my view, separable in nature – a unicameral legislature is
one; a parliamentary form of government is another. The first is a mere amendment and contains only one subject
matter. The second is clearly a revision that affects every article and every provision in the Constitution to an extent
not even the proponents could at present fully articulate. Petitioners Lambino, et al. thus go about proposing
changes the nature and extent of which they do not as yet know exactly what.

The proposal, therefore, contained in the petition for initiative, regarding a change in the legislature from a bicameral
or two-chamber body to that of a unicameral or one-chamber body, is sustainable. The text of the changes needed
to carry it out are perfunctory and ministerial in nature. Once it is limited to this proposal, the changes are simply one
of deletion and insertions, the wordings of which are practically automatic and non-discretionary.

As an example, I attach to this opinion an Appendix "A" showing how the Constitution would read if we were to
change Congress from one consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives to one consisting only of the
House of Representatives. It only affects Article VI on the Legislative Department, some provisions on Article VII on
the Executive Department, as well as Article XI on the Accountability of Public Officers, and Article XVIII on
Transitory Provisions. These are mere amendments, substantial ones indeed but still only amendments, and they
address only one subject matter.

Such proposal, moreover, complies with the intention and rationale behind the present initiative, which is to provide
for simplicity and economy in government and reduce the stalemates that often prevent needed legislation.

For the nonce, therefore, I vote to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution to change Congress into a unicameral body. This is not say that I favor
such a change. Rather, such a proposal would come within the purview of an initiative allowed under Article XVII of
the Constitution and its implementing Republic Act, and should, therefore, be submitted to our people in a plebiscite
for them to decide in their sovereign capacity. After all is said and done, this is what democracy under the rule of law
is about.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
and NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

"It is a Constitution we are expounding…"1

– Chief Justice John Marshall

DISSENTING OPINION

PUNO, J.:

The petition at bar is not a fight over molehills. At the crux of the controversy is the critical understanding of the first
and foremost of our constitutional principles — "the Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."2 Constitutionalism dictates that this creed
must be respected with deeds; our belief in its validity must be backed by behavior.

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus to set aside the resolution of respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who
have affixed their signatures thereon, and praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
COMELEC to set the date of the plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendments to the Constitution in
accordance with Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
First, a flashback of the proceedings of yesteryears. In 1996, the Movement for People's Initiative sought to
exercise the sovereign people's power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative under
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Its founding member, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, filed with the COMELEC
on December 6, 1996, a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative" (Delfin Petition). It proposed to amend Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8
of Article X of the 1987 Constitution by deleting the provisions on the term limits for all elective officials.

The Delfin Petition stated that the Petition for Initiative would first be submitted to the people and would be formally
filed with the COMELEC after it is signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters in
the country. It thus sought the assistance of the COMELEC in gathering the required signatures by fixing the
dates and time therefor and setting up signature stations on the assigned dates and time. The petition prayed
that the COMELEC issue an Order (1) fixing the dates and time for signature gathering all over the country; (2)
causing the publication of said Order and the petition for initiative in newspapers of general and local circulation;
and, (3) instructing the municipal election registrars in all the regions of the Philippines to assist petitioner and the
volunteers in establishing signing stations on the dates and time designated for the purpose.

The COMELEC conducted a hearing on the Delfin Petition.

On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a
special civil action for prohibition before this Court, seeking to restrain the COMELEC from further considering the
Delfin Petition. They impleaded as respondents the COMELEC, Delfin, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa
(Pedrosas) in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA) which was likewise engaged in signature gathering to support an initiative to amend the Constitution. They
argued that the constitutional provision on people's initiative may only be implemented by a law passed by
Congress; that no such law has yet been enacted by Congress; that Republic Act No. 6735 relied upon by Delfin
does not cover the initiative to amend the Constitution; and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, the implementing
rules adopted by the COMELEC on the conduct of initiative, was ultra vires insofar as the initiative to amend the
Constitution was concerned. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325, entitled Santiago v. Commission on
Elections.3

Pending resolution of the case, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition and the Pedrosas from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to
amend the Constitution.

On March 19, 1997, the Court rendered its decision on the petition for prohibition. The Court ruled that the
constitutional provision granting the people the power to directly amend the Constitution through initiative is not self-
executory. An enabling law is necessary to implement the exercise of the people's right. Examining the provisions of
R.A. 6735, a majority of eight (8) members of the Court held that said law was "incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned,"4 and thus voided portions of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It was also held that even if R.A. 6735 sufficiently covered
the initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was valid, the Delfin Petition should
still be dismissed as it was not the proper initiatory pleading contemplated by law. Under Section 2, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by
at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is
represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition did not contain
signatures of the required number of voters. The decision stated:

CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer
be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any
longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the
people under that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-
037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.5
Eight (8) members of the Court, namely, then Associate Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (ponente), Chief Justice
Andres R. Narvasa, and Associate Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo,
Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. and Justo P. Torres, fully concurred in the majority opinion.

While all the members of the Court who participated in the deliberation6 agreed that the Delfin Petition should be
dismissed for lack of the required signatures, five (5) members, namely, Associate Justices Jose A.R. Melo,
Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo J. Francisco and Artemio V. Panganiban, held that R.A. 6735 was
sufficient and adequate to implement the people's right to amend the Constitution through initiative, and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 validly provided the details for the actual exercise of such right. Justice Jose C.
Vitug, on the other hand, opined that the Court should confine itself to resolving the issue of whether the Delfin
Petition sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law on initiative, and there was no need to rule on the
adequacy of R.A. 6735.

The COMELEC, Delfin and the Pedrosas filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Court's decision.

After deliberating on the motions for reconsideration, six (6)7 of the eight (8) majority members maintained their
position that R.A. 6735 was inadequate to implement the provision on the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Justice Torres filed an inhibition, while Justice Hermosisima submitted a Separate Opinion adopting
the position of the minority that R.A. 6735 sufficiently covers the initiative to amend the Constitution. Hence, of the
thirteen (13) members of the Court who participated in the deliberation, six (6) members, namely, Chief Justice
Narvasa and Associate Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan voted to deny the motions for
lack of merit; and six (6) members, namely, Associate Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima and
Panganiban voted to grant the same. Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial
adjudication. The motions for reconsideration were therefore denied for lack of sufficient votes to modify or reverse
the decision of March 19, 1997.8

On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the
Constitution (PIRMA Petition). The PIRMA Petition was supported by around five (5) million signatures in
compliance with R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and prayed that the COMELEC, among others: (1)
cause the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local
circulation; (2) order all election officers to verify the signatures collected in support of the petition and submit these
to the Commission; and (3) set the holding of a plebiscite where the following proposition would be submitted to the
people for ratification:

Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the President the chance to be reelected for
another term, similarly with the Vice-President, so that both the highest officials of the land can serve for two
consecutive terms of six years each, and also to lift the term limits for all other elective government officials,
thus giving Filipino voters the freedom of choice, amending for that purpose, Section 4 of Article VII,
Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI and Section 8 of Article X, respectively?

The COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of the permanent restraining order issued by the Court in
Santiago v. COMELEC.

PIRMA filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari seeking to set aside the COMELEC Resolution
dismissing its petition for initiative. PIRMA argued that the Court's decision on the Delfin Petition did not bar the
COMELEC from acting on the PIRMA Petition as said ruling was not definitive based on the deadlocked voting on
the motions for reconsideration, and because there was no identity of parties and subject matter between the two
petitions. PIRMA also urged the Court to reexamine its ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC.

The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and certiorari in its resolution dated September 23, 1997. It
explained:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the
public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19,
1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.

The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the second issue posed by the
petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief
Justice and six (6) other members of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and
Torres, JJ., voted that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-
examination of said second issue since the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5)
other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ., opined
that there was a need for such a re-examination x x x x9

In their Separate Opinions, Justice (later Chief Justice) Davide and Justice Bellosillo stated that the PIRMA petition
was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.

Now, almost a decade later, another group, Sigaw ng Bayan, seeks to utilize anew the system of initiative to
amend the Constitution, this time to change the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-
parliamentary system.

Let us look at the facts of the petition at bar with clear eyes.
On February 15, 2006, Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP),
embarked on a nationwide drive to gather signatures to support the move to adopt the parliamentary form of
government in the country through charter change. They proposed to amend the Constitution as follows:

A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:

Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which
shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the
provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.

(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five
years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and
shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to
the number thereof, except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and
whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the
parliamentary districts.

B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read, as
follows:

Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be
exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be
elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be
responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.

C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory
Provisions," which shall read, as follows:

Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their
term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the
1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim
parliament.

(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent
President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent
disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the
interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under
Article VII as amended.

Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the
exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby
be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are
hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are
inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to
conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all
references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress"
shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of
Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read
as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and/or "Acting President"
shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the
exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended
and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall
be retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be
inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to
a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any all references
therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be
changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress,"
"Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as
"Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and or "Acting President"
shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament
which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall
have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive
departments.

(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the
thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He
 shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the
interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the
members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.

(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the
thirtieth day of June 2010.

(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene
to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local
autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.

Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the
members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority
vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and
shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent
President."

(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be
synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. The duly
elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities
of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President.10

Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, on the upper portions of which were written the abstract of the
proposed amendments, to wit:

Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Articles VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the
form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of
government, in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in government; and providing an
Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?

The signature sheets were distributed nationwide to affiliated non-government organizations and volunteers of
Sigaw ng Bayan, as well as to the local officials. Copies of the draft petition for initiative containing the proposition
were also circulated to the local officials and multi-sectoral groups.

Sigaw ng Bayan alleged that it also held barangay assemblies which culminated on March 24, 25 and 26, 2006, to
inform the people and explain to them the proposed amendments to the Constitution. Thereafter, they circulated the
signature sheets for signing.

The signature sheets were then submitted to the local election officers for verification based on the voters'
registration record. Upon completion of the verification process, the respective local election officers issued
certifications to attest that the signature sheets have been verified. The verified signature sheets were
subsequently transmitted to the office of Sigaw ng Bayan for the counting of the signatures.

On August 25, 2006, herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the COMELEC a
Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution entitled "In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987
Constitution through a People's Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary
Government by Amending Articles VI and VII; and Providing Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the
Presidential to the Parliamentary System." They filed an Amended Petition on August 30, 2006 to reflect the text of
the proposed amendment that was actually presented to the people. They alleged that they were filing the petition in
their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures on the
signature sheets attached thereto. Petitioners appended to the petition signature sheets bearing the signatures of
registered voters which they claimed to have been verified by the respective city or municipal election officers, and
allegedly constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative
district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.

As basis for the filing of their petition for initiative, petitioners averred that Section 5 (b) and (c), together with
Section 7 of R.A. 6735, provide sufficient enabling details for the people's exercise of the power. Hence,
petitioners prayed that the COMELEC issue an Order:

1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;

2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and
local circulation; and

3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after the Certification by the
COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the
proposition.

Several groups filed with the COMELEC their respective oppositions to the petition for initiative, among
them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan
V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.,
Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and
Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-
Baraquel; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party,
Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald
Pamugas; Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L.
Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong.

On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the Petition for Initiative. It cited this Court's ruling in
Santiago v. COMELEC11 permanently enjoining the Commission from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the system.

Forthwith, petitioners filed with this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus praying that the Court set
aside the August 31, 2006 resolution of the COMELEC, direct respondent COMELEC to comply with Section 4,
Article XVII of the Constitution, and set the date of the plebiscite. They state the following grounds in support of the
petition:

I.

The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take
cognizance of, and to give due course to the petition for initiative, because the cited Santiago ruling of 19
March 1997 cannot be considered the majority opinion of the Supreme Court en banc, considering that upon
its reconsideration and final voting on 10 June 1997, no majority vote was secured to declare Republic Act
No. 6735 as inadequate, incomplete and insufficient in standard.

II.

The 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, Republic Act No. 8189 and existing appropriation of the
COMELEC provide for sufficient details and authority for the exercise of people's initiative, thus, existing
laws taken together are adequate and complete.

III.

The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take
cognizance of, and in refusing to give due course to the petition for initiative, thereby violating an express
constitutional mandate and disregarding and contravening the will of the people.

A.

Assuming in arguendo that there is no enabling law, respondent COMELEC cannot ignore the will of
the sovereign people and must accordingly act on the petition for initiative.

1.

The framers of the Constitution intended to give the people the power to propose
amendments and the people themselves are now giving vibrant life to this constitutional
provision.

2.

Prior to the questioned Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997, the right of the people to exercise
the sovereign power of initiative and recall has been invariably upheld.

3.

The exercise of the initiative to propose amendments is a political question which shall be
determined solely by the sovereign people.

4.

By signing the signature sheets attached to the petition for initiative duly verified by the
election officers, the people have chosen to perform this sacred exercise of their sovereign
power.

B.

The Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 is not applicable to the instant petition for initiative filed by the
petitioners.

C.

The permanent injunction issued in Santiago vs. COMELEC only applies to the Delfin petition.

1.
 It is the dispositive portion of the decision and not other statements in the body of the
decision that governs the rights in controversy.

IV.

The Honorable public respondent failed or neglected to act or perform a duty mandated by
law.

A.

The ministerial duty of the COMELEC is to set the initiative for plebiscite.12

The oppositors-intervenors, ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III,
Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc.; Bayan, Kilusang
Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino
Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, and Dr. Reginald Pamugas; Senate Minority
Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M.
Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja,
and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar,
Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong moved to intervene in this case and filed
their respective Oppositions/Comments-in-Intervention.

The Philippine Constitution Association, Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M.
Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P. Aguas, and Amado Gat Inciong; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Cebu City and Cebu Province Chapters; former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino;
and the Senate of the Philippines, represented by Senate President Manuel Villar, Jr., also filed their respective
motions for intervention and Comments-in-Intervention.

The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Sulongbayan Movement Foundation, Inc., Ronald L. Adamat,
Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya, Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization, and Victorino F.
Balais likewise moved to intervene and submitted to the Court a Petition-in-Intervention. All interventions and
oppositions were granted by the Court.

The oppositors-intervenors essentially submit that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying due course to the petition for initiative as it merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC as
affirmed in the case of PIRMA v. COMELEC, based on the principle of stare decisis; that there is no sufficient law
providing for the authority and the details for the exercise of people's initiative to amend the Constitution; that the
proposed changes to the Constitution are actually revisions, not mere amendments; that the petition for initiative
does not meet the required number of signatories under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; that it was
not shown that the people have been informed of the proposed amendments as there was disparity between the
proposal presented to them and the proposed amendments attached to the petition for initiative, if indeed there was;
that the verification process was done ex parte, thus rendering dubious the signatures attached to the petition for
initiative; and that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no legal capacity to represent the signatories in the
petition for initiative.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in compliance with the Court's resolution of September 5, 2006, filed its
Comment to the petition. Affirming the position of the petitioners, the OSG prayed that the Court grant the petition at
bar and render judgment: (1) declaring R.A. 6735 as adequate to cover or as reasonably sufficient to implement the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and as having provided sufficient standards for subordinate
legislation; (2) declaring as valid the provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution; (3) setting aside the assailed resolution of the COMELEC for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and, (4) directing the COMELEC
to grant the petition for initiative and set the corresponding plebiscite pursuant to R.A. 6735, COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300, and other pertinent election laws and regulations.

The COMELEC filed its own Comment stating that its resolution denying the petition for initiative is not tainted with
grave abuse of discretion as it merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in Santiago v. COMELEC which declared
that R.A. 6735 does not adequately implement the constitutional provision on initiative to amend the Constitution. It
invoked the permanent injunction issued by the Court against the COMELEC from taking cognizance of petitions for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a valid enabling law shall have been passed by Congress. It
asserted that the permanent injunction covers not only the Delfin Petition, but also all other petitions involving
constitutional initiatives.

On September 26, 2006, the Court heard the case. The parties were required to argue on the following issues:13

1. Whether petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present Petition in behalf of the
more than six million voters who allegedly signed the proposal to amend the Constitution.

2. Whether the Petitions for Initiative filed before the Commission on Elections complied with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.

3. Whether the Court's decision in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997) bars the
present petition.
 4. Whether the Court should re-examine the ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that there is no sufficient law
implementing or authorizing the exercise of people's initiative to amend the Constitution.

5. Assuming R.A. 6735 is sufficient, whether the Petitions for Initiative filed with the COMELEC have
complied with its provisions.

5.1 Whether the said petitions are sufficient in form and substance.

5.2 Whether the proposed changes embrace more than one subject matter.

6. Whether the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution.

6.1 Whether the proposed changes are the proper subject of an initiative.

7. Whether the exercise of an initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is a political question to
be determined solely by the sovereign people.

8. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Petitions for
Initiative filed before it.

With humility, I offer the following views to these issues as profiled:

Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present Petition in behalf of the
more than six million voters who allegedly signed the proposal to amend the Constitution.

Oppositors-intervenors contend that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are not the proper parties to file the instant
petition as they were not authorized by the signatories in the petition for initiative.

The argument deserves scant attention. The Constitution requires that the petition for initiative should be filed by at
least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein. The petition for initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado
before the COMELEC was accompanied by voluminous signature sheets which prima facie show the intent of the
signatories to support the filing of said petition. Stated above their signatures in the signature sheets is the following:

x x x My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies
my support for the filing thereof.14

There is thus no need for the more than six (6) million signatories to execute separate documents to authorize
petitioners to file the petition for initiative in their behalf.

Neither is it necessary for said signatories to authorize Lambino and Aumentado to file the petition for certiorari and
mandamus before this Court. Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may file a petition for
certiorari and mandamus. Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 65 read:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station x x x and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.

Thus, any person aggrieved by the act or inaction of the respondent tribunal, board or officer may file a petition for
certiorari or mandamus before the appropriate court. Certainly, Lambino and Aumentado, as among the proponents
of the petition for initiative dismissed by the COMELEC, have the standing to file the petition at bar.

II

The doctrine of stare decisis does not bar the reexamination of Santiago.

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm." The
doctrine started with the English Courts.15 Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an
established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation."16 As the rule
evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly
unreasonable;" (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the
decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach
the decision."17

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution.18 According
to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the
courts."19 Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or
repealing the law, it should be rejected."20 Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about
the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent."21 He added that their
ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility
demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for
over two centuries."22

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare
decisisdeveloped its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal
scholars.23 The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of
the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires
that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare
decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing
choice but not a command.24 Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional stare
decisis and statutory stare decisis.25 Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the
Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for
courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on
the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis
stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not
inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court,
which is again called upon to consider a question once decided."26 In the same vein, the venerable Justice
Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have
said about it."27 In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible.
As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of
decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss
had been drafted by the Congress itself."28 This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to
preserve the courts' limited resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons,29 viz: (1) it legitimizes judicial
institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be
bound by the stare decisis rule where30 (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings;
(2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad
constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts
while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its
decisions in 192 cases.31 The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education32 which
junked Plessy v. Ferguson's33 "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law
requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously
held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S.
Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has
likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan
Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,34 we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are
unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,35 we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion
for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the extradition process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the
factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance,
intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following
determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.36

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations
is Planned Parenthood v. Casey.37 It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the
rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a
kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no
more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be
seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.

Following these guidelines, I submit that the stare decisis rule should not bar the reexamination of
Santiago. On the factor of intolerability, the six (6) justices in Santiago held R.A. 6735 to be insufficient as it
provided no standard to guide COMELEC in issuing its implementing rules. The Santiago ruling that R.A. 6735 is
insufficient but without striking it down as unconstitutional is an intolerable aberration, the only one of its kind in
our planet. It improperly assails the ability of legislators to write laws. It usurps the exclusive right of legislators to
determine how far laws implementing constitutional mandates should be crafted. It is elementary that courts cannot
dictate on Congress the style of writing good laws, anymore than Congress can tell courts how to write literate
decisions. The doctrine of separation of powers forbids this Court to invade the exclusive lawmaking domain of
Congress for courts can construe laws but cannot construct them. The end result of the ruling of the six (6)
justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient is intolerable for it rendered lifeless the sovereign right of the people to amend
the Constitution via an initiative.

On the factor of reliance, the ruling of the six (6) justices in Santiago did not induce any expectation from the
people. On the contrary, the ruling smothered the hope of the people that they could amend the Constitution by
direct action. Moreover, reliance is a non-factor in the case at bar for it is more appropriate to consider in decisions
involving contracts where private rights are adjudicated. The case at bar involves no private rights but the
sovereignty of the people.

On the factor of changes in law and in facts, certain realities on ground cannot be blinked away. The urgent need
to adjust certain provisions of the 1987 Constitution to enable the country to compete in the new millennium is given.
The only point of contention is the mode to effect the change - - - whether through constituent assembly,
constitutional convention or people's initiative. Petitioners claim that they have gathered over six (6) million
registered voters who want to amend the Constitution through people's initiative and that their signatures have been
verified by registrars of the COMELEC. The six (6) justices who ruled that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to
implement the direct right of the people to amend the Constitution through an initiative cannot waylay the
will of 6.3 million people who are the bearers of our sovereignty and from whom all government authority
emanates. New developments in our internal and external social, economic, and political settings demand the
reexamination of the Santiago case. The stare decisis rule is no reason for this Court to allow the people to
step into the future with a blindfold.

III

A reexamination of R.A. 6735 will show that it is sufficient to implement the people's initiative.

Let us reexamine the validity of the view of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to implement Section 2,
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution allowing amendments to the Constitution to be directly proposed by the people
through initiative.

When laws are challenged as unconstitutional, courts are counseled to give life to the intent of legislators. In
enacting R.A. 6735, it is daylight luminous that Congress intended the said law to implement the right of the people,
thru initiative, to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action. This all-important intent is palpable from
the following:

First. The text of R.A. 6735 is replete with references to the right of the people to initiate changes to the
Constitution:

The policy statement declares:

Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)

It defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and
enact legislations through an election called for the purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which
an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people."

It provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution, viz:

(1) That "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of
the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein;"38 and

(2) That "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the
1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter."39

It fixes the effectivity date of the amendment under Section 9(b) which provides that "(t)he proposition in an initiative
on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of
the plebiscite."

Second. The legislative history of R.A. 6735 also reveals the clear intent of the lawmakers to use it as the instrument
to implement people's initiative. No less than former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., the ponente in Santiago,
concedes:40

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments
to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17 x x x x The
Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill,
which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of Representatives.
This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.

Third. The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. 6735 similarly demonstrate beyond doubt this intent. In his
sponsorship remarks, the late Senator Raul Roco (then a Member of the House of Representatives) emphasized
the intent to make initiative as a mode whereby the people can propose amendments to the Constitution. We quote
his relevant remarks:41

SPONSORSHIP REMAKRS OF REP. ROCO

MR. ROCO. Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the committee, we wish to speak in support of House Bill
No. 497, entitled: INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT OF 1987, which later on may be called Initiative
and Referendum Act of 1989.

As a background, we want to point out the constitutional basis of this particular bill. The grant of plenary
legislative power upon the Philippine Congress by the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, Mr. Speaker, was
based on the principle that any power deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition is necessarily
possessed by the Philippine Congress unless the Organic Act has lodged it elsewhere. This was a citation
from Vera vs. Avelino (1946).

The presidential system introduced by the 1935 Constitution saw the application of the principle of
separation of powers. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the principle remained
applicable, Amendment 6 or the 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution ensured presidential dominance
over the Batasang Pambansa.

Our constitutional history saw the shifting and sharing of legislative power between the legislature and the
executive.

Transcending such changes in the exercise of legislative power is the declaration in the Philippine
Constitution that he Philippines is a Republican State where sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.

In a Republic, Mr. Speaker, the power to govern is vested in its citizens participating through the right of
suffrage and indicating thereby their choice of lawmakers.

Under the 1987 Constitution, lawmaking power is still preserved in Congress. However, to institutionalize
direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986 Revolution, there is a practical recognition of what we
refer to as people's sovereign power. This is the recognition of a system of initiative and referendum.

Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, and I quote:

The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision
on initiative and referendum.

In other words, Mr. Speaker, under the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have plenary powers. There is
a reserved legislative power given to the people expressly.

Section 32, the implementing provision of the same article of the Constitution provides, and I quote:

The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject
any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration
of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, or
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters thereof.

In other words, Mr. Speaker, in Section 1 of Article VI which describes legislative power, there are reserved
powers given to the people. In Section 32, we are specifically told to pass at the soonest possible time a bill
on referendum and initiative. We are specifically mandated to share the legislative powers of Congress with
the people.

Of course, another applicable provision in the Constitution is Section 2, Article XVII, Mr. Speaker. Under the
provision on amending the Constitution, the section reads, and I quote:

Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

We in Congress therefore, Mr. Speaker, are charged with the duty to implement the exercise by the people
of the right of initiative and referendum.

