Mind Association

Review
Reviewed Work(s): Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted Psychology by Robert C.
Richardson
Review by: Sven Walter
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 118, No. 470 (Apr., 2009), pp. 523-527
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20532790
Accessed: 22-09-2018 22:26 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Mind Association, Oxford University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Mind

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Sat, 22 Sep 2018 22:26:07 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Book Reviews 523

Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted Psychology, by Robert C.

Richardson. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008. Pp. xi + 213. H/b $30.00,
?19.95.

Broadly speaking, evolutionary psychology is the attempt to supplement psy

chological theorizing with the central tenets of evolutionary biology. In the
narrow sense, it is an adaptationist programme trying to discover the psycho
logical mechanisms that underlie our current behaviour by regarding our
mind as an integrated collection of adaptations?traits present today because
they solved adaptive problems Homo sapiens recurrently encountered during
evolutionary time, like choosing a mate, detecting cheaters, recognizing emo
tional expressions, acquiring a language, remembering the location of edible
plants etc.
Evolutionary psychology in the narrow sense, as advocated by, for example,
David Buss, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby and Steven Pinker, is the target of
Richardson's book. At issue are the evolutionary credentials of evolutionary
psychology, not its quality as a psychological research programme. Richard
son's strategy is to examine 'what we would need to know in order to vindicate
the evolutionary claims of evolutionary psychology' (p. viii) and to see whether
we actually know or at least could know it. His verdict is negative: 'we are
unlikely ever to have the sort of evidence that would be required to make it
reasonable to embrace the hypotheses of evolutionary psychology' (p. 38). This
is particularly problematic, he ventures, because the claims of evolutionary
psychology have a social impact 'and, for theories that matter more, we should
expect better evidence' (p. 34). At the very least, we should expect from evolu
tionary psychologists the same kind of evidence we expect from evolutionary
biologists, and when measured by this standard, Richardson argues, evolution
ary psychology fails.
The controversial claim is not that our psychological faculties have evolved.
It is that they are adaptations, and, more specifically, adaptations for solving
particular adaptive problems. Richardson admits that psychological faculties
have evolved, and that some or even most of them may be adaptations; yet, he
insists, in some cases we just do not know enough to establish that they are
adaptations, and we rarely, if ever, know enough to establish that they are
adaptations for finding a mate, acquiring a language, engaging in social coop
eration etc. Consequently, Richardson's book centers around two questions:
what do we have to know in order to establish that a trait is an adaptation for
solving a particular adaptive problem, and can we know this for the traits dis
cussed by evolutionary psychologists?
To answer the first question, he discusses three approaches that are success
fully used to evaluate adaptationist explanations in evolutionary biology: (1)
reverse engineering, (2) adaptive thinking, and (3) comparative analysis.
(1) Reverse engineering: reverse engineering tries to infer the historical func
tion of an organism's traits from its current structure: one is 'beginning with
the "solution" and inferring what the ecological "problem" must have been if

Mind, Vol. 118 . 470 . April 2009 ? Mind Association 2009

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Sat, 22 Sep 2018 22:26:07 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
524 Book Reviews

those traits were to evolve' (p. 42). The difficulty is that current function under
determines historical cause. For instance, although structural considerations
suggest that the feathered wings of birds solve the aerodynamic problem of sus
taining flight, they are compatible with many other possibilities, and additional
information in fact reveals that feathers cannot be adaptations for flight
because they were present already in non-flying dinosaurs (p. 181). Hence,
'unless supplemented and augmented in a variety of ways [by information
regarding population structure, phylogenetic history, ecological conditions
etc.], considerations of design are inconclusive and likely misleading' (p. 52).
(2) Adaptive thinking: adaptive thinking 'begins with the ecological "prob
lems" an organism confronts and explains or infers the likely "solutions" based
on the problems' (p. 42). Again, such inferences must be supported by addi
tional information about: (i) selection (including the very fact of selection, its
strength, and the trait variation underlying it), (ii) ecological factors, (iii) her
itability, (iv) population structure, or (v) trait polarity (is the alleged adapta
tion a derived or a primitive trait?). We need not have detailed information on
all of these issues, but successful adaptationist explanations in evolutionary
biology require knowing at least something about some of them (pp. 99-104).
(3) Comparative analysis: adaptationist explanations can be confirmed or
disconfirmed by comparing 'a trait or behavior to phylogenetically related
ancestors and conditions' (p. 148). If a trait originated in a line for which its
alleged evolutionary function would have been irrelevant, the adaptationist
explanation is disconfirmed. Conversely, if a trait historically evolved more
than once in response to similar evolutionary environments, the adaptationist
explanation receives support.
According to Richardson, knowing these sorts of things is required in evolu
tionary biology to establish that a trait is an adaptation and what it is an adap
tation for. Since it 'is evolutionary biology that defines the context in which the
adaptive claims of evolutionary psychology should be assessed' (p. 37), this
leads to the second question: can we know these sorts of things for the traits
discussed by evolutionary psychologists?
(1) Reverse engineering: for psychological faculties we seem to lack the sup
plementary information needed to back the inference from structure to func
tion. In the case of Buss's research on the evolution of sex differences in
jealousy, for instance, we know nothing about group structure and size, mat
ing structures, similarities between ancestral and current group structures, or
the alleged differences in mating behaviour in ancestral groups (pp. 60-4). Yet,
it is only such knowledge that could disambiguate the ambiguous structural
information. Without it, inferring that sex differences between males and
females are adaptations to different adaptive problems 'is not a very compel
ling case of reverse engineering' (p. 64), and just as error-prone as the infer
ence that the feathers of birds are adaptations for flying.
(2) Adaptive thinking: something similar holds for the supplementary
information required in the case of adaptive thinking. Richardson discusses

