VIEWS, COMMENT AND OPINION
A clear case for not mandating LV surge
protection in domestic installations
Having been associated with lightning and related overvoltage issues for much of my professional life, I was intrigued recently to see some
discussions on possible modification to the South African Wiring Code SANS 10142-1.
I was particularly surprised to learn that
mandatory installation of LV surge protection
(SPDs) in the electricity supply to domestic
housing was again being considered
– apparently on grounds of lightning
protection.
Surprised, because whenever overvoltages
are of concern in the engineering world, then
the need for, and choice of surge protection
(as well as insulation) should be evaluated
on a risk assessment basis – in line with the
long established practices of professional
insulation coordination [1]. And surprised
therefore, since I was not aware that lightning,
and the related overvoltages are so severe in
South Africa, as to warrant mandatory surge
protection in all domestic LV installations.
After all, my own experience in lightning
research had shown that apart from a
relatively high incidence of lightning in certain
regions, as an engineering disturbance
lightning in SA is essentially similar to that
found in many other parts of the world [2].
And I was not aware that lightning surge
protection had been made mandatory
anywhere else. On the contrary, international
standards, such as the recent and very
comprehensive IEC 62305, also advocate risk
assessment as a guide to the relative need,
or not, for protection [3].
My concerns were soon eased however,
when I learnt that a team at the University
of the Witwatersrand had recently published
a comprehensive research report on this
theme [4], at the request of the SABS. Having
now studied this report, I am comforted to see
that the Wits team in fact clearly show that
there are no significant engineering grounds
for such mandatory LV surge protection i.e.
mandatory installation of LV surge protective
devices (SPD). Instead, their report presents
some general guidelines on those particular
circumstances where the relative risks may
justify the use of one form of protection or
another. In practice, on the national level
such situations turn out to be relatively
uncommon.
Some detailed analyses
The Wits report follows the methodology of
IEC 62305-2 Risk Management, including
by Dr. Andrew Eriksson, consultant, Switzerland
application of the associated calculation
model, but with some limited adaptation to
take account of local factors (such as higher
soil resistivities, varying service connection
heights, etc.). As such, this is not really a
“research” report. There is no particular
appraisal of the methodology, nor critical
review of the approach – although the
international team behind the IEC calculation
model [5] themselves emphasise that this is a
simplification for information purposes, and
thus should be treated mainly as a guide to
relative sensitivities.
Study of the Wits report requires parallel access
to and understanding of the associated IEC
standard. Both documents use a multitude
of normalising factors, which can quickly lead
to an overwhelmingly confusing alphabet
soup - in the absence of the clarifying IEC
document. One should additionally keep in
mind Prof. Bouquegneau’s (chairman of the
responsible IEC TC 81), cautionary remarks on
the IEC methodology [6], where he highlights
the “arbitrariness” of many of the normalising
factors and/or assumptions in the calculation
model. He also emphasises that the applied
“tolerable” values for risk are only suggested
values (e.g. 1x10-5 for loss of human life).
Subject to such limitations in the calculation
method, the Wits team have carried out
comprehensive and useful analyses, but
based additionally on a generalised and
simplified MV/LV network model – intended
to be illustrative of typical reticulation and
distribution connection arrangements to
domestic consumers. The analyses include
helpful sensitivity studies in which the relative
effects of various factors such as soil resistivity,
length of service connection, height of
feeders, buried or overhead, presence of SPD
or not, etc, are illustrated.
Of particular interest is the definition and
application of three different generalised
models for typical domestic housing,
namely:
• A suburban structure, being the typical
“bricks and mortar” house
• A township structure, illustrative of high
density low cost urban dwellings
• An informal structure, either as high density
township “shacks” or as traditionally built
housing (huts) in rural areas.
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The report includes some useful data on
related South African housing statistics
(1996/7 and 2004) which show, for example,
the relative incidence of various types of
structure, as
• about 59% = brick construction
• about 11% = informal shacks of varying
construction
• about 13% = built with traditional
materials, in rural areas
• the balance being apartment blocks,
cluster houses, semi-detached, etc.
Around 80% of all local structures currently
have mains electricity – at least for lighting
purposes – with about 19% still relying on
candles or paraffin, for lighting. About 50%
of the latter structures are informal, either
township or rural.
All these observations comprise significant
relativisation when considering the lightning
related risk analyses of the Wits study.
Depending on their relative locations and
construction, such alternative housing
variants may also be more or less exposed
to lightning risks, and more or less vulnerable
to related fire hazards. The Wits analyses
attempt additionally to take such factors
into account – again based partly on the
IEC methodology.
Finally, and following IEC 62305-2, these
analyses apply the simplified calculation
models to assess two primary risks, in relation
to lightning hazard:
• Risk type 1 (R1) = risk of loss of human life
in a structure
• Risk type 4 (R4) = risk of economic loss of
value in a structure
In the latter case, the Wits team make
interesting use of present value estimates
when assessing the relative cost / benefits
of applying SPD, in relation to the degree
of exposure to lightning damage and the
costs of the internal systems (e.g. electronic
equipment) potentially at risk. Comparisons
to sample insurance claim data are also
presented, showing reasonable agreement
to the analyses.
VIEWS, COMMENT AND OPINION
The resultant trends are clear
Overall, results from analysis over a wide
range of systematic parameter variations are
in line with fundamental expectations, in that
the calculated risks increase
• with increasing lightning ground flash
density;
• with enhanced structural exposure;
• with increased length of service
connection, especially when buried;
• with increased height of service
connection;
• with increasing soil resistivities; and
• susceptibility of the structure
construction to fire.
The resultant trends are presented in the Wits
report as a set of consolidating curves, as
shown in Fig. 51 below (taken directly from
the report).
Here, the IEC suggested value of 1x10-5 as
the tolerable level of risk R1 to human life, is
taken as the guiding criterion.
Considering the main structure variants, and
this level of risk R1, the analyses suggest that
protective measures should be considered
typically in the following situations;
• For suburban structures: L c > 500 m
and Ng > 6,5 flashes km-2;
(with buried connections) Lc > 700 m and
Ng > 9 flashes km-2
Fig. 51: Trend levels at which protection measures should be installed for a suburban and township/
informal structure based on calculations performed for risk type 1, loss of life.
Curve A represents the level at which protection should be adopted for an urban informal type structure
and a township type structure.
Curve B represents the level at which protection should be adopted for a suburban type structure.
Curve C represents the level at which protection should be adopted for a suburban structure with a single
buried service entering the structure.
Curve D represents a suburban structure which has a varying buried service with an overhead service of
no more than 200 m in length.
• For township structures: Lc > 250 m and
Ng > 7 flashes km-2
• Fo r u r b a n i n f o r m a l : L c > 5 0 0 m
and Ng > 3,5 flashes km-2;
(noting however, due to high housing
densities, that most Lc will be < 250 m)
• For traditional rural: Lc > 500 m and
Ng > 7 flashes km-2
In practice, such situations (combinations) are
not that common, as discussed later.
On the other hand, in analysis of the potential
risk of economic loss R4, the Wits analyses
are very clear in their overall conclusion that
the great majority of practical situations do
not warrant LV surge protection on economic
considerations. Application of SPDs is shown
to be potentially “cost-effective” (i.e. present
value in relation to the costs of such SPDs),
only when the relative costs of the internal
systems or equipment (cost of contents) are
themselves high.
For example, for the lowest cost of protection
assumed (R500), the Wits report indicates
that this would have economic benefit
in a suburban house only when the cost
of contents exceeds about R 40 000,
and then only in regions experiencing
Ng > 7 flashes km-2 and assuming at least
5 year life for such protection.
Appropriately therefore, where economic
risks are concerned, the Wits report
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concludes that “the final decision on
the application of surge protection for
electrical and electronic devices should
be the responsibility of the owner”. A better
criterion is likely to be the nuisance value
of equipment failure, or consequential
costs.
Implications and comments
Thus far, the Wits analyses have plainly
shown that there is no case for “mandatory”
surge protection on the basis of economic
risk considerations.
Where possible risk to human life is involved,
and taking the IEC tolerable level of 1x10-5
as a guide, then, as noted above, these
analyses indicate that protection should be
considered typically in regions experiencing
lightning ground flash densities Ng of about
6,5 - 7 flashes km-2 and above, and then
only when the individual incoming service
connections are longer than about 500 m.
(The latter, as an LV domestic feeder
distance, is itself rather long for most urban
and semi-urban - and even for many rural
- configurations).
The available data on regional ground
flash density variations across South Africa,
as determined originally by the CSIR and
consolidated later (in NRS 042-2004), as
summarised in the Wits report, show that
some 80% of all towns in the country
experience Ng < 7 flashes km-2 . Thus surge
protection is likely to be of interest only in
those remaining 20% of regions with higher
levels of Ng. Typically, these tend also to be
in more rural areas.
Undoubtedly, rural housing, especially
traditionally built structures, are likely to be
more vulnerable to lightning; often being
located in more exposed situations and
in some cases, in geographic areas with
higher ground flash density. Earlier studies
on lightning fatalities in South Africa over a
12-year period [7], found that 36% of all
fatalities – and 77% of all fatalities inside
structures – were in traditional rural huts. At
the time, the great majority of such housing
had no electrical services. So the lightning
risk in such situations is intrinsic (being due to
direct stroke risk) and is independent of any
possible incoming overvoltage surges. The
required protective measures therefore are
primarily against direct stroke hazard.
More generally, the Wits report could
usefully have discussed such issues as
comparative mortality rates, and / or the
comparative frequencies of practical
service connection configurations and
lengths, as helpful relativisation of the
calculation results and trends.
VIEWS, COMMENT AND OPINION
This is especially the case in considering
the IEC suggested level of 1x10 -5 as a
tolerable risk for human life. The same 12
year study on lightning incidents included
historical review of fatality rates over 50 years,
finding substantial reduction after about
1960 - 70, leading to mean mortalities of about
0,15 x10-5 for urban population centers and
0,8x10-5 for rural regions. To further put this
into perspective, one could also consider
other risks to human life, as in the following
examples for South Africa:
Annual average mortality rates
(refer to [8] – [11])
Electric current 0,1 x10-5
Drowning 1,4 x10-5
Smoke and fire 1,9 x10-5
Road accidents ± 25 x10-5
Murder ± 50 x10-5
Aids and related diseases ± 500 x10 -5
One must conclude that risks due to
lightning, even in exposed locations, are
not unduly high compared to many other
“common” hazard situations. And that there
are other circumstances in which corrective
or appropriately protective measures may
even more be warranted. Overall, in this
context the IEC suggested level of tolerable
risk is rather conservative.
Returning to the relative need for lightning
protection, the Wits analyses additionally
highlight a very important and fundamental
observation; namely, that the application of
overvoltage surge protection (SPD) alone
does not automatically reduce the total
risks to the structure (or to people). In many
cases, an external lightning protection
system (for direct strikes) is in fact the
primary requirement – also if the subsequent
application of SPD is to be effective. This is
comprehensively dealt with in IEC 62305
(as noted for example, in the Wits report in
section 6.3).
The report takes this theme further in
discussion of the relative risks to human life
in informal structures and some township
structures (e.g. in section 6.4), where it is
correctly stated that “the installation of
surge protection will not provide protection
against flashover within the structure
from a lightning surge”. This is due to the
fundamental need for appropriate earthing
and bonding measures. These aspects are
further emphasised in sections 10 and 11,
where it is generally concluded “that the
application of surge protection without
equipotential bonding and the (possible)
provision of some form of local earth
electrode would be of little benefit”. The
relative hazards of touch potential shock
to persons in a structure in the presence of
surge protection without correct earthing
or bonding, and the associated risk of
flashover, are also clearly shown in Annex
F to the report.
“Protection measures” therefore, as denoted
in Fig. 51 above from the report, should
thus plainly be understood to mean the
application of SPD in combination with the
appropriate external lightning protection
and earthing / bonding measures.
The additional costs of such external
lightning protection measures, and for
earthing and bonding provisions, were also
not included in the analyses of the relative
risks of economic loss and the cost / benefit
associated with surge protection – so the
economic case for SPDs becomes even
less convincing.
Concluding remarks
Accepting that the IEC methodology and
its application in these analyses should be
seen mainly as illustrating broad trends
(due to the inevitable simplifications and
generalizations), the Wits report still provides
a useful overview on the relative merits
of LV surge protection against lightning
hazard in SA.
It is clear that surge protection itself must
be dealt with as part of a fully integrated
approach to lightning protection; taking into
account external direct stroke protective
measures and ensuring appropriate
earthing and bonding measures – in line
with professional standards and guidance
[12], [13]. It is encouraging to see that
the commercial surge protection industry
(who would have the highest motivation to
promote SPD) themselves recognise both
the need for such an integrated approach,
as well as the relativisation of risk – as shown
in sample recommendations from a large
international supplier [14].
In many cases (especially in more vulnerable
structures in South Africa), installation of
SPD without ensuring all the additional
protective measures (i.e. external system
and earthing) would not significantly reduce
risk to human life.
Even without costing in such additional
measures, there is also only a very limited
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economic case for LV surge protection
measures.
The absolute risks associated with lightning
are relatively low compared to many
other hazards in normal life. Even when
considering a conservative level of tolerable
risk for human life, the relative exposure of
a majority of practical housing situations in
South Africa (> 80%) does not warrant the
application of LV surge protection – and
especially not without first ensuring primary
lightning protection measures.
Taking all such factors into account therefore,
the Wits analyses show that there is no case
for mandatory LV surge protection in local
domestic installations.
References
[1] see for example, IEC 60071 (1996-2006)
and IEC 60664 (2002–2005)
[2] Eriksson A. “The lightning ground flash – an
engineering study”. CSIR Special Report
ELEK 189, 1989.
[3] IEC 62305 “Protection against lightning”
Parts 1-5, 2006
[4] “Surge Protection in low voltage electrical
installations: risk analysis for South
Africa”; University of the Witwatersrand,
November 2006
[5] Kern A. et al; “The risk assessment calculator
as a simple tool for the application of the
standard IEC 62305-2” VIII International
Symposium on lightning protection;
November 2005.
[6] Bouquegneau C. “A critical view on
the lightning protection international
standard”; 27th International Conference
on lightning protection; September 2004
[7] Eriksson A and Smith M. “A study of lightning
fatalities and related incidents in Southern
Africa”; Trans SAIEE November 1986
[8] WHO Report on road traffic injur y
prevention, April 2004
[9] 7 t h U N S u r v e y o f c r i m e t r e n d s,
1998 – 2003.
[10] CIA World Factbook, December 2003.
[11] Statistics South Africa; “Adult mortality
1997 – 2004; September 2006
[12] see for example, SABS 0313 1999; “The
protection of structures against lightning”
as well as IEC 62305
[13] Eriksson A. et al. “A lightning protection
guide for electronic installations” CSIR
Special report ELEK 165, 1978
[14] Dehn + Söhne GmbH; “Lightning protection
guide” (www.dehn.de)
Contact Dr. Andrew Eriksson,
aeriksson@pop.agri.ch 