House Bill No. 21505, as reported out by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms last December
14, 1988, Mr. Speaker, is the response to such a constitutional duty.

Mr. Speaker, if only to allay apprehensions, allow me to show where initiative and referendum under
Philippine law has occurred.

Mr. Speaker, the system of initiative and referendum is not new. In a very limited extent, the system is
provided for in our Local Government Code today. On initiative, for instance, Section 99 of the said code
vests in the barangay assembly the power to initiate legislative processes, to hold plebiscites and to hear
reports of the sangguniang barangay. There are variations of initiative and referendum. The barangay
assembly is composed of all persons who have been actual residents of the barangay for at least six
months, who are at least 15 years of age and citizens of the Philippines. The holding of barangay plebiscites
and referendum is also provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.

Mr. Speaker, for brevity I will not read the pertinent quotations but will just submit the same to the Secretary
to be incorporated as part of my speech.

To continue, Mr. Speaker these same principles are extensively applied by the Local Government Code as it
is now mandated by the 1987 Constitution.

In other jurisdictions, Mr. Speaker, we have ample examples of initiative and referendum similar to what is
now contained in House Bill No. 21505. As in the 1987 Constitutions and House Bill No. 21505, the various
constitutions of the states in the United States recognize the right of registered voters to initiate the
enactment of any statute or to reject any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These states are
Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusetts, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and practically all other states.

In certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative and referendum applies is also without ay
limitation, except for emergency measures, which is likewise incorporated in Section 7(b) of House Bill No.
21505.

The procedure provided by the House bill – from the filing of the petition, the requirement of a certain
percentage of supporters to present a proposition to submission to electors – is substantially similar to those
of many American laws. Mr. Speaker, those among us who may have been in the United States, particularly
in California, during election time or last November during the election would have noticed different
propositions posted in the city walls. They were propositions submitted by the people for incorporation
during the voting. These were in the nature of initiative, Mr. Speaker.

Although an infant then in Philippine political structure, initiative and referendum is a tried and tested system
in other jurisdictions, and House Bill No. 21505 through the various consolidated bills is patterned after
American experience in a great respect.

What does the bill essentially say, Mr. Speaker? Allow me to try to bring our colleagues slowly through the
bill. The bill has basically only 12 sections. The constitutional Commissioners, Mr. Speaker, saw this system
of initiative and referendum as an instrument which can be used should the legislature show itself indifferent
to the needs of the people. That is why, Mr. Speaker, it may be timely, since we seem to be amply criticized,
as regards our responsiveness, to pass this bill on referendum and initiative now. While indifference would
not be an appropriate term to use at this time, and surely it is not the case although we are so criticized, one
must note that it is a felt necessity of our times that laws need to be proposed and adopted at the soonest
possible time to spur economic development, safeguard individual rights and liberties, and share
governmental power with the people.

With the legislative powers of the President gone, we alone, together with the Senators when they are
minded to agree with us, are left with the burden of enacting the needed legislation.

Let me now bring our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to the process advocated by the bill.

First, initiative and referendum, Mr. Speaker, is defined. Initiative essentially is what the term connotes. It
means that the people, on their own political judgment, submit fore the consideration and voting of the
general electorate a bill or a piece of legislation.

Under House Bill No. 21505, there are three kinds of initiative. One is an initiative to amend the Constitution.
This can occur once every five years. Another is an initiative to amend statutes that we may have approved.
Had this bill been an existing law, Mr. Speaker, it is most likely that an overwhelming majority of the
barangays in the Philippines would have approved by initiative the matter of direct voting.

The third mode of initiative, Mr. Speaker, refers to a petition proposing to enact regional, provincial, city,
municipal or barangay laws or ordinances. It comes from the people and it must be submitted directly to the
electorate. The bill gives a definite procedure and allows the COMELEC to define rules and regulations to
give teeth to the power of initiative.

On the other hand, referendum, Mr. Speaker, is the power of the people to approve or reject something that
Congress has already approved.

For instance, Mr. Speaker, when we divide the municipalities or the barangays into two or three, we must
first get the consent of the people affected through plebiscite or referendum.

Referendum is a mode of plebiscite, Mr. Speaker. However, referendum can also be petitioned by the
people if, for instance, they do not life the bill on direct elections and it is approved subsequently by the
Senate. If this bill had already become a law, then the people could petition that a referendum be conducted
so that the acts of Congress can be appropriately approved or rebuffed.

The initial stage, Mr. Speaker, is what we call the petition. As envisioned in the bill, the initiative comes from
the people, from registered voters of the country, by presenting a proposition so that the people can then
submit a petition, which is a piece of paper that contains the proposition. The proposition in the example I
 have been citing is whether there should be direct elections during the barangay elections. So the petition
must be filed in the appropriate agency and the proposition must be clear stated. It can be tedious but that is
how an effort to have direct democracy operates.

Section 4 of the bill gives requirements, Mr. Speaker. It will not be all that easy to have referendum or
initiative petitioned by the people. Under Section 4 of the committee report, we are given certain limitations.
For instance, to exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least 10 percent of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3 percent of the registered
voters thereof, shall sign a petition. These numbers, Mr. Speaker, are not taken from the air. They are
mandated by the Constitution. There must be a requirement of 10 percent for ordinary laws and 3 percent
representing all districts. The same requirement is mutatis mutandis or appropriately modified and applied to
the different sections. So if it is, for instance, a petition on initiative or referendum for a barangay, there is a
10 percent or a certain number required of the voters of the barangay. If it is for a district, there is also a
certain number required of all towns of the district that must seek the petition. If it is for a province then again
a certain percentage of the provincial electors is required. All these are based with reference to the
constitutional mandate.

The conduct of the initiative and referendum shall be supervised and shall be upon the call of the
Commission on Elections. However, within a period of 30 days from receipt of the petition, the COMELEC
shall determine the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same and set the date of the referendum which
shall not be earlier than 45 days but not later than 90 days from the determination by the commission of the
sufficiency of the petition. Why is this so, Mr. Speaker? The petition must first be determined by the
commission as to its sufficiency because our Constitution requires that no bill can be approved unless it
contains one subject matter. It is conceivable that in the fervor of an initiative or referendum, Mr. Speaker,
there may be more than two topics sought to be approved and that cannot be allowed. In fact, that is one of
the prohibitions under this referendum and initiative bill. When a matter under initiative or referendum is
approved by the required number of votes, Mr. Speaker, it shall become effective 15 days following the
completion of its publication in the Official Gazette. Effectively then, Mr. Speaker, all the bill seeks to do is to
enlarge and recognize the legislative powers of the Filipino people.

Mr. Speaker, I think this Congress, particularly this House, cannot ignore or cannot be insensitive to the call
for initiative and referendum. We should have done it in 1987 but that is past. Maybe we should have done it
in 1988 but that too had already passed, but it is only February 1989, Mr. Speaker, and we have enough
time this year at least to respond to the need of our people to participate directly in the work of legislation.

For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, we urge and implore our colleagues to approve House Bill No. 21505 as
incorporated in Committee Report No. 423 of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms.

In closing, Mr. Speaker, I also request that the prepared text of my speech, together with the footnotes since
they contain many references to statutory history and foreign jurisdiction, be reproduced as part of the
Record for future purposes.

Equally unequivocal on the intent of R.A. 6735 is the sponsorship speech of former Representative Salvador
Escudero III, viz:42

SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF REP. ESCUDERO

MR. ESCUDERO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues: Events in recent years highlighted the need to heed the clamor of the
people for a truly popular democracy. One recalls the impatience of those who actively participated in the
parliament of the streets, some of whom are now distinguished Members of this Chamber. A substantial
segment of the population feel increasingly that under the system, the people have the form but not the
reality or substance of democracy because of the increasingly elitist approach of their chosen
Representatives to many questions vitally affecting their lives. There have been complaints, not altogether
unfounded, that many candidates easily forge their campaign promises to the people once elected to office.
The 1986 Constitutional Commission deemed it wise and proper to provide for a means whereby the people
can exercise the reserve power to legislate or propose amendments to the Constitution directly in case their
chose Representatives fail to live up to their expectations. That reserve power known as initiative is explicitly
recognized in three articles and four sections of the 1987 Constitution, namely: Article VI Section 1; the
same article, Section 312; Article X, Section 3; and Article XVII, Section 2. May I request that he explicit
provisions of these three articles and four sections be made part of my sponsorship speech, Mr. Speaker.

These constitutional provisions are, however, not self-executory. There is a need for an implementing law
that will give meaning and substance to the process of initiative and referendum which are considered
valuable adjuncts to representative democracy. It is needless to state that this bill when enacted into law will
probably open the door to strong competition of the people, like pressure groups, vested interests, farmers'
group, labor groups, urban dwellers, the urban poor and the like, with Congress in the field of legislation.

Such probability, however, pales in significance when we consider that through this bill we can hasten the
politization of the Filipino which in turn will aid government in forming an enlightened public opinion, and
hopefully produce better and more responsive and acceptable legislations.

Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, this would give the parliamentarians of the streets and cause-oriented groups an
opportunity to articulate their ideas in a truly democratic forum, thus, the competition which they will offer to
 Congress will hopefully be a healthy one. Anyway, in an atmosphere of competition there are common
interests dear to all Filipinos, and the pursuit of each side's competitive goals can still take place in an
atmosphere of reason and moderation.

Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues, when the distinguished Gentleman from Camarines Sur and this
Representation filed our respective versions of the bill in 1987, we were hoping that the bill would be
approved early enough so that our people could immediately use the agrarian reform bill as an initial subject
matter or as a take-off point.

However, in view of the very heavy agenda of the Committee on Local Government, it took sometime before
the committee could act on these. But as they say in Tagalog, huli man daw at magaling ay naihahabol din.
The passage of this bill therefore, my dear colleagues, could be one of our finest hours when we can set
aside our personal and political consideration for the greater good of our people. I therefore respectfully urge
and plead that this bill be immediately approved.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

We cannot dodge the duty to give effect to this intent for the "[c]ourts have the duty to interpret the law as
legislated and when possible, to honor the clear meaning of statutes as revealed by its language, purpose and
history."43

The tragedy is that while conceding this intent, the six (6) justices, nevertheless, ruled that "x x x R.A. No. 6735
is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned" for the following reasons: (1) Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution; (2) the Act does not provide for the contents of the petition for initiative on the
Constitution; and (3) while the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.

To say the least, these alleged omissions are too weak a reason to throttle the right of the sovereign people to
amend the Constitution through initiative. R.A. 6735 clearly expressed the legislative policy for the people to
propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action. The fact that the legislature may have omitted certain
details in implementing the people's initiative in R.A. 6735, does not justify the conclusion that, ergo, the law is
insufficient. What were omitted were mere details and not fundamental policies which Congress alone can and
has determined. Implementing details of a law can be delegated to the COMELEC and can be the subject of its
rule-making power. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has the power to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of initiatives. Its rule-making power has long been
recognized by this Court. In ruling R.A. 6735 insufficient but without striking it down as unconstitutional, the six (6)
justices failed to give due recognition to the indefeasible right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution.

IV

The proposed constitutional changes, albeit substantial, are mere amendments and can be
undertaken through people's initiative.

Oppositors-intervenors contend that Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, only allow the use of
people's initiative to amend and not to revise the Constitution. They theorize that the changes proposed by
petitioners are substantial and thus constitute a revision which cannot be done through people's initiative.

In support of the thesis that the Constitution bars the people from proposing substantial amendments amounting
to revision, the oppositors-intervenors cite the following deliberations during the Constitutional Commission, viz:44

MR. SUAREZ: x x x x This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came
about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes
of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The Committee members felt that this system of
initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of
Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.

xxxxxxxxxxxx

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms
of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate
section as if it were a self-executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total
overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and
(b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given
to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
Commissioner (later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., espoused the same view:45

MR. DAVIDE. x x x x We are limiting the right of the people, by initiative, to submit a proposal for
amendment only, not for revision, only once every five years x x x x

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendment." Does it cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision?"

MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."

Commissioner (now a distinguished Associate Justice of this Court) Adolfo S. Azcuna also clarified this point46 -

MR. OPLE. To more closely reflect the intent of Section 2, may I suggest that we add to "Amendments" "OR
REVISIONS OF" to read: "Amendments OR REVISION OF this Constitution."

MR. AZCUNA. I think it was not allowed to revise the Constitution by initiative.

MR. OPLE. How is that again?

MR. AZCUNA. It was not our intention to allow a revision of the Constitution by initiative but merely by
amendments.

MR. BENGZON. Only by amendments.

MR. AZCUNA. I remember that was taken on the floor.

MR. RODRIGO. Yes, just amendments.

The oppositors-intervenors then point out that by their proposals, petitioners will "change the very system of
government from presidential to parliamentary, and the form of the legislature from bicameral to unicameral," among
others. They allegedly seek other major revisions like the inclusion of a minimum number of inhabitants per district,
a change in the period for a term of a Member of Parliament, the removal of the limits on the number of terms, the
election of a Prime Minister who shall exercise the executive power, and so on and so forth.47 In sum, oppositors-
intervenors submit that "the proposed changes to the Constitution effect major changes in the political structure and
system, the fundamental powers and duties of the branches of the government, the political rights of the people, and
the modes by which political rights may be exercised."48 They conclude that they are substantial amendments which
cannot be done through people's initiative. In other words, they posit the thesis that only simple but not
substantial amendments can be done through people's initiative.

With due respect, I disagree. To start with, the words "simple" and "substantial" are not subject to any accurate
quantitative or qualitative test. Obviously, relying on the quantitative test, oppositors-intervenors assert that the
amendments will result in some one hundred (100) changes in the Constitution. Using the same test, however, it is
also arguable that petitioners seek to change basically only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987
Constitution, i.e. Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII (Executive Department), together with the
complementary provisions for a smooth transition from a presidential bicameral system to a parliamentary
unicameral structure. The big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be affected including Articles I (National
Territory), II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), III (Bill of Rights), IV (Citizenship), V (Suffrage), VIII
(Judicial Department), IX (Constitutional Commissions), X (Local Government), XI (Accountability of Public Officers),
XII (National Economy and Patrimony), XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), XIV (Education, Science and
Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), XV (The Family), XVI (General Provisions), and even XVII (Amendments or
Revisions). In fine, we stand on unsafe ground if we use simple arithmetic to determine whether the
proposed changes are "simple" or "substantial."

Nor can this Court be surefooted if it applies the qualitative test to determine whether the said changes
are "simple" or "substantial" as to amount to a revision of the Constitution. The well-regarded political
scientist, Garner, says that a good constitution should contain at least three (3) sets of provisions: the constitution
of liberty which sets forth the fundamental rights of the people and imposes certain limitations on the powers of the
government as a means of securing the enjoyment of these rights; the constitution of government which deals
with the framework of government and its powers, laying down certain rules for its administration and defining the
electorate; and, the constitution of sovereignty which prescribes the mode or procedure for amending or revising
the constitution.49 It is plain that the proposed changes will basically affect only the constitution of
government. The constitutions of liberty and sovereignty remain unaffected. Indeed, the proposed changes will
not change the fundamental nature of our state as "x x x a democratic and republican state."50 It is self-
evident that a unicameral-parliamentary form of government will not make our State any less democratic or any less
republican in character. Hence, neither will the use of the qualitative test resolve the issue of whether the
proposed changes are "simple" or "substantial."

For this reason and more, our Constitutions did not adopt any quantitative or qualitative test to determine
whether an "amendment" is "simple" or "substantial." Nor did they provide that "substantial" amendments
are beyond the power of the people to propose to change the Constitution. Instead, our Constitutions carried
the traditional distinction between "amendment" and "revision," i.e., "amendment" means change, including
complex changes while "revision" means complete change, including the adoption of an entirely new covenant.
The legal dictionaries express this traditional difference between "amendment" and "revision." Black's Law
Dictionary defines "amendment" as "[a] formal revision or addition proposed or made to a statute, constitution,
pleading, order, or other instrument; specifically, a change made by addition, deletion, or correction."51 Black's also
refers to "amendment" as "the process of making such a revision."52 Revision, on the other hand, is defined as "[a]
reexamination or careful review for correction or improvement."53 In parliamentary law, it is described as "[a] general
and thorough rewriting of a governing document, in which the entire document is open to
amendment."54 Similarly, Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "amendment" – as "[a] correction or revision of a
writing to correct errors or better to state its intended purpose"55 and "amendment of constitution" as "[a] process of
proposing, passing, and ratifying amendments to the x x x constitution."56 In contrast, "revision," when applied to a
statute (or constitution), "contemplates the re-examination of the same subject matter contained in the statute (or
constitution), and the substitution of a new, and what is believed to be, a still more perfect rule."57

One of the most authoritative constitutionalists of his time to whom we owe a lot of intellectual debt, Dean Vicente
G. Sinco, of the University of the Philippines College of Law, (later President of the U.P. and delegate to the
Constitutional Convention of 1971) similarly spelled out the difference between "amendment" and "revision." He
opined: "the revision of a constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a consideration of the entire constitution and the
procedure for effecting such change; while amendment refers only to particular provisions to be added to or to be
altered in a constitution."58

Our people were guided by this traditional distinction when they effected changes in our 1935 and 1973
Constitutions. In 1940, the changes to the 1935 Constitution which included the conversion from a unicameral
system to a bicameral structure, the shortening of the tenure of the President and Vice-President from a six-year
term without reelection to a four-year term with one reelection, and the establishment of the COMELEC, together
with the complementary constitutional provisions to effect the changes, were considered amendments only, not a
revision.

The replacement of the 1935 Constitution by the 1973 Constitution was, however, considered a revision since
the 1973 Constitution was "a completely new fundamental charter embodying new political, social and economic
concepts."59 Among those adopted under the 1973 Constitution were: the parliamentary system in place of the
presidential system, with the leadership in legislation and administration vested with the Prime Minister and his
Cabinet; the reversion to a single-chambered lawmaking body instead of the two-chambered, which would be more
suitable to a parliamentary system of government; the enfranchisement of the youth beginning eighteen (18) years
of age instead of twenty-one (21), and the abolition of literacy, property, and other substantial requirements to widen
the basis for the electorate and expand democracy; the strengthening of the judiciary, the civil service system, and
the Commission on Elections; the complete nationalization of the ownership and management of mass media; the
giving of control to Philippine citizens of all telecommunications; the prohibition against alien individuals to own
educational institutions, and the strengthening of the government as a whole to improve the conditions of the
masses.60

The 1973 Constitution in turn underwent a series of significant changes in 1976, 1980, 1981, and 1984. The two
significant innovations introduced in 1976 were (1) the creation of an interim Batasang Pambansa, in place of
the interim National Assembly, and (2) Amendment No. 6 which conferred on the President the power to issue
decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, whenever the Batasang Pambansa fails to act adequately on any matter for
any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, or there is grave emergency or threat or imminence
thereof, with such decrees, or letters of instruction to form part of the law of the land. In 1980, the retirement age of
seventy (70) for justices and judges was restored. In 1981, the presidential system with parliamentary features was
installed. The transfer of private land for use as residence to natural-born citizens who had lost their citizenship was
also allowed. Then, in 1984, the membership of the Batasang Pambansa was reapportioned by provinces, cities, or
districts in Metro Manila instead of by regions; the Office of the Vice-President was created while the executive
committee was abolished; and, urban land reform and social housing programs were strengthened.61 These
substantial changes were simply considered as mere amendments.

In 1986, Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino assumed the presidency, and repudiated the 1973 Constitution. She governed
under Proclamation No. 3, known as the Freedom Constitution.

In February 1987, the new constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite and superseded the Provisional
or Freedom Constitution. Retired Justice Isagani Cruz underscored the outstanding features of the 1987
Constitution which consists of eighteen articles and is excessively long compared to the Constitutions of 1935 and
1973, on which it was largely based. Many of the original provisions of the 1935 Constitution, particularly those
pertaining to the legislative and executive departments, have been restored because of the revival of the bicameral
Congress of the Philippines and the strictly presidential system. The independence of the judiciary has been
strengthened, with new provisions for appointment thereto and an increase in its authority, which now covers even
political questions formerly beyond its jurisdiction. While many provisions of the 1973 Constitution were retained, like
those on the Constitutional Commissions and local governments, still the new 1987 Constitution was deemed as a
revision of the 1973 Constitution.

It is now contended that this traditional distinction between amendment and revision was abrogated by the 1987
Constitution. It is urged that Section 1 of Article XVII gives the power to amend or revise to Congress acting as a
constituent assembly, and to a Constitutional Convention duly called by Congress for the purpose. Section 2 of the
same Article, it is said, limited the people's right to change the Constitution via initiative through simple
amendments. In other words, the people cannot propose substantial amendments amounting to revision.

With due respect, I do not agree. As aforestated, the oppositors-intervenors who peddle the above proposition rely
on the opinions of some Commissioners expressed in the course of the debate on how to frame the
amendment/revision provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is familiar learning, however, that opinions in a
constitutional convention, especially if inconclusive of an issue, are of very limited value as explaining doubtful
phrases, and are an unsafe guide (to the intent of the people) since the constitution derives its force as a
fundamental law, not from the action of the convention but from the powers (of the people) who have ratified and
adopted it.62 "Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual members,
and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who
did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force
of fundamental law.'"63 Indeed, a careful perusal of the debates of the Constitutional Commissioners can
likewise lead to the conclusion that there was no abandonment of the traditional distinction between
"amendment" and "revision." For during the debates, some of the commissioners referred to the concurring
opinion of former Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,64 that stressed the traditional
distinction between amendment and revision, thus:65

MR. SUAREZ: We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is, "amendment." However, the
Committee finally agreed to use the terms – "amendment" or "revision" when our attention was called by the
honorable Vice-President to the substantial difference in the connotation and significance between the said
terms. As a result of our research, we came up with the observations made in the famous – or notorious –
Javellana doctrine, particularly the decision rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar,66 wherein he made the
following distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of an existing Constitution: "Revision" may involve
a rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a
change of specific provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire
Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a
consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to
the needs of the times.

The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new
fundamental Charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.

So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be employed in the
formulation of the Article governing amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.

To further explain "revision," former Justice Antonio, in his concurring opinion, used an analogy – "When a house is
completely demolished and another is erected on the same location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered
house, or do you have a new house? Some of the material contained in the old house may be used again, some of
the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact that you have altogether another or a new
house."67

Hence, it is arguable that when the framers of the 1987 Constitution used the word "revision," they had in mind the
"rewriting of the whole Constitution," or the "total overhaul of the Constitution." Anything less is an
"amendment" or just "a change of specific provisions only," the intention being "not the change of the entire
Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a
consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs
of the times." Under this view, "substantial" amendments are still "amendments" and thus can be proposed by the
people via an initiative.

As we cannot be guided with certainty by the inconclusive opinions of the Commissioners on the difference
between "simple" and "substantial" amendments or whether "substantial" amendments amounting to revision are
covered by people's initiative, it behooves us to follow the cardinal rule in interpreting Constitutions, i.e.,
construe them to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. The illustrious Cooley explains its
rationale well, viz:68

x x x the constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed, but from the people who
ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they have looked
for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the
sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the
sense designed to be conveyed. These proceedings therefore are less conclusive of the proper construction
of the instrument than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute; since in the latter
case it is the intent of the legislature we seek, while in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent
of the people through the discussion and deliberations of their representatives. The history of the calling of
the convention, the causes which led to it, and the discussions and issues before the people at the time of
the election of the delegates, will sometimes be quite as instructive and satisfactory as anything to be
gathered form the proceedings of the convention.

Corollarily, a constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or technical principles, but liberally and on broad
general lines, to accomplish the object of its establishment and carry out the great principles of government
– not to defeat them.69 One of these great principles is the sovereignty of the people.

Let us now determine the intent of the people when they adopted initiative as a mode to amend the 1987
Constitution. We start with the Declaration of Principles and State Policies which Sinco describes as "the basic
political creed of the nation"70 as it "lays down the policies that government is bound to observe."71 Section 1, Article
II of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1, Article II of the 1973 Constitution, similarly provide that "the Philippines is
a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." In a
republican state, the power of the sovereign people is exercised and delegated to their
representatives. Thus in Metropolitan Transportation Service v. Paredes, this Court held that "a republican state,
like the Philippines x x x (is) derived from the will of the people themselves in freely creating a government 'of the
people, by the people, and for the people' – a representative government through which they have agreed to
exercise the powers and discharge the duties of their sovereignty for the common good and general welfare."72
In both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the sovereign people delegated to Congress or to a convention, the
power to amend or revise our fundamental law. History informs us how this delegated power to amend or
revise the Constitution was abused particularly during the Marcos regime. The Constitution was changed
several times to satisfy the power requirements of the regime. Indeed, Amendment No. 6 was passed giving
unprecedented legislative powers to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. A conspiracy of circumstances from
above and below, however, brought down the Marcos regime through an extra constitutional revolution, albeit a
peaceful one by the people. A main reason for the people's revolution was the failure of the representatives of
the people to effectuate timely changes in the Constitution either by acting as a constituent assembly or by
calling a constitutional convention. When the representatives of the people defaulted in using this last peaceful
process of constitutional change, the sovereign people themselves took matters in their own hands. They
revolted and replaced the 1973 Constitution with the 1987 Constitution.

It is significant to note that the people modified the ideology of the 1987 Constitution as it stressed the
power of the people to act directly in their capacity as sovereign people. Correspondingly, the power of the
legislators to act as representatives of the people in the matter of amending or revising the Constitution
was diminished for the spring cannot rise above its source. To reflect this significant shift, Section 1, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution was reworded. It now reads: "the Philippines is a democratic and republican state.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The commissioners of the
1986 Constitutional Commission explained the addition of the word "democratic," in our first Declaration of
Principles, viz:

MR. NOLLEDO. I am putting the word "democratic" because of the provisions that we are now adopting which are
covering consultations with the people. For example, we have provisions on recall, initiative, the right of the people
even to participate in lawmaking and other instances that recognize the validity of interference by the people through
people's organizations x x x x73

MR. OPLE. x x x x The Committee added the word "democratic" to "republican," and, therefore, the first
sentence states: "The Philippines is a republican and democratic state x x x x

May I know from the committee the reason for adding the word "democratic" to "republican"? The
constitutional framers of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were content with "republican." Was this done
merely for the sake of emphasis?

MR. NOLLEDO. x x x x "democratic" was added because of the need to emphasize people power and
the many provisions in the Constitution that we have approved related to recall, people's
organizations, initiative and the like, which recognize the participation of the people in policy-making
in certain circumstances x x x x

MR. OPLE. I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear answer and I think it does meet a need x x x x

MR. NOLLEDO. According to Commissioner Rosario Braid, "democracy" here is understood as participatory
democracy. 74 (emphasis supplied)

The following exchange between Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Adolfo S. Azcuna is of the same import:75

MR. SARMIENTO. When we speak of republican democratic state, are we referring to representative
democracy?

MR. AZCUNA. That is right.

MR. SARMIENTO. So, why do we not retain the old formulation under the 1973 and 1935 Constitutions
which used the words "republican state" because "republican state" would refer to a democratic state where
people choose their representatives?

MR. AZCUNA. We wanted to emphasize the participation of the people in government.

MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept "republican state," we are stressing the participation of the
people x x x x So the word "republican" will suffice to cover popular representation.

MR. AZCUNA. Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the committee felt that in view of the introduction of
the aspects of direct democracy such as initiative, referendum or recall, it was necessary to emphasize the
democratic portion of republicanism, of representative democracy as well. So, we want to add the word
"democratic" to emphasize that in this new Constitution there are instances where the people would
act directly, and not through their representatives. (emphasis supplied)

Consistent with the stress on direct democracy, the systems of initiative, referendum, and recall were enthroned
as polestars in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Commissioner Blas F. Ople who introduced the provision on people's
initiative said:76

MR. OPLE. x x x x I think this is just the correct time in history when we should introduce an innovative
mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution, vesting in the people and their organizations the right
to formulate and propose their own amendments and revisions of the Constitution in a manner that will
be binding upon the government. It is not that I believe this kind of direct action by the people for amending
a constitution will be needed frequently in the future, but it is good to know that the ultimate reserves of
 sovereign power still rest upon the people and that in the exercise of that power, they can propose
amendments or revision to the Constitution. (emphasis supplied)

Commissioner Jose E. Suarez also explained the people's initiative as a safety valve, as a peaceful way for the
people to change their Constitution, by citing our experiences under the Marcos government, viz:77

MR. SUAREZ. We agree to the difficulty in implementing this particular provision, but we are providing a
channel for the expression of the sovereign will of the people through this initiative system.

MR. BENGZON. Is Section 1, paragraphs (a) and (b), not sufficient channel for expression of the will of the
people, particularly in the amendment or revision of the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. Under normal circumstances, yes. But we know what happened during the 20 years
under the Marcos administration. So, if the National Assembly, in a manner of speaking, is operating
under the thumb of the Prime Minister or the President as the case may be, and the required number of
votes could not be obtained, we would have to provide for a safety valve in order that the people could
ventilate in a very peaceful way their desire for amendment to the Constitution.

It is very possible that although the people may be pressuring the National Assembly to constitute
itself as a constituent assembly or to call a constitutional convention, the members thereof would
not heed the people's desire and clamor. So this is a third avenue that we are providing for the
implementation of what is now popularly known as people's power. (emphasis supplied)

Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong opined that the people's initiative could avert a revolution, viz:78

MR. MAAMBONG. x x x x the amending process of the Constitution could actually avert a revolution by
providing a safety valve in bringing about changes in the Constitution through pacific means. This, in effect,
operationalizes what political law authors call the "prescription of sovereignty." (emphasis supplied)

The end result is Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution which expressed the right of the sovereign people
to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action or through initiative. To that extent, the delegated
power of Congress to amend or revise the Constitution has to be adjusted downward. Thus, Section 1, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution has to be reminted and now provides: "The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum."

Prescinding from these baseline premises, the argument that the people through initiative cannot propose
substantial amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty on its head. At the very least,
the submission constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of the people. It also
denigrates the sovereign people who they claim can only be trusted with the power to propose "simple" but not
"substantial" amendments to the Constitution. According to Sinco, the concept of sovereignty should be strictly
understood in its legal meaning as it was originally developed in law.79 Legal sovereignty, he explained, is "the
possession of unlimited power to make laws. Its possessor is the legal sovereign. It implies the absence of any
other party endowed with legally superior powers and privileges. It is not subject to law 'for it is the author and
source of law.' Legal sovereignty is thus the equivalent of legal omnipotence."80

To be sure, sovereignty or popular sovereignty, emphasizes the supremacy of the people's will over the state which
they themselves have created. The state is created by and subject to the will of the people, who are the source of all
political power. Rightly, we have ruled that "the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose
dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They
knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to
govern."81

James Wilson, regarded by many as the most brilliant, scholarly, and visionary lawyer in the United States in the
1780s, laid down the first principles of popular sovereignty during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention of the 1787
Constitution of the United States:82

There necessarily exists, in every government, a power from which there is no appeal, and which, for that
reason, may be termed supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable.

x x x x Perhaps some politician, who has not considered with sufficient accuracy our political systems, would
answer that, in our governments, the supreme power was vested in the constitutions x x x x This opinion
approaches a step nearer to the truth, but does not reach it. The truth is, that in our governments, the
supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people. As our constitutions are superior
to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitutions. Indeed the superiority, in this last
instance, is much greater; for the people possess over our constitution, control in act, as well as right.
(emphasis supplied)

I wish to reiterate that in a democratic and republican state, only the people is sovereign - - - not the elected
President, not the elected Congress, not this unelected Court. Indeed, the sovereignty of the people which
is indivisible cannot be reposed in any organ of government. Only its exercise may be delegated to any of
them. In our case, the people delegated to Congress the exercise of the sovereign power to amend or revise
the Constitution. If Congress, as delegate, can exercise this power to amend or revise the Constitution, can it be
argued that the sovereign people who delegated the power has no power to substantially amend the Constitution by
direct action? If the sovereign people do not have this power to make substantial amendments to the Constitution,
what did it delegate to Congress? How can the people lack this fraction of a power to substantially amend the
Constitution when by their sovereignty, all power emanates from them? It will take some mumbo jumbo to argue
that the whole is lesser than its part. Let Sinco clinch the point:83

But although possession may not be delegated, the exercise of sovereignty often is. It is delegated to the
organs and agents of the state which constitute its government, for it is only through this instrumentality that
the state ordinarily functions. However ample and complete this delegation may be, it is nevertheless
subject to withdrawal at any time by the state. On this point Willoughby says:

Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of government and reserve to
themselves a right to control of so slight and so negative a character as to make its exercise a rare
and improbable occurrence; yet so long as such right of control is recognized to exist, and the
autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a grant and continuing consent of the
mother countries the sovereignty of those mother countries over them is complete and they are to be
considered as possessing only administrative autonomy and not political independence.

At the very least, the power to propose substantial amendments to the Constitution is shared with the
people. We should accord the most benign treatment to the sovereign power of the people to propose
substantial amendments to the Constitution especially when the proposed amendments will adversely
affect the interest of some members of Congress. A contrary approach will suborn the public weal to private
interest and worse, will enable Congress (the delegate) to frustrate the power of the people to determine
their destiny (the principal).

All told, the teaching of the ages is that constitutional clauses acknowledging the right of the people to exercise
initiative and referendum are liberally and generously construed in favor of the people.84 Initiative and
referendum powers must be broadly construed to maintain maximum power in the people.85 We followed this
orientation in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Commission on Elections.86 There is not an iota of reason to
depart from it.

The issues at bar are not political questions.

Petitioners submit that "[t]he validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution
and their will, as expressed by the fact that over six million registered voters indicated their support of the Petition for
Initiative, is a purely political question which is beyond even the very long arm of this Honorable Court's power of
judicial review. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution should be amended is a matter which the people and the
people alone must resolve in their sovereign capacity."87 They argue that "[t]he power to propose amendments to
the Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people. Hence, the determination by the people to
exercise their right to propose amendments under the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within
the ambit of a 'political question.'"88

The petitioners cannot be sustained. This issue has long been interred by Sanidad v. Commission on
Elections, viz:89

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the
vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent
President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act
or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President
that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be
found, the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it
may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure
followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the
question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for
submission of the proposals to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes
fallacy of vicious cycle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority
and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether,
therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry,
not by the people themselves – of course – who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the Supreme
Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to
determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry
must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.

In the instant case, the Constitution sets in black and white the requirements for the exercise of the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. The amendments must be proposed by the people "upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter."90Compliance with these requirements is clearly a justiciable and not a political question. Be that as it
may, how the issue will be resolved by the people is addressed to them and to them alone.

VI
 Whether the Petition for Initiative filed before the COMELEC complied with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution and R.A. 6735 involves contentious issues of fact which should first be resolved by the
COMELEC.

Oppositors-intervenors impugn the Petition for Initiative as it allegedly lacks the required number of signatures under
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Said provision requires that the petition for initiative be supported by at
least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein. Oppositors-intervenors contend that no
proper verification of signatures was done in several legislative districts. They assert that mere verification of the
names listed on the signature sheets without verifying the signatures reduces the signatures submitted for their
respective legislative districts to mere scribbles on a piece of paper.

Oppositor-intervenor ONEVOICE, Inc., submitted to this Court a certification dated August 23, 2006 issued by Atty.
Marlon S. Casquejo, Election Officer IV, Third District and OIC, First and Second District, Davao City, stating that his
office has not verified the signatures submitted by the proponents of the people's initiative. The certification reads:

This is to CERTIFY that this office (First, Second and Third District, Davao City) HAS NOT VERIFIED the
signatures of registered voters as per documents submitted in this office by the proponents of the People's
Initiative. Consequently, NO ELECTION DOCUMENTS AND/OR ORDER ISSUED BY HIGHER
SUPERIORSused as basis for such verification of signatures.91

Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., among others, further clarified that although Atty. Casquejo and
Reynne Joy B. Bullecer, Acting Election Officer IV, First District, Davao City, later issued certifications stating that
the Office of the City Election Officer has examined the list of individuals appearing in the signature sheets,92 the
certifications reveal that the office had verified only the names of the signatories, but not their signatures.
Oppositors-intervenors submit that not only the names of the signatories should be verified, but also their signatures
to ensure the identities of the persons affixing their signatures on the signature sheets.

Oppositor-intervenor Luwalhati Antonino also alleged that petitioners failed to obtain the signatures of at least three
per cent (3%) of the total number of registered voters in the First Legislative District of South Cotabato. For the First
District of South Cotabato, petitioners submitted 3,182 signatures for General Santos City, 2,186 signatures for Tupi,
3,308 signatures for Tampakan and 10,301 signatures for Polomolok, or 18,977 signatures out of 359,488
registered voters of said district. Antonino, however, submitted to this Court a copy of the certification by Glory D.
Rubio, Election Officer III, Polomolok, dated May 8, 2006, showing that the signatures from Polomolok were not
verified because the Book of Voters for the whole municipality was in the custody of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Polomolok, South Cotabato.93 Excluding the signatures from Polomolok from the
total number of signatures from the First District of South Cotabato would yield only a total of 8,676 signatures which
falls short of the three per cent (3%) requirement for the district.

Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino likewise submitted to this Court a
certification issued by Atty. Stalin A. Baguio, City Election Officer IV, Cagayan de Oro City, stating that the list of
names appearing on the signature sheets corresponds to the names of registered voters in the city, thereby implying
that they have not actually verified the signatures.94

The argument against the sufficiency of the signatures is further bolstered by Alternative Law Groups, Inc., which
submitted copies of similarly worded certifications from the election officers from Zamboanga del Sur95 and from
Compostela Valley.96 Alternative Law Groups, Inc., further assails the regularity of the verification process as it
alleged that verification in some areas were conducted by Barangay officials and not by COMELEC election officers.
It filed with this Court copies of certifications from Sulu and Sultan Kudarat showing that the verification was
conducted by local officials instead of COMELEC personnel.97

Petitioners, on the other hand, maintain that the verification conducted by the election officers sufficiently
complied with the requirements of the Constitution and the law on initiative.

Contravening the allegations of oppositors-intervenors on the lack of verification in Davao City and in Polomolok,
South Cotabato, petitioner Aumentado claimed that the same election officers cited by the oppositors-intervenors
also issued certifications showing that they have verified the signatures submitted by the proponents of the people's
initiative. He presented copies of the certifications issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo for the Second and Third
Legislative Districts of Davao City stating that he verified the signatures of the proponents of the people's initiative.
His certification for the Second District states:

This is to CERTIFY that this Office has examined the list of individuals as appearing in the Signature Sheets
of the Registered Voters of District II, Davao City, submitted on April 7, 2006 by MR. NONATO BOLOS,
Punong Barangay, Centro, Davao City for verification which consists of THIRTY THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (30,662) signatures.

Anent thereto, it appears that of the THIRTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (30,662) individuals,
only TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT (22,668) individuals were found to be
REGISTERED VOTERS, in the Computerized List of Voters of SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT,
DAVAO CITY.98

It was also shown that Atty. Casquejo had issued a clarificatory certification regarding the verification process
conducted in Davao City. It reads:
 Regarding the verification of the signatures of registered voters, this Office has previously issued two (2)
separate certifications for the 2nd and 3rd Districts of Davao City on April 20, 2006 and April 26, 2006,
respectively, specifically relating to the voters who supported the people's initiative. It was stated therein that
the names submitted, comprising 22,668 individual voters in the 2nd District and 18,469 individual voters in
the 3rd District, were found [to] be registered voters of the respective districts mentioned as verified by this
Office based on the Computerized List of Voters.

It must be clarified that the August 23, 2006 Certification was issued in error and by mistake for the reason
that the signature verification has not been fully completed as of that date.

I hereby CERTIFY that this Office has examined the signatures of the voters as appearing in the signature
sheets and has compared these with the signatures appearing in the book of voters and computerized list of
voters x x x 99

Petitioner Aumentado also submitted a copy of the certification dated May 8, 2006 issued by Polomolok Election
Officer Glory D. Rubio to support their claim that said officer had conducted a verification of signatures in said area.
The certification states:

This is to certify further, that the total 68,359 registered voters of this municipality, as of the May 10, 2004
elections, 10,804 names with signatures were submitted for verification and out of which 10,301 were found
to be legitimate voters as per official list of registered voters, which is equivalent to 15.07% of the total
number of registered voters of this Municipality.100

In addition to the lack of proper verification of the signatures in numerous legislative districts, allegations of fraud
and irregularities in the collection of signatures in Makati City were cited by Senator Pimentel, among others, to wit:

(1) No notice was given to the public, for the benefit of those who may be concerned, by the Makati
COMELEC Office that signature sheets have already been submitted to it for "verification." The camp of
Mayor Binay was able to witness the "verification process" only because of their pro-active stance;

(2) In District 1, the proponents of charter change submitted 43,405 signatures for verification. 36,219
alleged voters' signatures (83% of the number of signatures submitted) were rejected outright. 7,186
signatures allegedly "passed" COMELEC's initial scrutiny. However, upon examination of the signature
sheets by Atty. Mar-len Abigail Binay, the said 7,186 signatures could not be accounted for. Atty. Binay
manually counted 2,793 signatures marked with the word "OK" and 3,443 signatures marked with a check,
giving only 6,236 "apparently verified signatures." Before the COMELEC officer issued the Certification, Atty.
Binay already submitted to the said office not less than 55 letters of "signature withdrawal," but no action
was ever taken thereon;

(3) In District 2, 29,411 signatures were submitted for verification. 23,521 alleged voters' signatures (80% of
those submitted) were rejected outright. Of the 5,890 signatures which allegedly passed the COMELEC's
initial scrutiny, some more will surely fail upon closer examination;

(4) In the absence of clear, transparent, and uniform rules the COMELEC personnel did not know how to
treat the objections and other observations coming from the camp of Mayor Binay. The oppositors too did
not know where to go for their remedy when the COMELEC personnel merely "listened" to their objections
and other observations. As mentioned earlier, the COMELEC personnel did not even know what to do with
the many "letters of signature withdrawal" submitted to it;

(5) Signatures of people long dead, in prison, abroad, and other forgeries appear on the Sigaw ng Bayan
Signature Sheets. There is even a 15-year old alleged signatory;

(6) There are Signature Sheets obviously signed by one person;

(7) A Calara M. Roberto and a Roberto M. Calara both allegedly signed the Signature Sheets.101

Also, there are allegations that many of the signatories did not understand what they have signed as they were
merely misled into signing the signature sheets. Opposed to these allegations are rulings that a person who affixes
his signature on a document raises the presumption that the person so signing has knowledge of what the
document contains. Courts have recognized that there is great value in the stability of records, so to speak, that no
one should commit herself or himself to something in writing unless she or he is fully aware and cognizant of the
effect it may have upon her on him.102 In the same vein, we have held that a person is presumed to have knowledge
of the contents of a document he has signed.103 But as this Court is not a trier of facts, it cannot resolve the issue.

In sum, the issue of whether the petitioners have complied with the constitutional requirement that the petition for
initiative be signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein, involves
contentious facts. Its resolution will require presentation of evidence and their calibration by the COMELEC
according to its rules. During the oral argument on this case, the COMELEC, through Director Alioden Dalaig of its
Law Department, admitted that it has not examined the documents submitted by the petitioners in support of the
petition for initiative, as well as the documents filed by the oppositors to buttress their claim that the required number
of signatures has not been met. The exchanges during the oral argument likewise clearly show the need for further
clarification and presentation of evidence to prove certain material facts.104
The only basis used by the COMELEC to dismiss the petition for initiative was this Court's ruling in Santiago v.
COMELEC that R.A. 6735 was insufficient. It has yet to rule on the sufficiency of the form and substance of
the petition. I respectfully submit that this issue should be properly litigated before the COMELEC where both
parties will be given full opportunity to prove their allegations.

For the same reasons, the sufficiency of the Petition for Initiative and its compliance with the requirements
of R.A. 6735 on initiative and its implementing rules is a question that should be resolved by the COMELEC at the
first instance, as it is the body that is mandated by the Constitution to administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.105

VII

COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied due course to the Lambino and Aumentado
petition.

In denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition, COMELEC relied on this Court's ruling
in Santiagopermanently enjoining it from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.

Again, I respectfully submit that COMELEC's reliance on Santiago constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. The Santiago case did not establish the firm doctrine that R.A. 6735 is not a sufficient law
to implement the constitutional provision allowing people's initiative to amend the Constitution. To recapitulate, the
records show that in the original decision, eight (8) justices106 voted that R.A. 6735 was not a sufficient law; five
(5) justices107 voted that said law was sufficient; and one (1) justice108 abstained from voting on the issue holding that
unless and until a proper initiatory pleading is filed, the said issue is not ripe for adjudication.109

Within the reglementary period, the respondents filed their motion for reconsideration. On June 10, 1997, the Court
denied the motion. Only thirteen (13) justices resolved the motion for Justice Torres inhibited himself.110 Of the
original majority of eight (8) justices, only six (6) reiterated their ruling that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient
law. Justice Hermosisima, originally part of the majority of eight (8) justices, changed his vote and joined the
minority of five (5) justices. He opined without any equivocation that R.A. 6735 was a sufficient law, thus:

It is one thing to utter a happy phrase from a protected cluster; another to think under fire – to think for action
upon which great interests depend." So said Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and so I am guided as I
reconsider my concurrence to the holding of the majority that "R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation" and now to interpose my dissent thereto.

xxx

WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the Delfin petition.

I vote, however, to declare R.A. No. 6735 as adequately providing the legal basis for the exercise by
the people of their right to amend the Constitution through initiative proceedings and to uphold the
validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 insofar as it does not sanction the filing of the initiatory petition for
initiative proceedings to amend the Constitution without the required names and/or signatures of at least
12% of all the registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein. (emphasis supplied)

Justice Vitug remained steadfast in refusing to rule on the sufficiency of R.A. 6735. In fine, the final vote on whether
R.A. 6735 is a sufficient law was 6-6 with one (1) justice inhibiting himself and another justice refusing to rule on the
ground that the issue was not ripe for adjudication.

It ought to be beyond debate that the six (6) justices who voted that R.A. 6735 is an insufficient law failed to
establish a doctrine that could serve as a precedent. Under any alchemy of law, a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a
majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value. The opinion of the late Justice Ricardo J.
Francisco is instructive, viz:

As it stands, of the thirteen justices who took part in the deliberations on the issue of whether the motion for
reconsideration of the March 19, 1997 decision should be granted or not, only the following justices sided
with Mr. Justice Davide, namely: Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo and
Kapunan. Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Panganiban and the undersigned voted to grant the
motion; while Justice Vitug "maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication." In
other words, only five, out of the other twelve justices, joined Mr. Justice Davide's June 10, 1997 ponencia
finding R.A. No. 6735 unconstitutional for its failure to pass the so called "completeness and sufficiency
standards" tests. The "concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations"
which Article VII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution requires to declare a law unconstitutional was, beyond
dispute, not complied with. And even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the constitutional requirement
on the concurrence of the "majority" was initially reached in the March 19, 1997 ponencia, the same is
inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion for reconsideration. It was only on June 10,
1997 that the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735 was settled with finality, sans the constitutionally required
"majority." The Court's declaration, therefore, is manifestly grafted with infirmity and wanting in force
necessitating, in my view, the reexamination of the Court's decision in G.R. No. 127325. It behooves the
 Court "not to tarry any longer" nor waste this opportunity accorded by this new petition (G.R. No. 129754) to
relieve the Court's pronouncement from constitutional infirmity.

The jurisprudence that an equally divided Court can never set a precedent is well-settled. Thus, in the United States,
an affirmance in the Federal Supreme Court upon equal division of opinion is not an authority for the determination
of other cases, either in that Court or in the inferior federal courts. In Neil v. Biggers,111 which was a habeas
corpusstate proceeding by a state prisoner, the U.S. Supreme Court held that its equally divided affirmance of
petitioner's state court conviction was not an "actual adjudication" barring subsequent consideration by the district
court on habeas corpus. In discussing the non-binding effect of an equal division ruling, the Court reviewed the
history of cases explicating the disposition "affirmed by an equally divided Court:"

In this light, we review our cases explicating the disposition "affirmed by an equally divided Court." On what
was apparently the first occasion of an equal division, The Antelope, 10 Wheat, 66, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825),
the Court simply affirmed on the point of division without much discussion. Id., at 126-127. Faced with a
similar division during the next Term, the Court again affirmed, Chief Justice Marshall explaining that "the
principles of law which have been argued, cannot be settled; but the judgment is affirmed, the court being
divided in opinion upon it." Etting v. Bank of United States, 11 Wheat. 59, 78, 6 L. Ed. 419 (1826). As was
later elaborated in such cases, it is the appellant or petitioner who asks the Court to overturn a lower court's
decree. "If the judges are divided, the reversal cannot be had, for no order can be made. The judgment of
the court below, therefore, stands in full force. It is indeed, the settled practice in such case to enter a
judgment of affirmance; but this is only the most convenient mode of expressing the fact that the cause is
finally disposed of in conformity with the action of the court below, and that that court can proceed to enforce
its judgment. The legal effect would be the same if the appeal, or writ of error, were dismissed." Durant v.
Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107, 112, 19 L. Ed. 154 (1869). Nor is an affirmance by an equally divided Court entitled
to precedential weight. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264, 80 S. Ct. 1463, 1464, 4 L. Ed. 2d
1708 (1960).xxx"

This doctrine established in Neil has not been overturned and has been cited with approval in a number of
subsequent cases,112 and has been applied in various state jurisdictions.

In the case of In the Matter of the Adoption of Erin G., a Minor Child,113 wherein a putative father sought to set
aside a decree granting petition for adoption of an Indian child on grounds of noncompliance with the requirements
of Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that its decision in In re Adoption of T.N.F.
(T.N.F.),114 which lacked majority opinion supporting holding that an action such as the putative father's would
be governed by the state's one-year statute of limitations, was not entitled to stare decisis effect. In T.N.F., a
majority of the justices sitting did not agree on a common rationale, as two of four participating justices agreed
that the state's one-year statute of limitations applied, one justice concurred in the result only, and one justice
dissented. There was no "narrower" reasoning agreed upon by all three affirming justices. The concurring justice
expressed no opinion on the statute of limitations issue, and in agreeing with the result, he reasoned that ICWA did
not give the plaintiff standing to sue.115 The two-justice plurality, though agreeing that the state's one-year statute of
limitations applied, specifically disagreed with the concurring justice on the standing issue.116 Because a majority of
the participating justices in T.N.F. did not agree on any one ground for affirmance, it was not accorded stare decisis
effect by the state Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court of Michigan likewise ruled that the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to plurality
decisions in which no majority of the justices participating agree to the reasoning and as such are not authoritative
interpretations binding on the Supreme Court.117

In State ex rel. Landis v. Williams,118 the Supreme Court of Florida, in an equally divided opinion on the
matter,119 held that chapter 15938, Acts of 1933 must be allowed to stand, dismissing a quo warranto suit without
prejudice. The Court held:

In a cause of original jurisdiction in this court a statute cannot be declared unconstitutional nor its
enforcement nor operation judicially interfered with, except by the concurrence of a majority of the members
of the Supreme Court sitting in the cause wherein the constitutionality of the statute is brought in question or
judicial relief sought against its enforcement. Section 4 of Article 5, state Constitution.

Therefore in this case the concurrence of a majority of the members of this court in holding unconstitutional
said chapter 15938, supra, not having been had, it follows that the statute in controversy must be allowed to
stand and accordingly be permitted to be enforced as a presumptively valid act of the Legislature, and that
this proceeding in quo warranto must be dismissed without prejudice. Spencer v. Hunt (Fla.) 147 So.
282. This decision is not to be regarded as a judicial precedent on the question of constitutional law involved
concerning the constitutionality vel non of chapter 15938. State ex rel. Hampton v. McClung, 47 Fla. 224,
37 So. 51.

Quo warranto proceeding dismissed without prejudice by equal division of the court on question of
constitutionality of statute involved.

In U.S. v. Pink,120 the Court held that the affirmance by the U.S. Supreme Court by an equally divided vote of a
decision of the New York Court of Appeals that property of a New York branch of a Russian insurance company was
outside the scope of the Russian Soviet government's decrees terminating existence of insurance companies in
Russia and seizing their assets, while conclusive and binding upon the parties as respects the controversy in that
action, did not constitute an authoritative "precedent."
In Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,121 the U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit, in holding that printed lyrics which
had the same meter as plaintiffs' lyrics, but which were in form a parody of the latter, did not constitute infringement
of plaintiffs' copyrights, ruled that the prior case of Benny v. Loew's, Inc.,122 which was affirmed by an equally
divided court, was not binding upon it, viz:

Under the precedents of this court, and, as seems justified by reason as well as by authority, an affirmance
by an equally divided court is as between the parties, a conclusive determination and adjudication of the
matter adjudged; but the principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court
sitting prevents the case from becoming an authority for the determination of other cases, either in this or in
inferior courts.123

In Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago,124 the Supreme Court of Illinois dismissed the appeal as it was
unable to reach a decision because two judges recused themselves and the remaining members of the Court were
so divided, it was impossible to secure the concurrence of four judges as is constitutionally required. The Court
followed the procedure employed by the U.S. Supreme Court when the Justices of that Court are equally
divided, i.e. affirm the judgment of the court that was before it for review. The affirmance is a conclusive
determination and adjudication as between the parties to the immediate case, it is not authority for the determination
of other cases, either in the Supreme Court or in any other court. It is not "entitled to precedential weight." The legal
effect of such an affirmance is the same as if the appeal was dismissed.125

The same rule is settled in the English Courts. Under English precedents,126 an affirmance by an equally divided
Court is, as between the parties, a conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged; but the
principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case from
becoming an authority for the determination of other cases, either in that or in inferior courts.

After a tour of these cases, we can safely conclude that the prevailing doctrine is that, the affirmance by an equally
divided court merely disposes of the present controversy as between the parties and settles no issue of law; the
affirmance leaves unsettled the principle of law presented by the case and is not entitled to precedential weight or
value. In other words, the decision only has res judicata and not stare decisis effect. It is not conclusive and binding
upon other parties as respects the controversies in other actions.

Let us now examine the patent differences between the petition at bar and the Delfin Petition in the Santiago
case which will prevent the Santiago ruling from binding the present petitioners. To start with, the parties are
different. More importantly, the Delfin Petition did not contain the signatures of the required number of registered
voters under the Constitution: the requirement that twelve per cent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country
wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein was
not complied with. For this reason, we ruled unanimously that it was not the initiatory petition which the COMELEC
could properly take cognizance of. In contrast, the present petition appears to be accompanied by the signatures of
the required number of registered voters. Thus, while the Delfin Petition prayed that an Order be issued fixing the
time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, the Lambino and Aumentado petition, prayed for the
calling of a plebiscite to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition. COMELEC
cannot close its eyes to these material differences.

Plainly, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying due course
to the Lambino and Aumentado petition on the basis of its mistaken notion that Santiago established the doctrine
that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. As aforestressed, that ruling of six (6) justices who do not represent the
majority lacks precedential status and is non-binding on the present petitioners.

The Court's dismissal of the PIRMA petition is of no moment. Suffice it to say that we dismissed the PIRMA petition
on the principle of res judicata. This was stressed by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., viz:

The following are my reasons as to why this petition must be summarily dismissed:

First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed here and in Santiago v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of the fact that the former is substantially identical
to the latter, except for the reversal of the roles played by the principal parties and inclusion of additional, yet
not indispensable, parties in the present petition. But plainly, the same issues and reliefs are raised and
prayed for in both cases.

The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM, MODERNIZATION, AND
ACTION (PIRMA) and spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described
as "a non-stock, non-profit organization duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with office
address at Suite 403, Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City," with "ALBERTO
PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA" as among its "officers." In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made
respondents as founding members of PIRMA which, as alleged in the body of the petition therein, "proposes
to undertake the signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." In Santiago then, the
PEDROSAS were sued in their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.

The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly represented at the hearing of the Delfin
petition in the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner therein. Delfin alleged in his petition
that he was a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the
decision, it was noted that said movement was "[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity." In their Comment to the petition in Santiago, the
PEDROSAS did not deny that they were founding members of PIRMA, and by their arguments,
demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they had joined Delfin or his cause.
 No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the PEDROSAS, as well as the
others joining them, from the operation of the principle of res judicata, which needs no further elaboration.
(emphasis supplied)

Justice Josue N. Bellosillo adds:

The essential requisites of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on
the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, identity of subject
matter, and identity of causes of action.127

Applying these principles in the instant case, we hold that all the elements of res judicata are present. For
sure, our Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC, which was promulgated on 19 March 1997, and the motions
for reconsideration thereof denied with finality on 10 June 1997, is undoubtedly final. The said Decision was
rendered by this Court which had jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition under Rule 65. Our judgment
therein was on the merits, i.e., rendered only after considering the evidence presented by the parties as well
as their arguments in support of their respective claims and defenses. And, as between Santiago v.
COMELEC case and COMELEC Special Matter No. 97-001 subject of the present petition, there is identity
of parties, subject matter and causes of action.

Petitioners contend that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC are not identical to the parties in the instant
case as some of the petitioners in the latter case were not parties to the former case. However, a perusal of
the records reveals that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC included the COMELEC, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin,
spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of PIRMA, as well as Atty.
Pete Quirino-Quadra, another founding member of PIRMA, representing PIRMA, as respondents. In the
instant case, Atty. Delfin was never removed, and the spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa were joined by
several others who were made parties to the petition. In other words, what petitioners did was to make it
appear that the PIRMA Petition was filed by an entirely separate and distinct group by removing some of the
parties involved in Santiago v. COMELEC and adding new parties. But as we said in Geralde v. Sabido128-

A party may not evade the application of the rule of res judicata by simply including additional parties
in the subsequent case or by not including as parties in the later case persons who were parties in
the previous suit. The joining of new parties does not remove the case from the operation of the rule
on res judicata if the party against whom the judgment is offered in evidence was a party in the first
action; otherwise, the parties might renew the litigation by simply joining new parties.

The fact that some persons or entities joined as parties in the PIRMA petition but were not parties in
Santiago v. COMELEC does not affect the operation of the prior judgment against those parties to the
PIRMA Petition who were likewise parties in Santiago v. COMELEC, as they are bound by such prior
judgment.

Needless to state, the dismissal of the PIRMA petition which was based on res judicata binds only PIRMA but not
the petitioners.

VIII

Finally, let the people speak.

"It is a Constitution we are expounding" solemnly intoned the great Chief Justice John Marshall of the United
States in the 1819 case of M'cCulloch v. Maryland.129 Our Constitution is not a mere collection of slogans. Every
syllable of our Constitution is suffused with significance and requires our full fealty. Indeed, the rule of law will wither
if we allow the commands of our Constitution to underrule us.

The first principle enthroned by blood in our Constitution is the sovereignty of the people. We ought to be
concerned with this first principle, i.e., the inherent right of the sovereign people to decide whether to amend the
Constitution. Stripped of its abstractions, democracy is all about who has the sovereign right to make decisions for
the people and our Constitution clearly and categorically says it is no other than the people themselves from whom
all government authority emanates. This right of the people to make decisions is the essence of sovereignty,
and it cannot receive any minimalist interpretation from this Court. If there is any principle in the Constitution
that cannot be diluted and is non-negotiable, it is this sovereign right of the people to decide.

This Court should always be in lockstep with the people in the exercise of their sovereignty. Let them who
will diminish or destroy the sovereign right of the people to decide be warned. Let not their sovereignty be
diminished by those who belittle their brains to comprehend changes in the Constitution as if the people themselves
are not the source and author of our Constitution. Let not their sovereignty be destroyed by the masters of
manipulation who misrepresent themselves as the spokesmen of the people.

Be it remembered that a petition for people's initiative that complies with the requirement that it "must be signed by
at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3%
of the registered voters therein" is but the first step in a long journey towards the amendment of the Constitution.
Lest it be missed, the case at bar involves but a proposal to amend the Constitution. The proposal will still be
debated by the people and at this time, there is yet no fail-safe method of telling what will be the result of the
debate. There will still be a last step to the process of amendment which is the ratification of the proposal by
a majority of the people in a plebiscite called for the purpose. Only when the proposal is approved by a
majority of the people in the plebiscite will it become an amendment to the Constitution. All the way, we
cannot tie the tongues of the people. It is the people who decide for the people are not an obscure footnote
in our Constitution.

The people's voice is sovereign in a democracy. Let us hear them. Let us heed them. Let us not only sing
paens to the people's sovereignty. Yes, it is neither too soon nor too late to let the people speak.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the resolution of the Commission on Elections dated
August 31, 2006, denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado
in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures thereon and
to REMAND the petition at bar to the Commission on Elections for further proceedings.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent; TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP),
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and
VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN,
MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG
MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY,
ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS, LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY
SANTIAGO, and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA
THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI ANTONINO, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE
MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO M.
LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR,
MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Oppositors-Intervenors;

G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

SEPARATE OPINION

QUISUMBING, J.:

1. With due respect to the main opinion written by J. Antonio T. Carpio, and the dissent of J. Reynato S. Puno, I
view the matter before us in this petition as one mainly involving a complex political question.1 While admittedly the
present Constitution lays down certain numerical requirements for the conduct of a People's Initiative, such as the
percentages of signatures – being 12% of the total number of registered voters, provided each legislative district is
represented by at least 3% – they are not the main points of controversy. Stated in simple terms, what this Court
must decide is whether the Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petition to
submit the proposed changes to the Constitution directly to the vote of the sovereign people in a plebiscite.
Technical questions, e.g. whether petitioners should have filed a Motion for Reconsideration before coming to us,
are of no moment in the face of the transcendental issue at hand. What deserve our full attention are the issues
concerning the applicable rules as well as statutory and constitutional limitations on the conduct of the People's
Initiative.

2. It must be stressed that no less than the present Constitution itself empowers the people to "directly" propose
amendments through their own "initiative." The subject of the instant petition is by way of exercising that initiative in
order to change our form of government from presidential to parliamentary. Much has been written about the
fulsome powers of the people in a democracy. But the most basic concerns the idea that sovereignty resides in the
people and that all government authority emanates from them. Clearly, by the power of popular initiative, the people
have the sovereign right to change the present Constitution. Whether the initial moves are done by a Constitutional
Convention, a Constitutional Assembly, or a People's Initiative, in the end every amendment -- however
insubstantial or radical -- must be submitted to a plebiscite. Thus, it is the ultimate will of the people expressed in the
ballot, that matters.2

3. I cannot fault the COMELEC, frankly, for turning down the petition of Messrs. Lambino, et al. For the COMELEC
was just relying on precedents, with the common understanding that, pursuant to the cases of Santiago v.
COMELEC3 and PIRMA v. COMELEC,4 the COMELEC had been permanently enjoined from entertaining any
petition for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution by no less than this Court. In denying due course below to
Messrs. Lambino and Aumentado's petition, I could not hold the COMELEC liable for grave abuse of discretion
when they merely relied on this Court's unequivocal rulings. Of course, the Santiago and the PIRMA decisions could
be reviewed and reversed by this Court, as J. Reynato S. Puno submits now. But until the Court does so, the
COMELEC was duty bound to respect and obey this Court's mandate, for the rule of law to prevail.

4. Lastly, I see no objection to the remand to the COMELEC of the petition of Messrs. Lambino and Aumentado and
6.327 million voters, for further examination of the factual requisites before a plebiscite is conducted. On page 4 of
the assailed Resolution of the respondent dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC tentatively expressed its view that
"even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the total number of
registered voters", the COMELEC could not give the Petition due course because of our view that R.A. No. 6735
was inadequate. That, however, is now refuted by Mr. Justice Puno's scholarly ponencia. Now that we have
revisited the Santiago v. COMELEC decision, there is only one clear task for COMELEC. In my view, the only
doable option left for the COMELEC, once factual issues are heard and resolved, is to give due course to the
petition for the initiative to amend our Constitution so that the sovereign people can vote on whether a parliamentary
system of government should replace the present presidential system.

5. I am therefore in favor of letting the sovereign people speak on their choice of the form of government as a
political question soonest. (This I say without fear of media opinion that our judicial independence has been tainted
or imperiled, for it is not.) Thus I vote for the remand of the petition. Thereafter, as prayed for, COMELEC should
forthwith certify the Petition as sufficient in form and substance and call for the holding of a plebiscite within the
period mandated by the basic law, not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days from said certification. Only a
credible plebiscite itself, conducted peacefully and honestly, can bring closure to the instant political controversy.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G. R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
HE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and
Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE
V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DISSENTING OPINION

CORONA, J.:

The life of the law is not logic but experience.1 Our collective experience as a nation breathes life to our system of
laws, especially to the Constitution. These cases promise to significantly contribute to our collective experience as a
nation. Fealty to the primary constitutional principle that the Philippines is not merely a republican State but a
democratic one as well behooves this Court to affirm the right of the people to participate directly in the process of
introducing changes to their fundamental law. These petitions present such an opportunity. Thus, this is an
opportune time for this Court to uphold the sovereign rights of the people.

I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato Puno who has sufficiently explained the rationale for upholding the
people's initiative. However, I wish to share my own thoughts on certain matters I deem material and significant.

Santiago Does Not Apply to This Case But Only to the 1997 Delfin Petition

The COMELEC denied the petition for initiative filed by petitioners purportedly on the basis of this Court's ruling
in Santiago v. COMELEC2 that: (1) RA 6753 was inadequate to cover the system of initiative regarding amendments
to the Constitution and (2) the COMELEC was permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative regarding amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law was validly enacted to provide
for the implementation of the initiative provision.
However, Santiago should not apply to this case but only to the petition of Delfin in 1997. It would be unreasonable
to make it apply to all petitions which were yet unforeseen in 1997. The fact is that Santiago was focused on the
Delfin petition alone.

Those who oppose the exercise of the people's right to initiate changes to the Constitution via initiative claim
that Santiago barred any and all future petitions for initiative by virtue of the doctrines of stare decisis and res
judicata. The argument is flawed.

The ponencia of Mr. Justice Puno has amply discussed the arguments relating to stare decisis. Hence, I will address
the argument from the viewpoint of res judicata.

Res judicata is the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive
as to the rights of the parties and their privies and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action
involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.3 It has the following requisites: (1) the former judgment or
order must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits and (4) there must be identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of cause of action between the first and second actions.4

There is no identity of parties in Santiago and the instant case. While the COMELEC was also the respondent
in Santiago, the petitioners in that case and those in this case are different. More significantly, there is no identity of
causes of action in the two cases. Santiago involved amendments to Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of
Article VII and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution while the present petition seeks to amend Sections 1to 7 of
Article VI and Sections 1 to 4 of the 1987 Constitution. Clearly, therefore, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it ruled that the present petition for initiative was barred by Santiago and, on that ground, dismissed
the petition.

The present petition and that in Santiago are materially different from each other. They are not based on the same
facts. There is thus no cogent reason to frustrate and defeat the present direct action of the people to exercise their
sovereignty by proposing changes to their fundamental law.

People's Initiative Should Not

Be Subjected to Conditions

People's initiative is an option reserved by the people for themselves exclusively. Neither Congress nor the
COMELEC has the power to curtail or defeat this exclusive power of the people to change the Constitution. Neither
should the exercise of this power be made subject to any conditions, as some would have us accept.

Oppositors to the people's initiative point out that this Court ruled in Santiago that RA 6735 was inadequate to cover
the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and, thus, no law existed to enable the people to directly
propose changes to the Constitution. This reasoning is seriously objectionable.

The pronouncement on the insufficiency of RA 6735 was, to my mind, out of place. It was unprecedented and
dangerously transgressed the domain reserved to the legislature.

While the legislature is authorized to establish procedures for determining the validity and sufficiency of a petition to
amend the constitution,5 that procedure cannot unnecessarily restrict the initiative privilege.6 In the same vein, this
Court cannot unnecessarily and unreasonably restrain the people's right to directly propose changes to the
Constitution by declaring a law inadequate simply for lack of a sub-heading and other grammatical but insignificant
omissions. Otherwise, the constitutional intent to empower the people will be severely emasculated, if not rendered
illusory.

People's Right and Power to Propose Changes to the Constitution Directly Should not be Unreasonably
Curtailed

If Congress and a constitutional convention, both of which are mere representative bodies, can propose changes to
the Constitution, there is no reason why the supreme body politic itself – the people – may not do so directly.

Resort to initiative to amend the constitution or enact a statute is an exercise of "direct democracy" as opposed to
"representative democracy." The system of initiative allows citizens to directly propose constitutional amendments
for the general electorate to adopt or reject at the polls, particularly in a plebiscite. While representative government
was envisioned to "refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice
will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations,"7 the exercise of "direct democracy" through
initiative reserves direct lawmaking power to the people by providing them a method to make new laws via the
constitution, or alternatively by enacting statutes.8 Efforts of the represented to control their representatives through
initiative have been described as curing the problems of democracy with more democracy.9

The Constitution celebrates the sovereign right of the people and declares that "sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them."10 Unless the present petition is granted, this constitutional
principle will be nothing but empty rhetoric, devoid of substance for those whom it seeks to empower.

The right of the people to pass legislation and to introduce changes to the Constitution is a fundamental right and
must be jealously guarded.11 The people should be allowed to directly seek redress of the problems of society and
representative democracy with the constitutional tools they have reserved for their use alone.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174513.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G. R. No. 174153

RAUL LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent;
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL
RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND
GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE
VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA,
JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE
QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS
FORUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS, LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS,
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,
LUWALHATI ANTONINO, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL,
JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA,
JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and
PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU
CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANOTNIO L.
SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President,
MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,Oppositors-Intervenors;

G.R. No. 174299 entitled

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

SEPARATE OPINION

TINGA, J:

I join in full the opinion of Senior Associate Justice Puno. Its enviable sang-froid, inimitable lucidity, and luminous
scholarship are all so characteristic of the author that it is hardly a waste of pen and ink to write separately if only to
express my deep admiration for his disquisition. It is compelling because it derives from the fundamental democratic
ordinance that sovereignty resides in the people, and it seeks to effectuate that principle through the actual
empowerment of the sovereign people. Justice Puno's opinion will in the short term engender reactions on its impact
on present attempts to amend the Constitution, but once the political passion of the times have been shorn, it will
endure as an unequivocal message to the taongbayan that they are to be trusted to chart the course of their future.

Nothing that I inscribe will improve on Justice Puno's opinion. I only write separately to highlight a few other points
which also inform my vote to grant the petitions.

I.

I agree with Justice Puno that Santiago v. COMELEC1 and PIRMA v. COMELEC2 had not acquired value as
precedent and should be reversed in any case. I add that the Court has long been mindful of the rule that it
necessitates a majority, and not merely a plurality, in order that a decision can stand as precedent. That principle
has informed the members of this Court as they deliberated and voted upon contentious petitions, even if this
consideration is not ultimately reflected on the final draft released for promulgation.

The curious twist to Santiago and PIRMA is that for all the denigration heaped upon Rep. Act No. 6735 in those
cases, the Court did not invalidate any provision of the statute. All the Court said then was that the law was
"inadequate". Since this "inadequate" law was not annulled by the Court, or repealed by Congress, it remained part
of the statute books.3

I maintain that even if Rep. Act No. 6735 is truly "inadequate", the Court in Santiago should not have simply let the
insufficiency stand given that it was not minded to invalidate the law itself. Article 9 of the Civil Code provides that
"[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
laws."4As explained by the Court recently in Reyes v. Lim,5 "[Article 9] calls for the application of equity, which[, in
the revered Justice Cardozo's words,] 'fills the open spaces in the law.'"6 Certainly, any court that refuses to rule on
an action premised on Rep. Act No. 6735 on the ground that the law is "inadequate" would have been found in
grave abuse of discretion. The previous failure by the Court to "fill the open spaces" in Santiago further highlights
that decision's status as an unfortunate aberration.

I am mindful of the need to respect stare decisis, to the point of having recently decried a majority ruling that was
clearly minded to reverse several precedents but refused to explicitly say so.7 Yet the principle is not
immutable.8The passionate words of Chief Justice Panganiban in Osmeña v. COMELEC9 bear quoting:

Before I close, a word about stare decisis. In the present case, the Court is maintaining the ad ban to be
consistent with its previous holding in NPC vs. Comelec. Thus, respondent urges reverence for the stability
of judicial doctrines. I submit, however, that more important than consistency and stability are the verity,
integrity and correctness of jurisprudence. As Dean Roscoe Pound explains, "Law must be stable but it
cannot stand still." Verily, it must correct itself and move in cadence with the march of the electronic age.
Error and illogic should not be perpetuated. After all, the Supreme Court, in many cases, has deviated from
stare decisis and reversed previous doctrines and decisions.10 It should do no less in the present case.11

Santiago established a tenet that the Supreme Court may affirm a law as constitutional, yet declare its provisions as
inadequate to accomplish the legislative purpose, then barred the enforcement of the law. That ruling is erroneous,
illogical, and should not be perpetuated.

II.

Following Justice Puno's clear demonstration why Santiago should not be respected as precedent, I agree that the
COMELEC's failure to take cognizance of the petitions as mandated by Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse
of discretion correctible through the petitions before this Court.

The Court has consistently held in cases such as Abes v. COMELEC12, Sanchez v. COMELEC13, and Sambarani v.
COMELEC14 that "the functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially executive and
administrative in nature".15 More pertinently, in Buac v. COMELEC16, the Court held that the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC relative to the enforcement and administration of a law relative to a plebiscite fell under the jurisdiction of
the poll body under its constitutional mandate "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of a xxx plebiscite".17

Rep. Act No. 6735 is a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite. The primary task of the COMELEC under Rep. Act
No. 6735 is to enforce and administer the said law, functions that are essentially executive and administrative in
nature. Even the subsequent duty of the COMELEC of determining the sufficiency of the petitions after they have
been filed is administrative in character. By any measure, the COMELEC's failure to perform its executive and
administrative functions under Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

III.

It has been argued that the subject petitions for initiative are barred under Republic Act No. 6735 as they allegedly
embrace more than one subject. Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 classifies as a "prohibited measure," a petition
submitted to the electorate that embraces more than one subject.18 On this point, reliance is apparently placed on
the array of provisions which are to be affected by the amendments proposed in the initiative petition.

Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 is a reflection of the long-enshrined constitutional principle that the laws passed by
Congress "shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof".19 The one-subject
requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the
subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject
and title.20 An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may
be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
object.21

The precedents governing the one-subject, one-title rule under the Constitution should apply as well in the
interpretation of Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735. For as long as it can be established that an initiative petition
embraces a single general subject, the petition may be allowed no matter the number of constitutional provisions
proposed for amendment if the amendments are germane to the subject of the petition.

Both the Sigaw ng Bayan and the Lambino initiative petitions expressly propose the changing of the form of
government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary. Such a proposal may strike as
comprehensive, necessitating as it will the reorganization of the executive and legislative branches of government,
nevertheless it ineluctably encompasses only a single general subject still.

The 1987 Constitution (or any constitution for that matter) is susceptible to division into several general spheres. To
cite the broadest of these spheres by way of example, Article III enumerates the guaranteed rights of the people
under the Bill of Rights; Articles VI, VII and VIII provide for the organizational structure of government; while Articles
II, XII, XIII & XIV, XV and XVI enunciate policy principles of the State. What would clearly be prohibited under
Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 is an initiative petition that seeks to amend provisions which do not belong to the
same sphere. For example, had a single initiative petition sought not only to change the form of government from
presidential to parliamentary but also to amend the Bill of Rights, said petition would arguably have been barred
under Section 10, as that petition ostensibly embraces more than one subject, with each subject bearing no
functional relation to the other. But that is not the case with the present initiative petitions.

Neither can it be argued that the initiative petitions embrace more than one subject since the proposed amendments
seek to affect two separate branches of government. The very purpose of the initiative petitions is to fuse the
powers of the executive and legislative branches of government; hence, the amendments intended to effect such
general intent necessarily affects the two branches. If it required that to propose a shift in government from
presidential to parliamentary, the amendments to Article VII (Executive Branch) have to be segregated to a different
petition from that which would propose amendments to Article VI (Legislative Branch), then the result would be two
initiative petitions ─ both subject to separate authentications, consideration and even plebiscites, all to effect one
general proposition. This scenario, which entertains the possibility that one petition would ultimately fail while the
other succeeds, could thus allow for the risk that the executive branch could be abolished without transferring
executive power to the legislative branch. An absurd result, indeed.

I am not even entirely comfortable with the theoretical underpinnings of Section 10. The Constitution indubitably
grants the people the right to seek amendment of the charter through initiative, and mandates Congress to "provide
for the implementation of the exercise of this right." In doing so, Congress may not restrict the right to initiative on
grounds that are not provided for in the Constitution. If for example the implementing law also provides that certain
provisions of the Constitution may not be amended through initiative, that prohibition should not be sustained.
Congress is tasked with the implementation, and not the restriction of the right to initiative.

The one-subject requirement under Section 10 is not provided for as a bar to amendment under the Constitution.
Arguments can be supplied for the merit of such a requirement, since it would afford a measure of orderliness when
the vital question of amending the Constitution arises. The one-subject requirement does allow the voters focus
when deliberating whether or not to vote for the amendments. These factors of desirability nonetheless fail to detract
from the fact that the one-subject requirement imposes an additional restriction on the right to initiative not
contemplated by the Constitution. Short of invalidating the requirement, a better course of action would be to insist
upon its liberal interpretation. After all, the Court has consistently adhered to a liberal interpretation of the one-
subject, one-title rule.22 There is no cause to adopt a stricter interpretative rule with regard to the one-subject rule
under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735.

IV.

During the hearing on the petitions, the argument was raised that provisions of the Constitution amended through
initiative would not have the benefit of a reference source from the record of a deliberative body such as Congress
or a constitutional convention. It was submitted that this consideration influenced the Constitutional Commission as
it drafted Section 2, Article XVII, which expressly provided that only amendments, and not revisions, may be the
subject of initiative petitions.

This argument clearly proceeds from a premise that accords supreme value to the record of deliberations of a
constitutional convention or commission in the interpretation of the charter. Yet if the absence of a record of
deliberations stands as so serious a flaw as to invalidate or constrict processes which change a constitution or its
provisions, then the entire initiative process authorized by the Constitution should be scarlet-marked as well.

Even if this position can be given any weight in the consideration of these petitions, I would like to point out that
resort to the records of deliberations is only one of many aids to constitutional construction. For one, it should be
abhorred if the provision under study is itself clear, plain, and free from ambiguity. As the Court held in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary:23

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be
had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution
when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of
the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk . . . We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face."24

Even if there is need to refer to extrinsic sources in aid of constitutional interpretation, the constitutional record does
not provide the exclusive or definitive answer on how to interpret the provision. The intent of a constitutional
convention is not controlling by itself, and while the historical discussion on the floor of the constitutional convention
is valuable, it is not necessarily decisive. The Court has even held in Vera v. Avelino25 that "the proceedings of the
[constitutional] convention are less conclusive of the proper construction of the fundamental law than are legislative
proceedings of the proper construction of a statute, since in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature that
courts seek, while in the former courts are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions
and deliberations of their representatives."26 The proper interpretation of a constitution depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than the framers' understanding thereof.27

If there is fear in the absence of a constitutional record as guide for interpretation of any amendments adopted via
initiative, such absence would not preclude the courts from interpreting such amendments in a manner consistent
with how courts generally construe the Constitution. For example, reliance will be placed on the other provisions of
the Constitution to arrive at a harmonized and holistic constitutional framework. The constitutional record is hardly
the Rosetta Stone that unlocks the meaning of the Constitution.

V.
I fully agree with Justice Puno that all issues relating to the sufficiency of the initiative petitions should be remanded
to the COMELEC. Rep. Act No. 6735 clearly reposes on the COMELEC the task of determining the sufficiency of
the petitions, including the ascertainment of whether twelve percent (12%) of all registered voters, including three
percent (3%) of registered voters in every legislative district have indeed signed the initiative petitions.28 It should be
remembered that the COMELEC had dismissed the initiative petitions outright, and had yet to undertake the
determination of sufficiency as required by law.

It has been suggested to the end of leading the Court to stifle the initiative petitions that the Court may at this
juncture pronounce the initiative petitions as insufficient. The derivation of the factual predicates leading to the
suggestion is uncertain, considering that the trier of facts, the COMELEC in this instance, has yet to undertake the
necessary determination. Still, the premise has been floated that petitioners have made sufficient admissions before
this Court that purportedly established the petitions are insufficient.

That premise is highly dubitable. Yet the more fundamental question that we should ask, I submit, is whether it
serves well on the Court to usurp trier of facts even before the latter exercises its functions? If the Court, at this
stage, were to declare the petitions as insufficient, it would be akin to the Court pronouncing an accused as guilty
even before the lower court trial had began.

Matugas v. COMELEC29 inveighs against the propriety of the Court uncharacteristically assuming the role of trier of
facts, and resolving factual questions not previously adjudicated by the lower courts or tribunals:

[P]etitioner in this case cannot "enervate" the COMELEC's findings by introducing new evidence before this
Court, which in any case is not a trier of facts, and then ask it to substitute its own judgment and
discretion for that of the COMELEC.

The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may not be raised for the first time on appeal, and
documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court will not be considered in disposing of the
issues of an action. This is true whether the decision elevated for review originated from a regular court or
an administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, and whether it was rendered in a civil case, a special
proceeding, or a criminal case. Piecemeal presentation of evidence is simply not in accord with orderly
justice.30

Any present determination by the Court on the sufficiency of the petitions constitutes in effect a trial de novo, the
Justices of the Supreme Court virtually descending to the level of trial court judges. This is an unbecoming recourse,
and it simply is not done.

VI.

The worst position this Court could find itself in is to acquiesce to a plea that it make the choice whether to amend
the Constitution or not. This is a matter which should not be left to fifteen magistrates who have not been elected by
the people to make the choice for them.

A vote to grant the petitions is not a vote to amend the 1987 Constitution. It is merely a vote to allow the people to
directly exercise that option. In fact, the position of Justice Puno which I share would not even guarantee that the
Lambino and Sigaw ng Bayan initiative petitions would be submitted to the people in a referendum. The COMELEC
will still have to determine the sufficiency of the petition. Among the questions which still have to be determined by
the poll body in considering the sufficiency of the petitions is whether twelve percent (12%) of all registered voters
nationwide, including three percent (3%) of registered voters in every legislative district, have indeed signed the
initiative petitions.31

And even should the COMELEC find the initiative petitions sufficient, the matter of whether the Constitution should
be amended would still depend on the choice of the electorate. The oppositors are clearly queasy about some of the
amendments proposed, or the imputed motives behind the amendments. A referendum, should the COMELEC find
the petitions as sufficient, would allow them to convey their uneasiness to the public at large, as well as for the
proponents of the amendment to defend their proposal. The campaign period alone would allow the public to be
involved in the significant deliberation on the course our nation should take, with the ensuing net benefit of a more
informed, more politically aware populace. And of course, the choice on whether the Constitution should be
amended would lie directly with the people. The initiative process involves participatory democracy at its most
elemental; wherein the consequential debate would not be confined to the august halls of Congress or the
hallowed chambers of this Court, as it would spill over to the public squares and town halls, the academic yards and
the Internet blogosphere, the dining areas in the homes of the affluent and the impoverished alike.

The prospect of informed and widespread discussion on constitutional change engaged in by a people who are
actually empowered in having a say whether these changes should be enacted, gives fruition to the original vision of
pure democracy, as formulated in Athens two and a half millennia ago. The great hero of Athenian democracy,
Pericles, was recorded as saying in his famed Funeral Oration, "We differ from other states in regarding the man
who keeps aloof from public life not as 'private' but as useless; we decide or debate, carefully and in person all
matters of policy, and we hold, not that words and deeds go ill together, but that acts are foredoomed to
failure when undertaken undiscussed."32

Unfortunately, given the highly politicized charge of the times, it has been peddled that an act or vote that assists the
initiative process is one for the willful extinction of democracy or democratic institutions. Such a consideration should
of course properly play its course in the public debates and deliberations attendant to the initiative process. Yet as a
result of the harum-scarum, the temptation lies heavy for a member of this Court perturbed with the prospect of
constitutional change to relieve those anxieties by simply voting to enjoin any legal procedure that initiates the
amendment or revision of the fundamental law, even at the expense of the people's will or what the Constitution
allows. A vote so oriented takes the conservative path of least resistance, even as it may gain the admiration of
those who do not want to see the Constitution amended.

Still, the biases we should enforce as magistrates are those of the Constitution and the elements of democracy on
which our rule of law is founded. Direct democracy, as embodied in the initiative process, is but a culmination of the
evolution over the centuries of democratic rights of choice and self-governance. The reemergence of the Athenian
democratic ideal after centuries of tyrannical rules arrived very slowly, the benefits parceled out at first only to
favored classes. The Magna Carta granted limited rights to self-determination and self-governance only to a few
English nobles; the American Constitution was originally intended to give a meaningful voice only to free men,
mostly Caucasian, who met the property-holding requirements set by the states for voting. Yet even the very idea of
popular voting, limited as it may have already been within the first few years of the American Union, met resistance
from no less a revered figure as Alexander Hamilton, to whom the progressive historian Howard Zinn attributes
these disconcerting words:

The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been
quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or
determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct permanent share in the government… Can a
democratic assembly who annually revolve in the mass of the people be supposed steadily to pursue the
public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check the imprudence of democracy…33

This utterly paternalistic and bigoted view has not survived into the present age of modern democracy where a
person's poverty, color, or gender no longer impedes the exercise of full democratic rights. Yet a democracy that
merely guarantees its citizens the right to live their lives freely is incomplete if there is no corresponding allowance
for a means by which the people have a direct choice in determining their country's direction. Initiative as a mode of
amending a constitution may seem incompatible with representative democracy, yet it embodies an even purer form
of democracy. Initiative, which our 1987 Constitution saw fit to grant to the people, is a progressive measure that is
but a continuation of the line of evolution of the democratic ideal.

By allowing the sovereign people to directly propose and enact constitutional amendments, the initiative process
should be acknowledged as the purest implement of democratic rule under law. This right granted to over sixty
million Filipinos cannot be denied by the votes of less than eight magistrates for reasons that bear no cogitation on
the Constitution.

I VOTE to GRANT the petitions.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G. R. No. 174153

RAUL LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent;
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL
RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND
GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE
VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA,
JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE
QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS
FORUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS, LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS,
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,
LUWALHATI ANTONINO, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL,
JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA,
JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and
PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU
CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANOTNIO L.
SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President,
MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,Oppositors-Intervenors;

G.R. No. 174299

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DISSENTING OPINION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

"The people made the constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the creature of their will, and lives only by
their will. But this supreme and irresistible power to make or unmake, resides only in the whole body of the people;
not in any subdivision of them."

-- Marshall, C.J., Cohens v. Virginia (1821, US) 6 Wheat 264, 389, 5 L ed. 257, 287.

I express my concurrence in the discussions and conclusions presented in the persuasive and erudite dissent of
Justice Reynato S. Puno. However, I make some additional observations in connection with my concurrence.

While it is but proper to accord great respect and reverence to the Philippine Constitution of 1987 for being the
supreme law of the land, we should not lose sight of the truth that there is an ultimate authority to which the
Constitution is also subordinate – the will of the people. No less than its very first paragraph, the
Preamble,1expressly recognizes that the Constitution came to be because it was ordained and promulgated by the
sovereign Filipino people. It is a principle reiterated yet again in Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution, which
explicitly declares that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and
all government authority emanates from them." Thus, the resolution of the issues and controversies raised by the
instant Petition should be guided accordingly by the foregoing principle.

If the Constitution is the expression of the will of the sovereign people, then, in the event that the people change
their will, so must the Constitution be revised or amended to reflect such change. Resultantly, the right to revise or
amend the Constitution inherently resides in the sovereign people whose will it is supposed to express and embody.
The Constitution itself, under Article XVII, provides for the means by which the revision or amendment of the
Constitution may be proposed and ratified.

Under Section 1 of the said Article, proposals to amend or revise the Constitution may be made (a) by Congress,
upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or (b) by constitutional convention. The Congress and the
constitutional convention possess the power to propose amendments to, or revisions of, the Constitution not simply
because the Constitution so provides, but because the sovereign people had chosen to delegate their inherent right
to make such proposals to their representatives either through Congress or through a constitutional convention.

On the other hand, the sovereign people, well-inspired and greatly empowered by the People Power Revolution of
1986, reserved to themselves the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, to wit –

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.2

The afore-quoted section does not confer on the Filipino people the right to amend the Constitution because, as
previously discussed, such right is inherent in them. The section only reduces into writing this right to initiate
amendments to the Constitution where they collectively and willfully agreed in the manner by which they shall
exercise this right: (a) through the filing of a petition; (b) supported by at least twelve percent (12%) of the total
number of registered voters nationwide; (c) with each legislative district represented by at least three percent (3%)
of the registered voters therein; (d) subject to the limitation that no such petition may be filed within five years after
the ratification of the Constitution, and not oftener than once every five years thereafter; and (e) a delegation to
Congress of the authority to provide the formal requirements and other details for the implementation of the right.

It is my earnest opinion that the right of the sovereign people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through initiative is more superior than the power they delegated to Congress or to a constitutional convention to
amend or revise the Constitution. The initiative process gives the sovereign people the voice to express their
collective will, and when the people speak, we must be ready to listen. Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution
recognizes and guarantees the sovereign people's right to initiative, rather than limits it. The enabling law which
Congress has been tasked to enact must give life to the said provision and make the exercise of the right to initiative
possible, not regulate, limit, or restrict it in any way that would render the people's option of resorting to initiative to
amend the Constitution more stringent, difficult, and less feasible, as compared to the other constitutional means to
amend or revise the Constitution. In fact, it is worth recalling that under Article VI, Section 1 of the
Constitution, the legislative power of Congress is limited to the extent reserved to the people by the
provisions on initiative and referendum.

It is with this frame of mind that I review the issues raised in the instant Petitions, and which has led me to the
conclusions, in support of the dissent of Justice Puno, that (a) The Commission on Election (COMELEC) had indeed
committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution filed
by herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado; (b) The Court should revisit the pronouncements it
made in Santiago v. Commission on Elections;3 (c) It is the sovereign people's inherent right to propose changes to
the Constitution, regardless of whether they constitute merely amendments or a total revision thereof; and (d) The
COMELEC should take cognizance of Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative and, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, determine the factual issues raised by the oppositors before this Court.

The COMELEC had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when it summarily dismissed Lambino and
Aumentado's petition for initiative entirely on the basis of the Santiago case which, allegedly, permanently enjoined
it from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative to amend the Constitution in the absence of a
sufficient law.

After a careful reading, however, of the Santiago case, I believe in earnest that the permanent injunction actually
issued by this Court against the COMELEC pertains only to the petition for initiative filed by Jesus S. Delfin, and not
to all subsequent petitions for initiative to amend the Constitution.

The Conclusion4 in the majority opinion in the Santiago case reads –

CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer
be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any
longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the
people under that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

It is clear from the fallo, as it is reproduced above, that the Court made permanent the Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) it issued on 18 December 1996 against the COMELEC. The said TRO enjoined the COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's
initiative.5 It was this restraining order, more particularly the portion thereof referring to the Delfin Petition, which was
expressly made permanent by the Court. It would seem to me that the COMELEC and all other oppositors to
Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative gave unwarranted significance and weight to the first paragraph of
the Conclusion in the Santiago case. The first and second paragraphs of the Conclusion, preceding the
dispositive portion, merely express the opinion of the ponente; while the definite orders of the Court for
implementation are found in the dispositive portion.

We have previously held that –

The dispositive portion or the fallo is what actually constitutes the resolution of the court and which is the
subject of execution, although the other parts of the decision may be resorted to in order to determine the
ratio decidendi for such a resolution. Where there is conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of
the court contained in the text of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the
dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. Hence
execution must conform more particularly to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the
decision.6

Is there a conflict between the first paragraph of the Conclusion and the dispositive portion of the Santiago case?
Apparently, there is. The first paragraph of the Conclusion states that the COMELEC should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until
the enactment of a valid law. On the other hand, the fallo only makes permanent the TRO7 against COMELEC
enjoining it from proceeding with the Delfin Petition. While the permanent injunction contemplated in the
Conclusion encompasses all petitions for initiative on amendments to the Constitution, the fallo is expressly limited
to the Delfin Petition. To resolve the conflict, the final order of the Court as it is stated in the dispositive portion or
the fallo should be controlling.
Neither can the COMELEC dismiss Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative on the basis of this Court's
Resolution, dated 23 September 1997, in the case of People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA) v. The Commission on Elections, et al.8 The Court therein found that the COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the PIRMA Petition for initiative to amend the Constitution for it only complied with
the Decision in the Santiago case.

It is only proper that the Santiago case should also bar the PIRMA Petition on the basis of res judicata because
PIRMA participated in the proceedings of the said case, and had knowledge of and, thus, must be bound by the
judgment of the Court therein. As explained by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his separate opinion to
the Resolution in the PIRMA case –

First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed here and in Santiago v.
COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of the fact that the former is
substantially identical to the latter, except for the reversal of the roles played by the principal parties and
inclusion of additional, yet not indispensable, parties in the present petition. But plainly, the same issues and
reliefs are raised and prayed for in both cases.

The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM, MODERNIZATION, AND
ACTION (PIRMA) and Spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described
as "a non-stock, non-profit organization duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with office
address at Suite 403, Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City," with "ALBERTO
PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA" as among its "officers." In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made
respondents as founding members of PIRMA which, as alleged in the body of the petition therein, "proposes
to undertake the signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." In Santiago then, the
PEDROSAS were sued in their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.

The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly represented at the hearing of the Delfin
petition in the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner therein. Delfin alleged in his petition
that he was a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the
decision, it was noted that said movement was "[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity." In their Comment to the petition in Santiago, the
PEDROSA'S did not deny that they were founding members of PIRMA, and by their arguments,
demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they had joined Delfin or his cause.

No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the PEDROSAS, as well as the
others joining them, from the operation of the principle of res judicata, which needs no further elaboration.9

While the Santiago case bars the PIRMA case because of res judicata, the same cannot be said to the Petition at
bar. Res judicata is an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the same cause; and its requisites are: (a) the former
judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be one on the merits; (c) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between the first
and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.10

Even though it is conceded that the first three requisites are present herein, the last has not been complied with.
Undoubtedly, the Santiago case and the present Petition involve different parties, subject matter, and causes of
action, and the former should not bar the latter.

In the Santiago case, the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution was filed by Delfin alone. His petition does
not qualify as the initiatory pleading over which the COMELEC can acquire jurisdiction, being unsupported by the
required number of registered voters, and actually imposing upon the COMELEC the task of gathering the voters'
signatures. In the case before us, the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution was filed by Lambino and
Aumentado, on behalf of the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures on the signature sheets
attached thereto. Their petition prays that the COMELEC issue an Order –

1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;

2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and
local circulation; and

3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after the Certification by the
COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the
proposition.

Although both cases involve the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution, the personalities
concerned and the other factual circumstances attendant in the two cases differ. Also dissimilar are the particular
prayer and reliefs sought by the parties from the COMELEC, as well as from this Court. For these reasons, I find
that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it summarily dismissed the petition for initiative filed
by Lambino and Aumentado. It behooves the COMELEC to accord due course to a petition which on its face
complies with the rudiments of the law. COMELEC was openly negligent in summarily dismissing the Lambino and
Aumentado petition. The haste by which the instant Petition was struck down is characteristic of bad faith, which, to
my mind, is a patent and gross evasion of COMELEC's positive duty. It has so obviously copped out of its duty and
responsibility to determine the sufficiency thereof and sought protection and justification for its craven decision in the
supposed permanent injunction issued against it by the Court in the Santiago case. The COMELEC had seemingly
expanded the scope and application of the said permanent injunction, reading into it more than what it actually
states, which is surprising, considering that the Chairman and majority of the members of COMELEC are lawyers
who should be able to understand and appreciate, more than a lay person, the legal consequences and intricacies
of the pronouncements made by the Court in the Santiago case and the permanent injunction issued therein.

No less than the Constitution itself, under the second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4, imposes upon the
COMELEC the mandate to set a date for plebiscite after a positive determination of the sufficiency of a petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, viz –

SEC. 4. x x x

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by
the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.

As a rule, the word "shall" commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion,
and that the presumption is that the word "shall" when used, is mandatory.11 Under the above-quoted constitutional
provision, it is the mandatory or imperative obligation of the COMELEC to (a) determine the sufficiency of the
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution and issue a certification on its findings; and (b) in case such
petition is found to be sufficient, to set the date for the plebiscite on the proposed amendments not earlier than 60
days nor later than 90 days after its certification. The COMELEC should not be allowed to shun its constitutional
mandate under the second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4, through the summary dismissal of the petition for
initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado, when such petition is supported by 6.3 million signatures of registered
voters. Should all of these signatures be authentic and representative of the required percentages of registered
voters for every legislative district and the whole nation, then the initiative is a true and legitimate expression of the
will of the people to amend the Constitution, and COMELEC had caused them grave injustice by silencing their
voice based on a patently inapplicable permanent injunction.

II

We should likewise take the opportunity to revisit the pronouncements made by the Court in its Decision in
the Santiago case, especially as regards the supposed insufficiency or inadequacy of Republic Act No. 6735 as the
enabling law for the implementation of the people's right to initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

The declaration of the Court that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient or inadequate actually gave rise to more
questions rather than answers, due to the fact that there has never been a judicial precedent wherein the Court
invalidated a law for insufficiency or inadequacy. The confusion over such a declaration thereby impelled former
Chief Justice Davide, Jr., the ponente in the Santiago case, to provide the following clarification in his separate
opinion to the Resolution in the PIRMA case, thus –

Simply put, Santiago did, in reality, declare as unconstitutional that portion of R.A. No. 6735 relating to
Constitutional initiatives for failure to comply with the "completeness and sufficient standard tests" with
respect to permissible delegation of legislative power or subordinate legislation. However petitioners attempt
to twist the language in Santiago, the conclusion is inevitable; the portion of R.A. No. 6735 was held to be
unconstitutional.

It is important to note, however, that while the Decision in the Santiago case pronounced repeatedly that Republic
Act No. 6735 was insufficient and inadequate, there is no categorical declaration therein that the said statute was
unconstitutional. The express finding that Republic Act No. 6735 is unconstitutional can only be found in the
separate opinion of former Chief Justice Davide to the Resolution in the PIRMA case, which was not concurred in by
the other members of the Court.

Even assuming arguendo that the declaration in the Santiago case, that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient and
inadequate, is already tantamount to a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional, it was rendered in violation of
established rules in statutory construction, which state that –

[A]ll presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union, 59 SCRA 54 [19741). In fact, this Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of
the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be lis mota presented (Tropical Homes v. National Housing
Authority, 152 SCRA 540 [1987]).

First, the Court, in the Santiago case, could have very well avoided the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No.
6735 by ordering the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition for the simple reason that it does not constitute an
initiatory pleading over which the COMELEC could acquire jurisdiction. And second, the unconstitutionality of
Republic Act No. 6735 has not been adequately shown. It was by and large merely inferred or deduced from the
way Republic Act No. 6735 was worded and the provisions thereof arranged and organized by Congress. The
dissenting opinions rendered by several Justices in the Santiago case reveal the other side to the argument,
adopting the more liberal interpretation that would allow the Court to sustain the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
6735. It would seem that the majority in the Santiago case failed to heed the rule that all presumptions should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the statute.

The Court, acting en banc on the Petition at bar, can revisit its Decision in the Santiago case and again open to
judicial review the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735; in which case, I shall cast my vote in favor of its
constitutionality, having satisfied the completeness and sufficiency of standards tests for the valid delegation of
legislative power. I fully agree in the conclusion made by Justice Puno on this matter in his dissenting opinion12 in
the Santiago case, that reads –

R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC in promulgating the
law's implementing rules and regulations of the law. As aforestated, Section 2 spells out the policy of the
law; viz: "The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No. 6735 are the standards to canalize the delegated power to the
COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing. Thus, the law states the number of
signatures necessary to start a people's initiative, directs how initiative proceeding is commenced, what the
COMELEC should do upon filing of the petition for initiative, how a proposition is approved, when a
plebiscite may be held, when the amendment takes effect, and what matters may not be the subject of any
initiative. By any measure, these standards are adequate.

III

The dissent of Justice Puno has already a well-presented discourse on the difference between an "amendment" and
a "revision" of the Constitution. Allow me also to articulate my additional thoughts on the matter.

Oppositors to Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative argue that the proposed changes therein to the
provisions of the Constitution already amount to a revision thereof, which is not allowed to be done through people's
initiative; Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution on people's initiative refers only to proposals for amendments to
the Constitution. They assert the traditional distinction between an amendment and a revision, with amendment
referring to isolated or piecemeal change only, while revision as a revamp or rewriting of the whole instrument.13

However, as pointed out by Justice Puno in his dissent, there is no quantitative or qualitative test that can establish
with definiteness the distinction between an amendment and a revision, or between a substantial and simple change
of the Constitution.

The changes proposed to the Constitution by Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative basically affect only
Article VI on the Legislative Department and Article VII on the Executive Department. While the proposed changes
will drastically alter the constitution of our government by vesting both legislative and executive powers in a
unicameral Parliament, with the President as the Head of State and the Prime Minister exercising the executive
power; they would not essentially affect the other 16 Articles of the Constitution. The 100 or so changes counted by
the oppositors to the other provisions of the Constitution are constituted mostly of the nominal substitution of one
word for the other, such as Parliament for Congress, or Prime Minister for President. As eloquently pointed out in
the dissent of Justice Puno, the changes proposed to transform our form of government from bicameral-presidential
to unicameral-parliamentary, would not affect the fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and republican
state. It will still be a representative government where officials continue to be accountable to the people and the
people maintain control over the government through the election of members of the Parliament.

Furthermore, should the people themselves wish to change a substantial portion or even the whole of the
Constitution, what or who is to stop them? Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution which, by the way it is worded,
refers only to their right to initiative on amendments of the Constitution? The delegates to the Constitutional
Convention who, according to their deliberations, purposely limited Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution to
amendments? This Court which has the jurisdiction to interpret the provision? Bearing in mind my earlier declaration
that the will of the sovereign people is supreme, there is nothing or no one that can preclude them from initiating
changes to the Constitution if they choose to do so. To reiterate, the Constitution is supposed to be the expression
and embodiment of the people's will, and should the people's will clamor for a revision of the Constitution, it is their
will which should prevail. Even the fact that the people ratified the 1987 Constitution, including Article XVII, Section 2
thereof, as it is worded, should not prevent the exercise by the sovereign people of their inherent right to change the
Constitution, even if such change would be tantamount to a substantial amendment or revision thereof, for their
actual exercise of the said right should be a clear renunciation of the limitation which the said provision imposes
upon it. It is the inherent right of the people as sovereign to change the Constitution, regardless of the extent
thereof.

IV

Lastly, I fail to see the injustice in allowing the COMELEC to give due course to and take cognizance of Lambino
and Aumentado's petition for initiative to amend the Constitution. I reiterate that it would be a greater evil if one such
petition which is ostensibly supported by the required number of registered voters all over the country, be summarily
dismissed.

Giving due course and taking cognizance of the petition would not necessarily mean that the same would be found
sufficient and set for plebiscite. The COMELEC still faces the task of reviewing the petition to determine whether it
complies with the requirements for a valid exercise of the right to initiative. Questions raised by the oppositors to the
petition, such as those on the authenticity of the registered voters' signatures or compliance with the requisite
number of registered voters for every legislative district, are already factual in nature and require the reception and
evaluation of evidence of the parties. Such questions are best presented and resolved before the COMELEC since
this Court is not a trier of facts.

In view of the foregoing, I am of the position that the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 31 August 2006 denying
due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado be reversed and set aside for having been
issued in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and that the Petition be remanded to the
COMELEC for further proceedings.

In short, I vote to GRANT the petition for Initiative of Lambino and Aumentado.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, JR., and
Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE
V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

SEPARATE OPINION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Introduction

The fate of every democracy, of every government based on the Sovereignty of the people,
depends on the choices it makes between these opposite principles: absolute power on the
one hand, and on the other the restraints of legality and the authority of tradition.
—John Acton

In this thorny matter of the people's initiative, I concur with the erudite and highly persuasive opinion of Justice
Reynato S. Puno upholding the people's initiative and raise some points of my own.

The issue of the people's power to propose amendments to the Constitution was once discussed in the landmark
case of Santiago v. COMELEC.1 Almost a decade later, the issue is once again before the Court, and I firmly believe
it is time to reevaluate the pronouncements made in that case.

The issue of Charter Change is one that has sharply divided the nation, and its proponents and opponents will
understandably take all measures to advance their position and defeat that of their opponents. The wisdom or folly
of Charter Change does not concern the Court. The only thing that the Court must review is the validity of the
present step taken by the proponents of Charter Change, which is the People's Initiative, as set down in Article XVII,
Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution:

Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment
under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

In the Santiago case, the Court discussed whether the second paragraph of that section had been fulfilled. It
determined that Congress had not provided for the implementation of the exercise of the people's initiative, when it
held that Republic Act No. 6735, or "The Initiative and Referendum Act," was "inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation."2

With all due respect to those Justices who made that declaration, I must disagree.

Republic Act No. 6735 is the proper law for proposing constitutional amendments and it should not have
been considered inadequate.

The decision in Santiago focused on what it perceived to be fatal flaws in the drafting of the law, in the failings of the
way the law was structured, to come to the conclusion that the law was inadequate. The Court itself recognized the
legislators' intent, but disregarded this intent. The law was found wanting. The Court then saw the inclusion of the
Constitution in RA 6735 as an afterthought. However, it was included, and it should not be excluded by the Court via
a strained analysis of the law. The difficult construction of the law should not serve to frustrate the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution: to give the people the power to propose amendments as they saw fit. It is a basic
precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a
statute.3 The intent of the legislature was clear, and yet RA 6735 was declared inadequate. It was not specifically
struck down or declared unconstitutional, merely incomplete. The Court focused on what RA 6735 was not, and lost
sight of what RA 6735 was.

It is my view that the reading of RA 6735 in Santiago should have been more flexible. It is also a basic precept of
statutory construction that statutes should be construed not so much according to the letter that killeth but in line
with the purpose for which they have been enacted.4 The reading of the law should not have been with the view of
its defeat, but with the goal of upholding it, especially with its avowed noble purpose.

Congress has done its part in empowering the people themselves to propose amendments to the Constitution, in
accordance with the Constitution itself. It should not be the Supreme Court that stifles the people, and lets their cries
for change go unheard, especially when the Constitution itself grants them that power.

The court's ruling in the Santiago case does not bar the present petition because the fallo in the Santiago
case is limited to the Delfin petition.

The Santiago case involved a petition for prohibition filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago, et al., against the
COMELEC, et al., which sought to prevent the COMELEC from entertaining the "Petition to Amend the Constitution,
to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" filed by Atty. Jesus Delfin. In the body of the judgment,
the Court made the following conclusion, viz:

This petition must then be granted and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition or initiative on amendments on the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system (emphasis supplied).

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer
be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any
longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the
people under that system.

In the said case, the Court's fallo states as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R. A. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.

The question now is if the ruling in Santiago is decisive in this case. It is elementary that when there is conflict
between the dispositive portion or fallo of the decision and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of
the judgment, the former prevails over the latter. An order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body,
of the decision.5 The dispositive portion is its decisive resolution; thus, it is the subject of execution. The other parts
of the decision may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi for the disposition. Where there is
conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the
decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order,
while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. Hence, the execution must conform with that which is
ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.6

A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is an informal expression of the views of the court and
cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion
forms no part of the judgment. So there is a distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its
Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the
judgment itself. It is not infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially
those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions lapses, findings, loose
statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and
considered result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision.7
Applying the foregoing argument to the Santiago case, it immediately becomes apparent that the disposition in the
latter case categorically made permanent the December 18, 1996 Temporary Restraining Order issued against the
COMELEC in the Delfin petition but did NOT formally incorporate therein any directive PERMANENTLY enjoining
the COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments." Undeniably, the
perpetual proscription against the COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction over any other petition on Charter Change
through a People's Initiative is just a conclusion and cannot bind the poll body, for such unending ban would trench
on its constitutional power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall under Section 2, Article IX of the Constitution. RA 6735 gave the
COMELEC the jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the petition on the initiative under Section 8, Rule 11 and
the form of the petition under Section 3, Rule I; hence, it cannot be barred from entertaining any such petition.

In sum, the COMELEC still retains its jurisdiction to take cognizance of any petition on initiative under RA 6735 and
it can rule on the petition and its action can only be passed upon by the Court when the same is elevated through a
petition for certiorari. COMELEC cannot be barred from acting on said petitions since jurisdiction is conferred by law
(RA 6735) and said law has not been declared unconstitutional and hence still valid though considered inadequate
in the Santiago case.

Respondents, however, claim that the Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA v. Commission on
Elections8confirmed the statement of the Court in the Santiago case that the COMELEC was "permanently enjoined
from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments." Much reliance is placed on the
ruling contained in a Minute Resolution which reads:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of Discretion could be attributed to the
public respondent COMELEC in Dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
Complied with the DISPOSITIONS in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March
19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.

Take note that the Court specifically referred to "dispositions" in the March 19, 1997 Decision. To reiterate, the
dispositions in the Santiago case decision refer specifically to the December 18, 1996 TRO being made permanent
against the COMELEC but do not pertain to a permanent injunction against any other petition for initiative on
amendment. Thus, what was confirmed or even affirmed in the Minute Resolution in the PIRMA case pertains solely
to the December 18, 1996 TRO which became permanent, the declaration of the inadequacy of RA 6735, and the
annulment of certain parts of Resolution No. 2300 but certainly not the alleged perpetual injunction against the
initiative petition. Thus, the resolution in the PIRMA case cannot be considered res judicata to the Lambino petition.

Amendment or Revision

One last matter to be considered is whether the petition may be allowed under RA 6735, since only amendments to
the Constitution may be the subject of a people's initiative.

The Lambino petition cannot be considered an act of revising the Constitution; it is merely an attempt to amend it.
The term amendment has to be liberally construed so as to effectuate the people's efforts to amend the Constitution.

As an eminent constitutionalist, Dean Vicente G. Sinco,9 explained:

Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire
document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or
perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that
characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That
intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine
which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an
entirely new one.

The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions.
The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of
considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to
add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that
seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.

In this case, the Lambino petition is not concerned with rewriting the entire Constitution. It was never its intention to
revise the whole Constitution. It merely concerns itself with amending a few provisions in our fundamental charter.

When there are gray areas in legislation, especially in matters that pertain to the sovereign people's political rights,
courts must lean more towards a more liberal interpretation favoring the people's right to exercise their sovereign
power.

Conclusion

Sovereignty residing in the people is the highest form of sovereignty and thus deserves the highest respect even
from the courts. It is not something that can be overruled, set aside, ignored or stomped over by whatever amount of
technicalities, blurred or vague provisions of the law.

As I find RA 6735 to be adequate as the implementing law for the People's Initiative, I vote to grant the petition in
G.R. No. 174153 and dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 174299. The Amended Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners
Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado should be remanded to the COMELEC for determination whether or not
the petition is sufficient under RA 6735, and if the petition is sufficient, to schedule and hold the necessary plebiscite
as required by RA 6735.

It is time to let the people's voice be heard once again as it was twenty years ago. And should this voice demand a
change in the Constitution, the Supreme Court should not be one to stand in its way.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 Including Sigaw ng Bayan and Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP).

2 This provision states: "Requirements. — x x x x

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the
total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised
only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years
thereafter.

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed,
as the case may be;

c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
printed at the top of every page of the petition."

3
This provision states: "Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis
of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election."

4 Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI will be changed thus:

Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall
be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces,
representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least
three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each
district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province
must have at least one member.

(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years
old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected
by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof,
except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be
equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.

5 Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article VII will be changed thus:

Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a
Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the
Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of
government.

6 Sections 1-5 of the Transitory Provisions read:

Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on
the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless
impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.

(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent President, the
incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or
removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall
assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.
 Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception
of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and
Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress",
"Senate", "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that
any and all references therein to "Member[s] of Congress", "Senator[s]" or "Member[s] of the House of
Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member[s] of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister".

Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception
of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8,
9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in
which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of
government; provided however that any and all references therein to "Congress", "Senate", "House of
Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all
references therein to "Member[s] of Congress", "Senator[s]" or "Member[s] of the House of Representatives"
shall be changed to read as "Member[s] of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and or
"Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister".

Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall
continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It
shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the
incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.

(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth
day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially
convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime
Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim
Parliament from among themselves.

(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.

Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the
members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the
members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such
powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President.

(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be
synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. Thereafter, the Vice
President, as Member of Parliament, shall immediately convene the Parliament and shall initially preside
over its session for the purpose of electing the Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of all

its members, from among themselves. The duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and
perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of
incumbent President and Vice President.

7As revised, Article XVIII contained a new paragraph in Section 4 (paragraph 3) and a modified paragraph 2,
Section 5, thus:

Section 4. x x x x

(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day
of June 2010.

xxxx

Section 5. x x x x

(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be
synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. The duly elected
Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim
Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.

8 336 Phil. 848 (1997); Resolution dated 10 June 1997.

9 The COMELEC held:

We agree with the Petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional duty to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as in this case, initiative.
 This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution particularly on
initiative.

Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative,
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

The afore-quoted provision of the Constitution being a non self-executory provision needed an enabling law
for its implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the constitutional right of the people under a system
of initiative to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolution, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735.

However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago vs. Commission on Elections struck down
the said law for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.

The Supreme Court likewise declared that this Commission should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per
centumof the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot be given due course since the Supreme
Court categorically declared R.A. No. 6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution.

This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of the right of the people under a system
of initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the pronouncement of the High Court that in the
absence of a valid enabling law, this right of the people remains nothing but an "empty right", and that this
Commission is permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.

Considering the foregoing, We are therefore constrained not to entertain or give due course to the instant
Petition.

10Arturo M. De Castro; Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya; Philippine Transport and General
Workers Organization (PTGWO); Trade Union Congress of the Philippines; Sulong Bayan Movement Foundation,
Inc.

11Onevoice Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V.
Ople and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc.; Atty. Pete Quirino Quadra; Bayan, Bayan Muna,
Kilusang Mayo Uno, Head, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan,
League of Filipino Students, Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, Dr. Reginald Pamugas; Loretta Ann P. Rosales, and
Mario Joyo Aguja, Ana Theresa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Luwalhati Ricasa Antonino; Philippine Constitution
Association (PHILCONSA), Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M. Bacungan, Joaquin
T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P. Aguas, and Amado Gat Inciong; Senate of the Philippines; Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron
D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador and Randall C. Tabayoyong, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Cebu City and Cebu Province Chapters; Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators
Sergio R. Osmeňa III, Jamby Madrigal, Jinggoy Estrada, Alfredo S. Lim and Panfilo Lacson; Joseph Ejercito Estrada
and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino.

12 This provision states: "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment
under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than
once every five years."

13 I RECORD, 387-388.

14During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento made the following
report (I RECORD 389):

MR. SARMIENTO: Madam President, I am happy that the Committee on Amendments and Transitory
Provisions decided to retain the system of initiative as a mode of amending the Constitution. I made a
survey of American constitutions and I discovered that 13 States provide for a system of initiative as a mode
of amending the Constitution — Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma and Oregon. The initiative for ordinary laws
only is used in Idaho, Maine, Montana and South Dakota. So, I am happy that this was accepted or retained
by the Committee.
 xxxx

The Americans in turn copied the concept of initiatives from the Swiss beginning in 1898 when South Dakota
adopted the initiative in its constitution. The Swiss cantons experimented with initiatives in the 1830s. In
1891, the Swiss incorporated the initiative as a mode of amending their national constitution. Initiatives
promote "direct democracy" by allowing the people to directly propose amendments to the constitution. In
contrast, the traditional mode of changing the constitution is known as "indirect democracy" because the
amendments are referred to the voters by the legislature or the constitutional convention.

15Florida requires only that the title and summary of the proposed amendment are "printed in clear and
unambiguous language." Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General RE Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care
Providers, No. 90160, 22 January 1998, Supreme Court of Florida.

16State ex. rel Patton v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E. 872 (1933); Whitman v. Moore, 59 Ariz. 211, 125 P.2d
445 (1942); Heidtman v. City of Shaker Heights, 99 Ohio App. 415, 119 N.E. 2d 644 (1954); Christen v. Baker, 138
Colo. 27, 328 P.2d 951 (1958); Stop the Pay Hike Committee v. Town Council of Town of Irvington, 166 N.J. Super.
197, 399 A.2d 336 (1979); State ex rel Evans v. Blackwell, Slip copy, 2006 WL 1102804 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.), 2006-
Ohio-2076.

17 407 Mass. 949, 955 (1990). Affirmed by the District Court of Massachusetts in Henry v. Conolly, 743 F. Supp. 922
(1990) and by the Court of Appeals, First Circuit, in Henry v. Conolly, 9109 F. 2d. 1000 (1990), and cited in Marino
v. Town Council of Southbridge, 13 Mass.L.Rptr. 14 (2001).

18 89 P.3d 1227, 1235 (2004).

19 Stumpf v. Law, 839 P. 2d 120, 124 (1992).

20 Exhibit "B" of the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006.

21 Annex "B" of the Comment/Opposition in Intervention of Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra filed on 7 September 2006.

22 www.ulap.gov.ph.

23 www.ulap.gov.ph/reso2006-02.html.

The full text of the proposals of the Consultative Commission on Charter Change can be downloaded at its official
24

website at www.concom.ph.

25
The Lambino Group's Memorandum, p. 5.

26Under the proposed Section 1(2), Article VI of the Constitution, members of Parliament shall be elected for a term
of five years "without limitation as to the number thereof."

27Under the proposed Section 4(1), Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, the interim Parliament
"shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified." Also,
under the proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII, of the same Transitory Provisions, the interim Parliament "shall
provide for the election of the members of Parliament."

28Under the proposed Section 4(3), Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, the interim Parliament,
within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, "shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of,
this Constitution."

29 448 So.2d 984, 994 (1984), internal citations omitted.

30 698 P.2d 1173, 1184 (1985).

31 I RECORD 386, 392, 402-403.

32 196 P.2d 787, 790 (1948). See also Lowe v. Keisling, 130 Or.App. 1, 882 P.2d 91 (1994).

33 392 P.2d 636, 638 (1964).

34 930 P.2d 186, 196 (1996), internal citations omitted.

35 Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 118-119 (1894).

36 Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286 (1978).

37 Id.

38 Legislature of the State of California v. EU, 54 Cal.3d 492, 509 (1991).

39 California Association of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 109 Cal.App.4th 792, 836 (2003).
40 See note 44, infra.

41 Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p. 1294 (2003).

42 238 So.2d 824 (1970).

43 Id. at 830-832.

44 As stated by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. during the 26 September 2006 oral arguments.

45Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10 November 2003, 415 SCRA 44; J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 142 Phil. 393 (1970); Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil.
259 (1938).

46882 P.2d 91, 96-97 (1994). On the merits, the Court in Lowe v. Keisling found the amendment in question was not
a revision.

47 Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

48 Section 11(1), Article XVI of the Constitution.

49
Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution.

50This section provides: "The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them."

51 Spouses Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 760 (2001); Intia Jr. v. COA, 366 Phil. 273 (1999).

52 G.R. No. 129754, Resolution dated 23 September 1997.

Presidential Proclamation No. 58 dated February 11, 1987, entitled "Proclaiming the Ratification of the
53

Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines Adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986, including the
Ordinance Appended thereto."

PANGANIBAN, CJ.:

1 Chief Justice McLachlin spoke on "Liberty, Prosperity and the Rule of Law" in her speech before the Global Forum
on Liberty and Prosperity held on October 18-20, 2006 in Manila. She further stated: "Without the rule of law,
government officials are not bound by standards of conduct. Without the rule of law, the dignity and equality of all
people is not affirmed and their ability to seek redress for grievances and societal commitments is limited. Without
the rule of law, we have no means of ensuring meaningful participation by people in formulating and enacting the
norms and standards which organize the kinds of societies in which we want to live."

2 GR No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 336 Phil. 848. For ease of reference, my Separate Opinion is reproduced in full:

"Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:

'(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the 'initiatory'
Delfin Petition.

'(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to 'be directly proposed by the people through initiative,' there
is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is 'incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms
and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.'

'(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2300, 'insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution, is void.'

"I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of
signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every
legislative district — no public funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an
initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such
signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majority's two other rulings. Let me explain.

"Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's majority, the Constitution cannot be amended
at all through a people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by PIRMA, not by anyone, not even by all the voters of
the country acting together. This decision will effectively but unnecessarily curtail, nullify, abrogate and
render inutile the people's right to change the basic law. At the very least, the majority holds the right
hostage to congressional discretion on whether to pass a new law to implement it, when there is already one
existing at present. This right to amend through initiative, it bears stressing, is guaranteed by Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution, as follows:

their final weapons against political excesses, opportunism, inaction, oppression and misgovernance; as
well as their reserved instruments to exact transparency, accountability and faithfulness from their chosen
 leaders. While on the one hand, their misuse and abuse must be resolutely struck down, on the other, their
legitimate exercise should be carefully nurtured and zealously protected.

"WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago et al. and to DIRECT Respondent
Commission on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of prematurity, but not on the other
grounds relied upon by the majority. I also vote to LIFT the temporary restraining order issued on 18
December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa from exercising
their right to free speech in proposing amendments to the Constitution."

3GR No. 129754, September 23, 1997 (still unpublished in the Philippine Reports or in the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated). Again, for ease of reference, I reproduce my Separate Opinion in full:

"Petitioners assail the July 8, 1997 Resolution of Respondent Commission dismissing their petition for a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Said petition before the Comelec (henceforth, PIRMA petition)
was backed up by nearly six (6) million signatures constituting about 16% of the registered voters of the
country with at least 3% in each legislative district. The petition now before us presents two grounds:

"1. In refusing to act on the PIRMA petition, the Comelec allegedly acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

"2. In declaring R.A. 6735 "inadequate to cover its system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution"
and "declaring void those parts of Resolution 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of [an] initiative [on] amendments to the Constitution," the Supreme Court's
Decision in G.R. No. 127325 entitled Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Commission on Elections (hereafter
referred to as Santiago) should be reexamined because said Decision is allegedly "unconstitutional," and
because, in any event, the Supreme Court itself, in reconsidering the said issue per its June 10, 1997
Resolution, was deadlocked at six votes one each side.

"The following in my position on each of these two issues:

First Issue:

No Grave Abuse of Discretion in Comelec's Refusal to Act

"The Respondent Commission's refusal to act on the "prayers" of the PIRMA petition cannot in any wise be
branded as "grave abuse of discretion." Be it remembered that the Court's Decision in Santiago permanently
enjoined the Comelec "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to
the

4 Republic v. COCOFED, 423 Phil. 735, December 14, 2001.

5Well-entrenched is this definition of grave abuse of discretion. Id.; Benito v. Comelec, 349 SCRA 705, January 19,
2001; Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona Jr., 359 Phil. 276, November 18, 1998; and Philippine Airlines, Inc. v.
Confesor, 231 SCRA 41, March 10, 1994.

6In PIRMA, I submitted as follows: "I believed, and still do, that the majority gravely erred in rendering such a
sweeping injunction [that covered ANY petition, not just the Delfin petition], but I cannot fault the Comelec for
complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec was
directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave
abuse of discretion. Regusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other
mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of
discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies."

742 Am. Jr. 2d, §26, citing Birmingham Gas Co. v. Bessemer; 250 Ala 137, 33 So 2d 475, 250 Ala 137; Tacker v.
Board of Comrs., 127 Fla 248, 170 So 458; Hoxie V. Scott, 45 Neb 199, 63 NW 387; Gill v. Board of Comrs., 160
NC 176, 76, SE 204.

8 Partido ng Manggagawa v. Comelec, GR No. 164702, March 15, 2006.

9 Article XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)

"SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon the vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

"SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people though initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
 "SEC. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by
a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.

"SEC. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later
than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

"Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by
the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition."

10 Republic Act 6735, Sec. 10, provides:

"SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures. – The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:

(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and

(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in
Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its
effectivity."

11The principle of separation of powers operates at the core of a presidential form of government. Thus, legislative
power is given to the legislature; executive power, to a separate executive (from whose prominent position in the
system, the presidential nomenclature is derived); and judicial power, to an independent judiciary. This system
embodies interdependence by separation.

On the other hand, a parliamentary system personifies interdependence by integration, its essential features being
the following: "(1) The members of the government or cabinet or the executive arm are, as a rule, simultaneously
members of the legislature. (2) The government or cabinet, consisting of the political leaders of the majority party or
of a coalition who are also members of the legislative, is in effect a committee of the legislature. (3) The government
or cabinet has a pyramidal structure, at the apex of which is the Prime Minister or his equivalent. (4) The
government or cabinet remains in power only for as long as it enjoys the support of the majority of the legislature. (5)
Both government and legislature are possessed of control devices with which each can demand of the other
immediate political responsibility." These control devices are a vote of no-confidence (censure), whereby the
government may be ousted by the legislature; and the power of the government to dissolve the legislature and call
for new elections. (J. BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES A
COMMENTARY, Vol. II, 17-18 (1988 ed.).

With respect to the transformation from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, the change involves the form of
representation and the lawmaking process.

12Attached to the Opposition-in-Intervention of Intervenors OneVoice Inc., etc., is a photocopy of the Certification
dated August 23, 2006, issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo, the election officer for the 3rd District and the officer-in-
charge for the 1st and the 2nd Districts of Davao City. The Certification states that "this office (First, Second and Third
District, Davao City) has not verified the signatures of registered voters x x x."

13 In People v. Veneracion, the Court held: "Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice.
If judges, under the guide of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within
which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government
of laws, not of men, excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under
this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought 'to protect and enforce it without fear or favor,' resist
encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs." (249 SCRA
244, October 13, 1995, per Kapunan, J.)

14An American professor on legal philosophy, A. Altman, puts it thus: "By ratifying the constitution that included an
explicit amendment process, the sovereign people committed themselves to following the rule of law, even when
they wished to make changes in the basic system of government." A. ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT LAW 94 (2001).

15 See my Separate Opinion in Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 45, November 10, 2003.

16See, for instance, the front page Malaya report entitled "Lobbyists soil dignity of Supreme Court" (October 23,
2006).

17 Lk 8:17.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

1 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

2 SEC. 5. Requirements.— x x x

(c) The petition shall state the following:

 c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed,
as the case may be;

c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefore;

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6. an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.

3 SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.— For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean: x x x

(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.

4 I Record, Constitutional Commission 387-389 (July 9, 1986).

5 Community Gas and Service Company, Inc. v. Walbaum, 404 P.2d 1014, 1965 OK 118 (1965).

6 Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.

7The late Senator (then Congressman) Raul S. Roco stated this fact in his sponsorship presentation of H.B. No.
21505, thus:

xxxx

D. Prohibited Subjects.

The bill provides for two kinds of measures which cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum
petition. A petition that embraces more than one subject cannot be submitted to the electorate as it would be
violative of the constitutional proscription on passing bills containing more than one subject, and statutes
involving emergency measures cannot be subject to referendum until 90 days after its effectivity. [Journal
and record of the house of representatives, Second Regular Session, Vol. 6, p. 975 (February 14, 1989).]

8 Memorandum of petitioner Aumentado, p. 117.

9The proposed Section 4(3) of Article XVIII of the Constitution states that Senators whose term of office ends in
2010 shall be members of parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. No counterpart provision was
provided for members of the House of Representatives who, as members of the interim parliament under the
proposed changes, shall schedule the elections for the regular parliament in its discretion.

10The proposed Section 4(3), Article XVIII of the Constitution states that the interim parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes.

11 The United Kingdom, for instance, has a two-house parliament, the House of Lords and the House of Commons.

Philippine Political Law [1954 ed.], Vicente G. Sinco, pp. 43-44, quoted in Separate Opinion of J. Hilario G.
12

Davide, Jr. in PIRMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997, p. 7.

13 151-A Phil. 35 (1973).

14 196 P. 2d 787 (Cal. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).

15 801 P. 2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).

16 583 P. 2d 1281 (Cal. 1982).

17 Raven v. Deukmeijan, supra, citing Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P. 2d 274 (Cal. 1982).

18Supra note 13. It may well be pointed out that in making the distinction between amendment and revision, Justice
Antonio relied not only in the analogy presented in Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 37 S.E. 2d 322, but cited also the
seminal ruling of the California Supreme Court in McFadden v. Jordan, supra.

19Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed., Justice Isagani A. Cruz, p. 71, citing Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. PSC, 40
O.G., 8th Supp. 57.

20 The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., p. 1161.

21 Id.
22 Supra note 14.

The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st ed., Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., p. 567, citing B.
23

Schwartz, I The Powers of Government (1963).

24 16 C.J.S. §3 at 24.

25 14 T.M. Cooley, II Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed. (1927), p. 1349.

26 A bogus revolution, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 11, 2006, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., p. A15.

27 Article II, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

1 Works, Letter 164.

2 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

3 Resolution dated June 10, 1997, G.R. No. 127325.

4G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997. Joining PIRMA as petitioners were its founding members, spouses Alberto
Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa.

5Entitled "In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through a People's Initiative: A Shift from
a Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI and VII; and Providing
Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the Parliamentary System."

6Among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa,
Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr., Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P.
Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada, Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana
Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel, Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela,
Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby
Santiago and Reginald Pamugas, and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma.
Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong.

7 "Grounds for contempt

3. From the time the so-called People's Initiative (hereafter PI) now subject of Lambino v. Comelec, was
initiated, respondents did nothing to stop what was clearly lawless, and even arguably winked at, as
it were, if not condoned and allowed, the waste and misuse of its personnel, time, facilities and
resources on an enterprise that had no legal basis and in fact was permanently enjoined by this
Honorable Court in 1997. Seemingly mesmerized, it is time to disenthrall them.

3.1. For instance, undersigned counsel happened to be in the Senate on August 29, 2006 (on other
business) when respondent Chair sought to be stopped by the body from commenting on PI out of
prudential considerations, could not be restrained. On contentious issues, he volunteered that Sigaw ng
Bayan would not cheat in Makati as it was the opposition territory and that the fact that out of 43,405
signatures, only 7,186 were found authentic in one Makati District, to him, showed the "efficiency" of
Comelec personnel. He could not appreciate 1) that Sigaw had no choice but to get the
constitutionality-required 3% in every district, [Const., Art. VII, Sec. 2] friendly or otherwise,
including administration critics' turfs, and 2) that falsus in 36,319 (93.30%) falsus in omnibus, in an
exercise that could never be free, orderly, honest and credible, another constitutional
requirement. [Nothing has been heard about probing and prosecuting the falsifiers.]

xxxxxxxxx

3.2. It was excessively obvious to undersigned and other observers that respondent Chairman, straining at
the leash, was lawyering for Sigaw ng Bayan in the Senate! It was discomfiting that he would gloss
over the seeming wholesale falsification of 96.30% of the signatures in an exercise with no
credibility! Even had he been asked, he should have pled to be excused from answering as the
matter could come up before the Comelec for an official collegial position (different from conceding
that it is enjoined).

xxxxxxxxx

4. Respondents Commissioners Borra and Romeo A. Brawner, for their part, even issued widely-
publicized written directives to the field, [Annex C, as to Commissioner Brawner; that as to
Commissioner Borra will follow.] while the Commission itself was trying to be careful not to be
explicit in what it was abetting implicitly, in hypocritical defiance of the injunction of 1997.

8Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72424, February 13, 1989, 170
SCRA 246.
9 Supra.

Development Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 59; Albert v. Court of First Instance of
10

Manila (Branch VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948.

11 56 O.G. 3546 cited in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI), id.

12 Supra.

13 Separate Opinion of Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.

14 G.R. No. 109645, March 4, 1996, 254 SCRA 234.

15Philippine National Bank v. Palma, G.R. No. 157279, August 9, 2005, 466 CSRA 307, citing Moreno, Philippine
Law Dictionary (1988), 3rd ed. (citing Santiago v. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397, [1947]).

16Id., citing Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999, 305 SCRA 303, citing Government v.
Jalandoni, No. 837-R, August 30, 1947, 44 O.G. 1840.

17Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1921),
pp. 33-34.

18 William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc.,) 1973, p. 49.

19 Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296.

20 July 9, 1986. Records of the Constitutional Commission, No. 26.

21 Bernas, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, 1996 Ed., p. 1161.

22 242 N. W. 891 259 Mich 212.

23 State v. Orange [Tex. x. Civ. App.] 300 SW 2d 705, People v. Perkins 137, p. 55.

18 City of Midland v. Arbury 38 Mich. App. 771, 197 N.W. 2d 134.

25 Adams v. Gunter Fla, 238 So. 2d 824.

26 196 P.2d 787.

27 Adams v. Gunter Fla. 238 So.2d 824.

28 Mc Fadden v. Jordan, supra.

29 Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So.2d 501, p. 505 (Fla. 1958).

30 Joaquin Bernas, Sounding Board: AMENDMENT OR REVISION, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 25, 2006.

31 See Sections 8-12 for national initiative and referendum, and sections 13-19 for local initiative and referendum.

32Section 2. Statement of Policy. – The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by
any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed.

33 Section 3. Definition of terms.-

xxx

a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;

xxx

34 See Section 3(e).

35Section 5 (b) – A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of
the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only
after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.

xxx
36Section 9 (b) – The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
 [G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE

SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the
[1]

shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila
Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires
an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51%
shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle
of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30%
to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or
the eventual strategic partner, is to provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two
[2]

(2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state -

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC -

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset
to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and
GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract specified by the
Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel x x x x

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER -

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following
conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995); and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained. [3]

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner

and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS
dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a managers check
[4]

issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to
match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x which respondent
[5]

GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian
firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it
was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with
former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici
curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage
and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the
nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full
potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the
national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC
[6]

carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent
GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent
GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly
covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies. [7]

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony
and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be
preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules
mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price
per share. [8]

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-
executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said
provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay down conditions under which
business may be done. [9]

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under
the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and
exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution.According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have
slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic,
these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the
mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which
possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the
constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of
the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which
the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of
the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really
contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning
and not after it had lost in the bidding.
 Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which
provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price
per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching
bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot
be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is
premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and
the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not
yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail
since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner,
and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly,
the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it
demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of
them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance
and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except
by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
[10]

government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and
establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental
conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform
and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates
[11]

any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or
by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and
void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the
framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different
departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and
inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as
[12]

those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is
self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to
the legislature for action.[13]

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted
upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws
intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like
that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions
of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be [14]

cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that -

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective.These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute. [15]

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986
Constitutional Commission -
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on
Style. If the wording of PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be understood
as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not
make it clear?To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against whom? As against
aliens or over aliens ?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word QUALIFIED because
the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which business may
be done. For example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the setting up of other financial
structures, et cetera(underscoring supplied by respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to
make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly,
the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details
may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional
provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to
facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation
of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or
place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-
executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the
absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for
a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution
does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be
in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the
[17]

subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of
Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which
undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third
[18]

paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to

encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the
first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori,
by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-
executing in another. [19]

Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are
merely statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and
only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights - are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity, the sanctity of
[20] [21]
family life, the vital role of the youth in nation-building, the promotion of social
[22] [23]

justice, and the values of education. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance refers to

[24] [25] [26]

constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights and on [27]

education. Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato cites provisions on the promotion of

[28] [29]

general welfare, the sanctity of family life, the vital role of the youth in nation-
[30] [31]

building and the promotion of total human liberation and development. A reading of
[32] [33]

these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional
rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that
they are only principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may
be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance,
and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission explains - [34]

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to
our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands,
forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our
people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
[35]

natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While
it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved
to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue
of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called
the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of
the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine
Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional
Philippine hospitality. [36]

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart
and Memory of a City. During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese
[37]

Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned to
recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the
two (2) places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, the hotel became
the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970
the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an
acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a
failed coup d etat where an aspirant for vice-president was proclaimed President of the
Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs
and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public
interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone
who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In
this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that
the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of
the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which
the building stands. [38]

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our
Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is
very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the
amendment would consist in substituting the words QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with the following:
CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL
OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.

xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a
question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a corporation
wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should only
be 100-percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may refer only to
individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]

xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE
SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. And the word Filipinos here, as
intended by the proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled
entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos.[40]

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus -

MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his
amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino
enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the
Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo

continues
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called Filipino First
policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions,
privileges and rights covering the national patrimony.[42]

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the
subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo - [43]
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic concerns. It is
better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This provision was never found in previous
Constitutions x x x x

The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can
make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It
certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be
counterproductive and inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made
between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by

respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by
respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is
that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the
hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an
overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. [44]

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the
subject provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite
disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision - by the government itself
- is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to
ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the
Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own
and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a
defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding
legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional
government is apt -

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution,
even before Congress acts - provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive
action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional
command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution
and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask
Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a
constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates. [45]

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State,
not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This
argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could
only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent
Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this
fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In
constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is
a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private
actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government
has approved or authorized the action.It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in
selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories
of state action.Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by
respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the
constitutional command. [46]

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to
the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3)
divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional
mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is
addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a
government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet
the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only
be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary
contracts, and secured the requisite approvals.Since the Filipino First Policy provision of
the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest
bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning
bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under
obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions
of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional
provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent
GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic
principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the
fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for
being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing
to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate
[47]

itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder
notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot
conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the
Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino
matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we
are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the
bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it
would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign
investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always
open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when
venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do
business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to
know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner
could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike
were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino
qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign
entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the
bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid
offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel
respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the
foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid
did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless
perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to
foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to
insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its
mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino
people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather
remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government
develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad
pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute
the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the
latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the
1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to
be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding
the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it
is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx
of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business
opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such
preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could
have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa -

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that
of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in
nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to
economic progress and development x x x x in connection with a temporary injunction issued by
the Courts First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner,
certain statements were published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction again
demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in
contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable,
it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not
adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-
informed criticism. [48]

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and
preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take
precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective
should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution
enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to
the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing
so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the
Constitution is involved. [49]

Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and
republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all
government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people
must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any
constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign
investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of
nationalism. [50]

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be
sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an
ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that
has hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a
nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a
strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their
official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a
significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and
culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a
history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a
country.[51]

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of
respondents to sell the historical landmark - this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia - to a
total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to
alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a
veritable alienation of a nations soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask:
What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained
by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it stands for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How
much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign
entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national
patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This
is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine
Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the
duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the
sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from
selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per
share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the
sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr.,
JJ, concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), and Melo, J., joins J. Puno in his dissent.
Padilla, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., see separate concurring opinion
Mendoza, J., see concurring opinion
Torres, J., with separate opinion
Puno, J., see dissent.
Panganiban J., with separate dissenting opinion.
BASES CONVERSION AND G.R. No. 178160
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
*
- versus - TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, and
PERALTA, JJ.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Promulgated:

Respondent. February 26, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari[1] with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to nullify Decision No. 2007-
020[2] dated 12 April 2007 of the Commission on Audit (COA).

The Facts

On 13 March 1992, Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 7227 [3] creating the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA).Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that the
BCDA Board of Directors (Board) shall exercise the powers and functions of the BCDA. Under
Section 10, the functions of the Board include the determination of the organizational structure
and the adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme at least equivalent to that of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). Accordingly, the Board determined the organizational structure of
the BCDA and adopted a compensation and benefit scheme for its officials and employees.

On 20 December 1996, the Board adopted a new compensation and benefit scheme which
included a P10,000 year-end benefit granted to each contractual employee, regular permanent
employee, and Board member. In a memorandum[4] dated 25 August 1997, Board Chairman
Victoriano A. Basco (Chairman Basco) recommended to President Fidel V. Ramos (President
Ramos) the approval of the new compensation and benefit scheme. In a memorandum[5] dated 9
October 1997, President Ramos approved the new compensation and benefit scheme.

In 1999, the BSP gave a P30,000 year-end benefit to its officials and employees. In 2000, the
BSP increased the year-end benefit from P30,000 to P35,000. Pursuant to Section 10 of RA No.
7227 which states that the compensation and benefit scheme of the BCDA shall be at least
equivalent to that of the BSP, the Board increased the year-end benefit of BCDA officials and
employees from P10,000 to P30,000. Thus in 2000 and 2001, BCDA officials and employees
received a P30,000 year-end benefit, and, on 1 October 2002, the Board passed Resolution No.
2002-10-193[6]approving the release of a P30,000 year-end benefit for 2002.

Aside from the contractual employees, regular permanent employees, and Board members, the
full-time consultants of the BCDA also received the year-end benefit.

On 20 February 2003, State Auditor IV Corazon V. Espao of the COA issued Audit
Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2003-004[7] stating that the grant of year-end benefit to
Board members was contrary to Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Circular Letter
No. 2002-2 dated 2 January 2002. In Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 03-001-BCDA-
(02)[8] dated 8 January 2004, Director IV Rogelio D. Tablang (Director Tablang), COA, Legal
and Adjudication Office-Corporate, disallowed the grant of year-end benefit to the Board
members and full-time consultants. In Decision No. 2004-013[9] dated 13 January 2004,
Director Tablang concurred with AOM No. 2003-004 and ND No. 03-001-BCDA-(02).

In a letter[10] dated 20 February 2004, BCDA President and Chief Executive Officer Rufo
Colayco requested the reconsideration of Decision No. 2004-013. In a Resolution[11] dated 22
June 2004, Director Tablang denied the request. The BCDA filed a notice of appeal[12] dated 8
September 2004 and an appeal memorandum[13] dated 23 December 2004 with the COA.
The COAs Ruling

In Decision No. 2007-020,[14] the COA affirmed the disallowance of the year-end benefit
granted to the Board members and full-time consultants and held that the presumption of good
faith did not apply to them. The COA stated that:

The granting of YEB x x x is not without x x x limitation. DBM Circular Letter No.
2002-02 dated January 2, 2002 stating, viz:

2.0 To clarify and address issues/requests concerning the same, the following
compensation policies are hereby reiterated:

2.1 PERA, ADCOM, YEB and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in
addition to salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic salary
is also paid.

2.2 Members of the Board of Directors of agencies are not salaried officials of the
government. As non-salaried officials they are not entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEB
and retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law.

2.3 Department Secretaries, Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries who serve as

Ex-officio Members of the Board of Directors are not entitled to any remuneration in
line with the Supreme Court ruling that their services in the Board are already paid for
and covered by the remuneration attached to their office. (underscoring ours)

Clearly, as stated above, the members and ex-officio members of the Board of
Directors are not entitled to YEB, they being not salaried officials of the
government. The same goes with full time consultants wherein no employer-
employee relationships exist between them and the BCDA. Thus, the whole amount
paid to them totaling P342,000 is properly disallowed in audit.

Moreover, the presumption of good faith may not apply to the members and ex-officio
members of the Board of Directors because despite the earlier clarification on the
matter by the DBM thru the issuance on January 2, 2002 of DBM Circular Letter No.
 2002-02, still, the BCDA Board of Directors enacted Resolution No. 2002-10-93 on
October 1, 2002 granting YEB to the BCDA personnel including themselves. Full
time consultants, being non-salaried personnel, are also not entitled to such
presumption since they knew from the very beginning that they are only entitled to the
amount stipulated in their contracts as compensation for their services. Hence, they
should be made to refund the disallowed YEB.[15] (Boldfacing in the original)
Hence, this petition.

The Courts Ruling

The Board members and full-time consultants of the BCDA are not entitled to the year-end
benefit.

First, the BCDA claims that the Board can grant the year-end benefit to its members and full-
time consultants because, under Section 10 of RA No. 7227, the functions of the Board include
the adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme.

The Court is not impressed. The Boards power to adopt a compensation and benefit scheme is
not unlimited. Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that Board members are entitled to a per diem:

Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not more than Five thousand
pesos (P5,000) for every board meeting: Provided, however, That the per
diem collected per month does not exceed the equivalent of four (4)
meetings: Provided, further, That the amount of per diem for every board meeting
may be increased by the President but such amount shall not be increased within two
(2) years after its last increase. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 9 specifies that Board members shall receive a per diem for every board meeting; limits
the amount of per diem to not more than P5,000; and limits the total amount of per diem for one
month to not more than four meetings. In Magno v. Commission on Audit,[16] Cabili v. Civil
Service Commission,[17] De Jesus v. Civil Service Commission,[18] Molen, Jr. v. Commission on
Audit,[19] and Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit,[20] the Court held that the
specification of compensation and limitation of the amount of compensation in a statute
indicate that Board members are entitled only to the per diem authorized by law and no
other. In Baybay Water District, the Court held that:

By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled to receive and by limiting

the amount he/she is allowed to receive in a month, x x x the law quite clearly
indicates that directors x x x are authorized to receive only the per diem authorized by
law and no other compensation or allowance in whatever form.[21]

Also, DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states that, Members of the Board of Directors of
agencies are not salaried officials of the government.As non-salaried officials they are not
entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEB and retirement benefits unless expressly provided by
law. RA No. 7227 does not state that the Board members are entitled to a year-end benefit.

With regard to the full-time consultants, DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states that, YEB and
retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in addition to salaries. As fringe
benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic salary is also paid. The full-time
consultants are not part of the BCDA personnel and are not paid the basic salary. The full-time
consultants consultancy contracts expressly state that there is no employer-employee
relationship between the BCDA and the consultants, and that the BCDA shall pay the
consultants a contract price. For example, the consultancy contract[22] of a certain Dr. Faith M.
Reyes states:

SECTION 2. Contract Price. For and in consideration of the services to be

performed by the CONSULTANT (16 hours/week), BCDA shall pay her the amount
of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS and 00/100 (P20,000.00), Philippine currency,
per month.

xxxx

SECTION 4. Employee-Employer Relationship. It is understood that no employee-

employer relationship shall exist between BCDA and the CONSULTANT.

SECTION 5. Period of Effectivity. This CONTRACT shall have an effectivity

period of one (1) year, from January 01, 2002 to December 31, 2002, unless sooner
terminated by BCDA in accordance with Section 6 below.

SECTION 6. Termination of Services. BCDA, in its sole discretion may opt to

terminate this CONTRACT when it sees that there is no more need for the services
contracted for. (Boldfacing in the original)

Since full-time consultants are not salaried employees of BCDA, they are not entitled to the
year-end benefit which is a personnel benefit granted in addition to salaries and which is
paid only when the basic salary is also paid.