Mind, Vol. 118 . 470 . April 2009 ? Mind Association 2009

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Sat, 22 Sep 2018 22:26:07 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Book Reviews 525

Pinker's research on language (pp. 124-32) and Cosmides and Tooby's

research on reasoning and social exchange (pp. 132-6). Although the little we
know about selection, ecology, heritability, population structure, and trait
polarity in these cases suggests that we are indeed dealing with adaptations,
he concludes, it is entirely silent on the question what language and reason
ing are adaptations for. Hence, '[e]ven given that human language or reason
ing is an adaptation ... we should not think we have explained the proposed
design with the sorts of general suggestions that are warranted' (p. 137).
(3) Comparative analysis: there are two problems with comparative analysis.
First, the phylogenetic information we have does not show decisively whether,
for example, our language and reasoning faculties indeed originated in the
Homo sapiens line. If anything, it suggests that they are features of a broader
taxonomic class, and if that is correct, then 'fi]f we treat these as specifically
human adaptations, for all we know we are focused on the wrong taxonomic
level' (p. 171). Second, since comparative analysis supports adaptationist expla
nations by showing that a trait historically evolved more than once in similar
evolutionary environments, the very uniqueness of human language and rea
soning makes them unsuited for such explanations (p. 166). Hence, Richard
son concludes, '[ujnderstood as an evolutionary hypothesis, what we are
offered by evolutionary psychologists is inadequate' (p. 169).
Richardson offers a detailed, biologically well-informed and interesting
analysis of the difficulties that arise when Darwinian reasoning is applied to
the human mind. In particular, he redirects our attention to Gould and
Lewontin's famous observation that adaptationist stories are too often too
uncritically acknowledged as true explanations. Yet, he goes far beyond a mere
rehearsal of the 'story telling charge' by showing in exquisite detail how expla
nations in evolutionary biology set a reasonable standard while 'the sort of
information that is available does not support the adaptive explanations com
mon within evolutionary psychology' (p. 158)?a point that has so far not
received lots of attention but definitely deserves to be taken seriously.
Evolutionary psychologists must either deny that they have to meet the
standards Richardson argues for, or hold that they actually can meet them.
The latter strategy is not very promising, given how little we know of the social
structure of our ancestors' families, groups and societies, the variation in their
psychological faculties, their heritability, and the relevant selection pressures.
(Of course we know that our ancestors had to find food, mates, secure sexual
and social relationships etc. but the explanations based on this are too vague
and indeterminate to establish the much more concrete claims made by evolu
tionary psychologists.)
What is left is thus to deny that the standards endemic to evolutionary biol
ogy have to be met. Evolutionary psychology may have other methods for sup
porting its evolutionary claims. One issue Richardson is woefully playing
down, for instance, is that adaptationist thinking has generated some surpris
ing predictions which, when tested psychologically, proved to be correct. Cos

Mind, Vol. 118 . 470 . April 2009 ? Mind Association 2009

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Sat, 22 Sep 2018 22:26:07 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
526 Book Reviews

