Lecture 1: Tuesday, January 16

The need for a new philosophy of society. Foundational issues.

Why this course is not a conventional course in the philosophy of the social
sciences.
Reading: Chs. 1, Intentionality; Hollis, Ch.1: Introduction: problems of
Structure and Action.

Lecture 2: Thursday, January 18

Basic theory of intentionality.

Lecture 3: Tuesday, January 23

Structure of human action
Reading: Ch.3, Intentionality
Steven Lukes, “Methodological Individualism Reconsidered”

Lecture 4: Thursday, January 25

Intentional Causation.
Readings: Ch., Intentionality,
Paper topics #1 handed out.

Lecture 5: Tuesday, January 30

Collective Intentionality.
Reading: Ch. 5, Intentionality

Lecture 7: Thursday, February 1

Collective intentionality; social facts
Reading: “Collective Intentions and Actions,” Searle
Durkheim, “Social Facts”

Lecture 8: Tuesday, February 6

Foundational notions in social ontology. 1) Collective Intentionality, 2) The
assignment of function, 3) Constitutive rules
Reading: Chs.1—2, Construction of Social Reality

Lecture 9 Thursday, February 8

Language as constitutive of social reality.
Reading: Ch.3,. Construction of Social Reality

Lecture 10: Tuesday, February 13

Status functions as deontic powers
Reading: Ch.4—6, Construction of Social Reality
Lecture 11: Thursday, February 15
Social Background.
Paper #1 due

Lecture 12: Tuesday, February 20

Rationality and social rationality Weaknesses of the classical model.
Reading: Chs.1 and 3 Rationality in Action
Lukes, “Some Problems about Rationality”
Follesdal, “ The Status of Rationality Assumptions
Elster, “The nature and scope of rational choice explanations
Becker

Lecture 13: Thursday, February 22

Rationality. What is a reason for an action?
Reading Rationality in Action Ch 4

Lecture 14: Tuesday, February 27

Human social rationality as essentially involving desire-independent reasons for
action.
Readings: Ch.6 Rationality in Action, “Internal and External Reasons,” B.
Williams, Paper topics #2 handed out

Lecture 15: Thursday, March 1

Free will as the presupposition of rationality. Can this presupposition be
justified?
Readings: Ch. 9 Rationality in Action

Lecture 16: Tuesday, March 6

Movie: Berkeley in the sixties.
Reading: Hollis: Ch.2 Discovering Truth the Rationalist Way

Lecture 17: Thursday, March 8

The Berkeley experience as a laboratory study of status functions.
Reading: Hollis: Ch.3 Positive Science

Lecture 18: Tuesday, March 13

Explanation of social phenomena. The appeal and the weaknesses of the
deductive nomological model.
Reading
Hempel, The Function of General Laws in History”
Davidson “Pyschology as Philosophy”
Lecture 19: Thursday, March 15
Deductive Nomological explanations, continued
Readings: Hollis, Ch.5 “Systems and Functions”

Lecture 20: Tuesday, March 20

Explanation of social phenomena. Functional explanation.
Readings
Hempel, “The logic of functional analysis”
Dore “Function and Cause”
Elster, Functional Explanation : In Social Science
Paper #2 due

Lecture 21, Thursday, March 22

Explanation of social phenomena. Interpretative versus naturalistic accounts.
Reading
Taylor “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man”
Martin, “Taylor on Interpretation and the Sciences of Man”
Hollis, Ch.9, “Explaining and Understanding.”

March 26-30: Spring Break

Lecture 22: Tuesday, April 3

The unity of science and social explanation
Reading
Fodor “Special Sciences” Ch 44
Paper topics #3 handed out

Lecture 23: Thursday, April 5

Applications of the theory: human rights

Lecture 24: Tuesday, April 10

Applications of the theory: why socialism failed

Lecture 25: Thursday, April 12

Applications of the theory: political power

Lecture 26: Tuesday, April 17

Political power continued

Lecture 27: Thursday, April 19

Objectivity and Social Explanation
Reading
Weber “Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy”
Taylor :Neutrality in Political Science”

Lecture 28: Tuesday, April 24

Further discussion of applications of the Theory

Lecture 29: Thursday, April 26

Paper #3 due

Lecture 30: Thursday, April 28

Applications of the theory continued.

Lecture 31: Tuesday, May 1

Review

Lecture 32: Thursday, May 3

Last Lecture: Review

Final exam: Thursday, May 17, 8-11am

Books

Hollis, M., The Philosophy of Social Science, Cambridge University Press, 1994
Searle, J.R., The Construction of Social Reality, Free Press, 1995.
Searle, J.R., Intentionality, Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Searle, J.R., Rationality in Action, MIT press, 2001.

Reader (available at CopyMat)

Becker, G., “Economic Approach to Human Behavior”

Davidson, D., “Psychology as Philosophy”
Dore, R., “Function and Cause”
Durkeim, E., “Social Facts”
Elster, J., “Functional Explanation in Social Science”
Fodor, J., “Special Sciences”
Føllesdal, D., “The Status of Rationality Assumptions”
Hempel, P., “The Function of General Laws in History”
Hempel, P., “The Logic of Functional Analysis”
Lukes, S., “Methodological Individualism Reconsidered”
Lukes, S., “Some Problems about Rationality”
Martin, M., “Taylor on Interpretation and the Sciences of Man”
Searle, J.R., “Collective Intentions and Actions”
Taylor, C., “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man”
Taylor, C., “Neutrality in Political Science”
Weber, M., “Objectivity and Social Science and Social Policy”
Williams, B., “Internal and External Reasons”