Second, the BCDA claims that the Board members and full-time consultants should be granted
the year-end benefit because the granting of year-end benefit is consistent with Sections 5 and
18, Article II of the Constitution. Sections 5 and 18 state:

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all people of the blessings of democracy.

Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect
the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

The Court is not impressed. Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of Principles
and State Policies. By its very title, Article II is a statement of general ideological principles and
policies. It is not a source of enforceable rights.[23] In Tondo Medical Center Employees
Association v. Court of Appeals,[24] the Court held that Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the
Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In that case, the Court held that Some of the
constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the
Constitution specifically, Sections 5 x x x and 18 the provisions of which the Court
categorically ruled to be non self-executing.

Third, the BCDA claims that the denial of year-end benefit to the Board members and full-time
consultants violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.[25] More specifically, the BCDA
claims that there is no substantial distinction between regular officials and employees on one
hand, and Board members and full-time consultants on the other. The BCDA states that there is
here only a distinction, but no difference because both have undeniably one common goal as
humans, that is x x x to keep body and soul together or, [d]ifferently put, both have mouths to
feed and stomachs to fill.
The Court is not impressed. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the
constitutionality of RA No. 7227 and the burden of proof is on the BCDA to show that
there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.[26] In Abakada Guro Party List
v. Purisima,[27] the Court held that:

A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To

justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and unequivocal one. To invalidate [a law] based on x x x
baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed
it but also of the executive which approved it.

The BCDA failed to show that RA No. 7227 unreasonably singled out Board members and full-
time consultants in the grant of the year-end benefit. It did not show any clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution. The claim that there is no difference between regular officials and
employees, and Board members and full-time consultants because both groups have mouths to
feed and stomachs to fill is fatuous. Surely, persons are not automatically similarly situated
thus, automatically deserving of equal protection of the laws just because they both have
mouths to feed and stomachs to fill. Otherwise, the existence of a substantial distinction would
become forever highly improbable.

Fourth, the BCDA claims that the Board can grant the year-end benefit to its members and the
full-time consultants because RA No. 7227 does not expressly prohibit it from doing so.

The Court is not impressed. A careful reading of Section 9 of RA No. 7227 reveals that the
Board is prohibited from granting its members other benefits. Section 9 states:

Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not more than Five thousand
pesos (P5,000) for every board meeting: Provided, however, That the per
diem collected per month does not exceed the equivalent of four (4)
meetings: Provided, further, That the amount of per diem for every board meeting
may be increased by the President but such amount shall not be increased within two
(2) years after its last increase. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 9 specifies that Board members shall receive a per diem for every board meeting; limits
the amount of per diem to not more than P5,000; limits the total amount of per diem for one
month to not more than four meetings; and does not state that Board members may receive
other benefits. In Magno,[28] Cabili,[29] De Jesus,[30] Molen, Jr.,[31] and Baybay Water
District,[32] the Court held that the specification of compensation and limitation of the
amount of compensation in a statute indicate that Board members are entitled only to
the per diemauthorized by law and no other.

The specification that Board members shall receive a per diem of not more than P5,000 for
every meeting and the omission of a provision allowing Board members to receive other
benefits lead the Court to the inference that Congress intended to limit the compensation of
Board members to the per diem authorized by law and no other. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Had Congress intended to allow the Board members to receive other benefits, it would
have expressly stated so.[33] For example, Congress intention to allow Board members to receive
other benefits besides the per diem authorized by law is expressly stated in Section 1 of RA No.
9286:[34]
 SECTION 1. Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, is hereby
amended to read as follows:

SEC. 13. Compensation. Each director shall receive per diem to be determined by the
Board, for each meeting of the Board actually attended by him, but no director shall
receive per diems in any given month in excess of the equivalent of the total per diem
of four meetings in any given month.

Any per diem in excess of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) shall be subject to the
approval of the Administration. In addition thereto, each director shall receive
allowances and benefits as the Board may prescribe subject to the approval of
the Administration. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court cannot, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute or insert into a
statute what Congress omitted, whether intentionally or unintentionally.[35]

When a statute is susceptible of two interpretations, the Court must adopt the one in consonance
with the presumed intention of the legislature to give its enactments the most reasonable and
beneficial construction, the one that will render them operative and effective.[36] The Court
always presumes that Congress intended to enact sensible statutes.[37] If the Court were to rule
that the Board could grant the year-end benefit to its members, Section 9 of RA No. 7227 would
become inoperative and ineffective the specification that Board members shall receive a per
diem of not more than P5,000 for every meeting; the specification that the per diem received per
month shall not exceed the equivalent of four meetings; the vesting of the power to increase the
amount of per diem in the President; and the limitation that the amount of per diem shall not be
increased within two years from its last increase would all become useless because the Board
could always grant its members other benefits.

With regard to the full-time consultants, DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states that, YEB and
retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in addition to salaries. As fringe
benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic salary is also paid. The full-time
consultants are not part of the BCDA personnel and are not paid the basic salary. The full-time
consultants consultancy contracts expressly state that there is no employer-employee
relationship between BCDA and the consultants and that BCDA shall pay the consultants a
contract price. Since full-time consultants are not salaried employees of the BCDA, they are not
entitled to the year-end benefit which is a personnel benefit granted in addition to salaries and
which is paid only when the basic salary is also paid.

Fifth, the BCDA claims that the Board members and full-time consultants are entitled to the
year-end benefit because (1) President Ramos approved the granting of the benefit to the Board
members, and (2) they have been receiving it since 1997.

The Court is not impressed. The State is not estopped from correcting a public officers
erroneous application of a statute, and an unlawful practice, no matter how long, cannot give
rise to any vested right.[38]

The Court, however, notes that the Board members and full-time consultants received the year-
end benefit in good faith. The Board members relied on (1) Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which
authorized the Board to adopt a compensation and benefit scheme; (2) the fact that RA No.
7227 does not expressly prohibit Board members from receiving benefits other than the per
diem authorized by law; and (3) President Ramos approval of the new compensation and benefit
scheme which included the granting of a year-end benefit to each contractual employee, regular
 permanent employee, and Board member. The full-time consultants relied on Section 10 of RA
No. 7227 which authorized the Board to adopt a compensation and benefit scheme. There is no
proof that the Board members and full-time consultants knew that their receipt of the year-end
benefit was unlawful. In keeping with Magno,[39] De Jesus,[40] Molen, Jr.,[41] and Kapisanan ng
mga Manggagawa sa Government Service Insurance System (KMG) v. Commission on
Audit,[42] the Board members and full-time consultants are not required to refund the year-end
benefits they have already received.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Commission on Audit Decision

No. 2007-020 dated 12 April 2007 is AFFIRMEDwith the MODIFICATION that the Board
members and full-time consultants of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority are not
required to refund the year-end benefits they have already received.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

(On official leave)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave)

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by
their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her
parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES,
minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V.
PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA,
minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA,
JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their
parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN,
all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO
and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and
TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their
parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and
IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA,
PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their
parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of
the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital
life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal
petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional
plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized
for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural
resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable
Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as
a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers,
and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further
asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for
that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area
of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare
and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical
pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured
and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful
ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover
and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies,
such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as
of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water,
incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c)
massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil
eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire
island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna,
(e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous
cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading
to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by
the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the
floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the
siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of
supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic
and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of
said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for
commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per
hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of
forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff
adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and
their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural
resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource
property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2,
1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
 18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights
of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare,
barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had
been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy
of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-
being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory
to the Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and
efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article
XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to
arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on
two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the
plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In
their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said
order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it
raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for
would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask
this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but
have also joined the latter in this case.8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient
allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept
of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely
on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that
the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may
be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the
public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but
vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the
country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before
Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State
without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-
five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been
found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing
would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-
777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties
are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We
likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an
incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation
as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues
raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the
respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell
short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and
protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).
Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague
conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint
against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color
and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing
violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the
Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a
specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of
its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing
but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who
sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution — air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries
with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be
provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the
other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's
natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of
which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in
reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all
natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of
the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize
and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically
in Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the
full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the
 exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social
and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the
mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and
higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for
policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid
special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former
"declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man
and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The
latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a
cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is
beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case
is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in
the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the
utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted,
what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law
itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough
to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or
partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned,
there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally
involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished
member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to
rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their
acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The
catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that
can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause
found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement.
In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the
non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by
providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D.
No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace
or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . .
.

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
(37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

 cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law
or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of
the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance
Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters
of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist
if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to
regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the
prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover,
with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is
one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this
decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the
environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity.
I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance
of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly
regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the
subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in
this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek
to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to
be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public
administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether
some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future
determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right
— the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is
fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without
doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope
and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which
can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic
fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw
sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of
dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other
living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court:
Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as
the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful
ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards"
(fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the
particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right
which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the
particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing
with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other
words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that
Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of
the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this
doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to
be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in
language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be
violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can
validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that
the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the
proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless
the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants
may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to
health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the
policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before
the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's
petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be
asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber
companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners
implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute
the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus
between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by
petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our
territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should,
however, be subjected to closer examination.

# Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is
one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this
decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the
environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity.
I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance
of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly
regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the
subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in
this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek
to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to
be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public
administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether
some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future
determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right
— the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is
fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without
doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope
and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which
can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic
fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw
sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of
dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other
living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court:
Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as
the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful
ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards"
(fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the
particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right
which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the
particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing
with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other
words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that
Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of
the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this
doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to
be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in
language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be
violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can
validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that
the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the
proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless
the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants
may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
 a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to
health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the
policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before
the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's
petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be
asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber
companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners
implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute
the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus
between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by
petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our
territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should,
however, be subjected to closer examination.
G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004

REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003.
Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of
Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous since
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he had
parties or movements to back up his candidacy.

On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same
under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and
thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by
a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner
Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.

In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in
violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987

Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly
amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to
choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all
the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the
president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other
countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate
of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable
guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidate’s bio-data and his
program of government.

First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.

Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public
office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to
seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.
Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles
and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,2 and there is no
plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.3 The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any
cause of action before the courts.4

An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory.
The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public
office and prohibit public dynasties."6 Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought
forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of
the word "office" to "service." He explained his proposal in this wise:

I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important would be
equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would
be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as are also
possible. That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should
not mandate the State to make the government the number one employer and to limit offices only to
what may be necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change the
word "broaden."7 (emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as
many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the
framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition
of a clear State burden.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It
is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are
not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended.8 Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are
susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of
the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights
may be sourced.

As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some
valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions9 of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 645210 dated December 10, 2002 outlining
the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by
any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is
exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity stands and has
to be accorded due weight.

Clearly, therefore, petitioner’s reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
misplaced.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have
not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that
its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the
practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for
the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated
electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships,
whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency,
but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held:

[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum
of support before printing the name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot – the interest,
if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the democratic [process].11

The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it promulgated Resolution No. 6558 on 17
January 2004, adopting the study Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11 January 2004. As observed in the
COMELEC’s Comment:

There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national positions
because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national
campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates,
Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government. For
the official ballots in automated counting and canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount to more
or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION PESOS (₱450,000,000.00).

xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot wage a decent
campaign enough to project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim.12

The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates" to run in
the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers in
every polling place,13 watchers in the board of canvassers,14 or even the receipt of electoral
contributions.15Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are dependent on the
number of candidates in a given election.

Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The
organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates
with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is
not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body
would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude nuisance
candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, "their trips to the moon on gossamer wings."

The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to
ensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that distract
and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the administration of
elections16 and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the promotion of
free, orderly and honest elections.17 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fide candidates for public
office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.18 The determination of bona fidecandidates is
governed by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.

Now, the needed factual premises.

However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the case of the
petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailed resolutions
of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in determining that petitioner was a
nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarily take into account the
matters which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.

Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly evincing his credentials
as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly pass upon the
reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended any document to
their respective Comments.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual
determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order.

A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioner’s aspiration and offer to serve in the government. It
deserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of due process.

As to petitioner’s attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say that the form
strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision specifically enumerates what a
certificate of candidacy should contain, with the required information tending to show that the candidate possesses
the minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as established by the Constitution and other election laws.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC
for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a
nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court with
deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug*, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987

VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

CORTES, J.:

The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action
for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had
earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano
Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by
the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner
prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said
information.

This is not the first tune that the writ of mandamus is sought to enforce the fundamental right to information. The
same remedy was resorted to in the case of Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera et. al., (G.R. No. L-63915, April 24,1985,136
SCRA 27) wherein the people's right to be informed under the 1973 Constitution (Article IV, Section 6) was invoked
in order to compel the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions and
other presidential issuances. Prior to the recognition of the right in said Constitution the statutory right to information
provided for in the Land Registration Act (Section 56, Act 496, as amended) was claimed by a newspaper editor in
another mandamus proceeding, this time to demand access to the records of the Register of Deeds for the purpose
of gathering data on real estate transactions involving aliens (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383 [1948]).

The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition in the Bill of Rights,
Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution, which states:

Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The foregoing provision has been retained and the right therein provided amplified in Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987
Constitution with the addition of the phrase, "as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development." The new provision reads:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law.

These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the right to information
may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and
mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may
be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations
upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be
overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III
Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right
may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one.

The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to Our giving due course to this Petition. He challenges the
petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of
the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the
petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no
ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.

1. To be given due course, a Petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged
inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a
legal right. (Ant;-Chinese League of the Philippines vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012 [1947]). The petitioner in every case
must therefore be an "aggrieved party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct
interest in the duty or act to be performed.

In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It is asserted
that, the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, At most there is a vague reference to an unnamed client in whose behalf he had
allegedly acted when he made inquiries on the subject (Petition, Rollo, p. 3).
But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held that:

* * * when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L- 63915, April 24, 1985, 136
SCRA 27, 36).

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,
the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of
the general "public" which possesses the right.

The Court had opportunity to define the word "public" in the Subido case, supra, when it held that even those who
have no direct or tangible interest in any real estate transaction are part of the "public" to whom "(a)ll records
relating to registered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds shall be open * * *" (Sec. 56, Act No. 496, as
amended). In the words of the Court:

* * * "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every person.

To say that only those who have a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character in the
particular information sought are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction.
*** (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra at p. 387).

The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of
the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the present suit.

2. For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who
govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Only
governments operating under fundamental rules defining the limits of their power so as to shield individual rights
against its arbitrary exercise can properly claim to be constitutional (Cooley, supra, at p. 5). Without a government's
acceptance of the limitations imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an
acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights
becomes a sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion.

In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate
the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition,
government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public
disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law," in Article 11, Section 28 thereof, to wit:

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Art. 11, Sec. 28).

In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by what this Court declared as an imperative
duty of the government officials concerned to publish all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature
as well as all executive orders and proclamations of general applicability. We granted mandamus in said case, and
in the process, We found occasion to expound briefly on the nature of said duty:

* * * That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be in included or excluded from such publication. (Tanada v.
Tuvera, supra, at 39). (Emphasis supplied).

The absence of discretion on the part of government agencia es in allowing the examination of public records,
specifically, the records in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra:

Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle
curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves
with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their
prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze,
or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the
legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. ***
(Subido v. Ozaeta, supra at 388). (Emphasis supplied).

It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are without discretion in
refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable
regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to
information may be exercised by the public. In the Subido case, We recognized the authority of the Register of
Deeds to regulate the manner in which persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy records relating to
registered lands. However, the regulations which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to:

* * * prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to or loss of, the
records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and
 documents and other employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to make
inspection may be insured * * * (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387)

Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a municipal judge, to regulate the
manner of inspection by the public of criminal docket records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter No.
1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was filed against the respondent judge for his
alleged refusal to allow examination of the criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by the Investigating
Judge that the respondent had allowed the complainant to open and view the subject records, We absolved the
respondent. In effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by him upon the manner of
examining the public records were reasonable.

In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that the authority to regulate the
manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made
between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to
regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to
the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second
pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to
be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference with
the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional
right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaetal supra).

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government
agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public
records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent
upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory
by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the
concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on the propriety
of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the
ambit of the constitutional guarantee.

3. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition of
the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm. Matter No.
1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope
with the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,102 [1939]), access to information of general
interest aids the people in democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974]) by giving them a
better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.

But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every
door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain
types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security (Journal No. 90, September 23,
1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It follows that, in
every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the
information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted
by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the
information sought is of public interest or public concern.

a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as
already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial
of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public
concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee.
To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an
advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511
[1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is
subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied.
"Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a
case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

The public concern invoked in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, was the need for adequate notice to the public
of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra, the public
concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the knowledge of those real estate transactions which some
believed to have been registered in violation of the Constitution.

The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government employees that
they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as
a State policy that:
 Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined,
as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential
or highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).

Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers
are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions.

b. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the
information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any
provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations,
as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there
is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither
unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil
service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service
Commission.

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the
law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to
confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus,
therefore lies.

WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian,
and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the
Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin
and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004

REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003.
Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of
Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous since
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he had
parties or movements to back up his candidacy.

On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same
under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and
thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by
a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner
Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.

In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in
violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987

Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly
amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to
choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all
the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the
president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other
countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate
of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable
guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidate’s bio-data and his
program of government.

First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.

Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public
office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to
seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.
Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles
and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,2 and there is no
plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.3 The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any
cause of action before the courts.4

An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory.
The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public
office and prohibit public dynasties."6 Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought
forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of
the word "office" to "service." He explained his proposal in this wise:

I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important would be
equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would
be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as are also
possible. That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should
not mandate the State to make the government the number one employer and to limit offices only to
what may be necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change the
word "broaden."7 (emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as
many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the
framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition
of a clear State burden.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It
is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are
not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended.8 Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are
susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of
the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights
may be sourced.

As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some
valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions9 of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 645210 dated December 10, 2002 outlining
the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by
any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is
exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity stands and has
to be accorded due weight.

Clearly, therefore, petitioner’s reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
misplaced.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have
not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that
its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the
practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for
the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated
electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships,
whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency,
but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held:

[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum
of support before printing the name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot – the interest,
if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the democratic [process].11

The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it promulgated Resolution No. 6558 on 17
January 2004, adopting the study Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11 January 2004. As observed in the
COMELEC’s Comment:

There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national positions
because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national
campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates,
Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government. For
the official ballots in automated counting and canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount to more
or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION PESOS (₱450,000,000.00).

xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot wage a decent
campaign enough to project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim.12

The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates" to run in
the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers in
every polling place,13 watchers in the board of canvassers,14 or even the receipt of electoral
contributions.15Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are dependent on the
number of candidates in a given election.

Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The
organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates
with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is
not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body
would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude nuisance
candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, "their trips to the moon on gossamer wings."

The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to
ensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that distract
and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the administration of
elections16 and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the promotion of
free, orderly and honest elections.17 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fide candidates for public
office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.18 The determination of bona fidecandidates is
governed by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.

Now, the needed factual premises.

However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the case of the
petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailed resolutions
of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in determining that petitioner was a
nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarily take into account the
matters which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.

Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly evincing his credentials
as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly pass upon the
reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended any document to
their respective Comments.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual
determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order.

A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioner’s aspiration and offer to serve in the government. It
deserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of due process.

As to petitioner’s attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say that the form
strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision specifically enumerates what a
certificate of candidacy should contain, with the required information tending to show that the candidate possesses
the minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as established by the Constitution and other election laws.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC
for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a
nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court with
deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug*, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987

VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

CORTES, J.:

The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action
for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had
earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano
Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by
the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner
prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said
information.

This is not the first tune that the writ of mandamus is sought to enforce the fundamental right to information. The
same remedy was resorted to in the case of Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera et. al., (G.R. No. L-63915, April 24,1985,136
SCRA 27) wherein the people's right to be informed under the 1973 Constitution (Article IV, Section 6) was invoked
in order to compel the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions and
other presidential issuances. Prior to the recognition of the right in said Constitution the statutory right to information
provided for in the Land Registration Act (Section 56, Act 496, as amended) was claimed by a newspaper editor in
another mandamus proceeding, this time to demand access to the records of the Register of Deeds for the purpose
of gathering data on real estate transactions involving aliens (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383 [1948]).

The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition in the Bill of Rights,
Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution, which states:

Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The foregoing provision has been retained and the right therein provided amplified in Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987
Constitution with the addition of the phrase, "as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development." The new provision reads:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law.

These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the right to information
may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and
mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may
be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations
upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be
overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III
Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right
may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one.

The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to Our giving due course to this Petition. He challenges the
petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of
the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the
petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no
ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.

1. To be given due course, a Petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged
inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a
legal right. (Ant;-Chinese League of the Philippines vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012 [1947]). The petitioner in every case
must therefore be an "aggrieved party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct
interest in the duty or act to be performed.

In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It is asserted
that, the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, At most there is a vague reference to an unnamed client in whose behalf he had
allegedly acted when he made inquiries on the subject (Petition, Rollo, p. 3).
But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held that:

* * * when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L- 63915, April 24, 1985, 136
SCRA 27, 36).

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,
the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of
the general "public" which possesses the right.

The Court had opportunity to define the word "public" in the Subido case, supra, when it held that even those who
have no direct or tangible interest in any real estate transaction are part of the "public" to whom "(a)ll records
relating to registered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds shall be open * * *" (Sec. 56, Act No. 496, as
amended). In the words of the Court:

* * * "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every person.

To say that only those who have a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character in the
particular information sought are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction.
*** (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra at p. 387).

The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of
the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the present suit.

2. For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who
govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Only
governments operating under fundamental rules defining the limits of their power so as to shield individual rights
against its arbitrary exercise can properly claim to be constitutional (Cooley, supra, at p. 5). Without a government's
acceptance of the limitations imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an
acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights
becomes a sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion.

In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate
the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition,
government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public
disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law," in Article 11, Section 28 thereof, to wit:

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Art. 11, Sec. 28).

In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by what this Court declared as an imperative
duty of the government officials concerned to publish all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature
as well as all executive orders and proclamations of general applicability. We granted mandamus in said case, and
in the process, We found occasion to expound briefly on the nature of said duty:

* * * That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be in included or excluded from such publication. (Tanada v.
Tuvera, supra, at 39). (Emphasis supplied).

The absence of discretion on the part of government agencia es in allowing the examination of public records,
specifically, the records in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra:

Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle
curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves
with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their
prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze,
or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the
legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. ***
(Subido v. Ozaeta, supra at 388). (Emphasis supplied).

It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are without discretion in
refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable
regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to
information may be exercised by the public. In the Subido case, We recognized the authority of the Register of
Deeds to regulate the manner in which persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy records relating to
registered lands. However, the regulations which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to:

* * * prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to or loss of, the
records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and
 documents and other employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to make
inspection may be insured * * * (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387)

Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a municipal judge, to regulate the
manner of inspection by the public of criminal docket records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter No.
1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was filed against the respondent judge for his
alleged refusal to allow examination of the criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by the Investigating
Judge that the respondent had allowed the complainant to open and view the subject records, We absolved the
respondent. In effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by him upon the manner of
examining the public records were reasonable.

In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that the authority to regulate the
manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made
between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to
regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to
the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second
pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to
be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference with
the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional
right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaetal supra).

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government
agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public
records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent
upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory
by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the
concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on the propriety
of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the
ambit of the constitutional guarantee.

3. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition of
the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm. Matter No.
1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope
with the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,102 [1939]), access to information of general
interest aids the people in democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974]) by giving them a
better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.

But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every
door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain
types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security (Journal No. 90, September 23,
1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It follows that, in
every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the
information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted
by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the
information sought is of public interest or public concern.

a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as
already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial
of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public
concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee.
To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an
advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511
[1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is
subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied.
"Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a
case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

The public concern invoked in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, was the need for adequate notice to the public
of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra, the public
concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the knowledge of those real estate transactions which some
believed to have been registered in violation of the Constitution.

The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government employees that
they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as
a State policy that:
 Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined,
as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential
or highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).

Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers
are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions.

b. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the
information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any
provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations,
as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there
is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither
unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil
service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service
Commission.

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the
law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to
confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus,
therefore lies.

WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian,
and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the
Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin
and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.