mides and Tooby's hypothesis of a 'cheater detection module' or Silverman

and Eals's hypothesis of characteristic female superiorities in spatial abilities
are prime examples of cases where adaptive thinking led to empirical hypothe
ses that were later confirmed by psychological tests. The fact that this would be
unlikely were they merely just-so-stories that happen to be compatible with
the facts, one could argue, provides ample support even in the absence of
detailed knowledge of our ancestors' social and ecological environment. Of
course, this does not help with reverse engineering (like Margie Profet's expla
nation of pregnancy sickness as an adaptation for protecting the embryo
against maternal ingestion of toxins) and comparative analysis, since there no
predictions are made, but adaptive thinking seems to be the evolutionary psy
chologist's favoured strategy anyway (in fact, it is the one explicitly recom
mended by Cosmides and Tooby).
Richardson may respond that this does not warrant the claim that these fac
ulties are adaptations for detecting cheaters, or for solving different spatial
problems, given that to 'know the evolutionary explanation requires knowing
what something is an adaptation for?the conditions in response to which it
evolved' (p. 182). However, it is a legitimate question what else these faculties
should be. What evolutionary scenario could have lead to a faculty that allows
us to detect violations of conditional social contract rules? On the one hand, if
that trait is not even an adaptation, how else could it have come about? Rich
ardson repeatedly points out that ' [t]here are in fact many alternatives to adap
tive explanations that are fully evolutionary' (p. 58), but he never explains in
any detail how these alternatives could have led to the kind of traits studied by
evolutionary psychologists, and he never directly addresses the argument of
evolutionary psychologists that sufficiently complex structures must be due to
natural selection. On the other hand, if it is an adaptation, but not an adapta
tion for detecting violations of conditional social contract rules, what could it
possibly be an adaptation for that had this kind of side effect? There is simply
no remotely plausible alternative.
The point is: if our capacity to detect violations of conditional social
exchange rules is established by psychological experiments, if there are
grounds for thinking that it is an adaptation, and if we lack any remotely
plausible alternative hypothesis concerning what it could be an adaptation
for, then this seems to constitute good enough evidence for the evolutionary
psychologist's view of the matter, even if we lack the kind of knowledge we
have in biological cases. These are big 'ifs', of course. Even if they can be met
in a couple of paradigm cases, it is true that not even these (compared to evo
lutionary biology, lowered) standards are met often enough to warrant evolu
tionary psychologists' claims that our mind contains a vast number of specific
adaptations. This certainly limits the aspirations of evolutionary psychology
as a revolutionary research paradigm in psychology and the social sciences,
and rightly so, but it still leaves room to appreciate the better pieces of
research carried out under the label of 'evolutionary psychology'.

Mind, Vol. 118 . 470 . April 2009 Mind Association 2009

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Sat, 22 Sep 2018 22:26:07 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Book Reviews 527

For readers new to the debate, Richardson covers the basic theories, argu
ments, concepts, and some valuable background material. One may quibble
over the details, but the book is interesting and unlikely to lead anyone seri
ously astray. I agree with Richardson that some psychologists need to clean up
their methodology. Maybe many do. But that presumably holds for scientists
of all fields, and for the reasons just sketched, I do not think it shows that evo
lutionary psychology is irrevocably flawed. Evolutionary psychologists may be
able to make up for their weaknesses concerning the typical evolutionary evi
dence by offering a plausible overall package of biological, psychological, and
perhaps anthropological considerations that is empirically testable?if not
biologically, then psychologically.

Institute of Cognitive Science s ven Walter

University of Osnabr?ck
Albrechtstra?e 28
49076 Osnabr?ck
Germany
doi:io.i093/mind/fzpo45

Aristotle, by Christopher Shields. London: Routledge, 2007. Pp. xvi + 456.

H/b ?55.00, P/b ?14.99.

This book is one of the recent entries in the Routledge Philosophers series which
is advertised as aiming to 'place a major philosopher or thinker in historical
context, explain and assess their key arguments, and consider their legacy'.
When it comes to Aristotle, these three tasks are executed unevenly. The bulk
of Shields's book is dedicated to explaining and assessing Aristotle's key argu
ments; the historical context is outlined in the opening chapter ('Life and
Works'), and indicated occasionally through earlier doctrines that form the
backdrop against which Aristotle's views are introduced; and his legacy is rele
gated to the six and a half pages of the last chapter. The targeted readers of the
book?students of philosophy committed to expanding their basic knowledge
of Aristotle, and philosophers who teach introductory courses in which Aris
totle looms large?are likely to applaud such distribution of emphasis.
In the opening chapter Shields engagingly contrasts two opposed ancient
portraits of Aristotle, states the basic biographic facts, explains the structure of
the Aristotelian corpus, and makes some remarks that aim to prepare the
reader for coping with Aristotle's texts. The following two chapters set out the
fundamentals of Aristotelian philosophy. The second and longest chapter in
the book ('Explaining Nature and the Nature of Explanation') presents Aristo
tle's four-cause conception of explanation. The pair matter and form, that is,
the material and the formal cause, is soundly presented as a reply to the Eleatic
arguments against change; and it is extended into a discussion of the corre
sponding pair of familiar Aristotelian terms, potentiality and actuality. The

Mind, Vol. 118 . 470 . April 2009 ? Mind Association 2009

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Sat, 22 Sep 2018 22:26:07 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms